THE TRUE INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE:
THE FIRST PART
WHEREIN
All the REASON and PHILOSOPHY of ATHEISM is Confuted,
AND
Its IMPOSSIBILITY Demonstrated.

WITH
A DISCOURSE concerning the True Notion of the LORD's SUPPER;
AND
Two SERMONS, on 1 John II. 3, 4. and 1 Cor. XV. 57.

By RALPH CUDWORTH, D.D.

THE SECOND EDITION:
In which are now first added REFERENCES to the several Quotations in the Intellectual System; and an Account of the Life and Writings of the Author:

By THOMAS BIRCH, M.A. and F.R.S.

LONDON:

M DCC XLIII.
TO THE
Right Reverend Father in GOD,

JOSEPH,
Lord Bishop of Bristol,
AND
Dean of St. Paul's.

My Lord,

The Value of the present Work is so universally acknowledg'd, that to offer any thing here in recommendation of it, might seem equally to reflect upon your Lordship's Judgment, as on the Character of the excellent Author. It will be a sufficient Honour and Satisfaction to me, to have contributed in any measure to the Improvement of the Intellectual System, and to the spreading a Performance, one of the noblest of the last Age, and at least as necessary to the present, for supporting the grand Foundations of all Religion and Virtue, against Ignorance, Sophistry, and every pernicious Effect of Vice and Sensuality upon the human Understanding. Such a Design,
DEDICATION.

Sign, I persuade myself, wants no Apology, especially to a person, whose Writings display the Evidence, and whose Character exemplifies the Beauty and Dignity of Christianity. I shall therefore only add, that, upon these accounts, I am, with the highest Esteem and Veneration,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's most obedient

and most humble Servant,

London
Novemb. 6.
1742.

THOMAS BIRCH.
Advertisement to the Reader.

The former Edition of the *Intellectual System*, tho' the most valuable Treasure of the ancient Theology and Philosophy extant in any Language, had one considerable Defect, (frequent amongst even the best Writers of the last Age,) that the References of its numerous Quotations were very few, and those obscure and imperfect. Such as were wanting are therefore supplied in the present Edition with the utmost exactness, chiefly from Dr. Laurence Mosheim's Latin Translation of this Work, and placed at the Bottom of the Page; those of the Author being still left in the Margin, with proper Additions, included in [ ] to render them more clear and determinate.

The Dedication to the House of Commons in 1647, of the Sermon on 1 John ii. 3, 4. omitted in the second and third Editions, is restored likewise from the first.

To the whole is prefix'd a new Life of the Author, wherein is given a very particular Account of his several excellent Works still in Manuscript, as well as of those already published.
An ACCOUNT of the LIFE and WRITINGS of Ralph Cudworth, D.D.

DR. Ralph Cudworth was son of Dr. Ralph Cudworth, at first Fellow of Emanuel College in the University of Cambridge, and afterwards Minister of St. Andrew's Church in that town, and at last Rector of Aller in Somersetshire, and Chaplain to King James I. He died in August or September 1624. Though he was a man of Genius and Learning, he published only a Supplement to Mr. William Perkins's Commentary upon St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, of which, as well as several other works of that Divine, he was Editor.

Our Author's Mother was of the family of Machell, and had been nurse to Prince Henry, eldest son of King James I. and after Dr. Cudworth's death, married to Dr. Stoughton. Our Author himself was born at Aller in the year 1617, and educated with great care by his father-in-law Dr. Stoughton, and in 1630, was admitted pensioner in Emanuel College, the Doctor giving him this testimony, that he was as well grounded in school-learning as any boy of his age, that went to the University. July 5, 1632, he was matriculated as a student in the University, and applied himself to all parts of literature with such vigour, that in 1639, he was created Master of Arts with great applause. Soon after he was chosen Fellow of his college, and became an eminent Tutor there, and had at one time eight and twenty pupils; an instance scarce ever known before, even in the largest Colleges of the University. Among these was Mr. William Temple, afterwards famous for his embassies and writings. Not long after, he was presented to the Rectory of North Cadbury in Somersetshire, worth three hundred pounds per annum.

In 1642 he published a Discourse concerning the true Notion of the Lord's Supper. It was printed at London in quarto, with only the initial letters of his.

* See Dr. John Laurence Mosheim's Preface to his Latin translation of Dr. Cudworth's Intellectual System. The Pages of this Preface are not numbered.


‖ Mosheim, ubi supra.
his name. Bockart, Spencer, Selden, and other eminent writers quote this discourse with great commendations; and my most ingenious and learned friend Mr. Warburton, in a Letter of excellent Remarks upon our Author, which he fupport'd me with, styles it a master-piece in its kind; and observes that he has undoubtedly given the true nature and idea of the Sacrament, and supported it with all his learning. The fame year likewise appeared his treatife intituled, The Union of Chrif and the Church a Shadow, by R. C. printed at London in quarto.

He took the degree of Batchelor of Divinity in the year 1644, upon which occasion he maintained at the Commencement in the University the two following Theses: I. Dantur boni & mali rationes aeternæ & indiſpensabiles: II. Dantur substantia incorporeæ suæ naturæ immortales. Hence it appears, that even at that time he was examining and revolving in his mind thofe important fubjects, which he fo long afterwards clear'd up with fuch uncommon penetration in his Intellectual Syltem, and other works ftill preferv'd in manuscript.

In the fame year 1644, he was appointed Master of Clare-Hall in Cambridge, in the room of Dr. Paske, who had been ejecuted by the Parliamentary Visitors. In 1645, Dr. Metcalfe having reign'd the Regius professorhip of the Hebrew tongues, Mr. Cudworth was unanimously nominated on the 15th of October by the seven Electors to succeed him. From this time he abandon'd all the functions of a Minifter, and applied himself only to his academical employments and fudies, efpecially that of the Jewish antiquities. And we find the following paffage in a manuscript letter of Mr. John Worthington, afterwards Master of Jesus College, dated May 12 1646. "Our learned friend Mr. Cudworth reads every Wednesday in the schools. His fubjeft is "Templum Hierofolymitanum." When his affairs required his absence from the University, he fubstituted Mr. Worthington in his room. March 31, 1647, he preach'd before the Houfe of Commons at Wemfliner, upon a day of public humiliation, a fermon upon John ii. 3, 4. for which he had the thanks of that Houfe returned him on the fame day. This fermon was printed the fame year at Cambridge in quarto, with the following motto in the title-page, "Εκνιφήν, ἡ τιμων ὁ γὰρ ἱεράς ἡγεμόν ἤκριβέναις καὶ αἰνιγμοὶ: and with a Dedication to the Houfe of Commons, which was omitted in the fecond and third editions, but refotred in the preffent. In 1651 he took the degree of Doctor of Divinity. Tho' the places, which he held in the University were very honourable, yet he found the revenue of them not sufficient to support him; for which reafon he had thoughts of leaving Cambridge entirenly, and indeed actually retir'd from it, tho' but for a short time. This appears from two manuscript letters of Mr. Worthington; the former dated January 6, 1651, where he writes thus: "If thro' want of maintenance he (R. C.) "should be forced to leave Cambridge, for which place he is fo eminenfly "accomplifhed with what is noble and exemplarily academical, it would "be an ill omen." In the latter dated January 30. 1651, is this paffage: "After many toffings Dr. Cudworth is, thro' God's provi- "dence, returned to Cambridge, and fettled in Chrif's College, and by his "marriage more fettled and fixed." For upon the deceafe of Dr. Samuel

Boſton,
Bolton, Master of that college, in 1654, our Author was chosen to succeed him, and married the same year. In this station he spent the rest of his life, proving highly serviceable to the University and the whole Church of England. In January 1657 he was one of the persons nominated by a committee of the parliament to be consulted about the English translation of the Bible; as appears from the following passage of Whitelocke*.

January 16th. At the grand Committee for religion, ordered, that it be referred to a sub-committee to send for and advise with Dr. Walton, Mr. Hughes, Mr. Caftell, Mr. Clark, Mr. Poulk, Dr. Cudworth, and such others as they shall think fit; and to consider of the translations and impressions of the Bible, and to offer their opinions therein to this Committee; and that it be especially commended to the Lord Commissioner Whitelocke to take care of this Business.

"This committee, says Whitelocke, often met at my house, and had the most learned men in the oriental tongues to consult with in this great business, and divers excellent and learned observations of some mistakes in the translations of the Bible in English; which yet was agreed to be the best of any translation in the world. I took pains in it; but it becamefruitless by the parliament's dissolution."

Our Author had a great share in the friendship and esteem of John Thurloe Esq; Secretary of State to the Protectors Oliver and Richard Cromwell, who frequently corresponded with him, and consulted him with regard to the characters of such persons in the University, as were proper to be employ'd in political and civil affairs. For which purpose Dr. Cudworth wrote, among others, the following letter †.

"Honoured Sir,

"I must in the first place crave your pardon for the delay of this my second Letter thus long, (for, I suppose, you have receiv'd my former in answer to yours,) which, had not some unavoidable occasions hindered me, had come sooner to your hands. Sir, I think there are divers men in the University at this time, of singular parts and accomplishments for learning; some of which are so farre engaged in divinity, that they cannot well divert themselves to other professions or employments; others perhaps so much addicted to a contemplative life, that they could not so well apply themselves to political and civil affairs. But for those, which I conceive to be more free and undetermined, I shall here present you with a catalogue of some of their names, such as I conceive best qualified for civil employments. First, Mr. Page, a Fellow of King's Colledge, an excellent Latinist, and one, that hath travelled abroad for above ten yeares together. He is above 40 yeares of age; but how he hath been or is affected to the Parliament or present government, I cannot tell. He is now absent from the Univercity, and, I think, at present with the Earle of Devonshire. Secondly, Dr. Bagge, Fellow of Cajus College, and Doctor of Phyfick, a singularly good and ready Latinit; and I believe there is none of his yeares in England equal to him in the profession of phyfick. He hath excellent parts, but I know not certainly, whether being

† Thurloe's manuscript State-Papers Vol. XXXVIII. p. 259.
of Ralph Cudworth, D.D.

"So eminent in that way (though a very young Doctor) he would put himselfe upon State-employment; neither do I fully know how he is affected: There are of Trinity College severall, that are very good Latiniasts, and well furnished with all the politer Learning; as Mr. Valentine (a sober discreet Man) and Mr. Linne (well known for an excellent Poet.) Mr. Mildmay of Peter-houfe, one, whose inclination seems to be peculiarly carried out towards Politicall and Civill employments, a Scholar and a discreet man.

Mr. Croone of Emanuell Colledge, a young Master of Arts, of excellent good parts, and a general scholar.

Mr. Miles, Fellow of Clare-hall, formerly my pupil; one that hath no mind to professe Divinity, but a very good Scholar, and also a junior Master of Arts.

Lastly of Christ-Colledge there is a young Man, that is Master of Arts this yeare, one Mr. Leigle, that for his standing is very well accomplished, and I doubt not but in a very little time would exceedinge fitte for any such employment, as you would designde him for.

Many more names I could set down; but these may suffice for your choice; and you may, if you think it good, enquire further concerning any of them from some others, and, if you please, from this Gentleman, whom I have for that purpose desired to present this to you, Mr. George Rust *, Fellow of Christ-Colledge, who can further enforme and satisfy you concerning them. He is an understanding, pious, discreet man, and himselfe I know to bee a Man of exceeding good Parts, and a general Scholar, but one that seemes not so willing to divert himselfe from Preaching and Divinity, which he hath of late intended; otherwise I know his parts are such, as would enable him for any Employment.

If you please to enquire further from him, and by him signify your further pleasure to me, I shall be ready in this or any other thing els, that I am able, to expresse my selfe,

"Sir,

"Your affectionately devoted Freind and Servant,

R. Cudworth."
Sir,

Having this opportunity offered by Doctor Selater, who desires to waite upon you, upon your kind invitation, which I acquainted him with, I could do no less then accompany him with these few lines to prevent my service to you. I am perswaded, you will be well satisfied in his ingenuity, when you are acquainted with him. Now I have this opportunity, I shall use the freedom to acquaint you with another busines. I am perswaded by friends to publish some Discourses, which I have prepared in Latin, that will be of a polemicall nature in defense of Christianity against Judaism, explaining some chief places of Scripture controverted between the Jewes and us, (as Daniel's prophecy of the 70 Weekes, never yet sufficiently cleared and improved) and withall extricating many difficulties of Chronologie. Which take I the rather undertake, not only because it is suitable to my Hebrew Profession, and because I have lighted on some Jewish writings upon the argument, as have scarcely ever been seen by any Christians, which would the better enable me fully to confute them; but also because I conceive it a worke proper and suitable to this present age. However, though I should not be able myselfe to be any way instrumental to these great transactions of Providence (not without cause, hoped for of many) amongst the Jewes; yet I perswade myselfe my pains may not be alltogether unprofitable for the setting and establishing of Christians; or at least I shall give an account of my spending such vacant hours, as I could redeem from my preaching and other occasions, and the perpetual distractions of the Burfarship, which the Statutes of this College impose upon me. It was my purpose to dedicate these fruits of my studies to his Highnes, (to whose noble father I was much obliged) if I may have leave, or presume so to doe; which I cannot better understand by any than yourselfe, if you shall think it convenient, when you have an opportunity to informate any such thing, which I permitte wholly to your prudence. I intend God willing, to be in London some time in March; and then I shall waite upon you to receve your information. In the mean time craving pardon for this proximity of mine, and freedome, I subscribe myselfe

Your really devoted Friend and humble Servant,

R. Cudworth.

The Discourse concerning Daniel's Prophecy of the LXX Weeks, mention'd in this letter, and which is still extant in manuscript, is highly commended, by Dr. Henry More in his Preface §. 18. p. xvi. to his Explanation of the grand Mystery of Godliness, printed at London 1660. in fol. where he observes, that Dr. Cudworth in that Discourse, which was read in the publick Schools of the University, had undeceive'd the world, which had been mislead too long by the overgreat opinion they had of Scaliger; and that taking Funcccus's Epocha, he had demonstrated the manifestation of the Messiah to have fallen out at the end of the
the sixty-ninth week, and his Passion in the midst of the last, in the most natural and proper sense thereof; "which demonstration of his is of as much price and worth in Theology, as either the Circulation of the Blood in Phys- sic, or the Motion of the Earth in natural Philosophy."

Upon the Restauration of King Charles II. he wrote a Copy of Verses, publish'd in Academia Cantabrigiensiis ΣΩΣΤΡΑ, sine ad Carolum II. reducens de Regnis ipsis, Mythos per ipsum restitutis, Gratulationi, printed at Cambridge 1660 in quarto. In 1662 he was presented by Dr. Gilbert Sheldon, Bishop of London, to the Vicarage of Abowell in Hertfordshire, * to which he was admitted on the first of December that year.

In the beginning of the year 1665 he had a design to publish a Discourse concerning Moral Good and Evil, as appears from the following extracts of Letters written by him and by Dr. Henry More Fellow of his College †.

Dr. Cudworth in a Letter to Dr. John Worthington, January 1664.

"You know, I have had this Design concerning Good and Evil, or natural Ethics, a great while; which I begun above a year agoe, (when I made the first Sermon in the Chapel about the argument) to study over anew, and dispatch a discourse about it. No man had so frequently exhort me to it, and so earnestly, as this friend,—But about three months since unexpectedly he told me on a sudden, he had begun a discourse on the same argument. The next day in writing I imparted my mind more fully and plainly to him. Whereupon he came to me, and told me, he would speak with me about it after a day or two. So he did; and then excused the business; that he could not tell, whether I would dispatch and finish it or no, because I had been so long about it; that Mr. Fullwood and Mr. Jenks had solicited him to do this; and that you were very glad, that he would undertake it. But now he understood I was resolved to go through with it, he was very glad of it; that he would desist, and throw his into a corner. All this I impart to you privately, because a common friend. I have not spoken to any body else but Mr. Standish, and something to Mr. Jenks and Fullwood."

Dr. II. More in a Letter to Dr. Worthington, January 24. 1664.

"I understand by Mr. Standish's letter, that he awares speaking to the Matter of my Enchiridion Ethicum, he shew'd again his disgust, &c.—that if I persisted in the resolution of publishing my book, he would desist in his, though he had most of it then ready to send up to be licensed that week. I pray you, spur him up to let his to the prefs. For my part, it is well known, I have no designe at all but to serve the publick; and that I enter'd upon the task extreamly against my own will; and yet I have finish'd it all but a chapter. Whether, or when, I shall publish it, I shall have leisure enough to consider."

Dr.

* Newcourt, Repertorium, Vol. II. p. 462. fevlor of Rhetorick in Gresham College.
† Communicated by my very learned Friend, Mr. John Ward, F.R.S. and Pro-

Dr. Cudworth.
An Account of the Life and Writings

Dr. More in a Letter to Dr. Worthington, Feb. 7. 1664.

"Some few friends at Cambridge were exceeding earnest with me to write a short Ethicks, alledging no small reason for it. I did not only heartily reject them more than once, but with great zeal, if not rudeness, alledging several things, which were too long to write, indeed in a manner vilifying the project, preferring Experience of Life before all such fine Systems; alledging also, that Dr. Cudworth had a design for the greatest curiosity of that subject. But nothing would content them but my setting upon the work; that it was uncertain, when Dr. Cudworth's would come out; and besides, mine being a small treatise, running through the whole body of Ethicks, they would not interfere one with another. For my part, till I had by chance told Dr. Cudworth of my purpose, (which I did simply, thinking nothing) and how many chapters I had finisht, I knew nothing either of the time, or the scope of his writing; or if he intended a general Ethicks. But the effect of those Friends earnestness (to tell you plainly how the case stood) was this: A day or two after their last importunity, I waking in the morning, and some of their weightiest allegations recurring to my mind; and also remembering, with what an excessive earnestness one of them solicited me to this work (in which I thought there might be something more than ordinary, and that he was actuated in this business I knew not how,) I began seriously to think with myself of the matter; and at last was so conscientiously illaquated therein, that I could not absolutely free myself therefrom to this very day. Nor was this only an act of mere conscience, but of present self-denial. For it did very vehemently cross other great and innocent pleasures, that I promised myself in a certain order of my studies, which I had newly proposed to myself at that very time. But when I was once engaged, I proceeded not without some pleasure."

Dr. More, in a Letter to Dr. Worthington, May 10. 1665.

"I thank you for your freedom both to him and to me. It never came into my mind to print this Enchiridion, till his book was out, unless he would have professed his like of the project. I have new transcribed it all. Mr. Jenks and Mr. Fulkwood are exceeding earnest to see it, and would transcribe it for their present satisfaction. But if they should do so, and it be known, it would, it may be, disappoint Dr. Cudworth, whom I am very loth any way to grieve. But if you'll have a mind to see it, and could get a fair and true copy transcrib'd of it, I would willingly pay the Transcriber, and the Copy should be yours; for I am loth, that what I have writ on so edifying a subject, should be lost."

Irreligion began now to lift up its head; but the progress of it was opposed by no person with greater force and learning than by our Author. For this purpose in 1678, he publish'd at London, in folio, his True Intellectual System of the Universe: The first Part, wherein all the Reason and Philosophy of Atheism
of Ralph Cudworth, D.D.

Atheism is confuted, and its Impossibility demonstrated. The Imprimatur by Dr. Samuel Parker, Chaplain to Archbifhop Sheldon, is dated May 29, 1671, seven years before the publication of this Work; which met with great opposition from some of the Courtiers of King Charles II. who endeavoured to destroy the reputation of it, when it was first publish'd *. Nor has it elcep't the cenfures of Writers of different parties fince that time.

The first Piece, which appear'd againft it, was from a Roman Catholic, in a Letter to Mr. R. Cudworth, D.D. printed at the end of a Tract, intitled, Anti-Hamau, or an Answer to Mr. G. Burnet's Mystery of Iniquity unlaved: wherein is shew'd the Conformity of the Doctrine, Worship, and Practice of the Roman-Catholic Church with thofe of the pureft times; the Idolatry of the Pagans is truly stated, and the Imputation of Pagan Idolatry clearly confuted; and the Reasons are given, why Catholics avoid the Communion of the Protestant Church. To which is annex'd a Letter to R. Cudworth D.D. by W.E. Student in Divinity. With leave of Superiors; 1679 in octavo. This Writer attacks Dr. Cudworth's afertion, that tho' very few of the antient Philosophers thought God to be corporeal, as Epicurus, Strato, &c. yet that the greatest part of them believed him to be a pure Spirit, and adored the only true God under the names of Jupiter, Minerva, Osiris and Venus. In opposition to which his Antagonift maintains †, "that all Pagans (nay all "men) had naturally a knowledge of the true God, yet those, they adored; ", were Men:" in fupport of which he urges four proofs taken, 1. from the 

"divinity of their Sexes: 2. from their Generation: 3. from their Death: 4. from their Rites. He likewise attempts to confute what Dr. Cudworth has strenuously defended throughout his Book, that the Unity of God was a prime Article of the Pagan Creed.

But let us now fee, in how severe a manner he was treated even by a Protestant Divine, Mr. John Turner, in his Discourse of the Messiah ||. He tells us ‡, we must conclude Dr. Cudworth to be himfelf a Tritheiftic, a fall, for which, I believe, he may have a kindness, because he loves hard words; or something else without either trick or trick, which I will not name, because his Book pretends to be written againft it. And again |||, that "the moft, that Charity itself can "allow the Doctor, if it were to step forth, and speak his moft favourable "character to the world, is, that he is an Arian, a Socinian, or a Deift."

Mr. Dryden likewise tells us **, that our Author "has rais'd fuch strong "objections againft the being of a God and Providence, that many think he "has not answered them." And the late Earl of Shaftesbury, in his Moralifts, a Rhapsody ††, has the following paffage: "You know the common fate "of tho'fe, who dare to appear fair Authors. What was that pious and "learned man's cafe, who wrote the Intellectual Syftem of the Universe? I "confefs, it was pleafant enough to confider, that the whole world were "no lefs satisfied with his Capacity and Learning, than with his Sincerity in "the

* Vile Joannis Clerici Vitam, ed. ann. 1714, p. 129 Ed. Amphi. 1711. in octavo.
† P. 334, &c.
‡ P. 17. |||| P. 19.

** Dedication of his Translation of Virgil's

†† Part. 11. Sect. 1. Characteriticæ Vol. II.
"the Cause of the Deity; yet was he accused of giving the upper hand to the "Atheists, for having only stated their reasons and those of their Adversaries "fairly together."

Such was the treatment, which our great Author receiv'd for his immortal Volume; wherein, as Mr. Warburton says *, with a Boldness uncommon indeed, but very becoming a Man conscious of his own Integrity, and of the Truth and Evidence of his cause, he launch'd out into the immensity of the Intellectual System; and at his first essay penetrated the very darkest recesses of Antiquity, to strip Atheism of all its disguises, and drag up the lurking Monster to Conviction. Where tho' few readers could follow him, yet the very slowest were able to unravel his secret purpose—to tell the world—that he was an Atheist in his heart, and an Arian in his Book. However, thus ran the popular clamour against this excellent person. Would the reader know the consequence? Why, the Zealots inflam'd the Bigots:

'Twas the time's plague, when madmen led the blind:
The silly calumny was believ'd; the much injured Author grew disfigusted; his Ardour slackened; and the rest and far greatest part of the Defence never appear'd. The same Gentleman likewise, in his Letter to me above cited, observes, that among the other excellencies of this Work "all his Translations from "the Greek Writers are wonderfully exact, and a vast judgment and pene-"tration shewn in explaining their sense."

In 1706 there was publish'd at London, in two Volumes in quarto, an Abridgment of the Intellectual System under this title: *A Confutation of the Reason and Philosophy of Atheism*: being in a great measure either an Abridgment, or an Improvement, of what Dr. Cudworth offered to that purpose in his true Intellectual System of the Universe. Together with an Introduction, in which, among accounts of other matters relating to this Treatise, there is an impartial Examination of what that learned Person advanced touching the Christian Doctrine of a Trinity in Unity, and the Resurrection of the Body. By Thomas Wife B. D. Fellow of Exeter-College in Oxford, and Chaplain to his Grace the Duke of Ormond.

In the Introduction Mr. Wife styles Dr. Cudworth's Book the vaftest Magazine of Reasoning and Learning, that ever singly appear'd against Atheism; and then examines his Notions concerning the Trinity and the Resurrection of the Body. With regard to the former, he observes, that Dr. Cudworth having laid down a general Proposition, that the Heathens universally held but one unmade independent God, comes to shew, that the Platonists in particular maintained an Unity of the Godhead in their three divine Hypostases, viz. Monad or Good, Mind, and Soul, notwithstanding that they owned these three Hypostases to be numerically distinct, or to have distinct singular Essences of their own. To vindicate the Platonists in this point, he tells us, that the antient orthodox Fathers of the Christian Church were generally of no other persuasion than this, that that Essence or Substance of the Godhead, which all the three persons or hypostases agree in, as each of them is God, was not one singular or individual, but only one common or universal Essence or Substance.

"This," says Mr. Wife, and other assertions of the like nature in Dr. "Cudworth's Intellectual System," have made so much noise in the world, that

* Preface to the second Volume of his Divine Legation of Moys, p. x, xi, xii.
there has hardly been a pamphlet or book written for some years about the
blessed Trinity, especially in England, and in the heterodox way, which
does not bring in Dr. Cudworth upon the stage, and vouch his name and
quotations for its purpose. While on the other hand, the truly Orthodox
(cho’ often thro’ a misunderstanding of his sense) do aim at his Doctrine as
a mark of their Invectives; and others, who call themselves also by that
name, entertaining no little veneration for the very words used by the an-
tient Fathers, especially when repeated and revived by so learned a person
as Dr. Cudworth, and resolving whatever should come of it, to stand by
them, have unhappily fallen into a kind of Tritheism.” Mr. Wife therefore endeavours, as much as possible, to clear up and justify our Author’s Doc-
trine. However, Mr. Robert Nelson, in his Life of Bishop Bull *, declares, that
Dr. Cudworth’s Notion with regard to the Trinity was the same with Dr. Samuel Clarke’s, and represents it in the following terms; That the three Persons of the Trinity are three distinct spiritual Substances, but that the Father alone is truly and properly God; that he alone in the proper sense is supreme; that absolute supreme Honour is due to him only; and that he, absolutely speaking, is the only God of the Universe, the Son and Spirit being God but only by the Father’s concurrence with them, and their subordination and subjection to him. But to return to Mr. Wife; he next considers our Author’s opinion about the Resurrection, who, as appears from several passages of his Intellectual System, thought, that the Resurrection-body will not consist of the same substance with that, which was buried; and that it will not be a body of flesh, but an ethereal one; and that the present body is only a feed of the Resurrection. However Mr. Wife shews from other passages in his Works, that he has as plainly asserted the Resurrection of the same numerical Body, as in some places he has denied it.

In the year 1703, &c. Monsieur Le Clerc gave large extracts of the Intellectual System in his Bibliothæque Chosie, Tom. I. II. III. V. VII. VIII. IX. which engag’d him in a dispute with Monsieur Bayle, concerning Dr. Cudworth’s Notion of Plastic Natures. Monsieur Bayle, in his Continuation des Pensées diverses sur les Comètes †, had observed, that “the Atheists are very
much perplex’d, how to account for the Formation of Animals, which they
affirib’ed to a cause, which was not conscious of what it did, and yet followed
a regular Plan, without knowing according to what laws it went to work.
“ But Dr. Cudworth’s Plastic Nature, and Dr. Grew’s Vital Principle ‡ are
“ exactly in the same case; and thus they take away the whole strength of
“ this objection against the Atheists. For if God could communicate such
“ a plastic power, it follows, that it is not inconsistent with the nature of
“ things, that there be such agents. They may therefore exist of themselves,
“ will the adversary say; whence it would also follow, that the regularity,
“ which we observe in the universe, may be the effect of a blind cause,
“ which was not conscious of what it did.” Mr. Bayle however own’d, that Dr. Cudworth and Dr. Grew were not aware of the consequence, which,

* §. LXI. p. 539, 542. edit. London. 1714.
† Tom. I. §. 21.
‡ See Dr. Nehemiah Grew’s Cosmologia Sacra, printed at London, 1701. in folio.
An Account of the Life and Writings

according to him, followed from their system. Monsieur Le Clerc return'd an answer in the fifth Volume of his Bibliotheca Choise; wherein he observ'd, that the plastic or vital Natures, which those two Writers admit, cannot in the least favour the Atheists; because those nature are only instruments in the hand of God, and have no power nor efficacy, but what they receive from him, who rules and directs all their actions. That they are only instrumental causes produced and employ'd by the chief and first Cause; and that it cannot be said, that a palace has been built up without art, because not only hammers, rules, saws, &c. but even the arms of men, which made use of these instruments, are destitute of knowledge. It is sufficient, that the mind of the Builder directed all these things, and employ'd them in the Execution of his Design. It is therefore plain, that the Atheists, who deny the Being of an intelligent Cause, cannot retort the argument of Dr. Cudworth and Dr. Grew upon them. Monsieur Bayle, in his answer, endeavour'd to shew, that if these Writers had consider'd the plastic Natures only as instruments in the hand of God, this System would have been expos'd to all the difficulties, to which the Cartesian hypothesis is liable, and which they intend to avoid. That therefore we must suppose their opinion to have been, that these Natures are active Principles, which do not want to be continually let on and directed; but that it is sufficient, if God does put them in a proper situation, and superintend their actions, to set them right, if it be necessary. This being the case, Monsieur Bayle pretends, that the Argument may be retorted against those Writers. For, says he, since when the order and regularity of this world are all'd as a proof of the Being of a God, it is supposed, that a Being cannot produce a regular work, without having an idea of it; yet, according to Dr. Cudworth, the plastic Natures, which produce plants and animals, have not the least idea of what they do. If it be answer'd, that they have been created with that faculty by a Being, who knows all, and whose Ideas they only put in execution; the Stratonician will reply, that if they do it only as efficient Causes, this is as incomprehensible as that, which is objected to him; since it is as difficult for any Being to perform a scheme, which it does not understand, but which another endow'd, as it is to perform a scheme, which no Being at all has any notion of. Since you acknowledge, will the Stratonician say, that God could endow some Creatures with a power of producing excellent works, tho' without any knowledge; you must also confess, that there is no necessary connection between the power of producing excellent works, and the idea and knowledge of their essence, and of the manner of producing them: consequently you ought not to affert, that these things cannot subsist separately in nature, and that nature cannot have of it self, what, according to you, the plastic Beings received from God. In short, Monsieur Bayle ask'd, whether these Writers maintain'd, that the Plastic and Vital Natures are only passive instruments in the hand of God, as Monsieur Le Clerc seem'd to suppose by his Comparison of an Architect. Monsieur Le Clerc answer'd, that, according to Dr. Cudworth, the plastic Natures were not passive.

* p. 28, &c.
+ Hist. des Ouvrages des Savans. Art. 422.
1764. Art. 7. p. 385, &c.
of Ralph Cudworth, D.D.

passive instruments; but that they are under God's direction, who conducts them, tho' we cannot explain after what manner. Nor can the Atheists, added he, retort the argument, because God is the author of the regularity and order, with which the Plastic Natures act; whereas, according to the Atheists, Matter moves of itself, without any Cause to direct it, and to give it a power of moving regularly. This dispute was carried on still further, with some warmth, and a great many repetitions on both sides. But what has been said is sufficient to give the reader a notion of this controversy, for the progress of which he may consult the following Books: Histoire des Ouvrages des Scavans. Decemb. 1704. Art. 12. Bibliotheque Choisie, Tom. VII. Art. 7. Reponse aux Questions d'un Provincial, Tom. III. Chap. 179. Bibliotheque Choisie, Tom. IX. Art. 10. Reponse pour Mr. Bayle a Mr. Le Clerc, p. 31. annex'd to the fourth Volume of the Reponse aux Quei. d'un Provincial. —

Upon the whole, Mr. Warburton, in his Letter to me above cited, is of opinion, that our Author's "Plastic Life of Nature is fully overthrown by "Monseur Bayle, —whole superiority in that dispute with Monseur Le "Clerc, is clear and indiscutable."

Monseur Le Clerc * expresses'd his wishes, that some Man of Learning would translate the Intelletual System into Latin; but this design, tho' resolv'd upon and attempted by several persons in Germany †, was never executed till the Year 1733, when Dr. Mosheim published his Translation of it under the following title: RADULPHI CUDWORTH THEologiae Doctoris, & in Academiâ Cantabrigiensi Professoris, Systema Intelletualis physis Universi, seu de veris Natura Rerum originibus Commentarii; quibus omnis eorum Philosophia, quia Deum esse negant, sanitatis vertitur. Accedit reliquia ejus Opera. Ioannes Laurentius Molhemius, Theologiae Doctor, ferenissimi Ducis brunsenensis à Confi月中 Rerum sanctiorum, Abbas Caxniborum Vallis S. Marie & Lapidis S. Michaelis, omnia ex Anglico Latinè vertit, recensuit, variis Observationibus & Dissertationibus illustravit, & auxit. Jenae, 2 Volumes in folio. Dr. Mosheim, in his Preface, represents the difficulties of translating this work to be very great; and observes some Mistakes, which Monseur LeClerc has committed with regard to the sense of our Author in his Extracts in the Bibliotheque Choisie. Monseur Boudelet, a Member of the French Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres, had begun a Translation of the Intellectual System into French, but was prevented from completing it by his death, which happened in May 1717.

But to return to our Author: in 1678, he was install'd Prebendary of Gloucester ‡. He died at Cambridge June 26, 1688. and was inter'd in the Chapel of Christ's College, with the following Inscription on his Monument:

"Here lieth the Body of Dr. Ralph Cudworth, late Master of Christ's "College, about thirty Years Hebrew Professor, and Prebendary of Gloucester. "He died the 26th of June 1688, in the seventy-first Year of his Age." He

† See Dr. Mosheim's Preface.
He was a Man of very extensive Learning, excellently skill'd in the learned Languages and Antiquity, a good Mathematician, a subtle Philosopher, and a profound Metaphysician. He embraced the Mechanical or Corpuscular Philosophy; but with regard to the Deity, Intelligences, Genii, Ideas, and in short the Principles of human Knowledge, he followed Plato, and even the latter Platonists *. A great number of Writers commend his Piety and Modesty; and † Bishop Burnet having observ'd, that Dr. Henry More studied to consider Religion as a Seed of a Deform Nature, and in order to this, fet young Students much on reading the antient Philosophers, chiefly Plato, Tully, and Plotin, and on considering the Christian Religion as a Doctrine sent from God both to elevate and sweeten human Nature, tells us, that " Dr. Cudworth " carried this on with a great Strength of Genius, and a vast Compass of " Learning;" and that " he was a Man of great Conduct and Prudence; " upon which his Enemies did very falsely accuse him of Craft and Diffimu- " lation." The late Earl of Shaftesbury ‡ styles him an excellent and learned "Divine, of highest Authority at home, and Fame abroad.

Beside his Sermon on 1 John ii. 3, 4, above-mentioned, he publish'd likewise another on 1 Cor. xv. 57. the third Edition of both which was printed at London 1676, in folio.

He left several posthumous Works, most of which seem to be a Continu- nation of his Intellectual System, of which he had given the world only the first Part. One of these was publish'd by Dr. Edward Chandler, Bishop of Durham, at London, in 1731, under this Title; A Treatise concerning eternal and immutable Morality. In the Preface † to which the Bishop ob- serves, that in this Book our Author " proves the falseness of the Conse- quences with respect to natural Justice and Morality in God, which are de- ducible from the Principles of those, that maintain the second sort of Fate, denominated by him Theologic. And thus it may be reckoned to be a sequel in part of his first Book against Material Fate. Had it come abroad as early as it was written, it had served for a proper Antidote to the Poison in some of Mr. Hobbes's and others Writings, who reviv'd in that Age the exploded Opinions of Protagoras and other antient Greeks, and took away the essential and eternal Discriminations of moral Good and Evil, of just and unjust, and made them all arbitrary Productions of divine or human Will. Against the antient and modern Patrons of this Doctrine, no one hath writ better than Dr. Cudworth. His Book is indeed a Demonstration of the truth of the contrary Opinion, and is drawn up with that Beauty, Clearness, and Strength, as must delight as well as convince the Reader, if I may judge of the affection of others from the effect it had on me. It will certainly give a just Idea of the Writer's good Sense, as well as vast Learning. We are not certain, that this Treatise is quoted so perfect as the Author design'd it; but it appears from the Manuscript, that he transcribed the best part of it with his own hand, as if it was speedily to have been sent to the Press."
of Ralph Cudworth, D. D.

The Titles and Subjects of the rest of our Author's Manuscripts are as follow:
A Discourse of moral Good and Evil in several Folios, containing near 1000 Pages.

Heads of the Chapters of one of those Books.


2. Objections against Morality, p. 11.
3. Answers to the first Objection, p. 29.
4. Answer to the second and third Objection, p. 45.
5. Inconsistencies with a Common-wealth, p. 49.
7. The sixth and seventh Objections answer'd, p. 112.
8. Pleasure; wherein the ancient Hedonic Philosophy is explain'd, and it is largely debated, whether Pleasure is the Sumnum Bonum, p. 117.
9. Answer to the ninth Objection, p. 175.
11. Happiness; and the Philosophy of Epicurus concerning it examined and refuted, p. 253.
13. Refult of the former Discourse; incorporeal Substance Deity, p. 303.
15. Objections against Liberty. Τὸ ἀγαθόν Χαράματος.

Heads of another Book of Morality, wherein Hobbes's Philosophy is explain'd. Prolegomena; to shew, that if nothing is naturally just or unjust, nothing can be made so. Chap. 2. Not by Laws. Chap. 3. Not by Laws of Nature.

A Discourse of Liberty and Necessity, in which the Grounds of the atheistical Philosophy are confuted, and Morality vindicated and explained. This Book contains 1000 pages in folio.

Heads of the Chapters of one of the Books.

Chap. 1. The Necessity of all human Actions ascertained by three sorts of Men, and in different ways: first, some Christian Theologers of the latter age: secondly, the old Zenonian Stoics: thirdly, the Democritical Physiologers or atheistical Fatalists, p. 1.
3. The Stocical Fatalists pleading, p. 70.
4. Atheistical Fatalists pleading, p. 84.
5. Answer to the Phenomena objected, p. 119.
7. Of Intelllection, p. 196.
An Account of the Life and Writings


Heads of the Chapters of another Book De libero Arbitrio.
1. Dreams. 2. Indifferences. 3. General Account. 4. Particular or full Account. 5. Definition and particular Account. 6. An Imperfection not formally in God. 7. Arguments to prove such a thing. 8. That that, which rules all, is not ἀδίκων ἀπατώτατος, but πένθω λαπρός. 9. Answer to the objection, καθώς ἀνωτέρω. 10. Contingences. 11. Argument for Necessity, taken from the Nature of God.

Upon Daniel's prophecy of the LXX Weeks, wherein all the Interpretations of the Jews are considered and confused, with several of some learned Christians. In two Volumes in Folio.

Of the Verity of the Christian Religion against the Jews. Dr. Cudworth mentions this in his MSS. but it is not yet found.

A Discourse of the Creation of the World, and Immortality of the Soul, in 8vo.

Hebrew Learning.


Our Author had several sons, who probably died young, but he left one daughter, Damaris, who was second wife to Sir Francis Masham, of Oates in the County of Essex, Bart. * by whom she had a son, the late Francis-Cudworth Masham Esq. †, one of the Masters of the high Court of Chancery, and Accountant General of the said Court, and foreign Appofer in the Court of Exchequer. This Lady had a great friendship with Mr. Locke, who died at her house at Oates, where he had resided for several years before. She was distinguished for her uncommon genius and learning; and in the year 1696 publish'd at London in 12°, without her name, A Discourse concerning the Love of God. She introduces this Tract with observing, that 'whatever reproaches have been made by the Romanists, on the one hand, of the want of books of devotion in the Church of England, or by the Dissenters, on the other, of a dead and lifeless way of preaching, it may be affirmed, that there cannot any where be found so good a collection of discourses on moral subjects, as might be made of English sermons, and other treatises of that nature, written by the Divines of our church. Which books are certainly in themselves of the greatest, and most general use of any; and do most conduce to that, which is the chief aim of Christianity, a good Life.' She then animadverts upon those, who undervalue morality, and others, who strain the duties of it to an impracticable pitch, and pretend to ascend by it to something beyond or above it *; and afterwards proceeds to consider the conduct of those, who build their practical and devotional Discourses upon Principles, which will not bear the test, but which oblige them to lay down such affections of Morality, as sober and well-disposed Christians cannot understand to be practicable **. And here

* He died at his seat at Oates on Sunday the 5d of March 1704, in the 37th year of his age.
† He died May 17th, 1731.
‡ It contains 125 pages, besides the preface.
\# Pag. 2, 3.
\* P. 5, 6.
\** P. 7.
here she applies herself to the examination of Mr. John Norris's * Scheme in
his Practical Discourses and other Treatises, wherein he maintains, that
“mankind are obliged strictly, as their duty, to love, with desire, nothing
“but God only, every degree of desire of any creature whatsoever being
“sinful;” which assertion Mr. Norris defends upon this ground, that
God, not the creature, is the immediate efficient cause of our Sensations; for
whatever gives us pleasure, has a right to our love; but God only gives us
pleasure; therefore he only has a right to our love. This hypothesis is
considered with great accuracy and ingenuity by Lady Masham, and the bad
consequences of it represented in a strong light. Her Discourse was translated
into French by Mr. Peter Cole, and printed at Amsterdam in 1705. She
lies buried in the cathedral church of Bath, where a monument is erected
to her memory with the following inscription:

"Near this place lies Dame DAMARIS MASHAM, daughter of
Ralph Cudworth D. D. and second Wife of Sir Francis Masham of Oates in
the County of Essex Bart. who to the Softness and Elegancy of her own
Sex, added several of the noblest Accomplishments and Qualities to the
other.
"She possessed these Advantages in a degree unusual to either, and tem-
pered them with an Exactness peculiar to herself.
"Her Learning, Judgment, Sagacity, and Penetration, together with her
Candour and Love of Truth, were very observably to all, that conversed with
her, or were acquainted with those small treatises she published in her
life-time, tho’ she industriously concealed her Name.
"Being Mother of an only Son, she applied all her natural and acquired
Endowments to the care of his Education.
"She was a strict Observer of all the Virtues belonging to every Station
of her Life; and only wanted Opportunities to make these Talents shine in
the world, which were the Admiration of her Friends.
"She was born on the 18th of January 1658, and died on the 20th of
April 1708.”

* This Divine borrowed his hypothesis from Father Mallebranche.
To the Right Honourable

HENEAGE

LORD FINCH,

BARON OF DAVENTRY,

Lord High CHANCELLOR of England,

and one of His MAJESTY's most

Honourable Privy Council.

My Lord,

THE many Favours I have formerly received from You, as they might justly challenge, whenever I had a fit opportunity, a publick and thankful Acknowledgment; so have they encourag'd me at this time, to the Presumption of this Dedication to your Lordship. Whom, as your perspicacious Wit, and solid Judgment, together with Your acquired Learning, render every way a most accomplished and desirable Patron; so did I persuade my self, that your hearty Affection to Religion, and Zeal for it, would make you not unwilling, to take that into your Protection, which is written wholly in the Defence thereof; so far forth, as its own Defects, or Miscarriages, should not render it incapable of the same. Nor can I think it probable, that in an Age of so much Debauchery, Scepticism, and Infidelity, an Under-
taking of this kind should be judged by You useless or unseasonable. And now, having so fit an Opportunity, I could most willingly expatiate in the large Field of your Lordship’s Praises; both that I might do an Act of Justice to your self, and provoke others to your Imitation. But I am sensible, that as no Eloquence, less than that of your own, could be fit for such a Performance; so the Nobleness and Generosity of your Spirit is such, that you take much more Pleasure in doing praise-worthy things, than in hearing the repeated Echo’s of them. Wherefore instead of pursuing Encomiums, which would be the least pleasing to your self, I shall offer up my Prayers to Almighty God, for the Continuation of your Lordship’s Life and Health; that so his MAJESTY may long have such a loyal Subject and wise Counsellor; the Church of England such a worthy Patron; the High Court of Chancery such an Oracle of impartial Justice; and the whole Nation such a Pattern of Virtue and Piety. Which shall ever be the hearty Desire of,

MY LORD,

YOUR LORDSHIP’S

Most Humble, and

Most Affectionate Servant,

R. CUDWORTH.
THE
PREFACE
TO THE
READER.

THOUGH, I confess, I have seldom taken any great pleasure, in reading other men’s apologies, yet must I at this time make some my self. First therefore, I acknowledge, that when I engaged the pref, I intended only a discourse concerning Liberty and Necessity, or to speak out more plainly, against the fatal necessity of all Actions and Events; which, upon whatsoever grounds or principles maintain’d, will (as we conceive) serve the design of Atheism, and undermine Christianity, and all religion, as taking away all guilt and blame, punishments and rewards, and plainly rendering a day of judgment ridiculous; and it is evident, that some have pursued it of late, in order to that end. But afterwards we consider’d, that this, which is indeed a controversy concerning the True Intellectual System of the Universe, does, in the full extent thereof, take in other things; the necessity of all actions and events being maintained by several persons, upon very different grounds, according to that tripartite Fatalism, mentioned by us in the beginning of the first chapter. For first, the Démocritick Fate is nothing but the material necessity of all things, without a God, it supposing senseless matter, necessarily moved, to be the only original and principal of all things: which therefore is called by Epicurus, the Physiological; by us, the Atheistick Fate. Besides which, the Divine Fate is also bipartite; some Theists supposing God, both to decree and do all things in us (evil as well as good) or by his immediate influence to determinate all actions, and to make them alike necessary to us. From whence it follows, that his will is no way regulated or determined by any essential and immutable goodness and justice; or that he hath nothing of moral-ality in his nature, he being only arbitrary Will omnipotent. As also that, all good and evil moral, to us creatures, are more theical or positive things;
The PREFACE

v&mu, and not φυσιν, by law or command only, and not by nature. This therefore may be called the Divine Fate immoral, and violent. Again, there being other divine Fatalists, who acknowledge such a Deity, as both suffers other things, besides itself, to act, and hath an essential goodnes and justice in its nature, and consequently, that there are things, just and unjust to us naturally, and not by law and arbitrary constitution only; and yet nevertheless take away from men all such liberty, as might make them capable of praise and dispraise, rewards and punishements, and objects of distributive justice; they conceiving necessity to be intrinsical to the nature of every thing, in the actions of it, and nothing of contingency to be found any where: from whence it will follow, that nothing could possibly have been otherwise, in the whole world, than it is. And this may be called the Divine Fate moral, (as the other immoral,) and natural, (as the other violent;) it being a concatenation, or impplexed series of causes, all in themselves necessary, depending upon a Deity moral, (if we may so speak) that is, such as is essentially good, and naturally just, as the head thereof; the first contriver, and orderer of all. Which kind of Divine Fate, hath not only been formerly asserted by the Stoics, but also of late by divers modern writers. Wherefore of the three fatalisms, or false hypotheses of the universe, mentioned in the beginning of this book; one is absolute Atheism; another immoral Theism, or religion without any natural justice and morality; (all just and unjust, according to this hypothesis, being meer theoretical or factitious things, made by arbitrary will and command only;) The third and last such a Theism, as acknowledges not only a God, or omnipotent understanding Being, but also natural justice and morality, grounded in him, (and derived from him;) nevertheless, no liberty from necessity anywhere, and therefore no distributive or retributive justice in the world. Whereas these three things are (as we conceive) the fundamentals or essentials of true religion. First, that all things in the world do not float without a head and governour; but that there is a God, an omnipotent understanding Being, presiding over all. Secondly, that this God being essentially good and just, there is φυσιν, καλα τα κακα δικαιον, something in its own nature, immutably and eternally just, and unjust; and not by arbitrary will, law, and command only. And lastly, that there is something ἱστορικα, or, that we are so far forth principles or masters of our own actions, as to be accountable to justice for them, or to make us guilty and blame-worthy for what we do amiss, and to deserve punishment accordingly. Which three fundamentals of religion, are intimated by the author to the Hebrews in these words; be that cometh to God, must believe, that he is, and that he is a rewarder of those who seek him out. For to seek out God here, is nothing else, but to seek a participation of his image, or the recovery of that nature and life of his, which we have been alienated from. And these three things, namely, that all things do not float without a head and governor, but there is an omnipotent understanding Being presiding over all; that this God, hath an essential goodness and justice; and that the differences of good and evil moral, honest and dishonest, are not by mere will and law only, but
but by nature, and consequently, that the Deity cannot act, influence, and
necesitate men to such things, as are in their own nature evil; and lastly,
that necessity is not intrinsic to the nature of every thing, but that men
have such a liberty, or power over their own actions, as may render them
accountable for the same, and blame-worthy when they do amiss; and con-
sequently, that there is a justice distributive of rewards and punishments
running through the world: I say, these three, (which are the most impor-
tant things, that the mind of man can employ itself upon) taken all to-
gether, make up the wholeness and entireness of that, which is here called by
us, The True Intellectual System of the Universe, in such a sense, as Atheism
may be called a false System thereof; the word Intellectual being added,
to distinguish it from the other, vulgarly so called, Systems of the World,
(that is, the visible and corporeal world) the Ptolemaick, Tychonick, and
Copernick; the two former of which are now commonly accounted false,
the latter true. And thus our prospect being now enlarged into a threefold
fatalism, or spurious and false hypothesis of the Intellectual System, making
all things necessary upon several grounds; we accordingly designed the con-
futation of them all, in three several books. The first, against Atheism,
(which is the Democratick fate) wherein all the reason and philosophy
thereof is refelled, and the existence of a God demonstrated; and so that
much another, or material necessity of all things, overthrown. The second, for
such a God, as is not meer arbitrary will omnipotent, decreeing, doing, and
necesitating all actions, evil as well as good, but essentially moral, good
and just; and for a natural disjrimen bonorum & turpium, whereby anoth-
er ground of the necessity of all human actions will be removed. And the
third and last, against necessity intrinsic and essential to all action, and for
such a liberty, or sui-poteftas, in rational creatures, as may render them ac-
countable, capable of rewards and punishments, and so objects of distributive
or retributive justice; by which the now only remaining ground, of the fatal
necessity of all actions and events, will be taken away. And all these three
under that one general title of The True Intellectual System of the Universe;
each book having, besides, its own particular title: as, against Atheism;
for natural Justice and Morality, founded in the Deity; for Liberty from
Necessity, and a distributive Justice of Rewards and Punishments in the world.
And this we conceive may fully satisfy, concerning our general title, all
those, who are not extremely critical or captious, at least as many of them
as ever heard of the astronomical systems of the world; so that they will
not think us hereby obliged, to treat of the hierarchy of angels, and of all
the several species of animals, vegetables, and minerals, &c. that is, to write
de omni ente, of whatsoever is contained within the complexion of the uni-
verse. Though the whole scale of Entity is here also taken notice of; and
the general ranks of substantial beings, below the Deity (or Trinity of Di-
vine hypostases) consider'd; which yet, according to our philosophy, are
but two; souls of several degrees, (angels themselves being included within
that number) and body or matter; as also the immortality of those souls
proved. Which notwithstanding is suggested by us, only to satisfy some
men's
The PREFACE

men's curiosity. Nevertheless, we confess, that this general title might well have been here spared by us, and this volume have been presented to the reader's view, not as a part or piece, but a whole compleat and entire thing by it self, had it not been for two reasons; first, our beginning with those three Fatalisms, or false hypotheses of the Intellectual System, and promising a confutation of them all then, when we thought to have brought them within the compafs of one volume; and secondly, every other page's, throughout this whole volume, accordingly bearing the inscription of book the firft upon the head thereof. This is therefore that, which, in the firft place, we here apologize for, our publishing one part or book alone by it self, we being surprized in the length thereof; whereas we had otherwise intended two more along with it. Notwithstanding which, there is no reason, why this volume should be therefore thought imperfect and incomplete, because it hath not all the three things at firft designed by us, it containing all that belongeth to its own particular title and subject, and being in that respect no piece, but a whole. This indeed must needs beget an expectation of the two following treatises, (especially in such as shall have received any satisfaction from this firft,) concerning those two other Fatalisms, or false hypotheses mentioned; to make up our whole Intellectual System compleat: the one to prove, that God is not mere arbitrary Will omnipotent, (without any essential goodness and justice) decreeing and doing all things in the world, as well evil as good; and thereby making them alike necessary to us; from whence it would follow, that all good and evil moral are mere thermal, positive, and arbitrary things, that is, not nature, but will: which is the defence of natural, eternal immutable justice, or morality. The other, that necessity is not intrinsic to the nature of every thing, God and all creatures, or essential to all action; but, that there is something of it, or, that we have some liberty, or power over our own actions: which is the defence of a distributive or retributive justice, dispensing rewards and punishments throughout the whole world. Wherefore we think fit here to advertifie the reader concerning these, that though they were, and still are, really intended by us; yet the compleat finishing and publication of them will notwithstanding depend upon many contingencies; not only of our life and health, the latter of which, as well as the former, is to us very uncertain; but also of our leisure, or vacancy from other necessary employments.

In the next place, we must apologize also for the fourth chapter; inasmuch as, though, in regard of its length, it might rather be called a book, than a chapter, yet it doth not answer all the contents prefixed to it. Here therefore must we again confess our selves surprized; who, when we wrote those Contents, did not suspect in the leaf, but that we should have satisfied them all within a lesser compass. And our design then was, besides answering the objection, against the naturality of the idea of God, from the Pagan polytheism, (we having then to fit an occasion) to give such a further account of the idolatry and religion of the Gentiles, as might prepare our way for a defence of Christianity, to be subjoined in the close; it being not only agreeable to the sense of ancient doctors, but also expressly declared in the Scripture,
Scripture, that one design of Christianity was to abolish and extirpate the Pagan polytheism and idolatry. And our reasons for this intended defence of Christianity were: First because we had observed, that some professed opposers of atheism, had either incurred a suspicion, or at least suffered under the imputation, of being mere Theists, or natural Religion its only, and no hearty believers of Christianity, or friends to revealed Religion. From which either suspicion or imputation therefore we thought it juste to free our selves, we having so unshaken a belief, and firm assurance of the truth of the whole Christian Doctrin. But, secondly and principally, because we had further observed it to have been the method of our modern Atheists, to make their first assault against Christianity, as thinking that to be the most vulnerable; and that it would be an easy step for them, from thence, to demolish all religion and theism. However, since the satisfying the former part of those contents had already taken up so much room, that the pursuit of the remainder would have quite excluded our principally intended confutation of all the atheistical grounds; the forementioned objection being now sufficiently answered, there was a necessity, that we should there break off, and leave the further account of the Pagan Idolatry and Religion, together with our Defence of Christianity, to some other more convenient opportunity.

And now we shall exhibit to the reader's view a brief and general synopsis of the whole following work, together with some particular reflections upon several parts thereof, either for his better information concerning them, or for their vindication; some of which therefore will be of greater use, after the book has been read, than before. The first chapter is an account of the Atomick physiologe, as made the foundation of the Democritick fate. Where the reader is to understand, that this Democritick fate, which is one of the three false hypotheses of the Intellectual System, there mentioned, is the very self-same thing with the Atomick atheism, the only form of atheism, that hath publickly appeared upon the stage, as an entire philosophick system, or hath indeed been much taken notice of in the world for these two thousand years past. For, though it be true, That Epicurus, (who was also an Atomick Atheist, as is afterwards declared, having, in all probability, therefore a mind to innovate something, that he might not seem to have borrowed all from Democritus,) did by violence introduce liberty of will into his hypothesis; for the solving whereof he ridiculously devised, that his Third Motion of Atoms, called by Lucretius

---Exiguum Clinamen Principiorum:

yet was this, as Cicero * long since observed, a most heterogeneous patch, or assumentum of his, and altogether as contradictory to the tenor of his own principles, as it was to the doctrine of Democritus himself. There can be nothing more absurd, than for an Atheist to assert liberty of will; but it is most of all absurd, for an atomick one. And therefore our modern Atheists do here plainly disclaim Epicurus, (though otherwise so much admired by them,) and declare open war against this liberty of will; they apprehending

* De Nat. Deor. L. t. c. 25.
their busines, nor prove defensible, and therefore would attempt to carry on this cause of atheifm, in quite a different way, by the life and perception of matter; as also that this, in all probability, would ere long publickly appear upon the stage, though not bare-faced, but under a disguise. Which atheifick hypothesis is partly confuted by us, in the clofe of this chapter, and partly in the fifth.

In the next place, it being certain, that there had been other philofophick Atheifts in the world before thofe Atomicks, Epicurus and Democritus; we declare, out of Plato and Ariftotle, what that moft ancient atheifick hypothesis was; namely, the eduction of all things, even life and understanding it felf, out of matter, in the way of qualities, or as the passions and affections thereof, generable and corruptible. Which form of atheifm is styled by us, not only Hylopathian, but alfo Anaximandrian: however, we grant some probability of that opinion, that Anaximander held an Homeoeconomy of qualified atoms, as Anaxagoras afterwards did; the difference between them being only this, that the latter afferted an unmade mind, whereas the former generated all mind and understanding out of thofe qualified Atoms, hot and cold, moist and dry, compounded together; becaufe we judged this difference not to be a fufficient ground to multiply forms of atheifm upon. And here do we give notice of that strange kind of religious atheifm, or atheifick Theogonism, which afferted, not only other understanding beings, fuperior to men, called by them Gods, but alfo, amongst thofe, one fupreme or Jupiter too; nevertheless native, and generated at firft out of Night and Chaos, (that is, fenecefs matter,) as alfo mortal and corruptible again into the fame.

Besides which, there is yet a fourth atheifick form taken notice of, out of the writings of the ancients, (though perhaps junior to the reft, it seeming to be but the corruption and degeneration of Stoicifm) which concluded the whole world, not to be an animal, (as the Pagan Atheifts then generally supposed) but only one huge plant or vegetable, having an artificial, plantal; and plafick nature, as its higheft principle; orderly difposing the whole, without any mind or understanding. And here have we fet down the agreement of all the atheifick forms, (however differing fo much from one another) in this one general principle, viz. that all animality, confeious life and understanding, is generated out of fenecefs matter, and corruptible again into it.

Wherefore in the clofe of this third Chapter, we infift largely upon an artificial, regular, and plafick nature, devoid of exprif knowledge and understanding, as subordinate to the Deity; chiefly in way of confutation of thofe Cosmo-plafick and Hylozoick atheifms. Though we had a further design herein alfo, for the defence of Theifm; forasmuch as without fuch a nature, either God muft be fuppoled to do all things in the world immediately, and to form every gnat and fly, as it were, with his own hands; which feemeth not fo becoming of him, and would render his providence, to human apprehentions, laborious and diffticult; or else the whole fystem of this corporeal universe muft refult only from fortuitous mechanifm, without the direction of any mind: which hypothesis once admitted, would unque-
unquestionably, by degrees, supplant and undermine all Theism. And now, from what we have declared, it may plainly appear, that this digression of ours concerning an artificial, regular and plattick nature, (subordinate to the Deity) is no wen, or excrescency in the body of this book; but a natural and necessary member thereof.

In the fourth chapter; after the idea of God fully declared, (where we could not omit his essential goodness and justice, or, if we may so call it, the morality of the Deity, though that be a thing properly belonging to the second book, the confutation of the divine fate immoral) there is a large account given of the Pagan polytheism; to satisfy a very considerable objection, that lay in our way from thence, against the naturalness of the idea of God, as including oneliners and singularity in it. For had that, upon enquiry, been found true, which is so commonly taken for granted, that the generality of the Pagan nations had constantly scattered their devotions amongst a multitude of self-existent, and independent deities, they acknowledging no sovereign Numen; this would much have stumbled the naturalness of the divine idea. But now it being, on the contrary, clearly proved, that the Pagan theologers all along acknowledged one sovereign and omnipotent Deity, from which all their other gods were generated or created; we have thereby not only removed the forementioned objection out of the way, but also evinced, that the generality of mankind have constantly had a certain proleptis or anticipation in their minds, concerning the actual existence of a God, according to the true idea of him. And this was the rather done fully and carefully by us, because we had not met with it sufficiently performed before; A. Stenetus Eugubinus having laboured most in this subject, from whose profitable industry though we shall no way detract, yet whoever will compare what he hath written, with ours, will find no just cause to think ours superfluous and unnecessary, much less, a transcription out of his. In which, besides other things, there is no account at all given of the many pagan, poetical, and political gods, what they were; which is so great a part of our performance, to prove them really to have been but the polyonymy of one God. From whence it follows also, that the Pagan religion, though sufficiently faulty, yet was not altogether so nonessential, as the Atheists would represent it, out of design, that they might from thence infer all religion to be nothing but a meer cheat and imposture; they worshipping only one supreme God, in the several manifestations of his goodnless, power, and providence throughout the world, together with his inferior ministers. Nevertheless we cannot deny, that being once engaged in this subject, we thought our selves the more concerned to do the business thoroughly and effectually, because of that controversy lately agitated concerning idolatry, (which cannot otherwise be decided, than by giving a true account of the Pagan religion;) and the so confident affirmations of some, that none could possibly be guilty of idolatry, in the Scripture sense, who believed one God the Creator of the whole world; whereas it is most certain, on the contrary, that the Pagan polytheism and idolatry consisted not in worshipping many creators, or uncreated, but in giving religious worship
to creatures, besides the Creator; they directing their devotion, (as Athanasius * plainly affirmeth of them,) in oμενις, καὶ πολλής γεννοίς, to one uncreated only; but, besides him, to many created gods. But as for the polemick management of this controversy, concerning idolatry, we leave it to other learned hands, that are already engaged in it.

Moreover, we have, in this fourth chapter, largely insisted also upon the Trinity. The reason whereof was, because it came in our way, and our contents engaged us thereunto, in order to the giving a full account of the Pagan theology; it being certain, that the Platonicks and Pythagoreans at least, if not other Pagans also, had their Trinity, as well as Christians. And we could not well avoid the comparing of these two together: upon which occasion we take notice of a double Platonick trinity; the one furious and adulterated, of some latter Platonists; the other true and genuine, of Plato himself, Parmenides, and the ancients. The former of which, though it be opposed by us to the Christian Trinity, and confuted, yet betwixt the latter and that, do we find a wonderful correspondence; which is largely pursued in the Platonick Christian apology. Wherein, notwithstanding, nothing must be looked upon, as dogmatically asserted by us, but only offered, and submitted to the judgment of the learned in these matters; we confining our selves, in this mysterious point of the Holy Trinity, within the compass of those its three essentials declared: First, that it is not a Trinity of mere names and words, or of logical notions only; but of persons or hypothaises. Secondly, that none of those persons or hypothaises are creatures, but all uncreated. And lastly, that they are all three, truly and really one God. Nevertheless we acknowledge, that we did therefore the more copiously insist upon this argument, because of our then designed defence of Christianity; we conceiving, that this parallelism, betwixt the ancient or genuine Platonick, and the Christian Trinity, might be of some use to satisfy those amongst us, who boggle so much at the Trinity, and look upon it as the chock-pear of Christianity; when they shall find, that the free wit is amongst the Pagans, and the best philosophers, who had nothing of superstition to determine them that way, were so far from being shy of such an hypothesis, as that they were even fond thereof. And that the Pagans had indeed such a Cabala amongst them, (which some perhaps will yet hardly believe, notwithstanding all that we have said,) might be further convinced, from that memorable relation in Plutarch †, of Theophrastus Solenius, who, after he had been looked upon as dead for three days, reviving, affirmed, amongst other things, which he thought he saw or heard in the mean time in his ecstasie, this of three Gods in the form of a triangle, pouring in streams into one another; Orpheus his soul being said to have arrived so far; accordingly as from the testimonies of other Pagan writers we have proved, that a Trinity of Divine hypothaises was a part of the Orphick Cabala. True indeed, our belief of the Holy Trinity is founded upon no Pagan Cabala, but only Scripture revelation; it being

* Orat. IV. contra Arianos T. I., Opera, p. 469.
† Libro de his, qui fer. † Numine punian-
that, which Christians are, or should be, all baptized into. Nevertheless, these things are reasonably noted by us to this end, that that should not be made a prejudice against Christianity and Revealed Religion, nor looked upon as such an affrightful bugbear or 
mormo in it, which even Pagan philosopers themselves, and thofe of the moft accomplished intellecfuals, and un-captivated minds, though having neither councils, nor creeds, nor Scriptures, had so great a propensity and readiness to entertain, and such a veneration for.

In this fourth chapter, we were necessitated, by the matter it self, to run out into philology and antiquity; as also in the other parts of the book, we do often give an account of the doctrine of the ancients: which, however some over-fevere philofopers may look upon fadtidiously, or undervalue and depreciate, yet as we conceived it often neceffary, fo possibly may the variety thereof not be ungrateful to others; and this mixture of philology, throughout the whole, fweeten and allay the severity of philofphy to them; the main thing, which the book pretends to, in the mean time, being the philofphy of religion. But for our parts, we neither call philology, nor yet philosophy, our mistress; but ferve our felves of either, as occafion requireth.

As for the last chapter, though it promise only a confutation of all the atheiftic grounds, yet we do therein also demonstrate the abolute impofibility of all atheifm, and the actual eXistence of a God. We fay demonstrare, not a priori, which is impofible and contradictory; but by neceffary inference from principles altogether undeniable. For we can by no means grant to the Atheifts, that there is no more than a probable perfuafion, or opinion to be had of the eXistence of a God, without any certain knowledge or fience. Nevertheless, it will not fowll from hence, that whoever shall read thefe demonstrations of ours, and understand all the words of them, muft therefore of neceffity be prefently convinced, whether he will or no, and put out of all manner of doubt or hefitancy, concerning the eXistence of a God. For we believe that to be true, which fome have affirmed, that were there any interefl of life, any concernment of appetite and passion, againft the truth of geometrical theorems thernfelves, as of a triangle’s having three angles equal to two right, whereby men’s judgments might be clouded and bribed, notwithstanding all the demonstrations of them, many would remain, at leaft fceptical about them. Wherefore mere fpeculation, and dry mathematical reafon, in minds unpurified, and having a contrary interefl of carnality, and a heavy load of infidelity and diffufit finking them down, cannot alone beget an unfhaken confidence and affurance of fo high a truth as this, the eXistence of one perfect understanding Being, the original of all things. As it is certain also, on the contrary, that minds cleaned and purged from vice may, without fyllogifical reafonings, and mathematical demonstrations, have an undoubted affurance of the eXistence of a God, according to that of the philofopher, ἐὰν Ἀθηναῖοι ποιητῶν γνώρισσαν ἀτάσιον Βίον, Purify poiffes men with an affurance of the best things; whether this affurance be called a varification or divine fagacity, (as it is by Plato and Aristotle,) or faith, as in the Scripture. For the Scripture-faith is not a mere believing of historical things,
and upon inartificial arguments, or testimonies only; but a certain higher
and diviner power in the soul, that peculiarly correspondeth with the Deity.
Notwithstanding which, knowledge or science added to this faith, (accord-
to the Scripture advice) will make it more firm and stedfast, and the
better able to resist those assaults of sophistical reasonings, that shall be made
against it.

In this fifth chapter, as sometimes elsewhere, we thought our selves con-
cerned, in defence of the divine Wisdom, Goodness, and Perfection against
Atheists, to maintain, (with all the antient philosophick Theists,) the per-
fection of the creation also; or that the whole system of things, taken all to-
gether, could not have been better made and ordered than it is. And in-
deed, this divine Goodness and Perfection, as displaying and manifesting it
self in the works of Nature and Providence, is supposed in Scripture to be
the very foundation of our Christian faith; when that is defined to be the
substance and evidence rerum sperandarum; that is, of whatsoever is (by a
good man) to be hoped for. Notwithstanding which, it was far from our
intention therefore to conclude, that nothing neither in Nature nor Prov-
dence could be otherwise than it is; or that there is nothing left to the free
will and choice of the Deity. And though we do, in the third section, insist
largely upon that ancient Pythagorick Cabala, that souls are always united
to some body or other, as also, that all rational and intellectual creatures
consist of soul and body; and suggest several things from reason and Christian
antiquity in favour of them both; yet would we not be understood to
dogmatize in either of them, but to submit all to better judgments.

Again, we shall here advertise the reader, (though we have caution'd con-
cerning it in the book it self) that in our defence of incorporeal substance
against the Atheists, however we thought ourselves concerned to say
the utmost, that possibily we could, in way of vindication of the ancients, who
generally maintained it to be unextended, (which to some seems an absolute
impossibility;) yet we would not be supposed our selves dogmatically to a-
ffect any more in this point, than what all Incorporealists agree in, that there
is a substance specifically distinct from body; namely such, as consisteth not
of parts separable from one another, and which can penetrate body, and
lastly, is self-active, and hath an internal energy, distinct from that of local
motion. (And thus much is undeniable evidence, by the arguments before
proposed.) But whether this substance be altogether unextended, or ex-
tended otherwise than body; we shall leave every man to make his own judg-
ment concerning it.

Furthermore, we think fit here to suggest, that whereas throughout this
chapter and whole book, we constantly oppose the generation of souls, that is,
the production of life, cogitation and understanding, out of dead and senes-
cless matter; and assert all souls to be as substantial as matter it self; this is
not done by us, out of any fond adulterated to Pythagorick whimsies, nor
indeed out of a mere partial regard to that cause of Theism neither, which
we were engaged in, (though we had great reason to be tender of that too;) but
because we were enforced therunto, by dry mathematical reason; it
being
being as certain to us, as any thing in all geometry, that cogitation and understanding can never possibly result out of magnitudes, figures, sites, and local motions (which is all that our selves can allow to body) however compounded together. Nor indeed in that other way of qualities, is it better conceivable, how they should emerge out of hot and cold, moist and dry, thick and thin; according to the Anaximandrian atheism. And they, who can persuade themselves of the contrary, may believe, that any thing may be caused by any thing; upon which supposition, we confess it impossible to us, to prove the existence of a God, from the phænomena.

In the close of this fifth chapter; because the Atheists do in the last place pretend, theism and religion to be inconsistent with civil sovereignty, we were necessitated, briefly to unravel and confute all the atheistical ephicks and politicks, (though this more properly belong to our second book intended:) Where we make it plainly to appear, that the Atheists artificial and fictitious justice is nothing but will and words; and that they give to civil sovereigns no right nor authority at all, but only bellum liberty, and brutish force. But, on the contrary, as we affirm justice and obligation, not made by law and commands, but in nature, and prove this, together with conscience and religion, to be the only basis of civil authority; so do we also maintain all the rights of civil sovereigns; giving both to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's.

And now, having made all our apologies and reflexions, we have no more to add, but only the retraction or retraction of one passage, page 761. Where mentioning that opinion of a modern atheistical writer, That cogitation is nothing else but local motion, we could not think Epicurus and Democritus to have funk to such a degree, either of softishnelf or impudence as this; whereas we found cause afterwards, upon further consideration, to change our opinion herein, page 846. Forasmuch as when Epicurus derived liberty of will in men, merely from that motion of senseless atoms declining uncertainly from the perpendicular; it is evident, that, according to him, volition it self must be really local motion. As indeed in the Democritick fate, and material necessity of all things; it is implied, that human cogitations are but mechanism and motion. Notwithstanding which, both Democritus and Epicurus supposed, that the world was made without cogitation, though by local motion. So that the meaning of these befotted Atheists, (if at least they had any meaning) seems to have been this, That all cogitation is really nothing else but local motion; nevertheless all motion not cogitation, but only in such and such circumstances, or in bodies so modified.

And now we are not ignorant, that some will be ready to condemn this whole labour of ours, and of others in this kind, against atheism, as altogether useless and superfluous; upon this pretence, that an Atheist is a mere Chimæra, and there is no such thing any where to be found in the world. And indeed we could heartily wish, upon that condition, that all this labour of ours were superfluous and useless. But as to Atheists, these so confident explorers of them are both unskilled in the monuments of antiquity, and unacquainted
unacquainted with the present age they live in; others having found too
great an assurance, from their own personal converse, of the reality of them.
Nevertheless, this labour of ours is not intended only for the conversion of
downright and professed Atheists, (of which there is but little hope, they
being sunk into so great a degree of fottishness;) but for the confirmation of
weak, staggering, and sceptical Theifts. And unless these exploders of Athe-
ists will affirm also, that all men have constantly an unshaken faith, and
belief of the existence of a God, without the least mixture of doubtful distrust
or hesitancy, (which if it were so, the world could not possibly be so bad
as now it is) they must needs grant, such endeavours as these, for the con-
firming and estabishing of men’s minds in the belief of a God, by philo-
sophick reasons, in an age so philosophical, not to be superfluous and
useless.

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System of the Universe, &c.

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Sam. Parker, Reverend in
Christo Patri ac Domino,
Domino Gilberto, Divina
Providentia Archiep. Cant-
tuar. a Sacr. Dom.
THE TRUE INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

1. The fatal necessity of all human actions and events maintained upon three several grounds, which are so many false hypotheses of the intellectual system of the universe. 2. Concerning the mathematical or astrological fate. 3. Concerning the opinion of those, who suppose a fate superior to the highest Deity. 4. The moderation of this discourse. 5. The Atheistical hypothesis or Democritical fate being founded upon the atomical physiology: the necessity of giving an account of it, and that first briefly described. 6. The antiquity of this physiology, and the account, which is given of it by Aristotle. 7. A clear and full record of the same physiology in Plato, that hath not been taken notice of. 8. That neither Democritus, nor Leucippus, nor Protagoras, nor any Atheists were the first inventors of this philosophy; and of the necessity of being thoroughly acquainted with it, in order to the confession of Atheism. 9. The tradition of Posidonius the Stoick, that Mochus an ancient Phœnician was the first inventor of the atomical physiology. 10. That this Mochus, the inventor of the atomical physiology, was probably the same with Mochus the Physiologer in Jamblichus, with whose successors, priests and prophets, Pythagoras conversed at Sidon. 11. Other probabilities for this, that Pythagoras was acquainted with the atomical physiology. 12. That Pythagoras his Monads were atoms. 13. Proved plainly, that Empedocles, who was a Pythagorean, physiologized atomically. 14. The same further convinced from Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch and Stobæus. 15. That Anaxagoras was a spurious Atomist, or unskilful imitator of that philosophy. 16. That Ephantius the Pythagorean, Xenocrates, Heraclides, Diodorus and Metrodorus
Three Fatalisms and

Book I.

Chiues were all ancient afferers of the atomical physiology; together with Ariosto's testimony, that the ancient physiologers generally went that way. 17. How Aristotle is to be reconciled with himself, and the credit of other writers to be falsed, who impute this philosophy to Leucippus and Democritus; that they were the first atheizers of it, or the founders of that philosophy, which is atheisticaly atomical. 18. That the Atomists before Democritus were afferers of a Deity and substance incorporeal. 19. A confusion of those mistericks, who deny that incorporeal substance was ever affered by any of the ancients, and the antiquity of that doctrine proved from Plato, who himself profesedly maintained it. 20. That Aristotle likewise affered incorporeal substance. 21. That Epicurus endeavoured to confute this opinion, as that which Plato and others of the ancients had maintained. 22. That all those philosophers, who held the immortality of the souls, and a Deity diftant from the world, held incorporeal substance; and that besides Thales, Pythagoras was a grand champion for the same, who also affered a divine triad. 23. Parmenides an afferer of incorporeal substance, together with all those, who maintained that all things did not flow, but something stand. 24. Empedocles vindicated from being either an atheist or corporealis at large. 25. Anaxagoras a plain afferer of incorporeal substance. 26. Inferred that the ancient Atomists before Democritus were both theists and incorporeals. 27. That there is not only inconfistency between atomology and theology, but also a natural cognition proved from the origine of the atomical physiology, and first a general account thereof. 28. A more particular account of the origine of this philosophy from that principle of reason, That in nature, nothing comes from nothing, nor goes to nothing. 29. That the same principle, which made the ancients discard substantial forms and qualities, made them also to affer incorporeal substance. 30. That from the same ground of reason also they affered the immortality of souls. 31. That the doctrine of pre-existence and transmigration of souls bad its original from hence also. 32. That the ancients did not confine this to human souls only, but extend it to all souls and lives whatsoever. 33. All this proved from Empedocles, who affered the pre-existence as well as the post-existence of all souls upon that ground. 34. A censure of this doctrine; that the reason of it is irrefragable for the post-eternity of all human souls; and that the hypothefis of the creation of human souls, which makes their immortallity without pre-existence, is rational. 35. A new hypothefis to affer incorporeity of the souls of brutes, without their post-existence and succedaneous transmigrations. 36. That this will not prejudice the immortallity of human souls. 37. That the Empedoclean hypothefis is more rational than the opinion of those, that would make the souls of brutes corporeal. 38. That the constitution of the atomical physiology is such, that whoever entertain it, and thoroughly understands it, must needs hold incorporeal substance, in five particulars. 39. Two general advantages of the atomical or mechanical physiology; first, that it renders the corporeal world intelligible. 40. The second advantage of it, that it prepares an easy and clear way for the demonstration of incorporeal substance. 41. Concluded, that the ancient Mosheical philosophy consisted of two parts, atomical physiology, and theology or pneumatology. 42. That this entire philosophy was afterwards mangled and defhembred, some ta-
CHAP. I. False Hypotheses of the Mundane System.

king one part of it alone, and some the other. 43. That Leucippus and Democritus, being arbeitically inclined, took the atomical physiology, endeavouring to make it subervient to Atheism; and upon what occasion they did it, and how unsuccessfully. 44. That Plato took the theology and pneumatology of the ancients, but rejected their atomical physiology, and upon what accounts. 45. That Aristotle followed Plato herein, with a commendation of Aristotle's philosophy.

They, that hold the necessity of all human actions and events, do it upon one or other of these two grounds; either because they suppose, that necessity is inwardly essential to all agents whatsoever, and that contingent liberty is πρόμα ἀτυχήσαντος, a thing impossible or contradictory, which can have no existence anywhere in nature; the sense of which was thus expressed by the Epicurean poet:

_Quod res quaeque Necessum
Inteptum habeat cum sit in rebus agendis, &c._

That every thing naturally labours under an infinite necessity: or else, because though they admit contingent liberty not only as a thing possible, but also as that which is actually existent in the Deity, yet they conceive all things to be so determin'd by the will and decrees of this Deity, as that they are thereby made necessary to us. The former of these two opinions, that contingent liberty is πρόμα ἀτυχήσαντος, such a thing as can have no existence in nature, may be maintained upon two different grounds; either from such an hypothesis as this, That the universe is nothing else but body and local motion; and nothing moving itself, the action of every agent is determined by some other agent without it; and therefore that οὐκ οὐάμα, material and mechanical necessity must needs reign over all things: or else, though cogitative beings be supposed to have a certain principle of activity within themselves, yet that there can be no contingency in their actions, because all volitions are determined by a necessary antecedent understanding.

Plutinus* makes another distribution of Fatalists, which yet in the conclusion will come to the same with the former; ἐγὼ: ἐν τίς ἡμών τῷ τετελείωτος ἢν ἄν τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀποτελεσθείν, ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἢν τοῖς τῇ πάντω ἀποτελεσθε, ὅ ἐν ἐν τῷ ἢν. A man (faith he) will not do amiss, that will divide all Fatalists first into these two general heads, namely, that they derive all things from one principle, or not; the former of which may be called divine Fatalists, the latter atheistical. Which divine Fatalists he again subdivides into such, as first make God by immediate influence to do all things in us; as in animals the members are not determined by themselves, but by that which is the hegeemonick in every one: and secondly, such as make fate to be an impplexed series or concatenation of causes, all in themselves necessary, whereof God is the chief. The former seems to be a description of that very fate, that is

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* Lucret. Lib. II. v. 289, &c.  
maintain'd by some neoterick Christians; the latter is the fate of the Stoicks.

Wherefore Fatalists, that hold the necessity of all actions and events, may be reduced to these three heads: First, Such as asserting the Deity, suppose it irrespectively to decree and determine all things, and thereby make all actions necessary to us; which kind of fate, though philosophers and other ancient writers have not been altogether silent of it, yet it has been principally maintained by some neoterick Christians, contrary to the sense of the ancient church. Secondly, Such as suppose a Deity, that acting wisely, but necessarily, did contrive the general frame of things in the world; from whence by a series of causes doth unavoidably result whatsoever is now done in it. Which fate is a concatenation of causes, all in themselves necessary, and is that, which was ascertained by the ancient Stoicks Zeno and Chrysippus, whom the Jewish Essenes seemed to follow. And, lastly, such as hold the material necessity of all things without a Deity; which fate Epicurus calls τῶν φυσικῶν ἰδιαρχῶν, the fate of the Naturalists, that is, indeed the Atheists, the asserter whereof may be called also the Democritical Fatalists. Which three opinions concerning fate are so many several hypotheses of the intellectual sytem of the universe: all which we shall here propose, endeavouring to shew the falseness of them, and then substitute the true mundane sytem in the room of them.

II. The mathematical or astrological fate so much talked of, as it is a thing no way considerable for the grounds of it, so whatsoever it be, it must needs fall under one or other of those two general heads in the Plotinian distribution last mentioned, so as either to derive all things from one principle, or not. It seems to have had its first emersion amongst the Chaldeans from a certain kind of blind Polytheism (which is but a better sort of disguised Atheism) but it was afterwards adopted and fondly nurtured by the Stoicks, in a way of subordination to their divine fate; for Manilius, Firmicus, and other matters of that fect were great promoters of it. And there was too much attributed to astrology also by thofe, that were no Fatalists, both Heathen and Christian philosophers, such as were Plotinus, Origen, Simplicius and others; who though they did not make the stars to necesitate all human actions here below, they supposed, that divine providence (fore-knowing all things) had contrived such a strange coincidence of the motions and configurations of the heavenly bodies with such actions here upon earth, as that the former might be prognosticks of the latter. Thus Origen determines, that the stars do not make but signify; and that the heavens are a kind of divine volume, in whose characters they that are skilled, may read or spell out human events. To the same purpose Plotinus, Ὁ Πλωτίνος μεν ταῦτα ἐστὶ δι᾽ ἑαυτὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου, παραχείρεται δι᾽ ἑαυτὸν κρίνει τὰ τό εἰς αὐτὸ ὀστερ γραμματα βλάπτοντας, τὰς τακτὰς γραμματικὰς εἰδώλες ἀναγνώσκων τὰ μίλιατα ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ ματῶ τὸ ἀνάλογον μεθοδεύοντο τὸ συμμετέχον ὀστερ εἰς τις λίγοι ἐπειδὴ ὑψὸς ἥ χρήσεις σημαίνουσι ψηφιδίως τινὰς πράξεις. The motion of the stars was intended for

1 Vide Epit. Epicuri ad Menecceum apud
3 Libro de Fato, Ennead. III Lib. I. c. VI.
4 Videas etiam Ennead. III. Lib. III. c. I.

CHAP. I. The Opinion of a Fate superior to the Deity.

the physical good of the whole; but they afford also another use collaterally in order to prognoftication, namely that they, who are skilful in the grammar of the heavens, may be able from the several configurations of the stars, as it were letters, to spell out future events, by making such analogical interpretations as they use to do in augury: as when a bird flies high, to interpret this of some high and noble exploit. And Simplicius 1 in like manner, Συμφωνεῖς ὑπὸ Σεμι-μαρίουν περιφέρα τῇ προβολῇ τῶν ήλιων τῇ κατ' αὐτόν ἐργασίᾳ εἰς τὴν γνώσιν, εὐ- ανακάθυσα μὲν τὰς τόκους ὀργίαδι τῆς, συμφωνεῖ ἐπὶ τὰ τοῖς διεξέχεται αὐτῶν. The fatal conversion of the heavens is made to correspond with the production of souls into generation at such and such times, not necessitating them to will this or that, but conspiring agreeably with such appetites and volitions of theirs. And these philosophers were the rather inclined to this persuasion from a superfluous conceit, which they had, that the stars being animated, were intellectual beings of a far higher rank than men. And since God did not make them, nor any thing else in the world, singly, for themselves alone, but also to contribute to the publick good of the universal, their physical influence seeming inconsiderable, they knew not well what else could be worthy of them, unless they were to portend human events. This indeed is the chief sense, that can be made of astrological prognoftication; but it is a busines of that stands upon a very weak and tottering, if not impossible foundation.

III. There is another wild and extravagant conceit, which some of the Pagans had, who thought they verbally acknowledged the deity, yet supposed a certain fate superior to it, and not only to all their other petty Gods, but also to Jupiter himself. To which purpose is that of the Greek Poet, Lati-n'd by Cicero 2, Ψυχὸν δοξα περατομεν εἰς ἱδίους ἔκτασις ήρεμον; and that of Herodotus 3, Τῶν περιφέρας μοίραν ἀδύνατον ἔνα τῷ ἐνεργίας κόσμῳ τῷ ἔθελε. It is impossible for God himself to avoid the defined fate: And ἀληθινὸς Θεὸς ἀνάλογος 4, God himself is a servant of necessity. According to which conceit, Jupiter in Homer 5 laments his condition, in that the fates having determined, that his beloved Sarpedon should be slain by the son of Menetius, he was not able to withstand it. Though all these passages may not perhaps imply much more than what the Stoical hypothesis itself imported; for that did also in some sense make God himself a servant to the necessity of the matter, and to his own decrees, in that he could not have made the smallest thing in the world otherwise than now it is, much less was able to alter any thing: according to that of Seneca 6, Εαμεν νεκράτοις ἔκ τῶν ἱερών καθότι ζωτόν, ἰλέ ἵπτε οὖν κυνήκος συνάντησις ὑμῖν τούτων, δεσποτικος ἱστορίας ἤρεμον ζεῦς θεῖος; Semper pareret, semel jusfit, One and the same chain of necessity ties God and men. The same irrevocable and unalterable course carries on divine and human things. The very maker and governor of all things, that writ the fates, follows them. He did but once command, but he always obeys. But if there were this further meaning in the passages before cited, that a necessity without God, that was invincible by him, did

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5 Iliad. I. 14.
did determine his will to all things; this was nothing but a certain confused and contradictory jumble of atheism and theism both together; or an odd kind of intuition, that however the name of God be used in compliance with vulgar speech and opinion, yet indeed it signifies nothing, but material necessity; and the blind motion of matter is really the highest Numen in the world. And here that of Ballus the Stoick in Cicero is opportune:

Non est natura Dei praepotens & excellens, quæ est subjecta vel nature, vel calum, maria, servaque reguntur. Nibil autem est praepotens Deo. Nulli igitur est natura obedienti aut subjectus Deus. God would not be the most powerful and excellent being, if he were subject to that either necessity or nature, by which the heavens, seas and earth are governed. But the notion of a God implies the most excellent being. Therefore God is not obedient or subject to any nature.

IV. And now we think fit here to suggest, that however we shall oppose those three fatalisms before mentioned, as so many false hypotheses of the mundane system and oeconomy, and endeavour to exclude that severe tyrannies (as Epicurus calls it) of universal necessity reigning over all, and to leave some scope for contingent liberty to move up and down in, without which neither rational creatures can be blame-worthy for anything they do, nor God have any object to display his justice upon, nor indeed be justified in his providence; yet, as we vindicate to God the glory of all good, to do we not quite banish the notion of fate neither, nor take away all necessity; which is a thing the Clazomenian philosopher, of old was taxed for, affirming *μη τὸν γνωστὸν γινεῖ τὸν οἰκουμένη, αλλὰ τὸν μόνον τὸ νόημα* That nothing at all was done by fate, but that it was altogether a vain name. And the Sadduceans among the Jews have been noted for the same: Τίνι μὲν εἰμικράτεις ἀνάμικτος, οἷον εἰκόμεν τὰ τῶν ἑαυτῆς, οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἀδρόμων τιλε λαμβάνως, ἀπαύγως οἷς τοῦ αὐτοῦ τιθέντως: They take away all fate, and will not allow it to be anything at all, nor to have any power over human things, but put all things entirely into the hands of men own free-will. And some of our own seem to have approached too near to this extreme, attributing perhaps more to the power of free-will, than either religion or nature will admit. But the hypothesis, that we shall recommend, as most agreeable to truth, of a προαίρεσις διανοίας, placable providence, of a Deity essentially good, predating over all, will avoid all extremes, affording to God the glory of good, and freeing him from the blame of evil; and leaving a certain proportionate contemplation and commissure of contingency and necessity both together in the world; as nature requires a mixture of motion and rest, without either of which there could be no generation. Which temper was observed by several of the ancients; as the Pharisaick sect amongst the Jews, who determined *των ἃ ἐν παθή τῆς εἰμικρατείας ἐκαθειφθεν, τῶν δὲ ἔκ τοῦ ἐκαθειφθεν υπάρχεν* That some things and not all were the effects of fate; but some things were left in mens own power and liberty: and also by Plato amongst the

1 De Nat. Deor. Lib. II. c. 20. p. 3036.  
2 Axiomages, who was censured for this opinion by Alexander Abhandl. de Faro §. II. p. 11. Edit. Lond. 1638. in 12°.  
3 Josophi Antiq. Judaic. Lib. XIII. c. V.  
The Atheistical or Democritical Fate.

philosophers, Plato in hereditiam nee eis alia de invisibilibus. I. The fomewhere makes a thing into human lives and actions; he joins with it liberty of will also. He doth indeed suppose human souls to have within themselves the causes of their own changes to a better or worse state, and every where declares God to be blameless for their evils; and yet he somewhere makes the three fatal sisters notwithstanding, Clotho, Lachesis and Atropos, to be busy about them also. For according to the fenate of the ancients, fate is a servant of divine providence in the world, and takes place differently upon the different actions of free-willed beings. And how free a thing forever will of man may seem to be to some, yet I conceive it to be out of question, that it may contract upon it self such necessities and fatalities, as it cannot upon a sudden rid it self of at pleasure. But whatsoever is said in the sequel of this discourse by way of opposition to that fatalism of the neoteric Christians, is intended only to vindicate what was the constant doctrine of the Christian church in its greatest purity, (as shall be made manifest,) and not to introduce any new-fangled conceit of our own.

V. We must now proceed to give a more full and perfect account of these three several fates, or hypothesis of the mundane system before-mentioned, together with the grounds of them, beginning first with that, which we principally intend the confusion of, the Atheistical or Democritical fate: Which as it is a thing of the most dangerous consequence of all, so it seems to be most spreading and infectious in these latter times.

Now this atheistical system of the world, that makes all things to be materially and mechanically necessary, without a God, is built upon a peculiar physiological hypothesis, different from what hath been generally received for many ages; which is called by some atomical or corporeal, by others mechanical; of which we must therefore needs give a full and perfect account. And we shall do it first in general, briefly, not descending to those minute particularities of it, which are disputed amongst these Atomists themselves, in this manner.

The atomical physiology supposes, that body is nothing else but ἀπαραδόν ἀπίστου, that is, extended bulk; and resolves therefore, that nothing is to be attributed to it, but what is included in the nature and idea of it, viz. more or less magnitude, with divisibility into parts, figure, and position, together with motion or rest, but so as that no part of body can ever move it self, but is always moved by something else. And consequently it supposes, that there is no need of any thing else besides the simple elements of magnitude, figure, site and motion (which are all clearly intelligible as different modes of extended substance) to solve the corporeal phænomena by; and therefore, not of any substantial forms distinct from the matter; nor of any other qualities really existing in the bodies without, besides the results or aggregates of those simple elements, and the disposition of the insensible parts of bodies in respect of figure, site and motion; nor of any intentional species or fheues, propagated from the objects to our senses; nor, lastly, of any other kind of motion or action really distinct from local motion (such as generation,

Vide Platon. de Republicâ L. X. p. 520.
ration and alteration) they being neither intelligible, as modes of extended substance, nor any ways necessary. Forasmuch as the forms and qualities of bodies may well be conceived to be nothing but the result of those simple elements of magnitude, figure, figure and motion, variously compounded together, in the same manner as syllables and words in great variety result from the different combinations and conjunctions of a few letters, or the simple elements of speech; and the corporeal part of sensation, and particularly that of vision, may be solved only by local motion of bodies, that is, either by corporeal effluvia (called simulachra, membrane and exuviae) streaming continually from the surface of the objects, or rather, as the later and more refined atomists perceived, by pressure made from the object to the eye, by means of light in the medium. So that ἡς διὰ βαλανίτις το παλατίς αέρι το βλεπόμενον αἰκητικῶς, the sense taking cognizance of the object by the subtle interposed medium, that is tense and stretched, (thrusting every way from it upon the optic nerves) doth by that as it were by a staff touch it. Again, generation and corruption may be sufficiently explained by concretion and secretion, or local motion, without substantial forms and qualities. And lastly, those sensible ideas of light and colours, heat and cold, sweet and bitter, as they are distinct things from the figure, site and motion of the insensible parts of bodies, seem plainly to be nothing else but our own fancies, passions and sensations, however they be vulgarly mistaken for qualities in the bodies without us.

VI. Thus much may suffice for a general account of the atomical physiology. We shall in the next place consider the antiquity thereof, as also what notice Ariosto hath taken of it, and what account he gives of the same. For though Epicurus went altogether this way, yet it is well known, that he was not the first inventor of it. But it is most commonly fathered on Democritus, who was senior both to Ariosto and Plato, being reported to have been born the year after Socrates; from whose fountains Cicero faith, that Epicurus watered his orchards, and of whom Sex. Empiricus and Laertius testify that he did ἐξαλαλων τοι συνεπίτας, capiber qualities; and Plutarch, that he made the first principles of the whole universe ἀτομέως ἀπον ἄπαθεν, atoms devoid of all qualities and passions. But Laertius will have Leucippus, who was somewhat senior to Democritus, to be the first inventor of this philosophy, though he wrote not so many books concerning it as Democritus did. Ariosto, who often takes notice of this philosophy, and ascribes it commonly to Leucippus and Democritus jointly, gives us this description of it in his metaphysics; Λευκίππος ἦν ἐκ ἐκ τοῦ ἀτομείρῳ το Ἰδιομεῖρῳ συνεπίτας μὲν τὸ πλήρως ἀτομείρῳ το κενοτικῷ φασι, ἀτομέως δεινὸ τὸ μέν ὑπὸ τὸ ὑπὸ κενὸ το διαφοράς αἰτίας τῶν ἄλλων, φασι ταύτες μεντὶ προεὶς, ὑποκλῆμα το κενὸ τῶν ἄλλων, διάφρισιν γὰρ το ὑποκλῆμα ἰδιοκύρης το τρέψη. Leucippus and his companion Democritus make the first principles of all

all things to be Plenum and Vacuum (body and space) whereof one is Ens, the other Non-ens, and the differences of the body, which are only figure, order and position, to be the causes of all other things. Which differences they call by these names Rsynus, Diathige and Tropo. And in his book De Anima, having declared that Democritus made fire and the soul to consist of round atoms, he describes those atoms of his after this manner, οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ ἄξον τα ἀκλάματα ήσσαμάκα τοις δια τῶν ὁμοιών ἀξιών, πώ τῶν παντέρεσιν τοιχειοῦσεν Δημοκρίτου τῆς ὀλίγης Φύσεως, ὡςοι δὲ κλη ψευδή. They are (faith he) like those ramenta er dust particles which appear in the sun-beams, an omnifarious seminary whereof of Democritus makes to be the first elements of the whole universe, and so doth Leucippus likewise. Elsewhere s the same Aristotle tells us, that these two philosophers explained generation and alteration without forms and qualities by figures and local motion: Δημοκρίτου καὶ Λεύκηπον ποιώντος τα χρώματα τούτοις ἀκλάματα τού τινης ἀκτίνοις εἰς τάτον ποιμόν, διαχωρίζει μὲν αὐτάς ὑφετιν ὧν Φύσα, τάξιν δὲ τοὺς ἀλλαίους: Democritus and Leucippus having made figures, (or variously figured atoms) the first principles, make generation and alteration out of these; namely generation together with corruption from the concretion and secretion of them, but alteration from the change of their order and position. Again he elsewhere t takes notice of that opinion of the Atomists, that all sense was a kind of touch, and that the sensible qualities of bodies were to be resolved into figures, imputing it not only to Democritus, but also to the generality of the old philosophers, but very much disliking the same: Δημοκρίτου καὶ Λεύκηπον ποιώντος τα χρώματα τούτοις ἀκλάματα τού τινης ἀκτίνοις εἰς τάτον ποιμόν, διαχωρίζει μὲν αὐτάς ὑφετιν ὧν Φύσα, τάξιν δὲ τοὺς ἀλλαίους: Democritus and most of the physiologists here commit a very great absurdity, in that they make all sense to be touch, and resolve sensible qualities into the figures of insensible parts or atoms. And this opinion he endeavours to confute by these arguments. First, because there is contrariety in qualities, as in black and white, hot and cold, bitter and sweet, but there is no contrariety in figures; for a circular figure is not contrary to a square or multangular; and therefore there must be real qualities in bodies distinct from the figure, site and motion of parts. Again, the variety of figures and dispositions being infinite, it would follow from thence, that the species of colours, odours, and tastes should be infinite likewise, and reducible to no certain number. Which arguments I leave the professed Atomists to answer. Furthermore, Aristotle somewhere also confines that other fundamental principle of this atomical physiology, that the sensible ideas of colours and tastes, as red, green, bitter and sweet, formally considered, are only passions and fancies in us, and not real qualities in the object without. For as in a rainbow there is really nothing without our sight, but a rorida cloud diversely refracting and reflecting the sun-beams, in such an angle; nor are there really such qualities in the diaphanous prism; when refracting the light, it exhibits to us the same colours of the rainbow; whence it was collected, that those things are properly the phantasms of the sentient, occasioned by different motions on the optic nerves: so they conceived the cause to be the same in all other colours, and that both the colours of the prism and rainbow were as real as other colours, and all other colours as phantastical as C
they: and then by parity of reason they extended the business further to the other senibles. But this opinion Aristotle condemns in these words, O. ὑπὲρ τῶν καλῶν ἐγραφεῖ των ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ῥημάτων, ἄλλα μᾶλλον ὁμοίως, ἄλλα ἔτι τίνος ὁμοίως. The former physiologists were generally out in this, in that they thought there was no black or white without the fight, nor no bitter or sweet without the taste. There are other passages in Aristotle concerning this philosophy, which I think superfluous to infer here; and I shall have occasion to cite some of them afterward for other purposes.

VII. But in the next place it will not be amiss to shew, that Plato also hath left a very full record of this mechanical or atomical physiologe (that hath hardly been yet taken notice of) which notwithstanding he doth not impute either to Democritus (whose name Laeritus 3 thinks he purposely declined to mention throughout all his writings) or to Leucippus, but to Protagoras. Wherefore in his Theaetetus, having first declared in general, 3 that the Protagorean philosophy made all things to consist of a commixture of parts (or atoms) and local motion, he represents it, in particular concerning colours, after this manner: 4 ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων κατὰ τὰ ὁμοίων ῥημάτων, ἄλλα μᾶλλον εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως ῥημάτων, ἄλλα μᾶλλον εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως ῥημάτων, ἄλλα μᾶλλον ἐκ τῆς προσαλής τῶν ὁμοίων ῥημάτων. 5 οὗτοι ὁμοίως ῥημάτων ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ῥημάτων, ἄλλα μᾶλλον ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ῥημάτων. Where it follows immediately, δὴ ὁ ἐπισκόπησε ἐπὶ ὅλον τὴν Παλαιότατον ῥήματα τοιῶν καὶ εἰς ὅλον τὸν κόσμον. Can any or any man else be confident, that as every colour appears to him, so it appears just the same to every other man and animal, any more than tastes and touches, heat and cold do? From whence it is plain, that Protagoras made sensible qualities not to be all absolute things existing in the bodies without, but to be relative to us, and passions in us; and so they are called presently after this ἀν' ἐν τῷ φατάρια, certain fancies, feelings, or appearances in us. But there is another passage 5 in which a fuller account is given of the whole Protagorean doctrine, beginning thus: ἢ θάλα ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου ἐκ γῆς ἐκ τῆς ἁλόγομεν παράκειν ἡμῖν ἔτει αὐτῶν, πῶς τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἡμεῖς ἔτει, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐκ τῶν ἐκ τῶν ἐκ τῶν. The principle upon which all these things depend is this, that the whole universe is motion (of atoms) and nothing else besides; which motion is considered two ways, and accordingly called by two names, action and passion; from the mutual congress, and as it were attrition together of both which, are begotten innumerable offsprings, which though infinite in number, yet may be reduced to two general heads, sensibles and sensations, that are both

1 De Anima Lib. II. c. I. p. 43. Tom II. Oper.
2 Lib. IX. Segm. 42. p. 571.
3 P. 118.
4 Ibid. p. 119.
5 Ibid. p. 120.
both generated at the same time; the sensations are seeing and hearing and the like, and the correspondent sensibles, colours, sounds, &c. Wherefore when the eye, or such a proportionate object meet together, both the ai\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron and the ai\epsilon\eta\omicron, the sensible idea of white and black, and the sense of seeing, are generated together, neither of which would have been produced if either of those two had not met with the other. Kai τ' ἀλλα δὲ εἴ ὅτι ψευδο >( υφιστο \rfloor \piαια τοι̃ τὸ τρέπον ὄφος, αὐτὸ μὲν καὶ ἄλλο αὐτὸ μὴν εἴ νει, εἴ δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλὰ ὀρθὰ, ζῶον γινώσκει, κ. τ. παϊδία από τῇ οὐκοτης: The like is to be conceived of all other sensibles, as hot and cold, &c. that none of these are absolute things in themselves, or real qualities in the objects without, but they are begotten from the mutual congress of agent and patient with one another, and that by motion: so that neither the agent has any such thing in it before its congress with the patient, nor the patient before its congress with the agent. "Ex δὲ αἰσθήσιν τῇ ἰονιάδες κ. τοῦ ἀλλοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁρᾶτο τῇ ἀλλαγῇ συγκομιδῆσαι κ. ταῖς αἰσθήσεις κ. τῷ αἰσθήτῳ απογινώσκει, τὰ μὲν χων ἥτιν γίνομεν, τὰ δὲ αἰσθητικα. But the agent and patient meeting together, and begetting sensation and sensibles, both the object and the sentience are forthwith made to be so and so qualified, as when honey is tasted, the sense of tasting and the quality of sweetness are begotten both together, though the sense be vulgarly attributed to the taste, and the quality of sweetness to the honey. The conclusion of all which is summed up thus, κ. εἰ ἀλλὰ αὐτὸ καὶ ἄλλο αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τοις αἰεὶ γίνομεν, That none of these sensible things is any thing absolutely in the objects without, but they are all generated or made relatively to the sentient. There is more in that dialogue to this purpose, which I here omit; but I have set down so much of it in the author’s own language, because it seems to me to be an excellent monument of the wisdom and sagacity of the old philosophers; that which is the main curiosity in this whole business of the mechanical or atomical philosophy being here more fully and plainly expressed, than it is in Lucretius himself, viz. that sensible things, according to those ideas that we have of them, are not real qualities absolutely existing without us, but in νεικίφερματα, fancies or fantastics in us: so that both the Latin interpreters Ficinus and Seranus, though probably neither of them at all acquainted with this philosophy, as being not yet restored, could not but understand it after the same manner; the one expressing it thus, Color ex aspa\delta\omicron mortière medium quidam resitians ejf. Talis circa eosd\rho\omicron passio; and the other, ex varia aspicicius disatibes, variique sensibles specie colores variass &videri & fieri, ita tamen ut sit: Φοινικας, nec nisi in anno subs\judant. However, it appears like Plato’s manner of telling the story, and the tenour of the whole dialogue, that himself was not a little prejudiced against this philosophy. In all probability the rather, because Protagoras had made it a foundation both for scepticism and atheism.

VIII. We have now learnt from Plato, that Democritus and Leucippus were not the sole proprietaries in this philosophy, but that Protagoras, though not vulgarly taken notice of for any such thing (being commonly represented as a Sophist only) was a sharer in it likewise; which Protagoras indeed Laertius and others affirm to have been an auditor of Democritus; and so he might be, notwithstanding what Plutarch tells us, that Democritus

& Suidam voces "περιφράγματα."
wrote against his taking away the absolute natures of things. However we are of opinion, that neither Democritus, nor Protagoras, nor Leucippus was the first inventor of this philosophy; and our reason is, because they were all three of them Atheists (though Protagoras alone was banished for that crime by the Athenians) and we cannot think, that any Atheists could be the inventors of it, much less that it was the genuine spawn and brood of atheism itself, as some conceive, because however these Atheists adopted it to themselves, endeavouring to serve their turns of it, yet if rightly understood, it is the most effectual engine against atheism that can be. And we shall make it appear afterwards, that never any of those Atheists, whether ancient or modern (how great pretenders soever to it) did throughly understand it, but perpetually contradicted themselves in it. And this is the reason, why we insist so much upon this philosophy here, not only because without the perfect knowledge of it, we cannot deal with the Atheists at their own weapon; but also because we doubt not but to make a sovereign antidote against atheism out of that very philosophy, which so many have used as a vehiculum to convey this poison of atheism by.

IX. But besides reason, we have also good historical probability for this opinion, that this philosophy was a thing of much greater antiquity than either Democritus or Leucippus. And first, because Pheidonius, an ancient and learned philosopher, did (as both Empiricus and Strabo tell us) avouch it for an old tradition, that the first inventor of this atomical philosophy was one Mochus a Phoenician, who, as Strabo also notes, lived before the Trojan wars.

X. Moreover it seems not altogether improbable, but that this Mochus a Phoenician philosopher, mentioned by Pheidonius, might be the same with that Mochus a Phoenician physiologer in Jamblichus, with whose successors, priests and prophets, he affirms that Pythagoras, sometimes sojourning at Sidon (which was his native city) had convers’d: which may be taken for an intimation, as if he had been by them instructed in that atomical physiology, which Mochus or Mochus the Phoenician is said to have been the inventor of. Mochus or Mochus is plainly a Phoenician name, and there is one Mochus a Phoenician writer cited in Athenæus, whom the Latin translator calls Mochus; and Mr. Selden approves of the conjecture of Arceius, the publisher of Jamblichus, that this Mochus was no other than the celebrated Moses of the Jews, with whose successors the Jewish philosophers, priests and prophets, Pythagoras conversed at Sidon. Some fantastick Atomists perhaps would here catch at this, to make their philosophy to stand by divine right, as owing its original to revelation; whereas philosophy being not a matter of faith but reason, men ought not to affect (as I conceive) to derive its pedigree from revelation, and by that very pretence seek to impose it tyrannically upon the minds of men, which God hath here purposely left free to the use of their own faculties, that so finding out truth by them, they might enjoy that pleasure and satisfaction, which arises from thence. But we aim here at nothing more, than a confirmation of this truth, that the atomical physiology was both older than Democritus,

2 Lib. IX. advers. Mathematic. p. 621. 2 Lib. XVI. p. 718.
XI. But there are yet other considerable probabilities for this, that Pythagoras was not unacquainted with the atomical physiology. And first from Democritus himself, who as he was of the Italick row, or Pythagorick succession, so it is recorded of him in Laeritus, that he was a great emulator of the Pythagoreans, and seemed to have taken all his philosophy from them; insomuch that if chronology had not contradicted it, it would have been concluded, that he had been an auditor of Pythagoras himself, of whom he testified his great admiration in a book entitled by his name. Moreover some of his opinions had a plain corresponendy with the Pythagorick doctrines, forasmuch as Democritus did not only hold, that the atoms were carried round in a vortex, but altogether with Leucippus, that the earth was carried about the middle or centre of this vortex (which is the Sun) turning in the mean time round upon its own axis. And just so the Pythagorick opinion is express'd by Aripotle, that the earth, as one of the orbs (that is a planet) being carried about the middle or centre (which is fire or the sun) did in the mean time by its circumgyration upon its own axis make day and night. Wherefore it may be reaonably from hence concluded, that as Democritus his philosophy was Pythagorical, so Pythagoras his philosophy was likewise Democritical or Atomical.

XII. But that which is of more moment yet, we have the authority of Ecphantus a famous Pythagorean for this, that Pythagoras his monads, so much talked of, were nothing else but corporeal atoms. Thus we find it in Stobaeus, that the monads were carried round in a vortex; but altogether with Leucippus, that the earth was carried about the middle or centre of this vortex (which is the Sun) turning in the mean time round upon its own axis. And just so the Pythagorick opinion is express'd by Aripotle, that the earth, as one of the orbs (that is a planet) being carried about the middle or centre (which is fire or the sun) did in the mean time by its circumgyration upon its own axis make day and night. Wherefore it may be reaonably from hence concluded, that as Democritus his philosophy was Pythagorical, so Pythagoras his philosophy was likewise Democritical or Atomical.

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"I. That Pythagoras was an Atheist.

mocritus, and had no such atheistical original neither. And there wants not other good authority for this, that Pythagoras did borrow many things from the Jews, and translate them into his philosophy.

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Nature is nothing but the mixture and separation of things mingled; or thus, there is no production of any thing anew, but only mixture and separation of things mingled. Which is not only to be understood of animals, according to the Pythagorean doctrine of the transmigration of souls, but also, as himself expounds it, universally of all bodies, that their generation and corruption is nothing but mixture and separation; or, as Aristotle expresses it, ἡ ἀκατορθότης καὶ διάλεκτος, concretion and secretion of parts, together with change of figure and order. It may perhaps be objected, that Empedocles held four elements, out of which he would have all other bodies to be compounded; and that as Aristotle affirms, he made those elements not to be transmutable into one another neither. To which we reply, that he did indeed make four elements, as the first general concretions of atoms, and wherein he did no more than Democritus himself, who, as Lucretius writes, did from atoms moving round in a vortex, τῶν σωμάτων τινῶν ἃ ποιεῖ, χηραί, νηλύς, ἑλικία γὰρ χρόνων ἐς ἀτόμων των συνήζωσιν, generate all concretions, fire, water, air and earth, these being systems made out of certain atoms. And Plato further confirms the same; for in his book de Legibus he describes (as I suppose) that very atheistical hypothesis of Democritus, though without mentioning his name, representing it in this manner; that by the fortuitous motion of inef- fable matter were first made those four elements, and then out of them afterward sun, moon, stars and earth. Now both Plutarch and Stobæus testify, that Empedocles compounded the four elements themselves out of atoms, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ τὰ μικρότατα τῶν τῶν ἁλχίσματα ἀπείρων, καὶ οἰοι ὁρίζονται ἁλχίσματα. Empedocles makes the elements to be compounded of other small concretions, which are the least, and as it were the elements of the elements. And the same Stobæus again observes, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς παντὸς ποιητῶν ἁλχίσμων ἱοἴθυσα διὰ τῶν ἁλχίσμων ἱοἴθυσα. Empedocles makes the smallest particles and fragments of body (that is, atoms) to be before the four elements. But whereas Aristotle affirms, that Empedocles denied the transmutation of those elements into one another, that must needs be either a slip in him, or else a fault in our copies; not only because Lucretius, who was better verified in that philosophy, and gives a particular account of Empedocles his doctrine (besides many others of the ancients) affirms the quite contrary; but also because himself, in those fragments of his still preferred, expressly acknowledges this transmutation:  

4 Lib. IX. S. a. 44. p. 573. 

XIII. But to pass from Pythagoras himself; that Empedocles, who was a Pythagorean also, did physiologize atomically, is a thing that could hardly be doubted of, though there were no more proof for it than that one passage of his in his philopopik poems:  

1 Lib. X. p. 666. Oper. 
4 Vid. Lib. I. c. XVII. p. 53.
Chap. I. Physiologized Atomically.

XIV. Besides all this, no less author than Plato affirms, that according to Empedocles, vision and other sensations were made by ἀπορροή χρημάτων, the defluxions of figures, or effluvia of atoms, (for so Democritus his atoms are called in Aristotele χρῆμα, because they were bodies which had only figure without qualities) he supposing, that some of these figures or particles corresponded with the organs of one sense, and some with the organs of another.

1 Ὠναὶ λέγετε ἀπορροῖς τινάς τῶν ὄστων κατὰ Ἐμπεδόκλη, καὶ πόροι, εἰς ὅς, καὶ ὅν αἱ ἀπορροῖς περιφύσαι, καὶ τῶν ἀπορρόσων τὰς μὲν ἀριστήσίν εἰς τῶν πόρων, τὰς δὲ ἑλάτης ἡ μεῖζος ἐνίας. You say then, according to the doctrine of Empedocles, that there are certain corporeal effluvia from bodies of different magnitudes and figures, as also several pores and meatus's in us diversely corresponding with them: so that some of these corporeal effluvia agree with some pores, when they are either too big or too little for others. By which it is evident, that Empedocles did not suppose sensations to be made by intentional species or qualities, but as to the generality, in the atomical way; in which notwithstanding there are some differences among those Atomists themselves. But Empedocles went the same way here with Democritus, for Empedocles's ἀπορροῖς χρημάτων, defluxions of figured bodies, are clearly the same thing with Democritus his ἰδιαίως εἰσελείσθεν, insinuations of simulacra, or exeunt images of bodies. And the same Plato adds further 2, that according to Empedocles's, the definition of colour was this, ἀπορροή χρημάτων ὅσα σύμπεφρατέται καὶ αἰθημένοι. The defluxion of figures, or figured corpuscula (without qualities) commensurate to the sight and sensible. Moreover, that Empedocles his physiology was the very same with that of Democritus, is manifest also from this passage of Arifatole 3, Οἱ μὲν ἐν τε χρημάτων Ἐμπεδόκλει καὶ Δημόκριτοι καθάλαβον αὐτῶν ἐκπαίδευσιν, ἠ γενετικώς ἡ ἀλλήλων παραλήπτης, ἀλλ' Ἀριστότελε χρήσιν ἐκπαίδευσιν ἐκπαίδευσιν ἠμελᾶται Φασιν ὅπερ εἰς ἀρέια τῆς γνώσεως ὑπάρχει. Empedocles and Democritus deceiving themselves, unawares destroy all generation of things out of one another, leaving a seeming generation only: for they say, that generation is not the production of any new entity, but only the secretion of what was before inexist; as when divers kinds of things confounded together in a vessel are separated from one another. Lastly, we shall confirm all this by the clear testimony of Plutarch, or the writer de Placitis Philosophorum 4: Ἐμπεδόκλει καὶ Ἐπίκουρῳ καὶ πάντως ὅσια κατὰ συναθροίσμα τῶν λεπίδομερον σωμάτων κατασχομένης, συχροίσις μὲν καὶ διαρθρίσις εἰσάγοντι, γενετικὴν δὲ καὶ Φβραος ὁ κυρίως, ὁ γὰρ κατὰ πάντως ἐπὶ ἀλληλοῦ, κατὰ δὲ πάντως ἐπὶ συναθροίσμα τῶν γενετικῶν. Empedocles and Epicurus, and all those that compound the world of small atoms, introduce concritions and secretions, but no generations or corruptions properly so called; neither would they have these to be made according to quality by alteration, but only according to quantity by aggregation. And the same writer sets down the order and method of the Cosmopoeia according to Empedocles 5: Ἐμπεδόκλης, τὸν μὲν αἰθήμα χρῆματος διακρινόμενον, διότερον δε τὸ πόδι, εἴδωλον τοῦ γαρ ἐξ ἀρχαίων ἐξ ἀρχαίων

1 Plato in Menone, p. 14.
2 Ibid.
3 De Coelo, Lib. III. cap. VII. p. 682.
5 Lib. II. cap. VI. p. 567.

Tom. I. Oper.
Anaxagoras a Spurious Atomist. Book I.

XV. As for Anaxagoras, though he philosophized by atoms, substituting concretion and secretion in the room of generation and corruption, inflicting upon the fame fundamental principle, that Empedocles, Democritus and the other Atomists did; which was (as we shall declare more fully afterward) that nothing could be made out of nothing, nor reduced to nothing; and therefore that there were neither any new productions nor destructions of any substances or real entities: yet, as his Homœomeria is represented by Arifotæle, Lucretius and other authors, that bone was made of bony atoms, and flesh of fleshly, red things of red atoms, and hot things of hot atoms; these atoms being supposed to be endued originally with so many several forms and qualities essential to them, and inseparable from them, there was indeed a wide difference betwixt his philosophy and the atomical. However, this seems to have had its rise from nothing else but this philosopher's not being able to understand the atomical hypothesis, which made him decline it, and substitute this spurious and counterfeit atomism of his own in the room of it.

XVI. Lastly, I might add here, that it is recorded by good authors concerning divers other ancient philosophers, that were not addicted to Democriticism or Atheism, that they followed this atomical way of physiologizing, and therefore in all probability did derive it from those religious atomists before Democritus. As for example; Ephoratus the Syracusan Pythagoreis, who, as Stobæus writes, made τὰ ἄδειατα σώματα καὶ τὸ κείμενον, indivisible bodies and vacuum the principles of physiolog, and as Theocoret also testifies, taught in τὸν ἥλερμον συμφαίνειν τὸν κόσμον, that the corporeal world was made up of atoms; Xenocrates 3, that made μεγίστα ἄδειατα, indivisible magnitudes the first principles of bodies; Heraclides 4, that resolved all corporeal things into ψυχάρπα καὶ ἐρήμορπα τῶν ἑλέγχων, certain smallest fragments of bodies; Aellepidades 5, who supposed all the corporeal world to be made ἕκαστος καὶ ἄρματον ὑδάων, not of similar parts (as Anaxagoras) but of dissimilar and inconcin molecule, i. e. atoms of different magnitude and figures; and

1 Vide Plutarch. de Placitis Philos. Lib. I. cap. XIII. p. 885. Tom. II. Oper.
CHAP. I. Most of the ancient Physiologers Atomists.

Diodorus, that solved the material phenomena by \( \delta \mu \eta \gamma \tau \varepsilon \, \varepsilon \iota \lambda \chi \iota \sigma \zeta \), the smallest indivisibles of body. And lastly, Metrodorus (not Lampsalenus the Epicurean, but) Chius, who is reported also to have made indivisible particles and atoms the first principles of bodies. But what need we any more proof for this, that the atomical physiology was ancients than Democritus and Leucippus, and not confined only to that sect, since Aристote himself in the passages already cited doth expressly declare, that besides Democritus, the generality of all the other physiologers went that way; \( \Delta \mu \rho \omega \gamma \zeta \tau \sigma \varepsilon \, \kappa \varepsilon \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \iota \) \( \omega \tau \iota \epsilon \iota \tau \sigma \o\iota \theta \o\iota \omega \gamma \o\iota \omicron \omega \gamma \o\iota \), &c. The greatest of these physiologers (without any exception) said not well in this, that there was no black and white without the fight, nor bitter and sweet without the taste. Wherefore, I think, it cannot be reasonably doubted, that the generality of the old physiologers before Aristote and Democritus did pursue the atomical way, which is to resolve the corporeal phenomena, not into forms, qualities and species, but into figures, motions and fancies.

XVII. But then there will seem to be no small difficulty in reconciling Aristote with himself, who doth in so many places plainly impute this philosophy to Democritus and Leucippus, as the first source and original of it; as also in falving the credit of Laeritus, and many other ancient writers, who do the like, Democritus having had for many ages almost the general cry and vogue for atoms. However, we doubt not but to give a very good account of this businefs, and reconcile the seemingly different testimonies of these ancient writers, so as to take away all contradiction and repugnancy between them. For although the atomical physiology was in use long before Democritus and Leucippus, so that they did not make it, but find it; yet these two, with their confederate Atheists (whereof Protagoras seems to have been one) were undoubtedly the first, that ever made this physiology to be a complete and entire philosophy by it felf, so as to derive the original of all things in the whole univers from fensible atoms, that had nothing but figure and motion, together with vacuum, and made up such a fystem of it, as from whence it would follow, that there could not be any God, not fo much as a corporeal one. These two things were both of them before fingly and apart. For there is no doubt to be made, but that there hath been atheifm lurking in the minds of fome or other in all ages; and perhaps some of those ancient Atheists did endeavour to philosophize too, as well as they could, in some other way. And there was atomical physiology likewise before, without atheifm. But these two thus complicated together, were never before atomical atheifm, or atheifical atomifm. And therefore Democritus and his comrade Leucippus need not be envied the glory of

3 Lib. de Sensu & Sensibilibi, cap. IV. p. 70. Tom. II. Oper.
4 De Animâ, Lib. II. cap. I. p. 45. Tom. II. Oper.
of being reputed the first inventors or founders of the atomical philosophy atheized and adulterated.

XVIII. Before Leucippus and Democritus, the doctrine of atoms was not made a whole entire philosophy by itself, but looked upon only as a part or member of the whole philosophick system, and that the meanest and lowest part too, it being only used to explain that which was purely corporeal in the world; besides which they acknowledged something else, which was not more bulk and mechanism, but life and self-activity, that is, immaterial or incorporeal substance; the head and summity whereof is the Deity distinct from the world. So that there have been two forts of Atomists in the world, the one atheistical, the other religious. The first and most ancient Atomists holding incorporeal substance, used that physiology in a way of subordination to theology and metaphysics. The other allowing no other substance but body, made fennfeles atoms and figures, without any mind and understanding (i.e. without any God) to be the original of all things; which latter is that, that was vulgarity known by the name of atomical philosophy, of which Democritus and Leucippus were the source.

XIX. It hath been indeed of late confidently assered by some, that never any of the ancient philosophers dream'd of any such thing as incorporeal substance; and therefore they would bear men in hand, that it was nothing but an upstart and new-fangled invention of some bigotical religiousists; the fallity whereof we shall here briefly make to appear. For though there have been doubtles in all ages such as have disbelieved the existence of any thing but what was fensible, whom Plato¹ describes after this manner; εἰ διατεινοντ' αὐτῷ ὅ μη δυσκολοί ταῖς χερσὶ συμπελτζεῖν εἰκόνα, ὡς ἄρα τῶν ἑκάτων τὸ παρατάτοι εἶτε, that would contend, that whatsoever they could not feel or grasp with their hands, was altogether nothing; yet this opinion was professedly opposed by the bead of the ancient philosophers, and condemned for a piece of fortinftnes and stupidity. Wherefore the same Plato tells us, that there had been always, as well as then there was, a perpetual war and controversy in the world, and, as he calls it, a kind of giganatomachy betwixt these two parties or sects of men; the one, that held there was no other substance in the world besides body; the other, that afferteed incorporeal substance. The former of these parties or sects is thus described by the philosopher; ὡς μὲν εἰς χρόνιν εὖ ἄραιν καὶ τὸ ἀφάτον πάντα ἐνεργοί ταῖς χρησὶν ἀτελεῖοι, ὡς γὰρ τοιούτοι ἱππολαμβάνονται, τῶν γὰρ τοιτῶν ἵππον ἱππολαμβάνον παντόν, διαρκείζονται τὸτε ἐκείνη μόνον, καὶ ὅταν ἴππον παράγων παρατάτοι, τοιοῦτον σώμαν, καὶ υἱοῦν ἐν μελέμεν. τούτων ἤ ἄλλων ὦτις θυρίς μὲν σῶμα ἵππον ἱππολαμβάνοντες, τοιοῦτον σώμαν, καὶ ἰππολαμβάνοντες τὸ παρατάτοι, καὶ ἰππολαμβάνοντες ἀλλὰ ἰππολαμβάνοντες. These (faith he) pull all things down from heaven and the invisible region, with their hands to the earth, laying hold of rocks and oaks; and when they grasp all these hard and gross things, the confidently affirm, that that only is substance, which they can feel, and will resist their touch; and they conclude, that body and substance are one and the self same thing; and if any one chance to speak to them of something which is not body, i.e. of incorporeal substance, they will altogether despise him, and not bear a word more

¹ In Sophistà, p. 160.
from him. And many such the philosopher there says he had met withal. The other he represents in this manner; Ο' ὅποι οὗτος ἀμφισβητεῖται μάλις ἐνελθὼς ἀλωνίν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸν ἁπάνταναι νοῦτα ἄνω, ἵνα ἀνάμωσα εἶναι, βιαζόμενα τὸν ἀλήθειαν ἕτετο εἰσι. Εἰ μένος εἰ ἐπεί τούτα ἀπληκτο ἀμφίσβητος μάχας τις τοις ἐνελθέντεσιν. The adversaries of these Corporealists do cautiously and piously assail them from the invisible region, fetching all things from above by way of descent, and by strength of reason concerning, that certain intelligible and incorporeal forms are the true or first substance, and not sensible things. But between these two there hath always been (faith he) a great war and contention. And yet in the sequel of his discourse he adds, that those Corporealists were then grown a little more modest and shame-faced than formerly their great champions had been; such as Democritus and Protagoras; for however they still persisted in this, that the soul was a body, yet they had not, it seems, the impudence to affirm, that wisdom and virtue were corporeal things, or bodies, as others before and since too have done. We see here, that Plato expressly afferts a substance distinct from body, which sometimes he calls ἄνω ἀνάμωσα, incorporeal substance, and sometimes ὁ τῶν ὑπότον ἰδεῶν, intelligible substance, in opposition to the other which he calls ἁπάντας, sensible. And it is plain to any one, that hath had the least acquaintance with Plato's philosophy, that the whole scope and drift of it, is to raise up mens minds from sense to a belief of incorporeal things as the most excellent: τὰ γὰρ ἀνάμωσα κάλλιστα ὅταν ἄνω ἀνάμωσα λόγος μῶν, ἂλλοι δὲ ὑδάς, σοφοὶ διώκουσιν, as he writes in another place 1; for incorporeal things, which are the greatest and most excellent things of all, are (faith he) discoverable by reason only, and nothing else. And his subterraneous cave, so famously known, and so elegantly described by him 2, where he supposes men tied with their backs towards the light, placed at a great distance from them, so that they could not turn about their heads to it neither, and therefore could see nothing but the shadows (of certain substances behind them) projected from it, which shadows they concluded to be the only substances and realities, and when they heard the sounds made by those bodies that were betwixt the light and them, or their reverberated echo's, they imputed them to those shadows which they saw; I say, all this is a description of the state of those men, who take body to be the only real and substantial thing in the world, and to do all that is done in it; and therefore often impute sense, reason, and understanding, to nothing but blood and brains in us.

XX. I might also shew in the next place, how Aristotle did not at all differ from Plato herein, he plainly affirming 3, ἄλλοι οὗτοι παρηγνοῦσι τὰ ἄνωτα, another substance besides sensible, ὅσιαν ἥξις ἡμών καὶ τεκμίρησεν τῶν ἄνωτῶν, a substance separable and also actually separated from sensibles, ἀνίκτων oδύν, an immovable nature or essence (subject to no generation or corruption) adding, that the Deity was to be sought for here: nay, such a substance, ἄν ὑπὸ τῶν ἑπεξετασμένων ἑτέρων ἄλλος ἀμέτρητος ἀνίκτως ἑτέρων, is that to which all things do join, as hath no magnitude at all, but is impartible and indivisible. He also blaming Zeno (not the Stoick, who was junior to Aristotel, but an ancient philosopher of that name) for making

1 In Politic. p. 182. Oper.
2 De Repub. Lib. VII. p. 485.
Proved clearly that Incorporeal - Book I.

king God to be a body, in these words ¹; αὐτὸς γὰρ ἄρα πάντα λέγει εἰςαὶ τὸν Θεόν ἐστι οὗ τὸν τὸ ἐμὲ τὸν ἐκ τεκνίτον αὐτὸς λέγων. ἀσώματος γὰρ οὐ πῶς ὡς σφαιρῶδης εἶν; ὅταν ὡς τὶ ἢς καὶ καὶ, ὥς ἢς ἡμᾶς, μνήμες φοντάς ἐν τοῖς ἐνει διὸ σώματι ἔστω, τι ἢς αὐτὸ κακὸς καὶ κακικάρι. Zeno implicitly affirms God to be a body, whether he mean him to be the whole corporeal universe, or some particular body; for if God were incorporeal, how could he be spherical? nor could he then either move or rest, being not properly in any place: but if God be a body, then nothing binders but that he may be moved. From which, and other places of Aristotle, it is plain enough also, that he did suppose incorporeal substance to be un-extended, and as such, not to have relation to any place. But this is a thing to be disputed afterwards. Indeed some learned men conceive Aristotle to have reprehended Zeno without cause, and that Zeno made God to be a sphere, or spherical, in no other sense, than Parmenides did in that known verfe of his ²;

Πάντοθεν εἰκόνις οὐαίσας ἐναλίσκειν ὅμοιον.

Wherein he is understood to describe the divine eternity. However, it plainly appears from hence, that according to Aristotle's sense, God was ἀσώματος, an incorporeal substance distinct from the World.

XXI. Now this doctrine, which Plato epecially was famous for affertzing, that there was ιόν ἀσώματος, incorporeal substance, and that the souls of men were such, but principally the Deity; Epicurus taking notice of it, endeavoured with all his might to confute it, arguing sometimes after this manner: There can be no incorporeal God (as Plato maintained) not only because no man can frame a conception of an incorporeal substance, but also because whatsoever is incorporeal must needs want sense, and prudence, and pleasure, all which things are included in the notion of God; and therefore an incorporeal Deity is a contradiction. And concerning the soul of man; ³ οἱ λέγουσιν ἀσώματον εἴναι τὸν ψυχήν ματαιάζειν, &c. They who say, that the soul is incorporeal, in any other sense, than as that word may be used to signify a subtile body, talk vainly and foolishly; for then it could neither be able to do nor suffer any thing. It could not act upon any other thing, because it could touch nothing; neither could it suffer from any thing, because it could not be touched by any thing; but it would be just like to vacuum or empty space, which can neither do nor suffer any thing, but only yield bodies a passage through it. From whence it is further evident, that this opinion was professedly maintained by some philosophers before Epicurus his time.

XXII. But Plato and Aristotle were not the firt inventors of it; for it is certain, that all those philosophers, who held the immortality of the human soul, and a God distinct from this visible world, (and so properly the creator of it and all its parts) did really affect incorporeal substance. For that a corporeal soul cannot be in its own nature immortal and incorruptible, is plain to every one's understanding, because of its parts being separable from one another; and whwoever denies God to be incorporeal, if he make

¹ Libro de Zenone, Xenophane, & Gorgiā, cap. IV. p. 844. Tom. II. Oper.
² Apud Ariflot. in Libro jam laudato, cap. IV. p. 843. Tom. II. Oper. et apud Platonem in Sophilīa, & veterum alios.
⁴ Vide Diog. Luërt. Lib. X. Segm. 67, 68. p. 630.
Chap. I. Substance was ascertained by the Ancients.

him any thing at all, he must needs make him to be either the whole corporeal world, or else a part of it. Wherefore if God be neither of these, he must then be an incorporeal substance. Now Plato was not the first, who ascertained these two things, but they were both maintained by many philosophers before him. Pherecydes Syrus, and Thales, were two of the most ancient philosophers among the Greeks; and it is laid of the former of them, that by his lectures and disputes concerning the immortality of the soul, he first drew off Pythagoras from another course of life to the study of philosophy. Pherecydes Syrus (faith Cicero, primus dixit animos hominum esse sempiternos. And Thales in an Epitome, directed to him, congratulates his being the first, that had designed to write to the Greeks concerning divine things; which Thales also (who was the head of the Ionick succession of philosophers, as Pythagoras of the Italick) is joined with Pythagoras and Plato, by the writer de placitis philosophorum; after this manner; οὐκ ἐπεστάντας αὐτοῖς ἀκαίρως τὸν ψυχὴν ὑποτεθεία, ως αὐτοῖς αἱ τελείωτοι καὶ οὐσία τούτοι. All these determined the soul to be incorporeal, making it to be naturally self-moving (or self-active) and an intelligible substance, that is, not tenable. Now he, that determines the soul to be incorporeal, must needs hold the Deity to be incorporeal much more. Aquam dixit Thales esse initium rerum (faith Cicero) Deum autem eam mentem, que ex aqua curat fingeret. Thales said that water was the first principle of all corporeal things, but that God was that mind, which formed all things out of water. For Thales was a Phoenician by extraction, and accordingly seemed to have received his two principles from thence, water, and the divine spirit moving upon the waters. The first whereof is thus expressed by Sanchoniathan, in his description of the Phoenician theology, Χωρὶς ὁλιγάκις ἰδεώδες, a turbid and dark chaos; and the second is intimated in these words, ὁριζόντα τὸ πνεῦμα τῶν ἰδίων ἀρχῶν, the Spirit was affected with love towards its own principles, perhaps expressing the force of the Hebrew word Merapebethe, and both of them implying an understanding prolixical goodness, forming and hatching the corporeal world into this perfection; or else a plattick power, subordian to it. Zeno (who was also originally a Phoenician) tells us, that Hesiod's chaos was water; and that the material heaven as well as earth was made out of water (according to the judgment of the best interpreters) is the genuine sense of scripture, 2 Pet. iii. 5, by which water some perhaps would understand a Chaos of atoms confusedly moved. But whether Thales were acquainted with the Atomical physiology or not; it is plain that he affirmed, besides the soul's immortality, a Deity distinct from the corporeal world.

We pass to Pythagoras, whom we have proved already to have been an Atomist; and it is well known also, that he was a profess'd Incorporealist. That he affirmed the immortality of the soul, and consequently its immateriality, is evident from his doctrine of pre-existence and transmigration: and

2. Tom II. Oper.
4. Tom VII. Oper.
8. Tom. IX. Oper.

2 Vide Scholiasten in Apollon. Argonamic.
3 Vid. Ptolemei, c. c. c. 11. 15. 16.
4 Vide Hi. de Veritate Relig. Chrifti.
5 Vide Plutarch. de Placitis Philof. Lib. I.
that he likewise held an incorporeal Deity distinct from the world, is a thing not questioned by any. But if there were any need of proving it, (because there are no monuments of his extant) perhaps it might be done from hence, because he was the chief propagator of that doctrine amongst the Greeks, concerning three hypostases in the Deity.

For, that Plato and his followers held ταί οὐσίαι οὐκ ουσίαι, three hypostases in the Deity, that were the first principles of all things, is a thing very well known to all; though we do not affirm, that these Platonic hypostases are exactly the same with those in the Christian trinity. Now Plato himself sufficiently intimates this not to have been his own invention; and Plotinus tells us, that it was παλαιός θεός, an ancient opinion before Plato's time, which had been delivered down by some of the Pythagoricks. Wherefore, I conceive, this must needs be one of those Platonic monstrosities, which Xenophon covertly taxes Plato for entertaining, and mingling with the Socratical philosophy, as if he had thereby corrupted the purity and simplicity of it. Though a Corporealift may pretend to be a theeift; yet I never heard, that any of them did ever assert a trinity, respectively to the Deity, unless it were such an one, as I think not fit here to mention.

XXIII. That Parmenides, who was likewise a Pythagorean, acknowledged a Deity distinct from the corporeal world, is evident from Plato 1. And Plotinus tells us also, that he was one of them, that asserted the triad of divine hypostases. Moreover, whereas there was a great controversy amongst the ancient philosophers before Plato's time 2, between such as held all things to flow, (as namely Heraclitus and Cratylus;) and others, who asserted that some things did stand, and that there was ἀξιόν ἔστιν, a certain immutable nature, to wit, an eternal mind, together with eternal and immutable truths, (amongst which were Parmenides and Melissus;) the former of these were all Corporealists, (this being the very reason why they made all things to flow, because they supposed all to be body) though these were not therefore all of them Atheists. But the latter were all both Incorporealists and Theists; for whosoever holds incorporeal substance, must needs (according to reason) also assert a Deity.

And although we did not before particularly mention Parmenides amongst theatomical philosophers, yet we conceive it to be manifest from hence, that he was one of that tribe, because he was an eminent afferrer of that principle, χάριν ὁμοίως ὑπάρχει τῶν ὑπάρχοντων, that no real entity is either made or destroyed, generated or corrupted. Which we shall afterwards plainly shew, to be the grand fundamental principle of the atomical philosophy.

XXIV. But whereas we did evidently prove before, that Empedocles was an atomical phyfliologer, it may notwithstanding with some colour of probability be doubted, whether he were not an Atheist, or at least a Corporealift, because Aristotle accuses him of these following things. First 3, of making knowledge

1 In Parmenide.
2 Vide Platon. in Theæteto, p. 130, 131. 3 Aristot. de Animâ, Lib. III. cap. III. p. 45. Tom. II. Oper.
knowledge to be sense, which is indeed a plain sign of a Corporealistical; and therefore in the next place also, of compounding the soul out of the four elements, making it to understand every corporeal thing by something of the fame within it itself, as fire by fire, and earth by earth; and lastly, of attributing much to fortune, and affirming that divers of the parts of animals were made such by chance, and that there were at first certain mongrel animals fortuitously produced, that were βεργείων και ἀδοξάτων, such as had something of the shape of an ox, together with the face of a man, (though they could not long continue;) which seems to give just cause of suspicion, that Empedocles atheized in the same manner that Democritus did.

To the first of these we reply, that some others, who had also read Empedocles’s poems, were of a different judgment from Aristotle as to that, conceiving Empedocles not to make sense, but reason the criterion of truth. Thus Empiricus informs us: Others say, that, according to Empedocles, the criterion of truth is not sense, but right reason; and also that right reason is of two sorts, the one divine, or divine, the other ἀδοξάτως, or human: of which the divine is inexplicable, but the human declarable. And there might be several passages cited out of those fragments of Empedocles his poems yet left, to confirm this; but we shall produce only this one:

Γνῶθι τινί ὑπίκει, νοεῖς δὲ γείλα ἐκαστω 4.

To this sense; Suspend thy affent to the corporeal senses, and consider every thing clearly with thy mind or reason.

And as to the second crimination, Aristotle has much weakened his own testimony here, by accusing Plato also of the very same thing. Πλατων τὸν ἄρσην τοῦ συνριπτοῦ τοῦ μενόν διὰ τὸν ἐρμόν ὁμοιός, τα δὲ πράγματα τοῦ ἄρσην τοῦ μενόν εἰσοί. Plato compounds the soul out of the four elements, because like is known by like, and things are from their principles. Wherefore it is probable, that Empedocles might be no more guiltless of this fault (of making the soul corporeal, and to consist of earth, water, air, and fire) than Plato was, who in all mens judgments was as free from it, as Aristotle himself, if not more. For Empedocles did in the same manner, as Pythagoras before him, and Plato after him, hold the transmigration of souls, and consequently, both their future immortality and pre-existence; and therefore must needs affect their incorporeity; Plutarch 7 rightly declaring this to have been his opinion; Ἐπεί δὲ τὸν καταλαμνήν γεγονότας καὶ τοὺς ἑπειθείως ἐναντίον, that as well those who are yet unborn, as those that are dead, have a being. He also affected human souls to be here in a lapid state 8; μελανάτας, καὶ ἵδως, καὶ ἑρμόν, wanderers, strangers, and fugitives from God; declaring, as Plutinus 9 tells us, that it was a divine law, ἄμαξανονσάς ταῖς ζωῆς περίκες ἴστιν ἱστασθα, that soul’s sinning should fall down into these earthly bodies. But the fullest record of the Empedoclean philosophy concerning the soul is contained in this of Hierocles 10.
Empedocles vindicated from being. Book I.

Now from what hath been already cited it is sufficiently manifest, that Empedocles was so far from being either an Atheist or Corporealift, that he was indeed a rank Pythagorist, as he is here called. And we might add hereunto, what Clemens Alexandrinus observes, that according to Empedocles, 

νο σωματικοι διαιεξωμεν, μακαριοι ματι τιναθα, μακαριωτεροι δε μια τοιωθε απαλλαγην ου χρυον τω τινοι ιναιμοιν έχοντες, αλλα ειαιναι αυταπαθεια δυσκολοι, 

'Αφιεναις άλλοις ουμαθα, οι τη τραπεζας, &c. If we live boldly and justly, we shall be happy here, and more happy after our departure hence; having our happiness not necessarily confined to time, but being able to rest and fix in it to all eternity; feaing with the other immortal beings, &c. We might also take notice, how, besides the immortal souls of men, he acknowledged demons or angels; declaring that some of these fell from heaven, and were since proscribed by a divine Nemesis. For these in Plutarch are called, ι Θεαλατον σεφαιοπλειας έκεινοι του 'Εμπεδοκλον σαμιαινας. These Empedoclean demons lapsed from heaven, and purged with divine vengeance; whose restless torment is there described in several verses of his. And we might observe likewise, how he acknowledged a natural and immutable justice, which was not topical and confined to places and countries, and relative to particular laws, but catholic and universal, and every where the fame, through infinite light and space; as he expresseth it with poetick pomp and bravery:

And the asserting of natural morality is no small argument of a Theist.
But what then shall we say to those other things, which Empedocles is charged with by Ariosto, that seem to have so rank a smell of atheism? Certainly those murgil and biform animals, that are said to have sprung up out of the earth by chance, look as if they were more a-kin to Democritus than Empedocles; and probably it is the fault of the copies, that it is read otherwise, there being no other philosopher that I know of, that could ever find any such thing in Empedocles his poems. But for the rest, if Ariosto do not misrepresent Empedocles, as he often doth Plato, then it must be granted, that he being a mechanical physiologer, as well as theologer, did something too much indulge to fortuitous mechanism; which seems to be an extravagancy, that mechanical philosophers and Atomists have been always more or less subject to. But Ariosto doth not charge Empedocles with resolving all things into fortuitous mechanism, as some philosophers have done of late, who yet pretend to be Theists and Incorporealists, but only that he would explain some things in that way. Nay, he clearly puts a difference betwixt Empedocles and the Democritick Atheists in these words subjoined: Evt. &c. which is as if he should have said, Empedocles resolved some things in the fabric and structure of animals into fortuitous mechanism; but there are certain other philosophers, namely Leucippus and Democritus, who would have all things subsist forever in the whole world, heaven and earth and animals, to be made by chance and the fortuitous motion of atoms, without a Deity. It seems very plain, that Empedocles his Philia and Neikos, his friendship and discord, which he makes to be the aρεχα διασήμων, the active cause, and principle of motion in the universe, was a certain platitick power, superior to fortuitous mechanism: and Ariosto himself acknowledges somewhere as much. And Plutarch tells us, that, according to Empedocles, the order and system of the world is not the result of material causes and fortuitous mechanism, but of a divine wisdom, assigning to every thing καινον την φυσιν διδωσι τηρφα, αλλ' υπερ η τε χρονον ζεεν ενοικοεν την κρατουνον: not such a place as nature would give it, but such as is most convenient for the good of the whole. Simplicius, who had read Empedocles, acquaints us, that he made two worlds, the one intellectual, the other sensible; and the former of these to be the exemplar and archetype of the latter. And so the writer De Placitis Philosophorum observes, that Empedocles made δυο κλησ, τον μεν δυο κτενων, τον δι Φαισμον, προφυλαι αιρεν. the one archetypal and intelligible, the other apparent or sensible.

But I need take no more pains to purge Empedocles from those two imputations of corporealism and atheism, since he hath so fully confuted them himself in those fragments of his still extant. First, by expressing such a hearty renunciation of the excellency of piety, and the wretchedness and foolishness of atheism in these verses:

6 ουκ ηθες διειτον πραττειν ινα υπερτερών, Διηθετι την ημικουφον, 

E

1 Some Verses of Empedocles, wherein he expressly maintains that opinion, are extant in 


3 Sympol. Lib. I. Quaest. II. p. 618. 

4 Commentar. ad Ariosto. Libr. Phylsac. 

5 Lib. II. cap. XX. p. 900. Tom. II. 

6 Aet. vii. cap. XIV. p. 733. 

To
To this sense: *He is happy, who hath his mind richly fraught and stored with the treasures of divine knowledge; but he miserable, whose mind is darkened as to the belief of a God. And, secondly, by denying God to have any human form, or members,

1 'Ο μὴν γὰρ βασιλεὺς κεφαλὴ καὶ ἡ γῆ νίκασαι, &c.

Or otherwise to be corporeal,

2 'Ο μὴ ἐνεργά 

And then positively affirming what he is,

3 Ἀλλὰ φράσαι ἰσόν χὶ ἀπεικόνισον ἦπερ 

Only a holy and ineffable mind, that by swift thoughts agitates the whole world.

XXV. And now we shall speak something also of Anaxagoras, having shewed before, that he was a spurious Atomist. For he likewise agreed with the other Atomists in this, that he assered incorporeal substance in general as the active cause and principle of motion in the universe, and particularly an incorporeal Deity distinct from the world, affirming, that there was beside atoms, ὁ χώος ὁ δικαστικὸς τὸ καὶ τᾶς ὁνομάς, (as it is express'd in Plato*) An ordering and disposing mind, that was the cause of all things. Which mind (as Aristotle tells us 1) he made to be μοῖνον τῶν ὄντων ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀμφιγὰς καὶ καθο- 

XXVI. And by this time we have made it evident, that those atomical physiologers, that were before Democritus and Leucippus, were all of them Incorporealists; joining theology and pneumatology, the doctrine of incorporeal substance and a Deity, together with their atomical physiology. This is a thing expressly noted concerning Ecphantus the Pythagorean in Stobæus 6, ἐκ ἀπλοῦν τῶν ἀτόμων συνεστάναι τὸν κόσμον, διὰκινηθῆναι ὑπὸ ἀτόμῳ προνοίας; Ecphantus held the corporeal world to consist of atoms, but yet to be ordered and governed by a divine providence: that is, he joined atomology and theology both together. And the same is also observed of Arcesilas, or perhaps Ar- 

Popp

1 Apud Tzetz. Chiliad. XIII. Hist. CCCCLXIV. v. 80. &c Ammonium in Comment. in Aristotel. πτερ εὐκορικάς, fol. 107. Edit. Aldin
3 Apud Tzetz. & Ammonium, ubi supra.
5 De Anima Lib. I. cap. II. p. 6. Tom. II. Oper.
Post hos Arcesilas divinæ mente parastam
Conjicit hanc molem, confessam partibus illis,
Quas atomos vocat ipse leves.

Now, I say, as Ecphantus and Archelaus asserted the corporeal world to be made of atoms, but yet notwithstanding held an incorporeal Deity different from the same, as the first principle of activity in it; so in like manner did all the other ancient Atomists generally before Democritus join theology and incorporealism with their atomical physiology. They did atomize as well as he, but they did not atheize; but that atheistical atomology was a thing first set on foot afterward by Leucippus and Democritus.

XXVII. But because many seem to be so strongly possessed with this prejudice, as if atheism were a natural and necessary appendix to atomism, and therefore will conclude, that the same persons could not possibly be Atomists and Incorporealis or Theists, we shall further make it evident, that there is not only no inconsistency betwixt the atomical physiology and theology, but also that there is, on the contrary, a most natural cognition between them.

And this we shall do two manner of ways; first, by inquiring into the origin of this philosophy, and considering what grounds or principles of reason they were, which first led the ancients into this atomical or mechanical way of physiologizing. And secondly, by making it appear, that the intrinsical constitution of this physiology is such, that whoever entertains it, if he do but thoroughly understand it, must of necessity acknowledge, that there is something else in the world besides body.

First therefore, this atomical physiology seems to have had its rise and origin from the strength of reason, exerting its own inward active power and vigour, and thereby bearing it self up against the prejudices of sense, and at length prevailing over them, after this manner. The ancients considering and revolting the ideas of their own minds, found that they had a clear and distinct conception of two things, as the general heads and principles of whatsoever was in the universe; the one whereof was passive matter, and the other active power, vigour and virtue. To the latter of which belongs both cogitation, and the power of moving matter, whether by express consciousness or no. Both which together may be called by one general name of life; so that they made these two general heads of being or entity, passive matter or bulk, and self-activity or life. The former of these was commonly called by the ancients the ἄλογον, that which suffers and receives, and the latter the τὸ ἀληθὲς, the active principle, and the τὸ διὰ τὴν κατανομήν, that from whence παρὰ ὑπὸ κατανομήν springs. In rerum natura (faith Cicero ¹ according to the general senile ἔρυθρος Philo. of the ancients) duo querenda sunt; unum, quæ materia sit, ex quæ quoque res efficiatur; alterum, quæ res sit que quicque efficiat: There are two things to be enquired after in nature; one, what is the matter out of which every thing is made; another, what is the active cause or efficient. To the same purpose Seneca ²; Esse debet aliquid unde fiat, deinde quæ fiat; hoc est causa, illud

¹ De finibus bonorum & malorum Lib. 1. ² Epistol LXV. Tom II. Oper. p. 163. 
*sup. VI. p. 2346. Tom. VIII. Oper.
illud materia: There must be something out of which a thing is made, and then something by which it is made; the latter is properly the cause, and the former the matter. Which is to be understood of corporeal things and their differences, that there must be both matter, and an active power, for the production of them. And so also that of Aristotle¹, ὃ συν οἰκίας μὲν ὀφείλει τῷ ἀρχέῳ ἔναν τῷ τοῦ παράγοντος, μὲν ὦ τῆς ὑλῆς. That, from whence the principle of motion is, is one cause, and the matter is another. Where Aristotle gives that name of cause to the matter also, though others did appropriate it to the active power. And the writer de Placitis Philosoporum² expresses this as the general sense of the ancients: ἀρχή τοῦ μιᾶς ὑλή τῶν ὁμόλογον ἐς ταχθείσαν μὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑπόκεισθαι, οὐκ ὅσος ἀρχή ἀρκεῖ ἐκ τῇ ἐπικομικῇ γενέσθαι μὴν ἐκ τῷ παράγοντι τῇ τοῦ φυσικῷ, τούτῳ τινὶ τῷ αὐτοκόσμῳ, τούτῳ τῷ χάλκῳ, τῷ τῷ ἀρτώ καὶ τῇ ἀλκοῖ ὑλῇ: It is impossible, that matter alone should be the sole principle of all things, but there must of necessity be supposed also an agent or efficient cause: as silver alone is not sufficient to make a cup, unless there be an artificer to work upon it. And the same is to be said concerning brass, wood, and other natural bodies.

Now as they apprehended a necessity of these two principles, so they conceived them to be such, as could not be confounded together into one and the same thing or substance, they having such distinct ideas and essential characters from one another; the Stoics being the only persons, who offering violence to their own apprehensions, rudely and unskilfully attempted to make these two distinct things to be one and the same substance. Wherefore as the first of these, viz. matter, or passive extended bulk, is taken by all for substance, and commonly called by the name of body; so the other, which is far the more noble of the two, being that, which acts upon the matter, and hath a commanding power over it, must needs be substance too, of a different kind from matter or body; and therefore immaterial or incorporeal substance. Neither did they find any other entity to be conceivable, besides these two, passive bulk or extention, which is corporeal substance, and internal self-activity or life, which is the essential character of substance incorporeal; to which latter belongs not only cogitation, but also the power of moving body.

Moreover, when they further considered the first of these, the material or corporeal principle, they being not able clearly to conceive any thing else in it, besides magnitude, figure, site, and motion or rest, which are all several modes of extended bulk, concluded therefore according to reason, that there was really nothing else existing in bodies without, besides the various complexions and conjugations of these simple elements, that is, nothing but mechanism. Whence it necessarily followed, that whatsoever else was supposed to be in bodies, was, indeed, nothing but our modes of sensation, or the fancies and passions in us begotten from them, mistaken for things really existing without us. And this is a thing so obvious, that some of those philosophers, who had taken little notice of the atomical physiology, had notwithstanding a suspicion of it; as for example Plotinus³, who writing of the criterion of truth, and the power of reason, hath these words, Καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνόητων ἔστιν ἐναργεύσαντα, ἀπεικόνισαν ὑπόπτων ἐν τοῖς ὑποκεῖσιν.


p. 520.
Chap. I. Atomism and Incorporeals.

Though the things of sense seem to have so clear a certainty, yet notwithstanding it is doubted concerning them, whether (the qualities of them) have any real existence at all in the things without us, and not rather a seeming existence only, in our own passions; and there is need of mind or understanding to judge in this case, and to determine the controversy, which sense alone cannot decide. But the ancient physiologists concluded without any hesitation, εἷς τῶν ἡσύχων ὕποκειται, καὶ οὐκ εἰς τὰς ἐπιστήμους τοὺς πνεύματα. That the nature of being in itself is not the same thing with my being sweetened, nor of wormwood with that sense of bitterness which I have from it, διὰ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν δεικτῶν. That the nature of being is not the same thing with my being sweetened, nor of wormwood with that sense of bitterness which I have from it, διὰ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν δεικτῶν. The nature of being is not the same thing with my being sweetened, nor of wormwood with that sense of bitterness which I have from it, διὰ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν δεικτῶν.

I lay therefore, that the ancients concluded the absolute nature of corporeal things in themselves to be nothing but a certain disposition of parts, in respect of magnitude, figure, fit, and motion, which in tastes cause us to be differently affected with those senses of sweetnefs and bitterness, and in sight with those fancies of colours, and accordingly in the other senses with other fancies; and that the corporeal world was to be explained by these two things, whereof one is absolute in the bodies without us, the various mechanism of them; the other relative only to us, the different fancies in us, caused by the respective differences of them in themselves. Which fancies or fantaftick ideas are no modes of the bodies without us, but of that only in our selves, which is cogitative or self-active, that is, incorporeal. For the fenfible idea’s of hot and cold, red and green, &c. cannot be clearly conceived by us as modes of the bodies without us, but they may be easily apprehended as modes of cogitation, that is, of fenfation, or sympathyatical perception in us.

The result of all which was, that whatsoever is either in our selves, or the whole world, was to be reduced to one or other of these two principles; passive matter, and extended bulk, or self-active power and virtue; corporeal or incorporeal substance; mechanism or life; or else to a complication of them both together.

XXVIII. From this general account, which we have now given of the origin of the atomical physiology, it appears, that the doctrine of incorporeal substance sprung up together with it. But this will be further manifest from that which follows. For we shall in the next place shew, how this philosophy did, in especial manner, owe its original to the improvement of one particular principle of reason, over and besides all the rest; namely, that famous axiom, so much talked of among the ancients,

1 De nihil nihil, in nihilum nihil reverti;

That nothing can come from nothing, nor go to nothing. For though Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius abused this theorem, endeavouring to carry it further than

1 Persil Satir. III. ver. 84.
than the intention of the first Atomists, to the disproving of a divine creation of any thing out of nothing by it; Nullam rem à nihilo gigni divinitatis unquam⁴; and consequently of a Deity: yet as the meaning of it was at first confined and restrained, that nothing of itself could come from nothing nor go to nothing, or that according to the ordinary course of nature (without an extraordinary divine power) nothing could be rais'd from nothing, nor reduced to nothing; it is not only an undoubted rule of reason in itself, but it was also the principal original of that atomical physiolog, which, discarding forms and qualities, acknowledged really nothing else in body besides mechanism.

Wherefore it was not in vain, or to no purpose, that Laertius in the life of Democritus² takes notice of this as one of his Dogmata, μηδὲν ἐκ τοῦ μηδάν γί-

νεθαι, μηδὲ τοῦ μή διαφέρωθαι, that nothing was made or generated out of nothing, nor corrupted into nothing; this being a fundamental principle, not only of his atheism, but also of that very atomical physiology it self, which he purfued. And Epicurus, in his epiflile to Herodotus³, plainly fetches the beginning of all his philofophy from hence: Πρώτου μὲν οἷς ὑδάς γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ μη
dôματος, ἲν δὲ διαφέρεται εἰς τὸ μη δῦν. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγγύτερον το ἐκφαυάμενον ἐκ τοῦ μη δολοπο
tον ἢ ταὐτὸ ἤ ἐγγύτερον, σπαράζοντες διὰν προσθείμενον ὡς το ιδέας, ὡς τὸ ἀβαδίζω-

menoν ἐκ τοῦ μη δῦν, ταῦτα ἄν ταπολάλαι ἑκ πράγματα ἐκ δολοὶ τον εἰς ἄδικον. We fetch the beginning of our philofophy (faith he) from hence, that nothing is made out of nothing or destroyed to nothing; for if things were made out of nothing, then every thing might be made out of every thing, neither would there be any need of seeds. And if whatsoever is corrupted were destroyed to nothing, then all things would at length be brought to nothing. Lucretius in like manner beginning here, inffists more largely upon those grounds of reason hinted by Epicurus. And firft, that nothing can be made out of nothing he proves thus;

⁴ Nam sī de nihilo fierent, e x ommibus rebus
Omne genus nasci posset : nil semine egeret:
E mare primium homines & terra posset oriri
Squamigerum genus, &c.
Nec fructus idem arboribus conflare solarent,
Sed nutarentur : ferre omnes omnia posse
Praterea cur vere reseram, frumenta calore,
Vites autumno fundi suadente videmus? &c.
Quōd sī de nihilo fierent, subitō exorantur
Incerto statio atque alienis partibus annī.

In like manner he argues, to prove that nothing is corrupted into nothing:

⁵ Huc accedit uti quicque in sua corpora rustiam
Difsekat natura; neque ad nihilum interim conse
Nam sī quid mortale à cunctis partibus esse
Ex oculis res quaerendo repetere crepta periret.

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³ Lucret. Lib. I. ver. 151.
² Lib. IX. Segm. 42. p. 572.
¹ Apud Dog. Lucret. Lib. X. Segm. 58.
§ Id. Lib. I. ver. 216, &c.
Chap. I.

nor goes to Nothing.

Præterea quecumque venisti amovet atas,
Si penitus perimit, consumens materiam omne,
Unde animale genus generatim in lumina vitae
Reddicit Venus? aut reddidit Deus dala tellus
Unde alit aqae æquet? generatim fabula preebens, &c.

1 Hand igitur penitus perruit quecumque eidentur,
Quando altud ex alio reficit natura; nec ullam
Rem gigni patitur nisi morte adjutam aliena.

In which passages, though it be plain, that Lucretius doth not immediately drive at atheism, and nothing else, but primarily at the establishment of a peculiar kind of atomical physiology, upon which indeed these Democriticks afterward endeavoured to graft atheism; yet to take away that sufficicion, we shall in the next place shew, that generally the other ancient Physiologers also, who were Theists, did likewise build the structure of their philosophy upon the same foundation, that nothing can come from nothing, nor go to nothing: as for example, Parmenides, Melissus, Zeno, Xenophanes, Anaxagoras and Empedocles. Of Parmenides and Melissus Aristotle thus writes, 3, άδιν ψεύδαι φανεν εκ θεώρησι των θεών. They say that no real entity is either generated or corrupted, that is, made anew out of nothing, or destroy'd to nothing. And Simplicius tells us, that Parmenides gave a notable reacon for the confirmation of this affterion, that nothing in nature could be made out of nothing, αιτιω το δει τελος εκ νιν που, γενέσθαι το γνώμην, Ἐκμαστι στό Παρ-μενίδος προνοηκεν, ῥώς γάρ φησι, ει εν τα μη διξ, τις ή αποκλίβα τις τοτε γε-
νεσθαι οτε ινάητε, ἀλλα μη πρωτερον η ἡτερον. Because if anything be made out of nothing, then there could be no cause, why it should then be made, and neither sooner nor later. Again Aristotle 4 testifies of Xenophanes and Zeno, that they made this a main principle of their philosophy, μη ειδοτε ρώ; φησι αν ποι. ει κε μη-
περθε, 5 that it cannot be, that any thing should be made out of nothing: And of this Xenophanes, Sextus the philosopher tells us, 6, that he held οτι τι η αννο-
ματείστως: That there was but one God, and that he was incorporeal, speaking thus of him;

Εις οτις ουλις οτις ει ανθρώπων μηνος,
Ωστε οὔπως Συντότιν ομοιος, οὔπω μόροι.

Aristotle 6 also writes in like manner concerning Empedocles, ἀποκτω ποιητα κα-
κειμέν οραλογει ότι ικ τα μη διξ ομφιλκου εις γενεσθαι, το τε δι ελλυκοίς κατ'
The Origin of the
Book I.

v. 

Empedocles acknowledges the very same with other philosophers, that it is impossible anything should be made out of nothing, or perish into nothing. And as for Anaxagoras, it is sufficiently known to all, that his Homeomeria, or doctrine of similar atoms, (which was a certain spurious kind of atomism) was nothing but a superstructure made upon this foundation. Besides all which, Aristotle * pronounces universally concerning the ancient physiologers without any exception, that they agreed in this one thing, ἑπιστήμη, and in the relation of the word ρήματος, of τοιούτων γίγνεσθαι: The physiologers generally agree in this (laying it down for a grand foundation) that it is impossible, that anything should be made out of nothing. And again he calls this κατὰ δόξαν τῶν Φυσικῶν, the common opinion of naturalists; intimating also, that they concluded it the greatest absurdity, that any physiologist could be guilty of, to lay down such principles, as from whence it would follow, that any real entity in nature did come from nothing, and go to nothing.

Now it may well be supposed, that all these ancient physiologers (the most of which were also Theists) did not keep such a stir about this busines for nothing; and therefore we are in the next place to shew, what it was that they drove at in it. And we do affirm, that one thing, which they all aimed at, who insisted upon the forementioned principle, was the establishing some atomical physiolog of or other, but most of them at such as takes away all forms and qualities of bodies, (as entities really distinct from the matter and substance) and resolves all into mechanism and fancy. For it is plain, that if the forms and qualities of bodies be entities really distinct from the substance, and its various modifications, of figure, size, and motion, that then in all the changes and transmutations of nature, all the generations and alterations of body, (those forms and qualities being supposed to have no real existence any where before) something must of necessity be created or produced miraculously out of nothing; as likewise reduced into nothing in the corruptions of them, they having no being any where afterward. As for example; when ever a candle is but lighted or kindled into a flame, there must needs be a new form of fire, and new qualities of light and heat, really distinct from the matter and substance, produced out of nothing, that is, created; and the same again reduced into nothing, or annihilated, when the flame is extingushed. Thus, when water is but congealed at any time into snow, hail, or ice, and when it is again dissolved; when wax is by liquefaction made soft and transparent, and changed to moft of our senses; when the same kind of nourishment taken in by animals is turned into blood, milk, flesh, bones, nerves, and all the other similar parts; when that, which was in the form of bright flame, appears in the form of dark smoke; and that which was in the form of vapour, in the form of rain or water, or the like: I say, that in all these mutations of bodies, there must needs be something made out of nothing. But that in all the Protean transformations of nature, which happen continually, there should be real

real entities thus perpetually produced out of nothing and reduced to nothing, seemed to be so great a paradox to the ancients, that they could by no means admit of it. Because, as we have already declared, first they concluded it clearly impossible by reason, that any real entity should of itself arise out of nothing; and secondly, they thought it very absurd to bring God upon the stage, with his miraculous extraordinary power, perpetually at every turn; as also, that every thing might be made out of every thing, and there would be no cause in nature for the production of one thing rather than another, and at this time rather than that, if they were miraculously made out of nothing. Wherefore they sagaciously apprehended, that there must needs be some other mystery or intrigue of nature in this business, than was commonly dream'd of, or suspected; which they concluded to be this, that in all these transformations there were no such real entities of forms and qualities distinct from the matter, and the various disposition of its parts, in respect of figure, size and motion (as is vulgarly supposed) produced and destroyed; but that all these feats were done, either by the concretion and secretion of actually inexistant parts, or else by the different modifications of the same pre-existent matter, or the insensible parts thereof. This only being added hereunto, that from those different modifications of the small particles of bodies, (they being not so distinctly perceived by our senses) there are begotten in us certain confused phasmatas or phantasmata, apparitions, fancies and passions, as of light and colours, heat and cold, and the like, which are those things, that are vulgarly mistaken for real qualities existing in the bodies without us; whereas indeed there is nothing absolutely in the bodies themselves like to those fantastick ideas that we have of them; and yet they are wisely contriv'd by the author of nature for the adorning and embellishing of the corporeal world to us.

So that they conceived, bodies were to be considered two manner of ways; either as they are absolutely in themselves, or else as they are relatively to us: and as they are absolutely in themselves, that so there never was any entity really distinct from the substance produced in them out of nothing, nor corrupted or destroyed to nothing, but only the accidents and modifications altered. Which accidents and modifications are no entities really distinct from their substance; for as much as the same body may be put into several shapes and figures, and the same man may successively stand, sit, kneel and walk, without the production of any new entities really distinct from the substance of his body. So that the generations, corruptions and alterations of inanimate bodies are not terminated in the production or destruction of any substantial forms, or real entities distinct from the substance, but only in different modifications of it. But secondly, as bodies are considered relatively to us, that so besides their different modifications and mechanical alterations, there are also different fancies, seemings, and apparitions begotten in us from them; which unwary and unskilful philosophers mistake for absolute forms and qualities in bodies themselves. And thus they concluded, that all the phenomena of inanimate bodies, and their various transformations, might be clearly resolved into these two things: partly something that is real and absolute.
The Origin of the 

Book I.

absolute in bodies themselves, which is nothing but their different mechanism, or disposition of parts in respect of figure, size and motion; and partly something that is fantastical in the sentient.

That the atomical phycology did emerge after this manner from that principle of reason, that nothing comes from nothing, nor goes to nothing, might be further convinced from the testimony of Aristotle, 1 writing thus concerning it: 'Εκ των ρυθμων και αλλων τακταιων ενυπηρχουν αριστήραι εν τεραπευόμενοι ανάλογα ρυθμωμεναι η εις δομων η ειη μη δομων τον δε η το μει, εικ μη δουντα ρυθμωμενα αδιακολοι, περι ροη ταυτης ομορρομονουτοι της δοξης αποκλειει οι περι φυσεως το λευτου ησ εσμελεως εις αναικης ενσυνεις εις δομων μεν και εις ημεροντας γυναις, διε ει συμκροτητα των διων εις ακαιμηταν ημων. The ancient physiologers concluded, that because contraries were made out of one another, that therefore they were before (one way or other) inexistent; arguing in this manner, that if whatsoever be made, must needs be made out of something or out of nothing, and this latter (that any thing should be made out of nothing) is impossible, according to the general consent of all the ancient physiologers; then it follows of necessity, that all corporeal things are made or generated out of things that were really before and inexistent, though by reason of the smallness of their bulk they were insensible to us. Where Aristotle plainly intimates, that all the ancient philosophers, whosoever inflected upon this principle, that, nothing comes from, nor goes to nothing, were one way or other atomical, and did resolve all corporeal things into διων τυχεις δι εις των συμκροτητα ακαιμητας ημων, certain molecule or corpuscula, which by reason of their smallness were insensible to us, that is, into atoms. But yet there was a difference between these Atomists, forasmuch as Anaxagoras was such an Atomist, as did notwithstanding hold forms and qualities really distinct from the mechanical modifications of bodies. For he not being able (as it seems) well to understand that other atomical physiology of the ancients, that, exploding qualities, solved all corporeal phænomena by mechanism and fancy; and yet acknowledging, that that principle of theirs, which they went upon, must needs be true, that nothing could of itself come from nothing nor go to nothing, fram'd a new kind of atomology of his own, in supposing the whole corporeal world or mass of matter to consist of similar atoms, that is, such as were originally ended with all those different forms and qualities that are vulgarly conceived to be in bodies, some bony, some leathly, some fiery, some watery, some white, some black, some bitter, some sweet and the like, so that all bodies whatsoever had some of all sorts of these atoms (which are in a manner infinite) specifically differing from one another in them. 2 Πως ειναι παρα μερικαι, διότι πως ειναι παρα γινεται, θεωμαι εις διαφεροντα και προσοφευμεναι εις αλλων εις τα μολυτα υπερεξους διε το πληθυς εις τη μεγις των απειρων, etc. That all things were in every thing mingled together, because they saw, that every thing was made of every thing; but that things seemed to differ from one another, and were denominated to be this or that, from those atoms, which are most predominant in the mixture, by reason of their multiplicity: Whence he concluded, that all the generations,
generations, corruptions and alterations of bodies were made by nothing but the concretions and secretions of inexistant and pre-existant atoms of different forms and qualities, without the production of any new form and quality out of nothing, or the reduction of any into nothing. This very account Aristotle gives of the Anaxagorean hypothesis: ἔσεις ἀναξερχομένης ὑποτάξιν τὰ σοφίσκια, εἰς τοῦ ὑπολευκήθην, τέτυχος δὲ ἔσσε τοῦ φυσικοῦ ἵναι ἀλήθη, ὡς οἱ γνώμενοι σαῦρικα ἐκ τῶν μὲ ζηλος. Anaxagoras seemeth therefore to make infinite atoms enticed with several forms and qualities to be the elements of bodies, because he supposeth that common opinion of physiologers to be true, that nothing is made of nothing. But all the other antient physiologers that were before Anaxagoras, and likewise those after him, who insisting upon the same principle of nothing coming from nothing did not Anaxagorize, as Empedocles, Democritus and Protagoras, mufh needs make διὰς διόροις, dissimilar molecule, and ἄτομος ἀπὸς, atoms unformed and unqualified, otherwise than by magnitude, figure and motion, to be the principles of bodies, and caihiering forms and qualities (as real entities distinct from the matter) resolve all corporeal phenomena into mechanism and fancy. Because, if no real entity can come from nothing, nor go to nothing, then one of these two things is absolutely necessary, that either these corporeal forms and qualities, being real entities distinct from the matter, should exist before generations and after corruptions, in certain infensible atoms originally such, according to the Anaxagorean doctrine; or else, that they should not be real entities distinct from the matter, but only the different modifications and mechanism of it, together with different fancies. And thus we have made it evident, that the genuine atomical physiogy di spring originally from this principle of reason, that no real entity does of itself come from nothing, nor go to nothing.

XXIX. Now we shall in the next place shew, how this very same principle of reason, which induced the ancients to reject substantial forms and qualities of bodies, and to physiologize atomically, led them also unavoidably to assert incorporeal substances; and that the souls of men and animals were such, neither generated nor corrupted. They had argued against substantial forms and qualities, as we have shewed, in this manner, that since the forms and qualities of bodies are suppos'd by all to be generated and corrupted, made anew out of nothing and destroyed to nothing, that therefore they could not be real entities distinct from the substance of matter, but only different modifications of it in respect of figure, size and motion, causing different sensations in us; and were all to be resolved into mechanism and fancy. For as for that conceit of Anaxagoras, of pre and post-existent atoms, ended with all those several forms and qualities of bodies ingenerably and incorruptibly; it was nothing but an adulteration of the genuine atomical philosophy, and a mere dream of his, in which very few followed him. And now they argue contrariwise for the souls of men and animals, in this manner; because they are plainly real entities distinct from the substance of matter and its modification, and men and brutes are not mere machines, neither can life and cogitation, sens and consciousness, reason and understanding, appetite and will ever
ever result from magnitudes, figures, sites and motions, that therefore they are not corporeally generated and corrupted, as the forms and qualities of bodies are. *Αλλά εν μέσῳ περιτέλειας προπολίσμος. It is impossible for a real entity to be made or generated from nothing pre-existing. Now there is nothing of soul and mind, reason and understanding, nor indeed of cogitation and life, contained in the modifications and mechanism of bodies; and therefore to make soul and mind to rise out of body whenever a man is generated, would be plainly to make a real entity to come out of nothing, which is impossible. I say, because the forms and qualities of bodies are generated and corrupted, made and unmade, in the ordinary course of nature, therefore they concluded, that they were not real entities distinct from the substance of body and its various modifications: but because soul and mind is plainly a real entity distinct from the substance of body, its modification and mechanism; that therefore it was not a thing generated and corrupted, made and unmade, but such as had a being of its own, a substantial thing by itself. Real entities and substances are not generated and corrupted, but only modifications.

Wherefore these ancients apprehended, that there was a great difference betwixt the souls of men and animals and the forms and qualities of other inanimate bodies, and consequently betwixt their several productions: forasmuch as in the generation of inanimate bodies there is no real entity acquired distinct from the substance of the thing itself, but only a peculiar modification of it. The form of flone, or of timber, of blood, flesh and bone, and such other natural bodies generated, is no more a distinct substance or entity from the matter, than the form of an house, stool or table is: there is no more new entity acquired in the generation of natural bodies, than there is in the production of artificial ones. When water is turned into vapour, candle into flame, flame into smoke, grass into milk, blood and bones, there is no more miraculous production of something out of nothing, than when wool is made into cloth, or flax into linen; when a rude and unpolish'd stone is hewn into a beautiful statue; when brick, timber and mortar, that lay together before disorderly, is brought into the form of a stately palace; there being nothing neither in one nor other of these, but only a different disposition and modification of pre-existent matter. Which matter of the universe is always substantially the same, and neither more nor less, but only Proteanly transformed into different shapes. Thus we see, that the generation of all inanimate bodies is nothing but the change of accidents and modifications, the substance being really the same both before and after. But in the generations of men and animals, besides the new disposition of the parts of matter and its organization, there is also the acquisition and conjunction of another real entity or substance distinct from the matter, which could not be generated out of it, but must needs come into it from other way. Though there be no substantial difference between a stately house or palace standing, and all the materials of the same ruined and demolished, but only a difference of accidents and modifications; yet between a living man and a dead carcasse, there is besides the accidental modification of the body, another sub-
Chap. I. Principle with Atomism.

stantial difference, there being a substantial soul and incorporeal inhabitant dwelling in the one and acting of it, which the other is now deferted of. And it is very observable, that Anaxagoras himself, who made bony and flesby atoms, hot and cold, red and green, and the like, which he supposed to exist before generations and after corruptions, always immutably the same, (that so nothing might come from nothing and go to nothing) yet he did not make any animalish atoms sentient and rational. The reason whereof could not be, because he did not think sense and understanding to be as real entities as hot and cold, red and green; but because they could not be supposed to be corporeal forms and qualities, but must needs belong to another substance that was incorporeal. And therefore Anaxagoras could not but acknowledge, that all souls and lives did pre and post-exist by themselves, as well as those corporeal forms and qualities, in his similar atoms.

XXX. And now it is already manifest, that from the same principle of reason before-mentioned, that nothing of it self can come from nothing, nor go to nothing, the ancient philosophers were induced likewise to asser the soul's immortality, together with its incorporeity or distinctness from the body. No substantial entity ever vanifeth of itself into nothing; for if it did, then in length of time all might come to be nothing. But the soul is a substantial entity, really distinct from the body, and not the mere modification of it; and therefore when a man dies, his soul must still remain and continue to have a being somewhere else in the universe. All the changes that are in nature, are either accidental transformations and different modifications of the same substance, or else they are conjunctions and separations, or anagrammatical tranpositions of things in the universe; the substance of the whole remaining always entirely the same. The generation and corruption of inanimate bodies is but like the making of a house, stool, or table, and the unmaking or marring of them again; either different modifications of one and the same substance, or else divers mixtures and separations, concretions and secretions. And the generation and corruption of animals is likewise nothing but

μίξις τε διάλλαξις τε μαγιστρων,

The conjunction of souls together with such particular bodies, and the separation of them again from one another, and so as it were the anagrammatical tranposition of them in the universe. That soul and life, that is now fled and gone from a lifeless carcase, is only a los to that particular body or com-pages of matter, which by means thereof is now disanimated; but it is no los to the whole, it being but tranposed in the universe, and lodged somewhere else.

XXXI. It is also further evident, that this same principle, which thus led the ancients to hold the soul's immortality, or its future permanency after death,

death, must needs determine them likewise to maintain its προπάρχους, or pre-existence, and consequently its μετασώματος, or transmigration. For that, which did pre-exist before the generation of any animal, and was then somewhere else, must needs transmigrate into the body of that animal where now it is. But as for that other transmigration of human souls into the bodies of brutes, though it cannot be denied but that many of these ancients admitted it also, yet Timæus Locrus ¹, and divers others of the Pythagoreans, rejected it, any otherwise than as it might be taken for an allegorical description of that beaftly transformation, that is made of mens souls by vice. Aristotle tells us again ², agreeably to what was declared before, ὅτι μάλιστα Φιλοσόφων δικτίλησαν οἱ πάντες τὸ ἐκ μηδενὸς γίνωσθαι τι προπάρχους: that the ancient philosophers were afraid of nothing more, than this one thing, that any thing should be made out of nothing pre-existent: and therefore they must needs conclude, that the souls of all animals pre-existed before their generations. And indeed it is a thing very well known, that, according to the sense of philosophers, these two things were always included together in that one opinion of the soul's immortality, namely its pre-existence as well as its post-existence. Neither was there ever any of the ancients before Christianity, that held the soul's future permanency after death, who did not likewise assert its pre-existence; they clearly perceiving, that if it were once granted, that the soul was generated, it could never be proved but that it might be also corrupted. And therefore the assertors of the soul's immortality commonly begun here; first, to prove its pre-existence, proceeding thence afterward to establish its permanency after death. This is the method used in Plato ³, ὅς ἰημών ἢ ψυχή περὶ τῶν παράκολον ἧς καὶ ἰδὼν, ὥστε τὰ τὰ διαφόραν τι νοεῖν καὶ ἀγάπην νεφελήνως: Our soul was somewhere, before it came to exist in this present human form, and from thence it appears to be immortal, and such as will subsist after death. And the chief demonstration of the soul's pre-existence to the ancients before Plato was this, because it is an entity really distinct from body or matter and the modifications of it; and no real substantial entity can either spring of itself out of nothing, or be made out of any other substance distinct from it, because nothing can be made in μετασωμάτωμας ἢ προπάρχους, from nothing either in-existing or pre-existing; all natural generations being but the various dispositions and modifications of what was before existent in the universe. But there was nothing of soul and mind in-existing and pre-existing in body before, there being nothing of life and cogitation in magnitude, figure, fit, and motion. Wherefore this must needs be, not a thing made or generated, as corporeal forms and qualities are, but such as hath a being in nature ingeniously and incorruptibly. The mechanism of human body was a thing made and generated, it being only a different modification of what was before existent, and having no new entity in it distinct from the substance: and the totum or compositum of a man or animal may be said to be generated and corrupted, in regard of the union and disunion, conjunction and separation of those two parts, the soul and body. But the soul itself, according to these principles,

¹ De Animal Mundi & Naturâ, inter Scriptores Mythologicos à Tho. Gale editus, p. 560.
³ In Phædron, p. 532.
principles, is neither a thing generable nor corruptible, but was as well before the generation, and will be after the deaths and corruptions of men, as the substance of their body, which is supposed by all to have been from the first creation, and no part of it to be annihilated or lost after death, but only scattered and dispersed in the universe. Thus the ancient Atomists concluded, that souls and lives being substantial entities by themselves, were all of them as old as any other substance in the universe, and as the whole mass of matter, and every smallest atom of it is: that is, they who maintained the eternity of the world, did consequently assert also aeternitatem animorum (as Cicero calls it) the eternity of souls and minds. But they, who conceived the world to have had a temporary beginning or creation, held the coeity of all souls with it, and would by no means be induced to think, that every atom of sensibless matter and particle of dust had such a privilege and pre-eminency over the souls of men and animals, as to be the senior to them. 

Syntitus, though a Christian, yet having been educated in this philosophy, could not be induced by the hopes of a bishoprick to flifle or difsemble this sentiment of his mind: 'אֵיתוֹל, פְּרַמְיַס יִקְבּוּק וּסְהַקִּיקוּ, פְּרַמְיַס יִקְבּוּק וּסְהַקִּיקוּ. I shall never be persuaded to think my soul to be younger than my body. But such, it seems, was the temper of those times, that he was not only dispenfed withal as to this, but also as to another heterodoxy of his concerning the resurrection.

XXXII. It is already plain also, that this doctrine of the ancient Atomists concerning the immateriality and immortality, the pre and post-existence of souls, was not confined by them to human souls only, but extended universally to all souls and lives whatsoever; it being a thing, that was hardly ever called into doubt or question by any before Cartesius, whether the souls of brutes had any sense, cogitation or consciousnes in them or no. Now all life, sense and cogitation was undoubtedly concluded by them to be an entity really distinct from the substance of body, and not the mere modification, motion or mechanism of it; life and mechanism being two distinct ideas of the mind, which cannot be confounded together. Wherefore they resolved, that all lives and souls whatsoever, which now are in the world, ever were from the first beginning of it, and ever will be; that there will be no new ones produced, which are not already, and have not always been, nor any of those, which now are, destroyed, any more than the substance of any matter will be created or annihilated. So that the whole system of the created universe, consisting of body, and particular incorporeal substances or souls, in the successive generations and corruptions or deaths of men and other animals, was, according to them, really nothing else, but one and the same thing perpetually anagrammatizated, or but like many different syllables and words variously and successively compos'd out of the same pre-existent elements or letters.

XXXIII. We have now declared, how the same principle of reason, which made the ancient physiologers to become Atomists, must needs induce them also

1 Epistol. CV. p. 249. Oper.
also to be Incorporealists; how the same thing, which persuaded them, that corporeal forms were no real entities distinct from the substance of the body, but only the different modifications and mechanisms of it, convinced them likewise, that all cogitative beings, all souls and lives whatsoever, were in-generable and incorruptible, and as well pre-existent before the generations of particular animals, as post-existent after their deaths and corruptions. Nothing now remains but only to show more particularly, that it was de facto thus; that the same persons did from this principle (that nothing can come from nothing and go to nothing) both atomize in their physiology, taking away all substantial forms and qualities, and also theologize or incorpo-realize, affording souls to be a substance really distinct from matter and immortal, as also to pre-exist. And this we shall do from Empedocles, and first from that passage of his cited before in part:

Which I find Latin'd thus:

Ate alind dico; nihil est mortalibus ortus,
Est nihil interitus, qui rebus morte paratur;
Missio sed solum est, & concilatia rerum
Missilium; hae dico solita est mortalibus ortus.

The full sense whereof is plainly this, that there is no form, or production of any thing, which was not before; no new substance made, which did not really pre-exist: and therefore that in the generations and corruptions of inanimate bodies, there is no form or quality really distinct from the substance produced and destroyed, but only a various composition and modification of matter. But in the generations and corruptions of men and animals, where the souls are substances really distinct from the matter, that there, there is nothing but the conjunction and separation of souls and particular bodies, existing both before and after, not the production of any new soul into being, which was not before, nor the absolute death and destruction of any into nothing. Which is further expressed in these following verses:

To
To this sense; *that they are infants in understanding, and short-sighted, who think any thing to be made, which was nothing before, or anything to die, so as to be destroyed to nothing.* Upon which Plutarch glosses after this manner: *νυ ἄνωτερ γίνεσθαι, ἄλλα τινὶ ἐκ μὴ ἀνά ν, ἰδι Θυρακά, ἁλλά τὸν πάντα, ταῦτα τὸν ἐκ τῶν ἀπολύσων.* Empedocles does not here destroy generation, but only such as is out of nothing; nor corruption, but such as is into nothing. Which, as we have already intimated, is to be understood differently in respect to inanimate and animate things; for in things inanimate there is nothing produced or destroyed, because the forms and qualities of them are no entities really distinct from the substance, but only diverse mixtures and modifications. But in animate things, where the souls are real entities really distinct from the substance of the body, there is nothing produced nor destroyed neither, because those souls do both exist before their generations, and after their corruptions; which business, as to men and souls, is again more fully expressed thus; 

\[\text{\textit{O}}\text{\textit{ι}}\text{Δω \\textit{α}πο \textit{τω} \textit{το} \textit{ποι} \textit{το} \textit{σφ} \textit{ος} \textit{Φρει} \textit{ο} \textit{μα \πι} \textit{εσκο}, \text{\textit{νη} \δε \textit{τη} \textit{το} \textit{με} \textit{τω} \textit{βη} \textit{θε} \textit{σι}, \text{\textit{τή} \textit{τω} \textit{βι} \textit{α} \textit{το} \textit{ν} \textit{καλ} \textit{εσι}}, \text{\textit{τά} \textit{τρι} \textit{με} \textit{ν} \textit{εν} \textit{ει} \textit{σι}, \text{\textit{κα} \textit{τη} \textit{τω} \textit{τρι} \textit{κα} \textit{ει} \textit{να} \textit{κα} \textit{ει} \textit{σι}, \text{\textit{πη} \textit{ν} \δε \textit{πα} \textit{γι} \textit{ντε \πε\sigma} \textit{το} \textit{κα} \textit{λυ} \textit{ο} \textit{ι} \textit{εν} \textit{οδι} \textit{ει} \textit{σι}.} \]

That good and ill did first us here attend,  
And not from time before, the soul defend;  
That here alone we live, and sobren  
Hence we depart, we forthwith then  
Turn to our old non-entity again;  
Certes ought not to be believ'd by wise and learned men.

Wherefore, according to Empedocles, this is to be accounted one of the vulgar errors, that men then only have a being and are capable of good and evil, when they live here that which is called life; but that both before they are born, and after they are dead, they are perfectly nothing.

And besides Empedocles, the same is represented by the Greek tragedian also*, as the sense of the ancient philosophers;

\[\text{\textit{Θυς} \textit{τω} \textit{τω} \textit{φρε} \textit{ι} \textit{τω} \textit{ποι} \textit{η} \textit{με} \textit{σι}, \text{\textit{δι} \textit{ακε} \textit{ν} \textit{αυ} \textit{τη} \textit{τη} \textit{πρ} \textit{οσ} \textit{τη} \textit{πρ} \textit{οσ}}, \text{\textit{με} \textit{ση} \textit{τη} \textit{ι} \textit{τη} \textit{η} \textit{πο} \textit{κι} \textit{πο} \textit{κι}}. \]

That nothing dies or utterly perisheth; but things being variously concreted and secreted, transposed and modified, change their form and shape only, and are put into a new dress.

\[\text{G Agreeably} \]

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1 Apud Plutarch. adv. Colotem, p. 1113.  
2 Euripid. in Chrysippo apud Clement.  
Tom. II. Oper.  
Agreeably whereunto, Plato also tells us \(^1\), that it was παλαιὸς λόγος, an ancient tradition or doctrine before his time, τῶς ζώντων ἐκ τῶν τεθνατῶν γεγονός, that as well the living were made out of the dead, as the dead out of the living; and that this was the constant circle of nature. Moreover, the same philosopher acquaints us, that some of those ancients were not without suspicion, that what is now called death, was to men more properly a nativity or birth into life, and what is called generation into life, was comparatively rather to be accounted a sinking into death; the former being the soul's ascent out of these gross terrestrial bodies to a body more thin and subtil, and the latter its descent from a purer body to that which is more crass and terrestrial. \(^2\) τις οὖν εἰ τὸ ζῷον μέν ικανόν, τὸ καθάκειν ἐκ ζωῆς. Who knows whether that which is called living be not indeed rather dying; and that which is called dying, living?

Moreover, that this was the doctrine of Pythagoras himself, that no real entity perishes in corruptions, nor is produced in generations, but only new modifications and transpositions made; is fully expressed by the Latin poet \(^3\), both as to inanimate, and to animate things. Of the first thus,

\[\text{Nec perit in tanto quicquam (mibi credite) mundo,}
Sed variat, faciemque novat: nasique vocatur
Incipere esse alius, quum quod fuit ante; mori
Definere illud idem. Cum sunt huc forstian illa,
Hec translata illuc: ssumā tamen omnia constante.\]

Of the second, that the souls of animals are immortal, did pre-exist and do transmigrate, from the same ground, after this manner;

\[\text{Omnia mutantur; nihil interit: errat & illinc,}
Huc venit, hinc illuc, & quoqlibet occupat artus
Spiritus, æque feris humana in corpora transit,
Inque feras nofer, nec tempore deperit ulla.
Utque novis facilis signatur ceri: figuris,
Nec manet at fuerat, nec formas servat easdem,
Sed tamen ipsa eadem est; animam sic semper eandem
Eis, sed in varias doceo migrare figuras.\]

Wherefore though it be a thing, which hath not been commonly taken notice of, of late, yet we conceive it to be unquestionably true, that all those ancient

\(^1\) In Phæd. p. 381.
\(^2\) This passage of Euripides is cited by many of the ancients, as Plato, Cicero, Clemens Alexand. and Sextus Empiricus. See the Notes of Dr. Potter, now Archbp. of Canterbury, on Clem. Alexan. Stromat. Lib. III. cap. III. p. 517.
ancient philosophers, who insisted so much upon this principle, ἄνωθεν καὶ ὑπ' ἄνωθεν διἄρωμα ὑπὸ Φιλόσοψιν τῶν ὑπ' οὖν' that no real entity is either generated or corrupted, did therein at once drive at these two things: first, the establishing of the immortality of all souls, their praecedent and post-existence, forasmuch as being entities really distinct from the body they could neither be generated nor corrupted; and secondly, the making of corporeal forms and qualities to be no real entities distinct from the body and the mechanism thereof, because they are things generated and corrupted, and have no praecedent and post-existence. Anaxagoras, in this latter, being the only dissenter; who supposing those forms and qualities to be real entities likewise, distinct from the substance of body, therefore attributed perpetuity of being to them also, praecedent and post-existence, in similar atoms, as well as to the souls of animals.

And now we have made it sufficiently evident, that the doctrine of the incorporeity and immortality of souls, we might add also, of their praecedent and transmigration, had the same original and stood upon the same basis with the atomical physiology; and therefore it ought not at all to be wondered at (what we affirmed before) that the same philosophers and Pythagoreans asserted both those doctrines, and that the ancient Atomists were both Theists and Incorporealists.

XXXIV. But now to declare our sense freely concerning this philosophy of the ancients, which seems to be so prodigiously paradoxical, in respect of that praecedent and transmigration of souls; we conceive indeed, that this ratiocination of theirs from that principle, that nothing naturally, or of itself, comes from nothing, nor goes to nothing, was not only firmly conclusive against substantial forms and qualities of bodies, really distinct from their substance, but also for substantial incorporeal souls, and their engenderability out of matter, and particularly for the future immortality or post-existence of all human souls. For since it is plain, that they are not a mere modification of body or matter, but an entity and substance really distinct from it, we have no more reason to think, that they can ever of themselves vanish into nothing, than that the substance of the corporeal world, or any part thereof, can do so. For that in the consumption of bodies by fire, or age, or the like, there is the destruction of any real substance into nothing, is now generally exploded as an idiotsical conceit; and certainly it cannot be a jot less idiotsical to suppose, that the rational soul in death is utterly extinguished.

Moreover, we add also, that this ratiocination of the ancients would be altogether as firm and irrefragable likewise for the praecedent and transmigration of souls, as it is for their post-existence and future immortality; did we not (as indeed we do) suppose souls to be created by God immediately, and infused in generations. For they being unquestionably a distinct substance from the body, and no substance, according to the ordinary course of nature, coming out of nothing, they must of necessity either

pre-
pre-exist in the universe before generations, and transmigrate into their respective bodies; or else come from God immediately, who is the fountain of all, and who at first created all that substance that now is in the world besides himself. Now the latter of these was a thing, which those ancient philosophers would by no means admit of; they judging it altogether incongruous to bring God upon the stage perpetually, and make him immediately interpose every where, in the generations of men and all other animals, by the miraculous production of souls out of nothing. Notwithstanding which, if we well consider it, we shall find, that there may be very good reason on the other side for the successive divine creation of souls; namely, that God did not do all at first, that ever he could or would do, and put forth all his creative vigour at once, in a moment, ever afterwards remaining a spectator only of the consequent results, and permitting nature to do all alone, without the least interposition of his at any time, just as if there were no God at all in the world. For this may be, and indeed often hath been, the effect of such an hypothesis as this, to make men think, that there is no other God in the world but blind and dark nature. God might also, for other good and wise ends unknown to us, referre to himself the continual exercise of this his creative power, in the successive production of new souls. And yet those souls nevertheless, after they are once brought forth into being, will, notwithstanding their juniority, continue as firmly in the same, without vanishing of themselves into nothing, as the substance of senfeless matter, that was created many thousand years before, will do.

And thus our vulgar hypothesis of the new creation of souls, as it is rational in itself, so it doth sufficiently solve their incorporeity, their future immortality, or post-eternity, without introducing those offensive absurdities of their pre-existence and transmigration.

XXXV. But if there be any such, who, rather than they would allow a future immortality or post-existence to all souls, and therefore to those of brutes, which consequently must have their successive transmigrations, would conclude the souls of all brutes, as likewise the sensitive soul in man, to be corporeal, and only allow the rational soul to be distinct from matter; to these we have only thus much to say, that they, who will attribute life, senfe, cogitation, conscioness and self-enjoyment, not without some footsteps of reason many times, to blood and brains, or mere organized bodies in brutes, will never be able clearly to defend the incorporeity and immortality of human souls, as most probably they do not intend any such thing. For either all conscious and cogitative beings are incorporeal, or else nothing can be proved to be incorporeal. From whence it would follow also, that there is no Deity distinct from the corporeal world. But though there seem to be no very great reason, why it should be thought absurd, to grant perpetuity of duration to the souls of brutes, any more than to every atom of matter, or particle of dust that is in the whole world; yet we shall endeavour to suggest something towards the easing the minds of those, who are so much burthened with this difficulty; viz. that they may, if they please, suppose the souls of brutes,
brutes, being but so many particular eradiations or effluxes from that source of life above, whosoever and wheresoever there is any fitly prepared matter capable to receive them, and to be actuated by them, to have a sense and fruition of themselves in it, so long as it continues such; but as soon as ever those organized bodies of theirs, by reason of their indigibility, become uncapable of being further acted upon by them, then to be resumed again and retracted back to their original head and fountain. Since it cannot be doubted, but what creates anything out of nothing, or sends it forth from itself by free and voluntary emanation, may be able either to retract the same back again to its original source, or else to annihilate it at pleasure.

And I find, that there have not wanted some among the gentle philosophers themselves, who have entertained this opinion, whereof Porphyry is one: Μυστήριον έν Αίτω δύναμις άλογος τις την άλων εκείν τη πάντως, every irrational power is resolved into the life of the whole.

XXXVI. Neither will this at all weaken the future immortality or post-ecternity of human souls. For if we be indeed Theists, and do in very good earnest believe a Deity, according to the true notion of it, we must then needs acknowledge, that all created being whatsoever owes the continuance and perpetuity of its existence, not to any necessity of nature without God, and independently upon him, but to the divine will only. And therefore, though we had never so much rational and philosophical assurance, that our souls are immaterial substances, distinct from the body, yet we could not, for all that, have any absolute certainty of their post-ecternity, any otherwise than as it may be derived to us from the immutability and perfection of the divine nature and will, which does always that which is best. For the essential goodness and wisdom of the Deity is the only stability of all things. And for aught we mortals know, there may be good reaon, why that grace or favour of future immortality and post-ecternity, that is indulged to human souls, endued with reason, morality, and liberty of will, (by means whereof they are capable of commendation and blame, reward and punishment) that so they may be objects for divine justice to display itself upon after this life, in different retributions may notwithstanding be denied to those lower lives and more contemptible souls of brutes, alike devoid both of morality and liberty.

XXXVII. But if any, for all this, will still obstinately contend for that ancient Pythagorick and Empedoclean hypothesis, that all lives and souls whatsoever are as old as the first creation, and will continue to eternity, or as long as the world doth, as a thing more reasonable and probable than our continual creation of new souls, by means whereof they become juniors both to the matter of the world and of their own bodies, and whereby also (as they pretend) the divine creative power is made too cheap and prostituted a thing, as being famulative always to brutish, and many times to
to unlawful lusts and undue conjunctions; but especially than the continual decreation and annihilation of the souls of brutes; we shall not be very unwilling to acknowledge thus much to them, that indeed of the two this opinion is more reasonable and tolerable than that other extravagancy of those, who will either make all souls to be generated, and consequently to be corporeal, or at least the sensitive soul, both in men and brutes. For besides the monstrosity of this latter opinion, in making two distinct souls and perceptive substances in every man, which is a thing sufficiently confuted by internal sense, it leaves us also in an absolute impossibility of proving the immortality of the rational soul, the incorporeity of any substance, and by consequence, the existence of any Deity distinct from the corporeal world.

And as for that pretence of theirs, that senseless matter may as well become sensitive, and, as it were, kindled into life and cogitation, as a body, that was devoid of light and heat, may be kindled into fire and flame; this seems to argue too much ignorance of the doctrine of bodies in men otherwise learned and ingenious; the best naturalists having already concluded, that fire and flame is nothing but such a motion of the insensible parts of a body, as whereby they are violently agitated, and many times diffipated and scattered from each other, begetting in the mean time those fancies of light and heat in animals. Now there is no difficulty at all in conceiving, that the insensible particles of a body, which were before quiecent, may be put into motion; this being nothing but a new modification of them, and no entity really distinct from the substance of body, as life, sense and cogitation are. There is nothing in fire and flame, or a kindled body, different from other bodies, but only the motion or mechanism, and fancy of it. And therefore it is but a crude conceit, which the Atheists and Corporealists of former times have been always so fond of, that souls are nothing but fiery or flammeous bodies. For though heat in the bodies of animals be a necessary instrument for soul and life to act by in them, yet it is a thing really distinct from life; and a red-hot iron hath not therefore any nearer approximation to life than it had before, nor the flame of a candle than the extinguish’d snuff or tallow of it; the difference between them being only in the agitation of the insensible parts. We might also add, that, according to this hypothesis, the souls of animals could not be numerically the same throughout the whole space of their lives; since that fire, that needs a pabulum to prey upon, doth not continue always one and the same numerical substance. The soul of a new-born animal could be no more the same with the soul of that animal several years after, than the flame of a new lighted candle is the same with that flame that twinkles last in the socket; which indeed are no more the same, than a river or stream is the same at several distances of time. Which reason may be also extended further to prove the soul to be no body at all, since the bodies of all animals are in a perpetual flux.

XXXVIII.
XXXVIII. We have now sufficiently performed our first task, which was to show from the origin of the atomical physiology, that the doctrine of incorporeal substance must needs spring up together with it. We shall, in the next place, make it manifest, that the inward constitution of this philosophy is also such, that whoever really entertains it, and rightly understands it, must of necessity admit incorporeal substance likewise. 

First, therefore, the atomical hypothesis, allowing nothing to body, but what is either included in the idea of a thing impenetrably extended, or can clearly be conceived to be a mode of it, as more or less magnitude, with divisibility, figure, site, motion and rest, together with the results of their several combinations, cannot possibly make life and cogitation to be qualities of body; since they are neither contained in those things before mentioned, nor can result from any συγκρίνει, or conjugations of them. Wherefore it must needs be granted, that life and cogitation are the attributes of another substance distinct from body, or incorporeal.

Again, since according to the tenour of this physiology, body hath no other action belonging to it but that of local motion, which local motion, as such, is essentially heterokinety, that which never springs originally from the thing itself moving, but always from the action of some other agent upon it; that is, since no body could ever move itself, it follows undeniable, that there must be something else in the world besides body, or else there could never have been any motion in it. Of which we shall speak more afterwards.

Moreover, according to this philosophy, the corporeal phenomena themselves cannot be solved by mechanism alone without fancy. Now fancy is no mode of body, and therefore must needs be a mode of some other kind of being in ourselves, that is cogitative and incorporeal.

Furthermore, it is evident from the principles of this philosophy, that sense itself is not a mere corporeal passion from bodies without, in that it supposeth, that there is nothing really in bodies like to those fantastick ideas that we have of sensible things, as of hot and cold, red and green, bitter and sweet, and the like, which therefore must needs owe their being to some activity of the soul itself; and this is all one as to make it incorporeal.

Lastly, from this philosophy, it is also manifest, that sense is not the χάλασμα of truth concerning bodies themselves, it confidently pronouncing, that those supposetd qualities of bodies, represented such by sense, are merely fantastical things, from whence it plainly follows, that there is something in us superior to sense, which judges of it, detects its fantaty, and condemns its imposture, and determines what really is and is not, in bodies without us, which must needs be a higher self-active vigour of the mind, that will plainly speak it to be incorporeal.

XXXIX.
XXXIX. And now this atomical physiology of the ancients seems to have two advantages or pre-eminences belonging to it, the first whereof is this, that it renders the corporeal world intelligible to us; since mechanism is a thing that we can clearly understand, and we cannot clearly and distinctly conceive anything in bodies else. To say that this or that is done by a form or quality, is nothing else but to say, that it is done we know not how; or, which is yet more absurd, to make our very ignorance of the cause, disfigured under those terms of forms and qualities, to be it self the cause of the effect.

Moreover, hot and cold, red and green, bitter and sweet, &c. formally considered, may be clearly conceived by us as different fancies and vital passions in us, occasioned by different motions made from the objects without upon our nerves; but they can never be clearly understood as absolute qualities in the bodies themselves, really distinct from their mechanical dispositions; nor is there indeed any more reason, why they should be thought such, than that, when a man is pricked with a pin, or wounded with a sword, the pain which he feels should be thought to be an absolute quality in the pin or sword. So long as our sensible ideas are taken either for substantial forms or qualities in bodies without us, really distinct from the substance of the matter, so long are they perfectly unintelligible by us. For which cause Timeus Locrus¹ philosphizing (as it seems) after this manner, did confentaneously thereunto determine, that corporeal things could not be apprehended by us, otherwise than αἰσθητοὶ καὶ νόημοι νευρών, by sense and a kind of spurious or bastard reason; that is, that we could have no clear conceptions of them in our understanding. And for the same reason Plato² himselfs distinguisheeth betwixt such things as are νοητα καὶ λογικά περιηγητα: comprehensible by the understanding with reason, and those which are only εἰς καὶ αἰσθητάν αλόγα, which can only be apprehended by opinion, together with a certain irrational sense; meaning plainly, by the latter, corporeal and sensible things. And accordingly the Platonists frequently take occasion from hence, to enlarge themselves much in the disparagement of corporeal things, as being, by reason of that smallnes of entity that is in them, below the understanding, and not having so much ηει̂ν as γίνομαι, essence as generation, which indeed is fine fancy. Wherefore we must either, with these philosophers, make sensible things to be ἀναληηγητια or ἀπεριηγητια, altogether incomprehensible and inconceivable by our human understandings, (though they be able in the mean time clearly to conceive many things of a higher nature;) or else we must entertain some kind of favourable opinion concerning that which is the ancientest of all physiologies, the atomical or mechanical, which alone renders sensible things intelligible.

XL. The second advantage, which this atomical physiology seems to have, is this, that it prepares an eady and clear way for the demonstration of

¹ De Animâ Mundi, inter Scriptor. Mythol. a Tho. Gale editos. p. 545.
³ Plato de Republicâ, ubi supra.
of incorporeal substances, by settling a distinct notion of body. He, that will undertake to prove, that there is something else in the world besides body, must first determine what body is, for otherwise he will go about to prove, that there is something besides he knows not what. But now if all body be made to consist of two substantial principles, whereby one is matter devoid of all form, (and therefore of quantity as well as qualities) from whence these philosophers* themselves conclude, that it is incorporeal; the other, form, which being devoid of all matter, must needs be incorporeal likewise. (And thus * Stobæus*1 sets down the joint doctrine both of Plato and Aristotle; δυτ τρόπον το ίδιον της ολης α. χρισμον απόκματον, ύτως ε. τ. πλων. 

* Ῥωιν τω είδος χωρίων *) ὁ σώμα εικον, δείπ γαρ ἀμφοτέρ, της τον ρόδων, προπ της τον σώμαν. That in the same manner, as form alone separated from matter is incorporeal, so neither is matter alone, the form being separated from it, body. But there is need of the joint concurrence of both these, matter and form together, to make up the substance of the body.) Moreover, if to forms qualities be likewise superadded, of which it is consistentaneously also resolved by the Platonists, δι’ αι των εισωθεν κανεσκων, that qualities are incorporeal, as if they were so many spirits pervading bodies; I say, in this way of philosophizing, the notions of body and spirit, corporeal and incorporeal, are so confounded, that it is impossible to prove any thing at all concerning them; body itself being made incorporeal (and therefore every thing incorporeal;) for whatsoever is wholly compounded and made up of incorporeals, must needs be itself also incorporeal.

Furthermore, according to this doctrine of matter, forms and qualities in body, life and understanding may be supposed to be certain forms or qualities of body. And then the souls of men may be nothing else but blood or brains, enRuised with the qualities of sense and understanding; or else some other more subtle, sensitive and rational matter, in us. And the like may be said of God himself also; that he is nothing but a certain rational, or intellectual, subtle and fiery body, pervading the whole universe; or else that he is the form of the whole corporeal world, together with the matter making up but one substance. Which conceits have been formerly entertained by the best of those ancients, who were captivated under that dark infirmity of mind, to think, that there could be no other substance besides body.

But the ancient atomical philosophy, settling a distinct notion of body, that it is ἄυαςατον ἄνθρωπος, a thing impenetrably extended, which hath nothing belonging to it, but magnitude, figure, site, rest, and motion, without any self-moving power, takes away all confusion; shews clearly how far body can go, where incorporeal substance begins; as also that there must of necessity be such a thing in the world.

Again, this discovering not only that the doctrine of qualities had its original from mens mistaking their own fancies for absolute realities in bodies themselves;

The entire Philosophy of the Ancients Book I.

XLI. We have now clearly proved these two things; first, that the physiology of the ancients, before, not only Aristotle and Plato, but also Democritus and Leucippus, was atomical or mechanical. Secondly, that as there is no inconsistency between the atomical physiology and theology, but indeed a natural cognition; so the ancient Atomists before Democritus were neither Atheists nor Corporealisths, but held the incorporeity and immortality of souls, together with a Deity distinct from the corporeal world. Wherefore the first and most ancient Atomists did not make *αὐτὸμοι ἐξαιρετόν*, they never endeavoured to make up an entire philosophy out of atomology; but the doctrine of atoms was to them only one part or member of the whole philosophick system, they joining thereunto the doctrine of incorporeal substance and theology, to make it up complete: accordingly as Aristotle hath declared in his Metaphysics, that the ancient philosophy consisted of these two parts, *Σωφρονία* and *Σοφία* or *ὑπερβουλή Φιλοσοφία*, physiologick and theology or Metaphysicks. Our ancient Atomists never went about, as the blundering Democritus afterwards did, to build up a world out of mere passive bulk, and sluggish matter, without any ἀέρ χειρισμένος, any active principles, or incorporeal powers; understanding well, that thus they could not have so much as motion, mechanism, or generation in it; the original of all that motion that is in bodies springing from something that is not body, that is, from incorporeal substance. And yet if local motion could have been supposed to have risen up, or sprung in upon this dead lump and mass of matter, no body knows how, and without dependence upon any incorporeal being, to have actuated it fortuitously; these ancient Atomists would still have thought it impossible for the corporeal world itself to be made up, such as now it is, by fortuitous mechanism, without the guidance of any higher principle. But they would have concluded it the greatest impudence or madness, for men to assert, that animals also consisted of mere mechanism; or, that life and sense, reason and understanding, were really nothing else but local motion, and consequently, that themselves were but machines and automata. Wherefore they joined both active and passive principles together, the corporeal and incorporeal nature, mechanism and life, atomology and pneumatology; and from both these united, they made up one entire system of philosophy, correspondent with, and agreeable to, the true and real world without them. And this system of philosophy, thus consisting of the doctrine of incorporeal substance (whereof God is the head) together with the atomical and mechanical
CHAP. I.  mangled by Democritus.

Mechanical physiology, seems to have been the only genuine, perfect, and complete.

XLII. But it did not long continue thus; for, after a while, this entire body of philosophy came to be mangled and dismembered, some taking one part of it alone, and some another; some snatching away the atomical physiology, without the pneumatology and theology; and others, on the contrary, taking the theology and doctrine of incorporeals, without the atomical or mechanical physiology. The former of these were Democritus, Leucippus, and Protagoras, who took only the dead carcases or skeleton of the old Mofchical philosophy, namely the atomical physiology; the latter, Plato and Aristotle, who took indeed the better part, the soul, spirit, and quintessence of it, the theology and doctrine of incorporeals, but unbodied, and divested of its most proper and convenient vehicle, the atomical physiology, whereby it became exposed to fundry inconveniencies.

XLIII. We begin with Leucippus and Democritus; who being atheistically inclined, quickly perceived, that they could not in the ordinary way of physiologizing sufficiently secure themselves against a Deity, nor effectually urge Atheism upon others; forasmuch as Heraclitus and other philosophers, who held that all substance was body, as well as themselves, did notwithstanding affect a corporeal Deity, maintaining, that the form of the whole corporeal world was God, or else that he was $\delta\pi\iota$, $\nu\alpha\zeta$ $\epsilon\gamma\omega\tau\alpha$, a certain kind of body or matter, as (for example) a methodical and rational fire, pervading (as a soul) the whole universe; the particular souls of men and animals being but, as it were, so many pieces, cut and sliced out of the great mundane soul: so that, according to them, the whole corporeal universe, or mass of body, was one way or other a God, a most wise and understanding animal, that did frame all particularities within itself in the best manner possible, and providently govern the same. Wherefore those Atheists now apprehending, upon what ticklish and uncertain terms their atheistical philosophy then stood, and how that those very forms and qualities, and the self-moving power of body, which were commonly made a sanctuary for atheism, might notwithstanding chance to prove, contrariwise, the latibulum and asylum of a Deity, and that a corporeal God (do what they could) might lie lurking under them, assailing men's minds with doubtful fears and jealousies; understanding moreover, that there was another kind of physiology set on foot, which banishing those forms and qualities of body, attributed nothing to it but magnitude, figure, site, and motion, without any self-moving power; they seemed presently to apprehend some great advantage to themselves and cause from it; and therefore greedily entertained this atomical or mechanical physiology, and violently cutting it off from that other part, the doctrine of incorporeals, which it was naturally and vitally united to, endeavoured to serve their turns of it. And now joining these two things together, the atomical physiology, which supposes that there is nothing in body, but magnitude, figure, site and motion, and that prejudice or prepossession of their own minds, that there was no other substance in the world besides body; be-
tween them both they begat a certain mungrel and spurious philosophy, atheistical-atomical, or atomically-atheistical.

But though we have so well proved, that Leucippus and Democritus were not the first inventors, but only the depravers and adulterators of the atomical philosophy; yet if any will notwithstanding obstinately contend, that the first invention thereof ought to be imputed to them, the very principles of their atheism seeming to lead them naturally to this, to strip and divest body of all these forms and qualities, it being otherwise impossible for them, surely and safely, to exclude a corporeal Deity; yet so, as that the wit of these Atheists was also much to be admired, in the managing and carrying on of those principles in such a manner, as to make up so entire a system of philosophy out of them, all whose parts should be so coherent and consistent together: we shall only say thus much; that if those Atheists were the first inventors of this philosophy, they were certainly very unhappy and unsuccessful in it, whilst endeavours by it to secure themselves from the possibility and danger of a corporeal God, they unwares laid a foundation for the clear demonstration of an incorporeal one, and were indeed so far from making up any such coherent frame as is pretended, that they were forced everywhere to contradict their own principles. So that nonsense lies at the bottom of all, and is interwoven throughout their whole atheistical system; and that we ought to take notice of the invincible power and force of truth, prevailing irresistible against all endeavours to oppress it; and how desperate the cause of atheism is, when that very atomical hypothesis of theirs, which they would erect and build up for a strong castle to garrison themselves in, proves a most effectual engine against themselves, for the battering of all their atheistical structure down about their ears.

XLIV. Plato's mutilation and interpolation of the old Moschical philosophy was a great deal more excusable, when he took the theology and metaphysics of it, the whole doctrine of incorporeals, and abandoned the atomical or mechanical way of physiologizing. Which in all probability he did, partly because those forementioned Atheists having so much abused that philosophy, adopting it as it were to themselves, he thereupon began to entertain a jealousy and suspicion of it; and partly, because he was not of himself so inclined to physiologize as theology, to the study of corporeal as of divine things; which some think to be the reason, why he did not attend to the Pythagorick system of the corporeal world, till late in his old age. His genius was such, that he was naturally more addicted to ideas than to atoms, to formal and final than to material causes. To which may be added, that the way of physiologizing by matter, forms and qualities, is a more huffy and fanciful thing than the other; and lastly, that the atomical physiolog is more remote from senfe and vulgar apprehension, and therefore not so easily understood. For which cause many learned Greeks of later times, though they had read Epicurus his works, and perhaps Democritus his too, yet they were not able to conceive, how the corporeal and sensible phenomena could possibly be solved without real qualities; one instance
Chap. I. by Plato and Aristotle.

stance whereof might be given in Plutarch, writing against Celotes the Epicurean. Wherefore Plato, that was a zealous asserter of an incorporeal Deity, distinct from the world, and of immortal souls, seriously physiologized only by matter, forms and qualities, generation, corruption and alteration; and he did but play and toy sometimes a little with atoms and mechanism; as where he would compound the earth of cubical, and fire of pyramidal atoms, and the like. For that he did therein imitate the atomical physiology, is plain from these words of his; "πάντα ἦν δει ταύτα διαοικώνξα εἰκράντως, ἡς καθ' ἐν ἐκατόν νόμων φρόμων οὖν ἡμῶν, συναποδίναντω δι' πολλῶν, τὰς ὄνεις κατὰν ὄριοις. All these cubical and pyramidal corpuscula of the fire and earth are in themselves so small, that by reason of their parvitude none of them can be perceived singly and alone, but only the aggregations of many of them together.

XLV. And Aristotle here trod in Plato's footsteps, not only in the better part, in asserter an incorporeal Deity, and an immoveable first mover; but also in physiologizing by forms and qualities, and rejecting that mechanical way by atoms, which had been so generally received amongst the ancients. Wherefore though the genius of these two persons was very different, and Aristotle often contradicted Plato, and really dissents from him in several particularities; yet, so much I think may be granted to those reconcilers, (Porphyry, Simplicius, and others) that the main essentials of their two philosophies are the same.

Now, I say, the whole Aristotelical system of philosophy is infinitely to be preferred before the whole Democritical; though the former hath been so much disparaged, and the other cried up of late amongst us. Because, though it cannot be denied, but that the Democritical hypothesis doth much more handsomely and intelligibly solve the corporeal phenomena, yet in all those other things, which are of far the greatest moment, it is rather a madness than a philosophy. But the Aristotelick system is right and sound here, as to those greater things; as asserting incorporeal substance, a Deity distinct from the world, the naturality of morality, and liberty of will. Wherefore though a late writer of politics do so exceedingly disparage Aristotle's Ethicks, yet we shall do him this right here to declare, that his Ethicks were truly such, and answered their title; but that new model of ethicks, which hath been obstructed upon the world with so much futility, and is indeed nothing but the old Democritical doctrine revived, is no ethicks at all, but a mere cheat, the undermining and subversion of all morality, by substituting something like it in the room of it, that is a mere counterfeit and changeling; the design whereof could not be any other than to debauch the world.

We add further, that Aristotle's system of philosophy seems to be more consistent with piety, than the Cartesian hypothesis it self, which yet plainly supposeth incorporeal substance. For as much as this latter makes God to contribute nothing more to the fabric of the world, than the turning round of a vortex

1 In Timæ. p. 537. Oper.
vortex or whirlpool of matter; from the fortuitous motion of which, according to certain general laws of nature, must proceed all this frame of things that now is, the exact organization and successive generation of animals, without the guidance of any mind or wisdom. Whereas Aristotle's Nature is no fortuitous principle, but such as doth nothing in vain, but all for ends, and in every thing purfues the best; and therefore can be no other than a subordinate instrument of the divine wisdom, and the manuary opificer or executioner of it.

However, we cannot deny, but that Aristotle hath been taxed by sundry of the ancients, Christians and others, for not to explicityy affifting these two things, the immortality of human souls, and providence over men, as he ought to have done, and as his master Plato did. Though, to do him all the right we can, we shall observe here, that in his Nicomachian Ethicks, he speaks favourably for the latter; "εἰγὰρ τις ἐπιμελείᾳ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ Θεῶν γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ ὅκει, καὶ εὐλογον χαίρειν αὐτοῖς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ τῷ συλλησπερτῷ (τῷ γὰρ εἴμι οὐκέ) καὶ ταῖς ἐγκαταλήπταις μάλλον καὶ τις τιμώντας ἀντιπεπερασθείσα, ὡς τῶν φιλòν αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελημένος, ὅρθως τε ιαλύς πράττομαι." If God take any care of human things, as it seems be doth, then it is reasonable to think also, that he is delighted with that which is the best, and nearest akin to himself (which is mind or right reason) and that be rewards those who most love and honour it (as taking care of such things as are most pleasing to him) in doing rightly and honestly. A very good sentence, were it not ushered in with too much of scepticism. And as for the point of the soul's immortality; it is true, that whereas other philosophers before Aristotle affverted the pre-existence, incorporeity, and immortality of all souls, not only the rational, but the sensitive also, (which in men they concluded to be one and the same substance) according to that of Plato's πάντα μοίχη ἀνάκλητον, every soul is immortal, they resolving that no life nor cognition could be corporeal; Aristotle, on the contrary, doth expressly deny the pre-existence, that is, the separability, incorporeity and immortality of all sensitive souls, not in brutes only, but also everywhere, giving his reason for it in these words, "οὔτε μὲν ἡς οὖν τὰ πάσας προτάξεις, οὐδὲν ἐγὼ ἐκ τῶν τοιών, ὅτι τὰς αὑτούς ἀνεύσωμαι, αὐτοῖς διὰ τοῦτον, οἷον ἀρχικόν ἡ ἄρχησθα συμβασία, δήλου ὅτι τοιάτας ἄνευ σώματος ἀποκαίρως ὑπάρχων, οἷον βασιλείαν αὐτῶν ποιεῖν, ὅτε καὶ θυραβεῖ οἰστίας ἀναλυοῦν, ὁμοί δὲ αὐτοῖς καθ' ἑαυτός εἰς τοὺς ἄρχομεν ὑποτριής ὕστερ, ὁτ' ἐν σῶματι εἰσίναι ἡ πρὸς τοὺς ἄρχομεν εἰς τοὺς ἄρχομεν. That all souls cannot pre-exist, is manifest from hence, because those principles, whose action is corporeal, cannot possibly exist without the body, as the power of walking without the feet. Wherefore it is impossible, that these sensitive souls (pre-existing) should come into the body from without, since they can neither come alone by themselves naked and frit of all body, being inseparable from it; neither can they come in with a body, that is, the seed. This is Aristotle's argument, why all sensitive souls must needs be corporeal, because there is no walking without feet, nor seeing without eyes. But at the same time, he declares, that the mind or intellect does pre-exist and come in from without, that is, incorporeal, separable.

CHAP. I. with an impartial Censure.

separable and immortal, giving his reason for it in like manner 1: θείας ἂν \[. . .\] τὸν τοιούτον \[. . .\] μόνον ἀνθρώπον ἐπεισοδίως, ἃθετε \[. . .\] τὴν ἐνεργοῦ καθεξής \[. . .\] συμπτώματα ἔνεργεια. It remains, that the mind or intellect, and that alone (pre-existing) enter from without, and be only divine; since its energy is not blended with that of the body's, but it acts independently upon it. Notwithstanding which, Aristotle elsewhere 2 distinguishing concerning this mind or intellect, and making it to be twofold, agent and patient, concludes the former of them only to be immortal, but the latter corruptible; τὸ \[. . .\] μόνον ἀθροιστὸν \[. . .\] καθεξής, \[. . .\] ἀριστοτελείας \[. . .\] φοβερίας, the agent intellect is only immortal and eternal, but the passive is corruptible: where some interpreters, that would willingly excuse Aristotle, contend that by the passive intellect, is not meant the patient, but the fantasy only, because Aristotle should otherwise contradict himself, who had before affirmed the intellect to be separable, unmixed and inorganic, which they conceive must needs be understood of the patient. But this salvo can hardly take place here, where the passive intellect is directly opposed to the agent. Now what Aristotle's agent understanding is, and whether it be any thing in us, any faculty of our human soul or no, seems to be a thing very questionable, and has therefore caused much dispute among his interpreters; it being resolved by many of them to be the divine intellect, and commonly by others, a foreign thing. Whence it must needs be left doubtful, whether he acknowledged any thing incorporeal and immortal at all in us. And the rather because, laying down this principle, that nothing is incorporeal, but what acts independently upon the body, he somewhere plainly determines, that there is no intellect without corporeal fantasies. That, which led Aristotle to all this, positively to affirm the corporeity of sensitive souls, and to stagger so much concerning the incorporeity of the rational, seems to have been his doctrine of forms and qualities, whereby corporeal and incorporeal substance are confounded together, so that the limits of each could not be discerned by him. Wherefore we cannot applaud Aristotle for this; but that, which we commend him for, is chiefly these four things: first, for making a perfect incorporeal intellect to be the head of all; and secondly, for resolving, that nature, as an instrument of this intellect, does not merely act according to the necessity of material motions, but for ends and purposes, though unknown to it self; thirdly, for maintaining the naturality of morality; and lastly, for ascertaining the τὸ ἰδίον ἀυτεύον, autexoufý, or liberty from necessity.

2: Ibid. 2 De Ani, Lib. III. cap. VI. p. 52. Tom. II. Oper.
THE TRUE INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE.

BOOK I.

CHAP. II.

In this Chapter are contained all the grounds of reason for the atheistical hypothesis. 1. That the Democritick philosophy, which is made up of these two principles, corporealism and atomism complicated together, is essentially atheistical. 2. Though Epicurus, who was an Atomical-Corporealift, pretended to assert a democracy of Gods, yet he was, for all that, an absolute Atheist: and that Atheists commonly equivocate and disguise themselves. 3. That the Democritical philosophy is nothing else but a system of atheology, or atheism swaggering under the glorious appearance of philosophy. And though there be another form of atheism, which we call Stratonical, yet the Democritick atheism is only considerable; all whose dark mysteries will be here revealed. 4. That we being to treat concerning the Deity, and to produce all that profane and unallowed stuff of Atheists in order to a confutation, the divine assistance and direction ought to be implored. 5. That there are two things here to be performed: first, to show what are the Atheists pretended grounds of reason against the Deity; and secondly, how they endeavour either to solve or confute the contrary phenomena. The first of those grounds, that no man can have an idea or conception of God, and that he is an incomprehensible nothing. 6. The second atheistical argument, that there can be no creation out of nothing, nor no omnipotence, because nothing can come from nothing; and therefore whatsoever substantially is, was from eternity self-existent, and uncreated by any Deity. 7. The third pretended reason
reason against a Deity, that the strictest notion of a God implying him to be incorporeal, there can be no such incorporeal Deity, because there is no other subsistence but body. 8. The Atheists premise, that the doctrine of incorporeal substances sprung from a ridiculous mistaking of abstract names and notions for realities. They impudently make the Deity to be but the chief of spirits, and an Oberon or prince of fairies and fancies. Their fourth argument against a Deity, that to suppose an incorporeal mind to be the original of all things is but to make a mere accident and abstract notion to be the first cause of all. 9. Their fifth argument, a confutation of a corporeal Deity from the principles of corporealism it self, that matter being the only subsistence, and all other differences of things nothing but accidents, generable and corruptible, no living understanding being can be essentially incorruptible. The Stoical God incorruptible, only by accident. 10. Their sixth ratiocination from a complication of atomistics, that the first principle of all things whatsoever in the universe is atoms or corpuscles devoid of all qualities, and consequent of sense and understanding, (which spring up afterwards from a certain composition of them) and therefore Mind or Deity was not the first original of all. 11. In the seventh place they disprove the world’s animation, or its being governed by a living understanding animalib nature, presiding over the whole; because sense and understanding are a peculiar appendix to flesh, blood and brains, and reason is no where to be found but in human form. 12. The eighth atheistical ground, that God being taken by all for a most happy, eternal and immortal animal, (or living being) there can be no such thing, because all living beings are concretions of atoms, that were at first generated, and are liable to death and corruption by the dissolution of their compages. And that life is no simple primitive nature, but an accidental modification of compounded bodies, which upon the dissolution of their parts vanisheth into nothing. 13. The ninth pretended atheistical demonstration, that by God is meant a first cause or mover, which was not before moved by any thing else without it; but nothing can move it self, and therefore there can be no unmoved mover, nor any first in the order of causes, that is, a God. 14. Their further proof of this principle, that nothing can move it self, with an atheistical corollary from thence, that no thinking being could be a first cause, no cognition arising of itself without a cause; which may be reckoned a tenth argument. 15. Another mystery of atheism, that all knowledge, and mental conception is the information of the things themselves known, existing without the knower, and a passion from them; and therefore the world must needs be before any knowledge or conception of it, and no knowledge or conception before the world, as its cause. 16. The twelfth argumentation, that things could not be made by a God, because they are so faulty and ill made, that they were not contrived for the good of man; and that the deluge of evils, that corrump all, shows that they did not proceed from any Deity. 17. The thirteenth instance of the Atheists against a Deity, from the defect of Providence, that in human affairs all is Tohu and Bohu, chaos and confusion. 18. The fourteenth atheistical ground, that it is not possible for any one being to animadvert and order all things in the distant places of the whole world at once; but if it were possi-
ble, that such infinite negativeness would be absolutely inconsistent with happiness. 19. Several bold but flight queries of Atheists, why the world was not made sooner? and what God did before? why it was made at all, since it was so long unmade? and, how the architect of the world could rear up so huge a fabric? 20. The Atheists pretence, that it is the great interest of mankind, that there should be no God; and that it was a noble and heroic exploit of the Democriticks, to chase away that affrightful spectre out of the world, and to free men from the continual fear of a Deity and punishment after death, imbittering all the pleasures of life. 21. Another pretence of theirs, that Theism is inconsistent with civil sovereignty, it introducing a fear greater than the fear of the Leviathan; and that any other confidence allowed of besides the civil law (being private judgment) is, ipso facto, a dissolution of the body politic, and a return to the state of nature. 22. The Atheists conclusion from the former premises, as set down in Plato and Lucretius, that all things sprung originally from nature and chance, without any Mind or God, that is, proceeded from the necessity of material motions, undirected for ends; that infinite atoms devoid of life and sense, moving in infinite space from eternity, by their fortuitous encounters and intertanglements, produced the system of the whole universe, and as well animate as inanimate things.

I. Having in the former chapter given an account of the genuine and primitive atomical philosophy, which may be called the Moscheical; we are in the next place to consider the Democritical, that is, the atheized and adulterated atomology; which had its origin from nothing else but the joining of this heterogeneous and contradictitious principle to the atomical physiology, that there is no other substance in the world besides body. Now we say, that that philosophy, which is thus compounded and made up of these two things, atomicism and corporealism complicated together, is essentially atheistical, though neither of them alone be such. For the atomical physiology, as we have declared already, is in its own nature sufficiently repugnant to atheism. And it is possible for one, who holds, that there is nothing in the world besides body, to be persuaded notwithstanding of a corporeal Deity, and that the world was at first framed and is still governed by an understanding nature lodged in the matter. For thus some of these Corporealisits have fancied the whole universe itself to be a God, that is, an understanding and wise animal, that ordered all things within it itself, after the best manner possible, and providently governed the same. Indeed it cannot be denied, but that this is a very great intricacy of mind, that such persons lie under, who are not able to conceive any other substance besides body, by which is understood that, which is impenetrably extended, or else, in Plato’s language, which hath προσβαλα τε ἐπιπέδει, that thrusts against other bodies and resists their impulse; or, as others express it, which is τόπον πλησινον, that so fills up place, as to exclude any other body or substance from coexisting with it therein; and such must needs have not only very imperfect, but also spurious and false conceptions of the Deity, so long as they apprehend it to be thus corporeal; but yet it does not therefore follow, that they must needs be accounted Atheists. But whosoever holds these two principles
principles (before mentioned) together, that there is no other substance besides body, and that body hath nothing else belonging to it but magnitude, figure, site and motion, without qualities: I say, whosoever is that confounded thing of an Atomist and Corporealift jumbled together, he is essentially and unavoidably that, which is meant by an Atheift, though he should in words never so much disclaim it, because he must needs fetch the original of all things from sensles matter; whereas to affirm a God is to maintain, that all things sprung originally from a knowing and understanding nature.

II. Epicurus, who was one of those mongrel things before mentioned, (an Atomical-Corporealift or Corporeal-Atomist) did notwithstanding profess to hold a multiform rabble and democracy of Gods, such as though they were αἰθιοπόδωα ἄτομα, of human form, yet were so thin and subtle, as that comparatively with our terrestrial bodies they might be called incorporeal; they having not so much carnes as quasi-carne, nor sanguinem as quasi-sangvinnem, a certain kind of aerial or ethereal flesh and blood: which gods of his were not to be supposed to exist any where within the world, upon this pretence, that there was no place in it fit to receive them;

* Illud item non est, ut poscis credere sedes
Effe Deam sanctas, in mundi partibus nullis.

And therefore they must be imagined to subsist in certain intermundane spaces, and Utopian regions without the world, the deliciousness whereof is thus elegantly described by the poet;

* Quas neque concutient venti, neque nihilum nimbis
Adspersant, neque nix acri concreta pruinâ
Caena cadens violat, sempereque innubilus Aether
Integit, & largè diffuso lumine ridet.

Whereunto was added, that the chief happiness of these gods consisted in omnium vacatone munera, in freedom from all business and employment, and doing nothing at all, that so they might live a soft and delicate life. And lastly, it was pretended, that though they had neither any thing to do with us, nor we with them, yet they ought to be worshipped by us for their own excellent nature's sake, and happy state.

But whosoever had the least sagacity in him could not but perceive, that this theology of Epicurus was but romantic, it being directly contrary to his avowed and professed principles, to admit of any other being, than what was concreted of atoms, and consequently corruptible; and that he did this upon a politick account, whereby to decline the common odium, and those dangers and inconveniences, which otherwise he might have incurred by a downright denial of a God, to which purpose it accordingly served his turn. Thus Pseudoonis * rightly pronounced, Nulos

2 Id. Lib. III. ver. 19.
3 Laecret. Lib. V. ver. 147.
esse deos Epicuro videri; quaeque is de diis immortalibus dixerit, invidie detestandae gratia divisse. Though he was partly jocular in it all, it making no small sport to him, in this manner, to delude and mock the credulous vulgar; Deos jocandi causâ induxit Epicurus per lucidos & perfalibes, & habitantes tandem inter duas lucos, sic inter duas mundos proper metum ruinarum. However, if Epicurus had been never so much in earnest in all this, yet, by Gassendus his leave, we should pronounce him to have been not a jot the less an Atheist, so long as he maintained, that the whole world was made μηνάς διατάσσων τὰ διάτασσον τῶν πάσων μακαρίως ἐξολοθρεί τεθέαι διάθεσις, without the ordering and direction of any understanding being, that was perfectly happy and immortal; and fetched the original of all things in the universe, even of soul and mind, αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτόματον σωμάτων αὐτροκότων καὶ τυχαίων ἰχόντων τῆς κόσμου, from senseless atoms fortuitously moved. He, together with Democritus, hereby making the world to be, in the worst sense ὁδὸν τῆς νυκτὸς, an egg of the night, that is, not the off-spring of mind and understanding, but of dark senseless matter, of Tohu and Boo, or confused chaos; and deriving the original of all the perfections in the universe from the most imperfect being, and the lowest of all entities, than which nothing can be more atheistical. And as for those romantick monogrammous Gods of Epicurus, had they been sincerely believed by him, they could have been nothing else but a certain kind of aerial and spectrous men, living by themselves, no body knows where, without the world; ἔπειτας ὁμοίως μεν ἐν τῇ πάσῃ πολλῇ αἰτίαις τοι̇θαι θείως ὑπ’ αὐτόματον νοοῦ, the Gods, according to vulgar opinion, leaves a God; but, according to the nature of things, none at all.

And as Epicurus, so other Atheists in like manner have commonly had their wizards and disguises; atheism for the most part prudently chusing to walk abroad in masquerade. And though some over-credulous persons have been so far imposed upon hereby, as to conclude, that there was hardly any such thing as an Atheist any where in the world, yet they, that are sagacious, may easily look through these thin veils and disguises, and perceive these Atheists oftentimes infinuating their atheism even then, when they most of all profess themselves Theists, by affirming, that it is impossible to have any idea or conception at all of God; and that as he is not finite, so he cannot be infinite, and that no knowledge or understanding is to be attributed to him; which is in effect to say, that there is no such thing. But whosoever entertains the Democritick principles, that is, both rejects forms and qualities of body, and makes all things to be body, though he pretend never so much to hold a corporeal Deity, yet he is not at all to be believed in it, it being a thing plainly contradictionary to those principles.

III. Wherefore this mungrel philosophy, which Lucrius, Democritus and Protagoras, were the founders of, and which was entertained afterwards by Epicurus, that makes (as Laertius writes) ἄρχει τῶν ἄτομων αἰτίαις, senseless atoms to be the first principles, not only of all bodies (for that was a thing admitted

The Mysteries of Atheism revealed. Book I.

The phenomena which this, such something else; this, I say, was really nothing else but a philosophical form of atheology, a gigantic and Titanical attempt to dethrone the Deity, not only by solving all the phenomena of the world without a God, but also by laying down such principles, from whence it must needs follow, that there could be neither an incorporeal nor corporeal Deity. It was atheism openly swaggerting under the glorious appearance of wisdom and philosophy.

There is indeed another form of atheism, which (insulting on the vulgar way of philosophizing by forms and qualities) we for distinctiveness shall call Stratonical; such as, being too modest and shamefaced to fetch all things from the fortuitous motion of atoms, would therefore allow to the several parts of matter a certain kind of natural (though not animal) perception, such as is devoid of reflexive consciousness, together with a plastick power, whereby they may be able artificially and methodically to form and frame themselves to the best advantage of their respective capabilities; something like to Aristotle's nature, but that it hath no dependence at all upon any higher Mind or Deity. And these Atheists may be also called hylozoick (as the other atomick) because they derive all things in the whole universe, not only sensitive, but also rational souls, together with the artificial frame of animals, from the life of matter. But this kind of atheism seems to be but an unshapen embryo of some dark and cloudy brains, that was never yet digested into an entire system, nor could be brought into any such tolerable form, as to have the confidence to shew it self abroad in full and open view.

But the Democritick and Atomick atheism, as it is the boldest and rankest of all atheism, it not only undertaking to solve all phenomena by matter fortuitiously moved, without a God, but also to demonstrate, that there cannot be so much as a corporeal Deity; so it is that alone, which, pretending to an entire and coherent system, hath publicly appeared upon the stage, and therefore doth, in a manner, only deserve our consideration.

And now we shall exhibit a full view and prospect of it, and discover all its dark mysteries and profundities; we being much of this persuasion, that a plain and naked representation of them will be a great part of a confutation at least; not doubting but it will be made to appear, that though this monster, big-swoln with a puffy shew of wisdom, strut and talk so gigantically, and march with such a kind of flately philosophick grandeur, yet it is indeed but like the giant Orgaglio in our English poet, a mere empty bladder, blown up with vain conceit, an Empusa, phantasm, or spectre, the off-spring of night and darkness, non-sense and contradiction.

And yet for all that, we shall not wrong it the least in our representation, but give it all possible advantages of strength and plausibility, that so the Atheists may have no cause to pretend (as they are wont to do, in such cases) that either we did not understand their mysteries, nor apprehend the full strength of their cause, or else did purposefully smother and conceal it.

Which
CHAP. II. First, that there is no Idea of God.

Which indeed we have been so far from, that we must confess we were not altogether unwilling this busines of theirs should look a little like something, that might deserve a confutation. And whether the Atheists ought not rather to give us thanks for mending and improving their arguments, than complain that we have any way impaired them, we shall leave it to the censure of impartial judgments.

IV. Plato tells us, that even amongst those Pagans in his time there was generally such a religious humour, that πάντες ὁσι ὑπὸ βίου κυρίων εὐφροσύνης μελίζεται, ἔτι πάντες ἐρμής ἐπίκειται μεγάλα πράγματα, θειοὶ ἐπὶ τῷ εἰπικαλον. Whosoever bad but the least of seriousness and sobriety in them, whenever they took in hand any enterprise, whether great or small, they would always invoke the Deity for assistance and direction. Adding moreover, that himself should be very faulty, if in his Timeus, when he was to treat about so grand a point, concerning the whole world, εἰ γὰρ εἰς ἀρχὴν ἀρχηγὸν ἔστι, whether it were made or unmade, he should not make his entrance thereinto by a religious invocation of the Deity. Wherefore certainly it could not be less than a piece of impiety in a Christian, being to treat concerning the Deity itself, and to produce all that profane and unhallowed stuff of Atheists out of their dark corners, in order to a confutation, and the better confirmation of our faith in the truth of his existence, not to implore his direction and assistance. And I know no reafon, but that we may well do it in that same litany of Plato's, τὸ νῦν ἑκάστῳ μᾶλις ὁμοίως, ὑπομονῶν ἄρην εἰς τάξιν, that we may first speak agreeably to his own mind, or becomingly of his nature, and then contentaneously with our selves.

V. Now there are these two things here to be performed by us, first to discover and produce the chief heads of arguments, or grounds of reafon, insisted on by the Atheists to disprove a Deity, evincing withal briefly the ineffectualnes and falfeenes of them; and secondly, to shew how they endevour either to confute or solve, consistently with their own principles, all those phænomena, which are commonly urg'd against them to prove a Deity and incorporeal substance; manifesting likewise the invalidity thereof.

The grounds of reafon allledged for the atheistical hypothesis are chiefly these that follow. First, That we have no idea of God, and therefore can have no evidence of him; which argument is further flourish'd and descanted upon in this manner. That notion or conception of a Deity, that is commonly entertained, is nothing but a bundle of incomprehensibles, unconceivable, and impossibles; it being only a complement of all imaginable attributes of honour, courtship, and complement, which the confounded fear and astonishment of men's minds made them huddle up together, without any sense or philosophic truth. This seems to be intimated by a modern writer in these words: The attributes of God signify not true nor falfe, nor any opinion of our brain, but the reverence and devotion of our hearts; and therefore they are not sufficient premises to infer truth, or convince falshood. And the same thing again is further set out, with no small pre-
tence to wit, after this manner; They that venture to dispute philosophically, or reason of God's nature, from these attributes of honour, losing their understanding in the very first attempt, fall from one inconvenience into another, without end, and without number; in the same manner as when one, ignorant of the ceremonies of court, coming into the presence of a greater person than he is used to speak to, and stumbling at his entrance, to save himself from falling, lets slip his cloak, to recover his cloak lets fall his hat, and with one disorder after another discovers his astonishment and rufticity. The meaning of which, and other like passages of the same writer, seems to be this; that the attributes of God (by which his nature is supposed to be expressed) having no philosophick truth or reality in them, had their only original from a certain rustick astonishment of mind, proceeding from excess of fear, raising up the phantasm of a Deity, as a bug-bear for an object to itself, and affrighting men into all manner of confounded non-sense, and absurdity of expressions concerning it, such as have no signification, nor any conception of the mind answering to them. This is the first argument, used especially by our modern Democriticks, against a Deity, that because they can have no phantastick idea of it, nor fully comprehend all that is concluded in the notion thereof, that therefore it is but an incomprehensible nothing.

VI. Secondly, another argument much insisted on by the old Democritick Atheists, is directed against the divine omnipotence and creative power, after this manner. By God is always understood a creator of something or other out of nothing. For however the Theists be here divided amongst themselves, some of them believing, that there was once nothing at all existing in this whole space, which is now occupied by the world, besides the Deity, and that he was then a solitary being, so that the substance of the whole corporeal universe had a temporary beginning, and novity of existence, and the duration of it hath now continued but for so many years only. Others persuading themselves, that though the matter and substance at least, (if not the form also) of the corporeal world, did exist from eternity, yet nevertheless, they both alike proceeded from the Deity by way of emanation, and do continually depend upon it, in the same manner as light, though coeval with the sun, yet proceeded from the sun, and depends upon it, being always, as it were, made a-new by it; wherefore, according to this hypothesis, though things had no antecedent non-entity in time, yet they were as little of themselves, and owed all their being as much to the Deity, as if they had been once actually nothing, they being, as it were, perpetually created out of nothing by it. Lastly, others of those Theists resolving, that the matter of the corporeal universe was not only from eternity, but also self-existent and uncreated, or independent upon any Deity as to its being; but yet the forms and qualities of all inanimate bodies, together with the souls of all Animals in the successive generations of them, (being taken for entities distinct from the matter) were created by the Deity out of nothing. We say, though there be such difference among the Theists themselves, yet
yet they all agree in this, that God is, in some sense or other, the creator of some real entity out of nothing, or the cause of that which otherwise would not have been of itself, so that no creation out of nothing, (in that enlarged sense) no Deity. Now it is utterly impossible, that any substance or real entity should be created out of nothing (it being contradictory to that indubitable axiom of reason, de nihilo nihil, from nothing nothing. The argument is thus urged by Lucretius, according to the minds of Epicurus and Democritus:

\[ \text{Principium bine cujus nobis exordia sumet,} \\
\text{Nullam rerum est nihilum divinitatis unquam.} \\
\text{Quippe ita formido mortales continet omnes,} \\
\text{Quod multa in terris fieri calque tuentur,} \\
\text{Quorum operum causas nullas rationes videre} \\
\text{Possum, ac fieri divino numine ventur:} \\
\text{Quas ob res, ubi viserimus, nihil posse creari} \\
\text{De nihilo, tum quod sequimur, jam tutiis in,} \\
\text{Perspiciemus, & unde quae res queaque creari,} \\
\text{Et que queque modo iunt opera sive divum.} \]

It is true indeed, that it seems to be chiefly level'd by the poet against that third and last sort of Theists before mentioned, such as Heraclitus and the Stoicks, (which latter were contemporary with Epicurus) who held the matter of the whole world to have been from eternity of itself uncreated, but yet the forms of mundane things in the successive generations of them (as entities distinct from the matter) to be created or made by the Deity out of nothing. But the force of the argument must needs lie stronger against those other Theists, who would have the very substance and matter it self of the world, as well as the forms, to have been created by the Deity out of nothing. Since nothing can come out of nothing, it follows, that not so much as the forms and qualities of bodies (conceiv'd as entities really distinct from the matter,) much less the lives and souls of animals, could ever have been created by any Deity, and therefore certainly not the substance and matter it self. But all substance and real entity, whatsoever is in the world, must needs have been from eternity, uncreated and self-existent. Nothing can be made or produced but only the different modifications of pre-existent matter. And this is done by motions, mixtures and separations, concretions and secretions of atoms, without the creation of any real distinct entity out of nothing; so that there needs no Deity for the effecting of it, according to that of Epicurus, \( \text{ἡ 
θείως φύσεως} \ \text{μαντεία} \text{προς τὸ 
τῶν μικρῶν προσώπων κατασκευάζων,} \ \text{no divine power ought to be called in for the solving of those phenomena.} \) To conclude therefore, if no substance, nor real entity can be made, which was not before, but all whatsoever is, will be, and can be, was from eternity self-existent; then creative power, but especially that attribute of omnipotence, can belong to nothing; and this is all one as to say, there can be no Deity.
VII. Thirdly, the Atheists argue against the stricter and higher sort of Theists, who will have God to be the creator of the whole corporeal univerfe and all its parts out of nothing, after this manner: that which created the whole mass of matter and body, cannot be it self body; wherefore this notion of God plainly implies him to be incorporeal. But there can be no incorporeal Deity, because by that word must needs be understood, either that which hath no magnitude nor extension at all, or else that which is indeed extended, but otherwise than body. If the word be taken in the former sense, then nothing at all can be so incorporeal, as to be altogether unextended and devoid of geometrical quantity, because extension is the very essence of all existent entity, and that which is altogether unextended is perfectly nothing. There can neither be any substance, nor mode or accident of any substance, no nature whatsoever unextended. But if the word incorporeal be taken in the latter sense, for that which is indeed extended, but otherwise than body, namely so as to penetrate bodies and coexist with them, this is also a thing next to nothing; since it can neither act upon any other thing, nor be acted upon by, or sensible of, any thing; it can neither do nor suffer any thing. 

* Nam facere & fungi nisi corpus nulla potest res.*

Wherefore to speak plainly, this can be nothing else but empty space, or vacuum, which runs through all things, without laying hold on any thing, or being affected from any thing. This is the only incorporeal thing, that is or can be in nature, space or place; and therefore to suppose an incorporeal Deity is to make empty space to be the creator of all things.

This argument is thus proposed by the Epicurean poet:

* — Quodcunque erit esse aliquid, debet id ipsum
Augmine vel grandi vel parvo;
Cui si tamen erit, quamvis levis exiguissime,
Corporum agnitiis numerum summânum sequatur:
Si in intastile erit, nulla de parte quod ullam
Rem prohibere quest per je tranfire meantem,
Scilicet hoc id erit vacuum quod inane vocamus.*

Whatsoever is, is extended or hath geometrical quantity and mensurability in it; which if it be tangible, then it is body, and fills up a place in the world, being part of the coheres mass; but if it be intangible, so that it cannot resist the passage of any thing through it, then it is nothing else but empty space or vacuum. There is no third thing besides these two, and therefore whatsoever is not body, is space or nothing;

* — Præter

1 Lucret. Lib. I. vers. 444, &c. 2 Id. Lib. I. vers. 454, &c.
Chap. II. an Incorporeal Deity.

Præter imanæ & corpora tertia per se,
Nulla potest rerum in numero natura relinqu.

Thus the ancient Epicureans and Democriticks argued; there being nothing incorporeal but space, there can be no incorporeal Deity.

But because this seems to give advantage to the Theists, in making space something, or that which hath a real nature or entity without our conception, from whence it will follow, that it must needs be either itself a substance, or else a mode of some incorporeal substance; the modern Democriticks are here more cautious, and make space to be no nature really existing without us, but only the fantasm of a body, and as it were the ghost of it, which has no reality without our imagination. So that there are not two natures of body and space, which must needs infer two distinct substances, one whereof must be incorporeal, but only one nature of body. The consequence of which will be this, that an incorporeal substance is all one with an incorporeal body, and therefore nothing.

VIII. But because it is generally conceived, that an error cannot be sufficiently confuted, without discovering τὸ αἰτίου τὸ ἕνωσις, the cause of the mifake; therefore the Atheists will in the next place undertake to show likewise the original of this doctrine of incorporeal substances, and from what misapprehension it sprung; as also take occasion from thence, further to disprove a Deity.

Wherefore they say, that the original of this doctrine of incorporeal substances proceeded chiefly from the abuse of abstract names, both of substances (whereby the essences of singular bodies, as of a man or an horse, being abstracted from those bodies themselves, are consider'd universally;) as also of accidents, when they are consider'd alone without their subjects or substances. The latter of which is a thing, that men have been necessitated to, in order to the computation or reckoning of the properties of bodies, the comparing of them with one another, the adding, subtracting, multiplying and dividing of them; which could not be done, so long as they are taken concretely together with their subjects. But yet, as there is some use of those abstract names, so the abuse of them has been also very great; forasmuch as, though they be really the names of nothing, since the essence of this and that man is not any thing without the man, nor is an accident any thing without its substance, yet men have been led into a gross mistake by them, to imagine them to be realities existing by themselves. Which infatuation hath chiefly proceeded from scholasticks, who have been so intemperate in the use of these words, that they could not make a rational discourse of any thing, though never so small, but they must stuff it with their quiddities, entities, essences, hocuspocus and the like. Wherefore these are they, who being first deluded themselves, have also deluded the world, introducing an opinion into the minds of men,
that the essence of every thing is something without that thing it self, and also eternal; and therefore when any thing is made or generated, that there is no new being produced, but only an antecedent and eternal essence cloathed (as it were) with a new garment of existence: as also that the mere accidents of bodies may exist alone by themselves without their substances. As for example, that the life, sense and understanding of animals, commonly call’d by the names of soul and mind, may exist without the bodies or substances of them by themselves, after the animals are dead; which plainly makes them to be incorporeal substances, as it were the separate and abstract essences of men. This hath been observed by a modern writer in these words: Est hominum abstractus tum in omni vita, tum in philosophia, magnus & usus & abusus. Abusus in eo confisit, quod eum videant aliqui, considerari posse, id est, inferiri in rationes, accidentium incrementa & decrementa, sine consideratione corporum, Ivex subiectorum suorum, (id quod appellatur abstrabere) loquentur de accidentibus, tamen posse ab omni corpore separari: hinc enim originem trahunt quorumdam Metaphysicorum effus errores. Nam ex eo, quod considerari potest cogitatio, sine consideratione corporis, inferre solent non esse opus corporis cogitantis. It is a great abuse, that some Metaphysicians make of these abstracts names, because cogitation can be consider’d alone without the consideration of body, therefore to conclude, that it is not the action or accident of that body that thinks, but a substance by itself. And the same writer elsew’ere observes, that it is upon this ground, that when a man is dead and buried, they say his soul (that is, his life) can walk, separated from his body, and is seen by night among the graves. By which means the vulgar are confirmed in their superstitious belief of ghosts, spirits, demons, devils, fairies and hob-goblins, invisible powers and agents, called by several names, and that by those perfections, whose work it ought to be rather to free men from such superstition. Which belief at first had another original, not altogether unlike the former; namely from men mistaking their own fantasys for things really existing without them. For as in the feenie of vision, men are commonly deceived, in supposing the image behind the glass to be a real thing existing without themselves, whereas it is indeed nothing but their own fancy; in like manner when the minds of men strongly possesse’d with fear, especially in the dark, raise up the fantasms of spectres, bug-bears, or affrightful apparitions to them, they think them to be objects really existing without them, and call them ghosts and spirits, whilst they are indeed nothing but their own fantasies; so the fantasms or fantasms of a Deity (which is indeed the chief of all fantasms) created by fear, has upon no other account been taken for a reality. To this purpose a modern writer, From the fear, that proceeds from the ignorance it self, of what it is that hath the power to do men good or harm, men are inclined to suppose and feign to themselves several kinds of powers invisible, and to stand in awe of their own imaginations, and in time of distress to invoke them, as also in the time of an unexpected good success to give them thanks, making the creatures of their own fancies, their Gods. Which though it be prudently spoken in the plural number, that so it might be diverted and put off to the heathen gods; yet the writer is very simple, that does not perceive the reason of it to be the same con-
cerning that one Deity, which is now commonly worshipped; and that therefore this also is but the creature of mens fear and fancy, the chief of all fantastick ghosts and spirits, as it were an Oberon or prince of fairies and fancies. This (we say) was the first original of that vulgar belief of invisible powers, ghosts, and gods; mens taking their own fancies for things really exisiting without them. And as for the matter and subsatnce of these ghosts, they could not by their own natural cogitation fall into any other conceit, but that it was the same with that, which appeareth in a dream to one that sleepeith, or in a looking-glass to one that is awake, thin aerial bodies, which may appear and vanish when they please. But the opinion, that such spirits were incorporeal and immaterial could never enter into the minds of men by nature, unabused by doctrine; but it sprung up from those deceiving and deceived literati, scholasticks, philosophers, and theologers enchanting mens understandings, and making them believe, that the abstract notions of accidents and effences could exist alone by themselves, without the bodies, as certain separate and incorporeal subsatnces.

To conclude therefore, to make an incorporeal mind to be the cause of all things is to make our own fancy, an imaginary ghost of the world, to be a reality; and to suppose the mere abstract notion of an accident, and a separate essence, to be not only an absolute thing by itself, and a real subsatnce incorporeal, but also the first original of all subsatnces, and of whatsoever is in the universe. And this may be reckon'd for a fourth atheistical ground.

IX. Fifthly, the Atheists pretend further to prove, that there is no other subsatnce in the world besides body; as also from the principles of corporealism it self to evince, that there can be no corporeal Deity, after this manner. No man can devise any other notion of subsatnce, than that it is a thing extended, exisiting without the mind, not imaginary but real and solid magnitude; for whatsoever is not extended, is nowhere and nothing. So that res extensa is the only subsatnce, the solid basis and substratum of all. Now this is the very self-same thing with body; for substantia, or resistance, seems to be a necessary consequence and result from extension, and that they think otherwise, can show no reason, why bodies, may not also penetrate one another, as some Corporealists think they do; from whence it is inferred, that body or matter is the only subsatnce of all things. And whatsoever else is in the world, that is, all the differences of bodies, are nothing but several accidents and modifications of this extended subsatnce, body or matter. Which accidents, though they may be sometimes call'd by the names of real qualities, and forms, and though there be different apprehensions concerning them amongst philosophers, yet generally they agree in this, that there are these two properties belonging to them; first, that none of them can subsist alone by themselves, without extended subsatnce or matter, as the basis and support of them; and secondly, that they may be all destroyed without the destruction of any subsatnce. Now as blackness and whiteness, heat and cold, so likewise life, sense and understanding, are such accidents, modifications or qualities of body, that can neither exist by themselves, and may be destroyed without the
destruction of any substance or matter. For if the parts of the body of any living animal be disunited and separated from one another, or the organical disposition of the matter alter'd, those accidents, forms or qualities, of life and understanding, will presently vanish away to nothing, all the substance of the matter will remaining one where or other in the universe entire, and nothing of it left. Wherefore the substance of matter and body, as distinguished from the accidents, is the only thing in the world, that is uncorruptible and undestroyable. And of this it is to be understood, that nothing can be made out of nothing, and destroyed to nothing, (i.e.) that every entire thing, that is made or generated, must be made of some pre-existent matter; which matter was from eternity self-existent and unmade, and is also undestroyable, and can never be reduced to nothing. It is not to be understood of the accidents themselves, that are all makeable and destroyable, generable and corruptible. Whatsoever is in the world is but ὅν τὸς ἔκτεινε, matter so and so modified or qualified, all which modifications and qualifications of matter are in their own nature destroyable, and the matter itself (as the basis of them, not necessarily determined to this or that accident) is the only <οὐκ> κατὰ <κατὰ> τούτον, the only necessarily existent. The conclusion therefore is, that no animal, no living understanding body, can be absolutely and essentially uncorruptible, this being an incommunicable property of the matter; and therefore there can be no corporeal Deity, the original of all things, essentially undestroyable.

Though the Stoicks imagined the whole corporeal universe to be an animal or Deity, yet this corporeal God of theirs was only by accident incorruptible and immortal; because they supposed, that there was no other matter, which existing without this world, and making inroads upon it, could disunite the parts of it, or disorder its compages. Which if there were, the life and understanding of this Stoical God, or great mundane animal, as well as that of other animals in like cases, must needs vanish into nothing. Thus from the principles of corporealism itself, it plainly follows, that there can be no corporeal deity, because the Deity is supposed to be <οὐκ> κατὰ <κατὰ> τούτον, a thing that was never made, and is essentially undestroyable, which are the privileges and properties of nothing but senfeless matter.

X. In the next place, the Atheists undertake more effectually to confute that corporeal God of the Stoicks and others, from the principles of the atomical philosophy, in this manner. All corporeal Atheists, who assert, that an understanding nature or mind, residing in the matter of the whole universe, was the first original of the mundane system, and did intellectually frame it, betray no small ignorance of philosophy and the nature of body, in supposing real qualities, besides magnitude, figure, site and motion, as simple and primitive things, to belong to it; and that there was such a quality or faculty of understanding in the matter of the whole universe, coeternal with the same, that was an original thing uncompounded and undervived from any thing else. Now to suppose such original qualities and powers, which are really distinct from the substance of extended matter and its modifications, of divisibility, figure, site and motion, is really to suppose so many distinct substances, which therefore must needs be in-
Chap. II. is no Understanding Nature.

corporeal. So that these philosophers fall unawares into that very thing, which they are so abhorrent from. For this quality or faculty of understanding, in the matter of the univerfe, original and underiv’d from any other thing, can be indeed nothing else but an incorporeal substance. *Epicurus* suggested a caution against this vulgar mistake, concerning qualities, to this purpofe: *Non se cogiündae sunt qualitatis, quas sunt quaedam per se existentes nature sive substantiae*; *siquidem id menti assequi non licet; sed solummodo ut variis modis se ferendi corporis considera nde sunt.*

Body, as such, hath nothing else belonging to the nature of it, but what is included in the idea of extended substance, divisibility, figure, fite, motion or rest, and the results from the various compositions of them, caufing different fancies. Wherefore, as vulgar philosophers make their firit matter (which they cannot well tell what they mean by it) becaufe it receives all qualities, to be itself devoid of all quality; fo we conclude, that atoms (which are really the firit principles of all things) have none of those qualities in them, which belong to compounded bodies; they are not abfolutely of themfelves black or white, hot or cold, moist or dry, bitter or sweet, all these things arifing up afterwards from the various aggregations and contextures of them, together with different motions. Which *Lucretius* confirms by this reafon, agreeable to the tenour of the atomical philosophy, that if there were any fuch real qualities in the firit principles, then in the various corruptions of nature things would at last be reduced to nothing:

1. *Immutabile enim quiddam superare necesse est,*  
*Nec res ad nihilum redigantur funditius omnes.*  
*Proinde colore cave contingas femina rerum,*  
*Nec tibi res redeant ad nihilum funditius omnes.*

Wherefore he concludes, that it muft not be thought, that white things are made out of white principles, nor black things out of black principles:

2. *Ne ex albis alba reris*  
*Principii effe,*  
*Ant ea quae migrant, nigro de femine nata:*  
*Neve alium quemvis, que sunt induta, colorem,:*  
*Propter ea gerere bunc credas, quod materiâi*  
*Corpora confimili sunt ejus tintiâia colore:*  
*Nullus enim color est omnino materiâi*  
*Corporibus, neque par rebus, neque denique dispar.*

Adding, that the fame is to be resolved likewise concerning all other fensible qualities as well as colours.

3. *Sed ne forte putes solo spoliata colore*  
*Corpora prima manere; etiam secretâ teporis*  
*Sunt, ac frigoris omnino, calidique vaporis.*  

1 Lucret. Lib. II. ver. 750, 751, 754.  
2 Id. Lib. II. ver. 750, &c.  
3 Id. Lib. II. ver. 841, &c.
Lastly, he tells us in like manner, that the same is to be understood also concerning life, sense and understanding; that there are no such simple qualities or natures in the first principles, out of which animals are compounded, but that these are in themselves altogether devoid of life, sense and understanding:

\[ \text{Nunc ea, quae sentientia videmus cunque, necessis} \]
\[ \text{Ex insensilibus tamen omnia conficere} \]
\[ \text{Principiis conficere: neque id manifesta refutant,} \]
\[ \text{Sed magis ipfa manu ducunt, & credere cogunt,} \]
\[ \text{Ex insensilibus, quod dico, animalia gigni.} \]
\[ \text{Quippe videre licet, vivos exiherem vermes} \]
\[ \text{Stercore de tetro, putrorem cum sibi naedia} \]
\[ \text{Intempestantes ex imbris humida tellus.} \]

All sensitive and rational animals are made of irrational and senseless principles, which is proved by experience, in that we see worms are made out of putridified dung, moistened with immoderate showers.

Some indeed, who are no greater friends to a Deity than our selves, will needs have that sense and understanding, that is in animals and men, to be derived from an antecedent life and understanding in the matter. But this cannot be, because if matter as such had life and understanding in it, then every atom of matter must needs be a distinct perciptent, animal, and intelligent person by itself: and it would be impossible for any such men and animals as now are to be compounded out of them, because every man would be \textit{variorum animalivorum acervus}, a heap of innumerable animals and perciptents.

Wherefore as all the other qualities of bodies, so likewise life, sense, and understanding arise from the different contextures of atoms devoid of all those qualities, or from the composition of those simple elements of magnitudes, figures, sites and motions, in the same manner as from a few letters variously compounded all that infinite variety of syllables and words is made:

\[ \text{Quin etiam refert nostris in versibus ipsis} \]
\[ \text{Cum quibus & quali post turam continentur;} \]
\[ \text{Namque eadem calcum, mare, terras, flamina, solem} \]
\[ \text{Significant, eadem, fruges, arbusta, animantes;} \]
\[ \text{Sic ipsis in rebus item jam materiali} \]
\[ \text{Intervallo, vis, connexus, pondera, plage;} \]
\[ \text{Concursus, motus, ordo, posturam, figure;} \]
\[ \text{Cum permutantur, mutati res quoque debent.} \]

\[ \text{Id Lib. II. ver. 684, &c.} \]
\[ \text{Id Lib. II. ver. 1012.} \]
CHAP. II. *Atheists oppose the World's Animation.*

From the fortuitous concretions of senseless unknowing atoms did rise up afterwards, in certain parts of the world called animals, soul, and mind, sense and understanding, counsel and wisdom. But to think, that there was any animalish nature before all these animals, or that there was an antecedent mind and understanding, counsel and wisdom, by which all animals themselves, together with the whole world, were made and contrived, is either to run round in a senseless circle, making animals and animality to be before one another infinitely; or else to suppose an impossible beginning of an original understanding quality in the matter. Atoms in their first coalitions together, when the world was a making, were not then directed by any previous counsel or preventive understanding, which were things as yet unborn and unmade,

1 Nam certè neque consilio primordia rerum
Ordine fè quaque atque fagaci mente locârunt,
Nec quos queque darent motus, peüpere profèrât.

Mind and understanding, counsel and wisdom did not lay the foundations of the univerfe; they are no archical things, that is, they have not the nature of a principle in them; they are not simple, original, primitive and primordial, but as all other qualities of bodies, secondary, compounded and derivative, and therefore they could not be architectonical of the world. Mind and understanding is no God, but the creature of matter and motion.

The sense of this whole argument is briefly this: The first principle of all things in the whole univerfe is matter, or atoms devoid of all qualities, and consequently of all life, sense and understanding; and therefore the original of things is no understanding nature, or deity.

XI. Seventhly, The Democritick Atheists argue further after this manner: They who assert a Deity, suppose Ἰδιαὶ heres τῶν χάρας, the whole world to be animated, that is, to have a living, rational and understanding nature presiding over it. Now it is already evident from some of the premised arguments, that the world cannot be animated, in the sense of Platonists, that is, with an incorporeal soul, which is in order of nature before body, it being proved already, that there can be no substance incorporeal; as likewise that it cannot be animated neither in the Stoical sense, so as to have an original quality of understanding or mind in the matter; but yet nevertheless some may possibly imagine, that as in our selves and other animals, though compounded of senseless atoms, there is a soul and mind, resulting from the contexture of them, which being once made, domineers over the body, governing and ordering it at pleasure; so there may be likewise such a living soul and mind, not only in the stars, which many have supposed to be lesser deities, and in the sun, which has been reputed a principal deity; but also in the whole mundane system, made up of earth, seas, air, ether, sun, moon, and stars all together; one general soul and mind, which though resulting at first from the fortuitous motion of matter, yet being once produced,

1 Id. Lib. I. ver. 1020.
may rule, govern and sway the whole, understandingly, and in a more perfect manner than our souls do our bodies; and so long as it continues, exercise a principality and dominion over it. Which although it will not amount to the full notion of a God, according to the strict sense of Theists, yet it will approach very near unto it, and indanger the bringing in of all the same inconveniences along with it. Wherefore they will now prove, that there is no such foul or mind as this, (resulting from the contexture of atoms) that presides over the corporeal universe, that so there may not be so much as the shadow of a Deity left.

It was observed before, that life, sense, reason and understanding are but qualities of concreted bodies, like those other qualities of heat, and cold, &c. arising from certain particular textures of atoms. Now as those first principles of bodies, namely single atoms, have none of those qualities in them, so neither hath the whole universe any (that it can be denominated from) but only the parts of it. The whole world is neither black nor white, hot nor cold, pellucid nor opaque, it containing all those qualities in its several parts. In like manner, the whole has no life, sense, nor understanding in it, but only the parts of it, which are called animals. That is, life and sense are qualities, that arise only from such a texture of atoms as produceth soft flesh, blood, and brains, in bodies organized, with head, heart, bowels, nerves, muscles, veins, arteries and the like;

1 Sensus jungitur omnibus
Viseribus, nervis, venis, quecunque videmus,
Mollia mortali consifiere corpore creta;

And reason and understanding, properly so called, are peculiar appendices to human shape; 2 Ratio nusquam esse potest nisi in hominis figura. From whence it is concluded, that there is no life, soul nor understanding acting the whole world, because the world hath no blood nor brains, nor any animalish or human form. 3 Qui mundum ipsum animantem sapientemque esse dixerunt, nullo modo viderunt animi naturam, in quam figuram cadere possit. Therefore the Epicurean poet concludes upon this ground, that there is no divine sense in the whole world;

4 Dispositum videtur ubi esse & crescere possit
Seorsim anima atque animus; tanto magis incipientiis,
Totum possit extra corpus formâque animalem,
Putridus in glebis terrarum, aut folis in igni,
Aut in aqua durare, aut altis aetheris oris.
Hand igitur conflant divino predicta sensu,
Quandoquidem nequeunt vitaliter esse animata.

Now if there be no life nor understanding above us, nor round about us, not any where else in the world, but only in our selves and fellow animals, and we

1 Id. Lib. II. ver. 905, &c.
2 Velleius apud Ciceron. de Nat. Deor. IX. Oper.
4 Lucret. Lib. V. ver. 145, &c.
we be the highest of all beings; if neither the whole corporeal system be animated, nor those greater parts of it, sun, moon nor stars, then there can be no danger of any Deity.

XII. Eighthly, the Democritick Atheists dispute further against a Deity in this manner: the Deity is generally supposed to be ζωον μακρόπυκνον καὶ ἁθάνατον, a perfectly happy animal, incorruptible and immortal. Now there is no living being incorruptible and immortal, and therefore none perfectly happy neither. For, according to that Democritick hypothesis of atoms in vacuity, the only incorruptible things will be these three; first of all, vacuum or empty space, which must needs be such, because it cannot suffer from any thing, since it is plagarum expers,

1 Et manet intacrum, nec ab istu fungitur hilum.

Secondly, the single atoms, because by reason of their parvitude and solidity they are indivisible; and lastly, the summa summarum of all things, that is the comprehension of all atoms dispersed every where throughout infinite space.

2 —— Quia nulla loci sitat copia certum
Quo quae res possint discedere dissipataque.

But according to that other hypothesis of some modern Atomists (which also was entertained of old by Empedocles) that supposes a plenity, there is nothing at all incorruptible, but the substance of matter itself. All systems and compages of it, all συκρίματα and ἀπορίματα, all concretions and coagulations of matter divided by motion, together with the qualities resulting from them, are corruptible and destroyable: 3 quae est coagulationis rerum non dissolubilis? Death destroys not the substance of any matter; for as no matter came from nothing, but was self-eternal, so none of it can ever vanish into nothing; but it dissolves all the aggregations of it.

4 Non sic interimit mors res, ut materiae
Corpora conficiat, sed certum dissipat ollis.

Life is no substantial thing, nor any primitive or simple nature; it is only an accident or quality arising from the aggregation and contexture of atoms or corpuscules, which when the compages of them is disunited and dissolved, though all the substance still remain scattered and dispersed, yet the life utterly perishes and vanishes into nothing. No life is immortal; there is no immortal soul; nor immortal animal, or Deity. Though this whole mundane system were it self an animal, yet being but an aggregation of matter, it would be both corruptible and mortal. Wherefore since no living being can possibly

L 2

1 Id. Lib. V. verf. 358. Addas etiam Lib. III. verf. 814.
2 Id. Lib. III. verf. 815.
4 Lucret. Lib. II. verf. 1001.
Atheists impugn a First Cause or Mover. Book I.

have any security of its future permanency, there is none that can be perfectly happy. And it was rightly determined by our fellow-atheists, the Hedonicks and Cyrenaicks, that perfect happiness is a mere notion, a romantick fiction, a thing which can have no existence anywhere. This is recorded to have been one of Democritus his chief arguments against a Deity, because there can be no living being immortal, and consequently none perfectly happy. * Cuma Democritus, quia nihil semper suo statu maneant, neget esse quicquam sempiternum, nonne Deum ita tollit omnium, ut nullam opinionem ejus reliquam faciat?

XIII. A ninth pretended demonstration of the Democritick Atheists is as followeth. By God is understood a first cause or mover, which being not before acted upon by any thing else, but acting originally from itself, was the beginning of all things. Now it is an indubitable axiom, and generally received among philosophers, that nothing can move it self, but quicquid movetur, ab alio movetur; whatsoever is moved, is moved by something else; nothing can act otherwise than it is made to act by something without it, acting upon it. The necessary conquence whereof is this, that there can be no such thing as any first mover, or first cause, that is, no God. This argument is thus urged by a modern writer, agreeably to the sense of the ancient Democriticks; Ex quo quid nihil potest movere seipsum, non inferetur, id quid inferri solet, nempe Eternum Immobile, sed contrà Eternum Motum, siguident ut verum est, nihil moveri à seipso, ita etiam verum est nihil moveri nisi à moto. From hence, that nothing can move it self, it cannot be rightly inferred, as commonly it is, that there is an eternal immovable mover (that is, a God) but only an eternal moved mover; or that one thing was moved by another from eternity, without any first mover. Because as it is true, that nothing can be moved from it self, so it is likewise true, that nothing can be moved but from that which was itself also moved by something else before: and so the progress upwards must needs be infinite, without any beginning or first mover. The plain drift and scope of this ratiocination is no other than this, to shew that the argument commonly taken from motion, to prove a God, (that is, a first mover or cause) is not only ineffectual and inconclusive; but also that, on the contrary, it may be demonstrated from that very topick of motion, that there can be no absolutely first mover, no first in the order of causes, that is, no God.

XIV. Tenthly, because the Theists conceive that though no body can move it self, yet a perfect cogitative and thinking being might be the beginning of all, and the first cause of motion; the Atheists will endeavour to evince the contrary, in this manner. No man can conceive how any cogitation, which was not before, should rise up at any time, but that there was some cause for it, without the thinker. For else there can be no reason given, why this thought rather than that, and at this time rather than another, should start up. Wherefore this is universally true of all motion and action whatsoever, as it was rightly urged by the Stoicks, that there can be no motion without a cause, i.e. no motion, which has not some cause without the

 Chap. II. Atheists make Knowledge junior to the World.

the subject of it, or, as the same thing is expressed by a modern writer, Nothing takes beginning from itself but from the action of some other immediate agent without it. Wherefore no thinking being could be a first cause, any more than an automaton or machine could. To this purpose, it is further argued, that these two notions, the one of a knowing understanding being, the other of a perfectly happy being, are contradictory, because all knowledge essentially implies dependance upon something else, as its cause; scientia & intellectus signum est potentiæ ab alió dependentis, id quod non est beatissimum. They conclude, that cogitation, and all action whatsoever, is really nothing else but local motion, which is essentially heterokinesy, that which can never rise of itself, but is caused by some other agent without its subject.

XV. In the eleventh place, the Democritick Atheists reason thus: If the world were made by any antecedent mind or understanding, that is, by a Deity; then there must needs be an idea, platform and exemplar of the whole world before it was made; and consequently actual knowledge, both in order of time and nature, before things. But all knowledge is the information of the things themselves known; all conception of the mind is a passion from the things conceived, and their activity upon it; and is therefore junior to them. Wherefore the world and things were before knowledge and the conception of any mind, and no knowledge, mind or deity before the world as its cause. This argument is thus proposed by the atheistic Poet,

\[\text{Exemplum porro gignundis rebus & ipsa}\\Noites hominum Di vis unde insita primùm,\\Quid vellet facere, ut seirent, animoque viderent?\\Quove modo est unquam vis cognita principiorum,\\Quidnam inter sejè permutato ordine possent,\\Si non ipsa dedì specimen natura creandì?\]

How could the supposed Deity have a pattern or platform in his mind, to frame the world by, and whence should be receive it? How could he have any knowledge of men before they were made, as also what himself should will to do, when there was nothing? How could he understand the force and possibility of the principles, what they would produce when variously combined together, before nature and things themselves, by creating, had given a specimen?

XVI. A twelfth argumentation of the Democritick and Epicurean Atheists against a Deity is to this purpose: that things could not be made by a Deity, that is supposed to be a being every way perfect, because they are so faulty and so ill made: the argument is thus propounded by Lucretius;

\[\text{Quod si jam rerum igno rem primordia quæ sint,}\\Hoc tamen ex ipsis cali rationibus ausim\\Conscäone, alisque ex rebus reddere multis,\\Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam\\Naturam rerum, tantà fiant prædita culpà.\]

This

\[\text{Lucret. Lib. V. ver. 182.} \quad \text{Lib. II. ver. 177. & Lib. V. ver. 130.}\]
Atheists contend that the World is ill-made. Book I.

This Argument, à celi rationibus, from astronomy, or the constitution of the heavens, is this: 1 that the mundane sphere is so framed, in respect of the disposition of the æquator and ecliptic, as renders the greatest part of the earth uninhabitable to men and most other animals; partly by that excess of heat in the torrid zone (containing all between the tropicks) and partly from the extremity of cold in both the frigid zones, towards either pole. Again, whereas the Stoical Theists contemporary with Epicurus concluded, that the whole world was made by a Deity, only for the sake of men,


2 Horum omnia causâ
Constituiffe Deum fingunt

it is urged on the contrary, that a great part of the habitable earth is taken up by seas, lakes and rocks, barren heaths and sands, and thereby made useless for mankind; and that the remainder of it yields no fruit to them, unless expugned by obstinate labour, after all which, men are often disappointed of the fruits of those labours by unseasonable weather, storms and tempests. Again, that nature has not only produced many noxious and poisonous herbs, but also destructive and devouring animals, whose strength surpasseth that of mens; and that the condition of mankind is so much inferior to that of brutes, that nature seems to have been but a step-mother to the former, whilst she hath been an indulgent mother to the latter. And to this purpose, the manner of mens coming into the world is thus aggravated by the poet:

5 Tum porro puer, ut sevis projetis ab undis
Novita, nudus humi jacet, infans, indignus omni
Vita auxilio, cum primum in luminis oras
Nixibus ex alvo matris natura profudit:
Vagitique locum lugubri complei, ut æquum fē,
Quoi tantum in vita refet tranfire malorum.

But on the contrary, the comparative advantages of brutes and their privileges, which they have above men, are described after this manner:

4 At variæ crescent pecudes, armenta, fer.eque:
Nec crepitacula eis opus fum, nec quoequam adhibenda fē
Aime nutricis blanda atque infrastræ loquela;
Nec variis querunt vesles pro tempore celli.
Denique non armis opus est, non manibus altis,
Quois sua tutentur, quando omnibus omnia largè
Tellus ipsa parit, naturâque Dxdala rerum.

And lastly, the topick of evils in general, is infused upon them, not those which are called culpa, evils of fault (for that is a thing which the Democratick Atheists utterly explode in the genuine sense of it) but the evils of pain and trouble; which they dispute concerning, after this manner. 5 The suppos'd Deity and maker of

1 Vid. Lucret. Lib. V. ver. 255, 295. &c.
Cicero in Somnio Scipionis cap. VI. p. 598. 1
Tom. XI. Opera.
2 Lucret. Lib. II. ver. 174, 175.
3 Id. Lib V. ver. 223.
4 Id. ibid.
of the world was either willing to abolish all evils, but not able; or he was able but not willing; or thirdly, he was neither willing nor able; or else lastly, he was both able and willing. This latter is the only thing that answers fully to the notion of a God. Now that the supposed creator of all things was not thus both able and willing to abolish all evils, is plain, because there would have been no evils at all left. Wherefore since there is such a deluge of evils overflowing all, it must needs be, that either he was willing and not able to remove them, and then he was impotent; or else he was able and not willing, and then he was envious; or lastly, he was neither able nor willing, and then he was both impotent and envious.

XVII. In the twelfth place, the Atheists further dispute in this manner. If the world were made by any Deity, then it would be governed by a providence; and if there were any providence, it must appear in human affairs. But here it is plain, that all is Tobi and Babu, chaos and confusion; things happening alike to all, to the wise and foolish, religious and impious, virtuous and vicious. (For these names the Atheist cannot chuse but make use of, though by taking away natural morality, they really destroy the things.) From whence it is concluded, that all things float up and down, as they are agitated and driven by the tumbling billows of careless fortune and chance. The impieties of Dionysius¹, his scoffing abuses of religion, and whatsoever was then sacred, or worship'd under the notion of a God, were most notorious; and yet it is observed, that he fared never a jot the worse for it. Hence nec Olympus Jupiter fulmine percussit, nec AEsculapius mifero diurnanoque morbo tabescit atrem, verum in suo lectulo mortuis, in Lympnidis regnum illius est, eaque potestatem, quam ipse per seculum naeus erat, quasi justam & legitimam, hereditatis loco tradidit: Neither did Jupiter Olympus strike him with a thunderbolt, nor AEsculapius inflicted any languishing disease upon him; but he died in his bed, and was honourably interred, and that power, which he had wickedly acquired, he transmitted, as a just and lawful inheritance, to his posterity. And Diogenes the Cynick, though much a Theist, could not but acknowledge, that Harpalus, a famous robber or pirate in those times, who committing many villainous actions, notwithstanding lived prosperously, did thereby Testimonium dicere contra deos, bear testimony against the Gods². Though it has been objected by the Atheists, and thought to be a strong argument for providence, that there were so many tables hung up in temples, the monuments of such as having prayed to the gods in storms and tempefts, had escaped shipwreck; yet as Diagoras observed, Nihil quam pieti sunt, qui morgorium feerunt, there are no tables extant of those of them, who were shipwreck'd³. Wherefore it was not considered by these Theists, how many of them that prayed as well to the gods, did notwithstanding suffer shipwreck; as also how many of those, which never made any devotional addresses at all to any deity, escaped equal dangers of storms and tempefts.

Moreover, it is contentaneous to the opinion of a God, to think, that thunder rattling in the clouds with thunder-bolts should be the immediate

² Id. ibid. cap. XXXIV. p. 3099.
³ Ib. id. cap. XXXVII. p. 5104.
significations of his wrath and displeasure: whereas it is plain, that these are
flung at random, and that the fury of them often lights upon the innocent,
whilst the notoriously guilty escape untouched; and therefore we understand
not, how this can be answered by any Theists.

' Cur, quibus incantum fculus aversabile cumque est,
Non faciant, iti flammias ut fulguris balent,
Peftore perfixo ; documen mortalibus acre?
Et potius nullae sibi turpis conscius rei,
Vokitur in flammis innoxius, inque peditur,
Turbine calcis subito corruptus, & igni?

Now the force of this argument appears to be very powerful, because it
hath not only flattered and confounded Theists in all ages, but also hath ef-
fectually transformed many of them into Atheists. For Diagoras Melinus 2
himself was once a superstitious religionist, in so much that being a Dithyram-
bick poet, he began one of his poems with these words, κατὰ δαιμονὶς ἡ τῷ-
χρὸνι πνεύμα τελείται, all things are done by God and fortune. But being injured
afterwards by a perjured person, that suffered no evil nor disaster thereupon,
he therefore took up this contrary persuasion, that there was no Deity. And
there have been innumerable others, who have been so far wrought upon by
this consideration, as if not absolutely to disclaim and discard a Deity, yet
utterly to deny providence, and all care of human affairs by any invisible
powers. Amongst whom the poet was one, who thus expressed his sensë:

5 Sed eum res hominum tantâ caligine volvi
Aspicerem, letóque diu florere nocentes,
Vexarique pios, rursus labesacta cadebat
Religio, causæque viam non sponte siquebar
Alterius, vacuo que currere femina notu
Affirmat, magnánque novas per inane figuræs,
Fortunæ, non arte regi ; que numina senfu
Ambiguo vel nulla putat, vel nescia nosri.

XVIII. A thirteenth argumentation of the Demoncritick and Epicurean
Atheists is to this purpose; that whereas the Deity is supposed to be such a
being, as both knows all that is done every where in the most distant places
of the world at once, and doth himself immediately order all things, this is,
first, impossible for any one being thus to animadvert and order all things in
the whole universe:

4 Quis regere immensì summam, quis habere profundi
Indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas?
Quis pariter calos omnës convertere ? & omnïes

Ignibus

1 Lucret Lib. VI. ver. 359, &c.
2 Vide Sext. Empiric. Lib. IX. adver.
Mathemat. §. LIII. p. 561.
3 Claudian. in Rufinum Lib. I. ver. 12,
4 Lucret. Lib. II. ver. 1094, &c.
And secondly, if it were suppos'd to be possible, yet such infinite negotiomy would be absolutely inconsequent with a happy state; nor could such a Deity ever have any quiet enjoyment of himself, being perpetually filled with tumult and hurrleury: 1 *sαμωνως* πραγματευονται *φατολεις* ανεφεραν αν κακαλινωτε, αλλα αιτουρκιανοθεροι εραζεται των χλωεσ ταυτα γινεται: Distraction of busines and solicitous cares, displeasures and favours, do not at all agree with happiness, but they proceed from imbecility, indigency and fear: 2 *και* μακαρον αναφερον ιτε αντο πραγματα τιχα, ιτε αλλω πολιχι, ιτε ιτε φεραν αντο κακαλινωτε συνεχεται, ιν αιτουρκια γαρ ποιει ταυτα. That which is happy and incorruptible, would neither have it self any busines to do, nor create any to others; it would neither have displeasure nor favour towards any other persons, to engage it in action; all this proceeding from indigency. That is, favour and benevolence, as well as anger and displeasure, arise only from imbecility. That which is perfectly happy, and wanteth nothing, οἶνος ου τετει συνεχει τις ευαιμωνιας, being wholly possesed and taken up in the enjoyment of its own happiness, would beRedeless of the concerns of any others; and mind nothing besides it self, either to do it good or harm. Wherefore, this curiosus et plenius negotii den s, this busy, restless, and praetualical deity, that must needs intermeddle and have to do with every thing in the world, is a contradictonal notion, since it cannot but be the most unhappy of all things.

XIX. In the next place, the Atheists dispute further by propounding several bold queries, which they conceive unanswerable, after this manner. If the world were made by a Deity, why was it not made by him sooner? or since it was so long unmade, why did he make it at all? 4 *Cur mundi eqificator repente exitavit, innumerabilia ant seacula dormirer?* How came this builder and architect of the world to start up upon a sudden, after he had slept for infinite ages, and bethink himself of making a world? For, certainly, if he had been awake all that while, he would either have made it sooner, or not at all; because there was either something wanting to his happiness, before, or nothing: if there had been any thing wanting before, then the world could not have been so long unmade; but if he were completely happy in himself without it, then μνει πλειστων κοινων αιτεθει επιχειρειν πραξει, wanting nothing, be vainly went about to make superficious things. All defire of change and novelty argues a fastidious fatiety, proceeding from defect and indigency;

5 *Qui dve not solit tanto posset, post quieta Indicer, ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem?*

M

4 Id. ibid. Lib. I. cap. IX. p. 2891.
3 Lucret. Lib. V. ver. 169, &c.
Several bold Queries of Atheists.

Book I.

Did this Deity therefore light up the stars, as so many lamps or torches, in that vast abyss of infinite darkness, that himself might thereby have a more comfortable and cheerful habitation? Why would he then content himself from eternity, to dwell in such a melancholick, horrid, and forlorn dungeon?

1 An, credo, in tenebris vita & marore jacebat,
Donec diluxit rerum genitalis origo?

Was company and that variety of things, by which heaven and earth are distinguished, desirable to him? Why then would he continue solitary so long, wanting the pleasure of such a spectacle? Did he make the world and men in it to this end, that himself might be worshipped and adored, feared and honoured by them? But what could he be the better for that, who was sufficiently happy alone in himself before? Or did he do it for the sake of men, to gratify and oblige them?

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2 At quid immortalibus atque beatis
Gratia nostra quiem largirier emolumenti,
Ut nostra quicquam causae gerere aggregiandus?

Again, if this were done for the sake of men, then it must be either for wise men or for fools: if for wise men only, then all that pains was taken but for a very few; but if for fools, what reason could there be, why the Deity should seek to deserve so well at their hands? Besides this, what hurt would it have been to any of us, (whether wise or foolisht) never to have been made?

3 Quidve mali fuerat nobis non esse creatis?
Nam enim debet quicunque est, velle manere
In vita, donec retinebit blanda voluptas:
Qui nunquam verò vitae gustavit amorem,
Nec fuit in numero, qui obest non esse creatum?

Lastly, 4 if this Deity must needs go about moliminoously to make a world,
Vegãta dixit, by inclination, like an artificer and carpenter, what tools and instruments could he have to work withal? what ministers and sublervient oppi-
cers? what engines and machines for the rearing up of so huge a fabrick? How could he make the matter to understand his meaning, and obey his beck? how could he move it, and turn it up and down? for if incorporeal, he could neither touch nor be touched, but would run through all things, with-

1 Id. ibid. ver. 175, 176.
2 Id. ibid. ver. 166.
3 Id. ibid. ver. 177, 88.
out fastening upon any thing; but if corporeal, then the same thing was both materials and architect, both timber and carpenter, and the stones must hew themselves, and bring themselves together, with discretion, into a structure.

XX. In the last place, the Atheists argue from interest (which proves many times the most effectual of all arguments) against a Deity; endeavouring to persuade, that it is, first, the interest of private persons, and of all mankind in general, and secondly, the particular interest of civil soveraigns, and commonwealths, that there should neither be a God, nor the belief of any such thing entertained by the minds of men; that is, no religion. First, they say therefore, that it is the interest of mankind in general; because so long as men are persuaded, that there is an understanding being infinitely powerful, having no law but his own will, (because he has no superior) that may do whatever he pleases at any time to them, they can never securely enjoy themselves or any thing, nor be ever free from disquieting fear and solicitude. What the poets fable of Tantalus in hell, being always in fear, of a huge stone hanging over his head, and ready every moment to tumble down upon him, is nothing to that true fear, which men have of a Deity, and religion, here in this life, which indeed was the very thing mythologized in it.

1 Nec miser impendens magnum timet aëre saxum
Tantalus, (ut fana est) cafus formidine torpens:
Sed magis in vita, divum metus urget inanis
Mortales, casuque timent, quemcumque ferat fors.

For besides mens insecurity from all manner of present evils, upon the supposition of a God, the immortality of souls can hardly be kept out, but it will crowd in after it; and then the fear of eternal punishments after death will unavoidably follow thereupon, perpetually embittering all the solaces of life, and never affuring men to have the least sincere enjoyment,

2 Nec certum finem esse viderent
Ærumnarum homines, aliquid ratione valerent
Religionibus, atque minus obfistere vatum.
Nunc ratio nulla e reftandi, nulla facultas:
Æternam quoniam ponus in morte timendum.
Ignoratur enim, quœ sit natura animœ,
Nata sit, an contr« nascentibus insinuetur;
Et simul intereat nobiscum morte dirempta,
An tenebrae Orcœ vijat corâsque lacunas.

Wherefore it is plain, that they, who first introduced the belief of a Deity and religion, whatever they might aim at in it, deferved very ill of all mankind, because they did thereby infinitely debase and deprec mens spirits under a servile fear;

3 Efficient animos humiles, formidine divum,
Depressisse premunt ad terram:

As

1 Lucret. Lib. III. ver. 993.  2 Id. Lib. I. ver. 138, &c.  3 Id. Lib. VI. ver. 51.
Atheists pretend that Theism is Book I.

As also cause the greatest griefs and calamities, that now disturb human life,

* Quae bene cognita si teneas, natura videtur
Libera continuâ, dominis privata superbis,
Ipse fuâ per se sponte omnia dis agere expers.

So that Lucretius does not without just cause erect a triumphal arch or monument to Epicurus, for this conquest or victory of his obtained over the Deity and religion, in this manner;

* Humana ante oculos pâx quem vita faceret
In terris, oppressâ gravî sub religione,
Quae caput à cæli regionibus offendebat,
Horribili super aspïctu mortalibus inâns.
Primium Graïus homo mortales tendere contrâ
Et oculos ausus, proximâque obsïcere contrâ;
Quem nec fames, nec fulmina, nec munitâ
Murmure compressit caelum, &c.

XXI. That it is also the interest of civil sovereigns and of all commonwealths, that there should neither be Deity nor religion, the Democritick Atheists would persuade in this manner: A body politicke or commonwealth is made up of parts, that are all naturally disassociated from one another, by reason of that principle of private self-love, who therefore can be no otherwise held together than by fear. Now if there be any greater fear than the fear of the Leviathan, and civil

1 Id. Lib. V. ver. 1195.  
2 Id. Lib. III. ver. 37.  
3 Id. Lib. II. ver. 1089.  
4 Id. Lib. I. ver. 63.
civil representative, the whole structure and machine of this great coloss must needs fall a-pieces, and tumble down. The civil sovereign reigns only in fear; wherefore unless his fear be the king and sovereign of all fears, his empire and dominion ceases. But as the rod of Moses devoured the rods of the magicians, so certainly will the fear of an omnipotent Deity, that can punish with eternal torments after death, quite swallow up and devour that comparatively petty fear of civil sovereigns, and consequently destroy the being of commonwealths, which have no foundation in nature, but are mere artificial things, made by the enchantment and magical art of policy. Wherefore it is well observed by a modern writer, That men ought not to suffer themselves to be abused by the doctrine of separated essences and incorporeal substances, (such as God and the soul) built upon the vain philosophy of Aristotle, that would fright men from obeying the laws of their country, with empty names, (as of hell, damnation, fire and brimstone) as men fright birds from the corn with an empty hat, doublet, and a crooked stick. And again, If the fear of spirits (the chief of which is the Deity) were taken away, men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience.

Moreover, the power of civil sovereigns is perfectly indivisible; 'tis either all or nothing; it must be absolute and infinite, or else 'tis none at all. Now it cannot be so, if there be any other power equal to it, to share with it, much less if there be any superior (as that of the Deity) to check it and control it. Wherefore the Deity must of necessity be removed and displaced, to make room for the Leviathan to spread himself in:

Lastly, 'tis perfectly inconsistent with the nature of a body politic, that there should be any private judgment of good or evil, lawful or unlawful, just or unjust allowed. But conscience (which theism and religion introduces) is private judgment concerning good and evil; and therefore the allowance of it, is contradictory to civil sovereignty and a commonwealth. There ought to be no other conscience (in a kingdom or commonwealth) besides the law of the country; the allowance of private conscience being, ipso facto, a disintegration of the body politic, and a return to the state of nature. Upon all these accounts it must needs be acknowledged, that these philosophers, who undermine and weaken theism and religion, do highly deserve of all civil sovereigns and commonwealths.

XXII. Now from all the premised considerations, the Democriticks confidently conclude against a Deity; that the system and compages of the universe had not its original from any understanding nature; but that mind and understanding it self, as well as all things else in the world, sprung up from senseless nature and chance, or from the unguided and undirected motion of matter. Which is therefore called by the name of nature, because whatsoever moves is moved by nature and necessity; and the mutual occurrences and encounters of atoms, their plagues, their strokes and daffings against one another, their reflexions and repercussions, their cohesions, implexions and entanglements, as also their scattered dispersions and divulsions, are all natural and
and necessary; but it is called alio by the name of chance and fortune, because it is all unguided by any mind, counsel or design.

Wherefore infinite atoms of different sizes and figures, devoid of all life and sense, moving fortuitously from eternity in infinite space, and making successively several encounters, and consequently various implexions and entanglements with one another, produced first a confused chaos of these omnifarious particles, jumbling together with infinite variety of motions, which afterward, by the tugging of their different and contrary forces, whereby they all hindred and abated each other, came, as it were by joint conspiracy, to be conglomered into a vortex or vortexes; where after many convolutions and evolutions, molitions and effays (in which all manner of tricks were tried, and all forms imaginable experimented) they chanced, in length of time, here to settle, into this form and system of things, which now is, of earth, water, air and fire; sun, moon and stars; plants, animals and men; so that fifeless atoms, fortuitously moved, and material chaos, were the first original of all things.

This account of the cosmopæia, and first original of the mundane system, is represented by Lucretius 1 according to the mind of Epicurus, though without any mention of those vortices, which were yet an essential part of the old Decritick hypothesis.

Sed quisque ille modis conjectus materiali
Fundarit calum, ac terram, pentique profunda,
Solis, lunæ cursus, ex ordine ponam.
Nam certè neque confilio primordia rerum
Ordine se quæque atque fægaci mente locarunt:
Nec quas quee darent motus, pepigere professed.
Sed quia multa modis multis primordia rerum,
Ex infinito jam tempore percita plagiis,
Ponderibusque suis conjurant concita ferri,
Omnimodisque coire, atque omnia pertinare,
Quæcumque inter se possent congræssæ creare:
Prophetæ fit, uti magnum volutat per ævum,
Omnigenos cōtus, & motus experipiendo,
Tandem ea conveniant, quæ ut convenire, repente
Magnarum rerum sint exordia sepe,
Terræ, maris, & coeli, generisque animantium.

But because some seem to think that Epicurus was the first founder and inventor of this doctrine, we shall here observe, that this same atheistical hypothesis was long before described by Plato, when Epicurus was as yet unborn; and therefore doubtless according to the doctrine of Leucippus, Democritus and Protagoras; though that Philosopher, in a kind of dilflain (as it seems) refused to mention either of their names: 

\[\text{ἐπὶ τὺχα πασὶ τὶχεὶ ἀσθενῶς, ἐπὶ τὰ μεῖξε ταῦτα καὶ ὀλύμπα, ὑπὸ τε ἡλίας χελών, ἀγρίᾳ τε πέπι, διὰ τῶν γεγυνωσὶν, παλάμοις ὁθῶν ἀφίκων. τίχη ς}

\[\text{ἡκ. Lib. V. ver. 417, &c.}

\[\text{a Plato de Legibus, Lib X. p 666. Oper.}\]
Chap. II. All sprung from Nature and Chance.

All sprung from Nature and Chance.

The Atheists say, that fire, water, air and earth (i. e. the four elements) were all made by nature and chance; and none of them by art or mind (that is, they were made by the fortuitous motion of atoms, and not by any Deity) and that those other bodies, of the terrestrial globe, of the sun, the moon, and the stars (which by all, except these Atheists, were, in those times, generally supposed to be animated, and a kind of inferior Deities) were afterwards made out of the aforesaid elements, being altogether inanimate. For they being moved fortuitously, or as it happened, and so making various commixtures together, did, by that means, at length produce the whole heavens and all things in them, as likewise plants and animal's here upon earth; all which were not made by mind, nor by art, nor by any God; but, as we said before, by nature and chance; art, and mind itself, rising up afterwards from the same senseless principles in animals.
THE TRUE
INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM
OF THE
UNIVERSE.

BOOK I.

CHAP. III.

An introduction to the confutation of the atheistical grounds, in which is contained a particular account of all the several forms of atheism. 1. That the grounds of the hylozoick atheism could not be insisted on in the former chapter, together with those of the atomick, they being directly contrary each to other; with a further account of this hylozoick atheism. 2. A suggestion, by way of caution, for the preventing of all mistakes, that every Hylozoist must not therefore be condemned for an Atheist, or a mere counterfeit hisorical Theist. 3. That nevertheless, such Hylozoists as are also Corporealists can by no means be excused from the imputation of atheism, for two reasons. 4. That Strato Lampræcenus, commonly called Physicus, seems to have been the first afferter of the hylozoick atheism, be holding no other God but the life of nature in matter. 5. Further proved, that Strato was an Albeist, and that of a different form from Democritus, be attributing an energetick nature, but without sense and animality, to all matter. 6. That Strato not deriving all things from a mere fortuitous principle, as the Democritick Albeists did, nor yet acknowledging any one plastick nature to preside over the whole, but deducing the original of things from a mixture of chance and plastick nature both together in the several parts of matter, must therefore needs be an hylozoick Albeist. 7. That the famous Hippocrates was neither an Hylozoick nor Democritick Albeist, but rather an Heraclitick corporeal Theist. 8. That Plato took no notice of the hylozoick atheism, nor of any other
other than what derives the original of all things from a mere fortuitous nature; and therefore, either the Democritical, or the Anaximandrian Atheism, which latter will be next declared. 9. That it is hardly imaginable, there should have been no philosophick Atheists in the world before Democritus and Leucippus, there being in all ages, as Plato observes, some or other sick of the atheistic disease. That Aristotle affirms many of the first philosophers to have assigned only a material cause of the mundane system, without either efficient or intending cause; they supposing matter to be the only substance, and all things else nothing but the passions and accidents of it, generable and corruptible. 10. That the doctrine of these Materialists will be more fully understood from the exceptions, which Aristotle makes against them: his first exception, That they assigned no cause of motion, but introduced it into the world, unaccountably, 11. Aristotle's second exception, That these Materialists did assign no cause τοῦ τινὸς καλὸς, of well and fit, and give no account of the orderly regularity of things. That Anaxagoras was the first Ionick philosopher, who made mind and good a principle of the universe. 12. Concluded, That Aristotle's Materialists were downright Atheists, not merely because they held all substance to be body, since Heraclitus and Zeno did the like, and yet are not therefore accounted Atheists, (they supposing their fiery matter to be originally intellectual, and the whole world to be an animal;) but because these made stupid matter, devoid of all understanding and life, to be the only principle. 13. As also, because they supposed every thing besides the substance of matter, life and understanding, and all particular beings, to be generable, and corruptible, and consequently, that there could be no other God, than such as was native and mortal. That those ancient theologers, who were Theonists, and generated all the Gods out of night and chaos, were only verbal Theists, but real Atheists; forless matter being to them the biggest Numen. 14. The great difference observed betwixt Aristotle's atheistical Materialists and the Italick philosophers, the former determining all things, besides the substance of matter, to be made or generated, the latter that no real entity was either generated or corrupted; thereupon both destroying qualities and forms of body, and asserting the ingenerability and incorporeity of souls. 15. How Aristotle's atheistical Materialists endeavoured to baffle and enclude that axiom of the Italick philosophers, That nothing can come from nothing nor go to nothing; and that Anaxagoras was the first among the Ionicks, who yielded so far to that principle, as from thence to assert incorporeal substance, and the pre-existence of qualities and forms in similar atoms, far as much as he conceived them to be things really distinct from the substance of matter. 16. The error of some writers, who because Aristotle affirms, that the ancient philosophers did generally conclude the world to have been made, from thence infer, that they were all Theists, and that Aristotle contradicts himself in representing many of them as Atheists. That the ancient Atheists did generally ἀκριβῶς assert the world to have been made, or have had a beginning; as also some Theists did maintain its eternity, but in a way of dependence upon the Deity. That we ought here to distinguish betwixt the system of the world, and the substance of the matter, all Atheists asserting the matter to have been, not only eternal, but also such independently upon any other being. 17. That Plato and others concluded this materialism, or hylo-
pathian atheism, to have been at least as old as Homer, who made the ocean (or fluid matter) the father of all the gods. And that this was indeed the ancientest of all atheisms, which verbally acknowledging gods, yet derived the original of them all from night and chaos. The description of this atheistical hypothesis in Aristophanes, That night and chaos first laid an egg, out of which sprung forth love, which afterwards mingling with chaos, begat heaven and earth, animals and all the gods. 18. That notwithstanding this, in Aristotle's judgment, Parmenides, Hesiod, and others, who made love in like manner, senior to all the gods, were to be exempted out of the number of Atheists; they understanding this love to be an active principle, or cause of motion in the universe, which therefore could not rise from an egg of the night, nor be the offspring of chaos, but must be something in order of nature before matter. Simias Rhodius his Wings, a poem in honour of this heavenly love. This not that love, which was the offspring of Penia and Porus in Plato. In what rectified sense it may pass for true theology, that love is the supreme Deity and original of all things. 19. That though Democritus and Leucippus be elsewhere taxed by Aristotle for this very thing, that they asigned only a material cause of the universe; yet they were not the persons intended by him in the fore-cited accusation, but certain ancients philosophers, who also were not Atomists, but Hylopathians. 20. That Aristotle's atheistical Materialists were all the first Ionick philosophers before Anaxagoras, Thales being the head of them. But that Thales is acquitted from this imputation of atheism by several good authors (with an account how he came to be thus differently represented) and therefore that his next successor Anaximander is rather to be accounted the prince of this atheistical philosophy. 21. A passage out of Aristotle objected, which, at first sight, seems to make Anaximander a divine philosopher, and therefore both led both modern and ancient writers into that mistake. That this place well considered proves the contrary, That Anaximander was the chief of the old atheistical philosophers. 22. That it is no wonder, if Anaximander called sensles matter the to be, or God, since to all Atheists that must needs be the highest Numen; also how this is said to be immortal, and to govern all; with the concurrent judgment of the Greek scholiasts upon this place. 23. A further account of the Anaximandrian philosophy, manifesting it to have been purely atheistical. 24. What ill judges the vulgar have been of Theists and Atheists; as also that learned men have commonly supposed fewer Atheists than indeed there were. Anaximander and Democritus Atheists both alike, though philosophizing different ways. That some passages in Plato respect the Anaximandrian form of Atheism, rather than the Democritical. 25. Why Democritus and Leucippus new-model'd atheism into the atomick form. 26. That besides the three forms of atheism already mentioned, we sometimes meet with a fourth, which supposes the universe, though not to be an animal, yet a kind of plant or vegetable, having one platick nature in it, devoid of understanding and senses, which disposes and orders the whole. 27. That this form of atheism, which makes one platick life to preside over the whole, is different from the bylozoick, in that it takes away all fortuitousness, and subjects all to the fate of one platick methodical nature. 28. Though it be possible, that some in all ages might have entertained this atheistical conceit, that things are dispensed by one regular and methodical, but unknowing sensles nature; yet
it seems to have been chiefly affected by certain spurious Heracliticks and Stoicks. 29. That, besides the philosophic Atheists, there have been always enthusiastic and fanatical Atheists, though in some sense all Atheists may be said also to be both enthusiastic and fanatical, they being led by an έρωτικάς, or irrational impetus. 30. That there cannot easily be any other form of atheism, besides those four already mentioned, because all Atheists are Corporealists, and yet all Corporealists not Atheists, but only such as make the first principle of all things not to be intellectual. 31. A distribution of atheisms producing the former quaternio, and showing the difference between them. 32. That they are but bunglers at atheism, who talk of sensible and rational matter; and that the canting astrological Atheists are not at all considerable, because not understanding themselves. 33. Another distribution of atheisms. That they either derive the original of things from a merely fortuitous principle, the unguided motion of matter, or else from a plastic and methodical, but senseless nature. What Atheists denied the eternity of the world, and what affurred it. 34. That of these four forms of atheism, the Atomick or Democritical, and the Hylozoick or Stratonical are the chief; and that these two being once confuted, all atheism will be confuted. 35. These two forms of atheism being contrary to one another, how we ought in all reason to insist rather upon the atomick; but that afterwards we shall confute the hylozoick also, and prove against all Corporealists, that no cogitation nor life belongs to matter. 36. That in the mean time we shall not neglect any form of atheism, but confute them all together, as agreeing in one principle; as also show, bow the old atomick Atheists did sufficiently overthrow the foundation of the Hylozoicks. 37. Observed here, that the Hylozoicks are not condemned merely for ascertaining a plastic life, distinct from the animal, (which, with most other philosophers, we judge highly probable, if taken in a right sense;) but for grossly misunderstanding it, and attributing the same to matter. The plastic life of nature largely explained. 38. That though the confutation of the atheistic grounds, according to the laws of method, ought to have been reserved for the last part of this discourse; yet we having reasons to violate those laws, crave the reader’s pardon for this prepossession. A considerable observation of Plato’s, that it is not only moral vitiosity, which inclines men to atheize, but also an affection of seeming wiser than the generality of mankind, as likewise, that the Atheists, making such pretence to wit, it is a reasonable undertaking to evince, that they stumble in all their ratiocinations. That we hope to make it appear, that the Atheists are no conjurers; and that all forms of atheism are nonsense and impossibility.

I. We have now represented the grand mysteries of atheism, which may be also called the mysteries of the kingdom of darkness; though indeed some of them are but briefly hinted here, they being again more fully to be insisted on afterward, where we are to give an account of the Atheists endeavours to solve the phenomenon of cogitation. We have represented the chief grounds of atheism in general, as also of that most notorious form of atheism in particular, that is called Atomical. But whereas there hath been already mentioned another form of atheism
III. further explained.

Atheism, called by us hylozoical; the principles hereof could not possibly be insisted on in this place, where we were to make the most plausible plea for atheism, they being directly contrary to those of the Atomical, so that they would have mutually destroyed each other. For, whereas the Atomick atheism supposes the notion or idea of body to be nothing but extended resisting bulk, and consequently to include no manner of life and cogitation in it; hylozoism, on the contrary, makes all body, as such, and therefore every smallest atom of it, to have life essentially belonging to it (natural perception, and appetite) though without any animal sense or reflexive knowledge, as if life, and matter or extended bulk, were but two incomplete and inadequate conceptions of one and the same substance, called body. By reason of which life (not animal, but only plastic) all parts of matter being supposed able to form themselves artificially and methodically (though without any deliberation or attentive consideration) to the greatest advantage of their present respective capabilities, and therefore also sometimes by organization to improve themselves further into sense and self-enjoyment in all animals, as also to universal reason and reflexive knowledge in men; it is plain, that there is no necessity at all left, either of any incorporeal soul in men to make them rational, or of any Deity in the whole universe to solve the regularity thereof. One main difference betwixt these two forms of atheism is this, that the Atomical supposes all life whatsoever to be accidental, generable and corruptible; but the hylozoick admits of a certain natural or plastic life, essential and substantial, inengerable and incorruptible, though attributing the fame only to matter, as supposing no other substance in the world besides it.

II. Now to prevent all mistakes, we think it here by way of caution to suggest, that as every Atomist is not therefore necessarily an Atheist, so neither must every Hylozoist needs be accounted such. For whoever so holds the life of matter, as notwithstanding to affect another kind of substance also, that is immaterial and incorporeal, is no ways obnoxious to that foul imputation. However, we ought not to dissimble, but that there is a great difference here betwixt these two, atomism and hylozoism, in this regard; that the former of them, namely atomism (as hath been already declared) hath in it self a natural cognition and conjunction with incorporeal, though violently cut off from it by the Democritick Atheists; whereas the latter of them, hylozoism, seems to have altogether as close and intimate a correspondence with corporealism; because, as hath been already signified, if all matter, as such, have not only such a life, perception and self-active power in it, as whereby it can form itself to the best advantage, making this a fun, and that an earth or planet, and fabricating the bodies of animals most artificially, but also can improve it self into sense and self-enjoyment; it may as well be thought able to advance it self higher, into all the acts of reason and understanding in men; so that there will be no need either of an incorporeal immortal soul in men, or a deity in the universe. Nor indeed is it easily conceivable, how any should be induced to admit such
such a monstrous paradox as this is, That every atom of dust or other fenfeless matter is wiser than the greatest politician and the most acute philosopher that ever was, as having an infallible omniscience of all its own capabilities and congruities; were it not by reason of some strong prepossession, against incorporeal substance and a Deity: there being nothing so extravagant and outragiously wild, which a mind once infected with atheistical sottishness and disbelief will not rather greedily swallow down, than admit a Deity, which to such is the highest of all paradoxes imaginable, and the most outright bug-bear. Notwithstanding all which, it may not be denied, but that it is possible for one, who really entertains the belief of a Deity and a rational soul immortal, to be perfuaded, first, that the sentient soul in men as well as brutes is merely corporeal; and then that there is a material plastic life in the seeds of all plants and animals, whereby they do artificially form themselves; and from thence afterward to descend also further to hylozoism, that all matter, as such, hath a kind of natural, though not animal life in it: in consideration whereof, we ought not to censure every Hylozoist, professing to hold a Deity and a rational soul immortal, for a mere disguifed Atheift, or counterfeit histrionical Theift.

III. But tho’ every Hylozoist be not therefore necessarily an Atheift, yet whosoever is an Hylozoist and Corporealift both together, he that both holds the life of matter in the sense before declared, and also that there is no other substance in the world besides body and matter, cannot be excused from the imputation of atheism, for two reasons: first, because though he derive the original of all things, not from what is perfectly dead and stupid, as the atomick Atheift doth, but from that which hath a kind of life or perception in it, nay an infallible omniscience, of whatsoever it self can do or suffer, or of all its own capabilities and congruities, which seems to bear some semblance of a Deity; yet all this being only in the way of natural, and not animal perception, is indeed nothing but a dull and drowsy, plastic and spermatick life, devoid of all consciousness and self-enjoyment. The Hylozoists nature is a piece of very mysterious nonsense, a thing perfectly wise, without any knowledge or conscientious of it self; whereas a Deity, according to the true notion of it, is such a perfect understanding being, as with full conscientious and self-enjoyment is completely happy. Secondly, because the hylozoick Corporealift, supposing all matter, as such, to have life in it, must needs make infinite of those lives, (forasmuch as every atom of matter has a life of its own) coordinate and independent on one another, and consequently, as many independent first principles, no one common life or mind ruling over the whole. Whereas, to affect a God, is to derive all things ἀπ’ ἕνος τῆς κατανόης, from some one principle, or to suppose one perfect living and understanding being to be the original of all things, and the architect of the whole universe.

Thus we see, that the hylozoick Corporealift is really an Atheift, though carrying more the semblance and disguise of a Theift, than other Atheists,
in that he attributes a kind of life to matter. For indeed every Atheist must of necessity cast some of the incommunicable properties of the Deity, more or less, upon that which is not God, namely matter; and they, who do not attribute life to it, yet must needs bestow upon it necessary self-existence, and make it the first principle of all things, which are the peculiarities of the Deity. The Numen, which the hylozoick Corporalift pays all his devotions to, is a certain blind the-god or goddef, called Nature, or the life of matter; which is a very great mystery, a thing that is perfectly wise, and infallibly omnicient, without any knowledge or consciousness at all; something like to that τὸν πνεῖον κείμενον (in * Plato) πρέπεινDe Rep. 1. 5.

τὸν εὐσκόμην κορίτσι τῆς γνώσεως, that vulgar enigma or riddle of boys concerning an eunuch striking a bat; a man and not a man, seeing and not seeing, did strike and not strike, with a stone and not a stone, a bird and not a bird, &c. the difference being only this, that this was a thing intelligible, but humouromly expressed; whereas the other seems to be perfect nonsense, being nothing but a misunderstanding of the plastick power, as shall be showed afterwards.

IV. Now the first and chief afferter of this hylozoick atheifm was, as we conceive, Strato Lampasaeus¹, commonly called also Physicus, that had been once an auditor of Theophrasus, and a famous Peripatetic, but afterwards degenerated from a genuine Peripatetic into a new-formed kind of Atheist. For Veleius, an Epicurean Atheist in Cicero, reckoning up all the several sorts of Theists, which had been in former times, gives such a character of this Strato, as whereby he makes him to be a strange kind of atheistical Theist, or divine Atheist, if we may use such a contradictory expression: his words are these, † Nec audiendo Strato, qui Physicus appellatur, qui omnem vim divinam in natura stam esse censet, quae causasignitenti, augendis, minuendis habeat, sed careat omni sensu. Neither is Strato, commonly called the Naturalist or Physiologist, to be heard, who places all divinity in nature, as having within itself the causes of all generations, corruptions and augmentations, but without any manner of sense. Strato's deity therefore was a certain living and active, but senseless nature. He did not fetch the original of all things, as the Democritick and Epicurean Atheists, from a mere fortuitous motion of atoms, by means whereof he bore some flight semblance of a Theist; but yet he was a down-right Atheist for all that, his God being no other than such a life of nature as was both devoid of sense and consciousness, and also multiplied together with the several parts of it. He is also in like manner described by Seneca in St. Augufine as a kind of mongrel thing, betwixt an Atheist and a Theist; Ego feram aut Platonem aut Peripateticum Stratonem, quorum alter deum sine corpore fecit, alter sine animo? Shall I endure either Plato, or the Peripatetic Strato, wheresof the one made God to be without a body, the other without a mind? In which words Seneca taxes these two philosophers, as guilty of two contrary extremes; Plato, because he made God to be a pure mind or a perfectly incorporeal being; and Strato, because he made him to be a body without a mind,

¹ Vide Diogen. Laert. segm. 58. p. 298.
he acknowledging no other deity than a certain stupid and plattick life, in all the several parts of matter, without sense. Wherefore this seems to be the only reason, why Strato was thus sometimes reckoned amongst the Theists, though he were indeed an Atheist, because he disdained from that only form of Atheism, then so vulgarly received, the Democritick and Epicurean, attributing a kind of life to nature and matter.

V. And that Strato was thus an Atheist, but of a different kind from Democritus, may further appear from this passage of Cicero's; Strato Lamp. l. 4. [Cap 3] facenus negat operâ deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum; quaecunque sunt docet omnia esse effe ex naturâ, nec ut ille, qui aperis, & levibus, & hæmatibus uncinatique corporibus concreta hæc esse dicat, interjectâ inani; solum concessit hæc esse Demectist, non docentis, sed optantis. Strato denies, that he makes any use of a God, for the fabricating of the world, or the solving the phenomena thereof; teaching all things to have been made by nature; but yet not in such a manner, as be who affirmed them to be all concreted out of certain rough and smooth, bookey and crooked atoms, be judging these things to be nothing but the mere dreams and dotages of Democritus, not teaching but wisdom. Here we see, that Strato denied the world to be made by a Deity or perfect understanding nature, as well as Democritus; and yet that he disdained from Democritus notwithstanding, holding another kind of nature, as the original of things, than he did, who gave no account of any active principle and cause of motion, nor of the regularity that is in things. Democritus his nature was nothing but the fortuitous motion of matter; but Strato's nature was an inward plattick life in the several parts of matter, whereby they could artificially frame themselves to the best advantage, according to their several capabilities, without any conscious or reflexive knowledge. Quicquid aut fit aut fiat, (says the same author,) naturalibus fieri, aut fallum esse docet ponderibus & motibus. Strato teaches whatsoever is, or is made, to be made by certain inward natural forces and activities.

VI. Furthermore it is to be observed, that though Strato thus attributed a certain kind of life to matter, yet he did by no means allow of any one common life, whether sentient and rational, or plattick and spermatick only, as ruling over the whole mals of matter and corporeal univerle; which is a thing in part affirmed by Plutarch, and may in part be gathered from these words of his; τοσκόμαος αυτού τις ζωή είσαι, τούτε κατά φύσιν είς ητί το κατά τυχή, αρνίν γελανθικε το αυτόκτονον τιν, εύτε έστιν σφαλλής ότι τω φυσικών τελεσκω εκ- sorof. Strato affirmeth, that the world is no animal (or god) but that what is natural in every thing, follows something fortuitous antecedent, chance first beginning, and nature acting consequently thereupon. The full sense whereof seems to be this, that though Strato did not derive the original of all mundane things from mere fortuitous mechanism, as Democritus before him had done, but supposed a life and natural perception in the matter, that was directive of it; yet not acknowledging any one common life, whether animal or plattick,
stick, as governing and swaying the whole, but only supposing the several parts of matter to have so many plastick lives of their own, he must needs attribute something to fortune, and make the mundane system to depend upon a certain mixture of chance and plastick or orderly nature both together, and consequently must be an Hylozoist. Thus we see, that these are two schemes of atheism, very different from one another; that, which fetches the original of all things from the mere fortuitous and unguided motion of matter, without any vital or directive principle; and that, which derives it from a certain mixture of chance and the life of matter both together, it supposing a plastick life, not in the whole univerfe, as one thing, but in all the several parts of matter by themselves; the first of which is the Atomick and Democritick atheism, the second the Hylozoick and Stratonic.

VII. It may perhaps be suspected by some, that the famous Hippocrates, who lived long before Strato, was an adherent of the Hylozoick atheism, because of such passages in him as these, άπειρον η φύσις κατά τό σώμα. Tom. II. Μόρφος τά είναι ποιόν. Nature is unlearned or untaught, but it learnt from itself what things it ought to do: and again, ου από την φύσιν αυτήν εκδηλούται τό διάφορον. A. lef. Οι φύσεις, επί δέ αυτοτικώς. Nature find out ways to it self, not by ratiocination. But there is nothing more affirmed here concerning nature by Hippocrates, than what might be affirmed likewise of the Aristotelick and Platonick nature, which is supposed to act for ends, though without consultation and ratiocination. And I must confess, it seems to me no way misbecoming of a Theist, to acknowledge such a nature or principle in the univerfe, as may act according to rule and method for the sake of ends, and in order to the best, though it self do not understand the reason of what it doth; this being still supposed to act dependently upon a higher intellectual principle, and to have been first set a work and employed by it, it being otherwise nonfence. But to assert any such plastick nature, as is independant upon any higher intellectual principle, and to it self the first and highest principle of activity in the univerfe, this indeed must needs be, either that Hylozoick atheism already spoken of, or else another different form of atheism, which shall afterwards be desribed. But though Hippocrates were a corporeallift, yet we conceive he ought not to lie under the suspicion of either of those two atheism; forasmuch as hisfelf plainly afferts a higher intellectual principle, than such a plastick nature, in the univerfe, namely an Heraclitick corporeal God, or understanding fire, immortal, pervading the whole world, in these words; ουσίας εί μοι γενομένης, ή πολίτειά, άναθηματον τέ οίκια, τόλμην μέντως, καὶ άρρήτω, καὶ άκούσει, καί ιδον τάλα τά άφτα καί τά μέληντα ἐσοδοί. It seems to me, that that which is called heat or fire, is immortal, and omniscient, and that it sees, hears, and knows all things, not only such as are present, but also future. Wherefore we conclude, that Hippocrates was neither an Hylozoick nor Democritick Atheist, but an Heraclitick corporeal Theist.

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VIII.

1 Vide Laëntant. de Irâ Dei, cap. N. p. 918.
VIII. Possibly it may be thought also, that Plato in his Sophist intends this hylozoick atheism, where he declares it as the opinion of many, τὸν φύσιν πάντα γενόμενόν ἄδικος τοις αἰτίας αἰτιμέτρητος, ἡ ἄκεφος θανάσας θάνατος: That nature generates all things from a certain spontaneous principle, without any reason and understanding. But here the word αἰτιμέτρητος may be as well rendered fortuitous, as spontaneous; however, there is no necessity, that this should be understood of an artificial or methodical unknowing nature. It is true indeed, that Plato himself seems to acknowledge a certain Platonic or methodical nature in the universe, subordinate to the Deity, or that perfect mind, which is the supreme governor of all things; as may be gathered from these words of his, τὸν Φύσιν μετὰ λόγῳ καὶ σῦν ὅριν καὶ πάντα διὰ καὶ χαρακτηρισμὸν: that nature does rationally (or orderly) together with reason and mind, govern the whole universe. Where he supposes a certain regular nature to be a partial and subordinate cause of things under the divine intellect. And it is very probable, that Aristotle derived that whole doctrine of his concerning a regular and artificial nature, which acts for ends, from the Platonic school. But as for any such form of atheism, as should suppose a platick or regular, but senfeless nature either in the whole world, or the several parts of matter by themselves, to be the highest principle of all things, we do not conceive, that there is any intimacion of it to be found anywhere in Plato. For in his De Legibus, where he professedly disputes against atheism, he states the doctrine of it after this manner, τὰ μὲν μήγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἀπεξεργαζόμενοι φύσιν greatest and most excellent things, but that the smaller things were produced by human art. The plain meaning whereof is this, that the first original of things, and the frame of the whole universe, proceeded from a mere fortuitous nature, or the motion of matter unguided by any art or method. And thus it is further explained in the following words, ὦτ τοις καὶ ὠρας καὶ γῆς καὶ ἐδώρος φύσιν πάντα εἰς καὶ τῶς φυσὶ τῆς τοις ἐκ τῶν τῶν: That the first elements, fire, water, air, and earth, were all made by nature and chance, without any art or method; and then, that the bodies of the sun, moon and stars, and the whole heavens, were afterward made out of those elements, as devoid of all manner of life, and only fortuitously moved and mingled together; and lastly, that the whole mundane system, together with the orderly seasons of the year, as also plants, animals and men did arise after the same manner, from the mere fortuitous motion of senfeless and stupid matter. In the very same manner does Plato state this controversy again, butwixt Theists and Atheists, in his Philicus; Πάτρας, ὦ Προταρχί, τὰ ἑμαυτά, καὶ τὸ τὸ καλὰ μὲν ὄλον, ἀποτροπεῖς θύμοι τοῖς τὰ ἀθώα καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἐναντίον, καὶ τὰ ἔρημον οὐ μεταξάθεται, κατὰ τοῖς ἔρημοι γόνης, καὶ φύσιν τοῖς ἑκατομμύριον ἐκκυβερνοῦσι: Whether shall we say, O Protarchus, that this whole universe is dispensed and ordered, by a mere irrational, temerarious and fortuitous principle, and so as it happens; or contrarywise, (as our forefathers have instructed us) that mind, and a certain wonderful wisdom, did at first frame, and does still govern all things? Where-
Wherefore we conclude, that Plato took no notice of any other form of atheism, as then set on foot, than such as derives all things from a mere fortuitous principle, from nature and chance, that is, the unguided motion of matter, without any plastiick artificialnefs or methodicalnefs, either in the whole universe, or the parts of it. But because this kind of atheism, which derives all things from a mere fortuitous nature, had been managed two manner of ways, by Democritus in the way of atoms, and by Anaximander and others in the way of forms and qualities; (of which we are to speak in the next places) therefore the atheism, which Plato opposed, was either the Democritick or the Anaximandrian atheism; or else (which is most probable) both of them together.

IX. It is hardly imaginable, that there should be no philosophical Atheists in the world before Democritus and Leucippus. Plato long since concluded, that there have been Atheists, more or less, in every age, when he bequeaths his young Atheist after this manner: Οἱ σὺν μὲν ὁμοίως οἱ Φύλοι περάστος καὶ πέφασμα τὰ τῶν ἐκ πρώτων σει στήνει πλην τῆς καθότατος, γύμνωσαν μὲν δὲ τὰ τῶν ἐκλειπόν ταύτα τῶν τοῦ ἐκποιήθη ἀθεικοντος. The full sense whereof seems to be this; Neither you, my son, nor your friends (Democritus, Leucippus and Protagoras) are the first, who have entertained this opinion concerning the gods, but there have been always some more or less sick of this atheistical disease. Wherefore we shall now make a diligent search and enquiry, to see if we can find any other philosophers, who atheized before Democritus and Leucippus, as also what form of atheism they entertained.

Aristotle in his Metaphysics, speaking of the quaternio of causes, affirms, that many of those, who first philosophized, afflied only a material cause of the whole mundane system, without either intending or efficient cause. The reason whereof he intimates to have been this, because they asserted matter to be the only substance; and that whatsoever else was in the world, besides the substance or bulk of matter, were all nothing else but πάντα, different passions and affections, accidents and qualities of matter, that were all generated out of it, and corruptible again into it; the substance of matter always remaining the same, neither generated nor corrupted, but from eternity unmade; Aristotcle's words are: τῶν παντῶν Φιλοσοφηκῶν οἱ πληγαὶ τῶν ἐκ ύλεος ὕψει μίνοι φύσισαν ἀρχὰς ἐνια πάντας, ἐξ αὐτός ἐν ἀποκοιτα τα ὄντα, καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρώτως, καὶ ἐν τῇ θεοτητίπιοι τῆς μεν υἱας ὑπομενάσας, τὸς ἐν πάθει πρᾶσι "Lib. I. c. 5. Tom. IV. p. 264."

"Most of those, who first philosophized, took notice of no other principle of things in the universe, than what is to be referred to the material cause; for that, out of which all things are, and out of which all things are first made, and into which they are all at last corrupted and resolved, the substance always remaining the same, and being changed only in its passions and qualities; this they concluded to be the first original and principle of all things.

De Legibus, Lib. X. p. 665.
X. But the meaning of these old Material philosophers will be better understood by those exceptions, which Aristotle makes against them, which are two: first, that because they acknowledged no other substance besides matter, that might be an active principle in the universe, it was not possible for them to give any account of the original of motion and action. For, if there be a material action, as the philosophers call it, there is no way (as they say) to make motion and action, for there is no agent but matter itself, and that being moved and acted upon, is only to be accounted for as the cause of motion and action.

XI. And Aristotle’s second exception against these old Material philosophers is this: that since there could be no intending causality in senseless and stupid matter, which they made to be the only principle of all things, they were not able to align θείον και χάλκος αἰτία, any cause of well and fit, and so could give no account of the regular and orderly frame of this mundane system; for, if a material motion be altered, as it is, and στὰ τὸν λόγον οὕτω, a fair cause of the thing is, and ὁ θεός αὐτῷ, there is no cause of this frame. That things partly are so well in the world, and partly made so well, cannot be imputed either to earth or water, or any other senseless body; much less is it reasonable to attribute so noble and excellent an effect as this to mere chance or fortune. Where Aristotle again intimates, that as these Material philosophers shuffled in motion into the world without a cause, so likewise they must needs suppose this motion to be altogether fortuitous and unguided, and thereby in a manner make fortune, which is nothing but the absence or defect of an intending cause, to supply the room both of the active and intending cause, that is, efficient and final. Whereupon Aristotle subjoins a commendation of Anaxagoras, as the first of the Ionian philosophers, who introduced mind or intellect for a principle in the universe; that in this respect he alone seemed to be sober and in his wits, comparatively with those others that went before him, who talked so idly and atheistically. For Anaxagoras his principle was such, faith Aristotle, as was Ωον τοῦ καλός αἰτία, και ταυτά τόν θεόν καὶ κινητός ὁπάξειν, at once a cause of motion and also of well and fit; of all the regularity, aptitude, pulchritude and order.
der that is in the whole universe. And thus it seems Anaxagoras himself
had determined: Ἀναξαγόρας τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ καθὼς καὶ ὅσοις νοῦν λέγει, Anaxag- Aristotle. p. 1 e. 2. 
rus faith, that mind is the only cause of right and well; this being proper to
mind to aim at ends and good, and to order one thing firstly for the sake of II. Opert. 
Whence it was, that Anaxagoras concluded good also, as well as
mind, to have been a principle of the universe, Ἀναξαγόρας οὕτως καὶ ὁμολογεῖ τὸ ὑποκεισθαι τοῖς ἑαυτῷ ἀνθρώπων, ὡς ἐρωτεύεται, Anaxagoras makes good a principle, as that which moves; for though mind move matter, yet it moves it for
the sake of something, and being itself, as it were, first moved by good: so that
good is also a principle. And we note this the rather, to show how well these
three philosophers, Aristotle, Plato and Anaxagoras, agreed all together in
this excellent truth, that mind and good are the first principle of all things in
the universe.

XII. And now we think it is sufficiently evident, that these old Materialists
in Aristotle, whoever they were, were downright Atheists; not so much be-
because they made all substance to the body or matter, for Heraclitus first, and
after him Zeno, did the like, deriving the original of all things from fire, as
well as Anaximenes did from air, and Thales is supposed by Aristotle to have
done from water, and that with some little more seeming plausibility, since
fire being a more subtle and moveable body than any other, was therefore
thought by some ancients to be ἀλήθεια ἀληθείας, the most incorporeal of all bod-
dies, as earth was for that cause rejected by all those corporeal philosophers
from being a principle, by reason of the grossness of its parts. But Hera-
clitus and Zeno, notwithstanding this, are not accounted Atheists, because they
supposed their fiery matter to have not only life, but also a perfect under-
standing originally belonging to it, as also the whole world to be an animal:
whereas those Materialists of Aristotle made senseless and stupid matter, de-
void of all understanding and life, to be the first principle and root of all
things. For when they supposed life and understanding, as well as all other
differences of things, to be nothing but mere passions and accidents of matter,
generable out of it, and corruptible again into it, and indeed to be produced,
but in a secondary way, from the fortuitous commixture of those first ele-
mental qualities, heat and cold, moist and dry, thick and thin, they plainly
implied the substance of matter in itself to be devoid of life and under-
standing. Now if this be not atheism, to derive the original of all things,
even of life and mind itself, from dead and stupid matter fortuitously
moved, then there can be no such thing at all.

XIII. Moreover, Aristotle's Materialists concluded every thing besides the
substance of matter, (which is in itself indifferent to all things,) and con-
sequently all particular and determinate beings, to be generable and corrupti-
ble. Which is a thing, that Plato takes notice of as an atheistic principle, ex-
pressing it in these words: ἄλλως εἶναι ὅσα ὑποκεισθαι τοῖς ἑαυτῷ ἀνθρώπων, ὡς ἐρωτεύεται, that nothing ever
is, but every thing is made and generated. Forasmuch as it plainly follows from

The great Difference betwixt the

hence, that not only all animals and the souls of men, but also if there were any gods, which some of those Materialists would not stick, at least verbally, to acknowledge, (meaning thereby certain understanding beings superiour to men) these likewise must needs have been all generated, and consequently be corruptible. Now to say, that there is no other God, than such as was made and generated, and which may be again unmade, corrupted and die, or that there was once no God at all till he was made out of the matter, and that there may be none again, this is all one as to deny the thing itself. For a native and mortal God is a pure contradiction. Therefore whereas Aristotle, in his Metaphysicks, tells us of certain Theologers, of ἐξ ὑπάρξεως γένος, such as did generate all things (even the gods themselves) out of Night and Chaos, we must needs pronounce of such Theologers as these, who were Theogonists, and generated all the gods (without exception) out of senseless and stupid matter, that they were but a kind of atheistical Theologers, or theological Atheists. For though they did admit of certain beings, to which they attributed the name of gods, yet according to the true notion of God, they really acknowledged none at all, (i.e. no understanding nature as the original of things) but Night and Chaos, senseless and stupid matter, fortuitously moved, was to them the highest of all Numens. So that this theology of theirs was a thing wholly founded in atheistical nonsense.

XIV. And now we think it reasonable here to observe, how vast a difference there was betwixt those old Materialists in Aristotle, and those other philosophers, mentioned before in the first chapter, who determined, ὅτι οὐκ ἔγενος ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ἔθνωσί σα ἁπάτως. That no real entity at all was generated or corrupted, for this reason, because nothing could be made out of nothing. These were chiefly the philosophers of the Italick or Pythagorick succession; and their design in it was not, as Aristotle was pleased somewhere to affirm, ἀναλαβὼς πάντα τὸ τῆς γῆς, to contradict common sense and experience, in denying all natural generations and alterations; but only to interpret nature rightly in them, and that in way of opposition to those atheistical Materialists, after this manner; that in all the mutations of nature, generations and alterations, there was neither any new substance made, which was not before, nor any entity really distinct from the pre-existent substances, but only that substance which was before, diversely modified; and so nothing produced in generations, but new modifications, mixtures, and separations of pre-existent substances.

Now this doctrine of theirs drove at these two things; first, the taking away of such qualities and forms of body, as were vulgarly conceived to be things really distinct from the substance of extended bulk, and all its modifications of more or less magnitude, figure, site, motion or rest. Because, if there were any such things as these, produced in the natural generations and alterations of bodies, there would then be some real entity made ἐκ μαρτυρίων οὐκ ἐπὶ καθολός ἢ προτεινόμενος, out of nothing inessential or pre-existent. Wherefore
before they concluded, that these supposed forms and qualities of bodies were really nothing else, but only the different modifications of pre-existent matter, in respect of magnitude, figure, size and motion, or rest; or different concretions and secretions, which are no entities really distinct from the substance, but only cause different phantasms, fancies and apparitions in us.

The second thing, which this doctrine aimed at, was the establishing the incorporeity and ingenerability of all souls. For since life, cogitation, sense and understanding, could not be resolved into those modifications of matter, magnitude, figure, size and motion, or into mechanism and fancy, but must needs be entities really distinct from extended bulk, or dead and stupid matter; they concluded, that therefore souls could not be generated out of matter, because this would be the production of some real entity out of nothing inexistent or pre-existent; but that they must needs be another kind of substance incorporeal, which could no more be generated or corrupted, than the substance of matter itself; and therefore must either pre-exist in nature, before generations, or else be divinely created and infused in them.

It hath been already proved in the first chapter, that the upshot of that Pythagorick doctrine, that nothing could be generated out of nothing pre-existing, amounted to those two things mentioned, viz. the ascertaining of the incorporeity and ingenerability of souls, and the rejecting of those fantaflick entities of forms and real qualities of bodies, and resolving all corporeal phænomena into figures or atoms, and the different apparitions or fancies caused by them. But the latter of these may be further confirmed from this passage of Aristotle’s, where, after he had declared, that Democritus and Leucippus made the soul and fire to consist of round atoms or figures, like those in τὴν ἀέρι ἔσωματα, these ramenta that appear in the air when the sun-beams are transmitted through crannies; he adds ἰσομεὶον δὲ καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῶν Πυθαγορείων λεγόμενον, Νετ. Ἀνθ. 1. τὸν αὐτὸν ἐξει διάπαν, ἔσωμα γὰρ τοὺς αὐτῶς, ψυχὴν εἰςαὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ἔσωματα, οὐκ. 2. (This Reference is a mistake, for the passage is ἔσωματα or atoms; but others of them, that it is that which moves them; which latter doublets were the genuine Pythagoreans. However, it is plain from hence, that the old Pythagoreans physiologized by ἔσωματα, as well as

But Aristotle’s Materialists, on the contrary, taking it for granted, that matter, or extended bulk, is the only substance, and that the qualities and forms of bodies are entities really distinct from those modifications of magnitude, figure, size, motion or rest; and finding also by experience, that these were continually generated and corrupted, as likewise that life, sense and understanding were produced in the bodies of such animals, where it had not been before, and again extinguished at the death or corruption of them, concluded, that the souls of all animals, as well as those other qualities and forms of bodies, were generated out of the matter, and corrupted again into it; and consequently, that everything that is in the whole world, besides
How the Atheistick Materialists. Book I.

besides the substance of matter, was made or generated, and might be again corrupted.

Of this atheistic doctrine, Aristotle speaks elsewhere, as in his book De Caelo, p. 168. Oper. De Caelo. εἰς γὰρ τινες ἐν Φαισί, ὡςὶν ἀπρόβατον ἐμα ὑμῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίγνεται μάλιστα μεν ὧν τοῖς Ἰστοῖς, εἰτα ἐν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐν πρῶτοι φυσιολογίσκεται: οἱ δὲ, τὰ μὲν ἀλλὰ πάντα γίγνεται τε Φαισί, καὶ μείν, ἐμαὶ εἰ παρῶς οὖν, ἵνα τι μένα ὑπομείνη, ι δὲ τών πάντας μεταρχικαὶ ἐξει πίθους: There are some, who affirm, that nothing is ingenerable, but that all things are made; as Hesiod especially, and also among the rest they who first physiologized, whose meaning was, that all other things are made (or generated) and did flow, none of them keeping any stability; only that there was one thing (namely matter) which always remained, out of which all those other things were transformed and metamorphized. Though as to Hesiod, Aristotle afterwards speaks differently. So likewise in his Physicks, after he had declared, that some of the ancients made air, some water, and some other matter, the principle of all things; he adds, τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον Φαισίν εἰς τῶν ἀπαρχῶν οὐσίων τὰ ἐν ἰόλα ἄλλα πάντα παθητικών, καὶ ἐξει, καὶ διαζέισι, καὶ τούτων μεν ὧν εἰς ἐλεύτερα τὰ ἐν ἰόλα γίγνεται καὶ Φαισίαν ἐπιμάζεται: This they affirmed to be all the substance or essence that was; but all other things, the passions, affections and dispositions of it; and that this therefore was eternal, as being capable of no change, but all other things infinitely generated and corrupted.

XV. But these Materialists being sometimes assailed by the other Italick philosophers, in the manner before declared, that no real entities, dinstinct from the modifications of any substance, could be generated or corrupted, because nothing could come from nothing nor go to nothing; they would not seem plainly to contradict that theorem, but only endeavoured to interpret it into a compliance with their own hypothesis, and distingiuish concerning the sense of it in this manner; that it ought to be understood only of the substance of matter and nothing else, viz. that no matter could be made or corrupted, but that all other things whatsoever, not only forms and qualities of bodies, but also faults; life, sense and understanding, though really different from magnitude, figure site and motion, yet ought to be accounted only the πάθη, the passions and accidents of this matter, and therefore might be generated out of it, and corrupted again into it, and that without the production or destruction of any real entity, matter being the only thing that is accounted such. All this we learn from these words of Aristotle, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὑπὲρ ἃς νῦν ἔκθεται, ἵναι αὔξαλωθείν, ὡς τοῦ τοιαύτης φύσεως ἀνεκτικών, ἰδίως ὅταν ὅσως ἐν συνεργίᾳ συνεργοῦσι, ὡς τοῦ Σωκράτους Φαξίου ἡ ζωή τεταρτακαίνη ἄλλως, ἤτοι γίγνεται καλὸς, ἤ μεσοκατεύθυνσι, ἵναι αὔξαλωθείν, ὡς τοῦ ἀπακτία χωρίς τοῦ άλλως, διὰ τὸ ὑπομείνα τοῦ ἐνεργούνος, τοῦ Σωκράτους αὐτοῦ, ὡς τοῦ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοις γαρ ἐν τοῖς φύσεις, ἤ μοια, ἤ πλείως, ἤ μακρον, ἤ πικρον ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, συνεργοῦσι εἰσίν: The sense whereof is this; and therefore as to that axiom of some philosophers, that nothing is either generated or destroyed, these Materialists admit it to be true in respect of the substance of matter only, which is always preserved the same, As they say, we do not say, that Socrates is simply or absolutely made, when he is made either handsone or musical, or
that be is destroyed, when be loseth those dispositions, because the subject Socrates still remains the same; so neither are we to say, that any thing else is absolutely either generated or corrupted, because the substance or matter of every thing always continues. For there must needs be some certain nature, from which all other things are generated, that still remaining one and the same.

We have noted this passage of Aristotle's the rather, because this is just the very doctrine of Atheists at this day; that the substance of matter or extended bulk is the only real entity, and therefore the only unmade thing, that is neither generable nor creatable, but necessarily existent from eternity; but whatever else is in the world, as life and animality, soul and mind, being all but accidents and affections of this matter (as if therefore they had no real entity at all in them) are generable out of nothing and corruptible into nothing, so long as the matter, in which they are, still remains the same. The result of which is no less than this, that there can be no other gods or god, than such as was at first made or generated out of senseless matter, and may be corrupted again into it. And here indeed lies the grand mystery of atheism, that every thing besides the substance of matter is made or generated, and may be again unmade or corrupted.

However Anaxagoras, though an Ionick philosopher, and therefore, as shall be declared afterward, successor to those atheistical Materialists, was at length so far convinced by that Pythagorical doctrine, that no entity could be naturally generated out of nothing, as that he departed from his predecessors herein, and did for this reason acknowledge mind and soul, that is, all cogitative being, to be a substance really distinct from matter, neither generable out of it nor corruptible into it; as also that the forms and qualities of bodies (which he could not yet otherwise conceive of than as things really distinct from those modifications of magnitude, figure, site and motion) must for the same cause pre-exist before generations in certain similar atoms, and remain after corruptions, being only secreted and concreted in them. By means whereof he introduced a certain spurious atomism of his own; for whereas the genuine Atomists before his time had supposed ἀκόντις ἀκούς, disimilar atoms, devoid of all forms and qualities, to be the principles of all bodies, Anaxagoras substituted in the room of them his ἐνομορίας, his similar atoms, endued from eternity with all manner of forms and qualities incorruptibly.

XVI. We have made it manifest, that those Material philosophers, described by Aristotle, were absolute Atheists, not merely because they made body to be the only substance, though that be a thing, which Aristotle himself justly comprehends them for asio in these words of his, ὦτα μεν ὡς ἔστι το τῶν ἰκυς μιᾶς εἰς τις φύσις, ὥς ἐκά τις τιγίος, καὶ τοὺς ἔφωμικος, καὶ μέγας ἐγκύος, οἷος ὁ θεός πολλαχῶς ἔφωμικος, τῶν γὰρ σώματων τῇ συνεχεί αὐτῆς τιγίος μιᾶς, τίγης ἀσωματῶν ἀνετῶν καὶ ἀκούς. They who suppose the world to be one uniform thing, and acknowledge only one nature as the matter, and this corporeal or induced with magnitude, it is evident, that they err many ways, and particularly in this, that they set down only the elements of bodies, and not of incorporeal things, though there
be also things incorporeal. I say, we have not concluded them Atheists, merely for this reason, because they denied incorporeal substance, but because they deduced all things whatsoever from dead and stupid matter, and made every thing in the world, besides the bare substance of matter, devoid of all quality, generable and corruptible.

Now we shall take notice of an objection, made by some late writers, against this Aristotelick accution of the old philosophers, founded upon a passage of *Aristotle's* own, who elsewhere in his book *De Caelo*, speaking of the heaven or world, plainly affirms, *γενόμενον μὲν ὑπὸ εἰκονεῖς πᾶν ὡς ὦμον*, that all the philosophers before himself did assert the world to have been made, or have had a beginning. From whence these writers infer, that therefore they must needs be all Theists, and hold the divine creation of the world; and consequently, that *Aristotle* contradicts himself, in representing many of them as Atheists, acknowledging only one material principle of the whole universe, without any intending or efficient cause. But we cannot but pronounce this to be a great error in these writers, to conclude all these, who held the world to have been made, therefore to have been Atheists; whereas it is certain on the contrary, that all the first and most ancient Atheists did (in *Aristotle's language* *κοσμοποιήσαι γενέσθαι τὸν κόσμον*, make or generate the world, that is, suppose it not to have been from eternity, but to have had a temporary beginning; as likewise that it was corruptible, and would somehow or other, have an end again. The senfe of which atheistic philosophers is represented by *Lucretius* in this manner:

*Et quoniam docui, mundi mortalia templo
Esse, & nativo consilere corpore celum
Et quaecunque in eo sunt, sponte, necesse
Esse ea dissolvi.*

And there seems to be indeed a necessity, in reason, that they, who derive all things from a fortuitous principle, and hold every thing besides the substance of matter to have been generated, should suppose the world to have been generated likewise, as also to be corruptible. Wherefore it may well be reckoned for one of the vulgar errors, that all Atheists held the eternity of the world.

Moreover, when *Aristotle* subjoins immediately after, *ἀλλὰ γενόμενον, οἱ μὲν αἰείον, οἱ δὲ ϕαινόν*, that though the ancient philosophers all held the world to have been made, yet notwithstanding they were divided in this, that some of them supposed for all that, that it would continue to eternity such as it is, others, that it would be corrupted again; the former of these, who conceived the world to be γενόμενον, but αἰείον, made, but eternal, were none of them Atheists, but all Theists. Such as *Plato*, whom *Aristotle* seems particularly to perfringe for this, who in his *Timæus* introduceth the supreme Deity bespeaking those inferior gods, the sun, moon and stars (supposed by that philosopher...
Chap. III: of the World, a vulgar Error.

To be animated) after this manner; 

 переведено описание

μὴν οὖν ἰδεῖν πᾶν οὐκ θυμοῦ τόν μὲν καλὸς ἀρμοδίως καὶ ἔχοι εὑ, λύειν ἡλειν, κάκον; 

Φυσικ. aufcultat. Lib. VIII.

καὶ Ἡπίτειρ γεμίνεται, ἄλλως μὲν οὖν ἐστι, ὕπερ ἀλυτοὶ τὸ πᾶσαν οὖσι μὲν δὲ λύειν ἡπίτειρ γεμίνεται, οὐδὲ ἀλυτοὶ τὸ πάσαν οὖσι μὲν δὲ λύειν ἡπίτειρ γεμίνεται, οὐδὲ ἀλυτοὶ τὸ πάσαν οὖσι μὲν δὲ λύειν ἡπίτειρ γεμί

That things, which are made by me, are indissoluble by my will, and though every thing which is compacted, be in its own nature dissoluble, yet it is not the part of one that is good, to will the dissolution or deftruction of any thing that was once well made. Wherefore though you are not absolutely immortal, nor altogether indissoluble, yet notwithstanding you shall not be dissolved, nor ever die; my will being a stronger band to hold you together, than any thing else can to be loosened you. Philo and other Theists followed Plato in this, asserting, that though the world was made, yet it would never be corrupted, but have a pott-eternity. Whereas all the ancient Atheists, namely those, who derived the original of things from nature and fortune, did at once deny both eternities to the world, past and future. Though we cannot say, that none but Atheists did this; for Empedocles and Heraclitus, and afterward the Stoicks, did not only suppose the world likewise generated, and to be again corrupted, but also that this had been, and would be done over and over again, in infinite vicissitudes.

Furthermore, as the world’s eternity was generally opposed by all the ancient Atheists, so it was maintained also by some Theists, and that not only Aristotle, but also by him, by Oecellus Lucanus at least, though Aristotle thought not fit to take any notice of him; as likewise the latter Platonists universally went that way, yet so, as that they always suppoased the world to have as much depended upon the Deity, as if it had been once created out of nothing by it.

To conclude therefore; neither they, who assert the world’s generation and temporary beginning, were all Theists; nor they, who maintained its eternity, all Atheists; but before Aristotle’s time, the Atheists universally, and most of the Theists, did both alike conclude the world to have been made, the difference between them lying in this, that the one affirmed the world to have been made by God, the other by the fortuitous motion of matter.

Wherefore if we would put another difference betwixt the Theists and Atheists here, as to this particular, we must distinguish betwixt the sytem of the world and the substance of the matter. For the ancient Atheists, though they generally denied the eternity of the world, yet they supposed the substance of the matter, not only to have been eternal, but also self-existent and independent upon any other Being; they making it the first principle and original of all things, and consequently the only Numen. Whereas the genuine Theists, though many of them maintained the world’s eternity, yet they all

1 Physic. aufcultat. Lib. VIII.
concluded, both the form and substance of it to have always depended upon the Deity, as the light doth upon the sun; the Stoicks with some others being here excepted.

XVII. Aristotle tells us, some were of opinion, that this atheistical philosophy, which derives all things from senseless and stupid matter in the way of forms and qualities, was of great antiquity, and as old as any records of time amongst the Greeks; and not only so, but also that the ancient Theologers themselves entertained it: Eitsi δὲ τινες, οἱ κύριοι παραπολίκες, οὐ ποιεῖν ἔργον τῆς κτισίας ἄριστης, οἰκοδομῶν Θεογόνων, οὕτως οὕτως οὕτως, οὕτως οὕτως οὕτως, ὅπως οὕτως πριν τῆς Φώτευσ χριστιανίων. Ομοιοί τε γὰρ Τήθυν ἐποίησαν τῆς γενεσίας πατέρας, οὐ τοῦ ὄρκου τῶν Θεῶν ὑπόθεν, τὸν καλεμένον ὃς ἀυτῶν Στύγα τῶν παντων, τιμώτατον μὲν γὰρ τὸ προεκστάτων ἄρρητο, οὐ τὸ τιμώτατον ἔστιν. There are some who conceive, that even the most ancient of all, and the most remote from this present generation, and they also who first theologized, did physiologize after this manner; forasmuch as they made the Ocean and Tethys to have been the original of generation: and for this cause the oath of the gods is said to be by water (called by the poets Stryx) as being that, from which they all derived their original. For an oath ought to be by that, which is most honorable: and that which is most ancient, is most honorable. In which words it is very probable, that Aristotle aimed at Plato; however it is certain, that Plato, in his Theaetetus, affirms this atheistical doctrine to have been very ancient, ὅσι πάσα ζύγωρος ροδος τε κύριος, that all things were the offspring of flux and motion, that is, that all things were made and generated out of matter; and that he chargeth Homer with it, in deriving the original of the gods themselves in like manner from the ocean (or floating matter) in this verse of his,

\[\text{The father of all gods the ocean is,} \]
\[\text{Tethys their mother.}\]

Wherefore these indeed seem to have been the ancientest of all Atheists, who though they acknowledged certain beings superior to men, which they called by the name of gods, did notwithstanding really deny a God, according to the true notion of him, deriving the original of all things whatsoever in the universe from the ocean, that is, fluid matter, or, which is all one, from night and chaos; and supposing all their gods to have been made and generated, and consequently to be mortal and corruptible. Of which atheistical theology Aristotheles gives us the description in his Aenes, after this manner: That at first was nothing but Night and Chaos, which laying an egg, from thence was produced Love, that mingling again with Chaos, begat heaven, and earth, and animals, and all the gods.

Xεῦξις ἄγαν καὶ ὅπος ἔτηθος τοῦ μελαντοῦ χρῶτων, καὶ Τήθυντε γαρ κύρια.

Γαρ δὲ, οὐδὲ ἄγαν, οὐδὲ νυμφιός ἐστὶν ἐρείδας ὅς ἐν ἀντίπρος κυλῶνις.

\[\text{Verse 694 p. 404. Edit. Kufferi.}\]

\[\text{P. 118.}\]
Chap. III. out of Night and Chaos, Atheists.

First all was chaos, one confused heap;
Darkness enwrapt the disagreeing deep;
In a mixt crowd the jumbling elements were,
Nor earth, nor air, nor heaven did appear;
Till on this horrid vast abyss of things,
Teeming Night spreading o'er her coal-black wings,
Laid the first egg; whence, after time's due course,
Still'd forth Love (the world's prolific Source)
Glistening with golden wings; which fluttering o'er
Dark chaos, gendred all the numerous store
Of animals and gods, &c.

And whereas the poet there makes the birds to have been begotten between Love and Chaos before all the gods; though one might think this to have been done jocularly by him, merely to humour his plot; yet Salmasius' conceives, and not without some reason, that it was really a piece of the old Atheistic cabala, which seems to have run thus. That chaos or matter confusedly moved being the first original of all, things did from thence rise up gradually from lesser to greater perfection. First inanimate things, as the elements, heaven, earth and seas; then brute-animals; afterwards men, and last of all the gods. As if not only the substance of matter, and those inanimate bodies of the elements, fire, water, air and earth, were, as Aristotile somewhere speaks, according to the sense of those Atheistic theologers; * Philosophiae tenet Philo, Exegeti et alii, first in order of Cor. Lib. 2, c. nature before God, as being themselves also gods, but also brute-animals at 6. [p. 735. least, if not men too. And this is the atheistic creation of the world, Tom. I. O. gods and all, out of senseless and stupid matter, or dark chaos, as the only original Nomen; the perfectly inverted order of the universe.

XVIII. But though this hypothesis be purely atheistical, that makes Love, which is supposed to be the original deity, to have itself sprung at first from an egg of the night; and consequently that all deity was the creature or off-spring of matter and Chaos, or dark fortuitous nature; yet Aristotile somewhere conceives, that not only Parmentides, but also Hesiod, and some others, who did in like manner make Love the supreme deity, and derive all things from Love and Chaos, were to be exempted out of the number of those atheistical Materialists before described; forasmuch as they seemed to understand by love, an active principle and cause of motion in

* Exercit. Plinian, in Solinum, Tom. I. p. 529;
Some, who made Love the

in the universe; which therefore could not spring from an egg of the night, nor be the creature of matter, but must needs be something independent on it, and in order of nature before it: "υποπτεύεται δ' αυτ' τις, Ησίοδος πρώτος ἡρῴς τοῦ ταιώντος, κηδι' εἰ τις ἄλλος," Ησίοδος καὶ Επικούριος, εἴ τις οὖν ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔρχεται, οὗ τις Παρμενίδης. Καὶ γὰρ οὕτως κατακαίναζων τῷ τοῦ παν-

tοῦ γένεσιν,

Πρώτοιος μὲν (Φιτόν) ἔρωτα Πεινίων μετίσατο πάσατος.

Ησίοδος δὲ,

Πάνων μὲν πρώτοις χάρις γένετ', αὐτὰρ ἐπεκα.

Γαὶ εὐρύτεροι,

"Παρείπησαν ὅπως παράφεσαι τοῖς αὐτοῖς καί ὑποτίλουσα τοῖς
tοῖς μὲν οὖν τὸς χεῖρι διανεμομεριης περι τοῦ τις πρώτος, ἐκείνῳ χρίσαν ὑπερούσιον. One would suspect, that Hesiod, and if there be any other who made love or desire a prin-
ciple of things in the universe, aimed at this very thing, (namely, the settling of another active principle besides matter:) for Parmenides describing the generation of the universe, makes Love to be the senior of all the gods; and Hesiod, after he had mentioned chaos, introduced Love as the supreme Deity. As intimating herein, that besides matter, there ought to be another cause or principle, that should be the original of motion and activity, and also hold and conjoin all things together. But how these two principles are to be ordered, and which of them was to be placed first, whether Love or Chaos, may be judged of afterwards. In which latter words Aristotle seems to intimate, that Love, as taken for an active principle, was not to be supposed to spring from Chaos, but rather to be in order of nature before it; and therefore by this Love of theirs must needs be meant the deity. And indeed Simmias Readius in his Wings, a hymn made in honour of this Love, that is senior to all the gods, and a principle in the universe, tells us plainly, that it is not Cupid, Venus's soft and effeminate son, but another kind of love,

Οὔτι γε Κυνηρίδος παῖς,

'Ομυπτεύεται δ' αὐτὸς ὁ Ερως καλείμαχι

Οὔτι γὰρ ἰγκίνα βιείζειν, παράγω δὲ τείνει.

Γαὶς, ἀκλάστας τε μυχεὶς, υφανους πάσας τε Ἱερὰς μοι ἐκεῖ.

Τῶν δ' ἐρωτε ἐνεοσφυτάμμων ἕργον σκατέρος, ἐκρυπτὰ τε ὤφων Σέμιτος.

I'm not that wanton boy,
The sea-fraught goddes's only joy.

Pure heavenly Love I bight, and my

Soft magick charms, not iron bands, fast tye

Heaven, earth and seas. The gods themselves do readily

Stoop to my laws. The whole world daunces to my harmony.

Moreover, this cannot be that Love neither, which is describ'd in Plato's Symposium (as some learned men have conceived) that was begotten between Penia

CHAP. III. Supreme Deity, no Atheists.

Peuia and Pous, this being not a divine but daemonicack thing (as the philosopher there declares,) no God, but a demon only, or of a middle nature. For it is nothing but φιλοσοφία, or the love of pulchritude as such, which, though rightly used, may perhaps wing and inpire the mind to noble and generous attempts, and beget a scornful disdain in it of mean, dirty, and fordid things; yet it is capable of being abused also, and then it will strike downward into brutishness and sensuality. But at best it is an affection belonging only to imperfect and parturient beings; and therefore could not be the first principle of all things. Wherefore we see no very great reason, but that in a rectified and qualified sense this may pass for true theology; that Love is the supreme Deity and original of all things; namely, if by it be meant eternal, self-originated, intellectual Love, or essential and substantial goodnes, that having an infinite overflowing fulness and fecundity dispenses itself univindically, according to the best wisdom, sweetly governs all, without any force or violence (all things being naturally subject to its authority, and readily obeying its laws) and reconciles the whole world into harmony. For the Scripture telling us, that God is love, seems to warrant thus much to us, that love in some rightly qualified sense is God.

XIX. But we are to omit the fabulous age, and to descend to the philosophical, to enquire there, who they were among the professed philosophers, who atheiz'd in that manner before described. It is true indeed, that Aristotle in other places accuses Democritus and Leucippus of the very same thing, that is, of assigning only a material cause of the universe, and giving no account of the original of motion; but yet it is certain, that these were not the persons intended by him here; those, which he speaks of, being των περί των φιλοσοφών, some of the first and most ancient philosophers of all. Moreover, it appears by the description of them, that they were such as did not philosophize in the way of atoms, but resolved all things whatsoever in the universe into υγιν and φυσική υγιν, matter, and the passions or affections, qualities and forms of matter; so that they were not atomical, but hylopathian philosophers. These two, the old Materialists and the Democriticks, did both alike derive all things from dead and stupid matter, fortuitously moved; and the difference between them was only this, that the Democriticks managed this business in the way of atoms, the other in that more vulgar way of qualities and forms: so that indeed this is really but one and the same atheistical hypothesis, in two several schemes. And as one of them is called the atomick atheism, so the other, for distinction's sake, may be called the hylopathian.

XX. Now Aristotle tells us plainly, that these hylopathian Atheists of his were all the first philosophers of the Ionick order and succession, before Anaxagoras. Whereof Thales being the head, he is contemnously thereunto by Aristotle made to be ἀρχηγός τῆς τουτῆς φιλοσοφίας, the prince and leader of this kind of atheistical philosophy, he deriving all things whatsoever, as Homer had done before him, from water, and acknowledging no other principle but the fluid matter.

Not-
Notwithstanding which accaulation of Aristotle's, Thales is far otherwise represented by good authors; Cicero ¹ telling us, that besides water, which he made to be the original of all corporeal things, he ascribed also mind for another principal, which formed all things out of the water; and Laertius ² and Plutarch³ recording, that he was thought to be the first of all philosophers, who determined souls to be immortal. He is said also to have affirmed ⁴ that God was πάντων πάντων, the old of all things, and that the world was σωκόμα θεία, the workemanship of God. Clement ⁵ likewise tells us, that being asked, ει λαοκόν ποιήσας τι θάλασσαν τι δικρώματι, καί καὶ, εὑρέθη, ὅτι ἐκ διανοομήνων, whether any of a man's actions could be concealed from the Deity? he replied, not so much as any thought. Moreover Laertius ⁶ further writes of him, that he held τοῦ κόσμου ἡμετέρου καὶ διανοομένη πνήμα, that the world was animated, and full of demons. Lastly, Aristotle ⁷ himself elsewhere speaks of him as a Theist, καὶ εἰ τοῦ ὅλου ἐν τινὶ πυρικῇ μερίζεται Φανών. Ὁ τι εἰκῆ καὶ Θαλής ἂν θύμη πνεύμα πνήμα Θαλῆς εἶναι. Some think (faith he) that soul and life is mingled with the whole universe; and thence perhaps was that of Thales, that all things are full of Gods. Wherefore we conceive, that there is very good reason, why Thales should be acquitted from this accusation of atheism. Only we shall observe the occasion of his being thus differently represented, which seems to have been this; because as Laertius ⁸ and Theophrastus ⁹ intimate, which he left no philosophick writings or monuments of his own behind him, (Anaximander being the first of all the philosophick writers;) whence probably it came to pass, that in after-times some did interpret his philosophy one way, some another; and that he is sometimes represented as a Theist, and sometimes again as a down-right Atheist.

But though Thales be thus by good authority acquitted, yet his next succesor Anaximander can by no means be excused from this imputation; and therefore we think it more reasonable to fatten that title upon him, which Aristotle beftows on Thales, that he was ἄρχηγος τῆς τοιχύτης Φιλοσοφίας, the prince and founder of this atheistic philosophy; who derived all things from matter, in the way of forms and qualities; he supposing a certain infinite materia prima, which was neither air, nor water, nor fire, but indifferent to every thing, or a mixture of all, to be the only principle of the univerfe, and leading a train of many other Atheists after him, such as Hippo, furnamed Σέριος by Simplicius and others, Anaximenes, and Diogenes Apolloniates, and many more; who, though they had some petty differences amongst themselves, yet all agreed in this one thing, that matter devoid of understanding and life was the firft principle of all things; till at length Anaxagoras ftopp this atheistic current amongst these Ionick philosophers, introducing mind as a principle of the univerfe.

XXI.

² Lib. I. segm. 24. p. 16.
⁶ Lib. I. segm. 29. p. 18.
⁸ Lib. I. segm. 23. p. 15.
XXI. But there is a passage in Aristotle's Phyicks, which seems at first fight to contradict this again; and to make Anaximander also not to have been an Atheist, but a divine philosopher. Where having declared, that several of the ancient physiologers made άτωπον, or Infinite, to be the principle of all things, he subjoins these words, διὸ καθ' αὐτ' ἀττίμωμεν, τὰ τρίτης ἀξίωμα, ἀλλ' υπ' τῶν ἄλλων ἐνει δοκεῖ. Καὶ εἰρήκημεν ἀπάντησιν μὴν πεπεταμένην, δὲ φασιν ὅσοι μὴν διώκουσι πάρα τὸ ἄτομον ἄλλακτα αἰτίας, οὕνεια, ἡ θεία. Καὶ τέτο ἔστι τὸ διόν, ἀδύνατον γὰρ μὴν αὐτίκος, ὅπερ Φιλόσοφος ἀναγιναι, ἢ τί εἰς τοῖς τῶν Φυσιολόγων. Therefore there seems to be no principle of this Infinite, but this to be the principle of other things, and to contain all things, and govern all things, as they all lay, who do not make, besides infinite, any other causes, such as mind, or friendship; and that this is the only real Nomen or God in the world, it being immortal and incorruptible, as Anaximander affirms, and most of the physiologers. From which place some late writers have confidently concluded, that Anaximander, with those other physiologers there mentioned, did, by Infinite, understand God, according to the true notion of him, or an Infinite mind, the efficient cause of the universe, and not fenelefs and stupid matter; since this could not be said to be immortal, and to govern all things; and consequently, that Aristotle grossly contradicts himself, in making all these Ionick physiologers before Anaxagoras to have been mere Materialists or Atheists. And it is possible, that Clemens Alexandrinus also might from this very passage of Aristotle's, not sufficiently considered, have been induced to rank Anaximander amongst the divine physiologers, as he doth in his Protreptic to the Greeks; where, after he had condemned certain of the old physiologers as atheistic, he subjoins these words; * τῶν δὲ ἄλλων Φιλοσόφων, ὡσι τὰ σωφρόνες ὑπερβάλειτοι, ἐπιτυμεικεῖον τι υἱόν* Clem. Prot. Λόγων, ἐπερίττωτοι, οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν τὸ ἀτομον κατάγαςεαι, ὅπερ 'Αναξιμάνδρου τοῦ Μιλήσ. *45* [Cato. V. p. 57. Iom. οὐδὲ τὸν Ἀναξιμάντη τὸ Κλαζόμενον, καὶ τὸ Ἀθροίατον Ἀρχαίας. But of the other philosophers, who transcending all the elements, searched after some higher and more excellent thing, some of them praised Infinite, amongst which was Anaximander the Milesian, Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, and the Athenian Archelaus. As if these three had all alike acknowledged an incorporeal Deity, and made an infinite mind, distinct from matter, the first original of all things.

But that forecited passage of Aristotle's alone, well consider'd, will itself afford a sufficient confutation of this opinion; where Anaximander, with those other physiologers, is plainly opposed to Anaxagoras, who besides infinite fenelefs matter, or similar atoms, made mind to be a principle of the universe, as also to Empedocles, who made a plaffick life and nature, called friendship, another principle of the corporeal world; from whence it plainly follows, that Anaximander and the rest suppos'd not infinite mind, but infinite matter, without either mind or plaffick matter, to have been the only original of all things, and therefore the only Deity or Nomen.

Moreover, Democritus being linked in the context with Anaximander, as making both of them alike, τὸ άτίμωμα, or Infinite, to be the first principle of all; it might as well be inferred from this place, that Democritus was a genuine
genuine Theif, as Anaximander. But as Democritus his only principle was infinite atoms, without any thing of mind or plastiick nature; so likewise was Anaximander's an infinity of senseless and stupid matter; and therefore they were both of them Atheists alike, though Anaximander, in the cited words, had the honour (if it may be so called) to be only named, as being the most ancient of all those atheistical physiologers, and the ringleader of them.

XXII. Neither ought it at all to seem strange, that Anaximander and those other atheistical Materialists should call infinite matter, devoid of all understanding and life, the τὸ Ἴενω, the Deity or Numen, since to all those, who deny a God, (according to the true notion of him) whatsoever else they substitute in his room, by making it the first principle of all things, though it be senseless and stupid matter, yet this must needs be accounted the only Numen, and divinest thing of all.

Nor is it to be wondred at neither, that this infinite, being understood of matter, should be said to be, not only incorruptible, but also immortal, these two being often used as synonymous and equivalent expressions. For thus in Lucretius ¹, the corruption of all inanimate bodies is called death.

— Mors ejus quod fuit ante;  

And again,

² Quando alius ex alio refecit natura, nec ullam  
Rem gignit patitur, nisi morte adjutam alieni.

In like manner mortal is used by him for corruptible,

³ Nam siquid mortale à cunctis partibus effet,  
Ex oculis res queque repente crepuit periret.

And this kind of language was very familiar with Heraclitus ⁴, as appears from these passages of his, ἔν πάντων ἔνα ἔνα, ἐν ψευδίς; ἐν ἔνα ἔναν ἐν ἔναν; ἔνα ἔναν: The death of fire is generation to air; and the death of air is generation to water; that is, the corruption of them. And again, ἔν πάντων ἔνα ἔνα, ἔν πάντων ἔνα ἔνα: It is death to vapour or air, to be made water; and death to water, to be made earth. In which Heraclitus did but imitate Orpheus, as appears from this verse of his, cited by Clemens Alexand. ⁵

"Ec in ὑδρ ψευδ, ἐν αὑτοῖς ὑπάτεσσα ἀμοιβή;"

Besides which, there are many examples of this use of the word ἐνα ἔναν, in

¹ Lib. I. verf. 672.  
² Lib. I. verf. 264, 265.  
³ Lib. I. verf. 219.  
⁴ Vide Henr. Stephan. in Poesi Philo- 
   p. 137.  
⁵ Stromat. Lib. VI. cap. II. p. 476.
in other Greek writers, and some in Aristotle himself, who speaking of the heavens, attributes ἀκατάστατον and ἀληθικὸν to them, as one and the same thing; as also affirms, that the ancients therefore made heaven to be the seat of the Deity, ὡς ὅλα μονον ἀθάνατον, as being only immortal, that is, incorruptible.

Indeed that other expression, at first sight, would stagger one more, where it is said of this ἀπεργόν, or infinite, that it doth not only contain, but also govern all things: but Simplicius tells us, that this is to be understood likewise of matter, and that no more was meant by it, than that all things were contained in it, and depended on it, as the first principle; of ὅ ἐι λέγετο τοις τοῖσιν τερέξιν ἐλεγον ὡς κυβερνῶν ὅλον ἡμών ἡ Ἰταμάκτον. This made the philosophers speak only of natural principles, and not of supernatural; and though they say, that this infinite of theirs does both contain and govern all things, yet this is not at all to be wondered at, so far as containing belongs to the material cause, as that which goes through all things, and likewise governing, as that from which all things, according to a certain aptitude of it, are made. Philo of (who was a Chaldean) represents Aristotle's sense in this whole place more fully, after this manner. Those of the ancient physiologists, who had no respect to any active efficient cause, as Anaxagoras bad to mind, and Empedocles to friendship and contention, supposed matter to be the only cause of all things, and that it was infinite in magnitude, ingenerable and incorruptible, esteeming it to be a certain divine thing, which did govern all, or preside over the compasses of the universe, and to be immortal, that is, undefinable. This Anaximenes said to be air, Thales to be water, but Anaximander, a certain middle thing; some one thing, and some another. Καὶ ὁ δὲ θεομάκτον Ἐφιον, ἐν τῷ καθ ἕμοις περίεργον τὸς πρώτος μὴ ἐπισάλλον τῷ ἔργῳ τοῦ οὐλον ὅλοι ὑποκείμενοι, ὅ περ αὐτόν ὁπότεν ἐκάστος, αὐτὸς τὸς ἄλλος τι ἐπέτει, τάτο εὐθὺς ὃ Θεόν ὑποκείμενος: And Aristotle in this passage tells us, that it is no wonder, if they, who did not attend to the active cause, that presides over the universe, did look upon some one of the elements (that which each of them thought to be the cause of all other things) as God. But as they considering only the material principle, conceived that to be the cause of all things; so Anaxagoras supposed mind to be the principle of all things, and Empedocles friendship and contention.

XXIII. But to make it further appear, that Anaximander's philosophy was purely atheistical, we think it convenient to shew what account is given of it by other writers. Plutarch, in his Placita Philosophorum, does at once briefly represent the Anaximandridian philosophy, and centure it after this manner: Ἀναξιμανδρὸς Ἐφιον, τοῦ ὁλου τῶν ὁκείων ἐκεῖνο το ἀπεργόν, εἰς μάλιστα τάξιν γύρωθεν, καθ' εἰς Ῥιβ. I. c. 3. τοῦ τατίτον θείου, ἵνα καὶ γενομένοι ἀπεργόν κατέργη, καὶ τάλιν θείους λαγάνι ἐστὶ δια [p. 675. το ἀπεργόν ἐστίν, ἵνα μὴ ἐλλειπῇ ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ ὕψις αὐτοῦ, ἀμαρτήν σετε ἢ γενεσθαι, τῷ μέν τινι.]

Q 2

A fuller Account of Anaximander's Book I.

Anaximander affirms Infinite to be the first principle; and that all things are generated out of it, and corrupted again into it, and therefore that infinite worlds are successively thus generated and corrupted. And be gives the reason why it is infinite, that so there might be never any fail of generations. But be ereth in this, that assigning only a material cause, be takes away the active principle of things. For Anaximander's Infinite is nothing else but matter; but matter can produce nothing, unless there be also an active cause. Where he shews also, how Anaximenes followed Anaximander herein, in assigning only a material cause of the univerfe, without any efficient; though he differed from him, in making the first matter to be air, and deriving all things from thence by rarefaction and condensation. Thus, we see, it is plain, that Anaximander's Infinite was no infinite mind, which is the true Deity, but only infinite matter, devoid of any life or active power. Eusebius is more particular in giving an account of Anaximander's Cosmopoeia: 'The doctrine of Anaximander is as follows: if a man were to take a slice of the world cut out in the shape of a plate, and to separate the matter from the air, a certain depth of flame or fire did first arise and compass the air, which surrounds this earth, (as a bark doth a tree) which being afterwards broken, and divided into smaller spherical bodies, constituted the sun and moon and all the stars. Which Anaximandrian Cosmopoeia was briefly hinted at by Aristotle in the words, οί δὲ εἰ τὸν δόξαν, εἰσάγαγε τὸν εὐανείπτωσιν, εἰκότητα, ὑπὲρ 'Αναξιμανδρίδος Φυσις.' Some philosophers generate the world by the secretion and segregation of inconstant contrarieties, as Anaximander speaks. And elsewhere in his Metaphysicks, he takes notice of 'Αναξιμανδρίδι τὸ μοίχα, Anaximander's mixture of things. Whence we conclude, that Anaximander's Infinite was nothing else but an infinite chaos of matter, in which were either actually, or potentially, contained all manner of qualities: by the fortuitous secretion and segregation of which, he supposed infinite worlds to be successively generated and corrupted. So that we may now easily guess, whence Lenzippus and Democritus had their infinite worlds, and perceive how near a-kin these two atheistic hypotheses were. But it will not be amiss to take notice also of that particular conceit, which Anaximander had, concerning the first original of brute animals, and mankind. Of the former, Philebus gives us this account; 'And in his opinion, the first animals were generated in moisture, and encompass'd about with certain thorny barks, by which they were guarded and defended; which after further growth, coming to be more dry and cracking, they issued
issued forth, but lived only a short time after. And as for the first original of men, Eusebius represents his sense thus: 'Εξ ἀλλοιωμένων ζωῶν ὁ ἀνθρώπως ἔγεν- E. P. I. I. ηντικερτήτως, ἵνα τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔτη λαύεται, ἀλλὰ τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πολύχρωμοι δίδοιν ἐπειδὴ, διὸ καὶ οὗτος ἄν ἐν ποιήσει ὅτα διανοοῦν τινές. Men were at first generated in the bellies of other animals, forasmuch as all other animals, after they are brought forth, are quickly able to feed and nourish themselves, but man alone needs to be nursed up a long time; and therefore could not be preserved at first, in any other way. But Plutarch expresseth this something more particularly. 'Ἀναξίμανδρος ὑποθέσει τοῦ περί τοῦ ἰδίου ἱστούς τομ. II. μονάδος, ὁποδοτίται, καὶ τραφυλακὸς ἤ γενομένος ἀπὸ τού ἱστούς τομάδων, ἐναλαττά ἢ τοῖς ἀνάμεσας. Anaximander concludes, that men were at first generated in the bellies of fishes, and being there nourished, till they grew strong, and were able to shift for themselves, they were afterward cast out upon dry land. Lastly, Anaximander's theology is thus both represented to us, and cenured, by Velleius the Epicurean philosopher in Cicero: Anaximandri opif-. De Nat. D. nion est natos effe deos, longis intervallis orientes occidentque, cœque inumme- Lib. I. C. X. rables effe mundos; sed nos deum nifi supremum intelligere qui potissimus? At. Tom. IX. anaximander's opinion is, that the gods are native, rising and vanishing again, Oper.] in long periods of times; and that these gods are innumerable worlds; but how can we conceive that to be a God, which is not eternal? We learn from hence, that Anaximander did indeed so far comply with vulgar opinion, as that he retained the name of gods, but however that he really denied the existence of the thing it fell, even according to the judgment of this Epicurean philo- pher. Forasmuch as all his Gods were native and mortal, and indeed no- thing else, but those innumerable worlds, which he supposed in certain peri- od of time to be successively generated and destroyed. Wherefore it is plain, that Anaximander's only real Numen, that is, his first principle, that was ingenerable and incorruptible, was nothing but infinite matter, devoid of all understanding and life, by the fortuitous secretion of whose inexisten- qualities and parts, he suppos'd, first, the elements of earth, water, air and fire, and then, the bodies of the sun, moon and stars, and both bodies and souls of men and other animals, and lastly, innumerable or infinite such worlds as these, as so many secondary and native gods, (that were also mortal) to have been generated, according to that atheistical hypothesis described in Plato 1.

XXIV. It is certain, that the vulgar in all ages have been very ill judges of Theists and Atheists, they having condemned many hearty Theists, as guilty of atheism, merely because they differed from them in some of their super- stitious rites and opinions. As for example; Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, though he was the first of all the Ionick philosophers (unless Thales ought to be excepted) who made an infinite mind to be a principle, that is, affect- ed a Deity, according to the true notion of it; yet he was, notwithstanding, generally cried down for an Atheist, merely because he affirmed the sun to be μυκές βατιάο, a mass of fire, or a fiery globe, and the moon to be an earth; that is, because he denied them to be animated and endued with understand- 

1 De Legibus Lib. X. p. 666.
Theis and Atheisf mistaken for one another. Book I.

Plut. Apol.

ing souls, and consequently to be gods. So likewise Socrates was both accused, and condemned, for atheistical impiety, as denying all gods, though nothing was pretended to be proved against him, but only this, that he did even declare, μην νομίζειν, ἕν πολὺς νομίζει, ἵπτερα ἐπ' εὐτυχος καὶ τι νομίζειν, teach that those were not true gods, which the city worshipt, and in the room thereof introduce other new gods. And lastly, the Christians in the primitive times, for the same reason, were vulgarly traduced for Atheists by the Pagans, as Justin Martyr declares in his apology, άδελφοι πιστεύετε, η διαφόρως τῶν τιμίων νομιζομένων ήτοι άθεοι εἷς: We are called Atheists; and we confess ourselves such, in respect of those gods which they worship, but not of the true God. And as the vulgar have unjustly condemned many Theists for Atheists, so have they also acquitted many rank Atheists from the guilt of that crime, merely because they externally complied with them, in their religious worship, and forms of speech. Neither is it only the vulgar, that have been imposed upon herein, but also the generality of learned men, who have been commonly so superficial in this business, as that they have hardly taken notice of above three or four Atheists, that ever were in former times, as namely, Diagoras, Theodorus, Eucemerus, and Protagoras; whereas Democritus and Anaximander were as rank Atheists as any of them all, though they had the wit to carry themselves externally with more cautiousness. And indeed it was really one and the self-same form of atheism, which both these entertained, they deriving all things alike, from dead and stupid matter fortuitously moved, the difference between them being only this, that they managed it two different ways; Anaximander in the way of qualities and forms, which is the more vulgar and obvious kind of atheism; but Democritus in the way of atoms and figures, which seems to be a more learned kind of atheism.

And though we do not doubt at all, but that Plato, in his tenth de Legibus, where he attacks atheism, did intend the confutation as well of the Democritick as the Anaximandrian atheism; yet whether it were, because he had no mind to take any notice at all of Democritus, who is not so much as once mentioned by him any where, or else because he was not so perfectly acquainted with that atomick way of physiologizing, certain it is, that he there describes the atheistic hypothesis more according to the Anaximandrian than the Democritick form. For when he represents the atheistic generation of heaven and earth, and all things in them, as resulting from the fortuitous commixture of hot and cold, hard and soft, moist and dry corpufcula; this is clearly more agreeable with the Anaximandrian generation of the world, by the secretion of inexistent contrarieties in the matter, than the Democritick Cosmopoeia, by the fortuitous concourse of atoms, devoid of all manner of qualities and forms.

Some indeed seem to call that scheme of atheism, that deduces all things from matter, in the way of qualities and forms, by the name of Peripate- tick or Aristotelick atheism; we suppose for this reason, because Aristotle physiologized in that way of forms and qualities, educating them out of the power of the matter. But since Aristotle himself cannot be justly taxed

1 P. 56. Oper.
CHAP. III. Why Democritus new-model'd Atheism.

justly taxed for an Atheist, this form of theism ought rather, as we conceive, to be denominated from Anaximander, and called the Anaximandrian atheism.

XXV. Now the reasons, why Democritus and Leucippus new-modelled atheism, from the Anaximandrian and Hylopathian into the Atomick form, seem to have been chiefly these; first, because they being well instructed in that atomick way of physiologizing, were really convinced, that it was not only more ingenious, but also more agreeable to truth; the other, by real qualities and forms, seeming a thing unintelligible. Secondly, because they forefaw, as Lucretius intimates, that the production of forms and qualities out of nothing, and the corruption of them again into nothing, would prepare an easy way for men's belief of a divine creation and annihilation. And lastly, because, as we have already suggested, they plainly perceived, that these forms and qualities of matter were of a doubtful nature; and therefore, as they were sometimes made a shelter for atheism, so they might also prove, on the contrary, an asylum for corporeal theism; in that it might possibly be supposed, that either the matter of the whole world, or else the more subtle and fiery part of it, was originally ended with an understanding form or quality, and consequently the whole an animal or god. Wherefore they took another more effectual course, to secure their atheism, and exclude all possibility of a corporeal God, by deriving the original of all things from atoms, devoid of all forms and qualities, and having nothing in them, but magnitude, figure, site and motion, as the first principles; it following unavoidably from thence, that life and understanding, as well as those other qualities, could be only accidental and secondary results from certain fortuitous concretions and contextures of atoms; so that the world could be made by no previous counsel or understanding, and therefore by no Deity.

XXVI. We have here represented three several forms of atheism, the Anaximandrian, the Democritical and the Stratonical. But there is yet another form of atheism, different from them all, to be taken notice of, which is such, as supposeth one kind of plasick and spermatick, methodical and artificial nature, but without any sensible or conscious understanding, to preside over the whole world, and dispose and conserve all things, in that regular frame in which they are. Such a form of atheism as this is hinted to us in that doubtfull passage of Seneca's; Sive animal est mundi, (for so it ought be read, and not animal) sive corpus naturà gubernante, at arbores, ut fata; 1. 3. Str. 29. whether the whole world be an animal (i. e. endued with one sentient and rational life) or whether it be only a body governed by (a certain plasick and methodical, but senseless) nature, as trees, and other plants or vegetables. In which words are two several hypotheses of the mundane system, sceptically propos'd by one, who was a Corporealifh, and took it for granted that all was body. First, that the whole world, though having nothing but body in it, yet was notwithstanding an animal, as our human bodies are, endued with
with one sentient or rational life and nature, one soul or mind, governing and ordering the whole. Which corporeal cosmopoli&m we do not reckon amongst the forms of atheism, but rather account it for a kind of ipurious atheism, or atheism disguised in a paganic dress, and not without a complication of many false apprehensions, concerning the Deity, in it. The second is, that the whole world is no animal, but, as it were, one huge plant or vegetable, a body ended with one plattick or spermatick nature, branching out the whole, orderly and methodically, but without any understanding or sense. And this must needs be accounted a form of atheism, because it does not derive the original of things in the univerfe from any clearly intellectual principle or conscious nature.

XXVII. Now this form of atheism, which supposes the whole world (there being nothing but body in it) not to be an animal, but only a great plant or vegetable, having one spermatick form, or plattick nature, which without any conscious reason or understanding orders the whole, though it have some nearer correspondence with that hylozoick form of atheism before described, in that it does not suppose nature to be a mere fortuitous, but a kind of artificial thing; yet it differs from it in this, that the hylozoick supposing all matter, as much, to have life essentially belonging to it, must therefore needs attribute to every part of matter (or at least every particular totum, that is one by continuity) a distinct plattick life of its own, but acknowledge no one common life, as ruling over the whole corporeal universe; and consequently impute the original of all things (as hath been already observed) to a certain mixture of chance, and plattick or methodical nature, both together. Whereas the cosmo-plattick atheism quite excludes fortune or chance, subjecting all things to the regular and orderly fate of one plattick or plantal nature, ruling over the whole. Thus that philosopher before mentioned concludes, that whether the world were an animal (in the Stoical sense) or whether it were a mere plant or vegetable, ab initio ejus ufque ad exitum, quicquid facere, quicquid pati debeat, includit eft. Ut in feminine, omnis futuri ratio hominis comprehenfa eft. Et legem barbae & canorum nondum natus infantis babet; totius enim corporis, & sequentis eatis, in parvo occultoque lineamenta funt. Sic origo mundi non magis jolum & lunam, & vicces fiderum, & animalium orus, quam quibus mutarentur terranea, continuit. In his fuit inundatio, que non fucus quan byems, quam flatas, lege mundi venit. Whatsoever, from the beginning to the end of it, it can either do or suffer, it was all at first included in the nature of the whole; as in the seed is contained the whole delineation of the future man, and the embryo or unborn infant hath already in it the law of a beard and gray hairs; the lineaments of the whole body, and of its following age, being there described as it were in a little and obscure compendium. In like manner, the original and first rudiments of the world contained in them not only the sun and moon, the courses of the stars, and the generation of animals, but also the vicissitudes of all terrestrial things; and every deluge or inundation of water comes to pass no less by the law of the world (its spermatick or plattick nature) than winter and summer death.

XXVIII.
XXVIII. We do not deny it to be possible, but that some in all ages might have entertained such an atheistical conceit as this, that the original of this whole mundane system was from one artificial, orderly and methodical, but seneftec nature lodged in the matter; but we cannot trace the footstuffs of this doctrine any where so much as among the Stoicks, to which sect Seneca, who speaks so wavingly and uncertainly in this point, (whether the world were an animal or a plant) belonged. And indeed diverse learned men have suspected, that even the Zenonian and Heraclitick Deity it self was no other than such a plastick nature or spermatick principle in the universe, as in the seeds of vegetables and animals doth frame their respective bodies orderly and artificially. Nor can it be denied, but that there hath been just cause given for such a suspicion; forasmuch as the best of Stoicks, sometimes confounding God with nature, seemed to make him nothing but an artificial fire, orderly and methodically proceeding to generation. And it was familiar with them, as Laertius 1 tells us, to call God σπερματικόν λόγον τῆς κόσμου, the spermatick reason, or form of the world. Nevertheless, because Zeno 2 and others of the chief Stoical doctors did also many times assert, that there was θύει τι οὐκ άξον, a rational and intellectual nature (and therefore not a plastick principle only) in the matter of the universe; as likewise that the whole world was an animal, and not a mere plant: therefore we incline rather to excuse the generality of the first and most ancient Stoicks from the imputation of atheism, and to account this form of atheism, which we now speak of, to be but a certain degeneracy from the right Heraclitick and Zenonian Cabala, which seemed to contain these two things in it; first, that there was an animalish, sentient and intellectual nature, or a conscious soul and mind, that presided over the whole world, though lodged immediately in the fiery matter of it: secondly, that this sentient and intellectual nature, or corporeal soul and mind of the universe, did contain also under it, or within it, as the inferior part of it a certain plastick nature, or spermatick principle which was properly the fate of all things. For thus Heraclitus 3 defined Fate, λόγον τοῦ διὰ τῆς αύτίας τοῦ πασίων δύναμιν, ἢ ἀληθείαν ὀνήμα, σπέρμα τῆς τοῦ πάσης γνώσεως. A certain reason passing through the substance of the whole world, or an ethereal body, that was the seed of the generation of the universe. And Zeno's 4 first principle, as it is said to be an intellectual nature, so it is also said to have contained in it πάντας τῶν σπερματικῶν λόγως, καθ' ὅς ἐκεῖνα καθ' οἰκευμανίαν γίγνονται, all the spermatick reasons and forms, by which everything is done according to fate. However, though this seem to have been the genuine doctrine, both of Heraclitus and Zeno; yet others of their followers afterwards divided these two things from one another, and taking only the latter of them, made the plastick or spermatick nature, devoid of all animality or conscious intellectuality, to be the highest principle in the universe. Thus Laertius tells us 5, that

1 Lib. VII. segm. 156. p. 450.
3 Vide Plutarch: de Placitis Philosophor.
5 Lib. VII. segm. 143. p. 455.
that Boethus, an eminent and famous Stoical doctor did plainly deny the world to be an animal, that is, to have any sentient, conscious or intellectual nature presiding over it; and consequently must needs make it to be but corpus naturae gubernante, ut arbores, ut fata, a body governed by a plastic or vegetative nature, as trees, plants and herbs. And as it is possible, that other Stoicks and Heracliticks might have done the like before Boethus, so it is very probable, that he had alter him many followers; amongst which, as Plinius Secundus may be reckoned for one, so Seneca himself was not without a doubtful tincture of this atheifm, as hath been already showed. Wherefore this form of atheifm, which supposes one plafick or spermatic nature, one plantal or vegetative life in the whole world, as the highest principle, may, for distinction sake, be called the Pseudo-Stoical, or Stoical atheifm.

XXIX. Besides these philosophic Atheifts, whose several forms we have now described, it cannot be doubted, but that there have been in all ages many other Atheifts that have not at all philosophized, nor pretended to maintain any particular atheifick system or hypothesis, in a way of reason, but were only led by a certain dull and foolish, though confident disbelief of whatsoever they could not either see or feel: which kind of Atheifts may therefore well be accounted enthuflasticlal or fanatical Atheifts. Though it be true in the mean time, that even all manner of Atheifts whatsoever, and thole of them, who most of all pretend to reason and philosophy, may, in some fene, be jutly flyed also both Enthufiafts and Fanaticks. Forasmuch as they are not led or carried on, into this way of atheizing, by any clear dictates of their reason or understanding, but only by an οὐκ ἐξοργίζω, a certain blind and irrational impetus; they being, as it were, inspired to it by that lower earthly life and nature, which is called in the Scripture oracles, τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ κόσμου, the spirit of the world, or a mundane spirit, and is opposed to the τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, the spirit that is of God. For when the Apostle speaks after this manner, We have not received the spirit of the world, but the spirit that is of God, he seems to intimate thus much to us, that as some men were led and inspired by a divine spirit, so others again are inspired by a mundane spirit, by which is meant the earthly life. Now the former of these two are not to be accounted Enthufiafts, as the word is now commonly taken in a bad fene; because the spirit of God is no irrational thing, but either the very selfsame thing with reason, or else such a thing as Arifotle (as it were vaticinating concerning it) somewhere calls λόγος τῆς φύσεως, a certain better and diviner thing than reason, and Plotinus ἐν λόγῳ τῆς φύσεως, the root of reason. But on the contrary, the mundane spirit, or earthly life, is irrational foolish: and they, who are atheitelically inspired by it (how abhorrent foever they may otherwise seem to be from enthufiafn and revelations) are notwithstanding really no better than a kind of bewitched Enthufiafts and blind Spirituall, that are wholly ridden and acted by a dark, narrow, and captivated principle of life, and, to use their own language, in-blown by it, and by it bereft, even in speculative things, of all free reason and understanding. Nay, they are Fanaticks too, however that word seems to have a more peculiar respect to something of a Deity; all Atheifts being that blind goddesses Nature's Fanaticks.

XXX.
XXX. We have described four several forms of atheism; first, the Hydrophthalmian or Anaximandrian, that derives all things from dead and flupid matter, in the way of qualities and forms, generable and corruptible: secondly, the Atomical or Democritical, which doth the same thing in the way of atoms and figures: thirdly, the Cosmoplastic or Stoical atheism, which supposes one plastick and methodical but senseless nature, to preside over the whole corporeal univerfe: and lastly, the Hylozoick or Stratonical, that attributes to all matter, as such, a certain living and energetic nature, but devoid of all animality, sense and consciousnefs. And as we do not meet with any other forms or schemes of atheism besides these four, so we conceive, that there cannot easily be any other excogitated or devised; and that upon these two following considerations. First, because all Atheists are mere Corporealists, that is, acknowledge no other substance besides body or matter. For as there was never any yet known, who asffing incorporeal substance, did deny a Deity; fo neither can there be any reafon, why he that admits the former should exclude the latter. Again, the fame dull and earthly difbelief or confounded sottifhness of mind, which makes men deny a God, must needs incline them to deny all incorporeal substance alfo. Wherefore as the physicians speak of a certain difeafe or madness, called hydrophobia, the symptom of thofe that have been bitten by a mad dog, which makes them have a monstrous antipathy to water; fo all Atheists are poiffed with a certain kind of madness, that may be called Pneumatophobia, that makes them have an irrational but desperate abhorrence from spirits or incorporeal substances, they being acted alfo, at the fame time, with an Hylomania, whereby they madly doat upon matter, and devoutly worship it as the only Nume.

The second consideration is this, because as there are no Atheists but fuch as are mere Corporealists, fo all Corporealists are not to be accounted Atheists neither: thofe of them, who notwithstanding they make all things to be matter, yet fuppofe an intellectual nature in that matter to prefide over the corporeal univerfe, being in reafon and charity to be exempted out of that number. And there have been always fome, who, though fo strongly captivated under the power of grosf imagination, as that an incorporeal God feemed to them to be nothing but a God of words, (as fome of them call it) a mere empty found or contradicitious expression, fomething and nothing put together; yet notwithstanding, they have been poiffed with a firm belief and perffuation of a Deity, or that the fystem of the univerfe depends upon one perfect understanding being as the head of it; and thereupon have concluded that ἕλθεν ὁ Ἰχναρός, a certain kind of body or matter is God. The groflft and moft sottifh of all which corporeal Theifts feem to be thofe, who contend, that God is only one particular piece of organized matter, of human form and bignefs, which endued with perfect reafon and understanding exercifeth an universal dominion over all the reft. Which hypthefis however it hath been entertained by fome of the Christian profefion, both in former and later times, yet it hath feemed very ridiculous, even to many of thofe Heathen philofophers themselves, who were mere Corporealists, fuch as the Stoicks, who exploded it with a kind of indignation,
nation, contending earnestly 1 μὴ εἶναι Σένων ἀνθρωπομορφόν, that God (though corporeal) yet must not be conceived to be of any human shape. And Ἑννοφάνες 2, an ancient philosophick poet, expresscth the childishness of this conceit after this manner;

'Αλλ' ἐστοι χαῖρεσι' εἰχόν βόσεν ἢ λειτοτε,  
'Ἡ γράφετοι χαίρετε, καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἐπερ ἄδεες,  
Καὶ ἐν Σένω λήδες ἐγράφον, καὶ σώματι ἐποιεῖν  
Τοιοῦτον εὖν περι τοι καὶ δέως εἰχον ὀμοιοι.

If oxen, lions, affes and horses, had all of them a feme of a Deity, and were able to limn and paint, there is no question to be made, but that each of these several animals would paint God according to their respective form and likeness, and contend, that he was of that shape and no other. But that other corporeal Theist seems to be of the two rather more generous and genteel, which supposes the whole world to be one animal, and God to be a certain subtle and ethereal, but intellectual matter, pervading it as a soul: which was the doctrine of others before the Stoicks, 3 τὸ πρὸ Σένω ὑπελοχίων ἑπικούροςς εἰς Ἰ Μεταπόλινς καὶ τῇ Εἴπτετε Ἡρακλείως, Hippasus of Metapontus and Heraclitus the Ephesian suppos'd the fiery and ethereal matter of the world to be God. However, neither these Heracliticks and Stoicks, nor yet the other Anthropomorphitikes, are by us condemned for downright Atheists, but rather look'd upon as a sort of ignorant, childish, and unskilful Theistis.

Wherefore we see, that Atheists are now reduced into a narrow compas, since none are concluded to be Atheists, but such as are mere Corporealistes; and all Corporealistes must not be condemned for Atheists neither, but only those of them, who affert, that there is no conscious intellectual nature, presiding over the whole universæ. For this is that, which the Adepti in atheism, of what form soever, all agree in, that the first principle of the universæ is no animalish, sentient and conscious nature, but that all animation, sense and conscientiousnes, is a secontry, derivative and accidental thing, gernerable and corruptible, arisiting out of particular concrections of matter organized and dissolded together with them,

XXXI. Now if the first principle and original of all things in the universæ be thus suppos'd to be body or matter, devoid of all animation, sense and conscientiousnes, then it must of necessity be either perfectly dead and stupid, and without all manner of life; or else endued with such a kind of life only, as is by some-called plastick, spermatical and vegetative, by others the life of nature, or natural perception. And those Atheists, who derive all things from dead and stupid matter, must also needs do this, either in the way of qualities and forms, and these are the Anaximandrian Atheists; or else in the way of atoms and figures, which are the Democritical. But those, who make matter endued with a plastick life to be the first original of all things, must needs suppos'e either one such plastick and spermatick life only in the whole mass of matter or corporeal universe, which are the Stoical Atheists; or else all matter as such to have

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1 These are the words of Clemens Alexandrinus concerning Xenophanes, Stromat. Lib. V. p. 714.
2 Apud Clem. Alex. ubi supra, p. 715.
3 Idem in Protreptiko, cap. V. p. 55.
have life and an energetick nature belonging to it, (though without any animal sense or self-perception,) and consequently all the particular parts of matter, and every totum by continuity, to have a distinct plattick life of its own, which are the Strattonick Atheists. Wherefore there does not seem to be any room now left for any other form of Atheism, besides these four, to thrust in.

And we think fit here again to inculcate, what hath been already intimated, that one grand difference amongst these several forms of Atheism is this, that some of them attributing no life at all to matter, as such, nor indeed acknowledging any plattick life of nature, distinct from the animal, and supposing every thing whatsoever in the world, besides \( \Delta \gamma \alpha \pi \mu \nu \varepsilon \), the bare subsistence of matter considered as devoid of all qualities, (that is, mere extended bulk,) to be generated and corrupted; consequently resolve, that all manner of life whatsoever is generable and corruptible, or educible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again; and these are the Anaximandrian and Democratick Atheisms. But the other, which are the Stoical and Strattonick, do on the contrary suppose some life to be fundamental and original, essential and substantial, ingenerable and incorruptible, as being a first principle of things; nevertheless this not to be any animal, conscious and self-perceptive life, but a plattick life of nature only; all Atheists still agreeing in these two forementioned things: first, that there is no other subsistence in the world besides body; secondly, that all animal life, sense and self-perception, conscious understanding and personality are generated and corrupted, successively educed out of nothing and reduced into nothing again.

XXXII. Indeed we are not ignorant, that some, who seem to be well-wishers to Atheism, have talked sometimes of sensitive and rational matter, as having a mind to suppose, three several sorts of matter in the universe, specifically different from one another, that were originally such, and self-existent from eternity; namely sensibles, sensitive and rational: As if the mundane system might be conceived to ariseth from a certain jumble of these three several sorts of matter, as it were scuffling together in the dark, without a God, and to producing brute animals and men. But as this is a mere precarious hypothesis, there being no imaginable account to be given, how there should come to be such an essential difference betwixt matters, or why this piece of matter should be sensitive, and that rational, when another is altogether sensibles; for the suggettors of it are but mere novices in Atheism, and a kind of bungling well-wishers to it. First, because, according to this hypothesis, no life would be produced or destroyed in the successive generations and corruptions of animals, but only concreted and secreted in them; and consequently all human personalities must be eternal and incorruptible: Which is all one, as to affect the praef and post-existence of all souls from eternity to eternity, a thing that all genuine and thorow-pac'd Atheists are in a manner as abhorrent from, as they are from the Deity itself. And secondly, because there can be no imaginable reason given by them, why there might not be as well, a certain divine matter perfectly intellectual and
and self-existent from eternity, as a sensitive and rational matter. And therefore such an hypothesis as this can never serve the turn of Atheists. But all those, that are masters of the craft of Atheism, and thoroughly catechized or initiated in the dark mysteries thereof, (as hath been already inculcated) do perfectly agree in this, that all animal, sentient and conscious life, all souls and minds, and consequently all human personalities, are generated out of matter, and corrupted again into it, or rather reduced out of nothing and reduced into nothing again.

We understand also, that there are certain canting astrological Atheists, who would deduce all things from the occult qualities and influences of the stars, according to their different conjunctions, oppositions and aspects, in a certain blind and unaccountable manner. But these being persons devoid of all manner of sense, who neither so much as pretend to give an account of these stars, whether they be animals or not, as also whence they derive their original, (which if they did undertake to do atheistically, they must needs resolve themselves at length into one or other of those hypotheses already proposed) therefore, as we conceive, they deserve not the least consideration. But we think fit here to observe, that such devotos to the heavenly bodies, as look upon all the other stars as petty deities, but the sun as the supreme deity and monarch of the universe, in the mean time conceiving it also to be perfectly intellectual, (which is in a manner the same with the Cleanthean hypothesis) are not so much to be accounted Atheists, as spurious, paganical and idolatrous Theists. And upon all these considerations we conclude again, that there is no other philosophick form of Atheism, that can easily be devised, besides these four mentioned, the Anaximandrian, the Democritical, the Stoical, and the Stratonical.

XXXIII. Amongst which forms of Atheism, there is yet another difference to be observed, and accordingly another distribution to be made of them. It being first premised, that all these forementioned sorts of Atheists (if they will speak consistently and agreeably to their own principles) must needs supposè all things to be one way or other necessary. For though Epicurus introduced contingent liberty, yet it is well known, that he there-in plainly contradicted his own principles. And this indeed was the first and principal thing intended by us, in this whole undertaking, to confute that false hypothesis of the mundane system, which makes all actions and events necessary upon atheistic grounds, but especially in the mechanick way. Wherefore in the next place we must observe, that though the principles of all Atheists introduce necessity, yet the necessity of these Atheists is not one and the same, but of two different kinds; some of them supposing a necessity of dead and stupid matter, which is that, which is commonly meant by ἄληθὲς ἀνάλητος, or material necessity, and is also called by Aristotle, an absolute necessity of things; others, the necessity of a plastick life, which the same Aristotle calls an hypothetical necessity. For the Anaximandrian and Democritical Atheists do both of them assert a material and absolute necessity of all things, one in the way of qualities, and the other of motion.
motion and mechanism: but the Stoical and Stratonical Atheists assert a plaitical and hypothetical necessity of things only.

Now one grand difference betwixt these two sorts of Atheisms and their necessities lies in this, that the former, though they make all things necessary, yet they suppose them also to be fortuitous; there being no inconsistency between these two. And the sense of both the Anaximandrian and Democritian Atheisms seems to be thus described by Plato, * πάντα κακόν τέχνην εἰς αὐτήν συνεκαταλέγον, All things were mingled together by necessity according to fortune. For that nature, from whence these Atheists derived all things, is at once both necessary and fortuitous. But the Plaftick Atheisms suppose such a necessary nature for the first principle of things, as is not merely fortuitous, but regular, orderly and methodical; the Stoical excluding all chance and fortune univerfally, because they subject all things to one Plaftick nature ruling over the whole universe, but the Stratonical doing it in part only, because they derive things from a mixture of chance and Plaftick nature both together.

And thus we see, that there is a double notion of nature amongst Atheists, as well as Theists; which we cannot better express than in the words of Balbus the Stoick, perforated by Cicero: * Alii naturam consens effe vim quamdam fines ratioe, cientes motus in corporibus necessarios; alii autem vim participem ordinis, tantquam viâ progressiorem. Cujus solertia, nulla ars, nulla manus, nemo opifex, conseqüient poëto imitando; feminis enim vim esse tantam, ut id quanquam perexiguum, natumque suי materiam, quâ ali augerique paßit, ita fingat & efficit, in suo quidque genere, partim ut per fibrpes alantur fias, partim ut movere etiam possint, & ex se similia fui generare. Some by nature mean a certain force without reason and order, exciting necessary motions in bodies, but others understand by it such a force, as participating of order proceeds as it were methodically. * Whose exquisitens, no art, no hand, no opificer can reach to by imitation. For the force of seed is such, that though the bulk of it be very small, yet if it get convenient matter for its nourishment and increase, it so forms and frames things in their several kinds, as that they can partly through their flocks and trunks be nourished, and partly move themselves also, and generate their like. And again; * Sunt qui omnia naturae nemine appellent, ut Epicurus; sed nos, cum dicimus naturâ confiare administrarique mundum, non ita dicimus, ut glebam, aut fragmentum lapidis, aut aëris effusmodi, nulla coherendi natura; sed ut arborum, ut animalia, in quibus nulla temperitas, sed ordo appareat & artis quædam fimilitudo. There are some, who call all things by the name of nature, as Epicurus; but we, when we say that the world is administered by Nature, do not mean such a nature, as is in clods of earth and pieces of stone, but such as is in a tree or animal, in whose constitution there is no temperity, but order and fimilitude of art. Now, according to these two different notions of nature, the four forementioned forms of Atheism may be again dichotomized after this manner; into such as derive all things from a mere fortuitous and temperarious nature, devoid of all order and methodical-

1 De Legibus. Lib. X. p. 666. Oper,
What Atheists denied, and what

Book I.

ness; and such as deduce the original of things from a certain orderly, regular and artificial, though sensibly nature in matter. The former of which are the Anaximandrian and Democritick Atheisms, the latter the Stoical and Stratonical.

It hath been already observed, that those Atheists, that derive all things from a mere fortuitous principle, as also suppose every thing, besides ἐν ἀπειρο[...] the bare substance of matter or extended bulk, to be generated and corrupted; though they asserted the eternity of matter, yet they could not, agreeably to their own hypothesis, maintain the eternity and incorruptibility of the world. And accordingly hereunto, both the Anaximandrian and Democritick Atheists did conclude the world to be γενόμενον ἄφροτον, such as was at first made, and should be again corrupted. And upon this account, Lucretius concerns himself highly herein, to prove both the novity of the world, and also its future dissolution and extinction, that

Totum nativum mortali corpore conflat.

But instead of the world's eternity, these two sorts of Atheists introduced another paradox, namely an ἄπειρον ἄξομα, an infinity of worlds; and that not only successive, in that space, which this world of ours is conceived now to occupy, in respect of the infinity of past and future time, but also a contemporary infinity of coexistent worlds, at all times, throughout endless and unbounded space.

However it is certain, that some persons atheistically inclined have been always apt to run out another way, and to suppose, that the frame of things, and system of the world, ever was from eternity, and ever will be to eternity, such as now it is, diffenched by a certain orderly and regular, but yet sensibly and unknowing nature. And it is prophesied in scripture, that such Atheists as these should especially abound in the latter days of ours; There shall come in the last days (ἰωκαζίας) atheistical scoffers, walking after their own lusts, and saying, Where is the promise of his coming? For since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation. Which latter words are spoken only according to the received hypothesis of the Jews, the meaning of these Atheists being quite otherwise, that there was neither creation nor beginning of the world; but that things had continued, such as now they are, from all eternity. As appears also from what the Apostle there adds by way of confutation, That they were wilfully ignorant of this, that by the word of God the heavens were of old, and the earth standing out of the water and in the water; and that as the world, that then was, overflowing with water perished, so the heavens and earth, which now are, by the same word are kept in store, and reserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men. And it is evident, that some of these Atheists at this very day march in the garb of enthusiastical religionists, acknowledging no more a God than a Christ without them, and allegorizing the day of judgment and future conflagration into a kind of seemingly mythical, but really atheistical nonsense. These, if they did philosophize, would resolve themselves into one or other of those two hypotheses before mentioned;
CHAP. III. asserted the World's Eternity.

mentioned; either that of one plaitick orderly and methodical, but senfible nature, ruling over the whole univerfe; or else that of the life of matter, making one or other of these two natures to be their only God or Numen; it being sufficiently agreeable to the principles of both these atheiftick hypotheses (and no others) to maintain the world's both antí and post- eternity; yet so as that the latter of them, namely the Hylozoists, admitting a certain mixture of chance together with the life of matter, would suppose, that though the main strokes of things might be preferred the same, and some kind of constant regularity always kept up in the world, yet that the whole mundane system did not in all respects continue the same, from eternity to eternity, without any variation. But as Strabo tells us, that Strato Physicus Strab. 1. 1. maintaine'd, the Euxine sea at first to have had no outlet by Byzantium into the Mediterranean, but that by the continual running in of rivers into it, causing it to overflow, there was in length of time a passage opened by the Propontis and Hellefpond; as also that the Mediterranean sea forced open that passage of the Herculean straits, being a continual Ithmus or neck of land before; that many parts of the present continent were before sea, as also much of the present ocean habitable land: so it cannot be doubted, but that the same Strato did likewise suppose such kind of alternations and vicissitudes as these, in all the greater parts of the mundane system.

But the Stoical Atheifts, who made the whole world to be dispensed by one orderly and plaitick nature, might very well, and agreeably to their own hypothesis, maintain, besides the world's eternity, one constant and invariable course or tenor of things in it, as Plinius Secundus doth, who, if he were any thing, seems to have been one of these Atheifts; Mundum Nat. H 1 2. & hec quod nomine alias calum appellare libuit, (cujus circumflexu reguntur c. 1. cumea) Numen esse, credi par est, eternum, immensum, neque genitum, neque interitutum—Idem rerum natura opus, & rerum ipsa natura. The world, and that which by another name is called the heavens, by whose circum- guration all things are governed, ought to be believed to be a Numen, eternal, immensu, such as was never made, and shall never be destroyed. Where, by the way, it may be again observed, that those Atheifts, who denied a God, according to the true notion of him, as a conscious, understanding being, presiding over the whole world, did notwithstanding look upon either the world itself, or else a mere senfible plaitick nature in it, as a kind of Numen or Deity, they supposing it to be ingenerable and incorruptible. Which fame Pliny, as upon the grounds of the Stoical Atheiftm he maintained against the Anaximandrions and Democriticks the world's eternity and incor- ruptibility; so did he likewise in way of opposition to that ἀρχή νεόμαν, that infinity of worlds of theirs, assert, that there was but one world, and that finite. In like manner we read concerning that famous Stoick Boethus, whom Laeritus affirms to have denied the world to be an animal, (which, according to the language and sense of those times, was all one as to deny a God) that he also maintained, contrary to the received doctrine of the Stoicks, the world's ante-eternity and incorruptibility; Philo in his treatife περὶ ἀνθρώπινας κόσμως, or the incorruptibility of the world, testifying the same of him.

Nevertheless
Atheism Quadripartite, the Book I.

Neverthel'ess it seems, that some of these Stoical Atheists did also agree with the generality of the other Stoical Theists, in supposing a successive infinity of worlds generated and corrupted, by reason of intervening periodical conflagrations; though all dispensed by such a stupid and f编leis nature, as governs plants and trees. For thus much we gather from those words of Seneca before cited, where describing this Atheistical Hypothesis, he tells us, that though the world were a plant, that is, governed by a vegetative or plattick nature, without any animality, yet notwithstanding, ab initio ejus usque ad exitum, &c. it had both a beginning, and will have an end; and from its beginning to its end, all was dispensed by a kind of regular law, even its successive conflagrations too, as well as those inundations or deluges, which have sometimes happened. Which yet they understood after such a manner, as that in these several revolutions and successive circuits or periods of worlds, all things should be διχαίλακλα, exactly alike, to what had been infinitely before, and should be again infinitely afterwards. Of which more elsewhere.

XXXIV. This quadripartite Atheism, which we have now represented, is the kingdom of darkness divided, or labouring with an intestine seditious war in its own bowels, and thereby destroying itself. Infomuch that we might well have ourselves the labour of any further confusion of Atheism, merely by committing these several forms of Atheism together, and dashing them one against another, they opposing and contradicting each other, no lesss than they do Theism itself. For first, those two pairs of Atheisms, on the one hand the Anaximandrian and Democritic, on the other the Stoical and Stratonical, do absolutely destroy each other; the former of them supposing the first principle of all things to be stupid matter devoid of all manner of life, and contending that all life as well as other qualities is generable and corruptible, or a mere accidental thing, and looking upon the plattick life of nature as a fitment or phantastick capricio, a thing almost as formidable and altogether as impossible as a Deity; the other, on the contrary, founding all upon this principle, that there is a life and natural perception essential to matter, ingenerable and incorruptible, and contending it to be utterly impossible to give any account of the phenomena of the world, the original of motion, the orderly frame and disposition of things, and the nature of animals, without this fundamental life of nature.

Again, the single Atheisms belonging to each of these several pairs quarrel as much also between themselves. For the Democritic Atheism explodes the Anaximandrian qualities and forms, demonstrating that the natural production of such entities out of nothing, and the corruption of them again into nothing, is of the two rather more impossible than a divine creation and annihilation. And on the other side, the Anaximandrian Atheist plainly discovers, that when the Democriticks and Atomicks have spent all their fury against these qualities and forms, and done what they can to solve the phenomena of nature without them another way, themselves do notwithstanding like drunken men reel and stagger back into them, and
and are unavoidably necessitated at last to take up their sanctuary in them.

In like manner, the Stoical and Stratonical Atheists may as effectually undo and confute each other; the former of them urging against the latter, that beside that prodigious absurdity of making every atom of senseless matter infallibly wise or omnicient, without any consciousness, there can be no reason at all given by the Hylozoists, why the matter of the whole universe might not as well confpire and confederate together into one, as all the single atoms that compound the body of any animal or man; or why one conscious life might not as well result from the totum of the former, as of the latter; by which means the whole world would become an animal or God. Again, the latter contending, that the Stoical or Cosmo-platick Atheist can pretend no reason, why the whole world might not have one sentient and rational, as well as one platick soul in it, that is, as well be an animal as a plant: Moreover, that the sentient souls of brute animals, and the rational souls of men, could never possibly emerge out of one single, platick and vegetative soul in the whole universe: And lastly, that it is altogether as impossible, that the whole world should have life in it, and yet none of its parts have any life of their own, as that the whole world should be white or black, and yet no part of it have any whiteness or blackness at all in it: And therefore that the Stoical Atheists, as well as the Stoical Theists, do both alike deny incorporeal substance but in words only, whilst they really admit the thing itself; because one and the same life, ruling over all the distant parts of the corporeal universe, must needs be an incorporeal substance, it being all in the whole, and all acting upon every part, and yet none of it in any part by itself; for then it would be many, and not one. From all which it may be concluded, that Atheism is a certain strange kind of monster, with four heads, that are all of them perpetually biting, tearing, and devouring one another.

Now though these several forms of Atheism do mutually destroy each other, and none of them be really considerable or formidable in itself, as to any strength of reason which it hath; yet as they are compared together among themselves, so some of them may be more considerable than the rest. For first, as the qualities and forms of the Anaximandrian Atheist, supposed to be really distinct from the substances, are things unintelligible in themselves; so he cannot, with any colour or pretence of reason, maintain the natural production of them out of nothing, and the reduction of them again into nothing, and yet withstand a divine creation and annihilation, as an impossibility. Moreover, the Anaximandrian Atheism is as it were swallowed up into the Democritick, and further improved in it; this latter carrying on the same design, with more seeming artifice, greater plausibility of wit, and a more pompous show of something where indeed there is nothing. Upon which account, it hath for many ages past beaten the Anaximandrian Atheism in a manner quite off the stage, and reigned there alone. So
that the Democritick or Atomick Atheism seems to be much more con-
derable of the two, than the Anaximandrian or Hylopathian.

Again, as for the two other forms of Atheism, if there were any life at all in matter, as the first and immediate recipient of it, then in reason this must needs be supposed to be after the same manner in it, that all other corporeal qualities are in bodies, so as to be divisible together with it, and some of it be in every part of the matter; which is according to the hypothesis of the Hylozoists. Whereas on the contrary the Stoical Atheists supposing one life only in the whole mass of matter, after such a manner, as that none of the parts of it by themselves should have any life of their own, do thereby, no less than the Stoical Theists, make this life of theirs to be no corporeal quality or form, but an incorporeal substance; which is to contradict their own hypothesis. From whence we may conclude, that the Cosmo plastick or Stoical Atheism is, of the two, less considerable than the Hylozoick or Stratonical.

Wherefore amongst these four forms of Atheism, that have been pro-
pounded, these two, the Atomick or Democritick, and the Hylozoick or Stratonical are the chief. The former of which, namely the Democritick Atheism, admitting a true notion of body, that (according to the doctrine of the first and most ancient Atomists) it is nothing but resisting bulk de-
void of all manner of life; yet because it takes for granted, that there is no other substance in the world besides body, does therefore conclude, that all life and understanding in animals and men is generated out of dead and stupid matter, though not as qualities and forms (which is the Anaximandrian way) but as resulting from the contexts of atoms, or some peculiar com-
poition of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions; and consequently that they are themselves really nothing else but local motion and mechanizm: which is a thing, that some time since was very pertinently and judiciously both observed and perstringed by the learned author of the Exercitatio Epidstolica, now a reverend bishop. But the latter, namely the Hylozoick, though truly acknowledging on the contrary, that life, cogitation and un-
derstanding are entities really distinct from local motion and mechanizm, and that therefore they cannot be generated out of dead and stupid matter, but must needs be somewhere in the world, originally, essentially, and fund-
damentally; yet because they take it also for granted, that there is no other substance besides matter, do thereupon adulterate the notion of matter or body, blending and confounding it with life, as making them but two inade-
quate conceptions of substance, and concluding that all matter and sub-
fstance, as such, hath life and perception or understanding natural and in-
conscious essentially belonging to it; and that sense and conscious reason or understanding in animals arises only from the accidental modification of this fundamental life of matter by organization.

2 Dr. Selb Ward, Savilian Professor of successively Bishop of Exeter and Salisbury. Astronomy in the University of Oxford; and
CHAP. III. Of which the Atomick most considerable.

We conclude therefore, that if these two Atheiftick hypotheses, which are found to be the most considerable, be once confuted, the reality of all Atheifm will be ipso facto confuted; there being indeed nothing more requisite to a thorough confutation of Atheifm, than the proving of these two things; first, that life and understanding are not essential to matter as such; and secondly, that they can never possibly rife out of any mixture or modification of dead and stupid matter whatsoever. The reason of which affirmation is, because all Atheifts, as was before observed, are mere Corporealists, of which there can be but these two forts; either such as make life to be essential to matter, and therefore to be ingenerable and incorruptible; or else such as suppose life and every thing besides ἀν ἄνωθεν, the bare substance of matter, or extended bulk, to be merely accidental, generable or corruptible, as rising out of some mixture or modification of it. And as the proving of these two things will overthrow all Atheifm, so it will likewise lay a clear foundation, for the demonstrating of a Deity distinct from the corporeal world.

XXXV. Now that life and perception, or understanding, should be essential to matter as such, or that all sensless matter should be perfectly and infallibly wise (though without consciousness) as to all its own congruities and capabilities, which is the doctrine of the Hylozoists; this, I lay, is an hypothesis so prodigiously paradoxical, and so outrageously wild, as that very few men ever could have atheiftick faith enough, to swallow it down and digest it. Wherefore this Hylozoick Atheifm hath been very obscure ever since its first emersion, and hath found so few fautors and abettors, that it hath looked like a forlorn and deserted thing. Neither indeed are there any publisk monuments at all extant, in which it is avowedly maintained, stated and reduced into any system. Infomuch that we should not have taken any notice of it at this time, as a particular form of Atheifm, nor have conjured it up out of its grave, had we not understood, that Strato's ghost had begun to walk of late; and that among some well-wishers to Atheifm, despairing in a manner of the Atomick form, this Hylozoick hypothesis began already to be looked upon, as the rising sun of Atheifm,

Et tanquam spes altera Troja, it seeming to smile upon them, and flatter them at a distance, with some fairer hopes of supporting that ruinous and desperate cause.

Whereas on the contrary, that other Atomick Atheifm, as it inflicteth upon a true notion of body, that it is nothing but resifting bulk; by which means we, joining issue thereupon, shall be fairly conducted on to a clear decision of this present controversy, as likewise to the disentangling of many other points of philosophy; so it is that, which hath filled the world with the noise of it, for two thousand years past; that, concerning which several volumes have been formerly written, in which it hath been flated and brought into a kind of system; and which hath of late obtained a resurrection amongst us, together with the Atomick physiologic, and been recommended
to the world anew, under a specious shew of wit and profound philosophy.

Wherefore, as we could not here insist upon both these forms of Atheifm together, because that would have been to confound the language of Atheifts, and to have made them, like the Cadmean off-spring, to do immediate execution upon themselves; so we were in all reason obliged to make our first and principal assault upon the Atomick Atheifm, as being the only considerable, upon this account, because it is that alone, which publickly confronts the world, and like that proud uncircumcised Philifrine, openly defies the hofts of the living God; intending nevertheless in the clofe of this whole difcourfe, (that is, the laft book) where we are to determine the right intellectual fystem of the univerfe, and to affer a incorporeal Deity, to demonstrate, that life, cogitation and understanding do not essentially belong to matter, and all fubfance as fuch, but are the peculiar attributes and characterifticks of fubfance incorporeal.

XXXVI. However, fince we have now started these several forms of Atheifm, we fhall not in the mean time neglect any of them neither. For in the anfwer to the second atheiftick ground, we fhall confume them all together at once, as agreeing in this one fundamental principle, That the originall of all things in the univerfe is fenselss matter, or matter devoid of all animality or conscious life. In the reply to the fourth atheiftick argumentation, we fhall briefly hint the grounds of reafon, from which incorporeal fubfance is demonstrated. In the examination of the fifth, we fhall confume the Anaximandrian Atheifm there propounded, which is, as it were, the firft fciography and rude delineation of Atheifm. And in the confutation of the firft, we fhall fhew, how the ancient Atomick Atheifts did pre-ventively overthrow the foundation of Hylozoifm. Besides all which, in order to a fuller and more thorough confutation, both of the Cosmo-plaffick and Hylozoick Atheifts, we fhall in this very place take occasion to infift largely upon the plaffick life of nature, giving in the firft place a true account of it; and then afterwards fhewing, how grofsly it is mis-understood, and the pretence of it abused by the afferters of both thefe Atheiftick hypothefes. The heads of which larger digreffion, because they could not be fo conveniently inferted in the contents of the chapter, fhall be repreffented to the reader’s view at the end of it.

XXXVII. For we think fit here to obferve, that neither the Cosmo-plaffick or Stoical, nor the Hylozoick or Stratonical Atheifts are therefore condemned by us, because they suppose such a thing as a plaffick nature, or life distinct from the animal; albeit this be not only exploded, as an absolute non-entity, by the Atomick Atheifts, who might possibly be afraid of it, as that which approached too near to a Deity, or else would hazard the introducing of it; but also utterly discarded by some profeffed Theifts of later times, who might notwithstanding have an undiscerned tang of the Mechanick Atheifm, hanging about them, in that their fo confident
confident rejecting of all final and intending causality in nature, and admitting of no other causes of things, as philosophical, save the material and mechanical only; this being really to banish all mental, and consequently divine causality, quite out of the world; and to make the whole world to be nothing else, but a mere heap of dust, fortuitously agitated, or a dead cadaverous thing, that hath no signatures of mind and understanding, counsel and wisdom at all upon it; nor indeed any other vitality acting in it, than only the production of a certain quantity of local motion, and the conservation of it according to some general laws; which things the Democritick Atheists take for granted, would all be as they are, though there were no God. And thus Aristotle describes this kind of Dr. Cael. I. 2. philosophy, that it made the whole world to consist, ἐν σωμάτων μόνον, τοῖς φυσικοῖς, φιλολογία, and ἰδίω τριβοι, ἐπειδὴ γίνονται, of nothing but bodies and matter. Tom. I. nads (that is, atoms or small particles of matter) only ranged and disposed Oper.] together into such an order, but altogether dead and inanimate.

2. For unless there be such a thing admitted as a plastick nature, that acts ἐνεργῶς τῷ, for the sake of something, and in order to ends, regularly, artificially and methodically, it seems, that one or other of these two things must be concluded; that either in the efformation and organization of the bodies of animals, as well as the other phenomena, every thing comes to pass fortuitously, and happens to be as it is, without the guidance and direction of any mind or understanding; or else, that God himself doth all immediately, and, as it were with his own hands, form the body of every gnat and fly, insect and mite, as of other animals in generations, all whose members have so much of contrivance in them, that Galen professed he could never enough admire that artifice, which was in the leg of a fly, (and yet he would have admired the wisdom of nature more, had he been but acquainted with the use of microscopes:) I say, upon supposition of no plastick nature, one or other of these two things must be concluded; because it is not conceived by any, that the things of nature are all thus administered, with such exact regularity and constancy every where, merely by the wisdom, providence, and efficiency of those inferior spirits, demons or angels. As also, though it be true, that the works of nature are deepened by a divine law and command, yet this is not to be understood in a vulgar sense, as if they were all effected by the mere force of a verbal law or outward command, because inanimate things are not commendable nor governable by such a law. And therefore besides the divine will and pleasure, there must needs be some other immediate agent and executioner provided, for the producing of every effect; since not so much as a stone, or other heavy body, could at any time fall downward, merely by the force of a verbal law, without any other efficient cause; but either God himself must immediately impel it, or else there must be some other subordinate cause in nature for that motion. Wherefore the divine law and command, by which the things of nature are administered, must be conceived to be the real appointment of some energetick, effectual, and operative cause for the production of every effect.
3. Now to assert the former of these two things, that all the effects of nature come to pass by material and mechanical necessity, or the mere fortuitous motion of matter, without any guidance or direction, is a thing no less irrational than it is impious and atheistical. Not only because it is utterly unconceivable and imposible, that such infinite regularity and artificialness, as is every where throughout the whole world, should constantly result out of the fortuitous motion of matter; but also because there are many such particular phænomena in nature, as do plainly transcend the powers of mechanism, of which therefore no sufficient mechanical reasons can be devised, as the motion of respiration in animals: as there are also other phænomena, that are perfectly cros to the laws of mechanism; as for example, that of the distant poles of the æquator and ecliptick, which we shall insist upon afterward. Of both which kinds there have been other instances proposed by my learned friend Dr. More, in his Euchiridion Metaphysicum, and very ingeniously improved by him to this very purpose, namely to evince, that there is something in nature besides mechanism, and consequently substance incorporeal.

Moreover, those Theists, who philosophize after this manner, by resolving all the corporeal phenomena into fortuitous mechanism, or the necessary and unguided motion of matter, make God to be nothing else in the world, but an idle spectator of the various results of the fortuitous and necessary motions of bodies; and render his wisdom altogether useless and insignificant, as being a thing wholly inclosed and shut up within his own breast, and not at all acting abroad upon any thing without him.

Furthermore, all such Mechanists as these, whether Theists or Atheists, do, according to that judicious censure passed by Aristote long since upon Democritus, but substitute as it were ἄριστος ξυλόν τιλίνων, a carpenter’s or artificer’s wooden hand, moved by strings and wires, instead of a living hand. They make a kind of dead and wooden world, as it were a carved statue, that hath nothing neither vital nor magical at all in it. Whereas to those, who are considerative, it will plainly appear, that there is a mixture of life or plaffick nature, together with mechanism, which runs through the whole corporeal universe.

And whereas it is pretended, not only that all corporeal phænomena may be sufficiently solved mechanically, without any final, intending and directive causality, but also that all other reason of things in nature, besides the material and mechanical, are altogether unphilosophical, the same Aristote ingeniously exposes the ridiculousness of this pretence after this manner; telling us, that it is just as if a carpenter, joiner, or carver should give this account, as the only satisfactory, of any artificial fabrick or piece of carved imagery, ὅτι ἰματίους τῷ ὑδάτῳ τοῦ μὲν καθολο ἑγίνατο τὸ δε ἵππον, that because the instruments, axes and hatchets, plains and chisels, happened to fall so and so upon the timber, cutting it here and there,
that therefore it was hollow in one place, and plain in another, and the
like; and by that means the whole came to be of such a form. For is it not
altogether as absurd and ridiculous, for men to undertake to give an
account of the formation and organization of the bodies of animals, by
mere fortuitous mechanism, without any final or intending cause,
as why there was an heart here, and brains there; and why the heart had
so many and such different valves in the entrance and outlet of its ven-
tricles; and why all the other organick parts, veins and arteries, nerves
and muscles, bones and cartilages, with the joints and members, were
of such a form? Because forsooth, the fluid matter of the seed happened to
move so and so in several places, and thereby to cause all those dif-
ferences, which are also diverse in different animals; all being the necessary
result of a certain quantity of motion at first indifferently impressed upon
the small particles of the matter of this univerfe turned round in a
vortex. But, as the same Arifiole adds, no carpenter or artificer is so sim-
ple, as to give such an account as this, and think it satisfactory, but he will
rather declare, that himself directed the motion of the instruments, after
such a manner, and in order to such ends: *βιοτον οὐ τίθην, οὐ γὰρ ίκατον ίσως. *De Part.
αὐτῷ, τὸ τοσοῦτον εἶπεν, ὅτι ἢπαντὸς τῶν ὀργάνων, &c. ἀλλὰ διότι τὸν πληγὰ ἐπικίνδυνον ἄν
τοιχίων, καὶ τοῖς ἱηκαί, ἱπτὶ τὴν ἀίδων, ὅποις τοιχίς δὴ τοιχίκως τὴν μορφὴν γένηται.
A carpenter would give a better account than so, for he would not think it
sufficient to say, that the fabrick came to be of such a form, because the in-
struments happened to fall so and so, but he will tell you that it was because
himself made such strokes, and that he directed the instruments and determined
their motion after such a manner, to this end that he might make the whole a
fabrick fit and useful for such purposes. And this is to affign the final
cause. And certainly there is fearcely any man in his wits, that will not ac-
knowledge the reason of the different valves in the heart from the apparent
usefulness of them, according to those particular structures of theirs, to be
more satisfactory, than any, which can be brought from mere fortuitous me-
chanism, or the unguided motion of the seminal matter.

4. And as for the latter part of the disjunction, that every thing in na-
ture should be done immediately by God himself; this, as, according to
vulgar apprehension, it would render divine Providence operose, licentious
and distractions, and thereby make the belief of it to be entertained with
greater difficulty, and give advantage to Atheists; so, in the judgment of
the writer de mondo, it is not so decorous in respect of God neither, that he
should autogenen apouata, let his own hand, as it were, to every work, and
immediately do all the meanest and triflingest things himself drudgingly,
without making use of any inferior and subordinate instruments. *Εἰπεῖ* Cap. 7.
ἀπεμνοῦν εὖ αὐτὸ ποιεῖν Περσῶν αὐτογενῆν ἀπαχτα, ηδὶ διάτελεν ἐν βύλινο, ηδὶ ιδεῖς ἀριστεῖν
ἠαινεῖν, πολὶ μᾶλλον ἀπετής ἀν ἤν τῷ θεῷ. Σεμανθέροι ηδὶ προεσωθέρον τῷ
ἀναμια κατ᾽ ἐν τῷ σύμπαντος καίμαν ἀνακαίν, ἵλιον τε καὶ νεὶν ηδὶ σκληρυν, &c. If it
were not congruous in respect of the state and majesty of Xerxes the great
King of Perlia, that he should condescend to do all the meanest offices himself;

* Vide Cartes. Libr. de Homine, & de Formacione Perse.
much less can this be thought decorous in respect of God. But it seems far more
august, and becoming of the Divine Majesty, that a certain power and virtue,
derived from him, and passing through the universe, should move the sun and
moon, and be the immediate cause of those lesser things done here upon earth.

Moreover, it seems not so agreeable to reason neither, that nature, as a
distinct thing from the Deity, should be quite superceded or made to signify
nothing, God himself doing all things immediately and miraculously; from
whence it would follow also, that they are all done either forcibly and vio-
lently, or else artificially only, and none of them by any inward principle
of their own.

Lastly; This opinion is further confuted by that slow and gradual process,
that is in the generations of things, which would seem to be but a vain and
idle pomp, or a trilling formality, if the agent were omnipotent: as also by
those ἀμφίβητος (as Aristotle calls them) those errors and bungles, which
are committed, when the matter is inept and contumacious; which argue
the agent not to be irrefistible, and that nature is such a thing, as is not al-
together incapable (as well as human art) of being sometimes frustrated
and disappointed, by the indisposition of matter. Whereas an omnipotent
agent, as it could dispatch its work in a moment, so it would always do it
infallibly and irrefistibly; no ineptitude or obstinacy of matter being
ever able to hinder such a one, or make him bungle or fumble in any thing.

5. Wherefore since neither all things are produced fortuitously, or by the
unguided mechanism of matter, nor God himself may reasonably be thought
to do all things immediately and miraculously; it may well be concluded,
that there is a platick nature under him, which, as an inferior and subordi-
nate instrument, doth drudgingly execute that part of his providence, which
consists in the regular and orderly motion of matter; yet so as that there is
also, besides this, a higher providence to be acknowledged, which presiding
over it, doth often supply the defects of it, and sometimes over-rule it; for
as much as this platick nature cannot act electively, nor with discretion.
And by this means the wisdom of God will not be shot up nor concluded
wholly within his own breast, but will display itself abroad, and print its
stamps and signatures everywhere throughout the world; so that God, as
Plato 1 (after Orpheus 2) speaks, will be not only the beginning and end,
but also the middle of all things; they being as much to be ascribed to his
causality, as if himself had done them all immediately, without the concur-
rent instrumentality of any subordinate natural cause. Notwithstanding
which, in this way it will appear also to human reason, that all things are
dispersed and ordered by the Deity, without any solicitous care or difica-
tious providence.

And indeed those mechanick Theists, who rejecting a platick nature,
affect to concern the Deity as little as is possible in mundane affairs, either:
for fear of debasing him, and bringing him down to too mean offices, or else

1 De Legibus, Lib. IV. p. 600. Oper. 2 Vide Apuleium de Mundo, p. 25.
of subjecting him to solicitous incumbrance, and for that cause would have God to contribute nothing more to the mundane system and oeconomy, than only the first impressing of a certain quantity of motion upon the matter, and the after-conserving of it, according to some general laws: these men (I say) seem not very well to understand themselves in this. For as much as they must of necessity, either suppose these their laws of motion to execute themselves, or else be forced perpetually to concern the Deity in the immediate motion of every atom of matter throughout the universe, in order to the execution and observation of them. The former of which being a thing plainly absurd and ridiculous, and the latter that, which these philosophers themselves are extremely abhorrent from, we cannot make any other conclusion than this, that they do but unskilfully and unawares establish that very thing, which in words they oppose: and that their laws of nature concerning motion are really nothing else, but a plattick nature, acting upon the matter of the whole corporeal universe, both maintaining the same quantity of motion always in it, and also dispensing it (by transferring it out of one body into another) according to such laws, fatally impressed upon it. Now if there be a plattick nature, that governs the motion of matter every where, according to laws, there can be no reason given, why the same might not also extend farther to the regular disposal of that matter, in the formation of plants, and animals, and other things, in order to that apt coherent frame and harmony of the whole universe.

6. And as this plattick nature is a thing, which seems to be in itself most reasonable, so hath it also had the suffrage of the best philosophers in all ages. For first, it is well known, that Aristotle concerns himself in nothing more zealously than this, that mundane things are not effected merely by the necessary and unguided motion of matter, or by fortuitous mechanism, but by such a nature as acts regularly and artificially for ends; yet so as that this nature is not the highest principle neither, or the supreme Numen, but subordinate to a perfect mind or intellect; he affirming, that μετ' αυτοῦ ἔσται τὸ πάντοτε, that Mind together with nature was the cause of this universe, and that heaven and earth, plants and animals, were framed by them both; that is, by Mind as the principal and directive cause, but by nature as a subservient or executive instrument: and elsewhere joining in like manner God and nature both together, as when he concludes, That God and nature do nothing in vain.

Neither was Aristotle the first broacher or inventor of this doctrine, Plato before him having plainly asserted the same. For in a passage already cited, he affirms, that nature together with reason, and according to it, orders all things; thereby making nature, as a distinct thing from the Deity, to be a subordinate cause under the reason and wisdom of it. And elsewhere he resolves, that there are έν θεῷ τέλειον, οὐκ οὐκ θεὶς, certain causes of a wise and artificial nature, which the Deity makes as subser- vient to itself; as also, that there are ἔνατικα τοῖς θεογονίς, causes, which God makes use of, as subordinately co-operative with himself.

Moreover,
Moreover, before Plato, Empedocles philosophized also in the same manner, when supposing two worlds, the one archetypal, the other ectypal, he made φίλις and νείκις, friendship and discord, to be the ἀέρι ἀρκτής, the active principle and immediate operator in this lower world; he not understanding thereby, as Plutarch and some others have conceived, two substantial principles in the world, the one of good, the other of evil, but only a plastick nature, as Aristate in sundry places intimates: which he called by that name, partly because he apprehended, that the result and upshot of nature in all generations and corruptions amounted to nothing more than mixtures and separations, or concretion and secretion of pre-existent things; and partly because this plastick nature is that, which doth reconcile the contrarieties and enmities of particular things, and bring them into one general harmony in the whole. Which latter is a notion, that Plotinus, describing this very seminary reason or plastick nature of the world, (though taking it in something a larger sense than we do in this place) doth ingeniouly pursue after this manner; Ἀρίστας δὲ ἀλλὰς τὰ μὲν, χω τοιούτου ἵνα, πολεµίων ης μάχης σύγκειν χή γένους ἐλεγάκτω, διὸ γενώς ἤν τῶν τινὸς παρ᾽ ἔλθῃ, καὶ μή λὺν εἰπεν, γενεμῶν γὰρ οὐκ ἕτοι τοὺς μέσης πολεµίων, ὅπως τοίς, χώ φίλον, ὡσπερ δ᾽ ἐν διάματος λόγοι εἰς, ό το διάματος ἱκετω, εἴχων καὶ αὐτῶν πολλαὶ μάχαις τὸ μὲν ἐν διάματα τὰ μεµαχημένα, οὐν τίς μίας ἀρµενίας, ἢν σύμφωνον—καὶ ταῦτα ἦν τὰς τῆς αρµενίας τῇ ἐν μαχημένων εἰκάσει. The seminary reason or plastick nature of the universe, opposing the parts to one another, and making them severally indigent, produces by that means war and contention. And therefore though it be one, yet notwithstanding it consists of different and contrary things. For there being hostility in its parts, it is nevertheless friendly and agreeable in the whole; after the same manner as in a dramatick poem, clashings and contentions are reconciled into one harmony. And therefore the seminary and plastick nature of the world may fitly be resembled to the harmony of disagreeing things. Which Plotinick doctrine may well pass for a commentary upon Empedocles, accordingly as Simplicius briefly repreffets his sense, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δ᾽ οὐκ οὐσίας λογοτρικίας, τοῦ μὲν ζῷαλον ἄξονον, τοῦ δὲ ἔναρχον μαχαίριον καὶ ἀλληλόν, ἂς τῷ τῶν κόσμων τῷ ἐναντίον ὀλιγοχρῶν ἐχαστὸν οὐκ ἀλλὰ ἄλλατον ἔτεκε οὕνε τούτου Ἐμπεδοκλῆς makes two worlds, the one united and intelligible, the other divided and sensible; and in this lower sensible world, he takes notice both of unity and discord.

It was before observed, that Heraclitus likewise did affeet a regular and artificial nature, as the fate of things in this lower world; for his reason passing thorough the substance of all things, or ethereal body, which was the seed of the generation of the universe, was nothing but that spermatick or plastick nature which we now speake of. And whereas there is an odd passage of this philosopher’s recorded, ή γὰρ τοῦτον ἐν τῷ τῆς ἑδράς στόχων ἀθραπτῶν ἐπίκειναι, that neither any God nor man made this world, which as it is justly derided by Plutarch for its simplicity, so it looks very atheistically at first sight; yet because Heraclitus hath not been accounted an Atheist, we therefore conceive the meaning of it to have been this, that the world was not made by any whatsoever, after such a manner as an artificer makes an house, by

2 Apud Plutarch. de Animæ Procreat. cx XIV. p. 711.
And as Hippocrates followed Heraclitus in this, (as was before declared,) so did Zeno and the Stoicks also; they supposing, besides an intellectual nature, as the supreme architect and master-builder of the world, another plattick nature as the immediate workman and operator: which plattick nature hath been already described, in the words of Balbus, as a thing, which acts not fortuitously, but regularly, orderly and artificially. And Laerlius tells us, it was defined by Zeno himself after this manner: ἐν τίνι φρεις ἦν τῇ πρώτῃ παγανίᾳ, καθαρὲς ἀριστεῖς καὶ ἀποκλίνας, ὅπως συνήχεον τῇ ἐν αὐτῇ Ζενον., ἀνεμομῆναι χρῶμες, ἢ τοιαύτα δοξαίς ἀπ' οἷον ἀπικροτίν. Nature is a habit moved from itself according to permutative reasons or seminal principles, perfecting and containing those several things, which in determinate times are produced from it, and acting agreeably to that from which it was secreted.

Lastly, as the latter Platonists and Peripateticks have unanimously followed their masters herein, whose vegetative soul also is no other than a plattick nature; so the Chymists and Paracelssians insist much upon the same thing, and seem rather to have carried the notion on further, in the bodies of animals, where they call it by a new name of their own, the Archeus.

Moreover, we cannot but observe here, that, as amongst the ancients they were generally condemned for downright Atheists, who acknowledged no other principle besides body or matter, necceffarily and fortuitously moved, such as Democritus and the first Ionicks; so even Anaxagoras himself, notwithstanding that he was a professed Theist, and plainly affirmed mind to be a principle, yet, because he attributed too much to material necessity, admitting neither this plattick nature nor a mundane soul, was severely censoed, not only by the vulgar, (who unjustly taxed him for an Atheist) but also by Plato and Aristotle, as a kind of spurious and imperfect Theist, and one who had given great advantage to atheism. Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, thus represents his philosophy: Ἀναξαγόρας τε γαρ μνημονέα των τῆς πρός τὸν κοσμότατόν, καὶ ἐπηκούσαν τὸν αἰτίον, ὃς ἀναίκησε ἔτι, τότε ἐλευθερ. [Lib. VII. legm. 148. p. 459.] Anaxagoras, Opera.

Use both mind and intellect, that is, God, as a machine in the Cosmos; and when he is at a loss to give an account of things by material necessity, then, and never but then, does he draw in mind or God to help him out; but otherwise he will rather assign any thing else for a cause than mind. Now, if Aristotle censures Anaxagoras in this manner, though a professed Theist, because he did but seldom make use of a mental cause for the solving of the phenomena of the world, and only then when he was at a loss for other material and mechanical causes (which it seems he sometimes confessed himself to be) what would that philosopher have thought of those our so confident Mechanists of later times, who will never vouchsafe so much as once to
be beholden to God Almighty for any thing in the ooeconomy of the corporeal world, after the first impression of motion upon the matter?

Plato likewise, in his Phaedo, and elsewhere, condemns this Anaxagoras by name for this very thing, that though he acknowledged mind to be a cause, yet he seldom made use of it for solving the phenomena; but in his twelfth de Legibus, he perverting him unnamed, as one who, though a professed Theist, had notwithstanding given great encouragement to atheism, after this manner: 1. Αγνοεῖ πάντα ἀμαρτίαν, ὡς χωρίς φύσεως, ἡν ἀνεξώτερον ἐνιαυτά, ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκομενικῶν παρὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, μεταξύ δὲ τῶν θεών, τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφοράς, ᾧ ἂν ἰσομερής ἔστω, τὸ γὰρ ἐμὲ πρὸ τῶν ὀμαλῶν πάθων, αὐτοὶ ἐφέσον, τὰ καλή ὄρασιν ἱεράμενα, μεταξύ δὲ τῶν θεών, καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφοράς, ἀναμφότερον τὴς μεταξύ τῶν πάντων, ταύτ' ὑπ' τὰ τότε ἐξεισαγωγὴν πολλάς ἀπεικόνισε. Some of them, who had concluded, that it was mind, that ordered all things in the heavens, themselves erring concerning the nature of the soul, and not making that older than the body, have overturned all again; for heavenly bodies being supposed by them to be full of stones, and earth, and other inanimate things, (dispening the causes of the whole universe) they did by this means occasion much atheism and impiety.

Furthermore, the same Plato there tells us, that in those times of his, astronomers and physiologists lay under the prejudice and suspicion of atheism amongst the vulgar, merely for this reason, because they dealt so much in material causes; Οἱ πολλοὶ διακόνουσιν τοὺς τῶν θεῶν μελαχρισμάτων, ἀποφυγόμενοι τὰς μεταξύ τῶν πάντων ἀνάλογας διάφορας, πάντας γὰρ τὰ πάντα, καὶ τὸ θεώτητα τοῦ τῆς τῶν πάντων τιμήματος. The vulgar think, that they, who add to themselves in astronomy and physiology, are made Atheists thereby, they seeing so much as is possible, how things come to pass by material necessities, and being thereby disposed to think them not to be ordered by mind and will, for the sake of good. From whence we may observe, that, according to the natural apprehensions of men in all ages, they, who resolve the phenomena of nature into material necessity, allowing of no final nor mental causality (dispening things in order to ends) have been strongly suspected for friends to atheism.

7. But because some may pretend, that the plastick nature is all one with an occult quality, we shall here show how great a difference there is betwixt these two. For he, that afferts an occult quality for the cause of any phenomenon, does indeed assign no cause at all of it, but only declare his own ignorance of the cause: but he, that afferts a plastick nature, assigns a determinate and proper cause, nay the only intelligible cause, of that which is the greatest of all phenomena in the world, namely the ὅτα ἡ χαλάς, the orderly, regular and artificial frame of things in the universe, whereas the mechanick philosophers, however pretending to solve all phenomena by matter and motion, assign no cause at all. Mind and understanding is the only true cause of orderly regularity; and he that afferts a plastick.
plastick nature, afferts mental causuality in the world; but the fortuitous Mechanists, who exploding final causes, will not allow mind and understanding to have any influence at all upon the frame of things, can never possibly assign any cause of this grand phenomenon, unless confusion may be said to be the cause of order, and fortune or chance of constant regularity; and therefore themselves must resolve it into an occult quality. Nor indeed does there appear any great reason, why such men should assign an infinite mind in the world, since they do not allow it to act any where at all, and therefore must needs make it to be in vain.

8. Now, this plastick nature being a thing, which is not without some difficulty in the conception of it, we shall here endeavour to do these two things concerning it; first, to set down a right representation thereof; and then afterwards to shew, how extremely the notion of it hath been mistaken, perverted and abus'd by those Atheists, who would make it to be the only God almighty, or first principle of all things.

How the plastick nature is in general to be conceived, Aristotle instructs us in these words: 'ειν ειν εν τω ξυλω και κατηγορη ειναι δε τω φυσιν ιναι. If the naupkeical art, that is, the art of the shipwright, were in the timber itself, operatively and essentially, it would there act just as nature doth. And the case is the same for all other arts. If the eccemocolical art, which is in the Oper.] mind of the architect, were supposed to be tranfused into the stones, bricks and mortar, there acting upon them in such a manner as to make them come together of themselves, and range themselves into the form of a complete edifice, as Amphion was said, by his harp, to have made the stones move, and place themselves orderly of their own accord, and so to have built the walls of Thebes; or if the musical art were conceived to be immediately in the instruments and strings, animating them as a living soul, and making them to move exactly, according to the laws of harmony, without any external impulsion: these, and such like instances, in Aristotle's judgment, would be fit iconisms or representations of the plastick nature, being art itself acting immediately upon the matter as an inward principle in it. To which purpose the same philosopher adds, that this thing might be further illustrated by another instance or resemblance, μαλιστα δε διολογον των των αιτησιων αιτησιων, τοιον γαρ ειναι και φυσιν. Nature may be yet more clearly resembled to the medicinal art, when it is employed by the physician in curing himself. So that the meaning of this philosopher is, that nature is to be conceived as art acting not from without and at a distance, but immediately upon the thing itself which is formed by it. And thus we have the first general conception of the plastick nature, that it is art itself, acting immediately on the matter as an inward principle.

9. In the next place, we are to observe, that though the plastick nature be a kind of art, yet there are some considerable preeminences which it hath above human art; the first whereof is this, that whereas human art cannot act upon the matter otherwise than from without and at a distance,
nor communicate itself to it, but with a great deal of tumult and huriarily, noise and clatter, it using hands and axes, saws and hammers, and after this manner with much ado, by knockings and thrullings, slowly introducing its form or idea (as for example of a ship or house) into the materials; nature in the mean time is another kind of art, which insinuating itself immediately into things themselves, and there acting more commandingly upon the matter as an inward principle, does its work easily, cleverly; and silently. Nature is art as it were incorporated and embodied in matter, which doth not act upon it from without mechanically, but from within vitally and magically; ὡς χεῖες ἑνκάθεν, ὡς πόδες, ὡς τι ἐφάύξων ἐπανέφερω ἡ σύμφωνα, ὃς δὲ δεῖ εἴ τις ποιητές, ὡς ἦν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τινὰ κάλλιτε ὄψιν, δεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ μορ-χλεῖον ἄφθελιν ἐκ τῆς φυσικῆς νωτικῆς. ποῖος γὰρ γίνοµοι, ἕτερα ποιητία, &c. Here are no hands, nor feet, nor any instrument, connate, or adventitious, there being only need of matter to work upon, and to be brought into a certain form, and nothing else. For it is manifest that the operation of nature is different from mechanism, it doing not its work by trufition or pulsion, by knockings or thrullings, as if it were without that which it wrought upon. But as God is inward to every thing, so nature acts immediately upon the matter, as an inward and living soul, or law in it.

10. Another preeminence of nature above human art is this, that whereas human artists are often to seek and at a lost, and therefore consult and deliberate, as also, upon second thoughts mend their former work; nature, on the contrary, is never to seek what to do, nor at a lost; and for that reason also (besides another that will be suggested afterwards) it doth never consult nor deliberate. Indeed Arifbold intimates, as if this had been the grand objection of the old atheiftick philosophers against the plafick nature, That because we do not see natural bodies to consult or deliberate, therefore there could be nothing of art, counsel or contrivance in them, but all things came to pass fortuitously. But he confutes it after this manner: Ἀνάγκης δὲ τὸ μὴ οὕσει ἑνκάθεν το γινέσθαι, ἀρδὲ μὴ ἕως τι κυνὸς βελτωθάλων, κατὰ μὲν ἡ τέχνη ἀν ἑρεῖα. It is absurd for men to think nothing to be done for ends, if they do not see that which moves to consult, although art itself doth not consult. Whence he concludes, that nature may act artificially, orderly and methodically, for the sake of ends, though it never consult or deliberate. Indeed human artists themselves do not consult properly as they are artists, but when ever they do it, it is for want of art, and because they are to seek, their art being imperfect and adventitious: but art itself or perfect art is never to seek, and therefore doth never consult or deliberate. And nature is this art, which never hesitates nor studieth, as unresolved what to do, but is always readily prompted; nor does it ever repent afterwards of what it hath formerly done, or go about, as it were upon second thoughts, to alter and mend its former course, but it goes on in one constant unrepenting tenor, from generation to generation, because it is the stamp or impress of that infallibly omniscient art, of the divine understanding, which is the very law and rule of what is simply the best in every thing.
And thus we have seen the difference between nature and human art; that the latter is imperfect art, acting upon the matter from without, and at a distance; but the former is art itself, or perfect art, acting as an inward principle in it. Wherefore when art is laid to imitate nature, the meaning thereof is, that imperfect human art imitates that perfect art of nature, which is really no other than the divine art itself; as before Aristotle, Plato had declared in his Sophist', in these words; τὸ Φεῖ σεληγμέναν ποσεῖδαν ἀπειράτων. Those things, which are said to be done by nature, are indeed done by divine art.

11. Notwithstanding which, we are to take notice in the next place, that as nature is not the Deity itself, but a thing very remote from it, and far below it, so neither is it the divine art, as it is in itself pure and abstract, but concrete and embodied only; for the divine art considered in itself is nothing but knowledge, understanding, or wisdom in the mind of God. Now knowledge and understanding, in its own nature, is certain separate and abstract things, and of so subtle and refined a nature, as that it is not capable of being incorporated with matter, or mingled and blended with it, as the soul of it. And therefore Aristotle's second instance, which he propounds as most pertinent to illustrate this business of nature by, namely of the physician's art curing himself, is not so adequate thereunto; because when the medicinal art cures the physician, in whom it is, it doth not there act as nature, that is, as concrete and embodied art, but as knowledge and understanding only, which is art naked, abstract and un-bodied; as also it doth its work ambiguously, by the physician's willing and prescribing to himself the use of such medicaments, as do but conduct, by removing of impediments, to help that, which is nature indeed, or the inward archæus to effect the cure. Art is defined by Aristotle to be λόγος τοῦ ἔργου, the reason of the thing without matter; and so the divine art or knowledge in the mind of God is un-bodied reason: but nature is ratio meris & confusa, reason immersed and plunged into matter, and as it were fuddled in it, and confounded with it. Nature is not the divine art archetypal, but only cētypal; it is a living stamp or signature of the divine wisdom; which though it act exactly according to its archetype, yet it doth not at all comprehend nor understand the reason of what itself doth. And the difference between these two may be resembled to that between the λόγος ἑτεροτος, the reason of the mind and conception, called verbum mentis; and the λόγος πραγματος, the reason of external speech; the latter of which, though it bear a certain stamp and impress of the former upon it, yet itself is nothing but articulate sound, devoid of all understanding and sense. Or else we may illustrate this business by another similitude, comparing the divine art and wisdom to an architect, but nature to a manuary opifice: the difference betwixt which two is thus set forth by Aristotle pertinently to our purpose; τοῦ ἀρχιτεκτόνου περὶ ἑκατὸν τιμωρίας η ἀρχιτεκτόνου τοιούτου τῶν Κέλτων. And Pet. l. c. 11. Tom IV. p. 168. Oper. Lib. I. Cap I. p. 472. Tom II. Oper. De Partib. Animal.
Nature the Manuary Opificer of Book I.

12. Wherefore as we did before observe the preeminent of nature above human art, so we must here take notice also of the imperfections and defects of it, in which respect it falls short of human art, which are likewise two; and the first of them is this, that though it acts artificially for the sake of ends, yet itself doth neither intend those ends, nor understand the reason of that it doth. Nature is not matter of those confummate art and wisdom, according to which it acts, but only a servant to it, and a drudging executioner of the dictates of it. This difference betwixt natural and abstract art or wisdom is expressed by Plotinus in these words: τι διόικη τὴς λεγομένης Φύσεως Φρονιμίας; ὓπο τῆς μεν Φρονιμίας πρωτοῦ, ὅ ἢ Φύσις ἑκατοστόν ἔδολμα μαθησιῶν Φρονιμίας ἡ Φύσις, ψυχὴ φυσικὰ λεγόμενα ἐκχαλέομεν τούτων ἀλλαμάμαμον λογοῖ ἔχειν. οἷον ἂν ἐν μηρῷ βασίλει, δικαιωτὰ ἐκ οἰκήθου ἐπὶ Θείας ἐν τῇ ἑπτάεις τέσσερα ἐναγγέλλει μεθ᾽ ὁμώς τὰ ἀνω, εἰς ὦν καὶ σιζύκτως τοῦ κατώ, οἷον οὐδὲ οὗτος Φύσις, μὲν οἷον ἂν ποιεῖ. How doth wisdom differ from that, which is called nature? verily in this manner, that wisdom is the first thing, but nature the last and lowest; for nature is but an image or imitation of wisdom, the last thing of the soul, which hath the lowest impress of reason shining upon it; as when a thick piece of wax is thoroughly impressed upon by a seal, that impress, which is clean and distinct in the superior superficies of it, will in the lower hide be weak and obscure; and such is the stamp and signature of nature, compared with that of wisdom and understanding, nature being a thing, which doth only do, but not know. And elsewhere the same writer declares the difference between the sphenmatick ὁμοίων, or reasons, and knowledges or conceptions of the mind in this manner: Πόσω εἰς οἷον ἱέριμον αὐτοὶ οἱ ἡμῖν ψυχὴν νοηματὸς; ἀλλὰ πως κατὰ τα ψυχὴν νοηματὸς; ἢ γὰρ λόγος ἐν ὑπο ποιεῖ, ηθος τὸ ποιητικοῖς, οὐ τοὺς, οὐδὲ ἐκ τοῖς ἐκ τινὸς ἔκ τοῦ τούτων, ἀλλὰ ἐκ τῶν τοῖς, ἀλλὰ ἐν τις τοιοῦτος τοιοῦτος, ἐκ τοῦτος τῶν, ἐκ τοῦτος τῶν. Whether are these plastick reasons or forms in the soul knowledges? but how shall it then be, according to those knowledges? for the plastick reason or form acts or works in matter, and that which acts naturally is not intellection nor vision, but a certain power of moving matter, which doth not know, but only do, and makes as it were a stamp or figure in water.

And with this doctrine of the ancients, a modern judicious writer and sagacious inquirer into nature seems fully to agree, that nature is such a thing as doth not know, but only do: for after he had admired that wildom and art, by which the bodies of animals are framed, he concludes, that one or other

other of these two things must needs be acknowledged, that either the vegetative or plastick power of the soul, by which it fabricates and organizes its own body, is more excellent and divine than the rational; or else, in nature. Harv. de operibus neque prudentiam nec intelleclum inesse, sed ita solum videri conceptui nostro, qui secundum artes nostras & facultates, seu exemplaria à nobismetipsis mutuata, de rebus nature divinis judicamus, quasi principia nature activa effectus sios eo modo producere, quo nos operamur artificialia solemus: That in the works of nature there is neither prudence nor understanding, but only it seems so to our apprehensions, who judge of these divine things of nature according to our own arts and faculties, and patterns borrowed from ourselves; as if the active principles of nature did produce their effects in the same manner as we do our artificial works. Therefore we conclude, agreeably to the sense of the best philosophers, both ancient and modern, that nature is such a thing, as though it act artificially, and for the sake of ends, yet it doth but ape and mimick the divine art and wisdom, itself not understanding those ends which it acts for, nor the reason of what it doth in order to them; for which cause also it is not capable of consultation or deliberation, nor can it act electively, or with discretion.

But because this may seem strange at the first sight, that nature should be said to act ουκετώς, for the sake of ends, and regularly or artificially, and yet be itself devoid of knowledge and understanding, we shall therefore endeavour to persuade the possibility, and facilitate the belief of it, by some other instances; and first by that of habits, particularly those musical ones of singing, playing upon instruments, and dancing. Which habits direct every motion of the hand, voice, and body, and prompt them readily, without any deliberation or studied consideration, what the next following note or motion should be. If you jog a sleeping musician, and sing but the first words of a song to him, which he had either himself composed, or learnt before, he will presently take it from you, and that perhaps before he is thoroughly awake, going on with it, and singing out the remainder of the whole song to the end. Thus the fingers of an exercised lutanist, and the legs and whole body of a skilful dancer, are directed to move regularly and orderly, in a long train and series of motions, by those artificial habits in them, which do not themselves at all comprehend those laws and rules of music or harmony, by which they are governed. So that the same thing may be said of these habits, which was said before of nature, that they do not know, but only do. And thus we see there is no reason why this plastick nature (which is supposed to move body regularly and artificially) should be thought to be an absolute impossibility, since habits do, in like manner, gradually evolve themselves in a long train or series of regular and artificial motions, readily prompting the doing of them, without comprehending that art and reason, by which they are directed. The forementioned philosopher illustrates the seminary reason and plastick nature of the univerfe, by this very instance: η τούτω δεύτερα αὐτής τεχνική. En. 3. 1. 2. ὅπερ ἃν ὁ ἄρχων ἡμῶν, κυριότερόν εἰπ. ὁ γὰρ ἄρχων ἔτι οὐδὲν τεχνικὴ ἔστω τοιαύτης. Εἰς τοῦτον τεχνικὰ δεικτέον ἀπε. 16. τοίς, ἢ τὰ τέχνη αὐτῶν κυρίω, ἢ οὕτω κυρίω, ἢ τίς ζῆς αὐτῆς τοιαύτης ποιούσα, The energy of Oper.
of nature is artificial, as when a dancer moves; for a dancer resembles this artificial life of nature, forasmuch as art itself moves him, and so moves him as being such a life in him. And agreeably to this conceit, the ancient mythologists represented the nature of the univerfe by Pan playing upon a pipe or harp, and being in love with the nymph Echo; as if nature did, by a kind of silent melody, make all the parts of the univerfe every where dance in measure and proportion, itself being as it were in the mean time delighted and ravished with the re-echoing of its own harmony. Habits are laid to be an adventitious and acquired nature, and nature was before defined by the Stoicks to be τέχνη, or a habit: so that there seems to be no other difference between these two, than this, that whereas the one is acquired by teaching, industry and exercise; the other, as was expressed by Hippocrates, ἀυτοφάκτος δέ οὐκ ἀναδόουσα, unlearned and untaught, and may in some sense also be laid to be αὐτόπαιδευτός, self-taught, though the be indeed always inwardly prompted, secretly whispered into, and inspired by the divine art and wisdom.

14. Moreover, that something may act artificially and for ends, without comprehending the reason of what it doth, may be further evinced from those natural instincts that are in animals, which without knowledge direct them to act regularly, in order both to their own good, and the good of the univerfe. As for example; the bees in mellification, and in framing their combs and hexagonal cells, the spiders in spinning their webs, the birds in building their nests, and many other animals in such like actions of theirs, which would seem to argue a great sagacity in them, whereas notwithstanding, as Aristotle observes, οὗτοι τινοι, οὗτοι ζωονικα, οὗτοι βελευσάμενα ποιεῖν. They do these things, neither by art, nor by counsel, nor by any deliberation of their own; and therefore are not masters of that wisdom, according to which they act, but only passive to the instincts and impresses thereof upon them. And indeed to affirm, that brute animals do all these things by a knowledge of their own, and which themselves are masters of, and that without deliberation and consultation, were to make them to be endued with a most perfect intellect, far transcending that of human reason; whereas it is plain enough, that brutes are not above consultation, but below it, and that these instincts of nature in them are nothing but a kind of fate upon them.

15. There is in the next place another imperfection to be observed in the platlick nature, that as it doth not comprehend the reason of its own action, so neither is it clearly and expressly conscious of what it doth; in which respect, it doth not only fall short of human art, but even of that very manner of acting, which is in brutes themselves, who though they do not understand the reason of those actions, that their natural instincts lead them to, yet they are generally conceived to be conscious of them, and to do them by fancy; whereas
whereas the plastick nature in the formation of plants and animals seems to have no animal fancy, no express συνειδησις, con-jence or consciousness of what it doth. Thus the often commended philosopher, η Φυσις ου δε Ψυκτικα εκμα, η δε ιδιας Φαντασιας ισελεως, Φαντασια δε μεταξε Φυσις τουσ αη σουσιως η μειν Επ. 4. L. 4. γε ουλινιν αναπληκτιν ουδε σουνιν εχει. Nature hath not so much as any fancy in it; for what it doth as intertelligence and knowledge is a thing superior to fancy, so fancy is superior to the impress of nature, for nature hath no apprehension nor conscious perception of any thing. In a word, nature is a thing, that hath no such self-perception or self-injoyment in it, as animals have.

16. Now we are well aware, that this is a thing, which the narrow principles of some late philosophers will not admit of, that there should be any action distinct from local motion besides expressly conscious cogitation. For they making the first general heads of all entity to be extension and cogitation, or extended being and cogitative; and then supposing, that the essence of cogitation consists in express consciousnes, must needs by this means exclude such a plastick life of nature, as we speak of, that is supposed to act without animal fancy or express consciousnes. Wherefore we conceive, that the first heads of being ought rather to be expressed thus; refitting or antipous extension, and life, (i.e. internal energy and self-activity;) and then again, that life or internal self-activity is to be subdivided into such as either acts with express consciousnes and συνειδησις, or such as is without it; the latter of which is this plastick life of nature: so that there may be an action distinct from local motion, or a vital energy, which is not accompanied with that fancy, or consciousnes, that is in the energies of the animal life; that is, there may be a simple internal energy or vital autokinesy, which is without that duplication, that is included in the nature of συνειδησις, con-jence and consciousness, which makes a being to be present with itself, attentive to its own actions, or animadverse of them, to perceive itself to do or suffer, and to have a fruition or enjoyment of itself. And indeed it must be granted, that what moves matter or determines the motion of it vitally, must needs do it by some other energy of its own, as it is reasonable also to conceive, that itself hath some vital sympathy with that matter, which it acts upon. But we apprehend, that both these may be without clear and express consciousnes. Thus the philosopher, τασα ζωη En. 3. L. 2. εναι, εναι, εναι, εναι, εναι, εναι, εναι, εναι, εναι, εναι, εναι, εναι, εναι, εναι, εναι, εναι, εναι. Every life is energy, even the worst of lives, and therefore that of nature. Whose energy is not like that of fire, but such an energy, as though there be no sense belonging to it, yet is it not temerarious or fortitous, but orderly and regular.

Wherefore this controversy, whether the energy of the plastick nature be cogitation or no, seems to be but a logomachy, or contention about words. For if clear and express consciousnes be supposed to be included in cogitation, then it must needs be granted, that cogitation doth not belong to the plastick life of nature: but if the notion of that word be enlarged, so as to comprehend all action distinct from local motion, and to be of equal extent with life, then the energy of nature is cogitation.
Vital Energies

Book I.

Nevertheless, if any one think it fit to attribute some obscure and imperfect sense or perception, different from that of animals, to the energy of nature, and will therefore call it a kind of drowsy, unawaken'd, or attentive cogitation, the philosopher before mentioned will not very much gain by it: 

**En. 3. Lib. 8. S. 3.**

En. 3. Lib. 8. S. 3. [Libro de Naturá, contemptat. & unop. p. 345. f.] If any will needs attribute some kind of apprehension or sense to nature, then it must not be such a sense or apprehension, as is in animals, but something that differs as much from it, as the sense or cogitation of one in a profound sleep differs from that of one who is awake. And since it cannot be denied, but that the platiick nature hath a certain dull and obscure idea of that, which it stamps and prints upon matter, the fame philosopher himself sticks not to call this idea of nature, Síma and Siácma, a spectacle and contemplation, as likewise the energy of nature towards it, Σιάωα η Σιάσωα, a silent contemplation; nay, he allows, that nature may be said to be, in some sense, Φιλοσοφως, a lover of spectacles or contemplation.

17. However, that there may be some vital energy without clear and express consciousness, con-sense and consciousness, animadvertion, attention, or self-perception, seems reasonable upon several accounts. For first, those philosophers themselves, who make the essence of the soul to consist in cogitation, and again the essence of cogitation in clear and express consciousness, cannot render it any way probable, that the souls of men in all profound sleeps, lethargies and apoplexies, as also of embryo’s in the womb, from their very first arrival thither, are never so much as one moment without expressly conscious cogitations; which if they were, according to the principles of their philosophy, they must, ido facio, cease to have any being. Now if the souls of men and animals be at any time without consciousness and self-perception, then it must needs be granted, that clear and express consciousness is not essential to life. There is some appearance of life and vital sympathy in certain vegetables and plants, which, however called sensitive-plants and plant-animals, cannot well be supposed to have animal sense and fancy, or express consciousness in them; although we are not ignorant in the mean time, how some endeavour to solve all those phenomena mechanically. It is certain, that our human souls themselves are not always conscious of whatever they have in them; for even the sleeping geometrician hath, at that time, all his geometrical theorems and knowledges some way in him; as also the sleeping musician, all his musical skill and songs: and therefore why may it not be possible for the soul to have likewise some actual energy in it, which it is not expressly conscious of? We have all experience, of our doing many animal actions non-attendingly, which we reflect upon afterwards; as also that we often continue a long series of bodily motions, by a mere virtual intention of our minds, and as it were by half a cogitation. That vital sympathy, by which our soul is united and tied fast, as it were with a knot, to the body, is a thing, that we have no direct consciousness of, but only in its effects. Nor can we tell, how we come to be so differently affected in our souls, from the many different motions made upon

1 Ubi supra.
without express Consciousness.

upon our bodies. As likewise we are not conscious to ourselves of that energy, whereby we impress variety of motions and figurations upon the animal spirits of our brain in our phantastick thoughts. For though the geometrician perceive himself to make lines, triangles and circles in the dust with his finger, yet he is not aware, how he makes all those same figures first upon the corporeal spirits of his brain, from whence notwithstanding, as from a glass, they are reflected to him, fancy being rightly concluded by Aристote to be a weak and obscure sense. There is also another more interior kind of plastick power in the soul (if we may so call it) whereby it is formative of its own cogitations, which itself is not always conscious of; as when, in sleep or dreams, it frames interlocutory discourses betwixt itself and other persons, in a long series, with coherent sense and apt connections, in which oftentimes it seems to be surpriz'd with unexpected answers and repartees, though itself were all the while the poet and inventor of the whole fable. Not only our notions for the most part when we are awake, but also our nocturnal volutions in sleep, are performed with very little or no consciousnes. Respiration, or that motion of the diaphragma and other muscles which causes it (there being no sufficient mechanical account of it) may well be concluded to be always a vital motion, though it be not always animal; since no man can affirm, that he is perpetually conscious to himself of that energy of his soul, which does produce it when he is awake, much les when asleep. And lastly, The Cartesian attempts to solve the motion of the heart mechanically seem to be abundantly confuted by autopsie and experiment, evincing the systole of the heart to be a muscular contraction, caused by some vital principle, to make which nothing but a pulissick corporeal quality in the substance of the heart itself, is very unphilosophical and abfur'd. Now, as we have no voluntary imperium at all upon the systole and diaastole of the heart, so are we not conscious to ourselves of any energy of our own soul that causes them; and therefore we may reasonably conclude from hence also, that there is some vital energy, without animal fancy or synæsthesia, express consciousnes and self-perception.

18. Wherefore the plastick nature, acting neither by knowledge nor by animal fancy, neither electively nor hormetically, must be concluded to act fatally, magically and sympathetically. And thus that curious and diligent inquirer into nature, before commended, resolves; Natura tanquam fato quodam, seu mandato secundum leges operante, movet; Nature moveth as it were by a kind of fate or command, acting according to laws. Fate, and the laws or commands of the Deity, concerning the mundane oeconomy (they being really the same thing) ought not to be looked upon, neither as verbal things, nor as mere will and cogitation in the mind of God, but as an energetical and effectual principle, constituted by the Deity, for the bringing of things decreed to pass. The Aphroditiæan philosopher, with others of the ancients, have concluded, that fate and nature are but two different names for one and the same thing; and that τότε εἰμαχικάν κατὰ θύσιν, 'Y

Nature acts fatally and magically.

Book I.

\textit{to xwtà φίςω εἰμαριέων, both that which is done fatally is done naturally, and also whatever is done naturally is done fatally: but that, which we assert in this place, is only this, that the plastick nature may be said to be the true and proper fate of matter, or the corporeal world. Now, that which acts not by any knowledge or fancy, will or appetite of its own, but only fatally according to laws and impressions made upon it, (but differently in different cases) may be said also to act magically and sympathetically. 'Ἡ ἀλήθινη μαρτίς (faith the philosopher') ἔν τῷ πατρὶ φίλια καὶ νεῖν: \textit{The true magick is the friendship and discord, that is in the universe.} And again, magick is said to be founded, ἐν τῇ συμμετείχῃ καὶ τῇ τῶν δυσμενῶν τῶν πολλῶν ποικιλία τρες ἐν ξύνα συνελουτών, \textit{in the sympathy and variety of diverse powers conspiring together into one animal.} Of which passages though the principal meaning seem to be this, that the ground of magical fascinations is one vital unitive principle in the universe; yet they imply also, that there is a certain vital energy, not in the way of knowledge and fancy, will and animal appetite, but fatally sympathetic and magical. As indeed that mutual sympathy, which we have constant experience of, betwixt our soul and our body, \textit{(being not a material and mechanical, but vital thing)} may be called also magical.}

19. From what hath been hitherto declared concerning the plastick nature, it may appear, that though it be a thing, that acts for ends artificially, and which may be also called the divine art, and the fate of the corporeal world; yet for all that it is neither god nor goddes, but a low and imperfect creature. Forasmuch as it is not matter of that reason and wisdom, according to which it acts, nor does it properly intend those ends, which it acts for; nor indeed is it expressly conscious of what it doth, it not knowing, but only doing, according to commands and laws imparted upon it. Neither of which things ought to seem strange or incredible, since nature may as well act regularly and artificially, without any knowledge and conscientiousness of its own, as forms of letters compounded together may print coherent philosophick sense, though they understand nothing at all: and it may also act for the sake of those ends, that are not intended by itself but some higher being, as well as the law or hatcher in the hand of the architect or mechanicke doth, \textit{τὸ σκέπαρον ἅνεκα τῷ πελεκῷ, ἄλλα ἐν πελεκρολογμένου, ἄλλα γραφιν. Phys. I. 2. τῷ πελεκρολογμένῳ ὑπερτοῖν}; \textit{the ax cuts for the sake of something, though itself does not ratiocinate, nor intend or design any thing, but is only subservient to that which does so.} It is true, that our human actions are not governed by such exact reason, art, and wisdom, nor carried on with such constancy, evenness and uniformity, as the actions of nature are; notwithstanding which, since we act according to a knowledge of our own, and are masters of that wisdom, by which our actions are directed, since we do not act fatally only, but electively and intendingly, with conscientiousness and self-perception, the rational life that is in us ought to be accounted a much higher and more noble perfection than that plastick life of nature. Nay, this plastick nature is so far from being the first and highest life, that it is indeed the last and lowest of all lives, it being really the same thing with the vegetative.}

\footnote{Pleth. Lib. II. de dubit. Animæ, Ennæad. IV. Lib. V. Cap. XL. \textit{p 474.}}

165
tative, which is inferior to the sensitive. The difference betwixt nature and wisdom was before observed, that wisdom is the first and highest thing, but nature the last and lowest; this latter being but an unpretending imitation of the former. And to this purpose, this plastick nature is further described by the same philosopher, in these words: \( \text{En. 3. I. 2.} \)

\( \text{En. 4. I. 4r.} \)

And though this plastick nature contain no small part of divine providence in it; yet, it is a thing, that cannot act electively nor with discretion, it must needs be granted, that there is a higher and diviner providence than this, which also presides over the corporeal world itself; which was a thing likewise infused upon by that philosopher: \( \text{En. 3. I. 2.} \)

But though the plastick nature be the lowest of all lives, nevertheless since it is a life, it must needs be incorporeal; all life being such. For body being nothing but antitypous extension, or restless bulk, nothing but mere outside, \( \text{alid extra alid,} \) together with passive capability, hath no internal energy, self-activity, or life belonging to it; it is not able so much as to move itself, and therefore much less can it artificially direct its own motion. Moreover, in the efformation of the bodies of animals, it is one and the self-same thing that directs the whole. That, which contrives and frames the eye, cannot be a distinct thing from that which frames the ear; nor that which makes the hand, from that which makes the foot; the same thing, which delineates the veins, must also form the arteries; and that, which fabricates the nerves, must also project the muscles and joints; it must be the same thing that designs and organizes the heart and brain, with such communications betwixt them; one and the self-same thing must needs have in it the entire idea, and the complete model or platform of the whole organick.
organick body. For the several parts of matter distant from one another, acting alone by themselves, without any common direftrix, being not able to confer together, nor communicate with each other, could never possibly conspire to make up one such uniform and orderly system or compages, as the body of every animal is. The fame is to be said likewise concerning the plafick nature of the whole corporeal universe, in which συνιταξαμ, all things are ordered together conspiringly into one. It must be one and the fame thing, which formeth the whole, or else it could never have fallen into such an uniform order and harmony. Now that which is one and the fame, acting upon several distant parts of matter, cannot be corporeal.

Indeed Aristotle is severely censured by some learned men for this, that though he talk every where of such a nature as acts regularly, artificially and methodically, in order to the best, yet he does no where positively declare, whether this nature of his be corporeal or incorporeal, substantial or accidental; which yet is the lefs to be wondered at in him, because he does not clearly determine these fame points concerning the rational soul neither, but seems to stagger uncertainly about them. In the mean time it cannot be denied, but that Aristotle's followers do for the most part conclude this nature of his to be corporeal; whereas notwithstanding, according to the principles of this philosophy, it cannot possibly be such: for there is nothing else attributed to body in it, besides these three, matter, form and accidents; neither of which can be the Aristotlean nature. First, it cannot be matter; because nature, according to Aristotle, is supposèd to be the principle of motion and activity, which matter in itself is devoid of. Moreover, Aristotle concludes, that they, who assign only a material cause, assign no cause at all το ν ά ν ἁ λ ι ων, of well and fit, of that regular and artificial frame of things which is ascribed to nature; upon both which accounts, it is determined by that philosopher, that φύσις μᾶλλον ἀ φεχι καὶ αὐτίκα τῆς υλικῆς, nature is more a principle and cause than matter; and therefore it cannot be one and the same thing with it. Again, it is as plain, that Aristotle's nature cannot be the forms of particular bodies neither, as vulgar Peripatetics seem to conceive, these being all generated and produced by nature, and as well corruptible as generable. Whereas nature is such a thing as is neither generated nor corrupted, it being the principle and cause of all generation and corruption. To make nature, and the material forms of bodies to be one and the self-same thing, is all one, as if one should make the seal (with the Stamper too) to be one and the same thing with the signature upon the wax. And lastly, Aristotle's nature can leaft of all be the accidents or qualities of bodies; because these act only in virtue of their substance, neither can they exercise any active power over the substance itself in which they are; whereas the plafick nature is a thing, that domineers over the substance of the whole corporeal universe, and which, subordinate to the Deity, put both heaven and earth in this frame in which now it is. Wherefore since

Aristotle's
Aristotle’s nature can be neither the matter, nor the forms, nor the accidents of bodies, it is plain, that, according to his own principles, it must be incorporeal.

21. Now if the pl tastick nature be incorporeal, then it must of necessity be either an inferior power or faculty of some soul, which is also conscious, sensitive, or rational; or else a lower substantial life by itself, devoid of animal consciousness. The Platonists seem to affirm both these together, namely, that there is a pl tastick nature lodged in all particular souls of animals, brutes, and men, and also that there is a general pl tastick or spermatick principle of the whole universe distinct from their higher mundane soul, though subordinate to it, and dependent upon it, that λέγων τὸ νόημα ψυχῆς προτείου δυναμικὸς ζῶνος. That, which is called nature, is the offspring of a higher soul, which hath a more powerful life in it. And though Aristotle do not so clearly acknowledge the incorporeity and substantiality of souls, yet he concurs very much with this Platonick doctrine, that nature is either a lower power, or faculty of some conscious soul, or else an inferior kind of life by itself, depending upon a superior soul.

And this we shall make to appear from his book de partibus animalium, L. i. c. 1, after we have taken notice of some considerable preliminary passages in it [P. 470. l. Tom. II. Oper.] in order thereunto. For having first declared, that besides the material cause, there are other causes also of natural generations, namely these two, περὶ τῶν ἐνεκα ἡ ὀθων ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς καταστάσεως, that for whose sake, (or the final cause) and that from which the principle of motion is, (or the efficient cause;) he determines, that the former of these two is the principal, φαίνεται δὲ πρῶτη ὑπὸ λόγου ἐνεκά τινος, λόγῳ γὰρ οὗτος ἡ ἀρχὴ δὲ ὃς λόγος, ἐντευξάσθαι ἦν τοῖς κατὰ τί χρῆν τοῖς φυσικῶς πνεύματι. The chiefest of these two causes seems to be the final or the intending cause; for this is reason, and reason is alike a principle in artificial and in natural things. Nay, the philosopher adds excellently, that there is more of reason and art in the things of nature, than there is in those things that are artificially made by men, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐστὶν ὧν ἐνεκά τοῦ καλοῦ ἐν τοῖς φύσικῶς ἔργοις, ἡ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τίχης: There is more of final or intending causality, and of the reason of good, in the works of nature, than in those of human art. After which he greatly complains of the first and most ancient phylologers, meaning thereby Anaximander, and those other Ionicks before Anaxagoras, that they considered only τὸν υλικὸν ἀρχήν, the material principle and cause of things, without attending to those two other causes, the principle of motion, and that which aims at ends; they talking only of fire, water, air, and earth, and generating the whole world from the fortuitous concursoe of these sensibles bodies. But at length Aristotle falls upon Democritus, who being junior to those others before mentioned, philosophized after the same atheistical manner, but in a new way of his own, by atoms; acknowledging no other nature, neither in the universe, nor in the bodies of animals, than that of fortuitous mechanism, and supposing all things to arise from

& Uno, Ennead. III. Lib. VIII. Cap. III.
from the different compositions of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions.
Of which Democritick philosophy he gives his censure in these following
De part. An. words: εἰ μὲν οὖν τῷ σχῆματι ήτο τῷ σχῆματι εἰκαστὸν οτι, τοι: τι ζων τῷ μικρῷ,
Lib. 1: cap. 1. δομῶς ἄν Δημόκριτος λέγει, &c. If animals and their several parts did con-
sist of nothing but figure and colour, then indeed Democritus would be in the
right: but a dead man hath the same form and figure of body, that he had be-
fore, and yet for all that he is not a man; neither is a brazen or wooden band
a hand, but only equivocally, as a painted physician, or pipes made of stone are
so called. No member of a dead man's body is that, which it was before, when
he was alive, neither eye, nor hand, nor foot. Wherefore this is but a rude
way of philosophizing, and just as if a carpenter should talk of a wooden band.
For thus these physiologers declare the generations and causes of figures only, or
the matter out of which things are made, as air and earth. Whereas no arti-
ficer would think it sufficient to render such a cause of any artificial fabrick,
because the instrument happened to fall upon the timber, that therefore it
was hollow here, and plain there; but rather because himself made such strokes,
and for such ends, &c.

Now in the close of all, this philosopher at length declares, that there
is another principle of corporeal things, besides the material, and such as is
not only the cause of motion, but also acts artificially in order to ends, ἐκ τι
τοιούτου ἤ ἰκαλεῖ τάλαμον, there is such a thing as that which we call na-
ture; that is, not the fortuitous motion of senseless matter, but a plattick reg-
ular and artificial nature, such as acts for ends and good; declaring, in the
same place, what this nature is, namely that it is ψωξή, ἢ ψωξήν μέρος, ἢ μή ἰκα
ψωξής, soul, or part of soul, or not without soul; and from thence inferring, that it
properly belongs to a physiologer, to treat concerning the soul also. But
he concludes afterwards, οἵτι πᾶσα ψωξή φύσει, that the whole soul is not na-
ture; whence it remains, that according to Aristotle's sense, nature is ἡ ψωξής
μέρος, ἢ μή ἰκαλεῖ ψωξής, either part of a soul, or not without soul; that is,
either a lower part or faculty of some conscious soul; or else an inferior
kind of life by itself, which is not without soul, but subordinate to it, and
dependent on it.

22. As for the bodies of animals, Aristotle * first resolves in general, that
nature in them is either the whole soul, or else some part of it; φύσις ὡς ἡ
κυλίσας, κι ὑπὸ τὸ τίdefinitions τοι ζών, ἤτο πάσα ἡ ψωξή, ἢ μέρος τι αὐτῆς. Nature as the
moving principle, or as that which acts artificially for ends, (so far as con-
cerns the bodies of animals) is either the whole soul, or else some part of it.
But afterward he determines more particularly, that the plattick nature is
not the whole soul in animals, but only some part of it; οἵτι πᾶσα ψωξή
φύσει, ἀλλὰ τι μέροισιν αὐτῆς, that is, nature in animals, properly so called, is some
lower power or faculty lodged in their respective souls, whether senstive or
rational.

And that there is plattick nature in the souls of animals, the same Aristotle
elsewhere affirms and proves after this manner: τι τοί σωβαρὸν εἰς τοῖκον
[Page 266.]
[De An. 1. 2, c.]

CHAP. III. lodged in the Souls of Animals.

that which in the bodies of animals holds together such things as of their own nature would otherwise move contrary ways, and fly asunder, as fire and earth, which would be dissipated and dispersed, the one tending upwards, the other downwards, were there not something to hinder them. Now if there be any such thing, this must be the soul, which is also the cause of nourishment and augmentation. Where the philosopher adds, that though some were of opinion, that fire was that, which was the cause of nourishment and augmentation in animals, yet this was indeed but suaviter paulo, τὸ κατὰ πάντα, αἷς κατὰ, αἷς μᾶλλον τῷ ψυχῇ, only the con-cause or instrument, and not simply the cause, but rather the soul. And to the same purpose he philosophizeth elsewhere, οὐδὲ γὰρ η τέλος δι' η τοῦ γεώτης γίνεται κατὰ τοῖς ψυχαῖς, εἴποι δεισορείας ὡτὶ τοῦ γαίος ἕξεκέλτας πάλαι. Neither is conciliation, by which nourishment is made in animals, done without the soul, nor without heat, for all things are done by fire.

And certainly it seems very agreeable to the phenomena, to acknowledge something in the bodies of animals superior to mechanism, as that may well be thought to be, which keeps the more fluid parts of them constantly in the same form and figure, so as not to be enormously altered in their growth by disproportionate nourishment; that, which restores flesh that was lost, consolidates dissolved continuities, incorporates the newly received nourishment, and joins it continuously with the pre-existent parts of flesh and bone; which regenerates and repairs veins consumed or cut off, which causes dentition in so regular a manner, and that not only in infants, but also adult persons; that which casts off excrements, and dischargeth superfluities; which makes things seem ungrateful to an interior sense, that were notwithstanding pleasing to the taste; that nature of Hippocrates, that is the curatrix of disfaeces, αἱ ψυχαὶ τῶν υἱῶν ἡνεκω, and that archeus of the chi-mists or Paracelians, to which all medicaments are but subervient, as being able to effect nothing of themselves without it: I say, there seems to be such a principle as this in the bodies of animals, which is not mechanical but vital; and therefore since enties are not to be multiplied without necessity, we may with Aristotle conclude it to be μίας or μοῖρας τῆς ψυχῆς, a certain part of the soul of those animals, or a lower inconscious power lodged in them.

23. Besides this platick nature, which is in animals, forming their several bodies artificially, as so many microcosms or little worlds, there must be also a general platick nature in the macrocosm, the whole corporeal universe, that which makes all things thus to conspire every where, and agree together into one harmony. Concerning which platick nature of the universe the author de Mundo writes after this manner, τὸ τῶν ὁλοκόσμοι δυσκόσμητο μια ὤδα πάντων δύνασα δύσκομεν, one power passing thorough all things ordered and formed the whole world. Again, he calls the same τέλος, τὸ ἅλλον, ἔμπνευσε, ἡ γένεσις οὐσία, a spirit, and a living, and generative nature; and plainly declares it to be a thing distinct from the Deity, but subordinate to it and dependent on it. But Aristotle himself in that genuine work of

his before mentioned, speaks clearly and positively concerning this plaitick nature of the universe, as well as that of animals, in these words; 

_De Part. An. ch. 1._

\[ p. 474. \]

That Aristotle held

Book I.

Principio calor ac terram, campofque liquentes,

Lucentemque globum lune, Titanique astra,

Spiritus intus alit, totaque infusa per artus,

Mens agitat miles, & magno se corpore miscet.

Inde dominum pecuniae genus, vateque volantiam.

From whence it may be collected, that Aristotle did suppose this plaitick nature of the universe to be in medicines, in art, either part of some mundane soul, that was also conscious and intellectual, (as that plaitick

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\(^a\) Virgil. Æneid. Lib. VI. ver. 724;
nature in animals is) or at least some inferior principle, depending on such a soul. And indeed whatever the doctrine of the modern Peripateticks be, we make no doubt at all but that Aristotle himself held the world's animation, or a mundane soul: forasmuch as he plainly declares himself concerning it elsewhere in his book de Cielo, after this manner; *al' ημείς ως περί συμφ. Lib. 2 c. 1.*

For to Simplicius there rightly expounds the place; δει τις περί ἐκφώνων αὐτῶν συλλογιζομαι, ἣν λογικόν ἐκπώνων ψυχην, ως τ' ἀνατα- 

That we commonly think of the heavens as nothing else but bodies and monads, having only a certain order, but altogether inanimate, whereas we ought, on the contrary, to conceive of them as partaking of life and action: that is, as being induced with a rational or intellectual life. For to Simplicius there rightly expounds the place; δει δι ας περί ἐκφώνων αὐτῶν συλλογιζομαι, ἣν λογικόν ἐκπώνων ψυχην, ως τ' ἀναται- 

But not only irrational souls, but also of inanimate bodies, the word πνεύμα does only denominate rational beings: But further, to take away all manner of scruple or doubt concerning this bufines, that philosopher before, in the same book: *πνεύμα* affirmeth, δι ε' ἀληθείας ἐκφώνων, και α' ψυχήν καταρρέουμεν: But we ought to think of the heavens as animated with a rational soul, and thereby partaking of action and rational life. For (faith he) though πνεύμα be affirmed not only of irrational souls, but also of inanimate bodies, yet the word πνεύμα does only denominate rational beings: But not only irrational souls, but also of inanimate bodies, the word πνεύμα does only denominate rational beings: But further, to take away all manner of scruple or doubt concerning this bufines, that philosopher before, in the same book: *πνεύμα* affirmeth, δι ε' ἀληθείας ἐκφώνων, και α' ψυχήν καταρρέουμεν: But we ought to think of the heavens as animated with a rational soul, and thereby partaking of action and rational life. 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There is indeed one passage in the fame book de Cielo, which, at first sight, and slightly considered, may seem to contradict this again; and therefore probably is that, which hath led many into a contrary persuasion, that Aristotle denied the world's animation, *ἀλλ' οὖν διότι ὅτι ψυχήν ἀληθείας * L. 2 c. 1.* 

This passage, by the way, as by the heaven, as in many other places of Aristotle and Plato, is to be understood the whole world.
The Plastick Nature of the World

Book I.

The whole world or heaven, being as well a natural, as an animalis body, is moved properly by soul; but yet by means of nature also, as an instrument, so that the motion of it is not violent. But whereas Aristotle there intimates, as if Plato had held the heavens to be moved by a soul violently, contrary to their nature; Simplicius, though sufficiently addicted to Aristotle, ingenuously acknowledges his error herein, and, vindicating Plato from that imputation, shews how he likewise held a plastick nature, as well as a mundane soul;

* De Leg. 1.* and that amongst his ten instances of motion *, the ninth is that of nature; τὴν ἑπετερ αἱ κυρίων, ἕνα μεταβαλλόμενον ὑπὸ ἑπετερ' that which always moves another, being itself changed by something else; as the tenth, that of the mundane soul, τὴν εαυτὴν κυρίων ὑπὸ ἑπετερ', that which originally both moves itself and other things: as if his meaning in that place were, that though nature be a life and internal energy, yet it acts suberviently to a higher soul, as the first original mover.

But the grand objection against Aristotle's holding the world's animation is still behind; namely, from that in his Metaphysics', where he determines the highest flarry heaven to be moved by an immoveable mover, commonly supposed to be the Deity itself, and no soul of the world; and all the other spheres likewise to be moved by so many separate intelligencies, and not by souls. To which we reply, that indeed Aristotle's first immoveable mover is no mundane soul, but an abstract intellect separate from matter, and the very Deity itself; whose manner of moving the heavens is thus described by him *, καὶ δὲ ὅς ήμώμενον, it moveth only as being loved. Therefore, besides this supreme unmoved mover, that philosopher supposed another inferior moved mover also, that is, a mundane soul, as the proper and immediate efficient cause of the heavenly motions; of which he speaks after this manner: καὶ ημῶμεν δὲ τὰλα καὶ, that which itself being moved, (objectively, or by appetite and desire of the first good) moveth other things. And thus that safe and sure-footed interpreter, Alex. Apolodius, expounds his master's meaning, that the heaven being animated, and therefore indeed moved by an internal principle of its own, is notwithstanding originally moved by a certain inmoveable and separate nature, which is above soul, ἄλοιπον ἡ σωφροσύνη, καὶ ἑπετερ καὶ ἑπετερ ἤν ὑπὸ τῆς ὑμῶμενος αὐτοῦ, both by its contemplating of it, and having an appetite and desire of assimilating itself thereunto. Aristotle seeming to have borrowed this notion from Plato *, who makes the constant regular circumvagination of the heavens to be an imitation of the motion or energy of intellect. So that Aristotle's first mover is not properly the efficient, but only the final and objective cause, of the heavenly motions, the immediate efficient cause thereof being ὑμώμενον καὶ φως, soul and nature.

Neither may this be confuted from those other Arislotelick intelligences of the lesser orbs; that philosopher conceiving in like manner concerning them, that they were also the abstract minds or intellects of certain other inferior souls,


* De Legibus, Lib. X. p. 669. & alia.
souls, which moved their several respective bodies or orbs, circularly and uniformly, in a kind of imitation of them. For this plainly appears from hence, in that he affirms of these his inferior intelligences likewise, as well as of the supreme mover, that they do move only as the end.

Where it is evident, that though Aristotle did plainly suppose a mundane intellectual soul, such as also contained, either in it, or under it, a plastick nature, yet he did not make either of these to be the supreme Deity; but resolved the first principle of things to be one absolutely perfect mind or intellect, separate from matter, which was ἀξιωτάτων ὁ νόμος, an immoveable nature, whose essence was his operation, and which moved only as being loved, or as the final cause: of which he pronounces in this manner, ὃ τι ἐκ Μετ. l. 14. ὁ τοποθετεῖν ἀξιωτάτων ὁ νόμος ὁ ἔσχος ὁ Φύσις, That upon such a principle as this heaven and nature depends: that is, the animated heaven, or mundane soul, together with the plastick nature of the universe, must of necessity depend upon such an absolutely perfect and immoveable mind or intellect.

Having now declared the Aristotelick doctrine concerning the plastick nature of the universe, with which the Platonick also agrees, that it is, ὤ μήν ὁ ψυχής, ὤ μήν ὁ διάκω διορχής, either part of a mundane intellectual soul, (that is, a lower power and faculty of it) or else not without it, but some inferior thing depending on it; we think fit to add in this place, that though there were no such mundane soul, as both Plato and Aristotle supposed, distinct from the supreme Deity, yet there might notwithstanding be a plastick nature of the universe depending immediately upon the Deity itself. For the plastick nature essentially depends upon mind or intellect, and could not possibly be without it; according to those words before cited, ἐκ τοποθετεῖν ἀξιωτάτων ὁ πολιτικὸς ὁ Φύσις, Nature depends upon such an intellectual principle; and for this cause that philosopher does elsewhere join ὁ θεός and Φύσις, mind and nature both together.

25. Besides this general plastick nature of the universe, and those particular plastick powers in the souls of animals, it is not impossible but that there may be other plastick natures also (as certain lower lives, or vegetative souls) in some greater parts of the universe; all of them depending, if not upon some higher conscious soul, yet at least upon a perfect intellect presiding over the whole. As for example; though it be not reasonable to think, that every plant, herb and pile of grass, hath a particular plastick life, or vegetative soul of its own, distinct from the mechanism of the body, nor that the whole earth is an animal endowed with a conscious soul; yet there may possibly be, for aught we know, one plastick nature or life belonging to the whole terrestrial (or terraqueous) globe, by which all plants and vegetables, continuous with it, may be differently formed, according to their different seeds, as also minerals and other bodies framed, and whatsoever else is above the power of fortuitous mechanism effect'd, as by the immediate cause, though always subordinate to other causes; the chief

whereof is the Deity. And this perhaps may ease the minds of those, who cannot but think it too much, to impose all upon one plastick nature of the universe.

26. And now we have finished our first task, which was to give an account of the plastick nature, the sum whereof briefly amounts to this; that it is a certain lower life than the animal, which acts regularly and artificially, according to the direction of mind and understanding, reason and wisdom, for ends, or in order to good, though itself do not know the reason of what it does, nor is matter of that wisdom according to which it acts, but only a servant to it, and drudging executioner of the same; it operating fatally and sympathetically, according to laws and commands prescribed to it by a perfect intellect, and impress upon it; and which is either a lower faculty of some conscious soul, or else an inferior kind of life or soul by itself; but essentially depending upon an higher intellect.

We proceed to our second undertaking; which was to shew, how groely those two sorts of Atheists before mentioned, the Stoical or Cosmo-plastick, and the Stratonical or Hylozoick, both of them acknowledging this plastick life of nature, do mistake the notion of it, or pervert it, and abuse it, to make a certain ipurious and counterfeit God-almighty of it, (or a first principle of all things) thereby excluding the true omnipotent Deity, which is a perfect mind, or consciously understanding creature, presiding over the universe; they substituting this stupid plastick nature in the room of it.

Now the chief errors or mistakes of these Atheists concerning the plastick nature, are these four following. First, that they make that to be the first principle of all, and the highest thing in the universe, which is the last and lowest of all lives; a thing essentially secondary, derivative, and dependent.

For the plastick life of nature is but the mere unbrage of intellectuality, a faint and shadowy imitation of mind and understanding; upon which it doth as essentially depend, as the shadow doth upon the body, the image in the glass upon the face, or the echo upon the original voice. So that if there had been no perfect mind or intellect in the world, there could no more have been any plastick nature in it, than there could be an image in the glass without a face, or an echo without an original voice. If there be Φιλοσ., then there must be Nοσ.: if there be a plastick nature, that acts regularly and artificially in order to ends, and according to the best wisdom, though itself not comprehending the reason of it, nor being clearly conscious of what it doth; then there must of necessity be a perfect mind or intellect, that is, a Deity, upon which it depends. Wherefore Aristotel does like a philosopher in joining Φιλοσ. and Noσ., nature and mind both together; but these Atheists do very absurdly and unphilosophically, that would make a senseless and inconscious plastick nature, and therefore without any mind or intellect, to be the first original of all things.
Secondly, these Atheists augment the former error, in supposing those higher lives of sense or animality, and of reason or understanding, to rise both of them from that lower senseless life of nature, as the only original fundamental life. Which is a thing altogether as irrational and absurd, as if one should suppose the light, that is in the air or æther, to be the only original and fundamental light, and the light of the sun and stars but a secondary and derivative thing from it, and nothing but the light of the air modified and improved by condensation: or as if one should maintain, that the sun and moon, and all the stars, were really nothing else, but the mere reflections of those images, that we see in rivers and ponds of water. But this hath always been the sottish humour and guile of Atheists, to invert the order of the universe, and hang the picture of the world, as of a man, with its heels upwards. Conscientious reason and understanding, being a far higher degree of life and perfection, than that dull plastick nature, which does only do, but not know, can never possibly emerge out of it; neither can the duplication of corporeal organs be ever able to advance that simple and stupid life of nature into redoubled consciousness or self-perception; nor any triplification, or indeed milleclpitation of them, improve the same into reason and understanding.

Thirdly; for the better colouring of the former errors, the Hylozoists adulterate the notion of the plastick life of nature, confounding it with wildness and understanding. And though themselves acknowledge, that no animal-sense, self-perception and consciousness belongs to it, yet they will have it to be a thing perfectly wise, and consequently every atom of senseless matter that is in the whole world, to be infallibly omniscient, as to all its own capacities and congruities, or whatsoever itself can do or suffer; which is plainly contradictory. For though there may be such a thing as the plastick nature, that, according to the former description of it, can do without knowing, and is devoid of express consciousuess or self-perception, yet perfect knowledge and understanding without consciousnes is non-sense and impossibility. Wherefore this must needs be condemned for a great piece of sottishness in the Hylozoick Atheists, that they attribute perfect wisdom and understanding to a stupid unconscious nature, which is nothing but 

Lastly, these Atheists err in this, that they make this plastick life of nature to be a mere material or corporeal thing; whereas matter or body cannot move itself, much less therefore can it artificially order and dispose its own motion. And though the plastick nature be indeed the lowest of all lives, yet notwithstanding since it is a life, or internal energy, and self-activity, distinct from local motion, it must needs be incorporeal, all life being essentially such. But the Hylozoists conceive grossly both of life and understanding, spreading them all over upon matter, just as butter is spread upon bread, or plaster upon a wall, and accordingly fencing them out in different quantities.
quantities and bulks, together with it; they contending, that they are but inadequate conceptions of body; as the only substance; and consequently concluding, that the vulgarly received notion of God is nothing else but such an inadequate conception of the matter of the whole corporeal universe, mistaken for a complete and entire substance by itself, that is supposed to be the cause of all things: which fond dream or dotage of theirs will be further confuted in due place. But it is now time to put a period to this long (though necessary) digression, concerning the plastick life of nature, or an artificial, orderly and methodical nature.

XXXVIII. Plato gives an account, why he judged it necessary in those times, publickly to propose that atheistical hypothesis, in order to a confusion, as also to produce rational arguments for the proof of a Deity, after this manner; 

De Leg. lib. 10. 

[P. 666. Oper.] 

Had not these atheistical doctrines been publickly divulged, and made known in a manner to all, it would not have been needfull to have confuted them, nor by reasons to prove a Deity; but now it is necessary. And we conceive, that the same necessity at this time will justify our present undertaking likewise; since these atheistical doctrines have been as boldly vented, and publickly afferted in this latter age of ours, as ever they could be in Plato's time; when the severity of the Athenian government must needs be a great check to such designs, Socrates having been put to death upon a mere false and groundless accusation of atheism, and Protagoras, (who doubtless was a real Atheist) having escaped the same punishment no otherwise than by flight, his books being notwithstanding publickly burnt in the market-place at Athens, and himself condemned to perpetual exile, though there was nothing at that time proved against him, save only this one sceptical passage, in the beginning of a book of his, 

Diog. La. in vita Prot. 

[Lib. XIX. tegm. 51. p. 576.] 

Concerning the gods, I have nothing at all to say, either that they be or be not; there being many things, that hinder the knowledge of this matter, both the obscurity of the thing itself, and the shortness of human life. Whereas atheism, in this latter age of ours, hath been impudently afferted, and most industriously promoted; that very atomick form, that was first introduced (a little before Plato's time) by Leucippus, Protagoras, and Democritus, having been also revived amongst us, and that with no small pomp and ostentation of wisdom and philosophy.

It was before observed, that there were two several forms of atomical philosophy; first, the most ancient and genuine, that was religious, called Mochaial (or if you will Mosaical) and Pythagorical; secondly, the adulterated atheistical atomology, called Leucippean or Democritical. Now accordingly, there have been in this latter age of ours two several succesive refurrections or restitutions of those two atomologies. For Renatus Cartesius first revived and restored the atomick philosophy, agreeably, for the most part, to that ancient Mochaical and Pythagorical form; acknowledging besides
fides extended substance and corporeal atoms, another cogitative incorporeal substance, and joining metaphysics or theology, together with physiology, to make up one entire system of philosophy. Nor can it well be doubted, but that this physiology of his, as to the mechanick part of it, hath been elaborated by the ingenious author into an exactness at least equal with the best atomologies of the ancients. Nevertheless, this Cartesian philosophy is highly obnoxious to censure upon some accounts; the chief whereof is this, that deviating from that primitive Moschical atomology, in rejecting all platick nature, it derives the whole system of the corporeal universe from the necessary motion of matter, only divided into particles insensibly small, and turned round in a vortex, without the guidance or direction of any understanding nature. By means whereof, though it boast of solving all the corporeal phenomena by mere fortuitous mechanism, and without any final or mental causality, yet it gives no account at all of that, which is the grandest of all phenomena, the ὑέλασις, the orderly regularity and harmony of the mundane system. The occasion of which miscarriage hath been already intimated, namely, from the acknowledging only two heads of being, extended and cogitative, and making the essence of cogitation to consist in express consciousness; from whence it follows, that there could be no platick nature, and therefore either all things must be done by fortuitous mechanism, or else God himself be brought immediately upon the stage for the solving of all phenomena. Which latter absurdity our philosopher being over-careful to avoid, cast himself upon the former, the banishing of all final and mental causality quite out of the world, and acknowledging no other philosophick causes, beside material and mechanical. It cannot be denied, but that even some of the ancient religious Atomists were also too much infected with this mechanizing humour; but Renatus Cartesius hath not only outdone them all herein, but even the very Atheists themselves also, as shall be shewed afterward; and therefore as much as in him lies, has quite disarmed the world of that grand argument for a Deity, taken from the regular frame and harmony of the universe. To which gross miscarriage of his there might be also another added, that he seems to make matter necessarily existent, and essentially infinite and eternal. Notwithstanding all which, we cannot entertain that uncharitable opinion of him, that he really designed atheism, the fundamental principles of his philosophy being such, as that no atheistical architecture can possibly be built upon them. But shortly after this Cartesian restitution of the primitive atomology, that acknowledged incorporeal substance, we have had our Leucippus and Democritus too, who also revived and brought again upon the stage that other atheistical atomology, that makes ἄξιας τῶν ὀξύν ἀρώματι, senseless and lifeless atoms to be the only principles of all things in the universe; thereby necessarily excluding, besides incorporeal substance and immortality of souls, a Deity and natural morality; as also making all actions and events materially and mechanically necessary.

Now there could be no satisfactory confutation of this atheistical hypothesis, without a fair proposal first made of the several grounds of it to their
Two sorts of Atheists in Plato.  Book I.

beft advantage, which we have therefore endeavoured in the former chapter. The answers to which atheiftick arguments ought, according to the laws of method, to be referred for the laft part of the whole treatife, where we are positively to determine the right intellectual fystem of the universe; it being properly our work here, only to give an account of the three falfe hypotheses of the mundane fystem, together with their feveral grounds. Nevertheless, because it might not only feem indecorous, for the answers to those atheiftick arguments to be fo long deferred, and placed fo far behind the arguments themselves, but also prove otherwise really inconvenient, we fhall therefore chufe rather to break thofe laws of method, (neglecting the fervululofity thereof) and subjoin them immediately in this place, craving the reader’s pardon for this preposteroufnefs.

It is certain, that the source of all atheifm is generally a dull and earthly difbelief of the existence of things beyond the reach of fene; and it cannot be denied, but that there is fomething of immorality in the temper of all Atheifts, as all atheiftick doctrine tends also to immorality. Notwithstanding which, it muft not be therefore concluded, that all dogmatick Atheifts came to be fuch merely by means of grofs intemperance, fenfuality, and debauchery. Plato indeed describes one fort of Atheifts in this manner; \( \text{De Leg. I.} \)

10. p. 908.

Ow, who together with this opinion, that all things are void of gods, are acted also by intemperance of pleafures and pains, and hurried away with violent lufts, being persons otherwise endued with frong memories, and quick wits. And these are the debauched, ranting, and hectoring Atheifts. But besides these, that philofopher tells us, that there is another fort of Atheifts alfo, \( \text{Ibid.} \) who, that there be no gods at all, yet notwithstanding being naturally disposed to justice and moderation, as they will not do outrageous and exorbitant things themselves, fo they will fub the conversation of wicked debauched persons, and delight rather in the fociety of thofe that are fair and just. And these are a fort of externally honest or civilized Atheifts. Now what that thing is, which, besides grofs fenfuality and debauchery, might tempt men to entertain atheiftick opinions, the fame philofopher alfo declares; namely, that it is an affectation of singularity, or of feeming wifer than the generality of mankind. For thus when Clarias had difputed honestly against Atheifts, from thofe vulgar topicks of the regularity and harmony of the universe (obfervable in the courfes of sun, moon, and flars, and the feafons of the year) and of the common notions of mankind, in that both Greeks and Barbarians generally agreed in this, that there were gods, thinking he had thereby made a fufficient confutation of atheifm, the Athenian Hafes hereupon discovers a great fear and jealofy, which he had, left he should thereby but render himfelf an object of contempt to Atheifts, as being a

conceited.
conceited and scornful generation of men. Α. Φανηκας γε κε μικρας τες
μονακας, μενος ομοι καλαφικους, μεις μιν γε ως οι συντον περι, των της δια-
θεσις αιτιων, άλλη θείνθι ακραλια μενου ιδεων τε ιπειμων επι των άκατω βίων
εραμεναι τω ηφασα απει, δση. Ιαμα α φανηκας γε κε μικρας τες
μονακας, μενος ομοι καλαφικους, μεις μιν γε ως οι συντον περι, των της δια-
θεσις αιτιων, άλλη θείνθι ακραλια μενου ιδεων τε ιπειμων επι των άκατω βίων
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And we find the same thing at this very day, that Atheists make a great
pretence to wisdom and philosophy; and that many are tempted to main-
tain atheistic opinions, that they may gain a reputation of wit by it.
Which indeed was one reason, that the rather induced us, nakedly to reveal
all the mysteries of atheism, because we observed, that so long as these
things are concealed and kept up in huggermugger, many will be the ra-
ther apt to suspect, that there is some great depth and profundity of
wisdom lodged in them; and that it is some noble and generous truth, which
the bigotick religious endeavour to smoother and suffreps.

Now the case being thus, it was pertinently suggested also by the fore-
mentioned philosopher 1, ο εμπιστό με το διαφίασιν, ει Φανηκας οι λογοι απόλαμποι
άσειν, διαυς τα εκάστατα, μηδε ει τοις λόγοις, άλλη έχειμαστικών χρώματος.
That it must needs be a matter of no small moment, for any one to make it ap-
pear, that they, who maintain wicked atheistical opinions, do none of them reason
rightly, but grossly stumble in all their ratiocinations. And we hope to effect this
in our present undertaking, to make it evident, that Atheists are no such
conjurers, as (though they hold no spirits) they would be thought to be;
no such gigantick men of reason, nor profound philosophers, but that nor-
withstanding all their pretensions to wit, their atheism is really nothing else,
but αμαθία μάλα χαλίν, a most grievous ignorance, fottishness and stupidity
of mind in them.

Wherefore we shall, in the next place, conjure down all those devils raised
and displayed in their most formidable colours, in the precedent chapter; or rather
we shall discover, that they are really nothing else, but what these
Atheists pretend God and incorporeal spirits to be, mere phantastick spectres
and impostures, vain imaginations of deluded minds, utterly devoid of all
truth and reality. Neither shall we only confute these atheistical arguments,
and so stand upon our defensive posture, but we shall also assault atheism

even with its own weapons, and plainly demonstrate, that all forms of atheism are unintelligible nonsense and absolute impossibility to human reason: as we shall likewise, over and above, occasionally infer some (as we think) undeniable arguments for a Deity.

The Digression concerning the Plastick Life of Nature, or an Artificial, Orderly and Methodical Nature; N. 37. Chap. 3.

1. THAT neither the hylozoick nor cosmo-plastick Atheists are condemned for asserting an orderly and artificial plastick nature, as a life distinct from the animal, however this be a thing exploded, not only by the atomick Atheists, but also by some professed Theists, who notwithstanding might have an undiscovered tang of the mechanically-atheistick humour hanging about them. 2. If there be no plastick artificial nature admitted, then it must be concluded, that either all things come to pass by fortuitous mechanism, and material necessity (the motion of matter unguided) or else that God doth αἰτιωτείων ἡμᾶς, do all things himself immediately and miraculously, framing the body of every grain and fly, as if were with his own hands; since divine laws and commands cannot execute themselves, nor be the proper efficient causes of things in nature.

3. To suppose all things to come to pass fortuitously, or by the unguided motion of matter, a thing altogether as irrational as it is atheistical and impious; there being many phenomena, not only above the powers of mechanism, but also contrary to the laws of it. The mechanick Theists make God an idle spectator of the fortuitous motions of matter, and render his wisdom altogether useless and insignificant. Aristotle's judicious censure of the fortuitous Mechanists, with the ridiculousness of that presumption, that material and mechanical reasons are the only philosophical.

4. That it seems neither decorous in respect of God, nor congruous to reason, that he should αἰτιωτείων ἡμᾶς, do all things himself immediately and miraculously, nature being quite superseded and made to signify nothing. The same further confuted by the slow and gradual process of things in nature, as also by those errors and bungles, that are committed, when the matter proves inept and contumacious, arguing the agent not to be irrefitible. 5. Reasonably inferred, that there is a plastick nature in the universe, as a subordinate instrument of divine providence, in the orderly disposital of matter; but yet so as not without a higher providence prevailing over it, forasmuch as this plastick nature cannot act electively or with discretion. Those laws of nature concerning motion, which the mechanick Theists themselves suppose, really nothing else but a plastick nature. 6. The agreeableness of this doctrine with the sentiments of the best philosophers in all ages, Aristotle, Plato, Empedocles, Heraclius, Hippocrates, Zeno, and the Paracelsians. Anaxagoras, though a professed

Theist,
Theist, severely cenfur'd, both by Aristotle and Plato, as an encourager of atheism, merely because he used material and mechanical causes more than mental and final. Physiologers and astronomers why vulgarly suspect of atheism in Plato's time. 7. The plattick nature no occult quality, but the only intelligible cause of that, which is the grandest of all phenomena, the orderly regularity and harmony of things, which the mechanick Theist's, however pretending to solve all phenomena, can give no account at all of. A God, or infinite mind, affected by them, in vain and to no purpose. 8. Two things here to be performed by us; first, to give an account of the plattick nature, and then to shew how the notion of it hath been mistaken, and abused by Atheists. The first general account of this plattick nature, according to Aristotle, that it is to be conceived as art itself acting, inwardly and immediately, upon the matter; as if harmony living in the musical instruments should move the strings of them without any external impulfe. 9. Two pre-eminences of the plattick nature above human art. First, that whereas human art acts upon the matter from without cumbrousomely and moliminoiusly, with tumult and hurly-burly, nature acting on it from within more commandingly doth its work easily, cleverly and silently. Human art acts on the matter mechanically, but nature vitally and magically. 10. The second pre-eminence of nature above human art, that whereas human artist's are often to seek and at a loss, anxiously consult and deliberate, and upon second thoughts mend their former work, nature is never to seek, nor unresolved what to do, nor doth she ever repent afterwards of what she hath done, changing her former course. Human artist's themselves consult not, as artist's, but only for want of art; and therefore nature, though never consulting, may act artificially. Concluded, that what is called nature is really the divine art. 11. Nevertheless, that nature is not the divine art, pure and abstrad, but concreted and embodied in matter, ratio merita & confusa; not the divine art archetypal, but cypal. Nature differs from the divine art, as the manuary optician from the architete. 12. Two imperfections of the plattick nature, in respect whereof it falls short even of human art; first, that though it act for ends artificially, yet itself neither intends those ends, nor understands the reason of what it doth, and therefore cannot act effectively. The difference between the plattick reasons and knowledge. Nature doth but ape or mimic the divine art or wildom, being not matter of that reason, according to which it acts, but only a servant to it, and drudging executor of it. 13. Proved that there may be such a thing as acts artificially, though itself do not comprehend that art, by which its motions are governed; first from musical habits; the dancer resembles the artificial life of nature. 14. The same further evinced from the instincts of bruteanimals, directing them to act rationally and artificially, in order to their own good and the good of the universe, without any reason of their own. The instincts in brutes but passive impres of the divine wildom, and a kind of fate upon them. 15. The second imperfection of the plattick nature, that it acts without animal fancy,  Guzzle, express con-fenfe, and
and consciousness, and is devoid of self-perception and self-enjoyment. 16. Whether this energy of the plastick nature be to be called cogitation or no, but a logomachy or contention about words. Granted, that what moves matter vitally, must needs do it by some energy of its own, distinct from local motion; but that there may be a simple vital energy, without that duplication, which is in synæsthesia, or clear and express consciousness. Nevertheless, that the energy of nature might be called a certain drowsy, unawakend, or alonish'd cogitation. 17. Instances, which render it probable, that there may be a vital energy, without synæsthesia, clear and express consciousness, or consciousness. 18. The plastick nature, acting neither knowingly nor phantastically, acts fatally, magically and sympathetically. The divine laws and fate, as to matter, not mere cogitation in the mind of God, but an energetic and effectual principle; and the plastick nature, the true and proper fate of matter, or the corporeal world. What magic is, and that nature, which acts fatally, acts also magically and sympathetically. 19. That the plastick nature, though it be the divine art and fate, yet for all that, it is neither god nor goddes, but a low and imperfect creature; it acting artificially and rationally no otherwise, than compounded forms of letters, when printing coherent philosophick sense; nor for ends, than a saw or hatchet in the hands of a skilful mechanic. The plastick and vegetative life of nature the lowest of all lives, and inferior to the sensitive. A higher providence than that of the plakstick nature governing the corporeal world itself. 20. Notwithstanding which, so far as much as the plastick nature is a life, it must needs be incorporeal. One and the same thing, having in it an entire model and platform, and acting upon several distant parts of matter at once coherently, cannot be corporeal; and though Aristotle no where declares whether his nature be corporeal or incorporeal (which he neither doth clearly concerning the rational soul) and his followers conclude it to be corporeal, yet according to the very principles of that philosophy it must needs be otherwise. 21. The plastick nature being incorporeal, must either be a lower power lodged in souls, that are also conscious, sensible or rational; or else a distinct substantial life by itself, and inferior kind of soul. How the Platonists complicate both these together; with Aristotle's agreeable determination, that nature is either part of a soul, or not without soul. 22. The plastick nature as to animals, according to Aristotle, a part or lower power of their respective souls. That the phænomena prove a plastick nature or arches in animals, to make which a distinct thing from the soul, is to multiply entities without necessity. The soul endued with a plastick power, the chief formatrix of its own body, the contribution of certain other causes not excluded. 23. That besides that plastick principle in particular animals, forming them as so many little worlds, there is a general plastick nature in the whole corporeal universe, which likewise, according to Aristotle, is either a part and lower power of a conscious mundane soul, or else something depending on it. 24. That no less according to Aristotle than Plato and Socrates, our selves partake of life from the life of the universe, as well as we do of heat and cold,
from the heat and cold of the universe; from whence it appears, that
Aristotle also held the world's animation, with further undeniable proof
to the two most considerable places of that philosopher, that seem to imply the contrary. That Aristotle's first immovable mover was no soul, but a perfect intellect abstract from matter; but that he supposed this to move only as a final cause, or as being loved, and besides it, a mundane soul and plastic nature, to move the heavens efficiently. Neither Aristotle's nature, nor his mundane soul, the supreme Deity. However, though there be no such mundane soul, as both Plato and Aristotle conceived, yet notwithstanding there may be a plastic nature depending upon a higher intellectual principle. 25. No imposibility of some other particular plastic principles; and though it be not reasonable to think, that every plant, herb, and pile of grass, hath a plastic or vegetative soul of its own, nor that the earth is an animal; yet that there may possibly be one plastic unconscious nature in the whole terraqueous globe, by which vegetables may be severally organized and framed, and all things performed, which transcend the power of fortuitous mechanism. 26. Our second undertaking, which was to shew how grossly those Atheists (who acknowledge this plastic nature) misunderstand it and abuse the notion, to make a counterfeit God-Almighty or Numin of it, to the exclusion of the true Deity. First, in their supposing, that to be the first and highest principle of the universe, which is the last and lowest of all lives, a thing as essentially derivative from, and dependent upon a higher intellectual principle, as the echo on the original voice. 27. Secondly, in their making sense and reason in animals to emerge out of a senselss life of nature, by the mere modification and organization of matter. That no duplication of corporeal organs can ever make one single unconscious life to advance into redoubled consciousness and self-enjoyment. 28. Thirdly, in attributing perfect knowledge and understanding to this life of nature, which yet themselves suppose to be devoid of all animal sense and consciousness. 29. Lastly, in making the plastic life of nature to be merely corporeal; the Hylozoists contending, that it is but an inadequate conception of body, as the only substance; and fondly dreaming, that the vulgar notion of God is nothing but such an inadequate conception of the matter of the whole universe, mistaked for a complete and entire substance by itself, the cause of all things.
The True Intellectual System of the Universe.

Book I.

Chapter IV.

The idea of God declared, in way of answer to the first atheistic argument. The grand prejudice against the naturality of this idea, as essentially including unity or oneliness in it, from the Pagan polytheism, removed. Proved that the intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged one supreme Deity. What their polytheism and idolatry was; with some account of Christianity. 1. The either stupid insensibility, or gross impudence of Atheists, in denying the word God to have any signification, or that there is any other idea answering to it besides the mere phantasm of the sound. The disease called by the philosopher ἀπολύων τὰ υπότακτα, the petrification (or dead insensibility) of the mind. 2. That the Atheists themselves must needs have an idea of God in their minds, or otherwise when they deny his existence, they should deny the existence of nothing. And that they have also the same idea of him with Theists, they denying the very same thing which the others affirm. 3. A lemma, or preparatory proposition to the idea of God, that though some things be made or generated, yet it is not possible, that all things should be made, but something must of necessity exist of itself from eternity unmade, and be the cause of those other things that are made. 4. The two most opposite opinions, concerning that which was self-existent from eternity, or unmade, and the cause of all other things made: one, that it was nothing but sensible matter, the most imperfect of all things; the other, that it was something most perfect, and therefore conscientiously intellectual. The asserters of this latter
latter opinion, Theïsts in a strict and proper sense; of the former, Atheists. So that the idea of God in general is a perfect conscientiously understanding being (or mind) self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things. 5. Observed, that the Theïsts, who deny a God, according to the true idea of him, do often abuse the word, calling senflless matter by that name, and meaning nothing else thereby but a first principle, or self-existent unmade thing. That according to this notion of the word God, there can be no such thing as an Atheist, no man being able to persuade himself, that all things sprung from nothing. 6. In order to the more punctual declaration of the divine idea, the opinion of those taken notice of, who suppose two self-existent unmade principles, God and matter; and so God not to be the sole, but only the chief principle. 7. That these are but imperfect and mistaken Theïsts. Their idea of God declared, with its defectiveness. A latitude in thefin. None to be condemned for absolute Atheists, but such as deny an eternal unmade mind, ruling over matter. 8. The most compendious idea of God, an absolutely perfect being. That this includes not only conscious intelligibility and necessary existence, but also omnicausality, omnipotence and infinite power; and therefore God the sole principle of all, and cause of matter. The true notion of infinite power. Pagans acknowledged the divine omnipotence. And that the Atheists supposed infinite power to be included in the idea of God, proved from Lucretius. 9. That absolute perfection implies something more than power and knowledge. A volition in mens minds of a higher good than either. That God is better than knowledge, according to Aristotle; and that there is morality in the nature of God, wherein his chief happiness consists. This borrowed from Plato, who makes the highest perfection, and supreme Deity, to be goodness itself, above knowledge and intellect. God, and the supreme good, according to the scripture, love. God no soft or fond love, but an impartial law, and the measure of all things. That the Atheists supposed goodness also to be included in the idea of God. The idea of God more explicit and unfolded, a being absolutely perfect, infinitely good, wise and powerful, necessarily existent; and not only the framer of the world, but also the cause of all things. 10. That this idea of God essentially includes unity or oneness in it; since there can be but one supreme, one cause of all things, one omnipotent, and one infinitely perfect. This unity or oneness of the Deity supposed also by Epicurus and Lucretius, who professedly denied a God, according to this idea. 11. The grand prejudice against the naturalness of this idea of God, as it essentially includes unity and sameness, from the polytheism of all nations foremost, besides the Jews, and of all the wise men and philosophers: from whence it is inferred, that this idea of God is but artificial, and owes its original to laws and institutions. An enquiry to be made concerning the true sense of the Pagan polytheism. That the objectors take it for granted, that the Pagan polytheists universally asserted many self-existent intellectual beings, and independent deities, as so many partial causes of the world. 12. First, the irrationality of this opinion, and its manifest repugnancy to the phenomena, which render it less probable to have been the belief of all the Pagan polytheists. 13. Secondly,
that no such thing at all appears, as that ever any intelligent Pagans asserted a multitude of eternal, unmade, independent deities. The Hesiodian gods. The Valentinian Æons. The nearest approach made thereto by the Manichean good and evil gods. This doctrine not generally asserted by the Greek philosophers, as Plutarch affirmeth. Questioned whether the Persian evil Demon or Arimanis were a self-existent principle, essentially evil. Aristotle's confutation and expostion of many principles, or independent deities. Faustus the Manichean his conceit, that the Jews and Christians paganized, in the opinion of monarchy, with St. Austin's judgment, concerning the Pagans, thereupon. 14. Concluded that the Pagan polytheism must be understood according to another equivocation in the word gods, as used for created intellectual beings, superior to men, that ought to be religiously worshipped. That the Pagans held both many gods and one God, (as Onatus the Pythagorean declares himself) in different senses: many inferior deities subordinate to one supreme. 15. Further evidence of ibis, that the intelligent Pagan polytheists held only a plurality of inferior deities, subordinate to one supreme: first, because after the emersion of Christianity, and its contest with Paganism, when occasion was offered, not only no Pagan asserted a multiplicity of independent deities, but also all universally disclaimed it, and professed to acknowledge one supreme God. 16. That this was no refinement or interpolation of Paganism, as might possibly be suspected, but that the doctrine of the most ancient Pagan theologers, and greatest promoters of Polytheism, was agreeable hereunto; which will be proved, not from suspected writings, (as of Trismegist and the Sibyls) but such as are indubitate. First, that Zoroafter, the chief promoter of polytheism in the eastern parts, acknowledged one supreme Deity, the maker of the world, proved from Eubulus in Porphyry, besides his own words cited by Eusebius. 17. That Orpheus, commonly called by the Greeks the Theologer, and the father of the Greceanick polytheism, clearly asserted one supreme Deity, proved by his own words, out of Pagan records. 18. That the Egyptians themselves, the most polytheistical of all nations, had an acknowledgement amongst them of one supreme Deity. 19. That the poets, who were the greatest depravers of the Pagan theology, and, by their fables of the gods, made it look more aristocratically, did themselves notwithstanding acknowledge a monarchy, one prince and father of gods. That famous passage of Sophocles not to be suspected, though not found in any of these tragedies now extant. 20. That all the Pagan philosophers, who were Theists, universally asserted a mundane monarchy. Pythagoras, as much a Polytheist as any, and yet his first principle of things, as well as numbers, a monad or unity. Anaxagoras his one mind ordering all things for good. Xenophanes his one and all, and his one God the greatest among the gods. 21. Parmenides his supreme God, one immovable. Empedocles his both many gods junior to friendship and contention, and his one God, called τὸ διὸ, senior to them. Zeno Eleates his demonstration of one God, in Aristotle. 22. Philolans his prince and governor of all God always one. Euclides Megarensis his God, called ἦν τὸ ἐν κόσμῳ, one the very good. Timeus Locrus his mind and good, above the soul of the world. Antithenes his one natural God.
God. Onatus bis Corypheus. 23. Generally believed and true, that Socrates acknowledged one supreme God; but that he disclaimed all the inferior gods of the Pagans, a vulgar error. Plato also a polytheist, and that passage, which some lay to great stress upon, (that he was serious when he began his epistles with God, but when with gods jocular) spurious and counterfeit; and yet he was notwithstanding an undoubted Monotheist also in another sense; an asserter of one God over all, of a maker of the world, of a first God, of a greatest of the gods. The first hypostasis of the Platonick trinity properly the king of all things, for whose sake are all things; the father of the cause and prince of the world, that is, of the eternal intellect, or Θεός. 24. Aristotle an acknowledger of many gods (be accounting the stars such) and yet an express asserter of Θεός, one prince, one immovable mover. 25. Cleanthus and Chrysippus Stoicks, though they filled the whole heaven, earth, air and sea with gods, yet notwithstanding they acknowledged only one God immortal, Jupiter; all the rest being consumed into him, in the successive conflagrations, and afterwards made anew by him. Cleanthus his excellent and devout hymn to the supreme God. 26. Endeavours to cite all the passages of the later Pagan writers and polytheists, in which one supreme God is asserted. Excellent discourses in some of them concerning the Deity, particularly Plotinus, who, though he derived all things, even matter itself, from one supreme Deity, yet was a contender for many gods. 27. This not only the opinion of philosophers and learned men, but also the general belief of the Pagan vulgar: that there was one supreme God, proved from Maximus Tyrius. The Romans Deus optimus maximus. The Pagans, when most serious, speak of God singularly. Kyrie Eleison part of the Pagans litany to the supreme God. The more civilized Pagans at this very day acknowledge one supreme Deity, the maker of the world. 28. Plutarch's testimony, that, notwithstanding the variety of Paganick religions, and the different names of gods used in them, yet one reason, mind or providence ordering all things, and its inferior ministers, were alike every where worshipped. 29. Plain that the Pagan Theists must needs acknowledge one supreme Deity, because they generally believed the whole world to be one animal, governed by one soul. Some Pagans made this soul of the world their supreme God; others an abstract mind superior to it. 30. The Hebrew doctors generally of this persuasion, that the Pagans worshipped one supreme God, and that all their other gods were but mediators betwixt him and men. 31. Lastly, this confirmed from scripture. The Pagans knew God. Aratus bis Jupiter, and the Athenians unknown God, the true God. 32. In order to a fuller explication of the Pagan theology, and shewing the occasion of its being misunderstood, three heads requisite to be insisted on. First, that the Pagans worshipped one supreme God under many names. Secondly, that besides this one God, they worshipped also many gods, which were indeed inferior deities subordinate to him. Thirdly, that they worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods in images, statues and symbols, sometimes abusively called also gods. First, that the supreme God amongst the Pagans was polyonymous, and worshipped under several personal names, according to his several attributes and the manifesta-
tions of them, his gifts and effects in the world. 33. That upon the same account, things not substantial were personated and deified by the Pagans, and worshipped as so many several names and notions of one God. 34. That as the whole corporeal world animated was supposed by some of the Pagans to be the supreme God, so he was worshipped in the several parts and members of it (having personal names bestowed upon them) as it were by parcels and piece-meal, or by so many inadequate conceptions. That some of the Pagans made the corporeal world the temple of God only, but others the body of God. 35. The second head proposed, that besides the one supreme God, under several names, the Pagans acknowledged and worshipped also many gods; both corporeal, made gods, created intellectual beings superior to men. 36. The Pythagorick or Platonick trinity of divine hypostases. And the higher of the inferior deities, according to this hypothesis, Nous, Psyche, and the whole corporeal world; with particular Noes and Henades. 37. The other inferior deities acknowledged as well by the vulgar as philosophers, of three sorts. First, the sun, moon and stars, and other greater parts of the universe animated, called sensible gods. 38. Secondly, their inferior deities invisible, ethereal and aerial animals, called demons. These appointed by the supreme Deity to preside over kingdoms, cities, places, persons and things. 39. The last sort of the Pagan inferior deities, heroes and Sêvounoii, or men-gods. Euemerus taxed by Plutarch, for making all the Pagan gods nothing but dead men. 40. The third general head proposed, that the Pagans worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods in images, statues and symbols. That first of all, before images and temples, rude stones and pillars without sculpture were erected for religious monuments, and called βασιλεῖς, or Bethels. 41. That afterwards images, statues and symbols were used, and housed in temples. These placed in the west-end of the temples to face the east; so that the Pagans entering, worshipped towards the west: one probable occasion of the ancient Christians praying towards the east. The golden calf made for a symbolick presence of the God of Israel. 42. All the parts of the entire Pagan religion represented together at once in Plato. 43. That some late writers, not well understanding the sense of Pagans, have confounded all their theology, by supposing them to worship the animate parts of the world as such, for gods; therefore distinguishing between their animal and their natural gods. That no corporeal thing was worshipped by the Pagans either wife, than either as being itself animated with a particular soul of its own, or as being part of the whole animated world, or as having demons presiding over it, to whom the worship was properly directed; or lastly, as being images or symbols of divine things. 44. That though the Egyptians be said to have worshipped brute animals, and were generally therefore condemned by the other Pagans; yet the wife of them used them only as hieroglyphicks and symbols. 45. That the Pagans worshipped not only the supreme God, but also the inferior deities, by material sacrifices. Sacrifices or fire-offerings, in their first and general notion nothing else but gifts and signs of gratitude, and appendices of prayer. But that animal sacrifices had afterwards a particular notion also of expiation fastened on them, whether by divine direction, or human agreement, left undetermined. 46. The Pagans apology
apology for the three forementioned things. First, for worshipping one supreme God under many personal names, and that not only according to bis several attributes, but also his several manifestations, gifts and effects, in the visible world. With an excuse for those corporeal Thelẞs, who worshipped the whole animated world as the supreme God, and the several parts of it under personal names, as living members of him. 47. Their apology for worshipping, besides the one supreme God, many inferior Deities. That they worshipping them only as inferior could not therefore be guilty of giving them that honour, which was proper to the supreme. That they honoured the supreme God incomparably above all. That they put a difference in their sacrifices; and that material sacrifices were not the proper worship of the supreme God, but rather below him. 48. Several reasons of the Pagans, for giving religious worship to inferior created beings. First, that this honour, which is bestowed upon them, does ultimately redound to the supreme God, and aggrandize his state and majesty, they being all his ministers and attendants. 49. That as demons are mediators betwixt the celestial gods and men, so these celestial gods, and all the other inferior deities, are themselves also mediators betwixt man and the supreme God, and as it were convenient steps, by which we ought with reverence to approach him. 50. That there is an honour in justice due to all those excellent beings that are above us; and that the Pagans do but honour every thing as they ought, in that due rank and place, in which the supreme God hath set it. 51. That demons or angels being appointed to preside over kingdoms, cities and persons, and the several parts of the corporeal universe, and being many ways benefactors to us, thanks ought to be returned to them by sacrifice. 52. That the inferior gods, demons and heroes, being all of them able to do us either good or hurt, and being also irascible, and therefore provokable by our neglect of them, it is as well our interest as our duty to pacify and appease them by worship. 53. Lastly, that it cannot be thought, that the supreme God will envy those inferior gods that worship or honour, which is bestowed upon them; nor suspected, that any of those inferior deities will maliciously go about to set up themselves against the supreme God. 54. That many of the Pagans worshipped none but good demons, and that those of them, who worshipped evil ones, did it only in order to their appeasement and mitigation, that so they might do them no hurt. None but magicians to be accounted properly devil-worshippers, who honour evil demons, in order to the gratification of their revenge, lust and ambition. 55. The Pagans plead, that those demons, who delivered oracles, and did miracles among them, must needs be good, since there cannot be a greater reproach to the supreme God, than to suppose him to appoint evil demons as presidents and governors over the world, or to suffer them to have so great a sway and share of power in it. The faith of Plato in divine providence, that the good every where prevails over the bad, and that the Delphick Apollo was therefore a good demon. 56. The Pagans apology for worshipping the supreme God in images, statues and symbols. That these are only jocastically worshipped by them, the honour passifying from them to the prototype. And that since we living in bodies cannot easily have a conception of any thing without
without some corporeal image or phantasma, thus much must be indulged to the
infirnity of human nature (at least in the vulgar) to the worship of God,
corporeally in images, to prevent their running to atheism. 57. That though
it should appear by this apology of the Pagans, that their case were not alto-
gether so bad as is commonly supposed, yet they cannot be justified thereby
in the three particulars above mentioned, but the scripture-condemnation of them
is irrefragable, that knowing God, they did not glorify him as God, or sanctify
his name; that is, worship him according to his uncommon and incommunic-
able, his peculiar and incoercible, transcendent and singular, incomparable and
unresemblable nature; but mingled, some way or other, creature-worship with
the worshipping of the creator. First, that the worshipping of one God in his va-
rious gifts and effects, under several personal names, a thing in it self ab-
surd, may also prove a great occasion of atheism, when the things themselves
come to be called by those names, as wine Bacchus, corn Ceres. The con-
cclusion easily following from thence, that the good things of nature are the only
deities. But to worship the corporeal world it self animated, as the supreme
God, and the parts of it as the members of God, plainly to confound God with
the creature, and not to glorify him as creator, nor according to his separate
and spiritual nature. 58. To give religious worship to demons or angels,
heroes or fants, or any other intellectual creatures, though not honouring
them equally with the supreme God, is to deny God the honour of his bkolings,
his singular, incoercible, and incommunicable nature, as he is the only self-
originated being, and the creator of all of, whom, through whom, and to whom
are all things. As God is such a being, that there is nothing like him, so
ought the worship which is given him, to be such as hath nothing like to it, a
singular, separate and incommunicate worship. They not to be religiously
worshipped, that worship. 59. That the religious worship of created spirits
proceeded chiefly from a fear, that if they were not worshipped, they would
be provoked and do hurt, which is both highly injurious to good spirits, and a
distrust of the sufficiency of God's power to protect his worshippers. That all
good spirits univok'd are of themselves efficiously ready to assist those, who
sincerely worship and propitiate the supreme Deity, and therefore no need of the
religious worship of them, which would be also offensive to them. 60. That
mens praying to images and statues is much more ridiculous than children's
talking to babies made of clouts, but not so innocent; they thereby degrading both
themselves and God, not glorifying him according to his spiritual and unre-
semblable nature, but changing the glory of the incorruptible God into the
likeness of corruptible man or beast. 61. The mistake of those, who think, none
can be guilty of idolatry, that believe one God the maker of the world.
62. That from the same ground of reason, that nothing ought to be religiously
worshipped besides the supreme God, or whom he appoints to represent himself
(because he ought to be justified, and dealt withal, according to his singu-
lar nature, as unlike to every thing) it follows, contrary to the opinion of some
opposers of idolatry, that there ought also to be a discrimination made between
things sacred and profane, and reverence used in divine worship. Idolatry
and sacrilege allied. 63. Another scripture-charge upon the Pagans, that
they were devil-worshippers; not as though they intended all their worship
to evil demons or devils as such, but because their polytheism and idolatry (un-
acceptable to God and good spirits) was promoted by evil spirits delivering
oracles and doing miracles for the confirmation of it, they also insinuating
themselves into the temples and statues, therefore the worship was look'd upon,
as done to them. The same thing said of others besides Pagans, that they
worshipped Devils. 64. Proved that they were evil demons, who delivered
oracles, and did miracles amongst the Pagans, for the carrying on of that reli-
gion, from the many obscene rites and mysteries, not only not prohibited, but also
enjoined by them. 65. The same thing further proved from other cruel and
bloody rites, but especially that of man-sacrifices. Plutarch's clear acknowledg-
ment, that both the obscene rites and man-sacrifices, amongst the Pa-
gans owed their original to wicked demons. 66. That the God of Israel
neither required nor accepted of man-sacrifices, against a modern Diatribist.
67. That what faith fore'er Plato might have in the Delphic Apollo, he was
no other than an evil demon, or devil. An answer to the Pagans argument
from divine providence. 68. That the Pagans religion, unfound in its foun-
dation, was infinitely more corrupted and depraved by means of these four
things; first, the superstition of the ignorant vulgar. 69. Secondly, the li-
ceentious figments of poets and fable-mongers, frequently condemned by Plato
and other wiser Pagans. 70. Thirdly the craft of priests and politicians.
71. Lastly, the imposure of evil demons or devils. That by means of these
four things, the pagan religion became a most foul and unclean thing. And
as some were captivated by it under a most grievous yoke of superstition, so
others strongly inclined to atheism. 72. Plato not insensible, that the Pagan
religion stood in need of reformation; nevertheless supposing many of those re-
ligious rites to have been introduced by visions, dreams, and oracles, he con-
cluded, that no wise legislator would, of his own head, venture to make an
alteration: implying, that this was a thing not to be effected otherwise than
by divine revelation and miracles. The generally received opinion of the
Pagans, that no man ought to trouble himself about religion, but consent him-
self to worship God, ναϊνα πανεοι, according to the law of that country which
he lived in. 73. Wherefore God Almighty, in great compassion to mankind,
designed himself to reform the religion of the Pagan world, by introducing
another religion of his own framing instead of it; after he had first made a
preludium thereto in one nation of the Israelites, where he expressly pro-
hibited, by a voice out of the fire, in his first commandment, the Pagan po-
ytheism, or the worshipping of either inferior deities besides himself; and in
the second, their idolatry, or the worshipping of the supreme God in images,
various or symbols. Besides which, he restrained the use of sacrifices: as
also successively gave predictions, of a Messiah to come, such as together with
miracles might reasonably conciliate faith to him when he came. 74. That
afterwards, in due time, God sent the promised Messiah, who was the eterna
Word hypostatically united with a pure human soul and body; and so a true
Ιησους Χριστος, or God-man: designing him for a living temple and visible statue
or image, in which the Deity should be represented and worshipped; as also
after his death and resurrection, when he was to be invested with all power
and authority, for a prince and king, a mediator and intercessor between
God
75. That this Θεομαν, or God-man, was so far from intending to require men-sacrifices of his worshipers, as the Pagan demons did, that he devoted himself to be a catharum and expiatory sacrifice for the sins of the whole world; and thereby also abolished all sacrifices or oblations by fire whatsoever, according to the divine predication. 76. That the Christian trinity, though a mystery, is more agreeable to reason than the Platonick; and that there is no absurdity at all in supposing the pure soul and body of the Messiah to be made a living temple or Shechinah, image or statue of the Deity. That this religion of one God and one Mediator, or Θεομαν, God-man, preached to the Pagan world, and confirmed by miracles, did effectually destroy all the Pagan inferior deities, middle gods and mediators, demons and heroes, together with their statues and images. 77. That it is no way incongruous to suppose, that the divine Majesty, in prescribing a form of religion to the world, should graciously condescend to comply with human infirmity, in order to the removing of two such grand evils as polytheism and idolatry, and the bringing of men to worship God in spirit and in truth. 78. That demons and angels, heroes and saints, are different names for the same things, which are made gods by being worshipped. And that the introducing of angel and saint-worship, together with image-worship, into Christianity, seems to be a defect of one grand design of God Almighty in it, and the paganizing of that, which was intended for the un paganizing of the world. 79. Another key for Christianity in the Scripture, not disagreeing with the former, that since the way of wisdom and knowledge proved ineffectual as to the generality of mankind, men might, by the contrivance of the gospel, be brought to God and a holy life (without profound knowledge) in the way of believing. 80. That according to the Scripture, there is a higher, more precious and diviner light, than that of theory and speculation. 81. That in Christianity, all the great, godly, and most glorious things of this world, are flurred and disgraced, comparatively with the life of Christ. 82. And that there are all possible engines in it to bring men up to God, and engage them in a holy life. 83. Two errors here to be taken notice of; the first, of those, who make Christianity nothing but an Antinomian plot against real righteousness, and as it were a secret confederacy with the devil. The second, of those, who turn that into matter of mere notion and opinion, dispute and controversy, which was designed by God only as a contrivance, machine or engine, to bring men effectually to a holy and godly life. 84. That Christianity may be yet further illustrated, from the consideration of the adversary or Satanic power, which is in the world. This no Manichean substantial evil principle, but a polity of lapsed angels, with which the souls of wicked men are also incorporated, and may therefore be called the kingdom of darkness. 85. The history of the fallen angels in Scripture briefly explained. 86. The concurrent agreement of the Pagans concerning evil demons or devils, and their activity in the world. 87. That there is a perpetual war betwixt two polities or kingdoms in the world, the one of light, the other of darkness; and that our Saviour Christ, or the Messiah, is appointed the head or chieftain over the heavenly militia, or the forces of the kingdom of light.
88. That there will be at length a palpable and signal overthrow of the
Satanical power, and whole kingdom of darkness, by Θεός ἀνθρώπων;
God appearing in an extraordinary and miraculous manner; and that
this great affair is to be managed by our Saviour Christ, as God’s vice-
gerent, and a visible judge both of quick and dead. 89. That our Sa-
vior Christ designed not to set up himself factiously against God-almighty,
not to be accounted Θεός ἀνθρώπων, superior to God, but that when he hath
done his work, and put down all adversary power, himself will then be
subject to God, even the father, that so God may be all in all. 90.
Lastly, having spoken of three forms of religions, the J e w i s h, Ch r i s t i a n,
and the Pagan, and there remaining only a fourth the Mahometan, in
which the divine monarchy is zealously asser ted, we may now conclude, that
the idea of God (as essentially including unity in it) hath been entertained
in all forms of religion. An account of that seemingly-strange phenomenon
of providence; the rise, growth, and continuance of the Mahometan religion
not to be attempted by us, at least in this place.

HAVING in the former chapter prepared the way, we shall now
proceed (with the divine assistance) to answer and confute all those
atheistical arguments before proposed. The first whereof was
this, That there is no idea of God, and therefore, either no such thing exis-
ting in nature, or at least no possible evidence of it.

To affirm, that there is no idea of God, is all one as to affirm, that there
is no conception of the mind answering to that word or name; and this the
modern Atheists stick not to maintain, that the word God hath no signifi-
cation, and that there is no other idea or conception in men’s minds, an-
swering thereunto, besides the mere phantasm of the sound. Now for any
one to go about soberly to confute this, and to prove, that God is not the
only word without a signification, and that men do not every where pay all
their religious devotions to the mere phantasm of a transient sound, ex-
pecting all good from it, might very well seem to all intelligent persons
a most absurd and ridiculous undertaking; both because the thing is so evi-
dent in itself, and because the plainest things of all can least be proved; for
ὁ πάντα ἀπόθεσιν νεομικως, ·πνεύμα ἄντος ἐναφερ. He that thinks all things to be
demonstrable, takes away demonstration itself. Wherefore we shall here-
only suggest thus much, that since there are different words for God in se-
veral languages, and men have the same notion or conception in their minds,
answering to them all, it must needs be granted, that they have some other
idea or conception belonging to those words, besides the phantasms of their
several sounds. And indeed it can be nothing else, but either monstrous fort-
fulness and stupidity of mind, or else prodigious impudence, in these Atheists
to deny, that there is any idea of God at all in the minds of men, or that
the word hath any signification.
It was heretofore observed by Epictetus, άν τις είπεραί προς τά ζάχα ἐκφαν, Arria, l. i. c. πρὸς τοὺς οὓς ρᾴδιον ἐν τῷ ἑρᾷ λόγῳ, οὗ μεταπειτεῖ τίς ἀντίκα τοῦ δὲ οὗτο ἴμα παλάς τίνι ἑκάτοι γινάλει δύναμιν, οὗτο παρά τίνι ἀφικνοφοί αἴτουσ. That if any man will oppose or contradict the most evident truths, it will not be easy to find arguments where with to convince him. And yet this notwithstanding ought neither to be imputed to any inability in the teacher, nor to any strength of wit in the denier, but only to a certain dead insensibility in him. Whereupon he further adds, that there is a double ἀποκεφάλωσις or ἀπολήμφωσις, mortification or petrification of the soul; the one, when it is stupified and befotted in its intellecutals; the other, when it is bedeaded in its morals as to that pudor, that naturally should belong to a man. And he concludes, that either of these states (though it be not commonly so apprehended) is a condition little less deplorable, than that of bodily death; as also that such a person is not at all to be disputed with. For ποιὰν αὐτὴν τὴν ἡ ποίησιν σίδηρον προσάγω, ἡν αὐὴται οἵ τινες ἐκφανον τις λέγειν; οὗ τέκνων μὴ ἄνθρωπον ἀνελθεῖν; εἰς χέριον ἢ τῆς τεκνων, εἰκότης: γιὰ τὸ ἀδόματον αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ διδάγαν. What sword can one bring, or what fire, by burning or flashing, to make such a one perceive that he is dead? But if be be sofiable, and will not acknowledge it, then he is worse than dead, being caffrated to that pudor, that belongs to a man. Moreover, that philosopher took notice, that in those times, when this denial of most evident truths proceeded rather from impudence than stupidity or fottishness, the vulgar would be apt to admire it for strength of wit and great learning; ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ αἴθημα ἀνελθεῖθαι, τοῦτο ἢ τῇ δύναμιν καλοῦμαι. But if any man's pudor be dead or mortified in him, we call this power and strength.

Now as this was sometimes the case of the Academicks, so is it also commonly of the Atheists, that their minds are partly petrified and benumbed into a kind of fottish and stupid insensibility, so that they are not able to discern things that are most evident; and partly depredated, or become so void of shame, as that though they do perceive, yet they will obstinately and impudently deny the plainest things that are, as this, that there is any idea anwering to the word God, besides the phantasm of the found. And we do the rather insist upon this prodigious monstrosity of Atheists in this place, because we shall have occasion afterwards more than once to take notice of it again in other instances, as when they affirm, that local motion and cogitation are really one and the self-same thing, and the like. And we conceive it to be unquestionably true, that it is many times nothing else, but either this shameless impudence, or fottish insensibility in Atheists, that is admired by the ignorant for profoundness of wit and learning, αἵλλα ταύτι τῶν δύναμει ἐπιτο; μὴ γίνετο; εἰ μὴ ἐξ ἐν τῶν Κινάδων, καθ' ἐν τόν ἐπελθὼν ἐν μέγεθ τοῦ παντός τοῦ Κόσμος. But shall I call this power or wit, and commend it upon that account? no more than I will commend the impudence of the Cinaedi, who stick not publicly to θο and say any thing.

1 Epistic. apud Arrian, ubi supra, p. 96.
II. But whatever these Atheists deny in words, it is notwithstanding evident, that even themselves have an idea or conception in their minds answering to the word God, when they deny his existence, because otherwise they should deny the existence of nothing. Nor can it be at all doubted, but that they have also the same idea of God with Theists, they denying the existence of no other thing than what these affirm. And as in all other controversies, when men dispute together, the one affirming, the other denying, both parties must needs have the same idea in their minds of what they dispute about, or otherwise their whole disputation would be but a kind of Babel language and confusion; so must it be likewise in this present controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists. Neither indeed would there be any controversy at all between them, did they not both by God mean one and the same thing; nor would the Atheists be any longer Atheists, did they not deny the existence of that very same thing, which the Theists affirm, but of something else.

III. Wherefore we shall in the next place declare what this idea of God is, or what is that thing, whose existence they that affirm, are called Theists, and they who deny Atheists. In order whereunto, we must first lay down this lemma or preparatory proposition, that as it is generally acknowledged, that all things did not exist from eternity, such as they are, unmade, but that some things were made and generated or produced; so it is not possible that all things should be made neither, but there must of necessity be something self-existent from eternity, and unmade; because if there had been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. The reason of which is so evident and irresistible, that even the Atheists confefs themselves conquered by it, and readily acknowledge it for an indubitable truth, that there must be something ἅγιον, something which was never made or produced, and which therefore is the cause of those other things that are made, something αὐτόφυς and αὐτοποιός, that was self-originated and self-existing, and which is as well ἄναξ and ἀφθαρσία, as ἅγιον, incorruptible and undestroyable, as ingenerate; whole existence therefore must needs be necessary, because if it were supposed to have happened by chance to exist from eternity, then it might as well happen again to cease to be. Wherefore all the question now is, what is this ἅγιον and ἄναξ, αὐτόφυς and αὐτοποιός, this ingenerate and incorruptible, self-originated and self-existent thing, which is the cause of all other things that are made.

IV. Now there are two grand opinions opposite to one another concerning it: for first, some contend, that the only self-existent, unmade and incorruptible thing, and first principle of all things, is senseless matter, that is, matter either perfectly dead and stupid, or at least devoid of all animalish and conscious life. But because this is really the lowest and most imperfect of all beings, others on the contrary judge it reasonable, that the first principle and original of all things should be that, which is most perfect.
perfect (as *Aristotle* observes of Pherecydes, and his followers, "γενόσωσιν πάντα ἀπὸ τῆς θείας, that they made the first cause and principle of generation to be the best) and then apprehending, that to be endowed with conscious life and understanding is much a greater perfection than to be devoid of both, (as Balbus in Cicero declares upon this very occasion, *Nec dubium quin quod De Nat. Dier. animans sit, habeatique mentem, & rationem, & sensum, id sit melius quam id 2.* quod bis caret) they therefore conclude, that the only unmade thing, which *was the principle, cause and original of all other things, was not senile but the very principle, matter, but a perfect conscious understanding nature, or mind. And these *Oper.* are they, who are strictly and properly called Theists, who affirm, that a perfectly conscious understanding being, or mind, existing of itself from eternity, was the cause of all other things; and they on the contrary, who derive all things from senile matter, as the first original, and deny that there is any conscious understanding being self-existent or unmade, are those that are properly called Atheists. Wherefore the true and genuine idea of God in general, is this, *A perfect conscious understanding being (or mind) existing of itself from eternity, and the cause of all other things.*

V. But it is here observable, that those Atheists, who deny a God, according to this true and genuine notion of him, which we have declared, do often abuse the word, calling senile matter by that name; partly perhaps as in deavouring thereby, to decline that odious and ignominious name of Atheists, and partly as conceiving, that whatsoever is the first principle of things, ingenerative and incorruptible, and the cause of all other things besides itself, must therefore needs be the divinest thing of all. Wherefore by the word God these mean nothing else, but that which is ἄψυχον, unmade or self-existent, and the ἄρχον, or first principle of things. Thus it was before observed, that *Anaximander* called infinite matter, devoid of all manner of life, ἄνθρωποι, or God; and *Pliny* the corporeal world, en-dued with nothing but a plafick unknowing nature, *Numen*; as also others in *Aristotle*; upon the same account, called the inanimate elements gods, as supposd first principles of things, *κόσμος* ἂν ἄρχει, of these are also *Gods*. And indeed *Aristotle* himself seems to be guilty of this misapprehension of abusing the word God after this manner, when speaking of love and chaos, as the two first principles of things, he must, according to the *Metaph. lib. IV.* & *De Genere & Corruptione* of *Aristotle*, agree with that of *Epicharmus* & *Diogenes* of *Laert.* who considered the elements as gods, but of *Em-"
The Asser tors of two unmade principles, Book I.


which the learned Orig en took notice of in his book against Celsus, where he speaks of that religious care, which ought to be had about the use of words: οἱ τῶν μετέκολαθών, καὶ οὐδὲν τούτων περιεχόμεν οἰλαρθές, οὐλομενών, ὑπακούειν, ὑλὰ ἀλλὰς ἔχουσι, ὀλίγα περίσσας, μόνον ἀμαυτοίκος τοῦτο ὑπὸ Θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐφαρμόσας Φίλεις, ἐπὶ οὐκ ἐφαρμόζον. He therefore, that hath but the least consideration of these things, will take a religious care, that he give not improper names to things, lest he should fall into a like miscarriage with those, who attribute the name of God to inanimate and senseless matter. Now according to this false and spurious notion of the word of God, when it is taken for any supposed first principle, or self-existent unmade thing, whatsoever that be, there neither is nor can be any such thing as an Atheist; since whosoever hath but the least dram of reason, must needs acknowledge, that something, or other existed from eternity unmade, and was the cause of those other things that are made. But that notion or idea of God, according to which some are Atheists and some Theists, is in the strictest sense of it, what we have already declared, A perfect mind, or consciously understanding nature, self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things. The genuine Theists being those, who make the first original of all things universally to be a consciously understanding nature (or perfect mind;) but the Atheists properly such, as derive all things from matter, either perfectly dead and stupid, or else devoid of all conscious and animalish life.

VI. But that we may more fully and punctually declare the true idea of God, we must here take notice of a certain opinion of some philosophers, who went as it were in a middle betwixt both the former, and neither made matter alone, nor God, the sole principle of all things; but joined them both together, and held two first principles or self-existent unmade beings, independent upon one another, God, and the matter. Amongst whom the Stoicks are to be reckoned, who, notwithstanding, because they held, that there was no other sub stance besides body, strangely confounded themselves, being by that means necessitated to make their two first principles, the active and the passive, to be both of them really but one and the self-same substance: their doctrine to this purpose being thus declared by Cicero: Naturam dividant in res duas, et altera ejus efficient, altera autem quoddum buit se praebens, ex qua efficeretur aliquid. In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse confe vant; in eo, quod efficeretur, materia quan dam; in utroque tamen utrunque. Neque enim materiam ipsam coherere potuisse, si nullā vi contineretur, neque vim sine aliqua materia; nihil est enim, quod non aliqui esse cogatur. The Stoicks divided nature into two things as the first principles, one whereof is the efficient or artificer, the other that which offers itself to him for things to be made out of it. In the efficient principle they took notice of active force in the patient of matter, but so as that in each of these were both together; forasmuch as neither the matter could cohere together, unless it were contained by some active force, nor the active force subsist of itself without matter, because that is nothing, which is

* Academ. Quæst. Lib. I. Cap. VI. p. 2231. Tom. VIII. Oper. But Cicero in this passage does not treat of the opinion of the Stoicks, but of that of Plato and his ancient followers, or the first Academicks.
But besides these Stoicks, there were other philosophers, who admitting of incorporeal substance did suppose two first principles, as substances really distinct from one another, that were co-existent from eternity, an incorporeal Deity and matter; as for example, Anaxagoras, * See Eust. chel. Ob. chel. Atticus, and many more; inasmuch that Pythagoras himself was reckoned amongst those by Numenius, and Plato by Plutarch and Laertius. Lib.7. c.7.

And we find it commonly taken for granted, that Aristotle also was of this persuasion, though it cannot be certainly concluded from thence (as some seem to suppose) because he affected the eternity of the world; Plotinus, Porphyry, Jamblichus, Proclus and Simplicius doing the like, and yet notwithstanding maintaining, that God was the sole principle of all things, and that matter also was derived from him. Neither will that passage of Aristotle’s in his Metaphysicks necessarily evince the contrary, L.1. c.1. Θεός δὲ καὶ τὸ αὐτών πάντως ἐν εὐθεία τε καὶ ἔξω τοῖς ἐνηχοῖς, God seems to be a cause to all things, [P. 262. Tom.IV. Oper.] and a certain principle; because this might be understood only of the forms of things.

But it is plain, that Plutarch was a maintainer of this doctrine from his discourse upon the Platonick psychogonia, (besides other places) βιβλίων ἐν Πλάτωνι περιθομοὺς τοῦ μὲν κόσμου ὑπὸ Ἡσίου γενογένεις λέγειν καὶ πάντως ὁ μὲν γὰρ καλλίτερος τῶν γενογένεων, ὁ δὲ ἀριστέρος τῶν αἰτίων τῷ δὲ οὐσίαν ἑξ ὅλου, ἔξ ἐς γέροντα, οὐ γενομένως, ἀλλὰ ὑποκειμένως αὐτῷ τῷ σήμερον, εἰς διάθεσιν καὶ τόξων αὐτοῦ, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐφημανομένως, ως ὑπάκουον τῷ παρεχομένῳ οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ δι’ θεοῦ γεέννης, ἀλλὰ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς, μελλόντος ἵκοντος, οὐ γενόμενος, οὐ γεέννης, οὐ ἴκοντος. It is therefore better for us to follow Plato (than Hermathen) and loudly to declare, that the world was made by God. For as the world is theвест of all works, so is God the best of all causes. Nevertheless, the substance or matter, out of which the world was made, was not itself made; but always ready at hand, and subject to the artificer, to be ordered and disposed by him. For the making of the world, was not the production of it out of nothing, but out of an antecedent bad and disorderly state, like the making of an house, garment, or statue.

It is also well known, that Hermogenes and other ancient pretenders to Christianity did in like manner assert the self-existence and improduction of the matter, for which cause they were commonly called Materiarii, or the Materiarian hereticks; they pretending by this means to give an account (as the Stoicks had done before them) of the original of evils, and to free God from the imputation of them. Their ratiocination to which purpose, is thus set down by Tertullian: God made all things, either out of himself, or Adver. Her. out of nothing, or out of matter. He could not make all things out of himself, because himself being always unmade, he should then really have been the maker of nothing: and he did not make all out of nothing, because being essentially good, he would have made nihil non optimum, every thing in the best manner, and so there could have been no evil in the world: but since there are evils, and these could not proceed from the will of God, they must needs arise from the fault of something, and therefore of the matter, out of which things were.

2 Tom.II. Oper. p.1014.
were made. Lastly, it is sufficiently known likewise, that some modern facts of the Christian profession, at this day, do also affect the uncreatedness of the matter. But these suppose, in like manner as the Stoicks did, body to be the only substance.

VII. Now of all these, whosoever they were, who thus maintained two self-existent principles, God and the matter, we may pronounce univerally, that they were neither better nor worse, than a kind of imperfect Theists.

They had a certain notion or idea of God, such as it was, which seems to be the very same with that expressed in Aristotle, \( \text{Z\textcircled{\textalpha} \text{\varepsilon} \text{\iota} \text{\omicron} \text{\varphi} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\omicron} \text{\nu} \text{\micr...
Wherefore these Materiarian Theists acknowledged God to be a perfectly-understanding being, and such as had also power over the whole matter of the universe; which was utterly unable to move itself, or to produce any thing without him. And all of them, except the Anaxagoreans¹, concluded, that he was the creator of all the forms of inanimate bodies, and of the souls of animals. However, it was universally agreed upon amongst them, that he was at least the orderer and disposer of all; and that therefore he might upon that account well be called the ὄμορφος, the maker or framer of the world.

Notwithstanding which, so long as they maintained matter to exist independently upon God, and sometimes also to be refractory and contumacious to him, and by that means to be the cause of evil, contrary to the divine will; it is plain, that they could not acknowledge the divine omnipotence, according to the full and proper sense of it: which may also further appear from these queries of Seneca ² concerning God; Quantum Deus posse? materiam ipse sibi formet, an dat utatur? Deus quicquid vult efficiat? an in multis rebus illum trahitanda desituant, & a magno artifici prædæ formetur multa, non quia cessat ars, sed quia id, in quo exercetur, sepe inobsequens arti est? How far God's power does extend? whether he makes his own matter, or only use that which is offered him? whether he can do whatsoever he will? or the materials in many things frustrate and disappoint him, and by that means things come to be ill-framed by this great artificer, not because his art fails him, but because that, which it is exercised upon, proves stubborn and contumacious? Wherefore, I think, we may well conclude, that those Materiarian Theists had not a right and genuine idea of God.

Nevertheless, it does not therefore follow, that they must needs be concluded absolute Atheists; for there may be a latitude allowed in Theism. And though in a strict and proper sense they be only Theists, who acknowledge one God perfectly omnipotent, the sole original of all things, and as well the cause of matter as of any thing else; yet it seems reasonable, that such consideration should be had of the infirmity of human understandings, as to extend the word further, that it may comprehend within it those also, who affect one intellectual principle self-existent from eternity, the framer and governor of the whole world, though not the creator of the matter; and that none should be condemned for absolute Atheists, merely because they hold eternal uncreated matter, unless they also deny an eternal

unmade mind, ruling over the matter, and so make senseless matter the sole original of all things. And this is certainly most agreeable to common apprehensions; for Democritus and Epicurus would never have been condemned for Atheists merely for ascertaining eternal self-existent atoms, no more than Anaxagoras and Archelaus were, (who maintained the same thing) had they not also denied that other principle of theirs, a perfect mind, and concluded, that the world was made, 

That Omnipotence is included

Book I.

VIII. The true and proper idea of God, in its most contracted form, is this, a being absolutely perfect; for this is that alone, to which necessary existence is essential, and of which it is demonstrable. Now, as absolute perfection includes in it all that belongs to the Deity, so does it not only comprehend (besides necessary existence) perfect knowledge or understanding, but also omni-causality and omnipotence (in the full extent of it;) otherwife called infinite power. God is not only ζωὸν ἄνευς and animans quo nihil in omni natura praesumptus, as the Materiarian Theists described him, the best living being; nor, as Zeno Eleates called him, κράτιστος πάνω, the most powerful of all things; but he is also πανεξιάς, and πανεξιάκις, and πανεξιάτικος, absolutely omnipotent, and infinitely powerful: and therefore neither matter, nor any thing else, can exist of itself independently upon God, but he is the sole principle and source, from which all things are derived.

But because this infinite power is a thing, which the Atheists quarrel much withal, as if it were altogether unintelligible, and therefore impossible; we shall here briefly declare the sense of it, and render it (as we think) easily intelligible or conceivable, in these two following steps: First, that by infinite power is meant nothing else but perfect power, or else, as Simplicius calls it, ὁλὸς ὅλος, a whole and entire power, such as hath no allay and mixture of impotency, nor any defect of power mingled with it. And then again, that this perfect power (which is also the same with infinite) is really nothing else but a power of producing and doing all whatsoever is conceivable, and which does not imply a contradiction; for conception is the only measure of power and its extent, as shall be shewed more fully in due place.

Now, here we think fit to observe, that the Pagan Theists did themselves also vulgarly acknowledge omnipotence as an attribute of the Deity; which might be proved from sundry passages of their writings:

Homer. Od. 65.

Θεὸς ἄλλοτ' ἐπ' ἄλλῳ
Ζεὺς ἀγαθὸνες κακὸνες ἄδοι, δύναται ρᾶς ἀπαντα.

Deus

1 Vide Aristot. Libro de Xenocrate, Zeno, & Gorgias, Cap. III. p. 84c. Tom. II.

2 See note 226, 227.
Chap. IV. in the Divine Idea.

Deus aliud post aliud
Jupiter, bonumque malumque dat, potest enim omnia.

And again, Od. 61.

Orbe xό δύνασθε, το θάνατοι,
"Ordin et tu ζύμω χείλει, δώδεκα χρό χιλιάδα.

Deus autem hoc dabit, illud ommittit, quodcumque ei libitum fuerit, potest enim omnia.

To this purpose also, before Homer, Linus 3,

Páthi πάθα θεῷ τελέσαι, καὶ αὐτόν τε οὐδέρ.

And after him, Callimachus 3,

Δαιμον γείξαι πᾶν δυνάτων

All things are possible for God to do, and nothing transcends his power.

Thus also amongst the Latin poets, Virgil, Æn. the first,

Sed pater omnipotens speluncis abdidit atris.

Again, Æn. the second,

At pater Anchises oculos ad sydera datus
Extulit, & celo palmas cum voce tetendit;
Jupiter omnipotens, precibus & iuclteris ulla;

And, Æn. the fourth,

Talibus orantem dílis, aráisque tenentem
Audiit Omnipotens.

Ovid in like manner, Metamorph. 1.

Tum pater omnipotens misso perfriget Olympum
Fulmine, ò exculsit subjicitum Pelion Ossa.

And to cite no more, Agatho, an ancient Greek poet, is commended by Aristotle, for affirming nothing to be exempted from the power of God but only this, that he cannot make that not to have been, which hath been; that is, do what implies a contradiction.

Hoc namque dictatur negatum etiam Deo est,
Quae faciæ sunt, infera posse reddere.

D d 2 Lastly,

3 Verf. 432, 433.
XXVIII. p. 117, 118.

Erb. Nic. l. 4o
c. 2.
[P. 98. Tom. III. Oper.]
Lastly, that the Atheists themselves under Paganism look'd upon omnipotence and infinite power as an essential attribute of the Deity, appears plainly from Lucretius; when he tells us, that Epicurus, in order to the taking away of religion, set himself to confute infinite power.

--- Omne immensum peragravit mente animoque,
Unde referat nobis victor, quid posset oriri,
Quid nequeat: finita potestas denique quique
Quanam sit ratione, atque alienus herens.

Quare religio pedibus subjicit vicissim
Obiteratur, nos exequat victoria calo.

As if he should have said, Epicurus, by shewing that all power was finite, effectually destroyed religion; he thereby taking away the object of it, which is an omnipotent and infinitely powerful Deity. And this is a thing, which the same poet often harps upon again, that there is no infinite power, and consequently no Deity, according to the true idea of it. But last of all, in his sixth book, he condemns Religionists, as guilty of great folly, in afferting omnipotence or infinite power (that is, a Deity) after this manner:

Rurfus in antiquas referuntur religiones,
Et dominos aures aescunt, omnia polle,
Quos miseris credunt, ignari quid quaeat esse,
Quid nequeat, finita potestas denique quique,
Quanam sit ratione, atque alienus herens:
Quo magis errantes totid regione feruntur.

Where though the poet, speaking carelessly, after the manner of those times, seems to attribute omnipotence and infinite power to gods plurally; yet, as it is evident in the thing itself, that this can only be the attribute of one supreme Deity; so it may be observed, that in those passages of the poets before cited, it is accordingly always ascribed to God singularly. Nevertheless, all the inferior Pagan deities were suppos'd by them to have their certain shares of this divine omnipotence, severally dispenc'd and imparted to them.

**IX.** But we have not yet dispach'd all that belongs to the entire idea of God; for knowledge and power alone will not make a God. For God is generally conceived by all to be a most venerable and most desirable being; whereas an omniscient and omnipotent arbitrary Deity, that hath nothing either of benignity or morality in its nature to measure and regulate its will, as it could not be truly august and venerable, according to that maxim, *fine bonitate nulla majestas*; so neither could it be desirable, it being that which could only be feared and dreaded, but not have any firm faith or confidence placed in it. Plutarch, in the life of Aristides, to Θεον τριών δοξη διαφησιν, αφθαρσι, καὶ δυναμει, καὶ ατιτυ: ου κεμεντανον η αρετη και θειοταιου ει. 2 p. 322. Tom. L. Opdr.
Chap. IV.  

*make not up a God.*

It seems to excel in these three things, incorruptibility, power, and virtue; of all which the most divine and venerable is virtue: for vacuum and the senseless elements have incorruptibility, earthquakes and thunders, blustering winds and overflowing torrents, much of power and force. Wherefore the vulgar being affected three manner of ways towards the Deity, so as to admire its happiness, to fear it, and to honour it; they esteem the Deity happy for its incorruptibility, they fear it and stand in awe of it for its power, but they worship it, that is, love and honour it for its justice. And indeed an omnipotent arbitrary Deity may seem to be in some sense a worse and more undesirable thing, than the Manichean evil god; forasmuch as the latter could be but finitely evil, whereas the former might be so infinitely. However, I think, it can be little doubted, but that the whole Manichean hypotheses, taken all together, is to be preferred before this of one omnipotent arbitrary Deity (devoid of goodness and morality) ruling all things: because there the evil principle is yoked with another principle essentially good, checking and controlling it; and it also seems less dishonourable to God, to impute defect of power than of goodness and justice to him.

Neither can power and knowledge alone make a being in itself completely happy; for we have all of us by nature μαθημάτι τι (as both Plato and Aristotle call it) a certain divination, presage, and parturient vaticination in our minds, of some higher good and perfection than either power or knowledge. Knowledge is plainly to be preferred before power, as being that which guides and directs its blind force and impetus; but Aristotle himself declares, that there is λόγος τι κριτήριον, which is λόγος ἀρχή, something better than reason and knowledge, which is the principle and original of all. For (faith he) λόγος ἀρχή o λόγος, ἀλλά τι κριτήριον. The principle of reason is not reason, but something better. Where he also intimates this to be the proper and essential character of the Deity: τι oυ ἄν κριτήριον ἐπιστήμης, πλὴν ὁ Θεός: For what is there, that can be better than knowledge, but God? Likewise the famous philosopher elsewhere plainly determines, that there is morality in the nature of God; and that his happiness consisteth principally therein, and not in external things, and the exercise of his power: ὅτι μὲν ἄν εἰκάσῃ τῷ De Rep. 1. 7. 6 θεαίμονας ἐπιστής τοποτότῳ, ὅτι τις κριτήριος ή Φρονήσεως, ή τῷ πράγματι κατά τούτοις, ἔστω ἀναλογισμὸν ἡμῖν, μάρτυς τῷ ἔκ τι χρήσιμον, ὅσι εὐθυμιον μιν ἐπί καθαρίας, ὅτι οὐκ ἄν τῷ ἐκτεταρτῷ ἄρχωσι, ἀλλά ὅτι αὐτόν αὐτός, κατὰ τὸ ποιός τις εἰμι τῇ Φύσιν. That every man bathe so much of happiness, as he bath of virtue and wisdom, and of acting according to these, ought to be confessed and acknowledged by us, it being a thing, that may be proved from the nature of God, who is happy, but not from any external goods, but because he is himself (or that which he is) and in such a manner affected according to his nature; that is, because he is essentially moral and virtuous.

Which doctrine of Aristotle's seems to have been borrowed from Plato, who in his dialogues de Republica, discoursing about moral virtue, occasionally.

* De Republica, Lib. VI. p. 477. Oper.*
A Good superior to Knowledge. 

Book I.

fionally falls upon this dispute concerning the summum bonum, or chiefest good; wherein he concludes, that it neither consisted in pleasure as such, according to the opinion of the vulgar, nor yet in mere knowledge and understanding, according to the conceit of others, who were more polite and ingenious. ο'να θα τοις μεν πολλοῖς κάθισα δεν είλα το άγαθόν, τοις δ' ε'υωντισον ουλισες, κατα τοιτών πλήξας τινι είτε δοξων ήτις Φασάνες, αλλ' ανακληζόμενοι τιλοντισον τοι το άγαθόν καθαρα, μάλα γελοιοί, άνελυσον γιαί, οί δ' οικισμεν το άγαθόν, λείτοι τάλαι άς ειδώλοι. You know, that, to the vulgar, pleasure seems to be the chiefest good; but to those, who are more elegant and ingenious, knowledge: but they, who entertain this latter opinion, can none of them declare what kind of knowledge it is, which is that chiefest and chiefest good, but are necessitated at last to say, that it is the knowledge of good, very ridiculously: forasmuch as herein they do but run round in a circle, and upbraiding us for being ignorant of this chiefest good, they talk to us at the same time, as knowing what it is.

And thereupon he adds, Καλών αμφίτρεων άτονος, γνώσεως τε άγαθέας, άλλοι άμεταλ' άτονος πλήξας της Άποιας αυτού, άντινος άπητων. Επιθυμων δ' ε'υωντισον αυτον, άφηνε περίφημος τοις μεν καθαρισι ούκ, μην δ' οικισμεν ούκ άριστον, άλλ' άνελυσον αμφίτρεων μεν νοοντισον άγαθόν, άγαθόν δ' ε'υωντισον νοοντισον αυτών άνάριστον, αλλ' ε'υωνος τοι το άγαθόν άξιον τιμήσεως. That though knowledge and truth be both of them excellent things, yet be that shall conclude the chief good to be something which transcends them both, will not be mistaken. For as light, and sight, or the seeing faculty, may both of them rightly be said to be solidiform things, or of kin to the sun, but neither of them to be the sun itself; so knowledge and truth may likewise both of them be said to be bouniform things, and of kin to the chief good, but neither of them to be that chief good itself; but this is still to be looked upon as a thing more august and honourable. In all which of Plato's there seems to be little more, than what may be experimentally found within ourselves: namely, that there is a certain life, or vital and moral disposition of soul, which is much more inwardly and thoroughly satisfactory, not only than sensual pleasure, but also than all knowledge and speculation whatsoever.

Now whatever this chiefest good be, which is a perfection superior to knowledge and understanding; that philosopher 2 resolves, that it must needs be first and principally in God, who is therefore called by him, Θεός τ' άγαθον, the very idea or essence of good. Wherein he trod in the footsteps of the Pythagoreans, and particularly of Timæus Locrus 2, who making two principles of the universe, mind and necessity, adds concerning the former, τοιν τον μέν τις του άγαθου φύσες είθε, ίδοντες νοοντισον αναρίστον τοων άξιων: the first of these two is of the nature of good, and it is called God, the principle of the best things. Agreeably with which doctrine of theirs, the Hebrew Cabalists also make a Sephirah in the Deity, superior both to Binah and Chochmab, (understanding and wisdom) which they call Chether, or the crown. And some would suspect this Cabalistick learning to have been very ancient among the Jews, and that Parmenides was imbued with it, he calling God in like manner τεφανως, or the crown.

2 Vide Platon. de Repliccā Lib. II. p. 431. & Philebum, p. 771, &c. 
CHAP. IV. Morality in the Nature of God.

For which Velleius in Cicero 4, (representing the several opinions of philosophers concerning God) prefixs him amongst the rest; Parmenides commentitium quiddam corone semelitidine effectis, Stephanem appellat, continentem ardore lucis orbem, qui cingit calum, quem appellat deum.

But all this while we seem to be to seek, what the chief and highest good superior to knowledge is, in which the essence of the Deity principally consists; and it cannot be denied, but that Plato sometimes talks too metaphysically and cloudily about it; for which cause, as he lay open to the last of Aristotle, so was he also vulgarly prefixing it for it, as appears by that of Amphi the Poet in Laertius 2:

Το οι' ἀγάθον ο', τι ποτ' ἢν, δ' ὑπ' τούτῳ ζεῖν,
Μέλας δι' ταυτιν', ἐπιτού ὕδα τούτ' ἤν,
'Η το τοῦ Πλάτωνος τ' ἀγάθον'

What good that is, which you expect from hence, I confess, I less understand, than I do Plato's good. Nevertheless he plainly intimates these two things concerning it: first, that this nature of good, which is also the nature of God, includes benignity in it, when he gives this account 3 of God's both making the world, and after such a manner; Because he was good, and that which is good both no envy in it: and therefore he both made the world, and also made it as well, and as like to himself as was possible. And secondly, that it comprehends eminently all virtue and justice, the divine nature being the first pattern hereof; for which cause virtue is defined to be, an assimilation to the Deity. Justice and honesty are no fictitious things, made by the will and command of the more powerful to the weaker, but they are nature and perfection, and descend downward to us from the Deity.

But the holy scripture, without any metaphysical pomp and obscurity, tells us plainly, both what is that highest perfection of intellectual beings, which is καταλύον λόγον χρημάτων, better than reason and knowledge, and which is also the source, life and soul of all morality, namely, that it is love or charity. Though I speak with the tongue of men and angels, and have not love, I am but χαλέος τέκνων, ή καλέως διαλάλων, as sounding brads, or a tinkling cymbal, which only makes a noise without any inward life. And though I have prophecy, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge, and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not love, I am nothing; that is, I have no inward satisfaction, peace, or true happiness.

And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and give my body to be burned, and have not love, it profiteth me nothing; I am for all that utterly destitute of all true morality, virtue, and grace. And accordingly it tells us also, in the next place, what the nature of God is, that he is properly neither power nor knowledge, (though having the perfection of both in him) but love. And certainly whatever dark thoughts, concerning the Deity, some men in their cells may fit brooding on, it can never reasonably

2 Lib. III. segm. 27. p. 181.
3 Vide Platon. in Timæo, p. 527.
able be conceived, that that which is ἡλεος ἀναφέρων καὶ παρασκευής, the most self-sufficient and self-happy being, should have any narrow and selfish designs abroad, without itself, much less harbour any malignant and despightful ones towards its creatures. Nevertheless, because so many are apt to abuse the notion of the divine love and goodness, and to frame such conceptions of it, as destroy that awful and reverential fear that ought to be had of the Deity, and make men presumptuous and regardless of their lives; therefore we think fit here to superadd also, that God is no soft nor fond and partial love, but that justice is an essential branch of this divine goodness; God being, as the writer de Mundo well expresses it, νομις ἴσων, an impartial law; and as Plato, μητέρων, the measure of all things. In imitation whereof, Aristotle concludes also, that a good man (in a lower and more imperfect sense) is μητέρων too, an impartial measure of things and actions.

It is evident, that the Atheists themselves, in those former times of paganism, took it for granted, that goodness was an essential attribute of the Deity, whose existence they opposed, (so that it was then generally acknowledged for such, by the Pagan Theists) from those argumentations of theirs before mentioned, the 12th and 13th, taken from the topick of evils, the pretended ill frame of things, and want of providence over human affairs. Which, if they were true, would not at all disprove such an arbitrary Deity (as is now fancied by some) made up of nothing but will and power, without any essential goodness and justice. But those arguments of the Atheists are directly levelled against the Deity, according to the true notion or idea of it; and could they be made good, would do execution upon the same. For it cannot be denied, but that the natural consequence of this doctrine, that there is a God essentially good, is this, that therefore the world is well made and governed. But we shall afterwards declare, that though there be evil in the parts of the world, yet there is none in the whole; and that moral evils are not imputable to the Deity.

And now we have proposed the three principal attributes of the Deity. The first whereof is infinite goodness with fecundity; the second infinite knowledge and wisdom; and the last infinite active and perceptive power. From which divine attributes the Pythagoreans and Platonists seem to have framed their triinity of archical hypotheses, such as have the nature of principles in the universe, and which though they apprehended as several distinct substances, gradually subordinate to one another, yet they many times extend the τὸ Θεῖον so far, as to comprehend them all within it. Which Pythagorick triinity seems to be intimated by Aristotle in those words, καθότι ἔσω ἐκ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὸ πάν ὁ τὸ πάντα τοῖς τρισὶ διάφανον. As the Pythagoreans also say, the universe, and all things, are determined and contained by three principles. Of which Pythagorick triinity more afterwards. But now we may enlarge and fill up that compendious idea of God premised, of a being absolutely perfect, by adding therunto (to make it more particular)

CHAP. IV. Onelines contained in the Idea.

cular) such as infinitely good, wise, and powerful, necessarily existing, and not only the framer of the world, but also the cause of all things. Which idea of the Deity is sufficient, in order to our present undertaking.

Nevertheless, if we would not only attend to what is barely necessary for a dispute with Atheists, but also consider the satisfaction of other free and devout minds, that are hearty and sincere lovers of this most admirable and most glorious being, we might venture for their gratification, to propose yet a more full, free and copious description of the Deity, after this manner. God is a being absolutely perfect, unmade or self-originated, and necessarily existing; that hath an infinite fecundity in him, and virtually contains all things; as also an infinite benignity or overflowing love, unceasingly displaying and communicating itself; together with an impartial restitude, or nature of justice: who fully comprehends himself, and the extent of his own fecundity, and therefore all the possibilities of things, their several natures and respects, and the best frame or system of the whole: who hath also infinite active and perceptive power: the fountain of all things, who made all that could be made, and was fit to be made, producing them according to his own nature (his essential goodness and wisdom) and therefore according to the best pattern, and in the best manner possible, for the good of the whole; and reconciling all the variety and contrariety of things in the universe into one most admirable and lovely harmony. Lastly, who contains and upholds all things, and governs them after the best manner also, and that without any force or violence, they being all naturally subject to his authority, and readily obeying his law. And now we see, that God is such a being, as that if he could be supposed not to be, there is nothing, whose existence a good man could possibly more wish or desire.

X. From the idea of God thus declared it evidently appears, that there can be but one such being, and that Mowitz, unity, oneliness or singularity is essential to it; forasmuch as there cannot possibly be more than one supreme, more than one omnipotent or infinitely powerful being, and more than one cause of all things besides itself. And however Epicurus, endeavouring to pervert and adulterate the notion of God, pretended to satisfy that natural prolepsis or anticipation in the minds of men, by a feigned and counterfeit afferting of a multiplicity of coordinate deities, independent upon one supreme, and such as were also altogether unconcerned either in the frame or government of the world, yet himself notwithstanding plainly took notice of this idea of God, which we have proposed, including unity or oneliness in it (he profeffedly opposing the existence of such a Deity;) as may sufficiently appear from that argumentation of his, in the words before cited.

Quis regere immens' summaum, quis habere profundum
Indu manu validas potis est moderanter babenas?
Quis pariter celos omnes convertere, & omnes
Ignibus aetheris terras suffire feraces?
Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore præsto?

Lib. 2. p. 195.
Lamb.

E e Where
Where he would conclude it to be a thing utterly impossible, for the Deity to animadvert, order and dispose all things, and be present everywhere in all the distant places of the world at once; which could not be pretended of a multitude of coordinate gods, sharing the government of the world amongst them; and therefore it must needs be levelled against a divine monarchy, or one single, solitary supreme Deity, ruling over all. As in like manner, when he pursues the same argument further in Cicero, to this purpose, that though such a thing were supposed to be possible, yet it would be notwithstanding absolutely inconsistent with the happiness of any being, he still proceeds upon the same hypothesis of one sole and single Deity:

Sive ipse mundus Deus est, quid potest esse minus quietum, quam nullo puncto temporis intermisso, versari circum axem aeterni admirabili celeritate? sive in ipso mundo Deus inept aliquid, qui regat, qui gubernet, qui curset, qui curset astrorum, mutationes temporum, hominum commoda vitaeque tuetur, ne ille est implicatus molestis negotios & operosis. Whether you will suppose the world itself to be a God, what can be more unquiet, than without intermission perpetually to whirl round upon the axis of the heaven with such admirable celerity? or whether you will imagine a God in the world distinct from it, who does govern and dispose all things, keep up the courses of the stars, the successive changes of the seasons, and orderly vicissitudes of things, and contemplating lands and seas, conserve the utilities and lives of men; certainly he must needs be involved in much solicitous trouble and employment. For as Epicurus here speaks singularly, for the trouble of this theocracy could not be thought so very great to a multitude of coordinate Deities, when parcelled out among them, but would rather seem to be but a sportful and delightful divertissement to each of them. Wherefore it is manifest, that such an idea of God, as we have declared, including unity, onelines and singularity in it, is a thing, which the ancient Atheists, under the times of paganism, were not unacquainted with, but principally directed their force against. But this may seem to be anticipated in this place, because it will fall in afterwards more opportunely to be discoursed of again.

XI. For this is that, which lies as the grand prejudice and objection against that idea of God, which we have proposed, essentially including πολυεσως, singularity or oneliness in it, or the real existence of such a Deity, as is the sole monarch of the universe; because all the nations of the world heretofore (except a small and inconsiderable handful of the Jews) together with their wiseft men, and greatest philosophers, were generally looked upon as polytheists, that is, such as acknowledged and worshipped a multiplicity of gods. Now one God, and many gods, being directly contradictory to one another, it is therefore concluded from hence, that this opinion of monarchy, or of one supreme God, the maker and governour of all, hath no foundation in nature, nor in the genuine ideas and proplexes of men's minds, but is a mere artificial thing, owing its original wholly to private fancies and conceits, or to positive laws and institutions, amongst Jews, Christians, and Mahometans.
For the assailing of which difficulty (seeming so formidable at first sight) it is necessary, that we should make a diligent enquiry into the true and genuine sense of this Pagan polytheism. For since it is impossible, that any man in his wits should believe a multiplicity of gods, according to that idea of God before declared, that is, a multiplicity of supreme, omnipotent, or infinitely powerful beings; it is certain, that the Pagan polytheism, and multiplicity of gods, must be understood according to some other notion of the word gods, or some equivocation in the use of it. It hath been already observed, that there were sometime amongst the Pagans such, who meaning nothing else by gods but understanding beings superior to men, did suppose a multitude of such Deities, which yet they conceived to be all (as well as men) native and mortal, generated successively out of matter, and corrupted again into it, as Democritus his idols were. But these Theogoniasts, who thus generated all things whatsoever, and therefore the gods themselves universally, out of night and chaos, the ocean or fluid matter, (notwithstanding their using the name gods) are plainly condemned both by Aristotle and Plato for down-right Atheists, they making senseless matter the only self-existent thing, and the original of all things.

Wherefore there may be another notion of the word gods, as taken for understanding beings superior to men, that are not only immortal, but also self-existent and unmade. And indeed the assertors of a multiplicity of such gods as thefe, though they cannot be accounted Theists in a strict and proper sense (according to that idea of God before declared) yet they are not vulgarly reputed Atheists neither, but looked upon as a kind of middle thing between both, and commonly called Polytheists. The reason whereof seems to be this, because it is generally apprehended to be essential to atheism, to make senseless matter the sole original of all things, and consequently to suppose all conscious intellectual beings to be made or generated. Wherefore they, who on the contrary assert (not one but) many understanding beings unmade and self-existent, must needs be looked upon as those, who of the two approach nearer to atheism than to atheism, and so deserve rather to be called Polytheists than Atheists.

And there is no question to be made, but that the urgiers of the forementioned objection against that idea of God, which includes oneliness and singularity in it, from the Pagan polytheism, or multiplicity of gods, take it for granted, that this is to be underflood of many unmade self-existent deities, independent upon one supreme, that are so many first principles in the universe, and partial causes of the world. And certainly, if it could be made to appear, that the Pagan Polytheists did universally acknowledge such a multiplicity of unmade self-existent deities, then the argument fetched from thence, against the naturality of that idea of God proposed
II. But first this opinion of many self-existent deities, independent upon one supreme, is both very irrational in itself, and also plainly repugnant to the phænomena. We say first, it is irrational in itself, because self-existence and necessary existence being essential to a perfect being, and to nothing else, it must needs be very irrational and absurd to suppose a multitude of imperfect understanding beings self-existent, and no perfect one. Moreover, if imperfect understanding beings were imagined to exist of themselves from eternity, there could not possibly be any reason given, why just so many of them should exist, and neither more nor less, there being indeed no reason why any at all should. But if it be supposed, that there are many self-existent Deities happened only to exist thus from eternity, and their existence notwithstanding was not necessary, but contingent; the consequence hereof will be, that they might as well happen again to cease to be, and so could not be incorruptible. Again, if any one imperfect being whatsoever could exist of itself from eternity, then all might as well do so, not only matter, but also the souls of men, and other animals; and consequently there could be no creation by any Deity, nor those supposed deities therefore deserve that name. Lastly, we might also add, that there could not be a multitude of intellectual beings self-existent, because it is a thing, which may be proved by reason, that all imperfect understanding beings or minds do partake of one perfect mind, and suppose also omnipotence or infinite power; were it not, that this is a consideration too remote from vulgar apprehension, and therefore not so fit to be urged in this place.

Again, as this opinion of many self-existent deities is irrational in itself, so it is likewise plainly repugnant to the phænomena of the world. In which, as Macrobius writes, omnia sunt connexa, all things conspire together into one harmony, and are carried on peaceably and quietly, constantly and evenly, without any tumult or hurrly-burrly, confusion or disorder, or the least appearance of schism and faction; which could not possibly be supposed, were the world made and governed by a rabble of self-existent Deities, coordinate, and independent upon one supreme. Wherefore this kind of polytheism was obiter thus confuted by Origen; πόσο γὰρ βελτίων τοι ἐκ τῶν αἱρετῶν πιστότερον τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ὑπαξίαν τοῦ κόσμου στένων τοῦ θείου φεῦτος αὐτοῦ ἕως ὀλίγον ἔσω, καὶ συμπτιματία αὐτοῦ ὅλω γεωλογία, καὶ διὰ τούτο μὴ δυναμίαν ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἑξηκονικών μεγοῦτα, ὅτε ὡς ὑπὸ πολλῶν ψυχῶν συνεχόμενον ὅλον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κινήσατο. Now much better is it, agreeably to what we see in the harmonious system of the world, to worship one only maker of the world, which is one, and conspiring throughout with its whole self, and therefore could not be made by many artificers, as neither be contained by many souls, moving the whole heaven? Now since this opinion is both irrational in itself, and repugnant to the phænomena, there is the less probability, that it should have been received and entertained by all the more intelligent Pagans.

\[2^{nd} \text{In Somn. Scip. Lib. I. Cap. XIV. p. 25.}\]

XIII. Who,
XIII. Who, that they did not thus universally look upon all their gods as so many unmade self-existent beings, is unquestionably manifest from hence, because ever since Hesiod's and Homer's time at least, the Greekish Pagans generally acknowledged a theogonia, a generation, and production of the gods; which yet is not to be understood universally neither, forasmuch as he is no Theist, who does not acknowledge some self-existent Deity. Concerning this theogonia, Herodotus writeth after this manner: 

Homer's which was generated, or whether they all of them ever were, and what are their forms, is a thing, that was not known till very lately; for Hesiod and Homer were (as I suppose) not above four hundred years my seniors. And these were they, who introduced the theogonia among the Greeks, and gave the gods their several names: that is, settled the Pagan theology. Now, if before Hesiod's and Homer's time, it were a thing not known or determined amongst the Greeks, whether their gods were generated, or all of them existed from eternity; then it was not universally concluded by them, that they were all unmade and self-existent. And though perhaps some might in those ancient times believe one way, and some another, concerning the generation and eternity of their gods; yet it does not follow, that they, who thought them to be all eternal, must therefore needs suppose them to be also unmade or self-existent. For Aristole, who asserted the eternity of the world, and consequently also of those gods of his, the heavenly bodies, did not, for all that, suppose them to be self-existent or first principles, but all to depend upon one principle or original Deity. And indeed the true meaning of that question in Herodotus, whether the gods were generated or exiled all of them from eternity, is (as we suppose) really no other than that of Plato's, εἴ γὰρ ὅπος ἐκ οὐκείντων έστιν. Whether the world were made or unmade? and whether it had a temporary beginning, or exiled such as it is from eternity; which will be more fully declared afterwards. But ever since Hesiod's and Homer's time, that the theogonia or generation of the gods was settled, and generally believed amongst the Greeks, it is certain, that they could not possibly think all their gods eternal, and therefore much less unmade and self-existent. 

But though we have thus clearly proved, that all the Pagan gods were not universally accounted by them so many unmade self-existent Deities, they acknowledging a theogonia, or a generation of gods; yet it may be suspected notwithstanding, that they might suppose a multitude of them also (and not only one) to have been unmade from eternity and self-existent. Wherefore we add, in the next place, that no such thing does at all appear neither, as that the Pagans or any others did ever publicly or professedly assert a multitude of unmade self-existent deities. For first, it is plain concerning the Hesiodian gods, which were all the gods of the Greekish Pagans, that either
either there was but one of them only self-existant, or else none at all. Because Hesiod's gods were either all of them derived from chaos (or the floating water) love itself being generated likewise out of it (according to that Aristophanick tradition before mentioned;) or else love was supposed to be a distinct principle from chaos, namely the active principle of the universe, from whence, together with chaos, all the theogonia and cosmogonia was derived. Now if the former of these were true, that Hesiod supposed all his gods universally to have been generated and sprung originally from chaos, or the ocean; then it is plain, that notwithstanding all that rabble of gods mustered up by him, he could be no other than one of those atheistick Theognitiks before mentioned, and really acknowledged no God at all, according to the true idea of him; he being not a Theist, who admits of no self-existant Deity. But if the latter be true, that Hesiod supposed love to be a principle distinct from chaos, namely the active principle of the universe, and derived all his other gods from thence, he was then a right paganick Theist, such as acknowledged indeed many gods, but only one of them unmade and self-existant, all the rest being generated or created by that one.

Indeed it appears from those passages of Aristotle before cited by us, that that philosopher had been sometimes divided in his judgment concerning Hesiod, where he should rank him, whether among the Atheists, or the Theists. For in his book de Caele he ranks him amongst those, who made all things to be generated and corrupted, besides the bare substance of the matter, that is, amongst the absolute Atheists, and looked upon him as a ringleader of them; but in his Metaphysicks, upon further thoughts, suspects, that many of those, who made love the chiefest of the gods, were Theists, they supposing it to be a first principle in the universe, or the active cause of things, and that not only Parmenides, but also Hesiod was such. Which latter opinion of his is by far the more probable, and therefore embraced by Plutarch, who somewhere determines Hesiod to have asserted one ὑπὸ αγαπήν, or unmade Deity; as also by the ancient scholiaist upon him, writing thus, that Hesiod's love was ὁ ἀρχαῖος ἐρως, ὃς ἦλθεν ἀπὸ Αφροδίτης μεταγείγον ὁ παν. The heavenly love, which is also God, that other love, that was born of Venus, being junior. But Joannes Diaconus; έρωτα ὃ ἐπέκειται ἡ τοῦ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης παῖδα, τῶς ὑπὸ τῆς μητρὸς μῆπω μεροκίαις δημοτικάς παράγεται; ἀλλὰ ἀλλοι τυπα πρόσεχον ἐρωτα, εἰς τὸ ἔθνον τοῦ Ἐθνικοῦ Φυσικῶν κατ' ἐκκλησίαν ἐκάστος ἐξ οὗ ἐκείνου νόμον. By love here (faith he) we must not understand Venus her son, whose mother was as yet unborn, but another more ancient love, which I take to be the active cause or principle of motion, naturally inferred into things. Where though he do not seem to suppose this love to be God himself, yet he conceives it to be an active principle in the universe derived from God, and not from matter. But this opinion will be further confirmed afterward.

The next considerable appearance of a multitude of self-existant deities seems to be in the Valentinian thirty gods and æons, which have been taken by some for such; but it is certain, that these were all of them, save one, generated

We do indeed acknowledge, that there have been some, who have really asserted a multiplicity of gods, in the sense declared, that is of animalish or perceptive beings self-existent; one as the principle of good, and the other of evil. And this ditheism of theirs seems to be the nearest approach, that was ever really made to polytheism; unless we should here give heed to Plutarch's, who seems to make the ancient Persians, besides their two gods, the good and the evil, or Oromojites and Ariomanus, to have asserted also a third middle deity, called by them Mithras; or to some ecclesiastick writers, who impute a trinity of gods to Marcion; (though Tertullian be yet more liberal, and encrease the number to an ennead.) For those, that were commonly called Tritheists, being but mistaken Christians and Trinitarians, fall not under this consideration. Now, as for that foregoing ditheism, or opinion of two gods, a good and an evil one, it is evident, that its original sprung from nothing else, but first a firm persuasion of the essential goodness of the Deity, together with a conceit, that the evil that is in the world, was altogether inconsistent and unaccountable with the same; and that therefore for the solving of this phenomenon, it was absolutely necessary to suppose another animalish principle self-existent, or an evil god. Wherefore as such Ditheists, as to all that which is good in the world, held a monarchy, or one sole principle and original; so it is plain, that had it not been for this busines of evil (which they conceived could not be solved any other way) they would never have affected any more principles or gods than one.

The chiefest and most eminent asserter of which ditheistic doctrine of two self-existent animalish principles in the universe, a good God and an evil demon, were the Marcionites and the Manicheans; both of which, though they made some slight pretences to Christiainity, yet were not by Christians owned for such. But it is certain, that besides those, and before them too, some of the professed Pagans also entertained the same opinion, that famous moralist Plutarchus Chaeremonis being an undoubted patron of it; which in his book de Idee & Osiride he representeth, with some slight difference, after this manner: ἐναντίον τῆς ἡμᾶς ἀρχής ἡ συμμετέχει ἡ ἰδέα. Par. ἡ ἐνιαίος. οἷς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐναντιών, ἀλλά τὴν θεῖαν τοῦ κράτους ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπόστασιν ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ παντοκράτει μονακινήσω ἀλλάζων κυδωνίαν. The generation and constitution of this world is mixt of contrary powers or principles (the one good, the other evil).

* De Idee & Osiride, p. 160.

...
Plutarch a Ditheist, or Asservor

Indeed learned men of later times have, for the most part, looked upon Plutarch here, but either as a bare relater of the opinion of other philosophers, or else as a follower only, and not a leader in it. Notwithstanding which, it is evident, that Plutarch was himself heartily engaged in this opinion, he discovering no small fondness for it, in many of his other writings: as for example in his Platonick questions, where he thus declares himself concerning it, ή το πολλακις εδώ ημών περιχειν ἀληθείς εστιν, η μὲν γὰρ ἄλος ψυχή, ή το μορφη σώμα, συντηρηθεὶς ἀληθείς αἰτί, η το εορθον αὐτῶν γενειον ἁχιον οὔτι ἄρειον or else that which is often affirmed by us is true, that a mad irrational soul, and an unformed disorderly body, did co-exist with one another from eternity, neither of them having any generation or beginning. And in his Timean Psychogonia he does at large industriously maintain the same, there and elsewhere endeavouring to establish this doctrine, as much as possibly he could, upon rational foundations. As first, that nothing can be made or produced without a cause; and therefore there must of necessity be some cause of evil also, and that a positive one too; he representing the opinion of those as very ridiculous, who would make the nature of evil to be but ἐπιτοίδον, an accidental appendix to the world, and all that evil, which is in it, to have come in only by the by, and by consequence, without any positive cause. Secondly, that God being essentially good could not possibly be the cause of evil, where he highly applauds Plato for removing God to the greatest distance imaginable from being the cause of evil. Thirdly, that as God could not, so neither could ὑλὴ ἀτομος, matter in itself devoid of all form and quality, be the cause of evil, noting this to have been the subterfuge of the Stoicks. Upon which account he often condemns them, but uncertainly, sometimes as such, who ascribed no cause at all of evils, and sometimes again as those, who made God the cause of them. For in his Psychogonia he concludes, that unless we acknowledge a substantial evil principle, αἱ Στοικαι καταλαμβάνουσιν ἡμᾶς ἀπαίρητα, τὸ κακὸν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὅλης αὐτίκης αὐτὴς ἄμφοις ἐτε κατατηρηθέν τὸ πάκες ἐν πάσῃ ἐν τῇ πάτρᾳ κακίας η λοι πάμε νοθ ζεορνος ἐν πάσῃ τῇ πάτρᾳ. The Stoical difficulties will of necessity overtake and involve us, who introduce evil into the world from nothing, or without a cause, since neither that which is essentially good (as God) nor yet that which is devoid of all quality (as matter) could possibly give being or generation to it. But in his book against the Stoicks, he accuses them as those, who made God, essentially good, the cause of evil. Αὐτοὶ τὸν κακὸν ἄρειον ἀρχήν ὄντα τὴν Στοῦ πανίζα, ἐγένετο τῇ κακαίᾳ ἐν τούτους παραφθοικόντας ἀπεκόμισεν γάρ ἂν εἰς χάρακας διέκειτα διαφοράς, ὡς τι ποινῷ τούτον τοὺς αὐτοὺς χηματικότερος ἑβλάκει ὡς κακίαν τὸ κακὸν, ἐν τῷ δὲ αὐτῶν εἰς τοῦ μὴ μονοτος, δι' ἐν τῷ κακαίῳ ἄρειον τῷ ἔχειν πάλιν οὐκ αὐτοῖς. They themselves make God being good the principle and cause of evil, since...
Chap. IV.

of an evil Principle.

since matter which is devoid of quality, and receives all its differences from the active principle that moves and forms it, could not possibly be the cause thereof. Wherefore evil must of necessity either come from nothing, or else it must come from the active and moving principle, which is God. Now from all these premises joined together Plutarch concludes, that the phenomenon of evil could no otherwise possibly be solved, than by supposing a substantial principle for it, and a certain irrational and maleficent soul or daemon, unmade, and co-existing with God and matter from eternity, to have been the cause thereof. And accordingly he resolves, that as whatsoever is good in the soul and body of the universe, and likewise in the souls of men and demons, is to be ascribed to God as its only original; so whatsoever is evil, irregular and disorderly in them, ought to be imputed to this other substantial principle, a ψυχή ἄνω καὶ ἀκάτων, an irrational and maleficent soul or daemon, which infusing itself every where throughout the world, is all along intermingled with the better principle: so that neither the soul of the universe, nor that of men and demons, was wholly the workmanship of God, but the lower, brutish and disorderly part of them the effect of the evil principle.

But besides all this, it is evident, that Plutarch was also strongly possessed with a conceit, that nothing substantial could be created (no not by divine power) out of nothing pre-existing; and therefore that all the substance of whatsoever is in the world did exist from eternity unmade: so that God was only the orderer or the methodizer and harmonizer thereof. Wherefore as he concluded, that the corporeal world was not created by God out of nothing, as to the substance of it, but only the pre-existing matter, which before moved disorderly, was brought into this regular order and harmony by him; in like manner he resolved, that the soul of the world (for such a thing is always supposed by him) was not made by God out of nothing, neither, nor out of any thing inanimate and soul-less pre-existing, but out of a pre-existing disorderly soul was brought into an orderly and regular frame; ἀνάλογα γὰρ ταῦτα ποιεῖ τὸν κόσμον γενόμενον, ἀναλόγα δὲ εἰς ἀκόμα τὰ δεινὰ ἔργα ὡς ἄκαιρα. De Phæo. Ιον., εἰς ἀληθινὸν, ἄλλα ἄνεμου μὲν καὶ ἀφοιτατο οὕτως καὶ καταθεμένον ἐμπληκτόν η ἡ ἄκακος ἄλλα, ἡ ἄλλα τοῦ ἀκαρκτοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ ᾿τὰς ἄκαρκτος ἀνάμολος, καί παντί. There was unformed matter before this orderly world was made, which matter was not incorporeal, nor unmoved or inanimate, but body decomposed and acted by a furious and irrational mover, the deformity whereof was the disharmony of a soul in it, devoid of reason. For God neither made body out of that which was no-body, nor soul out of no-soul. But as the musician, who neither makes voice nor motion, does by ordering of them, notwithstanding, produce harmony; so God, though he neither made the tangible and resisting substance of body, nor the phantastic and self-moving power of soul, yet taking both those principles pre-existing (be one of which was dark and obscure, the other turbulent and irrational) and orderly disposing and harmonizing of them, he did by that means produce this most beautiful and perfect animal of the world. And further to the same purpose; ψυχή σώματος ἀπλώς, ὡς δὲ ἄλλα ἀλλά συμμετρίας

Footnote: Plutarch. de Animæ Procreat. ex Timæo, p. 1027.
we are not ignorant, that Plutarch endeavours with all his might to
persuade this to have been the constant belief of all the pagan nations, and
of all the wisest men and philosophers that ever were amongst them. For
this (faith he, in his book de Iste & Ofiride 1 ) is a most ancient opinion, that
bath been delivered down from theologers and law-makers, all along to poets and
philosophers; and though the first author thereof be unknown, yet hath it been
so firmly believed every where, that the footsteps of it have been impressed
upon the sacrifices and mysteries or religious rites, both of Barbarians and
Greeks; namely, that the world is neither wholly governed by any mind or
reason, as if all things floated in the streams of chance and fortune, nor yet
that there is any one principle steering and guiding all, without resistance or
control:

1 Tom. III. Oper. p. 369.
control; because there is a confused mixture of good and evil in every thing, and nothing is produced by nature sincere. Wherefore it is not one only dis- 

penser of things, who as it were out of several vessels distributeth those several liquors of good and evil, mingling them together, and dosing them as be pleaseth; but there are two distinct and contrary powers or principles in the world, one of them always leading as it were to the right hand, but the other tugging a contrary way. Infomuch that our whole life, and the whole world is a certain mixture and confusion of these two: at least this terrestrial world below the moon is such, all being every where full of irregularity and disorder. For if nothing can be made without a cause, and that which is good cannot be the cause of evil, there must needs be a distinct principle in nature, for the production of evil as well as good. And this hath been the opinion of the most and wisest men, some of them affirming that there are two gods as it were of contrary crafts and trades, one whereof is the maker of all good, and the other of all evil; but others calling the good principle only a God, and the evil principle a demon, as Zoroaster the magi- 

can. Besides which Zoroaster and the Persian Magi, Plutarch pretends, that the footsteps of this opinion were to be found also in the astrology of the Chaldeans, and in the mysteries and religious rites, not only of the Egypti- 

cans, but also of the Grecians themselves; and lastly, he particularly im- 
putes the fame to all the most famous of the Greek philosophers, as Py- 
thagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Plato and Aristotle; though his chiefest endeavour of all be to prove, that Plato was an undoubted champion for it; 'Αλλ' ουτοι Πλάτων εύχητε τοις θεοις, εύχη ταρδίου, ούτε τόπος, ούτε De Plato, 

ενικον, τον μετακινήσας τοις ύλαις, το υδατί τον τεθνείν άρδόν νήματα, ούτως υπόθεσι τοις λάχανα τοις επομενοις. Ηω, αντικείωται ενεπεδιώθησαν ευκατοχάραις ποιήμασι των κακών φύσεως αν' αυτομάτως κατά συμβολήσεις. Επεικόνιον μεν γαρ ουδέ άρδόν νήματα μετακινήσας τον τρόπους, ανθρώπους, ου τοις κεντείνεις, μενών εις τον μήν οίκος, αυτοί δε κεντείνεις, κακοσμομενοις τοποθετήσας. Ίσιον 

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So that those very philosophers, who will by no means allow to Epicurus the smallest declension of his atoms from the perpendicular, alledging, that this would be to introduce a motion without a cause, and to bring something out of nothing, themselves do, notwithstanding, suppose all that vice and misery, which is in the world, besides innumerable other absurdities and inconveniences about body, to have come into it, merely by accidental consequence, and without having any cause in the first principles. But Plato did not so, but dividing matter of all qualities and differences, by means whatsoever, it could not possibly be made the cause of evils, and then placing God at the greatest distance from being the cause thereof, be consequently resolved it into a third unmade principle between God and the matter, an irrational soul or demon, moving the matter dis- 

orderly.
Now because Plutarch's authority passes so uncontroll'd, and his testimony in this particular seems to be of late generally received as an oracle, and consequently the thing taken for an unquestionable truth, that the dithegick doctrine of a good and evil principle was the catholick or universal doctrine of the Pagan Theifts, and particularly that Plato, above all the rest, was a professed champion for the same; we shall therefore make bold to examine Plutarch's grounds for this so confident assertion of his; and principally concerning Plato. And his grounds for imputing this opinion to Plato are only these three, which follow. First, because that philosopher in his Politicis 1 speaks of a necessary and innate appetite, that may sometimes turn the heavens a contrary way, and by that means cause disorder and confusion: secondly, because in his tenth de Legibus he speaks of two kinds of souls, whereof one is beneficent, but the other contrary: and lastly, because in his Timeus he supposeth the matter to have been moved disorderly before the world was made, which implies, that there was a disorderly and irrational soul confuting with it as the mover of it, matter being unable to move itself. But as to the first of these allegations out of Plato's Politicis, we shall only observe, that that philosopher, as if it had been purposely to prevent such an interpretation of his meaning, there as this of Plutarch's, inserts these very words 2; ὧν ἂν δό την δοξα, ἑορτάστηκα διὰ τοῦ διὸ καθό. Neither must any such thing be supposed, as if there were two gods, contrarily minded to one another, turning the heavens sometimes one way, and sometimes another. Which plain declaration of Plato's sense, being directly contrary to Plutarch's interpretation, and this dithegick opinion, might serve also for a sufficient confutation of his second ground from the tenth de Legibus 3, as if Plato had there affirmed, that there were two souls moving the heavens, the one beneficent, but the other contrary; because this would be all one as to affect two gods, contrarily minded to one another. Notwithstanding which, for a fuller answer thereunto, we shall further add, that this philosopher did there, first, only distribute souls in general into good and evil, those moral differences properly belonging to that rank of beings, called by him souls, and first emerging in them, according to this premised doctrine, τῶν ἀρχῶν αὐτὰ τῇ φυσικῇ καὶ τῶν κατὰ νόμου καὶ κακωὸν καὶ ἀισχρῶν, διὰ καθός τοῦ καθός. Soul is the cause of good and evil, beneft and dishonest, just and unjust. But then afterwards, making enquiry concerning the soul of the world or heaven, what kind of soul that was, he positively concludes, that it was no other than a soul endued with all virtue. \[\text{A} \text{O. έπιεικής ψυχής μέν, ἐν τῇ περιάγωσιν ἡμῶν πάλιν, τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ περιβολῆς ἐν σκόπων περὶ ἄλλων, ἑπιμελημένη καὶ καρποφόρη, ἴτι τῷ αὐτῶν ἀρχής ἐπειὶ τῷ ἐναλλότριῷ. \text{K} \text{A. Ω. έπιεικῆς ἐπειὶ τῶν εἰς οὕτως ὁ παρελθόντων ἐπειὶ ἀλλαγμένων προκεκαθήσατο ἀρχής. \text{Ath. Holp. Since it is soul that moves all things, we must of necessity affirm, that the heaven or world is moved by some soul or other, adorning and disposing of it, whether it be the best soul, or the contrary. Clin. O Holpes, it is certainly not holy nor pious to conclude otherwise, than that a soul endowed with all virtue, one or more,} \]

1 P. 176. Oper,
2 Ibid. p. 175.
3 P. 669. Opr.
more, moves the world. And as for the last thing urged by Plutarch, that before the world was made, the matter is said by Plato to have been moved disorderly, we conceive, that that philosopher did therein only adhere to that vulgarly received tradition, which was originally Mosical, that the first beginning of the Cosmopoeia was from a chaos, or matter confusedly moved, afterward brought into order. And now we think it plainly appears, that there is no strength at all in any of Plutarch's forementioned allegations, nor any such monster to be found any where in Plato, as this substantial evil principle or god, a wicked soul or daemon, unmade and self-existent from eternity, opposite and inimicous to the good God, sharing the empire and dominion of the world with him. Which opinion is really nothing else but the deifying of the devil, or prince of evil spirits, making him a corvival with God, and entitling him to a right of receiving divine honour and worship.

And it is observable, that Plutarch himself confesseth this interpretation, which he makes of Plato, to be new and paradoxical, or an invention of his own, καὶ διὰ τὸ πλείστον τῶν ἀντὶ Πλάτων; υποτελεόσια δέχοντος παραγμάτως, Pschoq. p. such as because it was contrary to the generally received opinion of Platonists, 1012. himself thought to stand in need of some apology and defence. To which purpose therefore he adds again, πρῶτον οὖν ἡν χεὶρ περὶ τούτων διὰ τούτων, ἐκθέσαις Ρ. 1014. τιτωμὼν τῷ εἰκονικῷ καὶ παραγμάτωμι, ὦς δέ με, το ἀληθῶς τοῦ λόγου, καὶ περάσεως. I will (faith he) declare mine own opinion first concerning these things, confirming it with probabilities, and, as much as possibly I can, aiding and assenting the truth and paradoxicalness thereof. Moreover, Proclus upon the Timeaeus takes notice of no other philosophers, that ever imputed this doctrine to Plato, or indeed maintained any such opinion of two substantial principles of good and evil, but only Plutarch and Atticus; (though I confess Chalcidius cites Numinus also to the same purpose.) Proclus his words are there: οἱ μὲν πρὸς Πλατονίδης τὸν Χειρικὶ ή. "Αττικὸν πρέπει θαγὶ τινὸς ἀναλογίας θὴν. P. 116. περὶ τῆς γενεσίας περιέχει μή καὶ τῷ κατεγόριττῳ τῇ-χείρι τῷ τοῦ κακοῦ, πλέον γαρ ή κακίας ἡ, ἢ ἀπὸ ψευδο; οὔτε οἰκείας καὶ κακίας, αὐτὸς ὑπός ἄκιδος. Plutarchus Chersonensis and Atticus maintain, that before the generation and formation of the world, there was unformed and disorderly matter existing (from eternity) together with a maleficient soul: for whence, say they, could that motion of the matter, in Plato's Timeaeus, proceed but from a soul? and if it were a disorderly motion, it must then needs come from a disorderly soul. And as Proclus tells us, that this opinion of theirs had been before confuted by Porphyrius and Jamblichus, as that which was both irrational and impious, so doth he there likewise himself briefly refel it in these two propositions; first, that πάσα θυσιά γενεσία ἐστι, τοῦ Σιν, every soul is the offspring of God, and there can be no soul, nor any thing else, besides God self-existing; and secondly, το μακαρίον ἰδιωμένως πάσης, διότι γνός το οὐδεν, άτοπον, οὐ γαρ ὡμοίως τοῦ Σιν, το ἀνάθεν, οὕτω ἐνεργείος, οὕτω ἐλασσον ἄλλοθεν ενεργείον. It is absurd to make evil alike eternal with good, for that which is godless cannot be of like honour with God, and equally unmade, nor indeed can there be any thing at all positively opposite to God.

* In Timaeo Cap. XIV. p. 527.
But because it may probably be here demanded, what account it was then possible for Plato to give of the original of evils, so as not to impute them to God himself, if he neither derived them from ἄνευ ἀξίου, unqualified matter, (which Plutarch has plainly proved to be absurd) nor yet from a μηχανή, an irrational and maleficient soul of the world or daemon, self-existent from eternity; we shall therefore hereunto briefly reply, that though that philosopher derived not the original of evils from unqualified matter, nor from a wicked soul, or daemon unmade, yet did he not therefore impute them to God neither, but, as it seemeth, to the necessity of imperfect beings. For as Timæus Locrus had before Plato determined, that the world was made by God and necessity, so does Plato himself accordingly declare in his Timæus, ὁτι μεγαλυτερόν τοῖς νόμοις γρατίας ἐπὶ αἰσθήσεις ἀγαθοῖς ἔν τῷ σελήνῃ, καὶ ἐν ἄνδρον ἄχρονοι: That the generation of this world is mixt, and made up of a certain composition of mind and necessity both together, yet so as that mind doth also (in some sense) rule over necessity. Wherefore though, according to Plato, God be properly and directly the cause of nothing else but good, yet the necessity of these lower imperfect things doth unavoidably give being and birth to evils. For first, as to moral evils, (which are the chiefest) there is a necessity, that there should be higher and lower inclinations in all rational beings vitally united to bodies, and that as autexouphous or free-willed, they should have a power of determining themselves more or less either way; as there is also a necessity, that the same liberty of will, (essential to rational creatures) which makes them capable of praise and reward, should likewise put them in a possibility of deserving blame and punishment. Again, as to the evils of pain and inconvenience; there seems to be a necessity, that imperfect terrestrial animals, which are capable of the sense of pleasure, should in contrary circumstances (which will also sometimes happen, by reason of the inconsistency and incomposibility of things) be obnoxious to displeasure and pain. And lastly, for the evils of corruptions and disolutions; there is a plain necessity, that if there be natural generations in the world, there should be also corruptions; according to that of Lucretius before cited,

Quando alid ex alio reficit natura, nec ullam
Ren gigni patitur, nisi morte adjutam aliena.

To all which may be added, according to the opinion of many, that there is a kind of necessity of some evils in the world for a condiment (as it were) to give a relish and haut-gout to good; since the nature of impecable animals is such, that they are apt to have but a dull and fliggish sense, a flat and insipid taste of good, unless it be quickened and invigorated, by being compared with the contrary evil. As also, that there seems to be a necessary use in the world of the ἀνένα ἀξίωσια, those involuntary evils of pain and suffering, both for the exercise of virtue, and the quickning and exciting the activity of the world.

* P. 533. Oper.
* Lib. I. verf. 264.
world, as also for the repressing, chastising and punishing of those \textit{κακῶς ἔκαστος}, those voluntary evils of vice and action. Upon which several accounts, probably, \textit{Plato} concluded, that evils could not be utterly destroyed, at least in this lower world, which, according to him, is the region of lapidated souls: ἀλλ' οἱ ἀπολείποντα ἔδωκαν Ὀθόδοξος, ὁ Θεόδοξος, (ἀποκλισμα καὶ τῷ ὁμολογεῖν, οὐ τοῖς ἀνάγκαις) εἰς τοὺς ἔναντι ἔναντι, τοῖς ὑπερβολημένοι. But it is neither possible (O Theodorus) that evils should be quite destroyed (for there must be something always contrary to good) nor yet that they should be seated amongst the gods, but they will of necessity infest this lower mortal region and nature. Wherefore we ought to endeavour to flee from hence with all possible speed; and our flight from hence is this, to assimilate ourselves to God as much as may be; which assimilation to God consists in being just and holy with wisdom. Thus, according to the sense of Plato, though God be the original of all things, yet he is not to be accounted properly the cause of evils, at least moral ones (they being only defects) but they are to be imputed to the necessity of imperfect beings, which is that ἀλλ' ἀπολείποντα ἔδωκαν Ὀθόδοξος, καὶ ἀποκλίσσασα, that necessity, which doth often resist God, and as it were shake off his bridle. Rational creatures being, by means thereof, in a capability of acting contrary to God's will and law, as well as their own true nature and good; and other things hindred of that perfection, which the divine goodness would else have imparted to them. Notwithstanding which, mind, that is, God, is said also by Plato to rule over necessity, because those evils, occasioned by the necessity of imperfect beings, are over-ruled by the divine art, wisdom and providence, for good; Typhon and Arimanthus (if we may use that language) being as it were outriveted by Osiris and Oromasdes, and the worst of all evils made, in spight of their own nature, to contribute subserviently to the good and perfection of the whole; καὶ τούτῳ μεγίστη τέχνη ἔτηζωσαι ἔκαστος, and this must needs be acknowledged to be the greatest art of all, to be able to banify evils, or temper them with good.

And now we have made it to appear (as we conceive) that Plutarch had no sufficient grounds to impute this opinion, of two active perceptive principles in the world, (one the cause of good, and the other of evil) to Plato. And as for the other Greek philosophers, his pretences to make them afferrors of the same doctrine seem to be yet more flight and frivolous. For he concludes the \textit{Pythagoreans} to have held two such substantial principles of good and evil, merely because they sometimes talked of the \textit{πρόκειται καὶ συστήλαται}, the contrarieties and conjugations of things, such as finite and infinite, dextrous and sinistrors, even and odd, and the like. As also, that Heraclitus entertained the same opinion, because he spake of \textit{παντικαταπαντὶ ἀφροδίς}, a versatile harmony of the world, whereby things reciprocate forwards and backwards, as when a bow is successively intended and remitted; as likewise because he affirmed all things to flow, and was to be the father and lord of all. Moreover, he resolves,' that \textit{Empedocles} 215.
his friendship and contention could be no other than a good and evil god; though we have rendered it probable, that nothing else was understood thereby but an active spermatick power in this corporeal world, causing vicissitudes of generation and corruption. Again, Anaxagoras is entitled by him to the same philosophy, for no other reason, but only because he made mind and infinite matter two principles of the universe. And lastly, Aristotle himself cannot escape him from being made an author of a good and evil god too, merely because he concluded form and privation to be two principles of natural bodies. Neither does Plutarch acquit himself any thing better, as to the sense of whole nations, when this doctrine is therefore imputed by him to the Chaldeans, because their astrologers supposed two of the planets to be beneficent, two maleficient, and three of a middle nature; and to the ancient Greeks, because they sacrificed not only to Jupiter Olympus, but also to Hades or Pluto, who was sometimes called by them the infernal Jupiter. We confess, that his interpretation of the traditions and mysteries of the ancient Egyptians is ingenious, but yet there is no necessity for all that, that by their Typhon should be understood a substantial evil principle, or God self-existent, as he contends. For it being the manner of the ancient Pagans, (as shall be more fully declared afterwards) to physiologize in their theology, and to personate all the several things in nature; it seems more likely, that these Egyptians did after that manner, only προσωποποιοῦντο, personate that evil and confusion, tumult and hurrilyr, constant alternation and vicissitude of generations and corruptions, which is in this lower world, (though not without a divine providence) by Typhon.

Wherefore, the only probability now left is that of the Persian Magi, that they might indeed assert two such active principles of good and evil, as Plutarch and the Manicheans afterwards did; and we must confess, that there is some probability of this, because besides Plutarch, Laertius affirms the fame of them, δύο και αυτός εἶναι ἄρχει, ἀρχῶν δὲ τὰ δύο καὶ κακῶν, that there are two principles according to the Persian Magi, a good demon and an evil one; he seeming to vouch it also from the authorities of Hermippus, Endoxus and Theopompus. Notwithstanding which, it may very well be questioned, whether the meaning of these Magi were not herein misunderstood, they perhaps intending nothing more by their evil daemon than such a Satanical power as we acknowledge; that is, not a substantial evil principle, unmade and independent upon God, but only a polity of evil demons in the world, united together under one head or prince. And this not only because Theodorus in Philebus calls the Persian Arimanis by that very name, Satanas; but also because those very traditions of theirs, recorded by Plutarch himself, seem very much to favour this opinion, they running after this manner: ἐπὶ τις ἔρχεται ἔμαρμαρος, εν δ' τῷ θεομάθαι κομέθαι.

De Is. et Os. 6. Par. ἐπάγοντα καὶ λιμών, ἕτο τῶν αὐστηρῶν Φθειρῶν παλαιάτατοι καὶ αἰσθαισθία, τίς εἴ ἔρχη ἐπίπεδε καὶ ὄμηλης γεωργίας, ἔνα βιον καὶ μίαν πολιτείαν ἀδελφῶν μακρὸν καὶ ἐμφατος ἀπάντων νεῖδα. That there is a fatal time at hand, in which Arimanus

Magi, considered.

manius, the introducer of plagues and famines, must of necessity be utterly destroyed, and when the earth being made plain and equal, there shall be but one life, and one polity of men, all happy and speaking the same language. Or else, as Theopompos himself represented their fene, τὸν ἀποκλειτές τοῦ "Ἀθη, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀδέσποτοι εὐδαιμονίας έσσείν, μὴ τρεῖς δεινάνια, μὴ σκίῳ πανόντα; τοῦ δὲ πάντα μεγανασίμων θεών πρεμεῖν καὶ ανακεκιέναι χέρων κακῶς μὲν οὐ πεποίη τοῦ Στίβου, ὃς εὐθεῖαν δομᾶμα μέτειν. That in conclusion Hades shall be utterly abolished, and then men shall be perfectly happy, their bodies neither needing food, nor casting any shadow; that God, which contrived this whole scene of things, resting only for the present a certain season, which is not long to him, but like the intermission of sleep to men. For since an unmade and self-existent evil demon, such as that of Plutarch's and the Manicheans, could never be utterly abolished or destroyed; it seems rather probable, that the Perrian Magi did, in their Arimanians, either προσωποτεινον, personate evil only, as we suppose the Egyptians to have done in Typhon; or else understand a satirical power by it: notwithstanding which, they might possibly sacrifice thereunto (as the Greeks did to evil demons) for its appeasement and mitigation; or else as worshipping the Deity itself, in the ministers of its wrath and vengeance.

However, from what hath been declared, we conceive it does sufficiently appear, that this dithethick doctrine of a good and evil god, (or a good god and evil demon both self-existent) ascribed by Plutarch and the Manicheans, was never so universally received amongst the Pagans as the same Plutarch pretended. Which thing may be yet further evidenced from hence, because the Manicheans professed themselves not to have derived this opinion from the Pagans, nor to be a subdivision under them, or schism from them, but a quite different sect by themselves. Thus, Faufius in St. Contra Faust. Augufin: Pagani bona & mala, tetra & splendida, perpetua & caduca, Lib. 20 c. 3. mutabilia & certa, corporalia & divina, unum habere principium dogmatis cant. His ego valde contraria confo, qui bonis omnibus principium fater est Demn, contrariis vero Hylen (sic enim malis principium & naturam theologorum dict.) nonfer appellat.) The Pagans dogmatize, that good and evil things, foul and splendid, perishing and perpetual, corporal and divine, do all alike proceed from the same principle. Whereas we think far otherwise, that God is the principle of all good, but Hyle (or the evil demon) of the contrary, which names our theologers (Manes) confounds together. And afterwards Faufius there again determined, that there were indeed but two sects of religion in the world, really distinct from one another, viz. Paganism and Manicheism. From whence it may be concluded, that this doctrine of two active principles of good and evil was not then look'd upon as the generally received doctrine of the Pagans. Wherefore it seems reasonable to think, that Plutarch's imputing it so universally to them, was either out of design, thereby to gain the better countenance and authority to a conceit, which himself was fond of; or else because he being deeply tinctured, as it were, with the suffusions of it, every thing which he look'd upon

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1 Apud Plutarch. de Iside & Osiride, p. 370. Tom. II. Oper. 2 Apud Augustin. ubi supra.
The Pagans not generally Ditheists. Book I.

feemed to him coloured with it. And indeed, for aught we can yet learn, this Plutarchus Chersonensis, Numenius and Atticus, were the only Greek philosophers, who ever in publick writings positively affected any fuch opinion.

And probably St. Athanasius is to be understood of these, when, in his oration contra Genes 1, he writes thus concerning this opinion: Ελληνως ὅσ' τοις πλακωνίστης τῆς οὐδενί, κρήτις δ' εἰκὰ ἐργασίας, ἐν ύποστάσει καθ' ιατρον ἐκαί την κακίαν ἀπεφθάνατο· ἀμαζωνίας κατὰ δύο ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν ὑμνημονὸν ἀπεφθάνατος τοῦ ἐκαί πνευμα τῶν ὄντων, οἷς γὰρ ἠν ἐκ τῶν ὄντων κῷπος, ἐγένετε κατ' αὐτοῖς ἡ κακία καθ' ιατρον ὑποστάσει· ἡ πάλιν ἔλεος ἄλλων πνευματί τῶν ὄντων, ἥδ' ἐναλλοίκτη καθ' τοῦ κακοῦ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκαί ἐναλλοίκτη ἐκαύμαι, καὶ γὰρ τοῖς οὐδενὶ καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς κατ' αὐτοῖς ἐκαί. Some of the Greeks, wandering out of the right way, and ignorant of Christ, have determined evil to be a real entity by itself, erring upon two accounts; because they must of necessity either suppose God not to be the maker of all things, if evil have a nature and essence by itself, and yet be not made by him; or else that he is the maker and cause of evil: whereas it is impossible, that he, who is essentially good, should produce the contrary. After which that father speaks also of some degenerate Christians, who fell into the same error: οἱ δὲ ἂν τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἐπιστολῆς τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς διδασκαλίας, καὶ περὶ τῶν πνευμάτων νοοῦντας, καὶ οὗτα μὴν ὑποτάξεις τοῖς κακοῖς ἀναφερομένων ἐκαύματος. Some heretics, forsaking the ecclesiastical doctrine, and making shipwreck of the faith, have in like manner falsely attributed a real nature and essence to evil. Of which heretics there were several sects before the Manicheans, sometime taken notice of and censured by Pagan philosophers themselves; as by Celsus ², where he charges Christians with holding this opinion, that there is ἅπαξ τῇ μεγάλῃ Σεβ. Σῶς καὶ μεγαλομνως, an execrable god contrary to the great God; and by Plotinus, writing a whole book against such Christians, the 9th of his second Ennead, which, by Porphyryus was inscribed περὶ τοῦ Γονόθνο, against the Gnosticks.

But if, notwithstanding all that we have hitherto said to the contrary, that which Plutarch so much contends for should be granted to be true, that the Pagan theologers generally affected two self existent principles (a good God, and an evil soul or demon) and no more, it would unavoidably follow from thence, that all those other gods, which they worshipped, were not look'd upon by them so many unmade self existent beings, because then they should have acknowledged so many first principles. However, it is certain, that if Plutarch believed his own writings, he must of necessity take it for granted, that none of the Pagan gods (those two principles of good and evil only excepted) were by their theologers accounted unmade or self-existent beings. And as to Plutarch himself, it is unquestionably manifest, that though he were a Pagan, and a worshipper of all those many gods of theirs, but especially amongst the rest, of the Delian Apollo, (whose priest he declares himself to have been) yet he supposed them all (except only one good God, and another evil soul of the world) to be no self-existent deities, but Σεβ. ἄνομοι, generated or created gods only.

¹ Tom. I. p. 6. Oper.
² Apud Origen, contra Celsum, Lib. VI. p. 303.
³ Vide Rualdum in Vitae Plutarchi, Cap. IX.
CHAP. IV. Aristotle's Conflation of Many Principles.

And the same is to be affirmed of all his Pagan followers, as also of the Manicheans, forasmuch as they, besides their good and evil god, (the only unmade self-existent beings acknowledged by them) worshipped also innumerable other deities.

Hitherto we have not been able to find amongst the Pagans any, who asserted a multitude of unmade self-existents deities; but, on the contrary, we shall now find one, who took notice of this opinion of ἄραξαί, many principles, so far forth as to confute it; and that is Aristotle, who was not occasioned to do that neither, because it was a doctrine then generally received, but only because he had a mind obiously to impute such a thing to the Pythagoreans and Platonists, they making ideas (sometimes called also numbers) in a certain sense, the principles of things. Nevertheless, the opinion itself is well confuted by that philospher from the phenomena, after this manner: Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἄραξαν πρῶτον τῶν μαθημάτων, μή οὕτως αἰτι αριστ. Μετ. 1. ἀλλὰ ἤχομεν οὕτως καὶ ἄραξας ἐνάκτης ἄλλας, ἑπισκοπήσας τὸν τοῦ παντός οὐσίας υπό ὀπίσθιον. Συν. &c. They who say that mathematical number is the first, and suppose one principle of one thing, and another of another, would make the whole world to be like an incoherent and disagreeing poem, where things do not all mutually contribute to one another, nor conspire together to make up one sense and harmony: but the contrary, faith he, is most evident in the world; and therefore there cannot be many principles, but only one. From whence it is manifest, that though Aristotle were a worhipper of many gods, as well as the other Pagans, (he somewhere representing it as very absurd to sacrifice to none but Jupiter) yet he was no Polytheist, in the sense before declared, of many unmade self-existents deities, nor indeed any Ditheist neither, no assembler of two understanding principles, a good and evil god, (as Plutarch pretended him to be) he not only here explaining that opinion of πολλάὶ ἄραξαί, many principles, but also expressly deriving all from one; and in that very chapter affirming, that good is a principle, but not evil. But as for the Platonists and Pythagoreans there perstringed by him, though it be true, that they made ideas in some sense principles, as the paradigms of things; yet, according to Aristotle's own confession, even in that same chapter, they declared also, that there was ἄλλοι ἄραξας ἡ πρώτη, another principle more excellent or superior, which is indeed that, that was called by them the τὸ ὦ, or μοῖ, unity itself, or a monad, that is, one most simple deity.

Though we did before demonstrate, that the Pagan gods were not all suppos'd by them to be unmade self-existents beings, because they acknowledged a theogonia, a generation and temporary production of gods; yet, forasmuch as it might be suspected, that they held notwithstanding a multitude of unmade deities, we have now made the best enquiry that we could concerning this: and the utmost that we have been able yet to discover, is, that some few of the professed Pagans, as well as of pretended Christians, have indeed affected a duplicity of such gods (viz. understanding beings unmade) one good, and the other evil, but no more. Whereas, on the contrary, we have found, that Aristotle did professedly oppose this opinion of
of many principles, or unmade gods, which certainly he durft never have done, had it then been the generally received opinion of the Pagans. And though it be true, that several of the ancient Christians, in their disputes with Pagans, do confute that opinion of many unmade deities; yet we do not find for all that, that any of them seriously charge the Pagans with it, they only doing it occasionally and ex abundanti. But we should be the better enabled to make a clear judgment concerning this controversy, whether there were not amongft the Pagan deities a multitude of supposed unmade beings, if we did but take a short survey of their religion, and consider all the several kinds of gods worshipped by them; which may, as we conceive, be reduced to these following heads. In the first place therefore it is certain, that many of the Pagan gods were nothing else but dead men (or the souls of men deceased) called by the Greeks Heroes, and the Latin Manes; such as Hercules, Liber, Asculapins, Cæsor, Pollux, Quirinus, and the like. Neither was this only true of the Greeks and Romans, but also of the Egyptians, Syrians and Babylonians. For which cause the Pagan sacrifices are, by way of contempt in the Scripture called the sacrifices of the dead; that is, not of dead or lifeless statues, as some would put it off, but of dead men: which was the reason, why many of the religious rites and solemnities, observed by the Pagan priests, were mournful and funeral; Accordingly as it is expressed in Baruch concerning the Babylonians, Their priests sit in their temples, having their clothes rent, and their heads and beards shaven, and nothing upon their heads; they roar and cry before their gods, as men do at the feast, when one is dead. (Some of which rites are therefore thought to have been interdicted to the Israelitish priests.) And the same thing is noted likewise by the poet concerning the Egyptians:

Et quem tu plagens, hominem testaris, Osirin:

and intimated by Xenophanes the Colophonian, when he reprehensively admonished the Egyptians after this manner: ἐὰν γὰρ νομίζω, μὴ γνῶς, ἐὰν δὲ οὐκ οἴδας ἐὰν νομίζω, Ποιεῖσθαι τὸν νομίζων τὸν οὐδὲν νομίζων. That if they thought those to be gods, they should not so lament them; but if they would lament them, they should no longer think them gods. Moreover, it is well known, that this humour of deifying men was afterwards carried on further, and that living men (as Emperors) had also temples and altars erected to them; nay, human polities and cities were also sometimes deified by the Pagans, Rome itself being made a goddess. Now, no man can imagine, that those men-gods and city-gods were look’d upon by them so many unmade self-existent deities, they being not indeed so much as θεοὶ γεννητοὶ θεοί, gods made or generated by nature, but rather artificially made by human will and pleasure. Again, another sort of the Pagan deities were all the greater parts of the visible mundane sytem, or corporeal world, as supposed to be animated, the sun, the moon, and the stars, and even

even the earth itself, under the names of 

of the gods, and the like. Now it is certain allé, that none of these could be taken for unmade self-existent deities neither, by those, who supposed the whole world itself to have been generated, or had a beginning, which, as Aristotle tells us, was the generally received opinion before his time. There was also a third sort of Pagan dieties, ethereal and aerial animals invisible, called Dæmons, Genii and Lares, superior indeed to men, but inferior to the celestial or mundane gods before mentioned. Wherefore these must needs be look'd upon also by them but as ἄνυπότοι Σόι, generated or created gods, they being but certain inferior parts of the whole generated world.

Besides all these, the Pagans had yet another sort of gods, that were nothing but mere accidents or affections of substances, which therefore could not be supposed by them to be self-existent deities, because they could not so much as subsist by themselves. Such as were virtue, piety, felicity, truth, faith, hope, justice, clemency, love, desire, health, peace, honour, fame, liberty, memory, sleep, night, and the like; all which had their temples or altars erected to them. Now this kind of Pagan gods cannot well be conceived to have been any thing else, but the several and various manifestations of that one divine force, power and providence, that runs through the whole world (as respecting the good and evil of men) fictitiously personated, and so represented as so many gods and goddesses.

Lastly, there is still another kind of Pagan gods behind, having substantial and personal names, which yet cannot be conceived neither to be so many understanding beings, unmade, and independent upon any supreme, were it for no other reason but only this, because they have all of them their particular places and provinces, offices and functions severally (as it were) assigned to them, and to which they are confined; so as not to interfere and clash with one another, but agreeably to make up one orderly and harmonious system of the whole; one of these gods ruling only in the heavens, another in the air, another in the sea, and another in the earth and hell; one being the god or goddess of learning and wisdom, another of speech and eloquence, another of justice and political order; one the god of war, another the god of pleasure; one the god of corn, and another the god of wine, and the like. For how can it be conceived, that a multitude of understanding beings, self-existent and independent, could thus of themselves have fallen into such a uniform order and harmony, and without any clashing, peaceably and quietly sharing the government of the whole world amongst them, should carry it on with such a constant regularity? For which cause we conclude also, that neither those διὶ majorum gentium, whether the twenty Seleuci, or the twelve Consentes, nor yet that triumvirate of gods, amongst whom Homer shares the government of the whole world, according to that of Maximus Tyrius, τρισχεῖ ὁμόγενος δίδασκατι τὰ πάντα, Ποσιδώνιον Δίπ. 16. μὲν Ἄλαξι, πολλιὸν ἀλα ναιμέναι αὐτὶ, "Αἰδης δὲ Ἀλάξι Σάφους περιέλθη, Ζεὺς δὲ θράον. The sea being assigned to Neptune, the dark and subterraneous parts to Pluto, but:

The Things of Nature personated, and Book I.

...but the heaven to Jupiter; which three are sometimes called also the celestial, marine, and terrestrial Jupiter; nor lastly, that other Roman and Samothracian trinity of gods, worshipped all together in the capitol, Jupiter, Minerva, and Juno; I say, that none of all these could reasonably be thought by the Pagans themselves, to be so many really distinct, unmade, and self-existent deities.

Wherefore the truth of this whole business seems to be this, that the ancient Pagans did physiologize in their theology; and whether looking upon the whole world animated, as the supreme God, and consequently the several parts of it as his living members; or else, apprehending it at least to be a mirror, or visible image of the invisible Deity, and consequently all its several parts, and things of nature, but so many several manifestations of the divine power and providence, they pretended, that all their devotion towards the Deity ought not to be huddled up in one general and confused acknowledgment of a supreme invisible Being, the creator and governor of all; but that all the several manifestations of the Deity in the world, considered singly and apart by themselves, should be made so many distinct objects of their devout veneration. And therefore in order hereunto did they προσαποιημαι, speak of the things in nature, and the parts of the world, as persons, and consequently as so many gods and goddeses; yet so, as that the intelligent might easily understand the meaning, that these were all really nothing else but so many several names and notions of that one Numen, divine force and power, which runs through the whole world, multiformly displaying itself therein. To this purpose Ballus in Cicero: Videntes ut a physiocratis rebus traeta ratio fit ad comminimias & fictos deos? See you not, how from the things of nature fictitious gods have been made? And Origen seems to infin upon this very thing, (where Celsus upbraids the Jews and Christians for worshipping one only God) shewing, that all that seeming multiplicity of pagan Gods could not be understood of so many distinct substantial independent Deities; but ποιεῖται τάκε, τὰς αὐτός ὑπάκουα παραστάσεις τὸ πάνθος τῶν καθένας ἐλληνικῆς θεοῦς. Παραστάσεις. But ... οὐκ οὕτως Νομισμὸς γενομένης ἀπὸ Δίος τὰς Μοῖρας, ἡ Θημιόδωρ οὔτε τός Ὀμής, ἡ τὰς Κελτικάς αἱ ὑποκείμενα παραστάσεις δύναται καὶ οὕτως ὁπωσοῦ καὶ ὁπώς, ἀλλ' οὗ ὑποκείμενα τὰ Ἑλληνικά ἀναπλήρωμα (οὐκοῦν αὐτοπάλαιτα ὁπωσοῦ ἡμῶν ἀπὸ τῶν παραστάσεως) δυνατόν ἢ τὸν Θεόν. To this sense; Let Cellus therefore himself shew, how he is able to make out a multiplicity of Gods (substantial and self-existent) according to the Greeks and other Barbarian Pagans; let him declare the essence and substantial personality of that Memory, which by Jupiter generated the muses, or of that Themis, which brought forth the hours; or let him shew how the Graces, always naked, do subsist by themselves. But he will never be able to do this, nor to make it appear, that those figments of the Greeks (which seem to be really nothing else but the things of nature turned into persons) are so many distinct (self-existent) deities. Where the latter words are thus rendered in a late edition; Sed nunquam poterit (Celsus) Graecorum figmenta, que valida fieri videntur, ex rebus ipsis deos esse arguere; which we confess we cannot understand; but we conceive
conceive the word σωματικός, there turned validaer soli, is here used by Origen in the same sense with προσωποῦναίτις: so that his meaning is, as we have declared, that those sigments of the Greeks and other Barbarian Pagans, (which are the same with Balbus his commentiti & fieti Dii) are really nothing else but the things of nature, figuratively and fictitiously personated, and consequently not so many distinct substantial deities, but only several notions and considerations of one God, or supreme Numen, in the world.

Now this fictitious personating, and deifying of things, by the Pagan Theologers, was done two manner of ways; one, when those things in nature were themselves without any more ado, or change of names, spoken of as persons, and so made gods and goddesves, as in the many instances before preposed. Another, when there were distinct proper and perfonal names accommodated severally to those things, as of Minerva to wisdom, of Neptune to the sea, of Ceres to corn, and of Bacchus to wine. In which latter case, those personal names properly signify the invisible divine powers, supposed to preide over those several things in nature; and these are therefore properly those gods and goddesses, which are deities of the good things, and the removers of the contrary; but they are used improperly also for the things of nature themselves, which therefore as manifestations of the divine power, goodness and providence personated, are sometines also abusively called gods and goddesses. This mystery of the Pagan polytheism, is thus fully declared by Mosis chlynus: Ιστιον 61. In Hesiod, p.3!

Now we must know, that whatsoever the Greeks (or Pagans) saw to have any power, virtue or ability in it, they looked upon it as not arising according to such power, without the providence, presidency, or influence of the gods; and they called both the thing itself, which hath the power, and the deity presiding over it, by one and the same name: whence the miniferial fire used in mechanick arts, and the god presiding over those arts that work by fire, were both alike called Hephæstus, Vulcan, or Vulcan; so the name Demeter or Ceres was given as well to corn and fruits, as to that goddes which beosors them; Athëna or Minerva did alike signify wisdom and the goddes which is the dispener of it; Dionysius or Bacchus, wine, and the god that giveth wine; (whence Plato etymologizes the name from giving of wine.) In like manner, they called both the child-bearing of women, and the goddisses that superintended over the same, Eilithyia or Lucina; Coitus or coipulation, and the deity presiding over it, Aphrodite or Venus.
Venus. And lastly, in the same manner, by the Muses they signified both those rational arts, rhetoric, astronomy, poetry, and the goddesses, which assist therein or promote the same. Now, as the several things in nature and parts of the corporeal world are thus metonymically and catachrestically called gods and goddesses, it is evident, that such deities as these could not be supposed to be unmade or self-existent, by those, who acknowledged the whole world to have been generated and had a beginning. But as these names were used more properly, to signify invisible and understanding powers, predinding over the things in nature, and dispensing of them, however they have an appearance of so many several distinct deities ; yet they seem to have been all really nothing else, but as Balbus in Cicero¹ expresses it, Deus pertinens per naturam et siveque rei, God passing through, and acting in the nature of every thing ; and consequently, but several names, or so many different notions and considerations of that one supreme Numen, that divine force, power, and providence, which runs through the whole world, as variously manifesting itself therein.

Wherefore, since there were no other kinds of Gods amongst the Pagans, besides these already enumerated, unless their images, statues and symbols should be accounted such (because they were also sometimes abusively called gods) which could not be supposed by them to have been unmade or without a beginning, they being the workmanship of men's own hands; we conclude universally, that all that multiplicity of Pagan gods, which makes so great a show and noise, was really either nothing but several names and notions of one supreme Deity, according to its different manifestations, gifts and effects in the world, personated; or else many inferior understanding beings, generated or created by one Supreme: so that one unmade self-existent Deity, and no more, was acknowledged by the more intelligent of the ancient Pagans, (for of the fottish vulgar no man can pretend to give an account, in any religion) and consequently, the Pagan polytheism (or idolatry) consisted not in worshipping a multiplicity of unmade minds, deities and creators, self-existent from eternity, and independent upon one Supreme; but in mingling and blending, some way or other, unduly, creature-worship with the worship of the Creator.

And that the ancient Pagan Theists thus acknowledged one supreme God, who was the only θεός αρχήν, unmade or unproduced Deity, (I say, Theists, because those amongst the Pagans, who admitted of many gods, but none at all unmade, were absolute Atheists) this may be undeniably concluded from what was before proved, that they acknowledged omnipotence or infinite power to be a divine attribute. Because upon the hypothesis of many unmade self-existent deities, it is plain, that there could be none omnipotent, and consequently no such thing as omnipotence in rerum natura: and therefore omnipotence was rightly and properly styled by Macrobius², summi Dei omnipotentia, it being an attribute essentially peculiar to one supreme and sole self-existent Deity. And Simplicius, likewise a Pagan,

¹ De Natur. Deor. Lib. II. Cap. XXVIII.
Pagan, confuted the Manichean hypothesis of two self-existent deities from hence also, because it destroy'd omnipotence: οὐκ ἀναλακονεῖται διὸ λέγοντες τῷ Ἰν Επιθ. c. 4. δeus αἶσις (τὸ τε αὐτῶν τὸ κακόν) τὸ τε αὐτῶν τὸ κακόν ἕνας λεγόντες Θεόν, [Proutus in Cap. XXIV. p. 164. Edit. aut. tινι ἀληθινῷ καὶ ὅλην ἀναλακονεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μετά τῆς ἤλυς διάκριμος, εἰτερ ἀρχιν ἐγραμμ. τῶν. For they, who assert two principles of the universe (one good, the other evil) are necessitated to grant, that the good principle, called by them God, is not the cause of all things, neither can they praise it as omnipotent, nor ascribe a perfect and whole entire power to it, but only the half of a whole power at most, if so much. Over and besides all which, it hath been also proved already, that the ancient Atheists under paganism directed themselves principally against the opinion of monarchy, or of one supreme Deity ruling over all; from whence it plainly appears, that it was then asserted by the Pagan Theists.

And we think it here observable, that this was a thing so generally confessed and acknowledged, that Faustus the Manichean took up this conceit, that both the Christians and Jews paganized in the opinion of monarchy, that is, derived this doctrine of one Diety, the sole principle of all things, only by tradition from the Pagans, and by consequence were no other than schisms or subdivided sects of paganism. Vos deficiens in gentibus (faith he) monarchia opinem primò vocibus divulgatis, id est, ut omnia credallis ex deo. Eftis fane scibis, necnon & priores vestri Judaei. De opinione monarchiae, in nullo etiam ipsi diffentiant à paganis. Quare confiat vos atque Judeos scibis esse gentilitatis. Seitis autem si querae, non plures erant quam duae, Gentium & nostra. You resorting from the Gentiles, broke off their opinion of monarchy, and carried it along with you, so as to believe all things to come from God. Wherefore you are really nothing but a schism of paganism, or a subdivided branch of it, and so are your predecessors the Jews; who differ nothing from Pagans neither in this opinion of monarchy. Whence it is manifest, that both Christians and Jews are but schisms of gentilism. But as for sects of religion, really differing from another, there are but these two, that of the Pagans, and that of ours, who altogether dissent from them. Now though this be false and foolish, as to the Christians and Jews deriving that opinion of monarchy, only by way of tradition, from the Pagans, which is a thing Founded in the principles of nature; yet it sufficiently shews this to have been the general tenet of the Pagans, that all their gods were derived from one sole self-existent Deity: so that they neither acknowledged a multitude of unmade deities, nor yet that duplicity of them, which Platarch contended for, (one good, and the other evil,) who accordingly denied God to be the cause of all things, writing thus in his defect of oracles 1, ᾧ μὴν θεός ἕνας αὐτῶν τὸν Θεόν, ἐν δὲ κακοῖς πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς ποιήσει, ἀποχέτευσε τῷ μὲν ἔλεος ἀπὸ τῶν πιστών, τῶν δὲ πεισθέντων πεινάων. They are guilty of one extreme, who make God the cause of nothing, and they of another, who make him the cause of all things. But this paradox was both late started amongst the Greeks, and quickly cried down by the succession of their philosophers, and therefore prejudiceth

1 Tom. II. Oper. p. 414.
The Pagans held both many Gods,

not the truth of Faustin his general assertion concerning the Pagans.

Which is again fully confirmed by St. Austin in his reply; Siquid ita dividit, ut dicat verum, que aliquâ religione detinentur, alius placere unum Deum coelendum, alius multos; per banc differentiam & pagani ad nosis remoti sunt, & Manichæi cum paganis deputantur, nos autem cum Judæis. Hic fortè dicitatis, quod multis deos veros ex una sublantia peribebis; quae pagani multos jitus, non ex una offerant, quamvis diversa illis officia, & opera, & potentates illis attribuant; ficit etiam apud vos alius deus expugnat gentem tenesvarnum, alius ex ea capta fabricat mundum, &c. If one should make another distribution of Religionists into such as worship either one God, or many gods; according to this division, the Pagans will be removed from us Christians, and joined with you Manicheans. But perhaps you will here say, that all your many gods are derived from one substance; as if the Pagans did not also derive all their gods from one, though attributing several offices, works and powers to them; in like manner as amongs you, one God expungs the nation of darkness, another God makes a world out of it, &c. And again afterwards he writes further to the same purpose; Disce ergò Faustin monarckiæ opinionem non ex gentibus nos habere, sed gentes non uique adeo ad falsos deos esse dilapfas, ut opinionem amitterent unius veri dei, ex quo est omnis qualificandae natura: Let Faustin therefore know, that we Christians have not derived the opinion of monarchy from the Pagans, but that the Pagans have not so far degenerated, sinking down into the worship of false gods, as to have lost the opinion of one true God, from whom is all whatsoever nature.

XIV. It follows from what we have declared, that the Pagan polytheism or multiplicity of gods is not to be understood in the sense before expressed, of many theo apouoi, &c. universis, many unproduced and self-existent deities, but according to some other notion or equivocation of the word gods. For God is των πολλαχων ληγομενων, one of those words, that hath been used in many different senses, the Atheists themselves acknowledging a God and gods, according to some private sense of their own, (which yet they do not all agree in neither,) and Theists not always having the same notion of that word; forasmuch as angels in Scripture are called gods in some sense, that is, as understanding beings superior to man, immortal, holy, and happy; and the word is again sometimes carried down lower to princes and magistrates; and not only so, but also to good men such, when they are said to be made partakers of the divine nature 1. And thus that learned Philosopher and Christian Boethius 2, Omnis beatus deus; sed natura quidem unus, participatiōne verò nibil prohibet eſs quam plurimus: Every good and happy man is a god, and though there be only one God by nature, yet nothing binders but that there may be many by participation. But then again, all men and angels are alike denied to be gods in other respects, and particularly, as to religious worship: Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve. Now this is that, which seems to be essentially included in the Pagan notion of the word God or gods, when taken in general, namely, in respect to religious worship. Wherefore a God in general, according to the sense 2 Peter I. 4. 3 De Confolat. Philos. Lib. III. p. 72. f.
chap. iv. and one god in different senses.

sense of the pagan theists, may be thus defined, an understanding being superior to men, not originally derived from senseless matter, and looked upon as an object for men's religious worship. But this general notion of the word God is again restrained and limited by differences, in the division of it. For such a God as this may be either ἀγένεσις, ingenerate or unproduced, and consequently self-existent; or else γενόμενος, generated or produced, and dependent on some higher being as its cause. In the former sense, the intelligent pagans, as we have declared, acknowledged only one God, who was therefore called by them θεός κατ' ἑξής, according to that of Thales in laertius, προσέβαλισεν τω ὁσλον θεοσ, ἀγένεσις γάρ: God is the oldest of all things, because he is unmade or unproduced, and the only thing that is so: but in the latter, they admitted of many gods, many understanding beings, which, though generated or produced, yet were superior to men, and looked upon as objects for their religious worship. And thus the pagan theists were both polytheists and monotheists in different senses, they acknowledged both many gods, and one God; that is, many inferior deities, subordinate to one supreme. Thus onatus the pythagorean in stoics declares himself, ὅσος ἐὰν μοι, ἐὰν μὴ εἰς ἑκάσταν ὁ Θεός, ἀλλ' εἰς μὲν ὁ μεγίστος, ἕκαστος. ecl. phys. l. υπὲρείςγε, ὃ ἐκεῖνον τῶν πατέρων; οἱ δ' ἀλλ' ποιοὶ διαφημίζεις κατὰ δύναμιν. p. 4.

But as the most ancient philosophers, such as Anaxagoras seems to have been such a one; forasmuch as affixing one perfect mind ruling over all, (which is the true deity) he effectually degraded all those other pagan gods, the sun, moon, and stars from their godships, by making the sun nothing but a globe of fire, and the moon earth and stones, and the like of the other stars and planets. And some such there were also amongst the ancient egyprians, as shall be declared in due place. Moreover, proclus upon Plato's timeus tells us, that there hath been always less doubt and controversy in the world concerning the one God, than concerning the many gods. Wherefore onatus here declares his own sense, as to this particular, viz. that besides the one supreme God, there were also many other inferior deities, that is, understanding beings, that ought to be religiously worshipped.

1 Lib. I. segm. 35. p. 21. s.
But because it is not impossible, but that there might be imagined one supreme Deity, though there were many other θεοὶ ἀγάνευθοι, unmade and self-existent gods besides, as Plutarch suppos'd before, one supreme God, together with a ζωγράφοις, an irrational soul or demon unmade, inferior in power to it; therefore we add in the next place, that the more intelligent Pagans did not only assert one God, that was supreme and κράτος πάλιν, the most powerful of all the gods, but also, who being omnipotent was the principle and cause of all the rest, and therefore the only θεοὶ ἀγάνευθοι καὶ ἀωνίων, the only unproduced and self-existent Deity. Maximus Tyris affirms this to have been the general senie of all the Pagans, that there was θεός καὶ πάλιν, καὶ θεῖος παλλοί, θεῖο παίδες, εὐνάχειοι, εὐελ, one God the king and father of all, and many gods, the sons of God, reigning together with God. Neither did the Poets imply any thing less, when Zeus was so often called by the Greeks, and Jupiter by the Latins, παλλύς τρυπωτες Στίως, and hominum pater atque deorum, or hominum satórique deorum, and the like. And indeed the theogonia of the ancient Pagans before mentioned was commonly thus declared by them universally, γεννησὶ τῆς θεῶν εὐαν, that the gods were generated, or, as Herodotus \(^1\) expressett it, θεῖοι ἐκ τῶν βεβον ἡμῶν, that every one of the gods was generated or produced; which yet is not so to be understood, as if they had therefore suppos'd no God at all unmade or self-existent, (which is absolute atheism) but that the θεοὶ τῆς θεῶν, as distinguished from the οί θεοὶ or το θεῖο from God, or the supreme Deity, were all of them universally made or generated.

But to the end, that we may now render this business, yet something more easy to be believed, that the intelligent Pagans did thus suppos'd all their gods have one to have been made or generated, and consequently acknowledged only one θεός ἀγάνευθος καὶ ἀωνίων, one unproduced and self-existent Deity, we shall in this place further observe, that the theogonia of those ancient Pagans, their genesis and generation of gods, was really one and the same thing with the cosmogonia, the genesis and generation of the world, and indeed both of them understood of a temporary production both of these gods, and the world. And this we shall first prove from Plato in his Timaus; where he being to treat of the cosmogonia, premisseth this distinction concerning two heads of being; that some were eternal and never made, and some again made or generated, the former whereof he calls οὐκ ἢ esse, the latter γεννοι or generation: adding also this difference betwixt them, that the eternal and immutable things were the proper objects of science and demonstration, but the other generated things of faith and opinion only; οὐκ ἢ γεννοι γεννοι, τάτο προς πάντα ἀληθεία, for what esse is to generation, the same is certainty of truth or knowledge to faith. And thereupon he declares, that his reader was not to expect the same evidence and certainty of truth from him, where he was now to treat of things generated, (namely, the gods, and the visible world) as if he had been to discourse about things immutable and eternal, in these words, ἔναν οὐκ ἢ Σύνεκτος, πολλὰ πολλάκις εἰσόντων πεσόν, θεοὶ καὶ τῆς του πατος γενεσίμων, &c. If therefore, O Socrates, many things having

\(^1\) Hiitor. Lib. II. Cap. LIII. p. 109.
thing with the Cosmogonia.

been spoken by many men, concerning the gods and the generation of the universe, we be not able to discourse demonstratively concerning the same, you ought not at all to wonder at it, or be displeased with us, but on the contrary to rest well satisfied with our performance, if upon this argument we do but deliver probabilities. Where the gods are by Plato plainly referred to γόνες, and not to οἴσια, to generation and not to eternal or immutable essence, as they are also joined with the generation of the world, as being but a part thereof. Neither is this at all to be wondered at in Plato, since first the whole visible world was no less to him, than it was to the other Pagans, a God; he calling it Ξένος εὐξίμων, a happy God, and before it was yet made, Ξένος ιδόμενον, a God about to be made. Not as if Plato accounted the fenfdles matter of this corporeal world, whether as perfectly dead and stupid, or as ended with a plattick nature only, to be a God, (for no inanimate thing was a God to Plato) but because he supposed the world to be an animal, ended with an intellectual soul, and indeed the best of all animals compounded of soul and body, έν τοῖς οίνοι καὶ λόγοι τόου εἰσινα διέ λόγων, τόου τοῦ φύσιν ζωον Pag. 30: ἰμφυγενίς τού τῷ ἀληθεία διά τοῦ τοῦ Ξένος γενέσθαι πρώτων. Wherefore we are thus according to probability to conclude, that this world was really made by the providence of God an intellectual animal; whence from an animal forthwith it became a God. So that here we are to take notice of two gods in Plato, very different from one another; one a generated God, this whole world animated, and another that God, by whole providence this world was generated, and thus made an animal and a God; which latter must needs be an unmade, self-existent Deity, and not belong to γόνες but to οἴσια, not to generation, but to immutable essence. Again, those greater parts of the world, the sun, the moon, and the stars, (as supposed also to be animated with particular souls of their own) were as well accounted by Plato, as by the other Pagans, gods, he plainly calling them there οὐάδι καὶ γενναίοι Ξένοι, visible and generated gods. Besides which celestial gods, the earth itself also is supposed by him to be either a God or goddes, according to those ancient copies of the Timæus used both by Ciceron and Proclus: Γῆς δὲ, τρόφοι μίν υμάς, εἰκήματι δὲ περὶ τοῦ δίκτυ πάντος πάλαι τεκνωσών, φίλακα καὶ εὐμηργοῦ νυκτος τέ καὶ ημέρας, ἐμφαντωσάτω, πεσώσω καὶ προσβαλτάτω Ξένοι, οἷον οὐκ οὐδεμίου γεγένοις. God fabricated the earth also, which is our nurse, turning round us, on the axis of the world, and thereby causing and maintaining the succession of day and night, the first and oldest of all the gods generated within the heavens. Where since that philosopher seems the rather to make the earth an animal and a God, because of its diurnal circumgiration upon its own axis, we may conclude, that afterwards, when in his old age, (as Plutarch records from Theophrastus) he gave entertainment also to that other part of the Pythagoric hypothesis, and attributed to the earth a planetary annual motion likewise about the sun, (from whence it would follow, that, as Plutinus expresseth it, the earth was ζοῦ τῶν ἀστράων, one of the stars) he was therefore still so much the more inclined to think.

think the earth to be a God as well as the other planets, or at least as the moon; that having been formerly represented in the Orphick tradition but as another habitable earth. For these verses of Orpheus are recorded by Proclus, to that purpose;

Μίσατο δ’ ἥλιον γαῖαν ἀπείρατον, ὑπὲρ Σελήνην
Αθάνατον ἐκλίθησιν, ἐπίρχετοι δὲ τὰ Μόνα,
"Η πέλλα οὐρ' ἔχει, πέλλα ἄστεα, πολλὰ μέλαθρα.

The sense whereof is this; That God in the cosmogonia or cosmogonia, besides this earth of ours, fabricated also another vast earth, which the immortal gods call Selene, but mortal men Mene, or the moon; that hath many bills and valleys, many cities and houses in it. From whence Proclus, though as it seems a stranger to the Pythagorick system, yet being much addicted to these Orphick traditions, concluded the moon to be, γῆν αἰώνιαν, an ethereal earth.

See Macrobi. Som. Scip. I. 1. c. 11. [P. 58.]

After all this, Plato, that he might be thought to omit nothing in his Timean cosmogonia, speaks also of the genæs, ortus, or generation of the poetick gods, under the name of daemons, such as Tethys and Phorcys, Saturn and Rhea, Jupiter and Juno, and the like; which seem to be really nothing else, but the other inanimate parts of the world and things of nature ἑιστοποίησα, that is, fictiously personated and defied (as is elsewhere declared,) Which whole busines was a thing set off by those Poets with much fiction and physiologick allegory. And though Plato, out of a seeming compliance with the laws of his city, pretends here to give credit to this poetick theogonia, as tradition delivered down from the sons of the gods, who must not be suppos’d to have been ignorant of their parents; yet, as Eusebius well observeth, he doth but all the while slightly jeer it, plainly infinuating the fabulosity thereof, when he affirmeth it to have been introduced not only ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀποδείξεως, without necessary demonstrations, but also ἐν τοῖς ἐνοτοῖς, without so much as probabilities. Nevertheless Proclus supposeth no such matter, but taking Plato in all this to have been in very good earnest, interprets these poetick gods or daemons mentioned by him, to be the gods below the moon, (notwithstanding that the earth was mentioned before by Plato) calling them γενεαγόρας Σεις, the gods that cause generation, and seeming to understand thereby the animated elements; Jupiter being here not taken, as he is often elsewhere, for the supreme God, but only for the animated æther, as Juno for the animated air. And upon this occasion he runs out into a long dispute, to prove, that not only the stars were animated, but also all the other sublunary bodies or elements: εἰ γὰρ ὃς ὁ λόγος ἡ λειτουργίας ἢ ἡ ἐνδοτική, ἢ τὰς σφαίρας τε ἄλλας τοῖς διάθεσις ἐν ἄλλων ἀκτιών ἂν θεόν, ἢ αὐτόκροτον, εἰ δὲ τὰ πάντα μετέχει καὶ περιτοίχεια, Σειὰς ἐνακρόν Φεῦς, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ οἰκίαι τάξεις τῶν ἤθελτου εὐθείας, εἰ γὰρ καὶ οἶκοι Ἰδίων ἐπίστημον αὐτοῖς, εἰ γὰρ καὶ οὐκ οὐκ ἄλλοι ψυχάς καὶ λαον μετέχει τῆς μείζος ψυκῆς, καὶ τοῦ ἐνότου, τι χρῆ περὶ τούτων οἰκεῖαι τῶν ψυχικῶν πῶς οὐ πολλῷ μᾶλλον τούτα διὰ ὁ πού πᾶς χωρὶς Σειῶν τάξεις μείλεσθι τῆς μιᾶς τοῦ κόσμου Σειῶν ἄρα. For if the whole world be a happy God, then none of the parts of it are

* Praeaparat. Evangelic. Lib. II. Cap. VII. p. 75, 76.
* Plat. in Timæo Cap. XXVI. p. 249.
* In Timeum Platon. Lib. IV. p. 287.
are godless, or devoid of providence; but if all things partake of God and providence, then are they not unfurnished of the divine nature; and if so, there must be some peculiar orders of Gods presiding over them. For if the heavens by reason of particular souls and minds partake of that one soul and one mind, why should we not conclude the same concerning the elements, that they also by certain intermedius orders of gods, partake of that one divinity of the whole world? Wherefore a little before, the same Proclus highly condemns certain ancient physiologers, whom he supposes Aristotle to have followed: _nullos τῶν Φυσιολόγων ἄμφοι εἰς Φεβέμενα, καὶ ἀποφύγεια τοῦτο ἀκεῖ τὰ φυσικὰ νεώματα τὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐρανία διὰ τοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς τάξιν, νῦν καὶ Θεόν μετέχειν οὕμολογον, τὴν δὲ γενέσιν, ὡς παλαμαῶντος, καὶ ἄμεινον καὶ άπρώτον απόλειπον, οἷα ἐκ καὶ Άριστοτέλεις ὑμεροῦ ἐθύμει, ταῖς οὐρανίαις περιβολαῖς πλούσιας ἐνισχύσας, τὰς αἰκατολικές αἰτίας; εἰτε ἐκτὸς ἔρχεται, εἰτε πλείον ἄμφοι δὲ τὰ ψυχεῖα τοῦτο καταληπτῶν._ The elements were thought by most of the ancient Physiologers to be inanimate, and to be moved fortuitously without providence. For though they acknowledged the heavenly bodies, by reason of that order that appears in them, to partake of mind and gods; yet they left this sublunary world (or genesis) to float up and down without providence. And these Aristotle afterwards followed, appointing immovable intelligences to preside over the celestial spheres only, (whether eight or more) but leaving all the lower elements dead and inanimate.

Lastly, besides all those other mundane gods before mentioned, as generated together with the world, though Proclus seems to be of another opinion, yet it is manifest, that Plato doth not there in his Timeus altogether forget those properly called demons, (elsewhere so much infested upon by him) but in the very next following words he plainly insinuates them, after this manner; _τῶν φαινομένων καὶ οὕσω ἔστησεν θεῖοι, the gods, which appear visibly to us as often as they please, or which can appear and disappear at pleasure, speaking also of their genesis or generation as part of the cosmogonia; and then again afterwards calling them νυν θεοί, junior gods, he describes them as those, whose particular office it was to superintend and preside over human affairs, καὶ κατὰ δικαίωμα ὑπάνω καλλίτερα καὶ ἀξιότερα τὸ θεοῦ διακώισαμεν ζωόν, ὥσπερ παρὰ καθότι γένεσιν αὐτῶν, and to govern this mortal animal, man, after the best manner possible, so that he should no otherwise fail of doing well or being happy, than as he became a cause of evil and misery to himself, by the abuse of his own liberty._

And thus much out of Plato's Timeus; but the same thing might be proved also out of his other writings, as particularly from that passage in his tenth book of laws, where he takes notice again of the theogonia of the ancients, and that as it had been depraved and corrupted by a great mixture of impious and immoral fables. _Εἰς ὁμοίως ἐν γράμμασι λόγια κυβερνείας, οἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς πάντοις, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἀνώ τῆς ἱεράς τῆς ἔνωσις, οἱ μὲν παλαιότατοι, ὡς γένεσιν προτὸς θάνατος οὐρανιων τῶν ἀλλων περιβολῆς ἐνισχύσας διὰ τῆς γένεσις οὐ πολλῷ Θεογονίας διεξέχουσιν, γενέσεις τις ἡς πρὸς ἀλλότριος οἰκίας φέρεται. There are, faith he, extant amongst us Athenians, certain stories and traditions, very ancient, concerning the gods, written partly in metre, and partly in prose, declaring how the heaven, and the other gods were at first made, or generated, and then carrying on their

2 In Timaeus Cap. XXVI. p. 248  2 Ibid. Cap. XXIX. p. 252.  3 P. 664.
their fabulous theogonia farther, bow these generated gods afterward conversed with one another, and ingenerating after the manner of men, begat other gods. Where that philosopher taking off his vizard, plainly discovers his great dislike of that whole fabulous theogonia (however he acknowledges elsewhere; that it did contain ὑποτικίας, that is, physiological allegories under it) as a thing, that was destructive of all piety and virtue, by reason of its attributing all human passions and vices to the gods. However, it plainly appears from hence, that the theogonia and the cosmogonia were one and the same thing, the generation of the gods being here the generation of the heaven, and of the sun, moon, and stars, and the like.

Moreover, this same thing is sufficiently manifested also even from Hesiod's own Theogonia, which doubtless was that, which Plato principally aimed at; and if it were not absolutely the first, yet is it the most ancient writing now extant, in that kind. For there in the beginning of that poem, Hesiod in invokes his muses after this manner;

Χαλκώς, τέκνας Δίος, ἐστε ὑπὲρτέτατοι οἰνίμν.

Moreover, the generation of the gods is the generation of the earth, heaven, stars, seas, rivers, and other things begotten from them (as probably amongst the rest demons and nymphs, which the same Hesiod speaks of elsewhere.) But immediately after this invocation of the muses, the Poet begins with Chaos, and Tartara, and Love; as the first principles, and then proceeds to the production of the earth, and of night out of chaos; of the aether, and of day from night; of the starry heavens; mountains, and seas, &c. All which genesis or generation of gods is really nothing but a poetical description of the cosmogonia; as throughout the sequel of that whole poem all seems to be physiologically, veiled under fiction and allegories. And thus the ancient scholia upon that book begin, ιτιον ὑπάρχει τοις θεογονίαις λόγοις θεον γνώσαν τους ὑπό τούτους ὑποτικίας, we must know, that the whole doctrine of the theogonia contains under it, in way of allegory, a physiological declaration of things; Hesiod's gods being not only the animated parts of the world, but

* Vide Platon, de Republ. Lib. II. p. 430.  
* Theogon. vers. 104.
also all the other things of nature, fictitiously personated and defiled, or abusively called gods and goddesses.

Neither was this only the doctrine of the Greeks, that the world was thus made or generated, and that the generation of the world was a Theogonia, or a generation of gods, (the world itself and its several parts being accounted such by them) but also in like manner of the other Barbarian pagans. For Diogenes Laertius hath recorded concerning the Persian Magi, In Proam. p. 239. αποθεονομενα περι τε ισιαι θεων κα γενεσιων, ου ου τω εις τ η αγια η φυσι η ωδοι. That they did both assert the being and generation of gods, and also that these gods were fire, and earth and water; that is, that the animated elements were gods, (as Proclus also before declared) and that these, together with the world, were generated, or had a beginning. And both Laertius and Diodorus represent it as the opinion of the ancient Egyptians, that the world was generated, or had a temporary production; as also, that the sun and moon, and other parts of the world, were gods. But whereas the same Diodorus writes of certain Egyptian gods, οι γνωσιν αισθων ιερων των, which had an eternal generation; he seems to mean thereby only the celestial gods, the sun, moon and stars, as distinct from those other heroes and men-gods, which are again thus described by him: οι έστε τει ραηξετατας, δια δε σωσιν καινην ωραξη, νεομας της Θεωσεως: who, though naturally mortal, yet, by reason of their wisdom, virtue and beneficence toward mankind, had been advanced to immortality.

And by this time we think it doth sufficiently appear, that the Theogonia of the ancients is not to be understood merely of their heroes and men-gods, or of all their gods, as supposed to have been nothing else but mortal men, (Dii mortalibus nati matriibus, as Cotta in Cicero speaks) who, according to the more vulgar signification of the word, had been generated, (humano more) as some, otherwise learned men, have seemed to suppose; but that it extends to all the inferior Pagan gods, some whereof were parts of the visible world animated, as the sun, moon, stars and earth: so that their Theogonia was the very same thing with the Cosmogonia, or at least a part thereof. Notwithstanding which, we deny not, but that there was also in the paganick fables of the gods a certain mixture of history and heroology interferred, and complicated all along together with physiolog.

We are, in the next place, to observe, that both this Theogonia and Cosmogonia of the ancient Pagans, their generation of the world and gods, is to be understood of a temporary production of them, whereby they were made in περι ουτων, or from an antecedent non-existence brought into being. For this was the general tradition amongst the Pagans, that the world was made out of an antecedent chaos, as shall be afterwards further declared. And Aristotle affirmeth, that before his time, this genesis and temporary production of the world had been universally entertained by all, and par-

2 De Celo, Lib. I. Cap. X. p. 632. Tom. I.
particularly, that Plato was an asserter of the same. Nevertheless, the generality of the latter Platonists 1 endeavour, with all their might, to force a contrary sense upon his Timaeus: which is a thing, that Plutarch long since observed after this manner; οἱ πλείονι τοῦ χειρισμὸν Πάτων, φοβούμενοι, καὶ παραλυτήμανε, πάντα μηχανώλαι, καὶ συκεοδιάδουλοι καὶ στεφθένσαι, τὸ τε δινόν καὶ ἀρκετὸν οἰκομένει δεῖν περικαλυπτένει καὶ ἀριθμαίαι, τὸν τε κοσμὸ τὴν τε τῆς φύσης αὐτῷ γένεσιν καὶ οὐσίας, ἥν εἴ πάντας συμπυκνώσαι, οὔ οὖν τοῦ ἀπειρον χρόνον οὕτως ἔχον. The most of Plato's followers, being infinitely troubled and perplexed in their minds, turn themselves every way, using all manner of arts, and offering all kind of violence to his text, as conceiving, that they ought by all means possible to hide and conceal that opinion (as inaudible and defeatable) of the generation of the world, and of the soul of it, so as not to have continued from eternity, or through a succession of infinite time. Notwithstanding which, we conceive it to be undeniably evident, that Plato, in his Timaeus, doth assert the genesis of the world in this sense, to wit, of a temporary production of it, and as not having existed from eternity, or without beginning. First, because in the entrance of that discourse 2 he opposeth these two things to one another, τὸ καὶ τὸ, that which always is, and τὸ γενέσιν ἐχειν, that which is generated or made; and therefore, in affirming the world to have been generated, he must needs deny the eternity thereof. Again, the question is so punctually stated by him afterwards, as that there is no possibility of any subterfuge left, πάντως ἢ ἂν γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχων οὐδέναι, η γένεσιν, ἢ ἂν ἀρχὴς τοῦ ἐκζεῖναι. Whether the world always were, having no beginning or generation, or whether it was made or generated, having commenced from a certain epocha? To which the answer is, γένεσιν, that it was made, or had a beginning. Moreover, this philosopher there plainly affirms also 3, that time itself was made, or had a beginning; χρόνος 4 οὖν μετ' οὐρανὸς γένεσιν, ὁμοίως, ἀρχαὶ καὶ λυθῆναι, αὐτοῖς λοιποῖς τῷ αὐτῶν γένεσιν. Time was made together with the heaven, that being both generated together, they might be both dissolved together likewise, if at least there should ever be any dissolution of them. Besides which, he plainly declares, that before this orderly world was produced, the matter of it did move disorderly 4; πάντως ἢ ἂν ὡς τὰ παραλύσαν, οἷς καὶ συκεοδώλοι, αὖ ἂν ἄρω συνεχεία, ἀρκετὸν πασμενός καὶ παχύς, έι δὲν αὐτὸ ἔγερεν, ἵνα ὁ πασμενός πάσης τῆς ὀρφανίας; God taking all that matter, which was, (not then resting, but moving confusedly and disorderly) he brought it into order out of confusion. Which is no more than if he should have said, God made this world out of an antecedent chaos; which, as we said before, was the constant tradition of the ancient Pagans. Now, as to authority, we may well conclude, that Aristotle was better able to understand both Plato's philosophy and Greek, than any of those junior Platonists, who lived hundreds of years after. And yet we are not quite destitute of other suffrages besides Aristotle's neither, not only Philo the Jew 5, but also Plutarch 6 and Atticus 7, who were both of them Platonick Pagans, voting on this side, besides Alexander Apollodorus 8, a judicious Peripatetic.

1 Vide Proclum in Timeaun Platon.
2 Cap. XII. p. 235.
3 Cap. XX. p. 246.
4 Timaei Cap. XIV. p. 237.
5 In Libro, quod mundus sit incorruptibilis, p. 944. Oper.
6 In Libro de animae proeret. p. 1013, 1014.
7 Tom. II. Oper.
The only objection considerable is from what Plato himself writes in his third and sixth book of Laws; in the former wherof Clinias and the Athenian Hesper discourse together after this manner, concerning the original or first beginning of commonwealths: 

Πολιτείας δ' ἀρχήν τῶν πάντων φώνας τε-Ρ.676. Συμπ. 

γραφουσα: ΚΑ. Λέγεις δὲ πόθεν; ΛΘ. Οὐκειον μὲν ἀτὸν χρόνον μόνον τε εὐκειοιότατον, εἴ τι τῶν 

μετασχητῶν ἂν τῷ τούτῳ. ΚΑ. Πώς λέγεις; ΛΘ. Φαίην, ἀφ' ὀσείς τ' εἰναι εἴ γ' ἀληθωτι 

πολιτισμοὶ, δοκεῖς ὅτι παλαιότεροι χρόνοι πλήθως ὀσοῦ γένονται; ΚΑ. Οἶκα μακρον γε 

υπομακρον. ΛΘ. Τὸ δὲ γε ὃς ἀπειρὸν τι εὑρίσκων ἄν εἰν. ΚΑ. Πάνω μὲν εὑρίσκων γε, 

ΛΘ. Μάλλον γε εὑρίσκων μὲν ἐπὶ μακρίας ἡμῶν γενόντων τοίς τούτοις χρόνων, κατὰ 

τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦ πλήθους λόγος, εἰς ἑλάτων ἐφθασμέναι; πεπολεμισμέναι δ' ἂν πάχας πολιτεῖ 

ίας πολάκις ἐκαστὰκοι; εἰ τοῦτο μὲν ἐπὶ ἐλατῶνοι, μείζονας, τοῖς δὲ ἐπὶ μεγίστων, ἐπάνω 

τῶν χρόνων ἐκ βιλίανων γενόντων. ΚΑ. Οὐκ εἰς μεγίστων. ΛΘ. Βλαστοῦσαν 

Ἀθ. What beginning shall we say there was of commonwealths? Cl. Whence would you yourself derive them? Ath. I suppose from a great length and infinity of time, through successive changes. Cl. I understand not well what you mean. Ath. Thus therefore, do you think, that you are able to determine what length or quantity of time there hath been since cities and polities of men first began? Cl. This is by no means easy to be done. Ath. Wherefore there is a kind of infinity and inestimability of this time. Cl. It is very true. Ath. Have there not then been innumerable cities constituted within this time, and as many again destroyed, of all several forms; they being changed from greater to lesser, and from lesser to greater, from better to worsper, and from worse to better? Now, we say, that if Plato intended here to affort an absolute infinity of time past, then it must needs be granted, that in his old age, when he wrote his book of Laws, he changed his opinion from what it was before when he wrote his Timæus; and if so, he ought in all reason to have retractated the same, which he does not here do. But in very truth, the meaning of this philosopher, in those words cited, seems to be this; not that there was an absolute infinity of time past, (as Proclus contends, taking advantage of that word ἀπειρία) but only that the world had lasted such a length of time, as was in a manner inestimatable to us, or uncomputable by us; there having happened, as he addeth, in the mean time, several successive destructions and consumptions of mankind, by means of various accidents, as particularly one most remarkable deluge and inundation of waters. The latter place, in his sixth book of Laws, runs thus: ἦ τῶν ἄθρωπων γημεῖγεν ἦ τὸ παράπαν ἀρχήν ὑδηρίας ἤληχαν, οὐδ' Ρ. 781. 

ἐρεὶ ποτε γε πεπλευτών ἄλλα, ὅτε τε αἰει καὶ ἤτοι πάλιν εἴ γένος τι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀφ' ὧν γένος, 

ἀμέλεαι ἦν χρόνου ἐνα προϕοσίς καὶ εἰς. Either the generation of men had no beginning at all, and will have no end, but always was and always will be; or else there has been an inestimable length of time from the beginning of it. Which place affordeth still more light to the former; for we may well conclude, that by ἀπειρία τι καὶ ἀμέλεαι there was not meant an absolute infinity of time, but only such as had a very remote or distant beginning, because ἀμέλεαι here is plainly taken in that sense. We conceive therefore, that this was Plato's opinion in his old age, when he wrote his book of Laws, that though the world had a beginning, yet it had continued a very long time not computable by us; or at least he thought fit to declare himself after that manner, perhaps by reason of the clamours
That Plato was

Book I.

clamours of Aristotle, or some others against his Timeus, that so he might thereby somewhat mollify that opinion of the novity of the world, by removing the epocha and date thereof to so great a distance.

Now, it is very true, what we have several times before suggested, that there have been amongst the Pagans both Theogonists and Cosmogonists too, that were Atheists; they abusing the word gods several ways; some of them, as Anaximander, understanding thereby inanimate worlds successively generated out of sensles matter, and corrupted again into it; others, as Anaximenes and Democritus, allowing, that there were certain animals and understanding being superior to men, but such only as were native and mortal, in like manner as men, and calling these by the name of gods. Of the former of which two philosophers, St. Augustine gives us this account: Anaximenes omnes rerum causas infinito aeris dedit, nec deos negavit aut tacuit, non tamen ab ipissimis aerem factum, sed ipso aere ortos credit. Anaximenes made infinite air to be the first original and cause of all things; and yet was he not therefore silent concerning the gods, much less did he deny them, nevertheless he did not believe the air to have been made by the gods, but the gods to have been all generated out of the air. These were therefore such Theogonists, as supposing all the gods without exception to be generable and corruptible, and acknowledged no άγίον at all, no understanding being unmade and self-existent; but concluded sensles matter to be the only άγίον and original of all things, which is absolute atheism. Notwithstanding which, it is certain, that all the Pagan Theogonists were not Atheists, (no more than all their Cosmogonists Theists) but that there was another sort of Theogonists amongst them, who supposing indeed all the inferior mundane gods to have been made or generated in one sense or other; but asserted one άγίον άτομόν γνωστόν, one supreme unmade self-existent Deity, who was the cause of them all: which Theogonists, for distinction sake from those other atheistic ones, may be called divine.

And that Plato was such a divine Theogonist, is a thing, as we conceive, out of question: but if there had been any doubt concerning it, it would have been sufficiently removed from those passages before cited out of his Timeus. To which nevertheless, for fuller satisfaction, may be added the following two: the first, pag. 34. έμπίστως εκ πάσης έκς αιτίου λόγου, &c. For thus it ought to be read έκ έκς, as it is also in Aldus his edition; and not διότι, as in Stephens, following an error in that of Ficinus. And accordingly the words are thus rendred by Cicero: Hec Deus is, qui semper erat, de aliquando futuro deo cogitans, &c. Where again, it presently follows in Cicero’s version, Sic Deus ille eternus hunc perfectissimum deum procreavit, thus that eternal God procreated this perfectly happy god the world. Where there is plainly mention made of two gods, one a

* De Civitate Dei, Lib. VIII. Cap. II. p. 147. Tom. VII. Oper.
generated god, the animated world, called elsewhere in Plato θειον γεννητον; and another eternal and unmade God, innatus & infestus Deus, who was the cause of the world's generation or production; or, to keep close to Plato's own language, one God who belonged to genesis, or that head of being, which he calls generation, and therefore must needs have an antecedent cause of his existence, since nothing can be made without a cause; and another God, that was truly and properly θεός, immutable essence, who was the cause of that generated god the universal, and therefore of all things. The other passage of Plato's is, pag. 41. of his Timaeus, ἵππει ω̄ν πάντας οὕς τε περιπολοίητο Φανερός, καθ' οὐν θεον προς ἀληθείαν θεον, γένεσις ἦγορ, ἂλητες πρὸς οὕς τε ποιήσαντο τὸν θεόν θεόν, ὁμιλοῦσαν τῷ ὁμιλοῦσιν. When therefore all the gods, both those which move visibly about the heavens, and those which appear to us as often as they please, (that is, both the stars and demons) were generated or created, that God, which made this whole universe, bestowed these generated gods after this manner; Ζευσ gods of gods (whom I myself am the maker and father of) attend. Where the words ἦς θεόν, notwithstanding Proclus his other differing conjectures, seem to have been very well rendered by Cicero; Dii, qui deorum satu oris effis, Ζευσ gods, which are the progeny or off-spring of the gods. And the gods, whose off-spring these generated gods (the animated stars and demons) are said to be, must needs be those αἰθίον ὁι, those eternal gods, elsewhere mentioned in the same Timaeus, as where the philosopher calls the world τῷ αἰθίῳ θεόν γενομεν ἄραμμα, a generated or created image of the eternal gods; as Cicero also is to be understood of these, when he speaks of the world's being made by the gods, and by the counsel of the gods. Now, these eternal gods of Plato, called by his followers θεόν ὑπεράτμα, the supermundane gods, though, according to that stricter notion of the word γένεσις, as it is used both in Plato and Aristotle for a temporary production of things ἐξ εἷς οὗτον, they were indeed all ἄργυροι, because they were never not, and had no beginning of their existence; yet, notwithstanding were they not therefore supposed by that philosopher to be all αὐτόγενοι and αὐτοτετατοί, so many self-originated and self-subsistent beings, or first principles, but only one of them such, and the rest derived from that one: it being very true, as we conceive, what Proclus affirms, ὡς ὁ Πλατὸς ὁ τῆς μίας ἀρχής ἀλαζίος πάντα, In Timae. p. 7. that Plato reduces all things to one principle, even matter itself; but unique.

It is reasonable, that he deriveth all his gods from one. Wherefore all those eternal gods of Plato, (one only excepted) though they were not γένεσις, or generated in one sense, that is, κατὰ χρόνον, as to a temporary beginning, yet were they notwithstanding, as Proclus distinguishes, γένεσις αἰτίας, generated in another sense, as produced from a superior cause, there being only one such ἄργυρος, one ingenerate or unproduced Deity. Thus, according to Plato, there were two sorts of secondary or inferior and derivative gods; first, the θεόν ὑπεράτμα, or mundane gods, such as had all of them a temporary generation with the world, and of whom Plato's Theogonia and γένεσις θεόν is properly to be understood; and secondly, the ὑπεράτμα and αἴτωθεον, the supermundane and eternal gods, which were all of them also, save only one, produced from that one, and dependent on it as their cause.

"Timaei, Cap. XXI. p. 245. f."
Pagan Theogoniis Assertors  

Book I.

...But of these inferior eternal gods of the Platonists and Pythagoreans we are to speak again afterwards. In the mean time it is evident, that in that passage of Plato's before cited, there is plain mention made both of ὑπὸ γενέσεως εἰσόδες, of dii ori, gods who were made or generated with the world, and of ὁ τεὸς τὸ τῶν γενεάς, of one God, who was the maker of them, and of the whole universe, who therefore is himself every way ἀγαθὸς, unmade or unproduced. And accordingly he afterwards subjoins, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐν ταύτῃ πάλιν διπτάεται, ἐκεῖνος ἐν τῷ λοιπῷ κατὰ τρόπον θεός. μενοὺς δὲ νοστάλεις οἱ πάντες τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς τάξιν, ἵππεατον κατά, which Cicero thus renders; Atque is quidem (Deus) qui cuncta composuit, constanter in suo manebat statu, quia autem erant ab eo creati (dii) cum parentis ordinem cognovissent, bene sequabantur, &c. Then that God, who framed all things, remained constantly in his former state; and his sons, or the gods that were created by him, observed his order and appointment.

Neither was Plato singular in this, but the generality of the other Pagan Theists, who were more intelligent, all along agreed with him herein, as to the generation of the mundane gods; and so were both Theists and Theogoniis, they indeed understanding nothing else by their Theogonia, or generation of gods, than a divine Cosmogonia, or creation of the world by God; forasmuch as they supposed the world itself as animated, and its several parts to be gods. So that they asserted these three things; first, a Cosmogonia, the generation of the world, that it was not from eternity, but had a novelty or beginning; secondly, that this Cosmogonia, or generation of the world, was also a Theogonia, or generation of gods, the world itself and several of its parts animated being esteemed such; and lastly, that both these gods and the world were made and produced by one θεός ἄγαθος καὶ αὐτογενής, one unproduced and self-organized Deity. All which particulars we may here briefly exemplify in P. Ovidius Nafo, whose paganitv sufficiently appears from his Fastorurn and all his other writings, and who also went off the stage before Christianity appeared on it, and may well be presumed to represent the then generally received doctrine of the pagans. First therefore, as for the generation and novelty of the world, and its first production out of a chaos, we have it fully acknowledged by him in these following verses:

Metam. 1. 1.  
[Ver. 5.]

Ante mare & terras, &c, quod tegit omnia, cænum,  
Unus erat tota naturae vulbus in orbis,  
Quem dixere chaos, rudis indigestaque mole,  
Nec quietam nisi pondus inerc, congestaque eodem  
Non bene junctarum discordia femina rerum.  
Nullus adhuc mundo praebat lumina Titan,  
Nec nova crescente reparabat cornua Phoebe,  
Nec circumfuso pendebat in ære tellus,  
Ponderibus libra fuis; nec brachia longa  
Margine terrarum porrexerat Amphitrite.  
Quaeque erat & tellus, &c.

Which in Mr. Sandys his English, with some little alteration, speaks thus:

Before
Before that sea, and earth, and heaven was fram'd,
One face had nature, which they chaos nam'd.
No Titan yet the world with light adorns,
Nor waxing Phebe fills her wained horns;
Nor hung the self-poiz'd earth in thin air plac'd,
Nor Amphitrite the vast shore embrac'd;
Earth, air, and sea confounded, &c.

In the next place, when there was a world made out of this chaos, that this Cosmogonia, or generation of the world, was also a Theogonia, or generation of gods, is plainly intimated in these verses:

Neu regio foret ulla suis animalibus orba,
Astra tenent celeste solum, formaeque deorum.

To this sense,

That nought of animals might unfurnish'd lie,
The gods, in form of stars, possess the sky.

And that all this was effected, and this orderly mundane system produced out of a disorderly confused chaos, not by a fortuitous motion of matter, or the jumbling of atoms, but by the providence and command of one unmade Deity, which was also that, that furnished all the several parts of the world with respective animals, the sea with fishes, the earth with men, and the heaven with gods; is thus declared also by the poet:

Hanc Deus & melior litem natura diremit,
Nam caelo terras, & terris absedit undas:
Et liquidum ipsius seceravit ab aere calum, &c.
Sic ubi dispoitam, quisquis sibi ille deorum,
Congeriet secuit, seclamque in membra reedit;
Principio terram, ne non aequalis ab omni
Parte foet, magni spectem glomeravit in orbis:
Tum freta diffuist, rapidisque tumefecerit venti
Jussi, &c.
Sic onus inclusum numero distinctis eodem
Curavit Dei, &c.

This strife (with better nature) God decides,
He earth from heaven, the sea from earth divides:
He also pure extracts from groser air.
All which unfolded by his prudent care,
From that blind mass; the happily disjoin'd
With strifeless peace, be to their seats confin'd, &c.
What God 'ever this division wrought,
And every part to due proportion brought,
First, left the earth unequal should appear,
He turn'd it round in figure of a sphere.
Then seas diffus'd, commanding them to rear
With ruffling winds, and give the land a shore:

To
To those he added springs, ponds, lakes immense,
And rivers whose their winding borders fence.

Where though that learned paraphrast supposed (and not without some probability neither) that Deus & melior natura, God and the better nature, were one and the self-same thing, yet we rather conceived them to be distinct, but one of them subordinate to the other as its instrument; God and the plattick nature; accordingly as Aristotle writes in his Physicks, Νῦν γαϊτος αιτιον τοις τοι παιδις, That mind and nature were both together the cause of this universe.

Nevertheless, we cannot but observe in this place, that though that poet speaks more than once of God singularly, as also calls him mundi fabricator, and ille opifex rerum, and mundi melioris origo; yet notwithstanding, where he writes of the making of man, Pagan-like, he affirms him, though to have been made by God, yet according to the image or likenes of the gods, which govern all things.

Sanctus bis animal, mentisque capacius altae,
Decur adhuc, & quod dominari in cetera posset;
Natus homo efi: fove bune divino femine fecit,
Ille opifex rerum, mundi melioris origo:
Sive recent tellus, sedulique nuper ab alto
Aliter, cognati retinebat femina calor.
Quam fatus lapeto, mihi ani fluvialibus undis,
Finxit in effigiem moderantium cuncta deorum.

The nobler being, with a mind possesst,
Was wanting yet, that should command the rest.
That maker, the best world's original,
Either him fram'd of seed celestial;
Or earth, which late he did from heaven divide,
Some sacred seeds retain'd to heaven allied:
Which with the living stream Prometheus mixt,
And in that artificial structure set.
The form of all the all-ruling deities.

And because some may probably be puzzled with this seeming contradiction, that one God should be said to be the maker of the whole world and of man, and yet the government of all should be attributed to gods plurally, and man said to be made in the image and likenes of the gods; we shall therefore add here, that according to the tenor of the Pagan theology, the inferior and minor gods were supposed also to have all of them their several share in the government of things below them: for which cause they are called not only by Maximus Tyrius 1 ουσίας και ισόπλαιης, co-rulers with God, but also by Plato himself, τω παγκόσμια και λαον και εσθερος τος κυριος, the co-governors and co-reigners with the supreme God. So that the government of this inferior world was by the Pagans often attributed to them jointly, the supreme and inferior gods both together, under that one general name of gods. But the chief of those inferior deities, in whose image man is also said to have been made, as well as in the likenes of the supreme, were either these celestial gods and animated stars before mentioned by the poet, or else the eternal gods of Plato, which were look'd upon likeweise as co-makers of the world subordinate.

Besides

Besides Ovid, we might instance here in many more of the pagan Theogonists clearly acknowledging in like manner one unmade Deity, which generated both the world and all the other gods in it; as for example, Strabo, who affirming that the world was τοῦ φύσεως ἁρακ χ τοῦ πρωτοστασίας ἤγγο, the joint work both of nature and providence, as it was before ascribed by Ovid L. 17. p. 837, to Deus & melior natura, adds concerning providence or the Deity in this manner: Το δι τούς πρωτοστασίας, ὃν βεβηλίσαι καὶ αὐτῆ ποιμέλεσα τις ὡς, καὶ μιρὸν ἤγγον ἅμερος, ἵνα τοις πρώτοις ζωὴ γενήτω, ὡς πολύ διαφέραν τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τούτων τὰ κράτιστα Θεοί, τα δὲ αὐθεντικὰ, ως ἐνεκεν ὡς τὰ ἄλλα σωφρονικά. Τοίς μᾶλ γυν Θεοῖς αὖτίκειτο τοῦ ἀρχηγοῦ, τοῖς δὲ αὐθενταῖς τῶν γονέων. That having a multiform fecundity in it, and delighting in variety of works, it designed principally to make animals as the most excellent things, and amongst them chiefly those two noblest kinds of animals, gods and men; for whose sakes the other things were made; and then assigned heaven to the gods, and earth to men, the two extreme parts of the world for their respective habitations. Thus also Seneca in Laëntiuis, speaking concerning God; Ησειωμάτως τινωστόμῳ, ἑτερώς τοιαύτα φύσεως ηπειρόμενος, & hoc ordinetur, quod neque magis neque minore naturae nee melius, ut omnia sub ducebus irent, quamvis ipse per totum se corpus intenderat, tamen ministros regni sui deos genus. God, when he laid the foundations of this most beautiful fabric, and began to erect that structure, than which nature knows nothing greater or more excellent; to the end that all things might be carried on under their respective governors orderly, though he intended himself through the whole, as to preside in chief over all, yet did be generate gods also, as subordinate ministers of his kingdom under him. We shall forbear to mention the testimonies of others here, because they may be more opportunely inferred elsewhere; only we shall add, as to Hesiod and Homer, that though they seem to have been sometimes suspected, both by Plato and Aristotle, for atheisfick Theogonists, yet as Aristotle did upon maturer thoughts afterwards change his opinion concerning both of them, so is it most probable, that they were no Atheists but divine Theogonists, such as supposed indeed many generated gods, but one supreme unmade Deity, the Maker both of the world and them. And this not only for the grounds before alledged concerning Hesiod, and because both of them do every where affirm even their generated gods to be immortal, (which no Atheists did) but also for sundry other reasons, some of which may be more conveniently inferred elsewhere. Moreover it hath been already intimated, that the generated gods of Hesiod and Homer extend farther than those of Plato’s, they being not only the animated parts of the world, but also all the other things of nature fictitiously perfonated, and improperly or abusively called gods and goddesses; whereof a farther account will be afterwards given.

Neither ought it at all to be wondered at, if these divine Theogonists amongst the Pagans did many times, as well as those other atheisfick ones, make Chaos and the Ocean fanior to the gods, and Night the mother of them. The former of these being not only done by Hesiod and Homer, but also

also by the generality of the ancient pagan Theists in *Epibarman*; and the latter by *Orpheus* an undoubted Theist, in his hymn of the Night,

Νίκη θῶν νειτείας, ἀλφωνία, ηδὲ καὶ αὐτῶν

Non tem concelebro generetico hominumque detumque.

They not understanding this absolutely and universally of all the gods—without exception, as the other atheistical Theogonists did as if there had been no unmade Deity at all, but Chaos and Night, (that is, senseless matter blindly and fortuitously moved) had been the sole original of all things, but only of the *θεοί*, the gods, so-called by way of distinction from God: or the supreme Deity, that is, the inferior mundane gods generated together with the world. The reason whereof was, because it was a most ancient, and in a manner universally received, tradition amongst the Pagans, as hath been often intimated, that the cosmogonia or generation of the world took its first beginning from a chaos, (the divine-Cosmogonists agreeing herein with the atheistical ones;) this tradition having been delivered down from *Orpheus* and *Linus* (amongst the Greeks) by *Hesiod* and *Homer*, and others; acknowledged by *Epibarmus*; and embraced by *Thales*, *Anaxagoras*, *Plato*, and other philosophers, who were Theists: the antiquity whereof was thus declared by Euripides:—

Οὶς ἵμις ὁ μῆθς, ἀλλ' ἴμις μὴθς πέιας,

'Ως οἶκους τε γὰρ τ' ὧν μορφή μία,

'Ετέρ' Ἰχορισθαναν ἀλλὰθων ἄγνω πότα,

Τιτικτα πάντα, καὶ ἑαυτάκι εἰς Φάτη,

Τὰ δίνεια, πτιμέλ, Ζησαι, οδὲ δ' ἀλμην τεπήτη,

Πέος τε Συντῶν.

Non hic meus, sed matris est sermo meus.

Figure ut una fueris & calli & foli,

Secreta que mox ut receperunt statum,

Cumta ediderunt tec in orbis luminis;

Feras, volucres, arbores, ponti gregem,

Hominis quoque ipso.

Neither can it reasonably be doubted, but that it was originally Mosaiical, and indeed at first a divine revelation, since no man could otherwise pretend to know what was done before mankind had any being. Wherefore those pagan Cosmogonists, who were Theists, being Polytheists and Theogonists also, and asserting, besides the one supreme unmade Deity, other inferior mundane gods, generated together with the world (the chief whereof were the animated stars) they must needs, according to the tenor of that tradition, suppoll e them as to their corporeal parts at least, to have been juniors to Night and Chaos, and the offspring of them, because they were all made out of an antecedent dark chaos. Ἡθο μογαλιν ιτιτείδες λέγων (faith Plutarch) ὑπὸ λήσποιων τεπαλα ὁσαν, ὅτι τὸ σκότος του Φάτες ἀγαντο πεις θείεινον'thē'

*Sympos. L. 4.*

*Dea. 5.*

[p. 670.]

*Tom. II.*

*Oper.*


Chap. IV. Chaos and Night senior to the Gods.

The mus araneus being blind, is said to have been deified by the Egyptians, because they thought, that Darkness was older than Light. And the cause was the same concerning their demons likewise, they being conceived to have their corporeal vehicula also; for which cause, as Porphyrius \(^1\) from Numenius writeth, the ancient Egyptians pictured them in ships or boats floating upon the water: τὸς δὲ Αἰγυπτιῶς διὰ τὸ τὸς δαίμονας ἀναίρεσιν ἐν ἑκάστοις ἀπείρων ἀκτίνες, ἀλλὰ πάλαις ἐν πλοίοις. The Egyptians therefore represented all their demons, as not standing upon firm land, but in ships upon the water. But as for the incorporeal part or souls of those inferior gods, though these divine Theogonists could not derive their original from Chaos or matter, but rather from that other principle called Love, as being divinely created, and for having God for their father, yet might they notwithstanding, in another sense, fancy Night to have been their mother too, inasmuch as they were all made ἐκ ὑμνίων, from an antecedent non existent or nothing, brought forth into being. For which cause there seems to have been in Orpheus a dialogue between the Maker of the world and Night. For that this ancient cabala, which derived the cosmoogonia from Chaos and Love, was at first religious and not atheistical, and Love understood in it not to be the offspring of Chaos, may be concluded from hence, because this Love as well as Chaos was of a Mosaisical extraction also, and plainly derived from that spirit of God, which is said in Scripture to have moved upon the waters, that is, upon the chaos; whether by this spirit be to be meant God himself, as acting immediately upon the matter, or some other active principle derived from God and not from matter, (as a mundane soul or plafick nature.) From whence also it came, that as Porphyrius tells it, the ancient Pagans thought the water to be divinely inspired, ἃς θερμόν γὰρ προσεζών τῷ ὑδάτι τὰς θεοὺς, \(\text{Dr. Ant.}^{2}\), ἔφθοι ἐπισκόπων ἄδηλον ὑπ’ θεοῦ, ὡς θεοὺς ὁ Νυμφάρ ἐξ ἑκάστοις ἔπισκοπως ἀπείρων, ἴνα Νυμφ. p. 256. Προφητεύοντας οἶνον τῷ ὑδάτι τῶν πνεύμων. They thought, that souls attended upon the water or resorted thereunto, as being divinely inspired, as Numenius writeth, adding the prophet also therefore to have said, that the spirit of God moved upon the water.

And that this cabala was thus understood by some of the ancient pagan Cosmogonists themselves, appears plainly, not only from Simmias Rhodius and Parmenides, but also from their following verses of Orpheus, or whoever was the writer of those Argonauticks, undoubtedly ancient, where Chaos and Love are thus brought in together;

\[\text{P} \text{. 17. Ed.} \text{Steph.}\]

To this sense; We will first sing a pleasant and delightful song concerning the ancient Chaos, how heaven, earth and seas were framed out of it; as also concerning that much-wifed and sagacious Love, the oldest of all, and self-perfect, which actively produced all these things, separating one thing from another.

\(\text{K k} \text{2}\)

\(^1\) De Anto Nymphar. p. 56. Edit. Cantab. \(^2\) Apud Proculum & alios.
Where this Love is not only called πολύσωφος, of much-counsel or sagaciousness; which implies it to have been a substantial and intellectual thing, but also περιτοῖος, the eldest of all, and therefore senior to Chaos, as likewise, αυτοτελής, self-perfect or self-originated. From whence it is manifest, that according to the Orphick tradition, this Love, which the Cosmogonia was derived from, was no other than the eternal unmade Deity (or an active principle depending on it) which produced this whole orderly world, and all the generated gods in it, as to their material part, out of Chaos and Night. Accordingly, as Aristotle determines in his Metaphysics, not only in the place before cited, but also afterward: ἑτέρω δὲ τοῖς, ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν καταστημάτων, ἦτοί ἡ Νύμ ἡ Ἐρωτα πάσων ἀληθῶν. Others, besides the material cause of the world, assign an efficient, or cause of motion, namely, whatsoever make either Mind (and Intellec) or Love a principle. Wherefore we conclude, that that other atheiftick cabala, or Aristophanic tradition before mentioned, which accordingly, as Aristotle also elsewhere declareth concerning it, did in νυκτὶς πάντα γενέσθαι, generate all things whatsoever, even the gods themselves universally out of Night and Chaos, making Love itself likewise to have been produced from an egg of the Night: I say, that this was nothing else but a mere depravation of the ancient Mofaick cabala, as also an absolutely impossible hypothesis, it deriving all things whatsoever in the universal, besides the bare substance of fenfelefs matter, in another fenfe than that before mentioned, out of non-entity or nothing; as shall be also farther manifested afterwards.

We have now represented the fenfe and generally received doctrine of the ancient pagan Theologers, that there was indeed a multiplicity of gods, but yet so that one of them only was ἀγαθός, ingenerate or unmade, by whom all the other gods, together with the world, were made, so as to have had a novity of being or a temporary beginning of their existance: Plato and the Pythagorceans here only differing from the rest in this, that though they acknowledged the world and all the mundane gods to have been generated together in time, yet they suppos'd certain other intelligible and supramundane gods also, which however produced from one original Deity, were neverthelesfs eternal or without beginning. But now we must acknowledge, that there were amongst the pagan Theifts some of a different persuasion from the rest, who therefore did not admit of any theogonia in the fenfe before declared, that is, any temporary generation of gods, because they acknowledged no cosmogonia, no temporary production of the world, but concluded it to have been from eternity.

That Aristotle was one of these is sufficiently known, whose inferior gods therefore, the sun, moon and stars, must needs be ἀγαθός, or ingenerate, in this senfe, so as to have had no temporary production, because the whole world to him was such. And if that philosopher 1 be to be believed, himself was the very first, at least of all the Greeks, who affirmed this ingeneratefs or eternity of the world, he affirming, that all before him did γενέσθαι τῶν κόσμων, and ἐγένεσθαι, generate or make the world; that is, attribute

but a temporary production to it, and consequently to all those gods also, which were a part thereof. Notwithstanding which, the writer de Placitis Philosphorum ¹, and Stobæus ², impute this dogma of the world's eternity to certain others of the Greek philosophers before Aristotle, (besides Ocellus Lucanus ³, who is also acknowledged by Philo, to have been an asserter thereof.) And indeed Epicharmus, though a Theist, seems plainly to have been of this persuasion, that the world was unmade, as also that there was no Theogonia, nor temporary production of the inferior gods, from these verses of his ⁴, according to Gratian his correction:

"Αλλ' αἰτὶ τοι ὁ θεὸς παράτην, ὑπήλιον δ' ἡ πάτους; 
Τάδε δ' ἂνίεσθ' ὠμοία, διὰ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἂν.
"Αλλ' λόγιει μὲν χάρι πρῶτοι γένεσιν τῶν ἔθνων.
Πῶς δὲ; ἀμάχονος γ' 'ἀπό μικὴς τινος δ', τι πρῶτον μόλις.
Οὐκ ἀκὴ ἁμολε πρῶτον ἠδὲ, ὡδὲ μὲ Δίω δεύτερον.
Τῶν δὲ γ' ᾧ ἀμορμας τῶν λέγομεν ὡς ἑκάτεροι τάδε.

Nempe Di semper furent, aude nuncquam intercedunt:
Hec que dico semper nobis rebus in iisdem se exhibet.
Exitissi sed decurum primum peribetur caos:
Quinam verb? nam de nibilo nil potis primum existere.
Ergo nec primum profecto quiquam, nec suit alterum:
Sed quae nunc se appellantur, alia sint postmodum.

Where, though he acknowledges this to have been the general tradition of the ancient Theists, that Chaos was before the gods, and that the inferior mundane gods had a temporary generation, or production with the world; yet notwithstanding does he conclude against it, from this ground of reason, because nothing could proceed from nothing, and therefore, both the gods, and indeed whatsoever else is substantial in the world, was from eternity unmade, only the fashion of things having been altered.

Moreover, Diodorus Siculus affirms the Chaldeans likewise to have asserted this dogma of the world's eternity, οἱ δὲ Χαλδαῖοι τῷ μὲν τῷ χόλων φύσιν L. 2. p. 8з; αἱδαίον φανερών εὗρεις, ηῷ μὴν ζή αἰχμῆν ἔγινεν ἐκ τοῦ δικτυωμένου, μιθῇ ἤπειρον ζεῦγην ἐπιδείξασιν. The Chaldeans affirm the nature of the world to be eternal, and that it was neither generated from any beginning, nor will ever admit corruption. Who, that they were not Atheists for all that (no more than Aristotle) appears from those following words of that historiographer; τῶν τε τῶν ἔλαυ τάξεων τε τὸ καπνὸς λαμαρίων, καὶ τοι τῷ πρὸς μητέρων, ηῷ τῷ ζήσεγοι, σώτηρ αὐτοπάτης,"αλλ' αἰχμῆν τοὺς καὶ βιαίως κεκραμβεμένη θεῶν κόσμην, συντίκλισιν. They believe also, that the order and disposition of the world is by a certain divine providence, and that every one of those things, which come to pass in the heavens, happens not by chance, but by a certain determinate and firmly ratified judgment of the gods. However, it is a thing known to all, that the generality of the latter Platonists stubbornly adhered to Aristotle in this; neither did they only affect the corporeal world, with all the inferior mundane gods in it,

¹ Lib. II. Cap. IV. p. 886.
² Ecol. Physic. Lib. I. Cap. XXIV. p. 44.
³ De Mundi Aternitate, inter Scriptor. My-
⁴ Ἀπὸ Diogen. Laert. Lib. III. 6egm. X.
 p. 170.
to be ἀγανάκτης, or ingenerate, and to have existed from eternity, but also maintained the same concerning the souls of men, and all other animals, (they concluding that no souls were younger than body or the world;) and because they would not seem to depart from their master Plato, therefore did they endeavour violently to force this same sense upon Plato's words also.

Notwithstanding which, concerning these latter Platonists, it is here observable, that though they thus affected the world, and all inferior gods and souls to have been ἀγανάκτης, according to that stricter sense of the word declared, that is, to have had no temporary generation or beginning, but to have existed from eternity; yet by no means did they therefore conceive them to be αὐτοργενὲς, self-originated, and self-existing, but concluded them to have been all derived from one sole self-existent Deity as their cause, which therefore, though not in order of time, yet of nature was before them. To this purpose Platonius, νόμος ἁπάντως εἶναι τοῦ μεγίστου πρῶτον αὐτὸν ὄνα, ἀλλ' ἢ τοπε ἐκ τοῦ μεγίστου πρῶτος ἐκείνου, Κύριος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἐκείνου, ὁ παράδεισος ἐκείνου ἦν ὁ τιμίος αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν Πρῶτον Mind or God was before the world, or if it existed before it in time, but because the world proceeded from it, and that was in order of nature first as the cause thereof, and its archetype or paradigm, the world also always subsisting by it and from it. And again elsewhere to the same purpose, ὁ τοῦ ἐγείροντος ἢ ἐγείροντος, ὃν ἠγνώστο καὶ ἠγνώστο, καὶ ἡ ἡμεῖς ἠγνώστο. The things, which are said to have been made or generated, were not so made, as that they ever had a beginning of their existence, but yet they were made, and will be always made, (in another sense;) nor will they ever be destroyed otherwise than as being dissolved into those simple principles, out of which some of them were compounded. Where though the world be said never to have been made as to a temporary beginning, yet in another sense, is it said to be always made, as depending upon God perpetually as the emanative cause thereof. Agreeably whereunto, the manner of the world's production from God is thus declared by that philosopher; ἡ πρωτεύουσα θεία περιτεύουσα αὐτόν ὄνα, ὅτι ἔκ τοῦ ἐγείροντος ἦν τοῦ παράδεισος τευτον, ἐκ ἡμῶν ἢ συνείδην, οὔτε ἡμῶν, ἢ τὸν ἀπεικόνισαμεν, ὡς ἡμῶν αὐτὸς ἡμεῖς, ἢ μετα τὰ ἀλλα ἡλειαντικοα. They do not rightly, sωματονίτριον, and regenerate the world, for they will not understand what manner of making or production the world had, to wit, by way of effulgency or eradication from the Deity. From whence it follows, that the world must needs have been so long as there was a God, as the light was coever with the sun. So likewise Proclus 4 concludes, that the world was ἡ ἡμῶν ἢ τοῦ ἐγείροντος, ἢ ἠλειαντικομένος ἐκ τοῦ ἐγείροντος, always generated or eradicated from God, and therefore must needs be eternal, God being so. Wherefore these latter Platonists supposing the same thing concerning the corporeal world, and the lower mundane gods, which their master Plato did concerning his higher eternal gods; that though they had no temporary production, yet they all depended no less upon one supreme Deity, than if they had been made out of nothing by him. From whence it is manifest, that none of these philosophers

* There are still extant eighteen arguments of his, wherein he attacks the Christian Doctrine of the world's being created by God at time; in answer to which, John Philoponus wrote the same number of books against the eternity of the world. Vide Jo. Alberti Fabricii Biblioth. Grac. Lib. V. Cap. XXVI. §. XIII. p. 522.
philosophers apprehended any repugnancy at all betwixt these two things; existence from eternity, and being caused or produced by another. Nor can we make any great doubt, but that if the latter Platonists had been fully convinced of any contradictitious inconsistence here, they would readily have disclaimed that their so beloved hypothesis of the world's eternity; it being so far from truth what some have suppos'd, that the Affectors of the world's eternity were all Atheists, that these latter Platonists were led into this opinion no otherwise than from the sole consideration of the Deity; to wit, its ἄγαθοντις βέλεως, ἐν γόμμων δύναμις, its essential goodness, and generative power, or emanative secundity, as Proclus plainly declares upon the Zinus.

Now, though Aristotle were not act'd with any such divine enthusiasm as these Platonists seem to have been, yet did he notwithstanding, after his sober manner, really maintain the same thing; that though the world, and inferior mundane gods had no temporary generation, yet were they nevertheless all produced from one supreme Deity as their cause. Thus Simplicius represents that philosopher's senile, 'Ἀριστοτέλους δὲ γλείφαν ἄκουσα τὸν Κόσμον, ἀλλ' κατ' ἄλλον τεῖστον ὑπὸ Θεον παραγόντας: Aristotle would not have the world to have been made, (so as to have had a beginning) but yet nevertheless to have been produced from God after some other manner. And again afterwards; 'Ἀριστοτέλους τὸ αὐτὸν τὸ ἄρατα ὑπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς κυστοσεως αὐτῶ θεον λέγων, ὑμας ἀρέσχειν αὐτὸν ἀποδείκνυσιν. Aristotle, though making God the cause of the heavens and its eternal motion, yet concludes it not withstanding to have been ingenerate or unmade; that is, without beginning. However, we think fit here to observe, that though Aristotle do for the most part express a great deal of zeal and confidence for that opinion of the world's eternity, yet doth he sometimes for all that seem to flag a little, and speak more languidly and sceptically about it; as for example, in his book de Partibus Animalium, where he treats concerning an artificial nature, μᾶλλον εἰκός τὸν ἐρατόν γεγεννησαί, ὑπὸ τοιαύτης αἰτιᾶς, τὰ ὁμόν χάριν, ἕν πάντα διὰ τοιαύτης αἰτίας, μᾶλλον η γνώσις ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ. It is more likely, that the heaven was made by such a cause as this, (if it were made) and that it is maintained by such a cause, than that mortal animals should be so; which yet is a thing more generally acknowledged. Now it was before declared, that Aristotle's artificial nature was nothing but the mere executioner or opificer of a perfect mind, that is, of the Deity; which two therefore he sometimes joins together in the Cosmopoeia, affirming that Mind and Nature, that is, God and Nature were the cause of this universe.

And now we see plainly, that though there was a real controversy amongst the Pagan theologers, (especially from Aristotle's time downward) concerning the Cosmogonia and Theogonia, according to the stricter notion of those words, the temporary generation or production of the world and inferior gods, or whether they had any beginning or no; yet was there no controversy at all concerning the self-existency of them, but it was universally agreed upon amongst them, that the world and the inferior gods, however supposed by some to have exsisted from eternity, yet were nevertheless all derived from one sole self-existent Deity as their cause; ὑπὸ τοῦ παραγόντος ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀποδείκνυσιν, being either eradiated or produced from God. Wherefore
it is observable, that these pagan Theists, who asserted the world's eternity, did themselves distinguish concerning the word ἄγνιπτος (yivnikoú) strictly and properly taken, is to ἔν μέσῳ χάριν τὸ ἐκ τοῦ εἰς τὸν ἄναμενον λόγον, that which in respect of time passed out non-existence into being, or ὁ τὸ πρότερον ἐκ δὲ τοῦ χαρίν τοῦ δὲ δὲ τὸ προτέρον, that which being not before, afterwards was. Nevertheless they acknowledge, that in a larger sense, this word ἄγνιπτος may be taken also for ὁ ἐν εἰς ἔναθ οίνικος ὁ ἐν ἔναθ οίνικος, that which doth any way depend upon a superior Being as its cause. And there must needs be the same equivocation in the word ἄγνιπτος, so that this in like manner may be taken also, either χαρίν τοῦ, for that which is ingenerate in respect of time, as having no temporary beginning; or else for that which is ἄναθ οίνικος, ingenerate or unproduced from any cause: in which latter sense, that word ἄγνιπτος or unmade, is of equal force and extent with ἄναθ οίνικος or ὁ ἐν εἰς οίνικος, that which is self-subsistent or self-originated; and accordingly it was used by those pagan Theists, who concluded οὐκ οἰκνίκος ἄγνιπτος, i.e. that matter was unmade, that is, not only existed from eternity without beginning, but also was self-existent, and independent upon any superior cause. Now, as to the former of these two senses of those words, ἄγνιπτος and ἄγνιπτος, the generality of the ancient Pagans, and together with them Plato, affirmed the world, and all the inferior gods to be ἄγνιπτος, to have been made in time, or to have had a beginning; (for whatever the latter Platonists pretend, this was undoubtedly Plato's notion of that word, and no other, when he concluded the world to be ἄγνιπτος, forasmuch as himself expressly opposeth it to ἀναθ οίνικος, that which is eternal.) But on the contrary, Aristotle, and the latter Platonists, determined the world, and all the inferior gods, to be in this sense ἄγνιπτος, such as had no temporary beginning, but were from eternity. However, according to the latter sense of those words, all the pagan Theologers agreed together, that the world, and all the inferior gods, whether having a beginning, or existing from eternity, were notwithstanding ἄγνιπτος ἄναθ οίνικος, produced or derived from a superior cause; and that thus there was only one ἄγνιπτος, one unproduced and self-existent Deity, who is said by them to be ἀναθ οίνικος ἄγνιπτος, superior to a cause, and older than any cause, he being the cause of all things besides himself. Thus Cran-

In Timæ. p. 85. 3. Vide etiam eundem in Intra- 

Theologiam Platon. 

their ineffable procession from a superior first cause. Thus also Salustius, in his book de diis & mundo 1, where he contends the world to have been from eternity, or without beginning, yet concludes both it and the other inferior gods to have been made by one supreme deity, who is called by him, θεός, the first God. For, faith he, μετα της δυναμεως αυτης, αν ανθρωποι της ειδος και ρεισιον μουν τους ελλα θείους τε και θανατωκεις. God, or the first cause, having the greatest power, or being omnipotent, ought therefore to make not only men, and other animals, but also gods and demons. And accordingly this is the title of his 15th chapter, πως τα αιτια λεγειαι γηναις, How eternal things may be said to be made or generated. It is true indeed (as we have often declared) that some of the pagan Theists affirmed God not to be the only αγέννοτος και ανεπαγενοτος, the only unmade and self-existent being, but that matter also was such; nevertheless, this opinion was not so generally received amongst them, as is commonly supposed: and though some of the ancient fathers confidently impute it to Plato, yet there seems to be no sufficient ground for their so doing; and Porphyryus, Jamblichus, Proclus, and other Platonists, do not only professedly oppose the same as false, but also as that which was dιfferent from Plato's principles. Wherefore, according to that larger notion of the word αγέννοτος, as taken synonymously with αυτός and ανεπαγενοτος, there were very many of the Pagan Theologers, who agreed with Christians in this, οτι αυτο αγέννοτος ο θεος και εις αυτο ανεπαγενοτος. That God is the only ungenerate or unmade being, and that his very essence is ingenerability or ineffability; all other things, even matter itself, being made by him. But all the rest of them (only a few Dithelists excepted) thought they supposed matter to be self-existent, yet did they conclude, that there was only, τε ους αγερενοτος, only one unmade or unproduced God, and that all their other gods were γενομενοι, in one sense or other, if not as made in time, yet at least as produced from a superior cause.

Nothing now remaineth, but only that we shew, how the Pagans did distinguish, and put a difference, betwixt the one supreme unmade Deity, and all their other inferior generated gods. Which we are the rather concerned to do, because it is notorious, that they did many times also confound them together, attributing the government of the whole world to the gods promiscuously, and without putting any due discrimination betwixt the supreme and inferior (the true reason whereof seems to have been this, because they supposed the supreme God, not to do all immediately, in the government of the world, but to permit much to his inferior ministers) one instance of which we had before in Ovid, and innumerable such others might be cited out of their most sober writers. As for example, Cicero, in his first book of laws 2, Deorum immortalium vi, ratione, potestate, mente, numine, natura omnis regitur; the whole nature, or universe, is governed by the force, reason, power, mind, and divinity of the immortal Gods. And again in his second book 3, Deos esse dominos ac moderatores omnium rerum, cæque que geruntur, corum geri judiciio atque numine; cœlœsque optimè de genere hominum mereri,

2 Lib. I. Cap. VII. p. 3303. Oper. Tom. IX.
3 Lib. II. Cap. VII. p. 3343.
mereri, & qualis quisque sit, quid agat, quid in se admittat, qua mente, qua pietate religiones colat, intueri; priorimque & impiarum habere rationem; a principio civibus suorum effe debet: The minds of citizens ought to be first of all imbued with a firm persuasion, that the gods are the lords and masters of all things, and that the conduct and management of the whole world is directed and over-ruled by their judgment and divine power; that they deserve the best of mankind, that they behold and consider what every man is, what he doth and takes upon himself, with what mind, pity and sincerity he observes the duties of religion; and lastly, that these gods have a very different regard to the pious and the impious. Now such passages as these, abounding every where in Pagan writings, it is no wonder, if many, considering their theology but slightly and superficially, have been led into an error, and occasioned thereby to conclude the Pagans not to have asserted a divine monarchy, but to have imputed both the making and governing of the world to an aristocracy or democracy of co-ordinate gods, not only all eternal, but also self-existent and unmade. The contrary whereunto, though it be already sufficiently proved, yet it will not be amiss for us here in the close, to shew how the Pagans, who sometimes jumble and confound the supreme and inferior gods all together, do notwithstanding at other times many ways distinguish between the one supreme God, and their other many inferior gods.

First therefore, as the Pagans had many proper names for one and the same supreme God, according to several particular confiderations of him, in respect of his several different manifestations and effects in the world; which are oftentimes mistaken for so many distinct deities (some supposing them independent, others subordinate) so had they also, besides these, other proper names of God, according to that more full and comprehensive notion of him, as the maker of the whole world, and its supreme governor, or the sole monarch of the universe. For thus the Greeks called him Zeus and Zeh, &c. the Latins Jupiter and Jovis, the Babylonians Belus and Bel, the Persians Mithras and Ormofades, the Egyptians and Scythians (according to Herodatus) Ammon and Pappaeus. And Celsus in Origine concludes it to be a matter of pure indifference, to call the supreme God by any of all these names, either Zeus, or Ammon, or Pappaeus, or the like; Κιλ(γος ὅλος μένει διέφεσιν, Δίς Ἰησω,: καλῶν ὅ Ζαντ, ἡ Ἀδωνίων, ἡ Σαλβαδόν ἡ (ὡς Αργυρίς) Ἀμμων ἡ (ὡς Σμήνα) Παππαίων. Celsus thinks it to be a matter of no moment, whether we call the biggest and supreme God, Adonai and Sabaath, as the Jews do; or Dia and Zena, as the Greeks; or, as the Egyptians, Ammon; or, as the Scythians, Pappaeus. Notwithstanding which, that pious and jealous father expresseth a great deal of zeal against Christians then using any of those Pagan names. But we will rather endure any torment (faith he) than confess Zeus (or Jupiter) to be God, being well assured, that the Greeks often really worship, under that name, an evil demon, who is an enemy both to God and men. And we will rather suffer death, than call the supreme God Ammoun, whom the Egyptian enchanters thus invoke; λεβίτωσαν ὅς ἡ Σωτήρ τοῦ Παππαίων Θεὸν εἰς τὸν ἐπὶ πάσαν ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς οὐ πεισόμεθα, τινὲς μὲ τὸν ἐπὶ πάσαν Θεοῦ, οἷς ἀνέφη τὸ λαχτέρι τοῦ Σωτήρος εγκαίων, ἡ τὸν οὐκ αὐτοῦ ἡ δια- λικτινοί, οἷς ἀναμφίξεις τὸν Θεὸν, ὡς κυρίος ὑμῶν τὸν Παππαίων. Σωτήρι γὰρ τὸ
CHAP. IV. the Supreme from the inferior Gods.

In the mean time we deny not, but that both the Greeks used that word Zeus, and the Latins Jupiter, sometimes θεός, for the αἰθήρ, fire or air, some accordingly etymologizing Zeus from Zio, others Δίος from δίος: whence came those forms of speech, sub Jove, and sub Dio. And thus Cicero, Jovem Ennius nuncupat ita dicens.

Aspice hoc sublime candens, quem invocant omnes Jovem.

Hunc etiam augures nebris cium dicunt, Jove fulgente, Jove tonante; dicunt enim in caelo fulgente, tonante, &c. The reason of which speeches seems to have been this, because in ancient times some had supposed the animated heaven, αἰθήρ and air, to be the supreme deity. We grant moreover, that the same words have been sometimes used ιστορίως also, for an hero or deified man, said by some to have been born in Crete, by others in Arcadia. And Callimachus 1, though he were very angry with the Cretians for affirming Jupiter’s sepulchral monument to have been with them in Crete, as thereby making him mortal:

Κύριος οἰκίστας, Καί γὰρ τάφοι, Ζάγου, σεία,
Κύριος ιεροκτόνος σὺ δ’ οὐ δάνει, ἠδε γὰρ αὐτόν,

Cretes semper mendaces, tuum enim, rex, sepulchrum Extruxerunt: in verbo non est mortuos, semper enim es.

Himself notwithstanding (as Athenagoras 2 and Origen 3 observe) attributed the beginning of death to him, when he affirmed him to have been born in Arcadia; ἀεὶ γὰρ Σακάκα ἐπὶ γῆς γίνεται, because a terrestrial nativity is the beginning of death. Wherefore this may pass for a general observation here, that the Pagan theology was all along confounded with a certain mixture of phylogeny and herology or history blended together. Nevertheless it is unquestionable, that the more intelligent of the Greekish Pagans did fre-

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1 Hymno in Jovem, vers. 8, 9.
2 In Legation. pro Christianis, Cap. XXVI. p. 121.
3 Contra Celsum, Lib. III. p. 137.
quently understand by Zeus that supreme unmade Deity, who was the maker of the world, and of all the inferior gods. Porphyryius in Eufebius thus declares their fentre, to the Dia, to the Nee namo upolamiandes, οτα in auta idume- 
gren, ιχνο τον κομνον. By Zeus the Greeks understand that mind of the world, which 
framed all things in it, and containeth the whole world. Agreeable whereunto 
is that of Maximus Tyris 1, Kαλεί τον μην Δια, νεν πρεσβετατον, η αρχητατον, η 
póste ἑπταν πνευ χαλκη απελ ή σετ τον Πλάτωνα, αλλα αυτον ο ακιν-
tatw Nis, ο των θεων ὀμηρετό. Let Jupiter therefore be no longer that fiery 
and ethereal substance, which the ancient Pagans, according to Plutarch, 
supposed him to be; but that highest mind, which was the maker of all things. 
But Porfinus 2 by Jupiter understands the soul of the world, he writing 
thus concerning him; οπαν τη λυσιν απο ψυχης ονεκάμη, ένω η ο κυς-
ψυχη εξε στην σωικήσων αυτον, η αστη καλειπει Ζευς, αιτην ες το της ζωης τι πη 
ik teta basileias o Zeis λιγηται των υδων. As we ourselves are governed by a soul, fo 
bath the world in like manner a soul, that containeth it; and this is called 
Zeus, being the cause of life to all things that live; and therefore Zeus or 
Jupiter is said to reign over all things. However, though these were two 
different conceptions amongst the Pagans concerning God, some 
apprehending him to be an abstract mind separate from the world and matter, 
but others to be a soul of the world only; yet nevertheless they all agreed in 
this, that Zeus or Jupiter was the supreme moderator or governor of all. 

And accordingly Plato, in his Cratylus, taking these two words, Zee and 
Dias, both together, etymologizeth them as one, after this manner: συνεπικ 
και τη θεω της Φειδη της Ζει, τη ραφ ες εις τοις εις τοις αλλας πατω δεις ιτων αιτω 
μαλ 

258

Pagans proper Names

Book II.

Prop. Ev. L. 5. 3. [Cap. IX. P. 102.]

compliance with the third hypostasis of his divine triad, so as properly to signify the superior soul of the world; ενός τινός τινός δυνατός δύνατον ἑνώς τοι δια. Κρόνιτος γὰρ τὸ καθέσθων αὐτῷ θὰ ἄκρισαι τὸν Νόμον ὅτι οὗτος ὁ θεὸς, καὶ λέγω. Nevertheless it is reasonable to suppose Zeus or Jupiter to be the offspring of some great mind; and Chronos or Saturn signifies a pure and perfect mind eternal; who again is said to be the son of Uranus or Cælius. Where it is manifest, that Plato endeavours to accommodate this poetick trinity of gods, Uranus, Chronos and Zeus, or Cælius, Saturn and Jupiter, to his own trinity of divine hypostases, τρία βασιλεία, καὶ καταβεβαίων, the first good, a perfect intellect, and the highest soul. Which accommodation is accordingly further pursued by Plotinus in several places, as Enum. 5. l. 1. c. 4. and Enum. 5. l. 8. c. 13. Nevertheless, these three archial hypostases of the Platonic trinity, though look'd upon as substances distinct from each other, and subordinate, yet are they frequently taken all together by them for the whole supreme deity. However the word Zeus is by Plato severally attributed to each of them; which Proclus thus observed upon the Timæus: ἡ γὰρ θεότης τοῦ θεοῦ περιτελεῖ· έτὸς μεταβολή τοῦ παλαιοῦ πλατύνεται. P. 298. άλλος οὖν οὗτος θεὸς δυνατοῖς Ζήσες, καὶ τά Καπτίαμε γιγαντεύει, τά άλλα οὗτος Πρώτος τοῦ Κρόνιτος τειχόσες, καὶ τά τοῦ θεοῦ λείτου, καὶ άλλα σύνολοι, καὶ τά τοῦ Φυλήρου ποιοχείων, καὶ άλλα σύνολοι δεδομένα, καὶ άλλα περιτελεῖν. We say therefore, that there are several orders, ranks or degrees of Zeus or Jupiter in Plato; for sometimes he is taken for the Demiurgus or opificer of the world, as in Cratylus; sometimes for the first of the Saturnian triad, as in Gorgias; sometimes for the superior soul of the world, as in Phædus; and lastly, sometimes for the lower soul of the heaven. Though, by Proclus his leave, that Zeus or Jupiter which is mentioned in Plato's Cratylus (being plainly the superior psyché or soul of the world) is not properly the Demiurgus or opificer, according to him; that title rather belonging to Zeus or intellect, which is the second hypostasis in his trinity.

As for the vulgar of the Greekish Pagans, whether they apprehended God to be ζ续约 ξαγματικος τοι νοσυς, a mind or intellect separate from the world, or else to be a soul of the world only; it cannot be doubted, but that by the word Zeus they commonly understood the supreme Deity in one or other of those senses, the father and king of gods; he being frequently thus styled in their solemn nuncupations of vows, Ζήσες πάτερ, Ζήσες αυτε, O Jupiter father, and O Jupiter king. As he was invoked also Ζήσες βασιλεύ in that excellent prayer of an ancient poet, not without cause commended in Plato's Alcibiades 1:

Ζήσες βασιλεύ, τα μεν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ εὐχαρίστως καὶ ἀνέκδοτος.
"Αμήν δέ, τὰ οὖν ἔστιν εὐχαρίστως αὐτοῖς ἀπολλεῖν"

O Jupiter king, give us good things, whether we pray or pray not for them; but with bold evil things from us, though we should pray never so earnestly for them. But the instances of this kind being innumerable, we shall forbear to mention any more of them. Only we shall observe, that Zeus Sabazius was a name:

1 In Alcibiad, secundum, five de Paeans, p. 40.
The supreme God denoted by Appellatives. Book I.

name for the supreme God, sometime introduced among the Greeks, and derived in all probability from the Hebrew Sabaoth, or Adonai Tsebaoh, the Lord of hosts (that is, of the heavenly hosts) or the supreme governor of the world. Which therefore Ariiphobanes took notice of as a strange and foreign god, lately crept in amongst them, that ought to be banished out of Greece; these several names of God being then vulgarly spoken of as so many distinct deities, as shall be more fully declared afterwards. We shall likewise elsewhere shew, that besides Jovis, Jove also was used by the Greeks as a name for that God, who is the supreme moderator and governor of the whole world.

That the Latins did in like manner, by Jupiter and Jovis, frequently denote the supreme Deity, and monarch of the universe, is a thing unquestionable; and which does sufficiently appear from those epithets, that were commonly given to him, of optimus and maximus, the best and the greatest; as also of omnipotens, frequently bestowed upon him by Virgil and others. Which word Jupiter or Jovis, though Cicero etymology it a juvans, or from juvans pater, as not knowing how to do it otherwise; yet we may rather conclude it to have been of an Hebraical extraction, and derived from that Tetragrammaton, or name of God, consisting of four consonants; whose vowels (which it was to be pronounced with) though they be not now certainly known, yet must it needs have some such sound as this, either Jova-b, or Javob, or Jivis or Avis, or the like; and the abbreviation of this name was fab. For as the Pagan nations had, besides appellatives, their several proper names for God, so also had the Hebrews theirs, and such as being given by God himself, was most expressive of his nature, it signifying eternal and necessary existence.

But, in the next place, we shall suggést, that the Pagans did not only signify the supreme God, by these proper names, but also frequently by the appellatives themselves, when used not for a God in general, but for the God, or God κατ 'ιερον, and by way of eminency. And thus e Stos; and Sto; are often taken by the Greeks, not for Steu τις, a God, or one of the Gods, but for God, or the supreme Deity. We have several examples hereof in passages before-cited occasionally in this very chapter, as in that of Ariiphobes, τι δι ον κρείττον ἔτι ιερον πλάνον θεός; What is there therefore, that can be better than knowledge, but only God? As also that other of his, that happiness consisteth principally in virtue, ἐν εἰμι συνειρμομοιοι μάρτυρι το θεόν χρυσοίς, it is a thing, that ought to be acknowledged by us from the nature of God. So likewise in that of Thales, προσδιάγεσθαι πάντως ές θεόν, ἄγαντι πάσης θος; God is the eldest of all things, because he is unmade: and that of Maximus Tyrannus, πολλαί εις τινάς ής ναάρις ποτέ ης σαφές τείνεις ένας, Many gods, the sons of God, and co-reigners together with God. Besides which, there have been others also mentioned, which we shall not here repeat. And innumerable more instances of this kind might be added; as that of Antiphanes, Sto; εὐθεία τινές, διότερο τούτο ένας ευθείας χρυσάνθω τι εἰσοδός δοκεῖ, God is like to nothing, for which cause he cannot be learnt by any, from an image: This of Socrates, ένας φαίνει τίνι τις τού ένορίαν ταῦτα, ρωσίων.
Chap. IV. Θεοὶ taken for the inferior gods only.

If God will have it so, let it be so. And that of Epicurus, oX μόνον μέριστο τῶν καθολικῶν, τί εἴρω, τί μή εἴρω; τί ζήσει με ποιεῖν ο Θεὸς νῦν;

Do thou only remember these catholic and universal principles, what is mine, and what is not mine? what would God have me now to do? and what would be have me not to do? But we shall mention no more of these, because they occur so frequently in all manner of Greek writers, both metrical and prosaical.

Wherefore we shall here only add, that as the singular Θεός was thus often used by the Greeks for God κατ' ἐξεχείριον, or in way of eminency, that is, for the supreme Deity; so was likewise the plural Θεοὶ frequently used by them for the inferior gods, by way of distinction from the supreme. As in that usual form of prayer and exclamation, Ὅ Zeus ηΘεοὶ, O Jupiter and the gods; and that form of obtestation, πάρος Διός ηΘεοὶ, By Jupiter and the gods. So in this of Euripides:

 Ubique, Ἢς ἐπί τάξιν τις ἑρείδα λογον;
 Ζεὺς ηΘεοὶ, βοῶμαι λέγωντες πάντες;

Est, (sunt licet qui rideant) est Jupiter,
Superrique, caفس quid videmus mortalium.

In which passages, as Jupiter is put for the supreme God, so is Θεοὶ likewise put for the inferior gods, in way of distinction from him. Thus also, Θεοὶ and Θεοὶ are taken both together in Plato's Phaedo, Θεοὶ for the supreme, unmade and incorruptible Deity, and Θεοὶ for the inferior gods only, Ὅ δὲφ. p. 106. Θεοὶ (αἰμακι) ζην ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς αὖτό τοι τῶν ἔρων εἰδὸς παρὰ πάνων ἀν ὁμαλογηθείην, μεδί ποιε ἀπαλλόθυμα. Παρὰ πάνων μέντοι νῷ Δι (ἔρων) ἀνθρώπου γε, ὡς ἔτει μάλλον, ὡς ἐγομαί, παρὰ Θεοὶ. I suppose, said Socrates, that God, and the very species, essence or idea of life will be granted by all to be incorruptible. Doubtless by all Plato de Rep. men (said Cebes) but much more, as I conceive, by the gods. But a further instance will be propounded afterwards of the word Θεοὶ, thus used, by way of distinction, for the inferior gods only; as it was before declared, that the theogonia or generation of gods was accordingly understood by the Greeks universally of the Θεοὶ, that is, the inferior gods.

Moreover, as the word Θεοὶ was taken κατ' ἐξεχείριον, or by way of eminency, for the supreme God, so was Δαίμονοι likewise. As for example, in this passage of Callimachus, before cited imperfectly 3:

 Si Deus est tibi notus,
Hoc etiam nonis, omnia posse Deum.

Where Θεοἴ and Δαίμονοι are used both alike signanter, for the supreme God, and thus also in that famous passage of another poet:

—Τῶς.

Homer likewise, in one and the same place, seems to use Θεός and Δαίμων both together, after the same manner, for the supreme God:

"Οὔπποτε άνήρ θείς πρὸς δαίμονα φωτό μάκεται,
Όν με θεός τιμᾷ, τόχα οι μέγα πήμα κυλίσθην.

Quoties homo cult, adverso numine, cum viro pugnare,
Quem Deus hononrat, mox in eum magna clades devolvit.

Again we conceive, that Jupiter, or the supreme God, was sometimes signified amongst the Pagans by that expression, Θεός αυτός, Deus ipse, as in that of Homer’s ninth Iliad:

---Olim ei uxor miu pustata τη θεός αυτός,
Γάρ γάρ της θατερ Γάμμεν οἰον πολύτατο.

---Neque si nisi promitteret Deus ipse,
Sencilutem abradens, efficiturum me juvenem pebescentem.

And thus St. Cyril of Alexandria interprets Homer here, "γάρ τι πη θεον, εί τε Θεός τις υπόσχεται μοι η μεν γάρ ο της απεμπολπη παλαιωτετο δε την νεότητα τετρήκε οι θεοί μας μένον τι παντες θεος, δε το γάρ τι Θεός αυτός, εν τι δε τοι και αυτός περιλαζόμενον τινά, αυτόν δε ει αυτόν κυλισθησαίναι αυτόν τον αλλατις ένα τη Θεον." Homer doth not say, if any of the gods would promise me freedom from old age, and restitution of youth, but he reserves the matter only to the supreme God; neither doth he refer it to any of the fictitious poetick gods, but to the true God alone.

The same language was also spoken in the laws of the twelve tables: Deos adeunto cæsti, opes amovente: si fexus faxant, Deus ipse vindex erit. Let the Gods be worshipp’d: chastly, superfluity of riches and pomp being removed: if men do otherwise, God himself will be the avenger. Where, though the word gods be used generally, so as to comprehend both the supreme and inferior gods under it, yet Deus ipse, God himself, denotes the supreme God only.

In like manner, δαίμων αυτός also seems to be taken for the supreme God, in that of Euripedes:

Δάιμων με έν Δαίμων αυτός, έτει ένα γείω θείω,

which was thus rendered by Horace:

——Ipse Deus, simulatque volet, me solvet.

Notwithstanding which, Δαίμων and Δαίμων are often distinguished from Θεός and Θεός, they being put for an inferior rank of beings below the gods vulgarly called demons; which word in a large sense comprehends also

---Iliad, Lib. I. verf. 98.  
---Verf. 448.  
---Vide Ciceron de Legibus, Lib. II. Cap.  
---VIII. p. 3345. Tom. IX. Oper.  
---In Bacchis, verf. 497.
also heroes under it. For though these demons be sometimes called gods
too, yet were they rather accounted Ημιδεσ, demi-gods, than gods. And
thus Θεος η δαιμον, gods and demons, are frequently joined together, as
things distinct from one another; which notion of the word Plato refers to,
when he concludes love not to be a god, but a daemon only. But of these
demons we are to speak more afterwards.

Furthermore, the pagan writers frequently understand the supreme God
by the το Θεος, when the word is used substantively. As for example, in
this of Epicaramus 1;

Οἶδα δικηρυγεῖ τῷ Θείῳ τῷ γνώσει σε δι; Αυτὸς εἰδ' ἡμῶν ἐπάνω οὖν ἀδικεῖται ἡ ἐνί Θεον.

Res nulla est Deum quo lateat, scribe quod te convenit:
Ipse est noxer introspector, tum Deus nil non potest.

So likewise in this of Plato's 2, τὸρρομ ἠδον̣ς τ' ἀκπότητες ἐπιρταί τῷ Θείῳ, God is far
removed both from pleasure and grief. And Plutarch calls the supreme God,
τὸ ἐν τῷ παντὶ Θείῳ, the Divinity that is in the universe. But because the in-
stances hereof are also innumerable, we shall decline the mentioning of any
more, and instead of them, only set down the judgment of that diligent and
impartial observer of the force of words, Henricus Stephanus 3, concerning
it; Redditur etiam τὸ Θείῳ χάρις Deus, sed ita tamen, ut intelligendum sit, non
de quoluit Deo ab iphis etiam profanis scripserit dici, verum de eo quem in-
telligenter, cum ἑυρίσκων ἄκατον ἑκάστῳ ad differentiam eum, qui multi
appellationes Θείῳ includebantur, sumnum videlicet supremum Numinem, &
quae dicebat Θείῳ Θεοῦ ἐπ' αὐτό τῆς χάριτος, ut loquitur de Jove Homerus.

Lastly, as τὸ Θείῳ so likewise was τὸ δαιμονιον used by the Greeks for the
supreme Numen, or that Divinity, which governs the whole world. Thus
whereas it was commonly said, (according to Herodotus 4) ὀτί τῷ Θείῳ φθάσαον,
that God was ominous; the meaning whereof was, that he did not commonly
suffer any great human prosperity to continue long, without some check or
counterbuff; the fame proverbial speech is expressed in Aristophanes, φθάσαον τῷ
δαιμονιον. And in this sense the word seems to be used in Icorrates ad Dcpo-
nicium, τώρα τῷ δαιμονίῳ διὶ μου, πάλαι τη τῆς τύχης, worship God always,
but especially with the city, in her publick sacrifices. And doubtless it was
thus taken by Plotinus in this passage of his, μιᾷ ἐς ἤπι ἐπὶ ἑδονής, τῷ τῷ ὑς ὑπαρξεῖν, Arr. Lib. 4
μὲ μὴν μαίσι τῇ νίκης, ἐπὶ προχάλευν, ἀπόστολος τῶν ἀπορίας, τῷ ὑπαόν ἄνω c. 4. p. 387.
Ἑγέρθη, τὸ παραλάβει τάλαι τῷ δαιμονίῳ, τῇ τῇ τύχη. There is but one way
to tranquillity of mind and happiness; let this therefore be always ready at
hand with thee, both when their wakest early in the morning, and all the day
long, and when thou goest late to sleep; to account no external things thine
own, but to commit all these to God and fortune. And there is a very remark-
able passage in Demosthenes 5 (observed by Budeus) that must not be

V. p. 708. The Translation is by Grotius in
2 Epit. III. p. 708.
3 In Theofauro Graece Lingue, Tom. 1.
4 Lib. III. Cap. XII. p. 176. He cites
this from an Epistle of Amasis to the Tyrant
Polsocrates.
5 Orat. τῷ παραπρεπῆς, p. 266. Edit.
here omitted; in which we have οἱ Ξείδι plainly for the inferior or minor gods only, and τὸ δαίμονον for the supreme God, both together; ἵνα τι Ξείδι εἶναι καὶ τὸ δαίμονον, τὸ μὲ τὰ διόνυς ψυχισάμουν. The gods and the Deity will know or take notice of him that gives not a righteous sentence; that is, both the inferior gods and the supreme God himself. Wherefore we see, that the word δαίμονον, as to its grammatical form, is not a diminutive, as some have conceived, but an adjective substantiv’d; as well as τὸ Ξείδος is. Nevertheless in pagan writings, δαίμονος also, as well as δαίμων, from whence it is derived, is often used for an inferior rank of beings below the gods, though sometimes called gods too; and such was Socrates his δαίμονον so commonly known.

But the grammar of this word, and its proper signification in pagan writers, cannot better be manifested, than by citing that passage of Socrates his own, in his Apology, as written by Plato; who though generally supposed to have had a daemon, was notwithstanding by Melitus accused of atheism; ἦν δὲ Αριστοτέλειος Εὐριπίδης, ὁ Μελίτης, δαίμονια μὲν νομίζει πράγματα έύκα, αὐτάρκης δὲ τὸ νομίζει, ὡς ὅτι ημών μὲν οὐ νομίζειν, ἦττο καὶ τοιούτου, &c. ἐν ὑμιν, οὐ δέση αὐθεντικὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἱππὸς τῶν ἀνώτατον, ἵνα οὕτω δαίμωνα, μὲν νομίζειν περάσκειει εὔκα, δαίμωνα δὲ τὸ νομίζει, ἵνα οὐ τίνι ἀλλὰ τὸ δαίμωνα γένος τοῦ τούτου λόγου, οὐ δὲ τὸ δαίμωνα νομίζειν, καί δαίμωνα δέτεν πολλά διάλεγε νομίζειν με οἷα, τίς δὲ δαίμωναν ὡς τοι Ξείδες γένος τοῦ τούτου. Wherefore we do not think, that daemons are either gods, or at least sons of the gods? Wherefore for any one to conceive, that there are demons, and yet no gods, is altogether as absurd, as if any should think, that there are mules, but yet neither horses nor asses. However, in the New Testament, according to the judgments of Origen, Eusebius, and others of the ancient fathers, both those words δαίμωνα and δαίμωνα are alike taken, always in a worser sense, for evil and impure spirits only.

But over and besides all this, the Pagans do often characterize the supreme God by such titles, epithets, and descriptions, as are incommunically proper to him; thereby plainly distinguishing him from all other inferior gods. He being sometimes called by them ὁ Δὲμιουργός, the opifex, architect or maker of the world; ὁ Ηχομοῦ το πανός ὄ Αρχέων, the prince and chief ruler of the universe; ὁ Πρώτος and ὁ Πρώτος Θεός (by the Greeks) and (by the Latin) Primus Deus, the First God; Πρώτος Νός, the First Mind; ο μῖχος Θεός, the Great God; ο μῖχος δαίμων, and ὁ μῖχος τῶν αἰώνων, the greatest God, and the greatest of the gods; ὁ Θεός, the Higheft; and ὁ Πρώτος Θεός, the Supreme of the gods; ο παράδεισος Θεός, the uppermost, or most transcendent God; Princeps ille Deus, that chief or principal God; Θεός Θεών, the God of gods; and Ἀρχέων Αρχέων, the Principle of principles; Το πρώτον αἰτίον, the First Cause; ὁ τότε το παῖν γενόμενος, he that generated or created this whole universe; ο αἰτίον το πανός, he that rules over the whole world; Στόμη Θεὸς & Εὐκείμενος, the supreme Governor and Lord of all; ο ἐπί τής Στοίς.
Chap. IV. Champions for Paganism assert Monarchy.

ν'ες, the God over all; δ' ἤδεις ἄρσην, αὐτογενής, αὐτοφύτης, αὐτοπαράς, the ingenerate or unmade, self-originated and self-subsisting Deity; Μονας, a Monad; Τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄρσην, Unity and Goodness itself; Τὸ οἰκουμένη τῶν θεῶν, and Τὸ οἰκουμένη, that which is above essence or super-essential; Τὸ ὑπερανεύμων, that which is above mind and understanding; Summum illud & Eternum, neque mutabile neque interitterum, that Supreme and Eternal Being, which is immutable and can never perish; Ἀγώνης, ἐν τῷ ἀγάπης, the Beginning, and End, and Middle of all things; Ἔν ὅ τὸν ἑαυτόν, One and all things; Deus Unus & Omnis, One God and All Gods: and lastly, to name no more, ὁ Πάν, or Providence, as distinguished from Φύσις, Nature, is often used by them also as a name for the supreme God, which because it is of the feminine gender, the impious and atheistical Epicureans therefore took occasion to call God, ridiculously and jeeringly, Anum fatidicam Promeans 1. Now all these, and other such like expressions, being found in the writings of professed Pagans (as we are able to shew) and some of them very frequently, it cannot be denied, but that the Pagans did put a manifest difference betwixt the supreme God, and all other inferior gods.

XV. What hath been now declared, might, as we conceive, be judged sufficient, in order to our present undertaking; which is to prove, that the more intelligent of the ancient Pagans, notwithstanding that multiplicity of gods worshipped by them, did generally acknowledge one supreme, omnipotent, and only unmade Deity. Nevertheless, since men are commonly so much prepossessed with a contrary persuasion, (the reason whereof seems to be no other than this, that because the notion of the word God, which is now generally received amongst us Christians, is such as does essentially include self-existence in it, they are therefore apt to conceive, that it must needs do so likewise amongst the Pagans;) we shall endeavour to produce yet some further evidence for the truth of our assertion. And first, we conceive this to be no small confirmation thereof, because after the publication of Christianity, and all along during that tugging and contest, which was betwixt it and Paganism, none of the professed champions for paganism and antagonists of Christianity, (when occasion was now offered them) did ever assert any such thing as a multiplicity of understanding deities unmade (or creators) but on the contrary, they all generally disclaimed it, professing to acknowledge one supreme self-existent Deity, the maker of the whole universe.

It is a thing highly probable, if not unquestionable, that Apollonius Tyaneus, shortly after the publication of the gospel to the world, was a person made choice of by the policy, and affixed by the powers of the kingdom of darkness, for the doing of some things extraordinary, merely cut of design to derogate from the miracles of our Saviour Christ, and to enable paganism the better to bear up against the assaults of Christianity. For amongst the many writers of this philosopher's life, some, and particularly Philostratus, seem to have had had no other aim in this their whole undertaking, than only to dress up Apollonius in such a garb and manner, as might make him best seem to be a fit corvail with our Saviour Christ, both in respect of sanctity

Apollonius Tyanaeus. Book I.

and miracles. *Eunapius* therefore telling us, that he mis-titled his book, and that instead of "Apollonius, the life of Apollonius, he should have called it Θεος in; ἀνθρώπου ἔνωμον, the coming down, and converse of God with men; forasmuch as this Apollonius (faith he) was not a bare philosopher or man, ἀλλὰ τί Σώφω εἴ ἄνθρωπος μὲν, but a certain middle thing betwixt the gods and men. And that this was the use commonly made by the Pagans of this history of Apollonius, namely to set him up in way of opposition and rivalry to our Saviour Christ, appears sundry ways. Marcellinus, in an Epistle of his to St. Austin, declares this as the grand objection of the Pagans against Christianity, (therefore deferring St. Austin's anfier to the fame;) Nibil alius Dominum, quàm alii homines facere potuerunt, fecisse vel egiſe men-
tiuntur; Apollonium sœcidem fuum nobis, & Apuleius, alióque magicie artis homines, in medium preferunt, quorum majora contendunt exitiſſe mira-
cula. The Pagans pretend, that our Saviour Christ did no more than what other men have been able to do, they producing their Apollonius and Apuleius, and other magicians, whom they pretend to have done greater miracles. And it is well known, that Hierocles, to whom Eufebius gives the commendation of a very learned man, wrote a book against the Christians (entitled, Φιλαλέθης, or Λύγος Φιλαλεθίς;) the chief design whereof was to compare this Apollonius Tyanaeus with, and prefer him before our Saviour Christ: "Alno κατω Φιλαλεθίς, ουκ ἔνων, ὡς τυφλείς ἀνακλασὶς τι παραγον, καὶ των τοιχίων δράσεις Θεοματις. They are Hierocles his own words in Eufebius: The Christians (faith he) keep a great deal of this, crying up of one Jesus, for restoring sight to the blind, and doing some few other wonders. And then mentioning the Thaumaturgi or wonder-workers amongst the Pagans, but especially Apollonius Tyanaeus, and insulting largely upon his miracles, he adds in the close of all, τινες ουκ ἔνων τῶν ιμιόν τοις ἀνίμοις, νυκ ἐντὸς συνειρμαίνει τοῦ ἤμ-
tέρων ἀγάθων; οὐ βιβλιαίου ἐν ἰκάτω κόσμῳ, ἄ τον τῶν ἁγίων κυρίων ἄνευς ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ τῶν τοιχίων πεταλίων, ἐν οὐς, ἀλλὰ τῶν κεχαριμένων ἁγίων ἡμῶν, οἴ 
δι οἴ ἐνεκα τηρομένων των ἤμου Θεοῦ ἀναγεννησον. To what purpose now have we mentioned all these things? but only that the solid judgment of us [Pagans] might be compared with the levity of the Christians; forasmuch as we do not account him a god who did all these miracles, but only a person beloved of the gods; whereas they declare Jesus to be a God, merely for doing a few wonders. Where, because Eufebius is silent, we cannot but subjoin an answer out of Laelius (which indeed he seems to have directed against those very words of Hierocles, though not naming of him) it being both pertinent and full;

Apparet nos sacriptores esse, qui mirabilibus factis non flatim fidem divi-
tatis adjunximus, quàm vos, qui ob exigua pertenta Deum creditissi—

Difce igitur, si quid tibi coram est, non solum idcirco ad nobis Deum credi-
tum Christum, quia mirabilia fecit, sed quia vidimus in eo facta esse omnia, quae nobis annuicata sunt, vacinicia prophetarum. Tecit mirabilia; magnum putamus, ut & vos nuncupatis; & Judei tunc putaverunt, si nunc illa ipsa factarum Christum, prophetæ omnes uno spiritu predicassent. Itaque Deum cre-
dimus, non magis ex factis, operibusque mirandis, quàm ex illa ipsa cruce, quam vos fecit canes lambitis; quoniam simul & ulla crediit esse. Non igitur furo


tewifionio, (nui enim de se dicenti potest credi?) sed prophetarum testimonia, qui omnia que fecit ac passus est, multo ante ecceinunt, fidem divinitatis accepti; quod neque Apollonio neque Apuleio neque cuiquam magorum potest aliquando contingere. It is manifest, that we Christians are wiser than you Pagans, in that we do not presently attribute divinity to a person merely because of his wonders; whereas a few portentous things, or extraordinary actions, will be enough with you to make you deify the doer of them; (and so indeed did some of them, however Hierocles denies it, deify Apollonius.) Let this writer against Christianity therefore learn, (if be have any understanding or sense in him) that Christ was not therefore believed to be a God by us Christians, merely because of his miracles, but because we saw all those things done by, and accomplished in him, which were long before predicted to us by the prophets. He did miracles, and we should therefore have suspected him for a magician (as you now call him, and as the Jews then supposed him to be) had not all the prophets with one voice foretold, that he should do such things. We believe him therefore to be God, no more for his miracles than from that very crofs of his, which you so much quarrel with, because that was like-wise foretold. So that our belief of Christ’s divinity is not founded upon his own testimony (for who can be believed concerning himself?) but upon the testimony of the prophets, who sang long before of all those things, which he both did and suffered. Which is such a peculiar advantage and privilege of bis, as that neither Apollonius nor Apuleius, nor any other magician, could ever share therein. Now, as for the life and morals of this Apollonius Tyaneus, as it was a thing absolutely necessary for the carrying on of such a diabolical design, that the person made use of for an instrument should have some colourful and plausible pretence to virtue; so did Apollonius accordingly take upon him the profession of a Pythagorean; and indeed act that part externally so well, that even Sidonius Apollinaris, though a Christian, was so dazzled with the glittering shew and lustre of his counterfeit virtues, as if he had been enchanted by this magician so long after his death. Nevertheless, whatsoever is not very dim-fighted in such matters as these, or partially affected, may easily perceive, that this Apollonius was so far from having anything of that divine spirit which manifested itself in our Saviour Christ, (transcending all the philosophers that ever were) that he fell far short of the better moralized Pagans; as for example Socrates, there being a plain appearance of much pride and vain-glory (besides other folly) discoverable both in his words and actions. And this Eusebius undertakes to evince from Philostratus his own history (though containing many falsehoods in it) εὖ ἐν ἐπισκοπῇ, εἰ μητέρος ἑνδυκάνα ἐξεν ἑκάσον, ἐκ ὧν τῷ σωτῆρι ἡμῶν ἔγον παραθύπων τον Ἀπολλόνιον. That Apollonius was so far from deserving to be compared with our Saviour Christ, that he was not fit to be ranked amongst the moderately and indifferently honest men. Wherefore, as to his reputed miracle, if credit be to be given to those relations, and such things were really done by him, it must for this reason also be concluded, that they were done no otherwise than by magick and necromancy; and that this Apollonius was but an Archimago or grand Magician. Neither ought this to be suspected for a mere flander cast upon him by partially
tially affected Christians only, since, during his life-time, he was generally
reputed, even amongst the Pagans themselves, for no other than a γαστήρ, or infamous incantationer, and accused of that very crime before Domitian the
emperor: as he was also represented such by one of the Pagan writers of
his life, Μαραγενῆς, senior to Philostratus, as we learn from Origen: περὶ
μαγίας Φαρέβ, ὡς ὁ βολόμενος Ιεράσσα, πότερ εἰς μόνον κόσμον, εἰ μὴ, αναφέροντα τὰ γεγραμμένα Μαραγενῆς τῶν Ἀπολλώνιων τῷ Τυανίου μαγεῖ
καὶ Φιλοστρῶν ἀποτρυπομένην, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ μὴ Χριστιανοῦ, ἀλλὰ Φιλοστρῶν, ἐφησον
ἀλώνου ὠτί τις ἐν Ἀπολλώνιῳ μαγεῖ, καὶ ἀγνοεῖς τοις Φιλοστρῶν, ὧς πρὸς δεῖξα
αὐτῷ εἰσίλθρως. ἐν τούτῳ οἷῳ, ὡς περὶ Εὐβοᾶτον πάνω διέγνωσα, καὶ τῶν Ἐπικουρίων.
As concerning the infamous and diabolical magick, he that would know whether or no a philosopher be temptable by it, or illaqueable into it, let him read
the writings of Maragenes concerning the memorable things of Apollonius
Tyanaeus, the magician and philosopher; in which be that was no Christian,
but a Pagan philosopher himself, affirmed some not ignoble philosophers to have
been taken with Apollonius his magick, including (as I suppose) in that num-
ber Euphrates and a certain Epicurean. And no doubt but this was the
reason, why Philostratus derogates so much from the authority of this Mar-
agenses, affirming him to have been ignorant of many things concerning
Apollonius (ὡς Μαραγενῆς τε περὶ Ἀπολλώνιου, &c.) Because Maragenses had thus
represented Apollonius in his true colours as a magician; whereas Philostra-
tus his whole business and design was, on the contrary, to vindicate him
from that imputation: the truth whereof notwithstanding, may be sufficiently
evinced, even from those very things, that are recorded by Philostratus
himself. And here by the way we shall observe, that it is reported by
good historians, that miracles were also done by Vespasian at Alexandria,

 başka 4. p. Per eos menfes (they are the words of Tacitus) multa miracula evocere, quis
celitis favor, & quedam in Vespasianum inclinatio numinis offendetur.
Ex plebe Alexandrind quidam, oculorum tabe notus, genua ejus adoveleurit,
remedium cædatis ex opus venit; monitu Serapidis dei, quem dedita su-
perfitionibus gens ante altos eolvit; precabaturque principem, ut genus & ocu-
lorum orbès dignaretur respergere oris excremento. Alius manu ager; eodem
deo aufore, ut pede ac vestigio Cæfaris calcaretur orbat. At that time many
miracles happened at Alexandria, by which was manifested the heavenly favour
and inclination of the divine powers towards Vespasian. A plebeian Alexan-
drian, that had been known to be blind, casts himself at the feet of Vespasian,
besegging with tears from him a remedy for his sight, (and that according to the
suggestion of the god Serapis) that he would deign but to spit upon his eyes and
face. Another having a lame hand (directed by the same oracle) beseeches him
but to tread upon it with his foot. And after some debate concerning this
business, both these things being done by Vespasian, statim conversa ad usum
manus, & cecis reliquit dies; the lame hand presently was restored to its former
usefulness, and the blind man recovered his sight: both which things (faith
the historian) some who were eye-witnesses do to this very day report, when it
can be no advantage to any one to lye concerning it. And that there seems to be
some reason to suspect, that our archimagus Apollonius Tyanaeus might have some
finger

This is related by Philostratus in Vita Apollonii, Lib. II. Cap. X. III. p. 156.


Philostrat, ubi supra, Lib. VII. Cap. V. II.
further in this business also, because he was not only familiarly and intimately acquainted with Vespasian, but also at that very time (as Philostratus informs us) present with him at Alexandria, where he also did many miracles himself. However, we may here take notice of another stratagem and policy of the devil in this, both to obscure the miracles of our Saviour Christ, and to weaken men's faith in the Messiah, and baffle the notion of it; that whereas a name of prophecies had gone abroad every where, that a king was to come out of Judea and rule over the whole world, (by which was understood no other than the Messiah) by reason of these miracles done by Vespasian, this oracle or prediction might the rather seem to have its accomplishment in him, who was first proclaimed emperor in Judea, and to whom Josephus himself safely and flatteringly had applied it. And since this business was started and suggested by the god Serapis, that is, by the devil (of whose counsel probably Apollonius also was;) this makes it still more strongly suspicious, that it was really a design or policy of the devil, by imitating the miracles of our Saviour Christ, both in Apollonius and Vespasian, to counter-work God Almighty in the plot of Christianity, and to keep up or confer his own usurped tyranny in the pagan world still. Nevertheless, we shall here show Apollonius all the favour we can; and therefore suppose him not to have been one of those more foul and black magicians, of the common sort, such as are not only grossly funk and debauched in their lives, but also knowingly do homage to evil spirits as such, for the gratification of their lufts; but rather one of those more refined ones, who have been called by themselves Theurgists, such as being in some measure freed from the groffer vices, and thinking to have to do only with good spirits; nevertheless, being proud and vain-glorious, and affecting wonders, and to transcend the generality of mankind, are, by a divine nemesis, justly exposed to the illusions of the devil or evil spirits, cunningly inquinuating, here, and aptly accommodating themselves to them. However, concerning, this Apollonius, it is undeniable, that he was a zealous upholder of the Pagan polytheism, and a stout champion for the gods, he professing to have been taught by the Samian Pythagoras his master, how to worship these gods, invisible as well as visible, and to have converse with them. For which cause he is styled by Vespasian, amicus verus deorum, a true friend of the gods; that is, a hearty and sincere friend to that old Pagan religion, now assaulted by Christianity, in which not one only true God, but a multiplicity of gods were worshipped. But notwithstanding all this, Apollonius himself was a clear and undoubted assenter of one supreme Deity; as is evident from his apologe-tick oration in Philostratus, prepared for Domitian: in which he calls him, τὸν τῶν ὅλων, and τὸν πάντων δημιουργόν ὅλων, that God, who is the maker of the whole universe, and of all things. And, as he elsewhere in Philostratus declares, both the Indians and Egyptians to have agreed in this theology, infomuch that though the Egyptians condemned the Indians for many other of their opinions, yet did they highly applaud this doctrine of theirs, τὸς μὲν ὅλων προ-

* Vide Philostrat. ubi supra, Lib. I. Cap. XXXII. p. 40:
Celsus and Porphyrius - Book I.

Philos. p. 142.
[Lib. III.
Cap. XXXV.]

In the first and highofi seat is to be given to that God, who is the creator or creator of this great animal; and the next under it to those gods, that govern the several parts of it respectively: so that the poets were to be approved of here, when they affirm, that there are many gods in the heavens, many in the seas, many in the rivers and fountains, many also upon the earth, and some under the earth. Wherein we have a true representation of the old paganick theology, which both Indians, and Egyptians, and European poets, (Greek and Latin) all agree in; that there is one supreme God, the maker of the universe, and under him many inferior generated gods, or understanding beings (inferior to men) appointed to govern and preside over the several parts thereof, who were also to be religiously honoured and worshipped by men. And thus much for Apollonius Tyanaeus.

The first pagan writer against Christianity was Celsus, who lived in the times of Adrian, and was so profest a Polytheist, that he taxes the Jews for having been seduced, by the frauds of Moses into this opinion of one God; Orig. p. 17, άι το τον γάρ κατά την Μωσέως επέμενεν Μαύρους αυτός εν Ποιμανικον, άρχοντας αυτοίς γάρ ψυχα-γωνίσιοι, εστι δέμεναι εις Θεον ο Θεος οι δε ψυχεις και βεβαιωθης, οι δε ψυχεις οι συνεσχηματισμοι, εστι δεμεναι εις Θεον ος μεγας αυτοις. These silly shepherds and herdsmen, following Moses their leader, and being seduced by his rustic frauds, came to entertain this belief, that there was but one only God. Nevertheless, this Celsus himself plainly acknowledged, amongst his many gods, one supreme, whom sometimes calls οι πρώτοι θεοι, the first God; sometimes οι μεγαθεοι, the greatest God; and sometimes οι υψηλωται θεοι, the supercelestial God, and the like: and he doth so zealously affect the divine omnipotence, that he calls an imputation upon the Christians of derogating from the same, in that their hypothesis of an adversary power; σφάλλεται δ' αυτοτάτω αυτήν, οι δε περὶ τούτων μεγάθεως έμμένους αυτοις άνθρωποι και πιστευοντες, οι δευτερατατα ου το ανθρωποσ ιδου, οι δε την θεόν εμμένους, αι δε της θεοτητος έμμένους οι δε των ουσιων έμμένους; The Christians are erroneously led into most wicked opinions concerning God, by reason of their great ignorance of the divine enigmas; whilst they make a certain adversary to God, whom they call the devil, and in the Hebrew language Satan; and affirm, contrary to all piety, that the greatest God, having a mind to do good
Chap. IV. both Polytheists and Monstheists.

It men, is disabled or withstood by an adversary resisting him. Lastly, where Orig. con. Cels; he pleads most for the worship of demons, he concludes thus concerning the supreme God; θεος δε ευδοκιμων ουκ απολειπτων, ουτε μεθ' αμέτριον, ουτε πυκτωρ, ουτεν ουσιων; ει δοκην, ει δοξοι εν ποιλι η δοξα διπλακτη, αλλα γε η μετα τουτε, η χρυση, η χαλυβαν χωρον προς τον θεον. But God is by no means any where to be laid aside, or left out; neither by day nor by night, neither in publick nor in private, either in our words or actions; but in every thing our mind ought constantly to be directed towards God. A saying, that might very well become a Christian.

The next and greatest champion for the Pagan cause in books and writings was that famous Tyrian philosopher Malebus, called by the Greeks Porphyrius; who published a voluminous and elaborate treatise (containing fifteen books) against the Christians; and yet he notwithstanding was plainly as zealous an antagonist of one supreme Deity, and one only ἡμέρας, unw- made or self-existent principle of all things, as any of the Christians themselves could be; he strenuously opposing that forementioned doctrine of Plutarch and Atticus concerning three unmade principles, a good God, an evil soul or demon, and the matter, and endeavouring to demonstrate, that all things whatsoever, even matter itself, was derived from one perfect understanding Being, or self-originated Deity. The sum of whose argumentation to which purpose we have represented by Proclus upon the Timaeus, page 119.

After Porphyrius, the next eminent antagonist of Christianity, and champion for paganism, was Hierocles, the writer of that book, entitled (in Eusebius) Φιλαξηνι, or a lover of the truth; which is noted to have been a modeler inscription, than that of Celsus his ἡμερας λόγος, or true oration. For if Eusebius Pamphili were the writer of that answer to this Philalethes, now extant, as we both read in our copies, and as Photius also read; then must it needs be granted, that Hierocles the author of it was either contemporary with Porphyrius, or else but little his junior. Moreover, this Hierocles seems plainly to be the person intended by Lastantius, in these following De fub. l. 5. words: Alius eandem materiam mordaciis scripsit; qui erat tum è numero ju- dicum, & qui auæor in primis faciendæ persecutionis fuit: quo fcelere non contentus, eiam scriptis eos quos affixerat, infectus est. Contipuit enim libellos duos, non contra Christianos, ne imīc iis insecari videatur, sed ad Christianos, ut humanè ac benignù confudere videatur. In quibus ita falsitatem scripture sacre argure conatus est, tanquam sibi effe tota contraria.——Præcipue tamen Paulum Petrumque lacravit, ceteroque discipulos, tanquam fallacie fumantes; quos eodem tamen rudes & indoctosuisse tegerat us est. Another hath handled the same matter more smartly, who was first himself one of the judges; and a chief author of the persecution; but being not contented with that wickednes, he added this afterwards, to persecute the Christians also with his pen; he compofing two books, not inscribed against the Christians, (left he should seem plainly to act the part of an enemy) but to the Christians, (that he might be thought to counsel them humanely and benignly;) in which he so charges the holy scripture with falsity, as if it were all nothing else but contradictions: but he chiefly laches Paul and Peter, as diviners of byes and deceits, whom not-
Hierocles in his Philalethes clearly Book I.

withstanding he declares to have been rude and illiterate persons. I say, though Hierocles, for some cause or other, be not named here by Lacontius in these cited words, or that which follows, yet it cannot be doubted, but that he was the person intended by him, for these two reasons: First, because he tells us afterward, that the main business of that Christianus was to compare Apollonius with our Saviour Christ. Cium faita Christi mirabilia descreueret, nec tamen negaret, voluit asendere, Apollonium vel paria, vel etiam majora fecriffe. Mirum quid Apuleium pr.eferuerit, ejus saet & multa & mira memorari. Et ex hoc insolentiam Christi voluit arguere, quod demus fe constituerit: ut ille venecandior fuife wideretur, qui cium majora faecerat (ut hic putat) tamen id sibi non arrogaverit. That he might obscure the miracles of our Saviour Christ, which he could not deny, he would undertake to show, that equal or greater miracles were done by Apollonius. And it was a wonder he did not mention Apuleius too; of whose many and wonderful things the Pagans use to brag likewise. Moreover, he condemns our Saviour Christ of insolency, for making himself a god, affirming Apollonius to have been the modeler person, who, though he did (as he supposes) greater miracles, yet arrogated no such thing to himself. The second reason is, because Lacontius also expressly mentions the very title of Hierocles his book, viz. Philalethes. Cium talia ignorantiae sue deliramenta judicii, cunque veritatem penitus exciderc connivit, ejus cf libros suas nefarias, ac dei holses, philalethes annotare: Though pouring out so much folly and madness, professedly fighting against the truth, yet be presumed to call thefe his wicked books, and enemies of God, Philalethes, or enemies to truth. From which words of Lacontius, and thofe foregoing, where he Dr. Pearson, affirms this Christianus to have written two books, the learned prefacer of Chester, to the late edition of Hierocles, probably concludes, that the whole title of Hierocles his book was this, legi philalethes πτους Χριστιανος. And I conceive, that the first of thofe two books of Hierocles infcribed upon fuch things as Porphyrius had before urged againft the Christians; but then in the second, he added this de novo of his own, to compare Apoloni us with our Saviour Christ: which Eufebius only takes notice of. Wherefore Epiphanius telling us, that there was one Hierocles a prefent or governor of Alexandria, in thofe persecuting times of Diocletian, we may probably conclude, that this was the very person described in Lacontius, who is said to have been fift of the number of the judges, and a principal actor in the perfeuation; and then afterwards to have written this Philalethes againft the Christians, wherein besides other things, he ventured to compare Apollonius Tyaneus with our Saviour Christ. Now, if this Hierocles, who wrote the Philalethes in defence of the Pagan gods againft the Christians, were the author of thofe two other philosophick books, the Commentary upon the golden verses, and that De Eato & Providentia, it might be easily evinced from both of them, that he was notwithstanding an affifter of one supreme Deity. But Photius tells us, that that Hierocles, who wrote the book concerning fate and providence, did therein make mention of Jamblicbus, and his junior Finiarius Acheniatus: from whence Johnfus taking it for granted, that it was one and the fame Hierocles, who wrote againft the Christians, and de Eato, infers, that it could not be Eufebius Pampbili, who answered the Philalethes.

lethes, but that it must needs be some other Eusebius much junior. But we finding Hierocles his Philalethes in Laëtantius, must needs conclude on the contrary, that Hierocles, the famous Chrestian-marx, was not the same with that Hierocles, who wrote de Fatio. Which is further evident from Aeneas Gazens in his Theophrastus; where first he mentions one Hierocles an Alexandrian, that had been his master, whom he highly extols, ἀλλ' ῥ. 7. εἰκε μοι, ἐπὶ παρ' ἡμῖν εἰσὶν οἱ τῆς Φιλοσσίας φιλοσοφοὶ τῶν τελετῶν, ὡς ἐν Ιερουσαλήμ. [Edin. Bathy.] ο εἰς αὐτὸν; But tell me, I pray you, are there yet left amongst you in Egypt any such expounders of the arcane mysteries of philosophy, as Hierocles our master was? And this we suppose to be that Hierocles, who wrote concerning fate and providence, (if not also upon the golden verses.) But afterward upon occasion of Apollonius the Cappadocien, or Tyanean, he mentions another Hierocles distinct from the former; namely him, who had to boast of Apollonius his miracles, in these words, ὁ 'Ἀπολλώνιος τὸν λόγον λόγον ῥ. 14. Ἕλεγχεν. Περικλῆς δὲ ἐκ ὁ διδάσκαλος, ἀλλ' ὁ προσταλάματος τῶν Ἱερώνυμος, ἑπὶ τοῦ προσέγινην. Thus Apollonius is convinced of falsehood; but Hierocles (not our master) but he that boasts of the miracles of (Apollonius) adds another incredible thing. And though it be probable, that one of these was the author of that commentary upon the golden verses, (for that it should be written by a Christian, is but a dream) yet we cannot certainly determine, which of them it was. However, that this Hierocles, who was the matrix of Christi- anity, and champion for the gods, was notwithstanding a professed affirfer of one supreme Deity, is clearly manifest also from Lætantius, in these following words; Quam tandem nos atuitifli veritatem? nisi quod affertor deorum nos ipso ad ultimum prodiit: iusceceus enim summi dei landos, quem regem, quem maxum, quem opifem rerum, quem fontem bonorum, quem parentem omnium, quem factum aliorum viventium confessus es, ademissi Jovi tuo regnum; eique junna potestate depulfum in ministrorum numerum redigi. Epilogus ergo te tuus arguit studio, vanitas, erroris. Afirmas deos effer, & illos tamen subjiciis & mancipas ei deo, cujus religionem conarias evertere. Though you have entitled your book Philalethes, yet what truth have you brought us therein, unless only this, that being an affirfer of the gods, (contradicting yourself,) you have at last betrayed those very gods? For in the close of your book, prosecuting the praefices of the supreme God, and confessing him to be the king, the greateft, the opifex of the world, the fountain of good, the parent of all things, the maker and conservator of all living Beings, you have by this means dethroned your Jupiter, and degrading him from his sovereign power, reduced him into the rank of inferior ministers. Wherefore your epilogue argues you guilty of folly, vanity and error, in that you both affert gods, and yet subject and mancipate them under that one God, whose religion you endeavour to overthrow. Where we must confess we not understand not well Lætantius his logick: forasmuch as Hierocles his Zeus, or Jupiter, was one and the same with his supreme God, (as is also here intimated;) and though he acknowledged all the other gods to be but his inferior ministers, yet nevertheless did he contend, that these ought to be religiously worshipped, which was the thing that Lætantius should have confuted. But that, which we here take notice of, is this, that Hierocles, a grand perfecutor of the Chriftians, and the author of that bitter invective against them, called Philalethes, though
he were so strenuous an affter of polytheism, and champion for the gods, yet did he nevertheless at the same time clearly acknowledge one supreme Deity, calling him the king, (that is, the monarch of the universe) the greatest, the opifex of the world, the fountain of good, the parent of all things, and the maker and conserver of all life.

But the greatest opposer of Christianity every way was Julian the emperor, who cannot reasonably be suspected to have disguised or blanched paganism, because he was an emperor, and had so great an animosity against Christianity, and was so superstitiously or bigotryally zealous for the worship of the gods; and yet this very Julian, notwithstanding, was an unquestionable affter of one supreme Deity. In his book written against the Christians, he declares the general sense of the Pagans, after this manner: οἱ οὐκ ημετέροι Φασιν, τὸν δημιουργὸν αὔτῶν μὲν εἶναι καὶοὶ πατέρα καὶ βασιλεα, νυνμὲν δὲ τὰ λειτά τῶν θεὸν ὑπ’ αὐτῷ, ἐπαρχεῖαι ὑπὸ πολλὰς θεοῖς, ὧν ἐκάστος ἐπιτρέπεται τὸν ἐκτὸς λόγον εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ ἐπιθεῖ γὰρ οὐκεὶ μὲν τὸ πατέρα πάντα τιλείες, ἀλλὰ πάλι, ἵνα δὲ τοῖς μερήσι, ἄλλα παρ’ ἄλλοι καθ’ ἔδαμις, &c. Our theologians affirm the maker of all to be a common father and king; but that the nations, as to particular things, are distributed by him to other inferior gods, that are appointed to be governors over countries and cities, every one of which administers in his own province agreeably to himself. For whereas in the common father all things are perfect, and one is all, in the particular or partial deities one excels in one power, and another in another. Afterwards, in the same book he contends, that the Pagans did entertain richer opinions concerning the supreme God, than the Jews themselves; οἱ οὐκ οἱ προτεχθοὶ οὐδὲποτε κάμον δημιουργὸς οἱ κρατεῖσιν ὑπὸ τὸ Μωσῆς, ὡμεις υπ’ αὐτό βελλάς ἐχομεν δόξας, οἱ καὶ οἱ μικροὺς ὑπολαχεῖσιν αὔτῶν δι’ οὗτον, ἐπαρχεῖα δὲ ἄλλες, οἱ τυχοίμοι μὲν ὑπ’ ἲνα ἔρχονται, εἰς δὲ ὅπερ ὑπαρχεῖ Βασιλείας, ἐκαστὸς τὸν ἐκτὸς διαφόρους ἐπισκόπους οἰκονόμους οἰκονόμους, οἱ οἱ καθ’ αὐτοῦ, ἄλλοι ἄλλοις τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτῶν βελλοι καθ’ αὐτοῖς. If that God, who is so much spoken of by Moses, be the immediate opifex of the whole world, we Pagans entertain better opinions of him, who supposes him to be the common Lord of all; but that there are other governors of nations and countries under him, as prefects or presidents appointed by a king; we not ranking him amongst those partial governors of particular countries and cities, as the Jews do. From both which places it is evident, that, according to Julian's theology, all those other gods, whose worship he contended so much for, were but the subordinate ministers of that one supreme God, the maker of all.

The same thing might be further manifested from Julian's oration made in praise of the sun, as a great God in this visible world; he therein plainly acknowledging another far more glorious Deity, which was the cause of all things; τις μὲν οἱ πολλοὶ γεγονότα πολλοὶ εἰς οἱ κατ’ ἐφένα περιπλησίας ἐγκεκριμένοι ἦσι. There is one God the maker of all things; but besides him there are many other demiurgical gods moving round the heavens, in the midst of which is the sun. Where we have a clear acknowledgement of one supreme God, and of many inferior deities, both together. Moreover, in the same oration,
tion, he declareth, that the ancient poets, making the sun to have been the off-spring of Hyperion, did by this Hyperion understand nothing else but the supreme Deity; of Plato's philosophy, however, which Julian approached to, he seems to have been the first to conceive a certain intelligible sun, or corporeal or sensible sun (animated.)

Whereas, notwithstanding, we may take notice, how near this Pagan philosopher and emperor, Julian, approached to Christianity, though so much opposed by him, in that he also supposed an eternal mind or intellect, as the immediate off-spring of the first fountain of all things; which seems to differ but a little from the Christian λόγoς. However, it is plain, that this devout rector of paganism, and zealous contender for the worship of the gods, asserted no multiplicity of independent self-existent deities, but derived all his gods from one.

As for those other philosophers and learned men, who, in those latter times of the declining of paganism, after Constantine, still stood out in opposition against Christianity; such as Jamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus, Simplicius, and many others, it is unquestionably evident concerning them all, that they clearly acknowledged one supreme Deity as the original of all things. Maximus Madarseius, a confident and resolute Pagan in St. Au-

Chap. IV. derived all his Gods' from One.
Pagans disclaim a Multitude

Moreover, that the Pagans generally disclaimed this opinion of many unmade self-existent deities, appeareth plainly from Arnobius, where he brings them in complaining, that they were fallly and maliciously accused by some Christians as guilty thereof, after this manner: Fruxfris nos fafo & calumnio ineptitis & appellatis crimine, tangum inficias eamus Deum esse majorem; cim a nobis & Jupiter nominetur, & optimus babeat & maximus: cingue illi angulatissimas sedes, & Capitolia constiterimus immania. In vain do you Christians calumniate us, Pagans, and accuse us, as if we denied one supreme omnipotent God; though we both call him Jupiter, and account him the best and the greatest, having dedicated the most august seats to him, the vast Capitolis. Where Arnobius, in way of opposition, shows first, how perplexed and intangled a thing the Pagans theology was, their poetick fables of the gods nonfentially confounding herology together with theology; and that it was impossible, that that Jupiter of theirs, which had a father and a mother, a grand-father and a grand-mother, should be the omnipotent God. Nam Deus omnipotens, mente una omnium, & communi mortalitatis affectus, neque genitus situr, neque novan in lucem aliquando esse prolatus: nec ex aliquo tempore capisse esse, vel feculo. Ipsen enim est fons rerum, fator se-
cularum

* These words are not Longinianus's, but the argument of the epistle prefixed to it.
of Independent Deities.

culorum ac temporum. Non enim ipsa per se sunt, sed ex ejus perpetuitate perpetua, & infinita semper continuatae procedunt. At vero Jupiter (ut vos fertis) & patrem habet & matrem, avos & avias, nunc nuper in utero matris suae formatum, &c. Tu Pagans confoundetisvel cor- tradicis; for the omnipotens God, according to the natural sense of all man-kind, was neither begotten or made, nor ever had a beginning in time, be

being the fountain and original of all things. But Jupiter (as you say) had both father and mother, grand-fathers and grand-mothers, and was but lately formed in the womb; and therefore he cannot be the eternal omnipotens God. Nevertheless, Arnobius afterwards considering (as we suppose) that these pointick fables were by the wiser Pagans either totally rejected, or else some way or other allegorized, he candidly did mistrust this advantage, which he had against them, and grants their Jupiter to be the true omnipotens Deity, and consequently that same God, which the Christians worshipped, but from thence infers, that the Pagans therefore must needs be highly guilty, whilst worshippng the same God with the Christians, they did hate and persecute them after that manner. Sed sunt, ut vultis, unum, nec in aliquo, vi nominis, & majestate distantes; ecquid ergo injustis peren-qumini nos oditi? Quid, ut omnini peffimi, nostri nominis inborreceptis mentione, s, quem Deum colitis, eum & nos? aut quid in eadem causa vobis esse contenditis familiaree Divos, inimicos atque inferi?nus nobis? etenim, si una religio est nobis obidique communis, celfat ira cælestitum. But let it be granted, that (as you affirm) your Jupiter, and the eternal omnipotens God are one and the same; why then do you persecute us with unjust hatreds, abominating the very mention of our name, if the same God that you worship be worshipped by us? Or if your religion and ours be the same, why do you pretend, that the gods are propitious to you, but most highly provoked and incensed against us? Where the Pagan defence and reply is, Sed non idcirco Di vobis infeiti sunt, quod omnipotentem colatis Deum; sed quod boninem natum, quod personis infae est vilius, crucis supplicio interemptum, & Deum inesse contenditis, & superesse advic creditis, & quotidiani supplicationibus adoratis: But we do not say, that the gods are therefore displeased with you Christians, because you worship the omnipotent God; but because you contend him to be a God, who was not only born a mortal man, but also died an ignominious death, suffering as a malefactor; believing him still to survive, and adoring him with your daily prayers. To which Arnobius recorts in this manner: Tell us now, I pray you, who these gods are, who take it as so great an injury and indignity done to themselves, that Christ should be worshipped? Are they not Janus and Saturn, Æsculapius and Liber, Mercurius the son of Maia, and the Theban or Tyrian Hercules, Castor and Pollux, and the like? Ilice ergo Christum colis, & à nobis accipi, & exifiimati prò numine, vulneratis accipient auribus? & oblii paulo ante fertis & conditionis fæ, id, quod fobi concepsum ef, im-pertiri alteri nolunt? hoc est justitia calitum? hoc deorum juculitium sanctum? Nonne iudicis laveris est & ccevitius genus? non obtinctatio quodam fordinens, sus eminere columna valle fortunas, aliorum res pruni & in con-tempita humilitate calcaris, natum boninem colimus; quid enim, vos hominem nulium colitis natum? non unum & alium? non numeros altos? quiinimo
The Judgment of Fathers, concerning Book I.

quidnix non omnes quos jam templis vocatis veotris, mortalium justitiis ex numero, & cælo sideribusque donatos? Concedamus interdum manum veotris olationibus dantes, unam Christum fuiffe de nobis, meitus, animae, corporis, fragilitatis & conditionis unius; nonne dignus a nobis est tantorum ob numerum gratiam, Deus dici, Denique sentiri? Si enim vos Liberum, quod repetit utrum vini; si quod panis, Ceresem; si Aesculapium, quod herbarum; si Minervam, quod oleum; si Triptolemum, quod araui; si demique Herculem, quod feras, quod fures, quod multiplicium capitum superavit composuitque matricibus, divorum retulit in caum: honoribus quantis afficiendus est nobis, qui ab erroribus nos magnis inquinat vertate traduxit? &c.

Are these the gods, who are so much offended with Christ's being worshipped, and accounted a God by us? they, who being forgetful of their former condition, would not have the same bestowed upon another, which hath been granted to themselves? Is this the justice of the heavenly powers? this the righteous judgment of gods? or is it not rather base envy and covetousness, for them thus to ingrofs all to themselves? We worship indeed one, that was born a man: what then? do you worship no such? not one, and another, and innumerable? and are not almost all your gods such as were taken from out of the rank of men, and placed among the stars? and will you account that damnable in us, which yourselves practice? Let us for the present yield thus much to your infidelity, and grant, that Christ was but an ordinary man of the same rank and condition with other mortals; yet might we not for all that (according to your principles) think him worthy, by reason of the great benefits we received from him, to be accounted a God? For if you have advanced into the number of your Divi, Bacchus or Liber for inventing the use of vines, Ceres of corn, Aesculapius of herbs, Minerva of the olive, Triptolemus of the plow, and Hercules for subduing beasts, thieves, and monsters; with how great honours ought he to be affected by us, who by the infusion of divine truth hath delivered us from such great errors of mind? &c. Which argumentation of Arnobius, though it were good enough ad homines, to stop the mouths of the Pagans, there being more reason, that Christ should be made a god, for the benefits that mankind receive from him, than that Bacchus, or Ceres, or Hercules should be so; yet as the same Arnobius himself seems to intimate, it is not sufficient without something else superadded to it, for the justification of Christianity. Neither indeed was that the chief quarrel, which the Pagans had with the Christians, that they had defied one, who was crucified, (though the cross of Christ was also a great offence to them) but that they condemning the Pagans, for worshipping others besides the supreme omnipotent God, and decrying all those gods of theirs, did themselves notwithstanding worship one mortal man for a God. This

Lib. 8. p. 363:1

Celsus urges in Origem, si mun duxeritis alios iexcapitunos votis plius in Teum, non at eiusmod autis istos vivo in alios aititique vivi, non sit in te; ut vivi in te. Celsus takes this planetismus, ἕμοι ἐν πλημμαλίω νομίζουσι περί των θεών, εἰ ἐνδικέτι αὐτῷ εὐρεπόντις. If these Christians themselves worshipped no other but one God, or the pure divinity, then might they perhaps seem to have some just pretence of conferring us; but now they themselves give divine honour to one that lately rose up, and yet they persuade themselves, that they do not at all offend God in worshipping
that supposed minister of his. Which, as Origen makes there a reply to it, so shall it be further considered by us afterwards.

As for the judgment of the Fathers in this particular, Clemens Alexander was not only of this opinion, that the Pagans (at least the Greekish) did worship the true God, and the same God with the Christians, (though not after a right manner) but also endeavours to confirm it from the authority of St. Peter: That the Greeks knew God, Peter intimates in his 5:5.

predication. There is one God, faith he, who made the beginning of all things, and hath power over their end, &c. Worship this God, not as the Greeks. Wherein be feemeth to suppose the Greeks to worship the same God with us, though not according to the right tradition received by his Son. He does not enjoins us not to worship that God, which the Greeks worship, but to worship him otherwise than they do; altering only the manner of the worship, but not the object, or preaching another God. And what that is, not to worship God as the Greeks do, the same Peter intimated in these words; They worship him in images of wood and stone, brass and iron, gold and silver, and sacrifice to the dead also, as to gods. Where he adds further out of St. Peter's predication, Neither worship God as the Jews do, &c. The one and only God (faith Clemens) is worshipped by the Greeks paganically, by the Jews Judaically, but by us newly and spiritually. For the same God, who gave the two testaments to the Jews and Christians, gave philosophy to the Greeks, δ' ις ὁ πατοράτωρ παρ 'Ελλής: διδάσκεις, by which the omnipotent God is glorified among the Greeks.

La Stantius Firmianus also, in many places, affirms the Pagans to have De Ira Dei, acknowledged one supreme Deity; Summum Deum & philosophi & poetae, p. 727. & ipsi denique, qui deos colunt, sepe fereantur: That there is one supreme Deity, both philosophers and poets, and even the vulgar worshippers of the gods themselves, frequently acknowledge. From whence he concludes, that all the other Pagan gods were nothing but the ministers of this one supreme, and creatures made by him, (he then only blaming them for calling them gods, and giving them religious worship) Lib. 1. When he had declared, that it was altogether as absurd to suppose the world to be governed by many independent gods, as to suppose the body of a man to be governed by many minds or souls independent; he adds: Quod quia intelligunt ifi offerantes deorum, ita eos præesse singulis rebus ac partibus dicunt, ut tantum unus sit rector eximius. Jam ergo ceteri non dii erunt, sed satellites ad ministrum, quos ille unus, maximus & potens omnium, officis bis praebuit, ut ipsi ejus imperio & nutibus serviant. Si universi pares non sunt, non igitur dii euntes sunt. Nec enim potest boc idem esse, quod servit & quod dominatur. Nam si Deus est nomen summæ potestatis, incorruptibilis esse debet, perfecissimus, imparsissimus, nulli rei subiectus. Ergo dii non sunt, quos parere uni maximo Deo necessitas cogit. Which because the offerers of gods well understand, they affirm these gods of theirs so to preside over the several parts of the world, as that there is only one chief rector or governor. Whence it follows, that all their other gods can be no other thing than ministers and officers,
The Judgment of Fathers, concerning Book I.

officers, which one greatest God, who is omnipotent, hath variously appointed and constituted, so as to serve his command and beck. Now, if all the Pagan gods be not equal, then can they not be all gods; since that which rules, and that which serves, cannot be the same. God is a name of absolute power, and implies incorruptibility, perfection, impassibleness and subjection to nothing. Wherefore thefe ought not to be called gods, whom necessity compels to obey one greatest God. Again, in the fame book, Nunc faits est demonstrare, summo ingenio viros attigisse veritatem ac propé tenusiff; nisi eos certos animatam praevi opinionibus confuetudo rapuisset, qua & deos alios esse opinabantur, & ea, quae in umnum bononis Deus fecit, tanquam sensu præedita effent, pro diis babenda & coenda credeabant. It is now sufficient to have shown, that the more ingenious and intelligent Pagans came very near to the truth, and would have fully reached it, had not a certain customary infatuation of evil opinions snatched them away to an acknowledgment of other gods, and to a belief, that those things, which God made for the use of men, as ended with sense (or animated) ought to be accounted gods and worshipped; namely, the stars. And afterward, Quod fi cultores deorum eos ipsos se colere putant, quos summi Dei ministros appellantus, nihil est quod nebas facient invidiam, quin unum Deum dicamus, multos negemus. If the worshippers of the gods think, that they worship no other than the ministers of the one supreme God, then there is no cause, why they should render us as baseful, who say, that there is one God, and devy many gods.

Prop Evang. Ensebiius Cesaris et alius likewise gives us this account of the Pagans creed, or the tenor of their theology, as it was then held forth by them; τωι γαρ οἶδας οιδας, παλιοις διναμείς, τα πάλια πληροφ, ή ειτα πάνταν δικαιος, ή τοις πάλιν επι-
τεκίων ασκάτως δι' ε' πανος ει πάλιν θελα, ή ειτα πάλιν δικαιος: ή τοις αικά
τωι ειπνοικον εις ενως έις. The Pagans declare themselves in this manner, that there is one God, who with his various powers filleth all things, and paffeth through all things, and prefideth over all things; but being incorporeally and invisibly present in all things, and pervading them, be is reasonably wor-
shipped by or in those things, that are manifest and visible. Which passage of Ensebiius will be further considered afterward, when we come to give a more particular account of paganum.

What St. Austin's sense was concerning the theology of the Pagans, hath been already declared; namely, That they bad not so far degenerated as to have left the knowledge of one supreme God, from whom is all whatsoever nature; and that they derived all their gods from one. We shall now, in the last place, conclude with the judgment of Paulus Orosius, who was his contemporaries: Philofophi dun intento mentis studio quærunt scurranturque omnia, unum Deum autem omnium rererum, ad quem unum omnium referruntur; unde etiam nunc Pagni, quis jam declarata veritas de communaci magis quin de ignorantia convincit, cum a nebus discutientur, non se plures sequi, sed sub uno Deo magno, plures ministros venerari fatentur. Restat igitur de intelligendi veri Dei, per multas intelligendi suspiciones, confusa ciusque, quia de uno Deum omnium non una est opinio. The philofopher of the Gentiles, whilst

1 Lib. XX. contra Fainium Manich. Cap XIX. p. 246. Tom. VI Oper.
CHAP. IV. the Pagans Polytheists.

with intent study of mind they enquired and searched after things, found, that there was one God, the author of all things, and to which one all things should be referred. Whence also the Pagans at this very day, whom the declared truth rather convinceth of continuancy than of ignorance, when they are urged by us, confess themselves not to follow many gods, but only under one God to worship many ministers. So that there remaineth only a confused division concerning the manner of understanding the true God, because about one God there is almost one and the same opinion of all.

And by this time we think it is sufficiently evident, that the Pagans, (at least after Christianity) though they asserted many gods, they calling all understanding beings superior to men by that name, (according to that of St. Jeron, Deum quicquid supra se est, Gentiles putabant;) yet they acknowledged one supreme omnipotent, and only unmade Deity.

XVI. But because it's very possible, that some may still suspect all this to have been nothing else but a refinement and interpolation of Paganism, after that Christianity had appeared upon the stage; or a kind of manganization of it, to render it more vendible and plausible, the better able to defend itself, and bear up again the assaults of Christianity; whilst in the mean time the genuine doctrine of the ancient Pagans was far otherwise: although the contrary hereunto might sufficiently appear from what hath been already declared, yet however, for the fuller satisfaction of the more strongly prejudiced, we shall by an historical deduction made from the most ancient times all along downwards, demonstrate, that the doctrine of the greatest Pagan Polytheists, as well before Christianity as after it, was always the same, that besides their many gods, there was one supreme, omnipotent and only unmade Deity.

And this we shall perform, not as some have done, by laying the chief stress upon the Sibylline oracles, and those reputed writings of Hermes Trismegistus, the authority whereby hath been of late so much debited by learned men; nor yet upon such oracles of the Pagan deities, as may be suspected to have been counterfeited by Christians; but upon such monuments of Pagan antiquity, as are altogether unsuspected and in dubito. As for the Sibylline oracles, there may (as we conceive) be two extremes concerning them; one, in swallowing down all that is now extant under that title, as genuine and sincere, whereas nothing can be more manifest, than that there is much counterfeit and supposititious stuff in this Sibylline farrago, which now we have. From whence, besides other instances of the like kind, it appears too evidently to be denied, that some pretended Christians of former times have been for pious and religious frauds, and endeavoured to uphold the truth of Christianity by figments and forgeries of their own devising. Which, as it was a thing ignoble and unworthy in itself, and argued that those very defenders of Christianity did themselves distrust their own cause; so may it well be thought, that there was a policy of the devil in it also, there being no other more effectual way than this, to render all Christianity (at least in after-ages) to be suspected. Infomuch that

* Augudinus Eugubinus, Mutius Pana, and Martyr, in Orat. ad Græcos, & Eusebius in Praep. Evang. and others.

† These Oracles are produced by Julin.
that it might perhaps be questioned, whether the truth and divinity of Christianity appear more in having prevailed against the open force and opposition of its professed enemies, or in not being at last smothered and oppressed by these frauds and forgeries of its seeming friends and defenders. The other extreme may be, in concluding the whole bulkness of the Sibylline oracles (as any ways relating to Christianity) to have been a mere cheat and figment; and that there never was any thing in those Sibylline books, which were under the custody of the Quindecemviri, that did in the least predict our Saviour Christ, or the times of Christianity. For notwithstanding all that the learned Blondel hath written, it seems to be undeniably evident from Virgil's fourth Idyllyum, that the Cumean Sibyl was then supposed to have predicted a new flourishing kingdom or monarchy, together with a happy state of justice or righteousnes to succeed in the latter age of the world:

Ultima Cumei venit jam carminis atas,  
Magnus ab integro fectorum nascitur ordo.  
Jam reti & virgo, redunt Saturnia regna.  
Jam nova progenies calo delabitur alio, &c.

Moreover, it is certain, that in Cicero's time the Sibylline prophecies were interpreted by some in favour of Cæsar, as predicting a monarchy; Sibylla versus obercarnus, quos ulla fures fudide dicitur. Quorum interpres nuper falsa quodam bominum fama diffurus in senatu putatatur, eum, quem revera regem babebamus, appellandum quoque esse regem, fi falvi esse vellemus. We take notice of the verses of the Sibyl, which she is said to have uttered in a fury or prophetick frenzy, the interpreter whereof was lately thought to have been about to declare in the senate-house, that if we would be safe, we should acknowledge him for a king, who really was so. Which interpretation of the Sibyl's oracles (after Cæsar's death) Cicero was so much offended with, (he also looking upon a Roman monarchy, as a thing no less impossible than undesirable) that upon this occasion he quarrels with those very Sibylline oracles themselves, as well as the readers and expounders of them, after this manner; Hoc fi est in libris, in quem bovinum, & in quod tempus est? Callidæ enim, qui ulla compofuit, perfecti, ut, quodquum accidisset, predictum videreetur, bominum & temporum definitione sublatâ. Adhibuit etiam latebyram obscuritatis, ut idem versus aliis in aliem rem poffe accommodari videreatur. Non esse autem illud carmen furentis, tum ipsum poema declarat, (est enim magis artis & diligentiae quam incitatiouis & motus) tum vero ea quae ubi versus dicitur, cum deinceps ex primis versus literis aliquid connexitur. Quamobrem Sibyllam quidem fecositam & conditam babebamus, ut, id, quod predictum est à majoribus, inutile fententi ne legatur quidem libri. If there be any such thing contained in the Sibylline books, then we demand, concerning what man is it spoken, and of what time? For whoever framed those Sibylline verses, he fraudly contrived, that whatsoever should come to pass, might seem to have been predicted in them, by taking away all distinction of persons and times. He also purposely affected obscurity, that the

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3 In his Treatise of the Sibyl, printed in French at Paris 1649, in 4to.
the same verses might be accommodated sometime to one thing, and sometime to another. But that they proceeded not from fury and prophetick rage, but rather from art and contrivance, doth no less appear otherwise, than from the acrostick in them. Wherefore let us set up the Sibyl, and keep her close, that according to the decree of our ancestors, her verses may not be read without the express command of the senate. And lastly, he addeth, Cum autistitibus egamus, ut quidvis patius ex illis libris quam regem proferant, quem Rome poshab nec di nec homines esse patientur: Let us also deal with the Quindecimviri and interpreters of the Sibylline books, that they would rather produce any thing out of them, than a king, whom neither gods nor men will hereafter suffer at Rome. Where, though Cicero were mistaken as to the event of the Roman government, and there were doubtless some predictions in these Sibylline books of a new kingdom or monarchy to be set up in the world; yet that the Roman empire was not the thing intended in them, doth manifestly appear from that description in Virgil's forementioned eclogue; wherein there is accordingly another completion of them expected, though flattering applied to Solomon. Wherefore we conclude, that the kingdom, and happy state, or golden age, predicted in the Sibylline oracles, was no other than that of the Messiah, or our Saviour Christ, and the times of Christianity. Lastly, in that other passage of Cicero's, concerning the Sibylline oracles; Valeant ad deponendas patius quum ad suscipiendas religiones; let them be made use of rather for the extinguishing, than the begetting of religions and superstitions; there seems to be an intimation, as if, of themselves, they rather tended to the lessening than increasing of the pagan superstitions; and therefore may probably be thought to have predicted a change of that pagan religion, by the worship of one sole Deity to be introduced. Neither ought it to seem a jot more strange, that our Saviour Christ should be foretold by the pagan Sibyl, than that he was so clearly predicted by Balaam the Aramitick forcer. However, those things in the Sibylline verses might have been derived, some way or other, from the Scripture-prophecies; which there is indeed the more probability of, because that Sibylline prophet made use of those very same figures and allegories in describing the future happy state, that are found in the Scripture. As for example:

1 Nec magnos metuent armenta leones;
    Occidet & serpens, &c.

Now, as Cicero seems to complain, that in his time these Sibylline oracles were too much exposed to view, so is it very probable, that notwithstanding they were to be kept under the guard of the Quindecimviri, yet many of them might be copied out, and get abroad; and thereby an occasion be offered to the ignorantly zealous Christians, who were for officious liyes and pious frauds, to add a great deal more of their own forgery to them. Neither indeed is it imaginable, how any such cheat as this should either at first have been attempted, or afterwards have proved successful, had there not been some foundation of truth to support and countenance it. Besides which it is observable, that Celsus, who would have had the Christians rather to have made the Sibyl than

than our Saviour Christ a God; taking notice of their using of those Sibylline testimonies against the Pagans, did not tax them for counterfeiting the whole buffet of those Sibylline oracles, but only for infecting many things

* In Phocicis, Lib. X. Cap. IX. p. 820.  
Besides these Sibylline prophecies, there are also other oracles of the pagan deities themselves, in which there was a clear acknowledgment of one supreme and greatest God. But as for such of them, as are said to have been delivered since the times of Christianity, when the pagan oracles began to fail, and such as are now extant only in Christian writings, however divers of them are cited out of Porphyry's book of oracles; because they may be suspected, we shall not here mention any of them. Nevertheless, we shall take notice of one oracle of the Clarian Apollo, that is recorded by Macrobius 1, in which one supreme Deity is not only asserted, but is also called by that Hebrew name (or Tetragrammaton) Jao:

Φήσι ου τοις πάσιν ουλαος ους ημας λαο.

*You are to call the highest and supreme of all the gods, Jao:* though it be very true, that that Clarian devil there cunningly endeavoured to divert this to the sun, as if that were the only supreme Deity and true Jao. To which might be added another ancient oracle (that now occurs) of the Dodonean Jupiter 2, together with the interpretation of Themistocles, to whom it was delivered; wherein he was commanded προς τοις εμαθευμ της εις βασιλευν, to repair to him, who was called by the same name with God; which Themistocles apprehended to be the king of Persia, μεγαλος γαρ αμφοτερου ειης τι εκ λεγεσα, because both he and God were alike called (though in different respects and degrees) the great king or monarch.

But as for those writings, commonly imputed to Hermes Trismegist, that have been generally condemned by the learned of this latter age, as wholly counterfeit and supposititious, and yet on the contrary are asserted by Albinus Kircherus 3 for sincere and genuine; we shall have occasion to declare our senec concerning them more opportunely afterward.

The most ancient theologers, and most eminent assertors of polytheism amongst the Pagans, were Zoroaster in the eastern parts, and Orpheus amongst the Greeks. The former of which was of so great antiquity, that writers cannot well agree about his age. But that he was a Polytheist is acknowledged by all, some affirming it to be signified in his very name, as given him after his death; it being interpreted by them a worshipper of the stars 4; Neither is it to be doubted, but that Ster or Ester in the Persian language, did signify a star, as it hath been observed also by learned men concerning sundry other words, now familiar in these European languages, that they derived their original from the Persian. Notwithstanding which, it may be suspected, that this was here but a Greek termination; the word being not only in the oriental languages written Zertoos and Zaradaft, but also in Agathias, Zarades. However, Zoroaster's polytheism is intimated by Plato 5; where his magick is defined to have been nothing else but θεου θρησκευ, the worship

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1 Saturnal. Lib. I. Cap. XVIII. p. 299.
3 In Oedipo Ægyptiaco, & Obelisco Pamphilio, p. 35.
4 Thus it was explained by Dion and Hieromorus, as we are informed by Laertius in his proem. fragm. 8. p. 6. of which opinion is likewise Scaliger, with others of the moderns.
5 In Alcibiade I. Oper. p. 32.
Zoroaster, an Asserter. Book I.

worship of the gods. Whence taken by the way we learn also, that the word magick, or magick, was first taken in a good sense, which is confirmed by Porphyry, p. 166. Amongst the Persians, those, who were skilful in the knowledge of the Deity, and religious worshippers of the same, were called Magi. And as magick is commonly conceived to be founded in a certain vital sympathy that is in the universe, so did these ancient Persian Magi and Chaldeans (as Ptolus tells us) suppose sympathis inum to αυτος κατω, that there was a sympathy betwixt the superior and inferior beings; but it seems the only way at first by them approved, of attracting the influence and assistance of those superior invisible powers, was by piety, devotion, and religious rites. Nevertheless, their devotion was not carried out only to one omnipotent God, but also to many gods; neither is it to be questioned but that this divine magick of Zoroaster shortly after degenerated in many of his followers into the theurgical magick, and at length into phleia, downright sorcery and witchcraft; the only thing, which is now vulgarly called magick. But how many gods ever this Zoroaster worshipped, that he acknowledged notwithstanding one supreme Deity, appeareth from the testimony of Eubulus, cited by Porphyry in his De Antro Nympbarum, πέτας μη, ἀς ἐνενεκαλός, Ζωράφτερ τευτονικής σπηλαιος εν τοις πλαγίων ὑπέτης τις Περσίδος, αὐτοῦ χρυσός τε πυγίς ξέων αισχράσυνης, εἰς τοὺς τὸ πώτων ποιημα τοῦ πατέρα Μίθρας, εἰκόνα Φεοτομος κατὰ τα σπηλαίω το κόσμου, ἐν ο Μίθρας ἐξομήγευσεν. Zoroaster first of all, as Eubulus testifieth, in the mountains adjoining to Persis, consecrated a native orbicular cave, adorned with flowers, and watered with fountains, to the honour of Mithras, the maker and father of all things; this cave being an image or symbol to him of the whole world, which was made by Mithras. Which testimony of Eubulus is the more to be valued, because, as Porphyry elsewhere informs us, he wrote the history of Mithras at large in many books, from whence it may be presumed, that he had thoroughly furnished himself with the knowledge of what belonged to the Persian religion. Wherefore, from the authority of Eubulus, we may well conclude also, that notwithstanding the fun was generally worshipped by the Persians as a God, yet Zoroaster, and the ancient Magi, who were both initiated in the Mithraick mysteries, asserted another Deity, superior to the fun, for the true Mithras, such as was πατέρας πατής καὶ πατής, the maker and father of all things, or of the whole world, whereof the fun is a part. However, these also looked upon the fun as the most lively image of this Deity, in which it was worshipped by them; as they likewise worshipped the same Deity symbolically in fire, as Maximus Tyrirus informeth us; agreeable to which is that in the magick oracles, πώτα πυρός ἐν ἔκκοιμετα.

All things are the off-spring of one fire; that is, of one supreme Deity. And Julian the emperor was such a devout fun-worshipper as this, who acknowledged, besides the fun, another incorporeal Deity, transcendent to it. Nevertheless, we deny not, but that others amongst the Persians, who were...
not able to conceive of any thing incorporeal, might, as well as Heraclitus, Hippocrates, and the Stoics amongst the Greeks, look upon the firy substance of the whole world (and especially the sun) as animated and intellectual, to be the supreme Deity, and the only Mithras, according to that inscription 1, Deo Soli Invidia Mithrae. However, Mithras, whether supposed to be corporeal or incorporeal, was unquestionably taken by the Persians for the supreme Deity, according to that of Hesychius. Mithras, the first God among the Persians; who was therefore called in the inscription 2 Omnipotent, Omnipotenti Deo Mithrae. Which first, supreme and omnipotent God was acknowledged by Artaeanus the Persian, in his conference with Themisfocles, in these words; ἥμιν δὲ πᾶλλων Plut.Themis., νόμων καί καλῶν θυσίων, κάλλιστος θάτος ἐστὶ τὸ τιμῶν βασιλεία, κύριος προσκυνῶν εὐνουχία τοῦ τινὸς θεοῦ τὸν πάνταλα σοι. 3 Amongst these many excellent laws of ours, the most excellent is this, that the king is to be honoured and worshipp'd religiously, as the image of that God, which conferreth all things. Scaliger 4 with some others (though we know not upon what certain grounds) affirm, that Mithra in the Persian Language signified great, and Mithra, greater or greatest; according to which, Mithras would be all one with Deus major or maximus 5, the greatest God. Wherefore we conclude, that either Herodotus was mistaken, in making the Persian Mithras the same with Mylitta or Venus, (and perhaps such a mistake might be occasion'd from hence, because the word Mader or Mether in the Persian Language signified Mother, as Mylitta in the Syriam did 6;) or else rather, that this Venus of his is to be understood of the Genitrix Ἀρχαίας ἐγγονιν, the heavenly Venus or Love; and thus indeed is she the one called in Herodotus, Urania; by which though some would understand nothing else but the moon, yet we conceive the supreme Deity, true heavenly Love (the mother and nurse of all things) to have been primarily signified therein.

But Zoroaster and the ancient Magi are said to have called the supreme God also by another name, viz. Oromasdes or Ormifidas; however Oromasdes, according to Plato 7, seems to have been the father of Zoroaster. Thus, besides Plutarch and others, Porphyry, in the life of Pythagoras, παρακήνει P. 191, μᾶλα μᾶλα ἀληθεύατο, τοῦ ταχα μάνοι δυσαξιού οἰκεῖοι αἰήμονες ποιεῖ θείω περαπλεύσεις. [P. 41. Edit. Calvus.] ἐπεὶ γὰρ παρά τῷ Ζωρασδῆ, ὥσπερ τὰς Μάκριν ἐπιθεωχίας, ὧν Μεροδάκτων καλωθεὶς ἐκεῖνος, ἑικόνια τὸ μιὰ σὺνα Φαν. τῷ τί θυγατὴν ἀληθεύατο. Which we would understand thus: Pythagoras exhorted men chiefly to the love of truth, as being that alone, which could make them resemble God, by being learned from the Magi, that God, whom they call Oromasdes, was as to corporeals most like to light, and as to incorporeals to truth. Though perhaps some would interpret these words otherwise, so as to signify Oromasdes to have been really compounded of soul and body, and therefore nothing else but the animated sun, as Mithras is commonly supposed also to have been. But the contrary hereunto is plainly implied in those Zoroastrian traditions or fables concerning Oromasdes, recorded in Plutarch 8, ὅτι ἀνίπτοικεν τῇ ἥλιου πολτῷτον, ὅτι θος ἢ ἀλατὴ τῆς γῆς ἀφίεται, that Oromasdes was as far removed from the sun, as the sun was from

1 Vide Anton. Van Dale Diflert. IX. ad Antiquit. & Marmor. p. 119.
2 Apud Gruter. Theofar. Inerip. p. 34. n. 5.
3 De Emendat. Temporirum, Lib. VI. Cap.
from the earth. Wherefore Oromafdes was, according to the Persians, a Deity superior to the sun; God properly as the fountain of light and original of good, and the same with Plato's as or first good. From whom the Persians, as Scaliger informs us, called the first day of every month Oromada, probably because he was the beginning of all things. And thus Zoroaster and the ancient Magi acknowledged one and the same supreme Deity, under the different names of Mithras and Oromafdes.

But it is here observable, that the Persian Mithras was commonly called Τριπλαζίος, threefold or treble. Thus Dionysius, the Pseudo-Areopagite, ἥν' εὐστή Μάγοι τὰ μυστήρια τῳ Τριπλαζίῳ Μίθρᾳ τελέον. The Persian Magi to this very day celebrate a festival solemnity in honour of the Triplasian (that is, the threefold or triplicated) Mithras. And something very like this to this is recorded in Plutarch concerning Oromafdes also, ὅ μεν Ορωμαζίῃ τίγε Εικότω νείκος, Oromafdes thrice augmented or triplicated himself; from whence it further appears, that Mithras and Oromafdes were really one and the same Name. Now the Scholiasts upon Dionysius pretend to give a reason of this denomination of the Persian Mithras, Triplasian, or threefold, from the miracle done in Hezekiah's time, when the day was increased, and almost triplicated; as if the Magi then observing the same had thereupon given the name of Τριπλαζίος, or threefold, to their god Mithras, that is, the sun, and appointed an anniversary solemnity for a memorial thereof. But learned men have already shewed the foolery of this conceit; and therefore it cannot well be otherwise concluded, but that here is a manifest indication of a higher mystery, viz. a Trinity in the Persian theology; which Gerardus I. Vossius would willingly understand, according to the Christian hypothesis, of a divine Triunity, or three hypostases in one and the same Deity, whose distinct characters are goodness, wisdom, and power. But the magical or Zoroastrian oracles seem to represent this Persian trinity more agreeably to that Pythagoric or Platonick hypothesis, of three distinct substances subordinate one to another, to the two first whereof are thus expressed in the following verses⁺;

Πάντα γὰρ ἥτιτληκε πάλη, μὴ νῦ παράδοχεν
Δεντέρου, ὅ πρῶτον κληίζεται θεόν αὐνόμου.

To this sense: The Father, or first Deity, perfected all things, and delivered them to the second Mind, who is that, whom the nations of men commonly take for the first. Which oracle Pселlus,itus glosseth upon; τὴν πάνταν οὕτων ὑπομε-γίσας ἐν τῷ τριάδος πρῶτος παρέδοθεν, παράδοκεν ταῖτην τῷ νῦν ὄντων ἡν τῷ ξύμπλον γίνος τῶν αὐνόμου, ἀγγέλλων τῶν πατρικῶν ὑπερέχουν παρίτης. Εἷς πρῶτον καλόστ. The first Father of the Trinity having produced this whole creation, delivered it to Mind or Intellefä; which Mind, the whole generation of mankind, being ignorant of the paternal transcendency, commonly call the first God. After which, Pселlus takes notice of the difference here betwixt this Magical or Chaldaick Theology, and that

⁺ Epiflo. VII. ad Polycarpum, p. 91. Tom. II. Oper. ² De Iside & Osride, p. 370. Tom. II. Oper. ³ De Orig. & Progressa Idololat. Lib. II. Cap. IX. p. 131. ⁴ In Oraculis Zoroaftii adscriptis, Sect. II; verf. 27, 28. apud Stanley, ubi supra. ⁵ He and PIsito wore Commentaries on the Oracles of Zoroaster.
that of Christians: Plinius, Sec. 2:6: "Wherefore, which is the meaning of the high place in the world."

Chap. IV. The Magick and Chaldaick Trinity.

But besides these two hypostases, there is also a third mentioned in a certain other Magick or Chaldaick oracle, cited by Proclus, under the name of Psyche, or the mundane soul;

Metis de Patroclus: Atuxia,

After (or next below) the paternal Mind, I Psyche dwell. Now the paternal Mind, as Ptolemy informs us, is the second hypostasis before mentioned, 

Ø. πατέρας υμῶν, ο γὰρ πατέρα ἁπάντως ἐξετάζεται, τὸ νοστή διδάχθη εὖ χά (ταῦτα γὰρ ἤτι τὸ εὑρήθη, τὸν τιτικελεχρίεν τῇ τῇ τίτλῃ) γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἰδιοτοῦ διαφέρεται, ἔρχεν ἐκδύοντος γὰρ ἑγεῖλαι αὐτῶν, &c. The Father perfected all things, that is, the intelligible ideas (for these are those things, which are complete and perfect) and delivered them to the second God, to rule over them. Wherefore whatsoever is produced by this God, according to its own exemplar and the intelligible essence, must needs owe its original also to the highest Father. Which second God the generations of men commonly take for the first, they looking up no higher than to the immediate architect of the world. According to which interpretation of Ptolemy's (the more probable of the two) the second hypostasis in the Magick (or Persian) Trinity, as well as in the Platonick and Christian, is the immediate opifex or architect of the world; and this seems to be properly that, which was called Mithras in Eubulus.

De Iride & Osir, p. 370.
called the Father; the lowest to Arimanus; and the middle to Mithras, who in the same oracles is likewise called the second Mind. Whereupon he observes, how great an agreement there was betwixt the Zoroastrian and the Platonick Trinity, they differing in a manner only in words. And the middle of these, namely, the eternal Intellect, that contains the ideas of all things, being, according to the Platonick hypothesis, the immediate θεομορφός and architect of the world, this probably was that Mithras, as we have already intimated, who is called in Eubulus, the Demiurgus of the world, and the maker and father of all things. Now, if that third hypothesis of the Magick or Chaldæick oracles be the same with that which the Persians call Arimanus, then must it be upon such an account as this, because this lower world (wherein are souls vitally united to bodies, and lapsable) is the region, where all manner of evils, wickedness, pains, corruption and mortality reign. And herewith Hebesbius seemeth to agree: Ἀριμάνης (faith he) ὁ Ἀιων παρὰ Πέρσαις, Arimanus among the Persians is Hades, that is, either Orcus or Pluto; wherein he did but follow Theopompos, who in Plutarch calls Arimanus likewise Hades or Pluto: which it seems was as well the third in the Persian trinity (or Triplasian Deity) as it was in the Homeric. And this was that Arimanus, whom the Persian king in Plutarch, upon Themis hæc e his flight, addressed his devotion to;

In vit. Them. κατεξάκλητους αἰς τοῖς πολεμίσις, τοῖς πειραμασίς φιλοφίλοις τῶν Ἀριμάννων, ἄριστος ἡλικίας τῶν αἰτίων, be prayed, that Arimanus would always give such a mind to his enemies, as thus to banish and drive away their best men from them. And indeed from that which Plutarch affirms, διὰ τὴν Μέθραν Πέρσαι τὸν Μίθραν Ὀνομάζετο, that the Persians from their God Mithras, called any mediator, or middle betwixt two, Mithras; it may be more reasonably concluded, that Mithras, according to the Persian theology, was properly the middle hypothesis of that triplasian or triplicated Deity of theirs, than that he should be a middle self-existent god or mediator betwixt two adversarial gods unmade, one good, and the other evil, as Plutarch would suppose.

Notwithstanding which, if that, which the same Plutarch and others do so confidently affirm, should be true, that Zoroaster and the ancient Magi made good and evil, light and darkness, the two substantial principles of the universe; that is, asserted an evil daemon co-eternal with God, and independent on him, in the very same manner that Plutarch himself and the Manicheans afterward did; yet however it is plain, that in this way also Zoroaster and the Magi acknowledged one only fountain and original of all good, and nothing to be independent upon that one good principle or God, but only that, which is so contrary to his nature and perfection, as that it could not proceed from him, namely, evil. But we have already discovered a suspicion, that the meaning of those ancient Magi might possibly be otherwise; they philosophizing only concerning a certain mixture of evil and darkness, together with good and light, that was in the composition of this lower world, and perforating the same; as also perhaps taking notice especially therein of evil daemons (who are acknowledged likewise in the Magick oracles, and called Χείρων θυσίας, beasts of the earth, and χοιροι κυρίς, terrestrial dogs;) the head of which might be sometimes called also emphatically ὁ πονητός δαιμόν Περσῶν, the evil demon of the Persians, as being the very same.
fame with the devil: all which was under the immediate presidency or government of that God, called by them Arimanius, Hades or Pluto, the third hypostasis in the Triplalian Deity of the Persians. Which supposition may be yet further confirmed from hence, because the Persian Theologers, as appears by the inscriptions, expressly acknowledged the divine omnipotence, which they could not possibly have done, had they admitted of a Manichean substantial evil principle, coeternal with God, and independent on him. Besides which it is observable, that whereas the Gnosticks in Plotinus's time asserted this world to have been made, not so much from a principle essentially evil and eternal, as from a lapsed soul, to weigh down the authority of Plato, and this in the other scale, producing a book entitled, ἄριστοι Συγγραμματεῖς Ζωραβίτδες, or the Revelations of Zoroaster, Porphyryus tells us 1, that himself wrote purposely to disprove those Zoroastrian Revelations, as new and counterfeit, and forged by those Gnosticks themselves; therein implying also the doctrine of the ancient Zoroaster no way to have countenanced or favoured that Gnostick hereby. Moreover, the tenets of these ancient Magi, concerning that duplicity of principles, are by writers represented with great variety and uncertainty. That account, which Theodorus in Plotius 2 (treating of the Persian magic) gives thereof, as also that other of Eudemus in Damascius 3, are both of them so noncenchal, that we shall not here trouble the reader with them; however, neither of them suppose the Persian Arimanius, or Satanas, to be an unmade self-existing daemon. But the Arabians, writing of this Altanasia, or Persian duplicity of good and evil principles, affirm, that according to the most approved Magi, light was Kadianan, the most ancient and first God, and that darkness was but a created God; they expressly denying the principle of evil and darkness to be coeeternal with God, or the principle of good and light. And Apulæa represents the Zoroastrian doctrine (as the doctrine of the Magi reformed) after this manner; That Porock Spec. God was older than darkness and light, and the creator of them, so that he was High, Ar. p. a solitary being, without companion or rival; and that good and evil, vir. 146, 147, the and vice, did arise from a certain commixture of light and darkness together, 148, ther, without which this lower world could never have been produced; which mixture was still to continue in it, till at length light should overcome darkness: and then light and darkness shall each of them have their separate and distinct worlds, apart from one another.

If it were now needful, we might still make it further evident, that Zoroaster, notwithstanding the multiplicity of gods worshipped by him, was an affirer of one supreme, from his own description of God, extant in Euseb. Θεός ἐστιν οἱ παλαιοὶ θεός θεὸς θεοῦ, αἰθέρι, αἰνετικεῖα, αἱματικαῖ, αἰματοικότερα, ἑιρήνα Prop. Ev. 1. παλαιὰ καλὰ, ἀδυναμίτερα, αὐστροποτε, ἀρετοὶ ἀρετοτετερα, Φιλομίνα Φιλομένατοι, ἐπὶ δὲ καὶ Τ. παντὶ ἐναίοτα, ἐκκοιμητέρα, ἀνατολικεῖς, τιλικοῖς, ζείσας ὑποκειμένος ὑποκειμένος τε. God is [Cap.X. p. 42] the first incorruptible, eternal, unmade, indivisible, most unlike to every thing, 42] the head or leader of all good, unbribable, the best of the good, the wisest of the wise; he is also the father of law and justice; self-taught, perfect, and

1 In Vitæ Plotini Cap. XVI. p. 119. Edit. Fabrici. 3 περὶ τῶν πλατων ἀκρόπολις, a work never yet printed.

2 Biblioth. Cod. LXXXI. p. 199.
the only inventor of the natural holy. Which Eusebius tells us, that this Zoroastrian description of God was contained verbatim in a book entitled, A holy collection of the Persian monuments; as also that Oftanes (himself a famous magician, and admirer of Zoroaster) had recorded the very fame of him in his Ostatenon.

Now we having, in this discourse concerning Zoroaster and the Magi, cited the oracles, called by some magical, and imputed to Zoroaster, but by others Chaldaical; we conceive it not improper to give some account of them here. And indeed if there could be any assurance of the antiquity and fincerity of those reputed oracles, there would then need no other testimony to prove, that either Zoroaster and the Persian Magi, or else at least the Chaldeans, affected not only a divine monarchy, or one supreme Deity the original of all things, but also a trinity consistently with the same.

And it is certain, that those oracles are not such novel things as some would suspect; they being cited by Synesius, as then venerable, and of great authority, under the name of μηδέν λόγια, holy oracles; and there being, of this number, some produced by him, that are not to be found in the copies of Psellos and Pletho; from whence it may be concluded, that we have only some fragments of these oracles now left. And that they were not forged by Christians, as some of the Sibylline oracles undoubtedly were, seems probable from hence, because so many Pagan philosophers make use of their testimonies, laying no small stress upon them; as for example Damascius, out of whom Patritius hath made a considerable collection of such of these oracles as arc wanting in Psellos and Pletho's copies. And we learn from Photius, that whereas Hierocles his book of fate and providence was divided into seven parts, the drift of the fourth of them was this, τα ἐργάματα λόγια, εἰς εὐμφανίαν συνάρμα, οἱ Πλάτων ἐνομάτειας, to reconcile the reputed oracles with Plato's doctrines. Where it is not to be doubted, but that those reputed oracles of Hierocles were the same with these Magick or Chaldaick oracles; because these are frequently cited by philosophers under that name of λόγια or oracles. Proclus upon the Timeus, ὑπὸ τὸ Πλάτωνος, ἀρχῶν τῆς λόγια, ποιήσας ὑποτελεῖ τὰ παρεῖν, πατρὸς υἱῶν τὸ παῖς τοῦ πάτερ, Προκλήσις τοῦ τιμητικοῦ τοῦ φιλόσοφου τοῦ σημείου τῶν θεών, ὑποτελεῖ τοῦ πατρὸς τῆς γενετουροῦ θεοῦ. The maker of the universe is celebrated both by Plato, and Orpheus, and the oracles, as the father of gods and men, who both produceth multitudes of gods, and sends down souls for the generations of men. And as there are other fragments of these cited by Proclus elsewhere under the name of λόγια or oracles, so doth he sometimes give them that higher title of θεοπαραξένης λόγια, and μυστικαῖα, the theology that was of divine tradition or revelation. Which magnificent encomium was bestowed in like manner upon Pythagoras his philosophy by Jasonichus, that being thought to have been derived in great part from the Chaldeans and the Magi; in θεοπαραξένης λόγιας τὸ ναταιραξίας. This philosophy of Pythagoras having been first divinely delivered, or revealed by the gods, ought not to be handled by us without a religious invocation of them. And that Porphyrius was not acquainted with these oracles neither,

1 De Infor. 2 Biblioth. Cod. CCXLV. p. 553.

Chap. IV.

or Chaldaick Oracles.

293

neither, may be concluded from that book of his, intitled, τις ἐκ λα-

γιῶν Φιλοσοφίας, concerning the philosophy from oracles; which con- 

sisting of more parts, one of them was called, τας τῶν Χαλδαίων λόγων, the oracles of the 

Chaldeans: which, that they were the very same with those we now speak of, 

shall be further proved afterward. Now, though Pselus affirms, that 

the Chaldean dogmata contained in those oracles were some of them ad-

mitted both by Aristotle and Plato; yet does he not pretend these very 

Greek verfes themselves to have been so ancient. But it seems probable 

from Suidas, that Julian a Chaldean and Theurgist, the son of Julian a 

philosopher, (who wrote concerning Dæmons and Teleurgicks) was the 

first, that turned those Chalde or Magic oracles into Greek verfe: 'Ἰουλιου, 

ἐπὶ Μάρκη ποίημα τοῦ ἐμπειροῦ, ἐρασίνι Θεάρμα, τελησίκα, λόγια ὑπὲ ἰπών. 

Julian, in the time of Marcus Antonius the emperor, wrote the theurgic and 
}

theurgick oracles in verse. For that there is somthing of the theurgical ma-

gick mixed together with mystical theology in these oracles, is a thing so 

manifest from that operation about the Hecatine circle, and other passages 

in them, that it cannot be denied; which renders it still more unlikely 

that they should have been forged by Christians. Nevertheless, they carry 

along with them (as hath been already observed) a clear acknowledgment 

d of a divine monarch, or one supreme Deity, the original of all things; 

which is called in them the father, and the paternal principle, and that int-

telligible, μοὸ ἐστὶ σε νοεῖν ὑδείαν, that cannot be apprehended otherwise than by 

the flower of the mind; as also that one fire, from whence all things spring: 

Pselus, thus glossing upon that oracle, all things were the off-spring of one 

fire, πάντα τὸ θετημένα τοιαῦτα, καὶ αἰσθητός, ἀνάμονα ἔστι τὴν ὑπό- 

κελευθεροποίησιν, καὶ πρὸς μόνον Ἐδώρ εἰς ἔκπληκτος, δ. α. ἐκ 

λόγων, ὡς πληθες τὸ θετημένον ὑδά-

μαρτίων. All things, whether intelligible or sensible, receive their 

essence from God alone, and return back again only to him; so that this oracle is irrepre-

ensible, and full of our doctrine. And it is very observable, that these very 

same oracles expressly determined also that matter was not ἀγάλματι, unmade 

or self-existent, but derived in like manner from the Deity. Which we 

learn from Proclus upon Plato's Timeus, where, when he had positively 

asserted, that there is ὃ πάντων αἰτία, one thing the cause of all things; and 

τάγαθος πάντων αἰτίου ὄν, ὃν ὡς ὁ ἡλίος αἰτίον, that the supreme good, being the 

cause of all things, is also the cause of matter: he confirms this assertion of 
his from the authority of the oracles, ἀνάμονα τὸ τῆς τάξεως ὧν τὸ λόγῳ πα-

Ραγ. 116, ἐγένετο τὸν πολυποίκιλον ὕλην, ἐνθείνα δὴ χρήμα λεκτίσθη 

tοποικίλα ὑλῆς. From this order also do the oracles deduce the generation of the matter, in these words; 

from whence (that is, from one supreme Deity) altogether proceeds the genesis 
of the multivariogt matter. Which unquestionably was one of those very 

Magic or Chalde oracles; and it may be further proved from hence, be-

cause it was by Porphyrius set down amongst them, as appears from 

Anonymous Gaseus in his Theophrasles: οὗ γὰρ ἀγάλματι ἐνθείνα δὴ ἀπεκτίον 

ἀλλ' ὑλῆ, τὸν ἑαυτὸν ἔθνος Ἐαρέας καὶ ἔτοι τόθε ἡ τοῦ 

Χαλδαίων ὑδάτων, ὃς ὁ Πορφύριος ἐπικρατέσθη ἀκαθόριστον ὁ εἷς μείζων 

πρόξυνης, τῶν Χαλδαίων τὰ λόγια, ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ προκύπτων. Neither was matter void 

of generation or beginning, which the Chaldeans and Porphyrius teach thee; he 

making

The History of Orpheus

Book I.

Making this the title of a whole book published by him, *The Oracles of the Chaldeans; in which it is confirmed that matter was made.*

Moreover, that there was also in these Magick or Chaldee oracles a clear signification of a divine triad, hath been already declared. But we shall here produce Proclus 1 his testimony for it too; *οἳ τίνι ἱκάνω ἐν Τιμαύνῳ δια τὸν Τριαντάριον, ἐκ τῶν τῶν Τριών λόγων ἦν ὁ θεὸς πρώτος τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς θεομάχους τὸ παντελῶν.* Thus the divinely delivered (or inspired) theology affirmeth the whole world to have been completed from these three: Pylche, or the mundane soul, therein speaking concerning that Zeus or Jupiter, who was above the maker of the world, in this manner, &c. For we have already declared, that Proclus his *Συναγάγον ἡ Συναγωγία, his theology of divine tradition or revelation, is one and the same thing with the λόγια, or oracles. To which testimony of Proclus we might also superadd that oracle cited out of Damascius by Patrisius;

παντὸς γὰρ ἐν κόσμῳ λόγιμος Θεῖας, ἂς Μοίρας Άρχων.

In the whole world sitheth forth a triad or trinity, the head whereof is a sund or perfect unity; than which nothing can be plainer.

XVII. And now we pass out of Asia into Europe, from Zoroaster to Orpheus. It is the opinion of some eminent philologers of latter times, that there never was any such man as Orpheus, but only in Fairy-land; and that the whole history of Orpheus was nothing but a mere romantick allegory, utterly devoid of all truth and reality. But there is nothing alleged for this opinion from antiquity, save only this one passage of Cicero’s concerning *Aristotle*; Orpheum poetan doci Aristoteles nuncuam susce, Aristotile teacheb, that there never was any such man as Orpheus the poet: in which notwithstanding Aristotle seems to have meant no more than this, that there was no such poet as Orpheus senior to Homer, or that the verses vulgarly called Orphical were not written by Orpheus. However, if it should be granted, that Aristotle had denied the existence of such a man, there seems to be no reason at all, why his single testimony should here preponderate against that universal consent of all antiquity, which is for one Orpheus the son of Oeager, by birth a Thracian, the father or chief founder of the mythical and allegorical theology among the Greeks, and of all their most arcane religious rites and mysteries; who is commonly supposed to have lived before the Trojan war, (that is, in the time of the Israelish judges) or at least to have been senior both to Hesiod and Homer; and also to have died a violent death, most affirming him to have been torn in pieces by women. For which cause, in that vision of *Horus Panthylus* in Plato, Orpheus his soul being come down again into another body, is said to have chosen rather that of a swan (a reputed musical animal) than to be born again of a woman, by reason of that great hatred, which he had conceived of all woman-kind, for his suffering such a violent death from them. And the historical truth of Orpheus was not only acknowledged by Plato, but also by *Ictocrates*, senior to Aristotle likewise (in his oration in the praise of Bystris;)

1 Comment. in Timaxum Plat. p. 116. 2 P. 452.
and confirmed by that sober histriographer Diodorus Siculus, giving this account of Orpheus, That he was a man, who diligently applied himself to literature, and having learned the mysteries, or the mythical part of theology, travelled into Egypt, where he attain'd to further knowledge, and became the greatest of all the Greeks in the mystical rites of religion, theological skill, and poetry. To which Pausenius addeth, that he gained great authority, as being believed to have found out expiations for wicked actions, remedies for disaffections, and appeasements of the divine displeasure. Neither was this history of Orpheus contradicted by Origen, when Celsus gave him so strong a provocation to do it, by his preferring Orpheus before our Saviour Christ. To all which may be added, in the last place, that it is commonly concluded from the Greek word Ἑσθημα, that the Greeks derived their Telete and mysteries of religion from the Thracians, it is not so reasonable to think with the learned Vossius, that Xamolxis was the founder of them, (and not Orpheus) this Xamolxis being by most reported to have been Pythagoras his servant, and consequently too much a Junior; and though Herodotus attribute more antiquity to him, yet did he conceive him to have been no other than a daemon, who appearing to the Thracians, was worshipped by them; whereas in the mean time, the general tradition of the Greeks derived the Thracian religious rites and mysteries from Orpheus and no other, according to this of Suidas: Ἑλληνικώς ὁ Ὀρφεὺς ὁ Ὁρθός, πρῶτος ἐν τῇ Ἑλληνικῇ μυθολογίᾳ, καὶ τὸ τιμώμα τῆς Θεολογίας ἡ εἰκόνα τῆς ὑγίειας. It is commonly said, that Orpheus the Thracian was the first inventor of the religious mysteries of the Greeks, and that religion was from hence called Threskeia, as being a Thracian invention. Wherefore though it may well be granted, that by reason of Orpheus his great antiquity, there have been many fabulous and romantick things intermingled with this history; yet there appears no reason at all, why we should disbelieve the existence of such a man.

But though there were such a man as Orpheus, yet may it very well be question’d for all that, whether any of those poems, commonly entituled to him, and called Orphical, were so ancient, and indeed written by him, and this the rather, because Herodotus declares it as his own opinion, that Hesiod and Homer were the ancientest of all the Greek poets, οἵ δὲ πρῶτοι ποιηταὶ λεγόμενοι τῶν ὑμνῶν γενόμενοι οὕτως τουργείτω, and that those other poets, [Cap. LIII. said to have been before them, were indeed juniors to them; meaning hereby, p. 109.] in all probability, Orpheus, Musaeus, and Linus. As also because Aristotle seems plainly to have followed Herodotus in this, he mentioning the Orphick poems (in his book of the soul) after this manner, τὰ Ὀρφικὰ καλόμενα ἐπικύριος, Λ. I, c. 7. § 7, the verses that are called Orphical. Besides which, Cicero tells us, that some imputed all the Orphick Poems to Cercops a Pythagorean; and it is well known, that many have attributed the same to another of that school, Onomacritus, who lived in the times of the Pisistratidae: wherefore we read

Q. q
more than once in Sextus Empiricus of Ομοδικώτης in τον Ορφικών, Onomacritus in the Orphicks. Suidas also reports, that some of the Orphick poems were anciently ascribed to Theognetus, others to Timoecles, others to Zopyrus, 

Stromat. affirmeth, adding Stromat. affirmeth, adding Prol. Fl. &c. From all which Grotius seems to have made up this conclusion, That the Pythagoricks entitled their own books to Orpheus and Linus, just in the same manner as ancient Christianists entitled theirs, some to the Sibyls, and others to Hermes Trinimegirt. Implying therein, that both the Orphick poems and doctrine owed their very being and first origin only to the Pythagoricks. But on the other side, Clemens Alexandrinus affirmeth, that Heraclitus the philosopher borrowed many things from the Orphick poems. And it is certain, that Plato does not only very much commend the Orphick hymns for their suavity and deliciousness, but also produce some verses out of them, without making any scruple concerning their author. Cicero himself, notwithstanding what he cites out of Aristotle to the contrary, seems to acknowledge Orpheus for the most ancient poet, he writing thus of Cleanthes: In seundo libro de natura deorum, cult Orpheus, Musei, Hesiodi, Homericque fabellas accommodare ad ea, quae ipse de diis immortalibus scripserat, ut eisam veterrimi poetae, qui hanc suppositi quidem sunt, Stoici suijsse videantur. Cleanthes, in his second book of the nature of the gods, endeavours to accommodate the fables of Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer, to these very things, which himself had written concerning them; so that the most ancient poets, who never dream'd of any such matter, are made by him to have been Stoicks. Diodorus Siculus affirmeth Orpheus to have been the author of a most excellent poem: and Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus, Athenagoras, and others, take it for granted, that Homer borrowed many passages of his poems from the Orphick verses, and particularly that very beginning of his Iliad;

Lastly, Jamblichus testifieth, that by most writers Orpheus was represented as the ancientest of all the poets; adding moreover, what dialect he wrote in, ai plies tov xtox9wv apofxov; xiccerxei tii xotive1 ddiathei ju tov 0phi, xei(7 eitenev doa tov patawv. Most of the historiographers declare, that Orpheus, who was the ancientest of all the poets, wrote in the Dorick dialect. Which, if it be true, then those Orphick fragments, that now we have, (preferred in the writings of such as did not Dorize) must have been transformed by them out of their native idiom. Now as concerning Herodotus, who supposing Homer and Hesiod to have been the ancientest of all the Greek poets, seem'd therefore to conclude the Orphick poems to have been pseudepigraphous; himself intimates, that this was but a singular opinion, and as it were paradox, of his own, the contrary thereunto being then generally received. However Aristotle probably might therefore be the more inclined to follow Herodotus in this, because he had no great kindnes for the Pythagoric or Orphick philosophy. But it is altogether irrational and absurd to think, that the Pythagoricks would entitle their books to Orpheus, as

\[\text{1 Stromat. Lib. VI Cap. II. p. 752.} \]
\[\text{3 Lib. IV. Cap. XXV. p. 221.} \]
\[\text{4 Cohortat ad Grecos. p. 17. Oper.} \]
\[\text{5 Stromat. Lib. VI. Cap. II. p. 738 & 751.} \]
\[\text{6 Legat. pro Christianis, Cap. XV. p. 64 85.} \]
as designing to gain credit and authority to them thereby, had there been no such doctrine before, either contained in some ancient monument of Orpheus, or at least transmitted down by oral tradition from him. Wherefore the Pythagoricks themselves constantly maintain, that before Pythagoras his time, there was not only an Orphick cabala extant, but also Orphick poems. The former was declared in that ancient book called 'Ιερός λόγος, or, the holy oration, as we may believe Proclus upon the Timeus. Pythagoricks also P. 291. Timeus, ἵνα ταῖς Πυθαγορείων ἀγαθές αὐτοὶ διὰ εἰσὶν αἱ Ὀρφικοὶ παρεῖδεσιες: "Ας ἔρως Ορφεος ὑπό τοῦ ἀπορρίτω ὕλον μνήμων παραδόθην, ταῦτα Πυθαγορείων ἐξημακωτὶ ὁμοιότατα ἐν λειτουργίᾳ τοῖς Ὀρφαίοις, Ἀλακροθήμα τελείας μελαθῶς: Ταῦτα γὰρ Φιλίππου ο Πυθαγόρεις ἵνα το Ιερό λόγω. Timeus being a Pythagorean, follows the Pythagorick principles, and these are the Orphick traditions; for what things Orpheus delivered mystically, (or in arcane allegories,) these Pythagoricks learned when he was initiated by Aiglophemos in the Orphick mysteries, Pythagoras himself affirming as much in his book called, The Holy Oration. Where Proclus, without any doubt or scruple, entitles the book inscribed 'Ιερός λόγος, or the holy oration, to Pythagoras himself. Indeed several of the ancients have resolved Pythagoras to have written nothing at all, as Plutarch, Plutarch, Lucian and Porphyry; and Epigenes in Clemens Alex. affirms, that the Ιερός λόγος, or holy oration, was written by Cercops a Pythagorean. Neverthe- less, Diogenes Laerarius thinks them not to be in good earnest, who deny Pythagoras to have written any thing; and he tells us, that Heraclides acknowledged this 'Ιερός λόγος, or holy oration, for a genuine and indubitate factus of Pythagoras. Jamblichus is also of the same opinion, as the most received; though confessing some to have attributed that book to Telauges Pythagoras his son. But whoever was the writer of this Hieros Logos, whether Pythagoras himself, or Telauges, or Cercops, it must needs be granted to be of great antiquity, according to the testimony whereof, Pythagoras derived much of his Theology from the Orphick traditions. Moreover, Ion Chius in his Trigrammi testified, as Clemens Alexandrinus informeth us, that Πυθαγορας himself referred some poems to Orpheus as their author; which is also the general sense of Platonists as well as Pythagoreans. Wherefore upon all accounts it seems most probable, that either Orpheus himself wrote some philosophick or theologick poems, though certain other poems might be also father’d on him, because written in the same strain of mystical and allegorical Theology, and as it were in the same spirit, with which this Thracian prophet was inspired; or at least, that the Orphick doctrine was first convey’d down by oral cabala or tradition from him, and afterwards, for its better preference, express’d in verses, that were imputed to Orpheus, after the same manner, as the golden verses written by Lylys were to Pythagoras. And Philoponus intimates this latter to have been Aristotle's opinion concerning the Orphick verses; he glossing thus upon those words of Aristotle before cited: καλλιμμέναι εἶπε, ὡς μὴ δουλεῖ Ὀρφεός τῷ Ἰππ., ἃς κ’ αὐτός ἐν τῷ πειρασμῷ φιλοσοφίας λέγει. Αὐτῷ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμολόγῳ ταῦτα ὡς το φῶς Ὀρφαίων ὑπὸ ίητος καλλιμμέναι. Aristotle calls them the reputed Orphick verses, because they seem not to have been written by Orpheus himself, as the same Aristotle affirmeth in his book of philosophy. The doctrine and opinions of them indeed were
Orpheus a rank Polytheist, Book I.

were his, but Onomacritus is said to have put them into verse. However, there can be no doubt at all made, but that the Orphic verses, by whomsoever written, were some of them of great antiquity (they being much older than either Aristotle, Plato or Herodatus) as they were also had in great esteem amongst the Pagans; and therefore we may very well make a judgment of the theology of the ancient Pagans from them.

Now that Orpheus, the Orphick doctrine, and poems, were polytheistical, is a thing acknowledged by all. Justin Martyr affirms, that Orpheus asserted three hundred and sixty gods; he also bestows upon him this honourable title (if it may be so accounted) of polytheis: πολυθειστός των θεών, the father and first teacher of polytheism amongst the Greeks; he supposing, that Homer derived his polytheism from him, "Ομηρὸς τῆς πολυθειστος Ὀρφέως ζυλογικας ἐξελείθη, μεταδόντα τιμίων θεών μειναις, νομο τοις τοις πολυθεισιν ποιησας." Homer emulating Orpheus his polytheism, did himself therefore fabulously write of many gods, that he might not seem to dissent from his poems, wherein he had so great a veneration for. With which also agreeeth the testimony of Athenagoras; ορφείς η τας ουομαλκας θεών πρωτας θεονων, η τας νομον ευξελατοι, η δια έκας πεπεωλαν ετε, η ομηρος τα πολυλα απειρος θεων μαλλα . Orpheus first invented the very names of the gods, declaring their generations, and what was done by each of them; and Homer for the most part follows him therein. Indeed the whole mythical theology, or fables of the gods, together with the religious rites amongst the Greeks, are commonly supposed to have owed their first original to no other but Orpheus. In which Orphick fables, not only the things of nature, and parts of the world, were all theologized, but all manner of human passions, imperfections, and vices (according to the literal sense) attributed to the gods. Infomuch that divers of the Pagans themselves took great offence at them; as for example Socrates, who concludes that a divine Nemesis or vengeance was inflicted upon Orpheus for this impiety, "Ορφέης ὁ μάλλας τῶν τάκτων λόγων αδικεμεν, δια τας τον βίων ἠτέλεσκεν, Orpheus, οὐδον was most of all guilty in this kind, died a violent death. Also Diog. Laertius for this cause made a question, whether he should reckon Orpheus amongst the philosophers or no: and others have concluded, that Plato ought to have banished Orpheus likewise out of his commonwealth, for the same reason that he did Homer; which is thus expressed, for not lying well concerning the gods. And here we may take notice of the monstrousity and extravagancy of Orpheus his fancy, from what Damascius and others tell us, that he made one of his principles to be ὁδικολα κεφαλος ἀκοντα προπεφυκης τακενς η λεποτο, is μη τοις τε θεων πρόφωτω, α δρακοντα, a Dragon, having the heads both of a bull and a lion, and in the midst the face of a god, with golden wings upon his shoulders; which forsooth must be an incorporeal deity and Hercules, with which Nature (called Anemche and Adrahe) was associated. Nevertheless the generality of the Greekish Pagans, looking upon this Orpheus, not as a mere fanciful poet and fabulator, but as a serious and profound philosopher, or mystical theologer, a person transcendentally holy and wise; they supposed all

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1 Apolog. II. pro Christianis. p. 104.
2 Cohort. ad Ciccon. p. 17.
3 Apolog. pro Christian. Cap. XV. p. 64.
4 De Legibus, Lib II. p. 420.
5 parent άκόντα, after cited above.
all his fables of the gods to be deep mysteries and allegories, which had some arcane and recondite sense under them; and therefore had a high veneration for him, as one who did ἀληθέσεως θεολογίαν (as Athenagoras writes) more truly theologize than the rest, and was indeed divinely inspired. Infomuch, that Celsus would rather have had the Christians to have taken Orpheus for C. Cels. i. 7. a god, than our Saviour Christ, ἀπὸ φανομενίων φυσικής φαντάσεως την μορφήν, § 367. and in one, [as well as the Christians Jesus] died a violent death.

But that Orpheus, notwithstanding all his polytheism or multiplicity of gods, acknowledged one supreme unmade Deity, as the original of all things, may be first presumed from hence, because those two most religious philosophick sects, the Pythagoreans and Platonists, not only had Orpheus in great esteem, he being commonly called by them Ὄρθρος ή, the thelogger, but were also thought in great measure to have owed their theology and philosophy to him, as deriving the same from his principles and traditions. This hath been already intimated, and might be further proved. Pythagoras, as we are informed by Porphyryus and Jamblichus, learned something from all these four, from the Egyptians, from the Persian Magi, from the Chaldeans, and from Orpheus, or his followers. Accordingly, Syrius makes Ὄρθρος, the orphick and pythagorick principles to be one and the same. And as we understand from Suidas, the same Syrius wrote a book [In Com. entitiled, Συμφωνια Ὅρθρου, Πολυγράμμων Ἑλλάνων, The harmony of Orpheus, Pythagoras and Plato. Proclus, besides the place before cited, frequently inills upon this elsewhere, in his commentary upon the Timæus, as p. 289. phyf. Aristot. Πολυγράμμων διὶ το τας Ὅρθρου πεθάνοι γενεαλογίαν. Ἀλεπειν γὰρ ἀπο τῆς Ὅρθρους παραδόθην διὰ Πολυγράμμων ὡς ἐστὶν Ἐλλήνων ἡ περὶ Θεον ἔστω ἐπισκόπημα προόδου. It is Pythagorical to follow the Orphick genealogies. For from the Orphick tradition downward by Pythagoras was the knowledge of the gods derived to the Greeks. And that the Orphick philosophy did really agree and symbolize with that, which afterward was called Pythagorick and Platonick, and was of the same strain with it, may be gathered from that of Plato in his Cratylus, where he speaks concerning the etymology of the Greek word σώμα· σῶμα (μέτων μοι, μάλιστα θείων οἱ αὐθεὶμεν. Ὅσα τοῦ ὅμως ἐπονομασεῖσι, τοῦ τοῦτο διὰ τῆς ἐπίθεσιν τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς αὐτῶν ἀναφέρεται ἡ συνεργεία ἡ τῶν ἁγιωτάτων ἀναφέρεται τὸ σῶμα. Orpheus and his followers seem to me to have given the best etymology of this word σώμα (from σωζεῖσαι) that the soul is here in a state of punishment, its body being a prison to it, wherein it is kept in custody, till its debts or faults be expiated, and is therefore called σώμα. Now these three philosophies, the Platonick, Pythagorick, and Orphick, symbolizing so much together, it is probable, that as the Platonick and Pythagorick, so the Orphick likewise derived all their gods from one self-existent Deity.

Which may be further manifested from that epitome of the Orphick doctrine, made long since by Timotheus the chronographer in his Cosmopoeia, still

Orpheus, a Book. I.

still extant in Cedrenus¹ and Eusebi Chronica, and imperfectly set down by Suidas (upon the word Orpheus) as his own, or without mentioning the author's name:—

*E* ἄρχων ἀκαίρια ὑπὸ κακῶν ὁ ἀνθρώπος, ὡς τοῦ θεᾶ ἐνυμφηθένς.

First of all the other was made by God, and after the other a Chaos; a dark and dreadful night then covering all under the whole ether. Συνεισέχει τὸν νῦν πολλὸν ὑποδείξειν, Orpheus hereby signifying (as Timæus) that Night was senior to Day, or that the world had a beginning; Eternity is τῷ αὐτῷ ἐκάθεν, ὄκταλαίπτοι τοῖς ἡπτάλοις ὑπέρταλοι εἱκὼν, προσανετέρου τῇ ὑθημερευτῇ ἀπαίλων, ἡ αὐτή τῇ άνθρώποις, τῇ πάντων τῶν ὑπὸ αὐτῶν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. He having declared also in his explication, that there was a certain incomprehensible Being, which was the highest and oldest of all things, and the maker of every thing, even of the other itself, and all things under the ether. But the earth being then invisible by reason of the darkness, a light breaking out through the ether illuminated the whole creation; this light being said by him, to be that highest of all Beings, (before mentioned) which is called also counsel and life. Τάντα τῇ τριά ἐνόκται (to 3c Suidas his words here) μία ὄντων ἀφαίεται, ὡς τῇ θερμηνεῖ ἀπαίλων οὐδέν, τῇ πάντα ἐκ τῷ μηθῃ παραγογοῦσθαι τῇ τοῦ ὄνομα. These three names in Orpheus (light, counsel and life) declaring one and the same force and power of that God, who is the maker of all, and who produceth all out of nothing into being, whether visible or invisible. To conclude with Timæus: Οἱ δὲ αὐτὸς, ὁρφικός, ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ βέλτῳ ἐπεκτάγην ὡς διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τεῦχος ὄνοματα μίας βοήθεις, τῇ πάνται ἐκάθεν, ὡς αὐτὸς ἐκ ταῦτα. And the name Orpheus in his book declared, that all things were made by one Godhead in three names, and that this God is all things.

But that Orpheus assered one supreme Deity, as the original of all things, is unquestionably evident from the Orphick verses themselves; of which notwithstanding, before we mention any in way of proof, we shall premise this observation, or rather suspicion of our own, that there seem to be some Orphick verses supposititious, as well as there were Sibylline; they being counterfeited either by Christians or Jews. For we must freely profess for our own part, that we cannot believe all that to be genuine, which is produced by ancient fathers as Orphical; that is, either to have been written by Orphus himself, or else by Onomacritus, or any other Pagan of that antiquity, according to the Orphick cabala or tradition.

As for example, this concerning Mosis: 

'Ὁς λόγος ἀφαίεται, ὡς ὑπολογία διητάκην,
Ἐν θεόν γνώμαις λαβών κατὰ διπλαία βιοιμόν

Ut habit sermo antiquorum, ut ex-aqua-orbis descriptit,
Acceptā divinitus lege, qua duplicia præcepta continet.

And this that is commonly understood of Abraham,

Οὗ γὰρ καὶ τε Ἰακώβ, μετάυτων χρονισια,
Εἰ μὴ μημορφής τίς ἀπορροής φύλον αἰνεῖν
Χαλδαίων, ἢ δια γὰρ ἑνὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πορείας.

¹ In Chronograph. fol. 46.
Chap. IV. Profeffed Monarchist.

Non enim quispiam mortalium videre posset eum, qui hominibus imperat, Nisi Unigenitus quidam profeftus ab antiqua origine gentis Chaldeorum; sciebat enim a ftri cursum.

The manifest forgerie of which might make one fufpeft alfo some other passages, fuch as this concerning the divine Logos;

Εἰς δὲ λόγον Χρῖστον Βελτσών τῶν προφέτων,
Τὸν οὐρανὸν κρατίς οὐκέτω κύριον.

Wherefore it being not ingenuous to lay ftreis upon that for the proof of any thing, which ourselves believe not to be sincere and genuine; we shall here cite no Orphick verses for the acknowledgment of one supreme Deity, but only fuch as we find attested in Pagan writings. As first of all that copy produced by Proclus upon the Timæus:

Τότε καὶ συν τῷ πατὶ Διὸς πάλιν ιντς ἱνιχθν, Ἀυξεῖσθαι εὐρίσκεις ὡς ὀρθόν ἀγγείων ὁ ψυχήν, Πάλιν τ᾽ ἀφιγνέτω, γαίας τ᾽ ἐρχεῖσθαι ἔρη, 'Εκεῖσθαι τὸ μέγατα, ὡς νείατα τάρταρα γαίας, Καὶ πολυμορφή, ὡς πολύθρον ἀπειρίζοντο θάλας τε πάλια, Πάλιν τ᾽ Αἴανατο μάκαρες Στοι, ὡς Σιάνει, "ΟΣ Τ᾽ έγνωκάτα, ή δεῦρον οπότο ἤμελλεν Ἑρέσετο Ζηνός ὥς ἐν γονία σύρρα πεφύκει.

To this fene: Wherefore, together with the universe, were made within Jupiter the height of the ethereal heaven, the breadth of the earth and sea, the great ocean, the profound Tartara, the rivers and fountains, and all the other things, all the immortal gods, and goddeffes. Whatfoever hath been, or fhall be, was at once contained in the womb of Jupiter.

Proclus understands this of the idea's of all things being in God, before the world was produced, that is, in order of nature only, he supposing them in time coeve. However, it is plain, that all things are faid to be contained in the womb and fecundity of one self-originated Deity, not only all the other gods and goddeffes, but every thing elfe whatfoever.

Again Proclus, in the fame place, utters in another copy of Orphick verses (which are also found in the writer de Mundo) after this manner: τῶν δὲ Ἰδεῶν πλήρες οὐκ οἷον τέτων ἐκείνω τὰ δόλα πεισαίρει, ὡς ὡς τοῦ ἐκδεισπόρων οὐ λόγος ἐτώγαγα. The Demiurgus, or maker of the world, being full of ideas, did by these comprehend all things within himfelf, as that theologer also declareth in these following verses:

Ζηνὸς πετότο γάρ οὐ, Ζηνὸς ἔπαισος ἀρχιμοιχισμος
Ζηνὸς καθαρός, Ζηνὸς μήκος. Ζηνὸς θ᾽ έι πάντα τέμναλα
Ζηνὸς ξένων γένετο, Ζηνὸς ἄφθορος; ἐπέλειο νύμφη
Ζηνὸς πεθοῦν γαίας τε θ᾽ εργαίν ἀπειρίζοντο.
Proved clearly that the Orphists

Zeús ποιήσει πάντως: Zeús ἀκμάτω τιρᾶς δεμίος
Zeús ποιήσει τιρᾶς: Zeús ἐλεῖ πρὸς τελικόν
Zeús βασιλεὺς: Zeús αὐτὸς ἀπάντων ἄρχειν ἀνέλυτον,
Ε: κέρατον, τι: Δαίμων γένος, μέγας ἀρχός ἀπάντων.

Which likewise in plain prose is this: The high-thundering Jove is both the first and the last; Jove is both the head and middle of all things; all things were made out of Jupiter; Jove is both a man and an immortal maid; Jove is the profundity of the earth and stately heaven; Jove is the breath of all things; Jove is the force of the untameable fire; Jove the bottom of the sea; Jove is sun, moon, and stars; Jove is both the original, and king of all things: there is one power, and one God, and one great ruler over all.

Where though there be many strange expressions, yet this seems to be the strangest of them all, that Jupiter should be said to be both a man and an immortal maid. But this is nothing but a poetick description of ἄρχειν ἀνέλυτον, male and female together. And it was a thing very familiar with all the mystical theologers amongst the Pagans, to call God ἄρχειν ἀνέλυτον, male and female together; they signifying thereby emphatically, the divine fecundity, or the generative and creative power of the Deity; that God was able from himself alone to produce all things. Thus Damafcius the philosopher, writing of this very Orphick theology, expounds it, ἄρχειν ἀνέλυτον αὐτὸν ὑπετευκτε, πρὸς ὁσίου τῆς πάσης γυναικίς: Ζηοί, the Orphick theology calls the first principle hermaphrodite, or male and female together: thereby denoting that essence, that is generative or productive of all things. And that learned and pious Christian bishop, Synesius, it seems, thought the expression so harmful, that he scrupled not himself to make use of it, in those elegant and devout hymns of his to God Almighty:

Σὺ πατὴρ, Σὺ ἐστὶν πάτηρ,
Σὺ ὁ οὐράνιος, Σὺ ὁ θεός.

Τὸ Πάτερ, Ὅ τι εἶστιν Ματέρ,
Τὸ Ματά, Ὅ τι Εὔματιν.

Besides these, there are also certain other Orphick verses, scattered up and down in Proclus, but cited altogether in Eusebius out of Porphyry, in which the whole world is represented as one great animal, God being the soul thereof.

Ἐν ὤς ὄιμας βασιλείαν ἐν ὄς τάδε τώνα κυκλινται,
Πάσας ἰδας, ὡς γαίας, ῥων ἀνθρόπους ὡς τῇ ὄιμας.
Καὶ Μήτις τρωτοῖς γενετοῖς, καὶ ἔρως πολυτερτοῖς.
Πάσας γὰρ εἰς μεγάλα Δυνάς τὰς φάτα σομαλι ἔχειν.
Τὸ ὄντοι κυριαλιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ καλὰ πρόσωπα,
Οἰκεῖος αἰγλείς ὅ ὅροις ὁμοίως ἔθιγμα "Αγαμόν παρασκευής περικαλλάς ηὐσίους, &c.

Omnia

CHAP. IV.
asserted Monarchy.

Omnia regali sunt hoc in corpore clausa,
Ignis, & unda, & terra, atque cum notis dieque;

(Conflium, primus genitor, cum numine amoris:)

Jupiter immenso sub corpore cumula oecret:
En bujas caput eximium, vultuque decoros

Undique resplendens colum, cui pendula circum

Aurora Caesaries afferetur lumina fundit:

Sunt oculi Phoebus, Phoebique adversa recurrens

Cynthia, &c.

Where probably that one verse,

Καὶ Μούσαι, πρῶτοι γενέτωρ, ἡ Ἕκτες πολυτερπής,

though truly Orphical, and indeed divine, (it signifying, that Mind and Love
were the first begetters and original of all things) was notwithstanding clap'd
in unduly out of some other place. But from all these citations it plainly
appears, that according to the Orphick theology, though there were many
gods and goddeses too admitted, yet there was one original and king of
them all, one supreme Deity acknowledged. We are not ignorant, that
some of the ancient and learned fathers 1, conceiving it contradictory, for
Orpheus at the same time to assert both many gods and one God, apprehended
this to be a convenient salvo for this difficulty, to suppose, that Or-
phes had by fits and turns been of different humours and persuasions; first a
rank polytheist, asserting three hundred gods and more; and then after-
wards a converted monotheist, they being the rather led into this opinion,
by reason of certain counterfeit Orphick verses in Aristobulus, made pro-
bably by some ignorant Jew; wherein Orpheus is made to sing a palinodia or
recantation, for his former error and polytheism. But we must crave leave,
with all due respect, to differ from reverend antiquity in this; it plainly
appearing from that first Orphick exception in Proclus, that Orpheus at the
same time acknowledged both one unmade Deity (the original of all things)
and many generated gods and goddeses, that were all contained in it.

Having now made it sufficiently evident from such Orphick fragments, as
have been acknowledged by Pagan writers, and by them cited out of Or-
phes his hymns and rhapsodies, that the opinion of monarchy or one self-
existent Deity, the original of all things, was an essentical part of the Or-
phick theology or cabala; we shall here further observe, that besides
this opinion of monarchy, (but consistently with the same) a trinity also
of divine hypostases subordinate was another part of this Orphick ca-
bala. Proclus upon Plato's Timeus, making an inquiry into Plato's de-
miurgus or opifex of the world, gives us an account, amongst other Pla-
tonists, of the doctrine of Amelius (who was contemporary with Plotinus,
and who is said to have taken notice of what St. John the evangelist had
written concerning the Logos, as agreeing with the Platonick and Pythago-
rick hypothesis 2) after this manner: Ἄμελιος δὲ πρώτα ποιησάμενος, τὸν
Ναοὺς τεῖχος, τὸν Βασιλείαν τρεῖς, τὸν Ὁλία, τὸν Ἐχολία, τὸν Ὀρχυμαντήτος ἄλλα

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2 Vide Euseb. Praeparat. Evang. Lib. XI.
Julian, p. 25.
Clemens Alexandr. in Protrepticco, Cap. VII. Cap. XVIII, XIX, p. 540.
A Trinity, part. Book I.

Pythagoras makes a threefold demiurgus or opifex of the world: three minds and three kings; him that is, him that bath, and him that beholds. Which three minds differ thus, in that the first is essentially that, which he is (or all perfection: the second is its own intelligible, but bath the first (as something distinct from it) and indeed partakes thereof, and therefore is second. The third is also that intelligible of its own, (for every mind is the same thing with its correspondent intelligible) but bath that which is in the second, and beholds the first. For how much sooner every departure from the first, so much the obscurer is it. After which Proclus immediately subjoins, "totes υν τες τρεις νοες κατ' εκμελεχρος υποκλεια, κα τοις παρ' τι Πλάτωνω, τριεις βασιλιας, κα τοις παρ' Οφεις τρει, Φαντω, κα Ολοχνω, κα Κλειων, κα τοις μαλαιτες παρ' αυτω εκμελεχρος το Φανο εινω. Amelius therefore suspofeth these three minds and demiurgick principles of his to be both the fame with Plato's three kings, and with Orpheus his trinity of Phanes, Uranus, and Chronus; but Phanes is supposed by him to be principally the Demiurgus. Where tho Proclus (who had some peculiar fancies and whimsies of his own, and was indeed a confounder of the Platonick theology, and a mingler of much unintelligible fluff with it) does himself affert a monad or unity, superior to this whole trinity; yet does he seem nevertheless rightly to contend against Amelius, that it was not the first hypostasis neither in the Platonick nor Orphick trinity, that was chiefly and properly the demiurgus or opifex of the world, but the second. And thus Proclus his master Syrianus had before determined, that in the Orphick theology, the title of Opifex did properly belong to Orpheus his πρωτος ουδ, or first-begotten God, which was the fame with Plato's Νους or divine Intellett. Agreeably whereunto Proclus his conclusion is, the κα τοις μεν ευ τοις εκμελεχρος εις κα τοις Νους Ρεις τοις ευ τοις παρ' αυτω, εις κα τοις τρεις κα τοις υποκλειας, κα τοις τοις παρ' Φαντω, κα Ολοχνω, κα τοις μαλαιτιται εκμελεχρος Ζειων, απο τοις των υποκλειας. Thus much may suffice to have declared, who is the demiurgus of the world, namely, that it is the divine Intellett, which is the proper and immediate cause of the whole creation; and that it is one and the same demiurghical Jupiter, that is praised both by Orpheus and Plato. Now besides this, it is observable, that Damages in his book περι ερσηων, or concerning the principles (not yet published) giving an account of the Orphick theology, tells us, amongst other things, that Orpheus introduced τριους σεντιμελειας τοις χρονοις, κατο τοις τοις Οφεις προ τοις τοις χρονοις ειπον, κα Τριαδα δυολεις ουλικρος ουλικρος.

1 Comment. in Libr. aliquot Metaphys. mafctii, §. XIII. in Aneodo Græcis, Tom. III. p. 252. 253.

2 Vide Wofii Excerpta ex hoc Opere Da-
of the Orphick Cabala.

γύπος τὰ πάλα. These things Timotheus the chronographer wrote, affirming Orpheus, so long ago, to have declared, that all things were made by a conessential or confubstantial Trinity. Which, though otherwife it might be looked upon suspiciously, because that Timotheus was a Christian (especially in regard of that word ἕως (i.e.) yet by comparing it with what we have before alleged out of pagan writers, it appears, that so far as concerns an Orphick trinity, it was not altogether vainly written, or without ground by him.

But we have not yet done with Orpheus and the Orphick theology, before we have made one further reflection upon it, so as to take notice of that strong and rank haut-gout, which was in it, of making God to be all. As for example, if we may repeat the forecited passages, and put in the name of God, instead of Zeus or Jupiter; Διὸς πάλιν ἐτῶς ἐτώρθη, this universe, and all things belonging to it, were made within God. Ζησὸς ο' ἐν γαστὶ σώμα πεφυκε, all things were contained together in the womb of God: Ζησον φαύλι, Ζησός μέσα, God is the head and middle of all things; Ζησὸς τὸν πνεύμα γαίης, &c. God is the boses of the earth and heaven; God is the depth of the sea; God is the breath of all, (or the air that we breathe;) God is the force of the untameable fire; God is sun, moon, and stars. Εἰ τὶ δήμας βασιλέων, there is one kingy (or divine) body; and

Πάλα γὰρ ἐν μεγάλῳ Ζησὸς τάδε σώματι καὶταί,

For all these things lie in the great body of God. And thus was the Orphick theology before represented also by Timotheus the chronographer, διὰ τὸς Σωτήρος πάλιν ἐναντίον, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐστὶ πάλα, All things were made by God, and himself is all things.

But further to prove, that the ancient Greekish Pagans were indeed of such a religious humour as this, to resolve all things into God, and to make God all, we shall here cite a remarkable testimony of Plutarch's, out of his defect of oracles: διὸ πάλιν γνώναις αἰνίας ζήσης, οἱ μὲν σφέδας πωλαὶ Θεόλογοι Π. 436. τοῦ ποιητα, τῷ κατέλεισαν μόνον τὸν νῦν προσέχειν εἰς νῦν, τότε δὲ τὸ κινήσει ἐπιθεωρῆσαι ποιήσαται. Ζησὸς ἄριστος, Ζησὸς μέσος, Διὸς δὲ ἐν πάλαι πάλαις.

ταῖς δ' ἄνωθεν καὶ τὸν εὐνοικοὺς, ἐκ ἑτὶ προφήτης αἰτίαι τοῖς ὑστορεῖται τῷ φοινικοὶ προσερχομένους, τοιαύταν ἑκείνους, τῆς καλῆς τὴς οἰκίας αὐτοπλανούσες ἀρχής, ἐν σύνεχος τῷ πάλαις σωμάτων, παράγει τοὺς μεταβολικοὺς κράτεις τῷ σώματι. Whereas there are two causes of all generation (the divine and the natural) the most ancient theologers and poets attended only to the more excellent of these two (the divine cause) resolving all things into God, and pronouncing this of them universally, that God was both the beginning, and middle, and that all things were out of God. Infomuch that these had no regard at all to the other natural and necessary causes of things. But on the contrary their juniors, who were called Physici (or naturalists) straying from this most excellent and divine principle, placed all in bodies, their passions, collisions, mutations and commixtures together. Where by the most ancient theologers

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and poets, Plutarch plainly meant Orphens and his followers, it being an Orphick verfe, that is here cited by him, whereby he gives also an acknowledgment of their antiquity. But by their juniors, who are called Physici, he could understand no other than those first Ionick philosophers, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Hippo, and the rest, whom those degenerate Italicks afterward followed, atomizing atheistically, Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus. So that here we have another confirmation also of what was before asserted by us, that the Ionick philosophers after Thales, and before Anaxagoras, were generally atheistical. And indeed from them the word Φυσικος, or Naturalis, came to be often used as synonymous with Ἀθεις or Atheistics. Now these two are here condemned by Plutarch for two contrary extremes; the one, who resolved all into natural and necessary causes, that is, into matter, motion, and qualities of bodies, leaving out the divine cause, as guilty of atheism; the other, who altogether neglecting the natural and necessary causes of things, resolved all into the divine cause, as it were swallowing up all into God, as guilty of a kind of fanaticism. And thus we see plainly, that this was one grand arcanum of the Orphick cabala, and the ancient Greekish theology, that God is all things.

Some fanaticks of latter times have made God to be all, in a gross sense, so as to take away all real distinction betwixt God and the creature, and indeed to allow no other being besides God; they supposing the substance of every thing, and even of all inanimate bodies, to be the very substance of God himself, and all the variety of things, that is in the world, to be nothing but God under several forms, appearances and disguises. The Stoicks anciently made God to be all, and all to be God, in somewhat a different way; they conceiving God properly to be the active principle of the whole corporeal universe, which yet (because they admitted of no incorporeal substance) they supposed, together with the passive or the matter, to make up but one and the same complete substance. And others, who acknowledged God to be an incorporeal substance, distinct from the matter, have notwithstanding made all to be God also, in a certain sense; they supposing God to be nothing but a soul of the world, which, together with the matter, made up all into one entire divine animal. Now the Orphick theologers cannot be charged with making God all, in that first and grossly-fanatick sense; as if they took away all real distinction betwixt God and the creature, they so asserting God to be all, as that notwithstanding they allowed other things to have distinct beings of their own. Thus much appearing from that riddle, which in the Orphick verses was proposed by the maker of the world, to Night:

Πάντες δέικτε ἐν τι τὰ ποιεῖ ἔτει, ἢ θεός ἐκκατον;  

How can all things be one, and yet every thing have a distinct being of its own? Where "Εἰ τι τὰ πάλιν, all things one, or one all things, seems to be the supreme Deity, or divine Intellect, as Proclus also interprets it, τὰ δὲ περί ἔξω ὡς Ζεὺς ἢ πάντα μοναδίκως ἢ νεοῖς, κατὰ τότες χειλίκες,

* Reb. Fludd M.D. in the Preface to his Philosophia MOSAICA; and Jacob Behmen.
Chap. IV. Theology, that God is all.

metad tis mondes phisides, ky pantw te lidois, ky twn moniges te pnos. Jupiter, who contained the universe, and all things within himself, unitively and intellecutally, according to these Orphick oracles, gives a particular subsistence of their own also to all the mundane gods, and other parts of the universe. And this is ousis tceson, in that fore-cited Orphick verse, Every thing apart by itself, the whole produced or created universe, with all its variety of things in it; which yet are Orphically said to be God also in a certain sense, that shall be declared afterward. Nor can the Orphick theologers be charged with making God all in the second Stoical sense, as if they denied all incorporeal substance, they plainly asserting, as Damascius and others particularly note, God adumuxen, an incorporeal Deity. But as for the third way, it is very true, that the Orphick theologers did frequently call the world, the body of God, and its several parts his members, making the whole universe to be one divine animal; notwithstanding which, they supposed not this animated world to be the first and highest God, but either divino God, as the Hermaic or Trismegistick writers call it, the second God; or else, as Numenius and others of the Platonists speak, taisa the God, the third God; the soul thereof being as well in the Orphick, as it was in the Pythagorick and Platonick trinity, but the third hypostasis; they supposing two other divine hypostases superior thereunto, which were perfectly secrete from matter. Wherefore, as to the supreme Deity, these Orphick theologers made him to be all things, chiefly upon the two following accounts: first, because all things coming from God, they inferred, that therefore they were all contained in him, and consequentely were in a certain sense himself; thus much being declared in those Orphick verses cited by Proclus 1 and others,

Panta tae xwvias, a7res phiis is polignhis.
Millae adn xevdies prophiave, poluvrvekeda egwv.

Which Apuleius 2 thus renders,

Namque tam occultus, dulces in lumineus orae
Cuncta tuit, sacro versans sub pedes curas.

The sense whereof is plainly this; That God at first hiding or occultly containing all things within himself, did from thence display them, and bring them forth into light, or distinct beings of their own, and so make the world. The second is, because the world produced by God, and really existing without him, is not therefore quite cut off from him, nor subsists alone by itself as a dead thing, but is still livingly united to him, essentially dependent on him, always supported and upheld, quickned and enlivened, acted and pervaded by him; according to that Orphick passage 3, Eu 6 6vovis 6vovis pesi-

Now it is very true, that some Christian theologers also have made God to be all, according to those latter senses; as when they affirm the whole world

1 Comment. in Timaeum Platon. Lib. II. P. 95:
2 Libro de Mundo p. 25.
world to be nothing else but Deum explicatum, God expanded or unfolded, and when they call the creatures, as St. Jeron and others often do, radios Divitatis, the rays of the Deity. Nay, the scripture itself may seem to give some countenance also hereunto, when it tells us, that of him, and through him, and to him are all things; which in the Orphick theology was thus expressed; 

God is the beginning, and middle, and end of all things; that in autó kathid tó πάνα, all things were made in him, as in the Orphick verses,—Δος εύφλητον εὐρύφθη; that τα πάνα in autó σωκρατεί, all things consist in him; that, in him we live and move, and have our being; that God doth ζωοποιήσα πάνα, quicken all things, and that he ought to be made, πάνα in πάνω, all in all; which suppofeth him in some sense to be so. Notwithstanding which, this is a very ticklish point, and easily liable to mistake and abuse: and, as we conceive it was the mistake and abuse of this one thing, which was the chief ground and original of the both seeming and real polytheism, not only of the Greekish and European, but also of the Egyptian and other Pagans, as will be more particularly declared afterwards; they concluding, that because God was all things, and conseqently all things God, that therefore God ought to be worshipped in all things, that is, in all the several parts of the world, and things of nature, but especially in those animated intellectual beings, which are superior to men. Consequentely whereunto, they did both ζωοποιήσα, theologize or deify all things, looking upon every thing as having ἑρμηνευτικόν τι, something supernatural, or a kind of divinity in it; and also below several names upon God, according to all the several parts of the world, and things of nature, calling him in the starry heaven and æther, Jupiter; in the air, Juno; in the winds, Aëolus; in the sea, Neptune; in the earth and subterraneous parts, Pluto; in learning, knowledge, and invention, Minerva and the Muses; in war, Mars; in pleasure, Venus; in corn, Ceres; in wine, Bacchus; and the like.

However, it is unquestionably evident from hence, that Orpheus with his followers, that is, the generality of the Greekish Pagans, acknowledged one universal and all-comprehending Deity, one that was all; and consequently could not admit of many self-existent and independent deities.

XVIII. Having treated largely concerning the two most eminent Polytheists amongst the ancient Pagans, Zoroaster and Orpheus, and clearly proved, that they asserted one supreme Deity; we shall in the next place observe, that the Egyptians themselves also, notwithstanding their multifarious polytheism and idolatry, had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme and universal Numen.

There hath been some controversy amongst learned men, whether polytheism and idolatry had their first rise from the Egyptians, or the Chaldeans, because the Pagan writers for the most part give the precedence here to the Egyptians: Lucian himself, who was by birth a Syrian, and a diligent enquirer into the antiquities of his own country, affirming that the Syrians and Assyrians received their religion and gods first from the Egyptians: and before
before Lucian, Herodotus 1, the father of history, reporting likewise, that the Egyptians were the first, that erected temples and statues to the Gods. But whether the Egyptians or Chaldeans were the first Polytheists and Idolaters, there is no question to be made, but that the Greeks and Europeans generally derived their polytheism and idolatry from the Egyptians. Herodotus affirms in one place 2, that the Greeks received their twelve gods from thence; and in another 3, that ἔσσαν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι τῶν Ζων ἔλαιον ἧλιον εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, almost all the names of the gods came first out of Egypt into Greece. In what sense this might be true of Zeus itself, though the word be originally Greekish, shall be declared afterwards: but it is probable, that Herodotus had here a further meaning, that the very names of many of the Greekish gods were originally Egyptian. In order to the confirmation of which, we shall here propound a conjecture concerning one of them, viz. 'Αθηνᾶ, called otherwife by the Greeks Pallas, and by the Latins Minerva. For first, the Greek etymologies of this word seem to be all of them either trifling and frivolous, or violent and forced. Plato in his Cratylus 4 having observed, that according to the ancient allegorical interpreters of Homer, 'Αθηνᾶ was nothing else but νός or δώρα, Mind or Understanding, perforated and defied, conceived, that the first improver of that name, intending to signify thereby divine wisdom, called it 'Αθηνᾶ, as Θεόν νόμοι, the Understanding of God, or the Knowledge of divine things; as if the word had been at first Θεόν, and thence afterward transformed into 'Αθηνᾶ. But being not fully satisfied himself with this etymology, he afterwards attempts another, deriving the word from τόνωσιν τῷ ἤθῳ, knowledge concerning manners, or practical knowledge; as if it had been at first ἴθων, and from thence changed into 'Αθηνᾶ. Others of the Greeks have deduced this word αὖτον τῇ ἂττηω, because it is the property of wisdom, to collect all into one, supposing that it was at first 'Αθηνᾶ. Others would fetch it from Θήνως and Alpha privative, because Minerva or wisdom, though she be a goddess, yet hath nothing of feminine imperfection in her. Others again would etymologize it, αὖτον τῇ μαρτυρία Θήνως, by ἀπόταξιν τοῖς ἄθηω, because virtue or wisdom is of such a noble and generous temper, as that it seems to subject itself to any base and unworthy servitude. Lastly, others would derive it, αὖτον τῷ ἀθηναῖο, affirming it to have been at first Αἴτησις. 5 From all which uncertainty of the Greeks concerning the etymon of this word 'Αθηνᾶ, and from the frivolousness or forcedness of these conjectures, we may rather conclude, that it was not originally Greekish, but exotical, and probably, according to Herodotus, Egyptian. Wherefore let us try, whether or no we can find any Egyptian word, from whence this 'Αθηνᾶ might be derived. Plato in his Timeus 6, making mention of Sai, a city in Egypt, where Salom sometimes sojourned, tells us, ὅτι τῷ πάλαις ἔτος ἀγχυνῆς ἐστὶ. Αὐγόπηια μὲν τὸν Ναόν, Ἐλληνική Αἴτησις. Ἔστω ἐνδειχθή, Ἀθηνᾶ, that the president or tutelar God of that city was called in the Egyptian language Neith, but in the Greek, as the same Egyptians affirm, 'Αθηνᾶ. Now, why might not this very Egyptian word Neith, by an easy

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1. Lib. II. Cap. IV. p. 90.
easy inversion have been at first turned into Thien, or Θείος, (men commonly pronouncing exotic words ill-favourably) and then by additional Alpha's at the beginning and end, transformed into 'Αθήνα. This seems much more probable than either Plato's Θέων, or Ηρώων, or any other of those Greek etymologies before-mentioned. And as the Greeks thus derived the names of many of their gods from the Egyptians, so do the Latins seem to have done the like, from this one instance of the word Neptune; which though Varro would deduce à nubendo, as if it had been Nuptinus, because the sea covers and hides the land, and Scaliger with others, ἀν
d το ὑπερθείον, from washing, this being the chief use of water; yet as the learned Bochart hath observed, it may with greater probability be derived from the Egyptian word Nephthys, Plutarch telling us, ὅτι Νήφθων καλλίς τῆς γῆς τῷ ἐφάλλον παραδόθη πας κόλπη τῷ Θεάσθεν, That the Egyptians called the maritime parts of land, or such as border upon the sea, Nephthys. Which conjecture may be further confirmed from what the same Plutarch elsewhere writes, that as Isis was the wife of Osiris, so the wife of Typhon was called Nephthys. From whence one might collect, that, as Isis was taken sometimes for the earth, or the goddess presiding over it, so Nephthys was the goddess of the sea. To which may be further added out of the same writer, that Nephthys was sometimes called by the Egyptians ΑΦροδίτη, or Venus, probably because Venus is said to have riven out of the sea. But whatever may be thought of these etymological conjectures, certain it is, that no nation in the world was ever accounted by the Pagans more devout, religious and superstitious, than the Egyptians, and consequently none was more polytheistical and idolatrous. Ictocrates, in his praise of Bafiris, gives them a high encomium for their sanctity; and Herodotus affirneth of them, that they were 
περίσσερες μάλητος πάλαι ναών ἀθρόων, Exceedingly more religious and more devout worshippers of the Deity, than all other mortals. Wherefore they were highly celebrated by Apollo's oracle, (recorded by Porphyrius) and preferred before all other nations for teaching rightly ἀντίστοιχον ὁδόν παραφύσεως, that hard and difficult way, that leadeth to God and happiness. But in the scripture, Egypt is famous for her idols, and for her spirituall whoredoms and fornications; to denote the uncleannesses whereof she is sometimes joined with Sodom. For the Egyptians, besides all those other gods, that were worshipped by the Greeks and other Barbarians; besides the stars, dæmons and heroes; and those artificial gods, which they boasted so much of their power of making, viz. animated statues; and this peculiar intoxication of their own, which rendered them infamous and ridiculous even amongst all the other Pagans, that they worshipped brute animals also, in one sense or other;

Quis nescit, Veluthi Bithynice, qualia demens
Egyptus portenta colat? Crocodilon aderat
Pars hec, illa pater solament serpentibus ibiin.

Concerning which Origen against Celsus thus writeth; τωι οἱ προσώποι ίδιοι ιοί,
[These words, ἡμιπρόσεται τειμών, ἡ θεία, ἡ προσωπία καὶ καλλίτη τε ἡ κάλλη νοῦ ἡμικαλλίτη ἡ εὐκλεία, are not Ori-
gen's, but Cel-

1 Vide Voluum de Origine & Progrefla
Godolatria; Lib II. Cap. LXXVII. p. 259.
2 De Iside & Osride p. 366.
3 Lib. II. Cap. XXXVII. p. 102.
4 Ibid. p. 335.
5 Revelat, XI. 8.
6 Plutarch, Lib. I. Cap. II. p. 9, 10. &
Lib. IV. Cap. XXX. p. 283.
Chap. IV. Egypt a School of Literature before Greece.

But notwithstanding this multifarious polytheism and idolatry of these Egyptians, that they did nevertheless acknowledge one supreme and universal Numen, may first be probably collected from that fame, which they had anciently over the whole world for their wisdom. The Egyptians are called by the Elei in Herodotus, σοφάτας ανθρώπων, the wisest of men; and it is a commendation, that is given to one in the fame writer, that he excelled the Egyptians in wisdom, who excelled all other mortals. Thus is it set down in the scripture for Moses his encomium, that he was learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians; and the transcendency of Solomon's wisdom is likewise thus expressed by the writer of the book of Kings, that it excelled the wisdom of all the children of the east-country, and all the wisdom of Egypt. Where by the children of the east are chiefly meant the Persian Magi, and the Chaldeans; and there seems to be a climax here, that Solomon's wisdom did not only excel the wisdom of the Magi, and of the Chaldeans, but also that of the Egyptians themselves. From whence it appears, that in Solomon's time Egypt was the chief school of literature in the whole world, and that the Greeks were then but little or not at all taken notice of, nor had any considerable fame for learning. For which cause, we can by no means give credit to that of Philo, in the life of Moses, that besides the Egyptian priests, learned men were sent for by Pharaoh's daughter out of Greece to instruct Moses. Whereas it is manifest from the Greekish monuments themselves, that for many ages after Solomon's time, the most famous of the Greeks travelled into Egypt to receive culture and literature, as Lycurgus, Solon, Thales, and many others, amongst whom were Pythagoras and Plato. Concerning the former of which Socrates writes, that coming into Egypt, and being there instructed by the priests, he was the first, that brought philosophy into Greece; and the latter of them is perjured by Xenophon, because Αγοράς ή σωφρόν ή τον Πυθαγόρα πρεσβύτερος σοφός, not contented with that simple philosophy of Socrates, (which was little else but moral) he was in love with Egypt, and that monstrous wisdom of Pythagoras. Now, as it is not probable, that the Egyptians, who were so famous for wisdom and learning, should be ignorant of one supreme Deity, so is it no small argument to the contrary, that they were had in so great esteem by those two divine philosophers, Pythagoras and Plato. We grant indeed, that after the Greeks began to flourish in all manner of literature, the fame of the Egyptians was not only much eclipsed, (so that we hear no more of Greeks travelling

1 Lib. II. Cap. CLX. p. 151.
3 Acts VII. ver. 22.
4 1 Kings IV. 29.
5 Lib. I. p. 605.
6 In Eucemia Bysirides p. 470.
The learning of the Egyptians was either historical, or philosophical, or theological. First the Egyptians were famous for their historic learning and knowledge of antiquity, they being confessed in Plato to have had so much ancienler records of time than the Greeks, that the Greeks were but children or infants compared with them. They pretended to a continued and uninterrupted series of history from the beginning of the world downwards, and therefore seem to have had the clearest and strongest perfluations of the Cosmogonia. Indeed it cannot be denied, but that this tradition of the world’s beginning was at first in a manner universal among all nations. For concerning the Greeks and Persians we have already manifested the fame; and as Saneboniathom teftified the like concerning the Phænicians, fo does Strabo likewife of the Indian Brachmans, affirming, that they did agree with the Greeks in many things, and particularly in this, ὅτι γνωτίς ὁ κόσμος καὶ θεὸς, that the world was both made, and should be destroyed. And though Diodorus affirm the contrary of the Chaldeans, yet we ought in reason to affent rather to Berosus, in respect of his greater antiquity, who represents the sence of the ancient Chaldeans after this manner, γνωτίς ο κόσμος καὶ θεὸς ὅτι τὸν ὥθηκεν ὁ Βελου, ὅτι Δία μεθεμεταβίς, μέγευς τεμόντα τὸ σιών, χαρίσακεν γιὰς ἑγάριον, ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων, ἐς διαλέξεις τοῦ κόσμου— ἀποτελέσας ὁ τὸν Βελου καὶ ἐξέβαλεν ἑλευν καὶ εὐλυπὴν καὶ τὰς πάντα πλανατές. That there was a time, when all was darkness and water, but Bell (who is interpreted Jupiter) cutting the darkness in the middle, separated the earth and heaven from one another, and so framed the world; this Bell also producing the stars, the sun, and the moon, and the five planets. From whicb testimony of Berosus, according to the version of Alexander Polypitost, by the way it appears also, that the ancient Chaldeans acknowledged one supreme Deity, the maker of the whole world, as they are also celebrated for this in that oracle of Apollo, which is cited out of Porphyry by Eusibius,

Where the Chaldeans are joined with the Hebrews, as worshipping likewise in a holy manner one self-existent Deity. Wherefore, if Diodorus were not altogether mistaken, it must be concluded, that in the latter times, the Chaldeans (then perhaps receiving the doctrine of Aristotle) did desert and abandon the tradition of their ancestors concerning the Cosmogonia. But the Egyptians, however they attributed more antiquity to the world than they ought, yet seem to have had a constant persuasion of the beginning of

1 Lib XVII. p. 764.  
2 In Timo. p. 734.  
3 Lib. II. p. 83 Edit. Hanov. 1644.  
4 Apud Georg. Syria. in Chronico p. 29.
it, and the firmest of all other nations: they (as Kircher tells us) therefore picturing Horus, or the world, as a young man bearded, not only to signify its constant youthful and flourishing vigour, but also the youngness and newness of its duration. Neither ought it to be suspected, that though the Egyptians held the world to have had a beginning, yet they conceived it to be made by chance without a God, as Anaximander, Democritus, and Epicurus afterwards did; the contrary thereunto being so confessed a thing, that Simplicius, a zealous contender for the world's eternity, affirms the Mosaic history of its creation by God to have been nothing else but μύθοι Αἰγυπτίων, Egyptian fables. The place is so considerable, that I shall here set it down in the author's own language; Εἰ δὲ τὸν τῶν Ἱσδαίων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλῳ Ἀ. ἡμείς τὸν Ἱσδάιων νομοθέτη τεπίκρισιμως λέγωμεν, τὸν Ἀγγέλistringstream text.
the virtuous and pious souls should after this life enjoy a state of happiness in celestial or spiritual bodies. And the Egyptian doctrine is represented after the same manner by Porphyrius in Stobæus 1, as also in the Hermetic or Trismegistick writings. Moreover, Chalcidius reports, that Hermes Trismegist, when he was about to die, made an oration to this purpose; That he had here lived in this earthly body but an exile and stranger, and was now returning home to his own country; so that his death ought not to be lamented, this life being rather to be accounted death. Which persuasion the Indian Brahmanus also were embued withal, whether they received it from the Egyptians (as they did some other things) or no; τὸν μὲν ἐδόθη βίον, ὡς ἄναμνην κοιμήτων ἐναί, τὸν δὲ Σάκιλον γένετο εἰς τὸν ὄφος διόν, That this life here is but the life of embryo’s, and that death [to good men] is a generation or birth into true life.

And this may the better be believed to have been the Egyptian doctrine, because Diodorus himself hath some passages founding that way; as that the Egyptians lamented not the death of good men, but applauded their happiness, ὥς τὸν αἰώνα διατρέχει μίλλατες καὶ άναμνην ἐναί, as being to live ever in the other world with the pious. However, it being certain from this Egyptian doctrine of pre-existence and transmigration, that the Egyptians did afford the soul’s incorporeity, it cannot reasonably be doubted, but that they acknowledged also an incorporeal Deity. The objection against which, from what Porphyrius writeth concerning Charchemon, will be answered afterwards.

We come in the last place to the theology of the Egyptians. Now it is certain, that the Egyptians besides their vulgar and fabulous theology (which is for the most part that which Diodorus Siculus 2 describes) had another ἀναμνής τοῦ ζωῆς, arcane and recondite theology, that was concealed from the vulgar, and communicated only to the kings, and such priests and others, as were thought capable thereof; these two theologies of theirs differing, as Aristole’s Exotericks and Acroamatics. Thus much is plainly declared by Origen, whose very name was Egyptian, it being interpreted Hora-genitus, (which Horus was an Egyptian God) upon occasion of Celsus his boasting, that he thoroughly understood all that belonged to Christianiety: Celsus (faith he) seemeth here to me to do just as if a man travelling into Egypt, where the wise men of the Egyptians, according to their country learning, philosophize much about those things, that are accounted by them divine, whilst the idiots in the mean time bearing only certain fables, which they know not the meaning of, are very much pleased therewith; Celsus, I say, doth as if such a sojourner in Egypt, who had conversed only with these idiots, and not been at all instructed by any of the priests in their arcane and recondite mysteries, should boast, that he knew all that belonged to the Egyptian theology. Where the same Origen also adds, that this was not a thing proper neither to the Egyptians only to have such an arcane and true theology, distinct from their vulgar and fabulous one, but common with them to the Persians, Syrians, and other Barbarian Pagans; διί δὲ εἴπων πείρι Ἀγαπητῶν σεβόμεν τε καὶ ἱερετῶν δουλού ὑποτευ νατόν καὶ πείρι Περσῶν, &c. What we have now affirmed (faith he) concerning the difference between the wise men and the idiots among the Egyptians, the same may be said also of the Persians, amongst whom the religious rites are performed rationally by those, that

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2 Lib. I. p. 33.
are ingenious, whilst the superficial vulgar look no further in the observation of them, than the external symbol or ceremony. And the same is true likewise concerning the Syrians and Indians, and all those other nations, who have, besides their religious fables, a learning and doctrine. Neither can it be dissembled, that Origen in this place plainly intimates the same also concerning Christianity itself; namely, that besides the outside and exterior cortex of it (in which notwithstanding there is nothing fabulous) communicated to all, there was a more arcane and recondite doctrine belonging thereunto, which all were not alike capable of; he elsewhere observing this to be that wildom, that St. Paul spake amongst the perfect. From whence he concludes, that Celsus vainly boasted, πάλιν γὰρ οἶδα, For I know all things belonging to Christianity, when he was acquainted only with the exterior surface of it. But concerning the Egyptians, this was a thing most notewd and observed by sundry other writers; as for example Clemens of Alexandria, a man also well acquainted with the affairs of Egypt; Διότι ἐγὼ τοῖς ἐπίσκοποις τὰ παρὰ σφίγνους αὐθεντισάμενος, ὡς μὴν βρεθῶν τοι τῶν ἰδίων τῶν αὐθεντισάμενος ἥκεσιν, ἀλλὰ ὡς μὲν ἐκεῖνος τετυγχαίος τοῦ δικαίωμας τῆς βασιλείας προέδρου, χιτονίον δὲ τὸ τοῦ στρομ. I. 5. ἀποτέλεσαι τοῖς κριτικοῖς εἰς ὅλον δικαίωμας, ἀπὸ τοῦ τῆς τετυγχαίος τῆς τετυγχαίος ἀποτέλεσα. The Egyptians do not reveal their religious mysteries promiscuously to all, nor communicate the knowledge of divine things to the profane, but only to those, who are to succeed in the kingdom, and to such of the priests, as are judged most fitly qualified for the same, upon account both of their birth and education. With which agreeeth also the testimony of Plutarch, he adding a further confirmation thereof from the Egyptian Sphinxes, οἱ μὲν μαχιμῶν ἀπεδειγμένοι ἐν βασιλείᾳ ζητεῖν, De Is. & Oph. εὐθὺς ἦν ἡ τῶν ἰδίων ἔργων, μετείχεισι τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπικεκουμένης τά πολλά μῦθοι καὶ 354 λόγοις, ἐμφάνιζον τῆς αἰσθησίας τῇ διάφορας ἐξαιτίας ὑπὲρ ἀμφιτραὶ τὰ παραδειγματές αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ τῆς σφίγνους ἐπικεκουμένης ἀποτέλεσα, ὡς αἰσθητή οἰκονομία τῆς θεολογίας αὐτῶν ἱκέσι. When amongst the Egyptians there is any king chosen out of the military order, be it forthwith brought to the priests, and by them instructed in that arcane theology, which conceals mysterious truths under obscure fables and allegories. Wherefore they place Sphinxes before their temples, to signify, that their theology contained a certain arcane and enigmatical wisdom in it. And this meaning of the Sphinxes in the Egyptian temples is confirmed likewise by Clemens Alexandrinus, διὰ τιτό τοῦ τῆς ἀναγγελίας πρὸ τῶν ἱδίων τῆς σφίγνους ἲσχύος, ως αἰσθητή οἰκονομία τῆς ἱσχύος τῆς νοησίας. Therefore do the Egyptians place Sphinxes before their temples, to declare thereby, that the doctrine concerning God is enigmatical and obscure. Notwithstanding which, we acknowledge, that the same Clemens gives another interpretation also of those Sphinxes, or conjecture concerning them, which may not be unworthy to be here read, τάχα δὲ καὶ ἑτεροίῳ τοῖς ἱεραίς ἐστι καὶ φανερωταί τοῖς ἱεραίς ἁγαθοῖς μὲν ὡς προσφυγοὶ καὶ εὐσεβεῖς τοῖς ἱεραίς, ἐστι νομοί καὶ ὡς ἀπαραπέταιτο εἰκονίας τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ἐστὶν γὰρ ὑμῖν καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ σφῖνξ ἀνατρέπει τὸ εἰκονιοῦσθαι. But perhaps the meaning of those Egyptian Sphinxes might be also to signify, that the Deity ought both to be loved and feared, to be loved as benign and propitious to the holy, but to be feared as inexorably just to the impious, the Sphinx being made up of the image both of a man and a lion. Moreover, besides these Sphinxes, the Egyptians had

had also Harpocrates and Sigilions in their temples, which are thus described by the poet

The Egyptians, besides their vulgar, Book I.

Quique prement vocem, digitoque silentia suadent.

D. H. Ofr. The meaning of which Harpocrates is thus exprefled by Plutarch, τοι δ' Ἀρσεναράτην, ἐ θεόν ἄτλητα καὶ νότιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ Ἐλληνικὸν ἔσον ἀδικών, λόγῳ νεκροῖς καὶ ἄτλητας καὶ ἄθανατοις προσ-άτων καὶ σωφροσύνης, εἰ τε συμαίνει τινὶ δείκλου ξένης προεξάλειμνων, ἰχθυμοίς καὶ εἰσεῦδες σώμαλον. The Harpocrates of the Egyptians is not to be taken for an imperfect and infant God, but for the president of men's speech concerning the gods, that is but imperfect, balbutient and inarticulate, and the regulator or corrector of the fame; his finger upon his mouth being a symbol of silence and taciturnity. It is very true, that some Christians have made another interpretation of this Egyptian Harpocrates, as if the meaning of it had been this; that the gods of the Egyptians had been all of them really nothing else but mortal men, but that this was a secret, that was to be concealed from the vulgar. Which conceit, however it be witty, yet it is devoid of truth; and doubtless the meaning of those Egyptian Harpocrates was no other than this, that either the supreme and incomprehensible Deity was to be adored with silence, or not spoken of without much caution and circumpection; or else that the arcane mysteries of theology were not to be promiscuously communicated, but concealed from the profane vulgar. Which same thing seems to have been also signified by that yearly feast kept by the Egyptians in honour of Thoth or Hermes, when the priests eating honey and figs pronounced those words, γενεά ἡ ἀλθεία, Truth is sweet; as also by that amulet, which Isis was fabled to have worn about her, the interpretation whereof was Φων ἀληθῆ, True speech.

This ἀπίθητος θεολογία, this arcane and reconcile theology of the Egyptians, was concealed from the vulgar in two manner of ways, by fables of allegories, and by symbols or hieroglyphicks. Eusebius informs us, that Porphyryus wrote a book Περὶ τὸς ἀλληγορικὸς Ἑλληνικὸς καὶ Αιγυπτιων θεολογίας, concerning the allegorical theology both of the Greeks and Egyptians. And here by the way we may obferve, that this business of allegorizing in matters of religion had not its first and only rise amongst the Christians, but was a thing very much in ufe among the Pagan theologers also: and therefore Celsus in Origen 3 commends some of the Christians for this, that they could allegorize ingeniously and handifomely. It is well known, how both Plutarch 4 and Synesius 3 allegorized those Egyptian fables of Isis and Osiris, the one to a philosophical, the other to a political fene. And the Egyptian hieroglyphicks, which were figures not answering to sounds or words, but immediately representing the objects and conceptions of the mind, were chiefly made ufe of by them to this purpo 5 to express the mysteries of their religion and theology, so as that they might be concealed from the profane vulgar. For which cause the hieroglyphick learning of the Egyptians is commonly taken for one and the fame thing with their arcane theology,
or metaphysicks. And this the author of the questions and answers ad Orthodoxes 1 tells us was anciently had in much greater esteem amongst the Egyptians, than all their other learning; and that therefore Moses was as well instructed in this hieroglyphick learning and metaphysical theology of theirs, as in their mathematicks. And for our parts, we doubt not, but that the Mensa Hyaca lately published, containing so many strange and uncouth hieroglyphicks in it, was something of this ἀποκρυπτός θεολογία, this arcane theology of the Egyptians, and not mere history, as some imagine; though the late confident Oedipus seems to arrogate too much to himself, in pretending to such a certain and exact interpretation of it. Now as it is reasonable to think, that in all those Pagan nations, where there was another theology besides the vulgar, the principal part thereof was the doctrine of one supreme and universal Deity, the Maker of the whole world; so can it not well be conceived, what this ἀποκρυπτός and ἀποκρυπτέος and αὐγήματάδες θεολογία, this arcane and mysterious and enigmatical theology of the Egyptians, so much talked of, should be other than a kind of metaphysicks concerning God, as one perfect incorporeal Being, the original of all things.

We know nothing of any moment, that can be objected against this, save only that, which Porphyrius, in his epistle to Anebo an Egyptian priest, writeth concerning Charimon 2, Χαρίμηνω μεν γάρ, ή ἄλλοι, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι περὶ Pr. Ex. Lib. 3 τῶν ὁμολογών κόσμων ἡμῶν ἐν ψευδόν παρενοχεῖ τῆς Ἀιγυπτίως, ἀλλ' ἄλλως ήτοι, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι περὶ τῶν πλανῶν λεγομένων, καὶ τῶν συμπληρώσεων τῶν ζωικῶν, &c. Charimon and others acknowledge nothing before this visible and corporeal world, alleging for the countenance of their opinion such of the Egyptians, as talk of no other gods, but the planets and those stars, that fill up the Zodiack, or rise together with them, their decans, and horoscopes, and robust princes, as they call them; whose names are also inserted into their almanacks or ephemerides, together with the times of their risings and settings, and the prognosticks or significations of future events for them. For he observed, that those Egyptians, who made the sun the Demiurgus or architect of the world, interpreted the stories of Isis and Osiris, and all those other religious fables, into nothing but stars, and planets, and the river Nile, ἡν οὐς πάλιν εἰς τὸν Χανθάν, ἡν ἄλλοι ἐν αὐστρικίς ἡς ζώον τοις ζωικῶν, and referred all things universally into natural or inanimate, nothing into incorporeal and living substances. Which passage of Porphyrius concerning Charimon, we confess, Eusebius lays great stress upon, endeavouring to make advantage of it, first against the Egyptians, and then against the Greeks and other Pagans, as deriving their religion and theology from them: It is manifest from hence, faith he, that the very arcane theology of the Egyptians defied nothing but stars and planets, and acknowledged no incorporeal principal or demiurgick reason as the cause of this universe, but only the visible sun. And then he concludes in this manner, See now what is become of this arcane theology of the Egyptians, that defies nothing but senseless matter or dead inanimate bodies. But it is well known, that Eusebius took all advantages possible, to represent the Pagans to the worst, and render their theology ridiculous and absurd; nevertheless what he here urgeth against the Egyptians

1 Inter Jodini Martyris Opera, Quaestion. Mystereis Aegyptior. publ. at Oxford by
& Retron. XXV. p. 466. Dr. Theo. Gal.
2 This Epistle is prefixed to Jamblichuni de

An Objection from Chereomon answered. Book I.

... is the less valuable, because himself plainly contradicts it elsewhere, declaring, that the Egyptians acknowledged a demiurgick reason and intellectual architect of the world, which consequnently was the maker of the sun; and confessing the fame of the other Pagans also. Now to affirm, that the Egyptians acknowledged no other deity than inanimate matter and the senefeles corporeal world, is not only to deny that they had any αὐτόφυσις, Σειρολογία, any arcane theology at all (which yet hath been sufficiently proved) but also to render them absolute Atheists. For if this be not atheism, to acknowledge no other deity besides dead and senefeles matter, then the word hath no significane. Chereomon indeed seems to impute this opinion (not to all the Egyptians) but to some of them; and it is very possible, that there might be some Atheists amongst the Egyptians also, as well as amongst the Greeks and their philosophers. And doubtless this Chereomon himself was a kind of astrological Atheist; for which cause we conclude, that it was not Chereomon the Stoick, from whom notwithstanding Porphyrius in his book of abstinence citeth certain other things concerning the Egyptians, but either that Chereomon, whom Strabo made use of in Egypt, or else some other of that name. But that there ever was or can be any such religious Atheists, as Eusebius with some others imagine, who though acknowledging no Deity, besides dead and senefeles matter, notwithstanding devoutly court and worship the same, constantly invoking it and imploring its assistance, as expecting great benefit to themselves thereby; this we confes is such a thing, as we have not faith enough to believe, it being a fortifnness and contradicitious nonse, that is not incident to human nature. Neither can we doubt, but that all the devout Pagans acknowledged some living and understanding deities or other; nor easily believe, that they ever worshipped any inanimate or senefeles bodies, otherwise than as some way referring to the same, or as images and symbols of them. But as for that passage in Porphyrius his epistle concerning Chereomon, where he only propounds doubts to Anebos the Egyptian priest, as defining further information from him concerning them, Jamblichus hath given us a full anwer to it, under the person of Abanmo another Egyptian priest, which notwithstanding hath not hitherto been at all taken notice of, because Ficinus and Sculetius not understanding the word Chereomon to be a proper name, ridiculouly turned it in their translations, optaremn and ganderem, thereby also perverting the whole senfe. The words in the Greek MS. (now in the hands of my learned friend Mr. Gale) run thus: Χαίρεται δὲ καὶ οὕτως ἄλλω, τῶν περὶ τὸν κόσμον ἀποτελέον πρῶτον αἰτίων, τῶν τελευταίας ἀρχῶν ἐξηγοῦσαι, ὥστε τὸ τόπον αὑτοῦ, καὶ τὸν θεῖον, τῆς δὲ ἐκκόσμου, καὶ ἀκρο Reggie, καὶ τῶν λεγομένων κρατικῶν ἡμιμαῖων παραδίδει, τῆς μερίτους τῶν ἀρχῶν διανομῶν ἀπαραίτως, τούτῳ εἰς τὸν ἀλμπίνων μέγας τοῦ βεγαχτατων περίγεις τῶν ἔρεμων διατάξεως, καὶ τα περὶ αὖτην ἡ φάσιν, ἡ φώνης, η σέλευς αὐγήσας, καὶ μειωμένην ἐκ τῶν ἑρώτων εἰς τὸν Ἀιγυπτίων αἰσθητικῶν, Φιλός τὴ θεία τῆς, καὶ τῶν μετὰ αὐτοῦ τῆς συνεργίας. Ἐν ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς μόνω, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐφ' ἕμων, νῦν τε καὶ λόγοι προεπτόμενοι καὶ λαμ- της εὑτας, ὅταν ὀρκυνοίκι τοις τῷ γνῶσιμα. But Chereomon and those others, who pretend to write of the first causes of the world, declare only the least and

lowest principles, as likewise they who treat of the planets, the zodiac, the decans, the horoscopes, and the robusf princes. And those things, that are in the Egyptian almanack (or ephemerides) contain the least part of the Hermaical institutions, namely, the phases and occultations of the stars, the increase and decrease of the moon, and the like astrological matters, which things have the lowest place in the Egyptian etiology. Nor do the Egyptians resolve all things into (fensles) nature, but they distinguish both the life of the soul, and the intellectual life from that of nature, and that not only in ourselves, but also in the universe; they determining mind and reason first to have existed of themselves, and so this whole world to have been made. Wherefore they acknowledge before the heaven, and in the heaven a living power, and place pure mind above the world, as the Demiurgus and architect thereof. From which testimony of Jamblicbus, who was but little junior to Porphyrius, and contemporary with Eusebius, and who had made it his business to inform himself thoroughly concerning the theology of the Egyptians, it plainly appears, that the Egyptians did not generally suppose (as Chereemon pretended concerning some of them) a sensless inanimate nature to be the first original of all things, but that as well in the world as in ourselves, they acknowledged soul superior to nature, and mind or intellect superior to soul, this being the Demiurgus of the world. But we shall have afterwards occasion more opportunely to cite other passages out of this Jamblicbus his Egyptian mysteries to the same purpose.

Wherefore there is no pretence at all to suspect, that the Egyptians were universally Atheists and Anarchists, such as supposed no living understanding Deity, but resolved all into sensless matter, as the first and highest principle; but all the question is, whether they were not Polyarchists, such as asserted a multitude of understanding deities self-existent or unmade. Now, that monarchy was an essential part of the arcane and true theology of the Egyptians A. Steuebus Eugubinus, and many other learned men, have thought to be unquestionably evident from the Hermetic or Trismegistic writings, they taking it for granted, that there are all genuine and sincere. Whereas there is too much cause to suspect, that there have been some pious frauds practised upon these Trismegistic writings, as well as there were upon the Sibylline, and that every whole books of them have been counterfeited by pretended Christians, or at least several spurious and supposititious passages here and there inferred into some of them. Isaac Caiusbon*), who was the first discoverer, has taken notice of many such in that first Hermetic book, entitled, Parnander; some also in the fourth book, inscribed Crater, and some in the thirteenth called the sermon in the mount concerning regeneration; which may justly render those three whole books, or at least the first and last of them, to be suspeded. We shall here repeat none of Caiusbon's condemned passages, but add one more to them out of the thirteenth book, or sermon in the mount, which, however omitted by him, seems to be more rankly Christian than any other; λέγε μοι τότε τίς έστιν πανδικός τίς παλαιστήριος τίς παλιστυπτής; αντίσπον τις, ἄλλος α interrogat. Tell me this also, who is the cause or worker of regeneration? The son of God, one man by the will of God.


Wherefore,
Wherefore, though Ab. Kircherus contends with much zeal for the sincerity of all these Trismegistick books; yet we must needs pronounce of the three forementioned, at least the Pamander properly so called, and the sermon in the mount, that they were either wholly forged and counterfeited by some pretended Christians, or else had many spurious passages inferred into them. Wherefore, it cannot be solidly proved from the Trismegistick books after this manner; as supposed to be all alike genuine and sincere, that the Egyptian Pagans acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen: much less can the same be evinced from that pretended Aristotelick book, De secretiore parte divina sapientiae secundum Aegyptios, greedily swallowed down also by Kircherus, but unquestionably pseudepigraphous.

Notwithstanding which, we conceive, that though all the Trismegistick books, that now are or have been formerly extant, had been forged by some pretended Christians, as that book of the arcane Egyptian wisdom was by some philosopher, and imputed to Aristotle; yet would they for all that, upon another account, afford no inconsiderable argument to prove, that the Egyptian Pagans ascertained one supreme Deity, viz. because every cheat and imposture must needs have some basis or foundation of truth to stand upon; there must have been something truly Egyptian in such counterfeit Egyptian writings, (and therefore this at least of one supreme Deity) or else they could never have obtained credence at first, or afterwards have maintained the same. The rather, because these Trismegistick books were delivered in those ancient times, before the Egyptian paganism and their succession of priests were yet extinct; and therefore had that, which is so much infilited upon in them, been diffanton from the Egyptian theology, they must needs have been presently exploded as mere lies and forgeries. Wherefore, we say again, that if all the Hermaick or Trismegistick books, that are now extant, and those to boot, which being mentioned in ancient Fathers have been lost, as the τὰ γεν. and the τὰ διεσυμν. and the like, had been nothing but the pious frauds and cheats of Christians, yet must there needs have been some truth at the bottom to give subsistence to them; this at least, that Hermes Trismegist, or the Egyptian priests, in their arcane and true theology, really acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen.

But it does not at all follow, that, because some of these Hermaick or Trismegistick books now extant were counterfeit or supposititious, that therefore all of them must needs be such; and not only so, but those also, that are mentioned in the writings of ancient Fathers, which are now lost. Wherefore, the learned Casanbon seems not to have reckoned or concluded well, when from the detection of forgery in two or three of those Trismegistick books at most, he pronounces of them all universally, that they were nothing but Christian cheats and impoftures. And probably he was led into this mistake, by reason of his too securely following that vulgar error, (which yet had been confuted by Patricius) that all that was published by Ficinus under the name of Hermes Trismegist, was but one and the fame book Pamander, consisting of several chapters; whereas they are all indeed so many

1 In Obelisco Pamphylio p. 35. & in Oedipo Aegyptiac. Cl. XII. Cap. III.
many distinct and independent books, whereof 

Paulander is only placed 

first. However, there was no shadow of reason, why the 

Aphelipus should have fallen under the same condemnation, nor 

several other books superadded by 

Patricius, they being unquestionably distinct from the 

Paulander, and no signs of spuriousness or baftardly discovered in them. 

Much less ought those Trismegistick books cited by the Fathers, and 

now lost, have been condemned also unseen. Wherefore, notwithstanding 

all that 

Cajander has written, there may very well be some Hermetick or 

Trismegistick books genuine, though all of them be not such; 

that is, according to our after-declaration, there may be such books, as 

were really Egyptian, and not counterfeit by any Christian, though 

perhaps not written by 

Hermes Tris megist himself, nor in the Egyptian language. And as it cannot well be conceived, how there should have 

been any counterfeit Egyptian books, had there been none at all real; 

so that there were some real and genuine, will perhaps be rendered pro-

bable by these following considerations.

That there was anciently, amongst the Egyptians such a man as 

Thoth, 

Theuth, or 

Taul, who, together with letters, was the first inventor of arts 

and sciences, as arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and of the hieroglyphic 

learning, (therefore called by the Greeks Hermes, and by the Latins 

Mercurius) cannot reasonably be denied; it being a thing confirmed by 

general fame in all ages, and by the testimonies not only of 

Sanchoniathon 

a Phenician historiographer, who lived about the times of the Trojan war, 

and wrote a book concerning the theology of the Egyptians, and 

Manetho's 

Sebennyt, an Egyptian priest, contemporary with Plut. Philadelpbus; but also 

of that grave philosopher Plato, who is said to have sojourned thirteen 

years in Egypt, that in his 

Phileus speaks of him as the first inventor of letters, (who distinguished betwixt vowels and consonants determining their 

several numbers) there calling him either a God or divine man; but in his 

Phaedrus attributes to him also the invention of arithmetic, geometry 

and astronomy, together with some ludicrous recreations, making him either 

a God or demon, ἤνωτα περὶ Ναύαρρατος τοῖς Διπυτη, γνώρισ ς τοῖς ηνία, παλαιόις 

tικὼν Σίων, ἢ γὰρ τὸ βράσι τὸ μέγα ἢ γὰρ καλός ἢ θάνος, αὐτῷ ὑπὸ διοκτι 

τοῖς δαίμονες ἐπὶ θεῖοι. I have heard (faith he) that about Naucratis in Egypt, there was one 

of the ancient Egyptian gods, to whom the bird Ibis was sacred, as his 

symbol or hieroglyphick; the name of which demon was Theuth. In which place the 

philosopher subjoins also an ingenious dispute betwixt this Theuth, and 

Thamus the king of Egypt, concerning the convenience and inconvenience 

of letters; the former boasting of that invention ὡς μνήμης ἡς οὐσίας 

Φάραγχια, as a remedy for memory, and great help to wisdom, but the latter contending, 

that it would rather beget oblivion, by the neglect of memory, and therefore 

was not so properly μνήμης as ὑπομνήμως 

Φάραγχια, a remedy for memory, as reminiscence, or the recovery of things forgotten: adding, that it would also weaken and enervate mens natural faculties by flinging them, and rather beget ὄξαν οὐσίας, than ἀλλήλως, a puffy conceit and opinion.

T t 2

1 Apud Eufeb. Prepar. Evang. Lib. I. Cap. 2. 3 P. 75. 4 P. 356. 3
of knowledge, by a multifarious rabble of indigested notions, than the truth thereof. Moreover, since it is certain, that the Egyptians were famous for literature before the Greeks, they must of necessity have some one or more founders of learning amongst them, as the Greeks had; and Thoth is the only or first person celebrated amongst them upon this account, in remembrance of whom the first month of the year was called by that name. Which Thoth is generally supposed to have lived in the times of the Patriarchs, or considerably before Moses; Moses himself being said to have been instructed in that learning, which owed its original to him.

Again, besides this Thoth or Thonoth, who was called the first Hermes, the Egyptians had also afterwards another eminent advance or restorer of learning, who was called Ἀιτικος Hermes; the second Hermes; they perhaps supposing the soul of Thoth, or the first Hermes, to have come into him by transmigration, but his proper Egyptian name was Siphoas, as Syncellus out of Manetho informs us: Σ.φαξος, ὁ Ἰτηνιαν Πέρις, Σιφοας, (who is also Hermes) the son of Vulcan. This is he, who is said to have been the father of Tat, and to have been surnamed Τετούμενος, Ter Maximus, (he being so styled by Manetho, Jamblichus, and others.) And he is placed by Eusebius in the fiftieth year after the Israelitish Exits, though probably somewhat too early. The former of these two Hermes was the inventor of arts and sciences; the latter, the restorer and advance of them: the first wrote in Hieroglyphicks upon pillars, in τον Στροτα δη (as the learned Valesius conjectures it should be read, instead of Στρατας) which Syringes what they were, Am. Marcellinus will instruct us. The second interpreted and translated those Hieroglyphicks, composing many books in several arts and sciences; the number whereof set down by Jamblichus must needs be fabulous, unless it be understood of paragraphs or verses. Which Trismegistick or Hermetick books were said to be carefully preserved by the priests, in the interior recesses of their temples.

But besides the Hieroglyphicks written by the first Hermes, and the books composed by the second, (who was called also Trismegist) it cannot be doubted, but that there were many other books written by the Egyptian priests successively in several ages. And Jamblichus informs us, in the beginning of his mysteries, Thot Hermes, the God of eloquence, and president or patron of all true knowledge concerning the gods, was formerly accounted common to all the priests, insomuch, that to αὐτον της σωτης εἰρήματα αὐτῷ ἀντιτίθεσθαι ἐκμήν πάντα τα ἱερεῖα συγγράμματα ἰπνομαζόλες, they dedicated the inventions of their wisdom to him, entitling their own books to Hermes Trismegist. Now though one reason hereof might probably have been thought to have been this, because those books were supposed to have been written according to the tenour of the old Hermetonick or Trismegistick doctrine; yet Jamblichus here acquaints us with the chief ground of it, namely this, that though Hermes was once a mortal man, yet he was afterward deified by the Egyptians, (which is testified also by Plato) and
made to be the tutelar God, and fator of all arts and sciences, but especially theology; by whose inspiration therefore all such books were conceived to have been written. Nay further, we may observe, that in some of the Hermaic or Trifmegiſtick books now extant, Hermes is sometimes put for the divine wisdom or understanding itself. And now we see the true reason, why there have been many books called Hermetical and Trifmegiſtical; some of which, notwithstanding, cannot possibly be conceived to have been of such great antiquity, nor written by Hermes Trifmegiſt himself, viz. because it was customary with the Egyptian priests to intitle their own philosophick and theologicick books to Hermes. Moreover, it is very probable, that several of the books of the Egyptian priests of latter times were not originally written in the Egyptian language, but the Greek; because, at least from the Ptolemaick kings downward, Greek was become very familiar to all the learned Egyptians, and in a manner vulgarly spoken, as may appear from those very words, Hermes, Trifmegiſt, and the like, so commonly used by them, together with the proper names of places; and because the Coptick language to this very day hath more of Greek than Egyptian words in it; nay, Plutarch ventures to etymologize those old Egyptian names, Isis, Osiris, Horus and Typhon, from the Greek, as if the Egyptians had been anciently well acquainted with that language.

Now, that some of those ancient Hermaic books, written by Hermes Trifmegiſt himself, or believed to be such by the Egyptians, and kept in the custody of their priests, were still in being and extant amongst them, after the times of Christianity, seems to be unquestionable from the testimony of that pious and learned father Clemens Alexandrinus, he giving this Strom. 6. p. particular account of them, after the mentioning of their opinion concerning the transmigration of souls: The Egyptians follow a certain peculiar philosophy of their own, which may be best declared by setting down the order of their religious procession. First, therefore, goes the Precentor, carrying two of Hermes his books along with him; the one of which contains the hymns of the gods, the other directions for the king’s office. After him follows the Horoscoopus, who is particularly instructed in Hermes his astrological books, which are four. Then succeeds the Hierogrammatæus or sacred scribe, with feathers upon his head, and a book and rule in his bands, to whom it belongeth to be thoroughly acquainted with the hieroglyphicks, as also with cosmography, geography, the order of the sun and moon and five planets, the chorography of Egypt, and description of Nile. In the next place cometh the Steilætes, who is to be thoroughly instructed in those ten books, which treat concerning the honour of the gods, the Egyptian worship, sacrifices, first-fruits, prayers, pomp, and festivals. And last of all marches the prophet, who is president of the temple and sacred things, and ought to be thoroughly versed in those other ten books called clerical, concerning laws, the gods, and the whole discipline of the priests. Wherefore, amongst the books of Hermes, there are forty two accounted most necessary; of which thirty six, containing all the Egyptian philosophy, were to be learned by those particular orders before men-
Hermaick Books acknowledged

Book I.

There were certain Books really Egyptian, and called Hermaical or Trismegistical, (whether written by the ancient Hermes Trismegist himself, or by other Egyptian priests of latter times, according to the tenor of his doctrine, and only intitled to him) which, after the times of Christianity, began to be taken notice of by other nations, the Greeks and Latins, seems probable from hence, because such books are not only mentioned and acknowledged by Christian writers and fathers, but also by Pagans and philosophers. In Plutarch's discourse de Iyde & Osride, we read thus of them: "Εν δε ταύτη Ἑσυχ ληγμονίας βιβλίων, ἵππουσι πτέρυγια, περὶ τῶν ιερῶν οὐσιών, ὅτι τίνι μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς τῷ οἴνοι περίφορος τεταγμένον ἄνων, ταύτης Ἑλληνικὰ δὲ Ἀπολλωνικα καλοῦσιν, τε ὧν ἐπὶ τὸ πνεύματος, οἷς μὲν Ὀσρομ, οἷς τοῖς Σάρπινν, οἷς τοῖς Σιλεσίους Ἀσιοπάτοις. In the books called Hermes's, or Hermaical, it is reported to have been written concerning sacred names, that the power appointed to preside over the motion of the sun is called by the Egyptians Horus (as by the Greeks Apollo) and that, which presides over the air and wind, is called by some Osiris, by others Sarapis, and by others Sothi, in the Egyptian language. Now these sacred names in Plutarch seem to be several names of God; and therefore, whether these Hermaick books of his were the same with those in Clemens Alexandrinus, such as were supposed by the Egyptians to have been written by Hermes Trismegist himself, or other books written by Egyptian priests, according to the tenor of this doctrine; we may by the way observe, that, according to the Hermaical or Trismegistical doctrine, one and the same Deity was worshipped under several names and notions, according to its several powers and virtues, manifested in the world; which is a thing afterwards more to be instilled on. Moreover, it hath been generally believed, that L. Apuleius Madaurenfis, an eminent Platonick philosopher, and zealous afferter of paganism, was the translator of the Alexandrian dialogue of Hermes Trismegist out of Greek into Latin; which therefore hath been accordingly published with Apuleius his works. And Barbium affirms, that St. Augustine does somewhere expressly impute this version to Apuleius; but we confess we have not yet met with the place. However, there seems to be no sufficient reason, why Colinus should call this into question from the style and Latin. Again, it is certain, that Jablichus doth not only mention these Hermaick books, under the name of τοῖς Ρεγμάσιοι, the books that are carried up and down as Hermes's, or vulgarly imputed to him; but also vindicate them from the imputation of impollure. Nor as if there were any suspicion at all of that, which Osausbon is so confident of, that these Hermaick books were all forged by Christians; but because some might then possibly imagine them to have been counterfeited by philosophers; wherefore it will be convenient here to set down the whole passage of Jablichus concerning it, as it is in the Greek MS. δεκαεξηγηθηκόν.
whereas, Jamblichus
notwithstanding thefe books, which Porphyrius faid be met withal, (namely the Hermack, and thofe writings of Charemon) will be clear and easy. For the books vulgarly imputed to Hermes doth really contain the Hermack opinions and doctrines in them, although they often fpeak the language of philosophers; the reafon whereof is, because they were tranflation out of the Egyptian tongue by men not unacquainted with philosophy. But Charemon and thofe others, &c. Where it is firft observable, that Jamblicbus doth not affirm thofe Hermack books to have been written by Hermes Trismegift himself, he calling them only τα Φιλοσοφικα Διαλογισματα, the books that were carried about as Hermes's. But that which he affirneth of them is this, that they did really contain the Hermackal opinions, and derive their original from Egypt. Again, whereas fome might then poibly suspect, that thofe Hermack books had been counterfeited by Greek philosophers, and contained nothing but the Greek learning in them, because they fpeak fo much the philofophick language, Jamblicbus gives an account of this alfo, that the reafon hereof was, because they were tranflation out of the Egyptian language by men skilful in the Greek philosophy, who therefore added fomething of their own fhrance and notion to them. It is true indeed, that moft of thofe Hermack books, which now we have, feem to have been written originally in Greek; notwithstanding which, others of them, and particularly thofe that are now loft, as τα Γενεαλογικα, and the like, might, as Jamblicbus here affinmeth, have been tranflation out of the Egyptian tongue, but by their tranlators difguifid with philofophick language and other Greekick things intermixed with them. Moreover, from the forecited paffage of Jamblicbus we may clearly collect, that Porphyrius in his epifile to Anebo the Egyptian prieft (of which epifile there are only fome small fragments left 1) did alfo make mention of thofe Hermack writings; and whereas he found the writings of Charemon to be contradictory to them, therefore defired to be resolved by that Egyptian prieft, whether the doctrine of thofe Hermack books were genuine and truly Egyptian, or no. Now, Jamblicbus in his anfwer here affinmeth, that the doctrine of the ancient Hermes, or the Egyptian theology, was as to the fubftance truly repreffed in thofe books, (vulgarly imputed to Hermes) but not fo by Charemon. Laftly, St. Cyril of Alexandria informs us, that there was an edition of thofe Hermack or Trismegiftick books (compiled together) formerly made at Athens, under this title, Ἡρμαϊκα περιοδιακα βιβλια, fifteen Hermack books. Which Her-
maicks, Cecanbon, conceiving them to have been published before Jamb-
licbus his time, took them for thofe Salaminiaca, which he found in the Latin translations of Jamblicbus, made by Ficinus and Suetellius; whereas, indeed, he was here abufed by thofe tranlators, there being no fuch thing to be found in the Greek copy. But the word αλμειναια, (not understood by

1 These fragments are prefixed to Dr. Gale's Edition of Jamblicus de Nipis, Egyptian.

2 Exercit. 1. in Baronii Annal. p. 55.
by them) being turned into *Salaminaca*, Cafaubon therefore conjectured them to have been those Hermaick books published at Athens, because *Salamin* was not far distant from thence. Now, it cannot be doubted, but that this edition of Hermaick books at Athens was made by some philosopher or Pagans, and not by Christians; this appearing also from the words of St. Cyril himself, where, having spoken of Moses and the agreement of Hermes with him, he adds, Πεποίηται δι’ υἱὸν μονόν, εἰ δὲ οὐχ ἐστὶν θεόν, οὐ συνειδητικῶς Ἀθικῶς, τὰ ἢ πεῖναν Ἑμάνεια παντειόδεκα πεποίησα. Of which Moses be also, who compiled and published the fifteen Hermaick books at Athens, makes mention in his own discourse, (annexed thereunto.) For thus we conceive that place is to be understood, that the Pagan publisher of the Hermaick books himself took notice of some agreement, that was betwixt Moses and Hermes. But here it is to be noted, that because Hermes and the Hermaick books were in such great credit, not only among the Christians, but also the Greek and Latin Pagans, therefore there were some counterfeit writings obtruded also under that specious title; such as that ancient botanic book mentioned by Galen, and those Christian forgeries of later times, the *Psamander* and *Sermon on the Mount*; which being not cited by any ancient father or writer, were both of them doubtless later than *Jamblichus*, who discovers no suspicion of any Christian forgeries in this kind.

But Cafaubon, who contends, that all the theologick books imputed to *Hermes Trismegist* were counterfeited by Christians, affirms all the philosophy, doctrine and learning of them (excepting what only is Christian in them) to be merely Platonical and Grecanical, but not at all Egyptian; thence concluding, that these books were forged by such Christians, as were skilled in the Platonic or Grecanical learning. But first, it is here considerable, that since Pythagorism, Platonism and the Greek learning in general was in great part derived from the Egyptians, it cannot be concluded, that whatsoever is Platonical or Grecanical, therefore was not Egyptian. The only instance, that Cafaubon insists upon, is this dogma in the Trismegistick books, *That nothing in the world perisheth, and that death is not the destruction, but change and transmigration of things only*: which, because he finds amongst some of the Greek philosophers, he resolves to be peculiar to them only, and not common with the Egyptians. But since the chief design and tendency of that dogma was plainly to maintain the immortality, pre-existence and transmigration of souls, which doctrine was unquestionably derived from the Egyptians; there is little reason to doubt but that this dogma was itself Egyptian also. And *Pythagoras*, who was the chief propagator of this doctrine amongst the Greeks, ἦς ἐν οἷς γνωρίζεται ἡ Φιλοσοφία τῶν θεῶν, *that no real entity (in generations and corruptions) was made or destroyed*, according to those Ovidian verses before cited,

*Nec perit in teto quicquam, mibi credite, mundo, Sed variat faciemque novat. Nascique vocatur Incipere esse alium,* &c.

did in all probability derive it, together with its superstructure, (the
pre-existence and transmigration of souls,) at once from the Egyptians. But it is observable, that the Egyptians had also a peculiar ground of their own for this Doctma (which we do not find infested upon by the Greek philosophers) and it is thus expressed in the eighth of Ticious his Hermetic books or chapters; ε δεινει, ε δει, κς με, δί κς κό, ε δεινει, κς με, ε δεινει, κς με, ε δεινει, κς με. But this is not an argument for the immortality of the soul, for though the Egyptians, after the pre-existence of the soul, did not believe it could perish or come to nothing, but all things in the world are parts of this great mundane animal, and chiefly man, who is a rational animal. Which samie notion we find also infested on in the Aselepius dialogue; Secundum deum dixit credes, δ Αξελεπίου, υμα γεμερωνεται, υμιν φασιν, υμα ποιεων άιματα. Si enim animal, mundus, vivens, semper & futur εστι & έστι, nilb in mundo mortale est: viventis enim omnis uiininfalique partes, que in ipso mundo, sit et in uno eodemque animale semper vivente, nullus est mortalitatis locus. Where though the Latin be a little imperfect, yet the sense is this; You are to believe the world, δ Αξελεπίου, to be a second god governing all things, and illustrating all mundane animals. Now if the world be a living animal, and immortal; then there is nothing mortal in it, there being no place for mortality as to any living part or member of that mundane animal, that always liveth. Notwithstanding which, we deny not, but that though Pythagoras first derived this notion from the Egyptians, yet he and his followers might probably improve the same farther (as Plato tells us, that the Greeks generally did what they received from the Barbarians) namely to the taking away the qualities and forms of bodies, and resolving all corporeal things into magnitude, figure and motion. But that there is indeed some of the old Egyptian learning, contained in these Trismegistick books now extant, shall be clearly proved afterwards, when we come to speak of that grand mystery of the Egyptian theology (derived by Orpheus from them) that God is all. To conclude, Jamblicbus his judgment in this case ought without controversy to be far preferred before Cajander's, both by reason of his great antiquity, and his being much better skilled, not only in the Greek, but also the Egyptian learning; that the books imputed to Hermes Trismegistus did Ερμης Τρίσμεγιστος, really contain the Hermack opinions, though they spake sometimes the language of the Greek philosophers.

Wherefore, upon all these considerations, we conceive it reasonable to conclude, that though there have been some Hermack books counterfeited by Christians, since Jamblicbus his time, as namely the Pyramid and the sermon in the mount concerning regeneration, neither of which are found cited by any ancient father; yet there were other Hermack books, which though not written by Hermes Trismegistus himself, nor all of them in the Egyptian language, but some of them in Greek, were truly Egyptian, and did, for the substance of them, contain the Hermack doctrine. Such probably were those mentioned by the ancient fathers, but since lost, as the τα Τεσσαρωνια, which seems to have been a discourse concerning the Cosmogonia, and the τα Πράγματα, and the like. And such also may some of these Hermack books
books be, that are still extant; as to instance particularly, the Aplelian dialogue, entitled in the Greek διὰ τίμιον λόγον, the perfect oration, and in all probability translated into Latin by Apuleius. For it can hardly be imagined, that he who was so devout a Pagan, so learned a philosopher, and so witty a man, should be so far imposed upon by a counterfeit Trifmegistick book, and mere Christian cheat, as to belittle translating upon it, and recommend it to the world, as that which was genuinely Pagan. But however, whether Apuleius were the translator of this Aplelian dialogue or no, it is evident, that the spirit of it is not at all Christian, but rankly Pagan; one instance whereof we have, in its glorying of a power, that men have of making gods, upon which account St. Austin 1 thought fit to concern himself in the confutation of it. Moreover, it being extant and vulgarly known before Jamblchus his time, it must needs be included in his Τὰ Βιβλία τοῦ Ἐγγείου, and consequently receive this attestation from him, that it did contain not merely the Greekish, but the Hermical and Egyptian doctrine.

There are indeed some objections made against this, as first from what we read in this dialogue, concerning the purgation of the world partly by water, and partly by fire; Tunc ille Dominus & pater Deus, primipatens, & unus gubernator mundi, intimus in mores factaque hominum, voluntate tua (quae est dei benignitatis) vitii refitens, & corrupte le errore rovcanos, malignitatem omnem vel alia racione diluens, vel igne consumens, ad antiquam faciem mundum revocabit. When the world becomes thus degenerate, then that Lord and Father, the supreme God, and the only governor of the world, beholding the manners and deeds of men, by his will (which is his benignity) always resifting vice, and restoring things from their degeneracy, will either wash away the malignity of the world by water, or else consume it by fire, and restore it to its ancient form again. But since we find in Julius Firmicus 2, that there was a tradition amongst the Egyptians, concerning the Apocatastasis of the world, partim per aquam, partim per ignem, partly by inundation and partly by conflagration, this objection may signify nothing. Wherefore there is another objection, that hath some more plausibility, from that prophecy, which we find in this Apleius, concerning the overthrow of the Egyptian paganism (uttered in with much lamentation) in these words; Tunc terræ fæta, sanctissima sepalbrorum, sepulchrorum erit mortuorumque plenissima; then this land of Egypt, formerly the most holy seat of the religious temples of the gods, shall be every where full of the sepulchers of dead men. The sense whereof is thus expressed by St. Austin; Hoc videtur dolore, quod memoria martyrum sanctorum templis eorum delubrisque succederent; ut quis qui hic legent, animo à nobis adverso atque perverso, patēt a Paganis deos cultos suiæ in templis, à nobis autem coli mortalès in sepulbris: He seems to lament this, that the memorials of our martyrs should succeed in the place of their temples, so that they, who read this with a perverse mind, might think, that by the Pagans the gods were worshipped in temples, but by us (Christians) dead men in sepulchers. Notwithstanding which, this very thing seems to have had its accomplishment too soon after, as may be gathered from.

1 De Civitate Dei Lib. VIII cap. XXIII. p. 162. Tom. VII. Oper.
2 Mathiæsæ Lib. III. cap. 1. P. 164.
from these passages of Theodoret, ὃ γὰρ αἰτία τῶν κακομάθων Σεόν τίν μνήμην, ἐκ Δι Κατ. Χ. δ. τῆς τῶν οὐθρόπων ἔξελειας (οἱ μάρτυρες) διανοητικός. Now the martyrs have utterly put down this, having abolished and blotted out the minds of men the memory of those, who were, formerly called gods. And again, τὸς γὰρ οἷον εἰς τέμπλον νεοτέροις ἀδελφοὶ, οὐδεμία τοῖς οὐκετείοις Σεόν, καὶ τὸς μὲν Φρόδους ἀπέθανεν τεκνος καὶ τό εἰκόνων ἀπολογομένως, &c. Our Lord hath now brought his dead (that is, his martyrs) into the room and place (that is, the temples) of the gods, whom he hath sent away empty, and bestowed their honour upon these his martyrs. For now instead of the festivals of Jupiter and Bacchus, are celebrated those of Peter and Paul, Thomas and Sergius, and other holy martyrs. Wherefore this being so true and plain a description in the Asclepian dialogue of what really happened in the Christian world, it may seem suspicious, that it was rather a history, written after the event, than a prophecy before it, as it pretends to be: it very much resembling that complaint of Eunapius Sardianus in the life of Ædecius 1, when the Christians had demolished the temple of Serapis in Egypt, seizing upon its riches and treasures, that instead of the gods, the monks then gave divine honour to certain vile and flagitious perils deceased, called by the name of martyrs. Now if this be granted, this book must needs be counterfeit and supposititious. Nevertheless, St. Austin entertained no such suspicion concerning this Asclepine passage, as if it had been a history written after the fact, that is, after the perpetrators and memorials of the martyrs came to be so frequented; he supposing this book to be unquestionably of greater antiquity. Wherefore he concludes it to be a prophecy or prediction made instinctly fallacia spiritus, by the instinct or suggestion of some evil spirit; they falsely referring the ruin of their own empire. Neither was this Asclepine dialogue only ancienter than St. Austin, but it is cited by Lacontius Firmianus 2 also under the name of οἱ τίλευς λόγοι, the perfect oration, as was said before, and that as a thing then reputed of great antiquity. Wherefore, in all probability, this Asclepine passage was written before that described event had its accomplishment. And indeed if Antoninus the philosopher (as the forementioned Eunapius 3 writes) did predict the very same thing, that after his decease, that magnificent temple of Serapis in Egypt, together with the rest, should be demolished, καὶ τὰ ἱερα τάφων ζητεῖται, and the temples of the gods turned into sepulchers; why might not this Egyptian or Trismegistic writer receive the like inspiration or tradition? or at least make the same conjecture?

But there is yet another objection made against the sincerity of this Asclepine dialogue, from Lacontius his citing a passage out of it for the second perion in the Trinity, the Son of God; Hermes in eo libro (faith Lacontius) qui οἱ τίλευς λόγοι inscribitur, his usus est verbis, οἱ κύριος καὶ οἱ πάντων παλαιτί, οὖ καὶ κακήν νεοτικίαν, ἐπεὶ τὸν ἐκείνου ἐπαιδεύαν Σέλοι, ὁρισθεῖν καὶ εἰς πτολεμίου (κι大厦 ημει ή διὰ τὸ αἰζέθαι αὐτός, πειράματα ἔτοι καὶ τοῦτος καὶ ταύτος, καὶ κατείπηκα καὶ ημείς, κακῶς έξώθηκαν αὐτῶς, καὶ πλειστάνως παλαιόν τῶν ἡγαίων, ἡγαίον τε καὶ πανίν οὐκετείοις.

Which we find in Apuleius his Latin translation thus rendered; Dominus & omnium conformatum, quem recorde Deus dicitam, & se secundum dedit fecit, qui viserit sentire posset; quem secundum [deum] sensibilens, ita dixerim, non idem quod ipse fientat (de hoc enim an ipse sentiat animo also dicens tempore) sed eo quod videntium sensus incurrit: quoniam ergo hunc fecit ex se primum, & se secundum, visibilis eis ex pulchrum, ut potes qui est omnium bo-
mitate plenissimus, anavit eum ut dicitatis sue prolem, (for so it ought to be read, and not patrem, it being τὸν in the Greek.) The lord and maker of all, whom we rightly call God, when he had made a second god, visible and sen-
sible (I say, sensible, not actively, because himself Labor just, for concerning this, whether he have sens or no, we shall speak elsewhere, but passively, because he inews into our senses) this being his first and only production, seemed both be-
autiful to him, and most full of all good, and therefore he loved him dearly as his own offspring. Which Laetantius, and after him St. Austin, understanding the perfect Word of God or eternal Ὑδός, made use of it as a testimony against the Pagans for the confirmation of Christianity; they taking it for granted, that this Hermack book was genuinely Egyptian, and did represent the doctrine of the ancient Hermes Trismegist. But Dionysius Petavius and other later writers, understanding this place in the same sense with Laetantius and St. Austin, have made a quite different use of it, namely, to infer from thence, that this book was spurious and counterfeited by some Christian. To which we reply, first, that if this Hermack writer had ac-
nowledged an eternal Ὑδός; or Word of God, and called it a second God and the Son of God, he had done no more in this, than Philo the Jew did, who speaking of this same Ὑδός, expressly calls it οὕδος deo και παράδοτοι οὕδος τω δι', the second God and the first-begotten Son of God. Notwithstanding which, those writings of Philo's are not at all suspected. And Origens affirms, that some of the ancient philosophers did the like; Multi philosophorum veterum, unum esse deum, qui cumilla crearet, dixerunt; atque in hoc consensit legi. Ali-
quanti autem hoc adiunctum, quod Deus cumilla per verbum suam fecerit & regat; & verbum Dei sit, quo cumilla moderetur; in hoc non selim legi, sed & evangelio queque consensu scribunt. Many of the old philosophers (that is, all besides a few atheistical ones) have said, that there is one God who created all things, and these agree with the law: but some add further, that God made all things by his Word, and that it is the Word of God, by which all things are governed; and these write conformably not only to the law, but also to the gospel. But whether 
Philo derived this doctrine from the Greek philosophers, or from Egyptians and Hermes Trismegist, he being an Alexandrian, may well be a question. For St. Cyril doth indeed cite several passages out of Hermack writings then ex-
 tant, to this very purpose. We shall only set down one of them here; 'ὅτα
πάντα ἐνορμήθη ἐν τῷ δικαίῳ ὑμῶν καὶ ἐξ ὑμῶν ἀπεκδεχόμεθα, καὶ ἐν ὑμῖν ἔλεημ

3 Vide Juan. Clerici Comment. in XVIII. Priora Comment. Evangel. Joannis in Ham-
Chap. III. by Laërtius and St. Austin.

The world hath a governor set over it, that Word of the Lord of all, which was the maker of it; this is the first power after himself, uncreated, infinite, looking out from him, and ruling over all things that were made by him; this is the perfect and genuine son of the first omnipotent Being. Nevertheless the Author of the τὸν ἀληθ. λόγον, or Ateleian Dialogue, in that forecited passage of his, by his second God, the son of the first, meant no such thing at all as the Christian Logos, or second person of the Trinity, but only the visible world. Which is so plain from the words themselves, that it is a wonder how Laërtius and St. Austin could interpret them otherwise, he making therein a question, whether this second God were [actively] sensible or no. But the same is farther manifested from other places of that dialogue, as this for example, Ἀληθείας Δωδεκά τὸν πρῶτον ἐγέρθη, δεικτὸς εἰς υἱὸν Ἰχθύος; The Lord of eternity is the first God, but the second God is the world. And again, Summius qui dicitur Deus, referret gubernatorque sensibilis Dei, ejus qui in se complectitur omnem locum, omnemque rerum substantiam; The supreme God is the governor of that sensible god, which contains in it all place and all the substance of things. And that this was indeed a part of the Hermaick or Egyptian theology, that the visible world animated was a second God, and the son of the first God, appears also from those Hermaick books published by Ficinus, and vulgarly called Pamerand, though that be only the first of them. There hath been one passage already cited out of the eighth book, ἐν τῷ ἀληθ. θεῷ, ὁ λόγος, the world is a second God. After which followeth more to the same purpose, τοὺς μὲν ὁμοίως θεοὺς, ἐν τῷ ἀληθ. θεῷ, καὶ ὁμοίως τοὺς θεόν οὐκ, ἐν τῷ ἀληθ. θεῷ, καὶ τῷ ἀληθ. κυρίῳ, καὶ τῷ ἀληθ. τριγυμίῳ, καὶ τῷ ἀληθ. ζῷῳ, ὁ παντός παντός, The first God is that eternal unmade maker of all things; the second is he that is made according to the image of the first, which is contained, cherished or nourished and immortalized by him, as by his own parent, by whom it is made an immortal animal. So again in the ninth book, οὗ τῆς ἱδρυσις τῆς πάντως, καὶ τῆς κυρίας τῆς ζωῆς τῆς θερετρίας, God is the father of the world, and the world is the son of God. And in the twelfth, ὁ ἐν χρόνως κυρίος οὗ τῆς μέγας θεοῦ καὶ τῆς μεγίστης εἰκόνος, this whole world is a great God and the image of a greater.

As for the other Hermaick or Trismegistic books, published partly by Ficinus and partly by Patricius, we cannot confidently condemn any of them for Christian cheats or impostures, save only the Pamerand, and the Sermon in the mount concerning regeneration, the first and thirteenth of Ficinus his chapters or books. Neither of which books are cited by any of the ancient fathers, and therefore may be presumed not to have been extant in Pamphilus his time, but more lately forged; and that probably by one and the selfsame hand, since the writer of the latter (the Sermon in the mount) makes mention of the former (that is, the Pamerand) in the close of it. For that, which Cusanus objects against the fourth of Ficinus his books or chapters (entituled the Crater), seems not very considerable, it being questionable, whether by the Crater any such thing were there meant, as the Christian Baptiforion. Wherefore, as for all the rest of those Hermaick books, especially such of
them as being cited by ancient fathers, may be presumed to have been extant before Iamblichus his time; we know no reason why we should not concur with that learned philosopher in his judgment concerning them, that though they often speak the language of philosophers, and were not written by Hermes Trismegist himself, yet they do really contain δόξας Ερμαινικές, Hermatical opinions, or the Egyptian doctrine. The ninth of Ficinus his books mentions the Asclepian dialogue, under the Greek title of δέ τέλων λόγος, pretending to have been written by the same hand; χάρις ἰ' Ἀσκληπίου, τον τέλων ἀποθέωκα λόγον, τον δὲ ἀναγκάζων γράμμα αὐξάδευξ, ἑκείνου, κατ' αὐτὸν περί αἰώνων λόγων διεξελέγω. The meaning of which place (not understood by the translator) is this; I lately published (O Asclepius) the book entitled δέ τέλων λόγος (or the perfect oration) and now I judge it necessary, in pursuit of the same, to discourse concerning sense. Which book, as well as the perfect oration, is cited by Latantius. As is also the tenth of Ficinus, called the Clavis, which does not only pretend to be of kin to the ninth, and consequently to the Asclepius likewise, but also to contain in it an epitome of that Hermack book called τὸ γενικόν, mentioned in Eusebius his Chronicon 2, τον χρις λόγον, ἰ' Ἀσκληπίου, σε αὐθαίνου, τὸν δὲ σήμερον δικαίων ἐν τῷ Τατ. αὐθαίναν ἐπιτί καὶ τὸν Γενικὸν Λόγον, τῶν περὶ αὐτῶν λαξάθρων ἐν ἐπιτομῇ. My former discourse was dedicated to thee, O Asclepius, but this to Tatus, it being an epitome of those Genica that were delivered to him. Which Genica are thus again afterwards mentioned in the same book, ἔν γενικόν ἐν τοῖς Γενικοῖς, ὧν ἀπὸ μιᾶς ψυχῆς τοῦ τῆς πανίδος πάσης αἱ ψυχαί εἰσιν; Have you not heard in the Genica, that all souls are derived from one soul of the universe? Neither of which two places were understood by Ficinus. But doubtlest this latter Hermack book had something foisted into it, because there is a manifest contradiction found therein; forasmuch as that transmigration of human souls into brutes, which in the former part thereof is asserted after the Egyptian way, ὡς καταδίωκεν ψυχῆς ἕκας ἕκας, as the just punishment of the wicked, is afterwards cried down and condemned in it, as the greatest error. And the eleventh and twelfth following books seem to us to be as Egyptian as any of the rest; as also does that long book entitled κόρη κόσμου, the thirteenth in Patricius. Nay, it is observable, that even these very books themselves, that are so justly suspected and condemned for Christian forgeries, have something of the Hermatical or Egyptian philosophy, here and there interpersed in them. As for example, when in the Paemander God is twice call ἀνθρωπομολόγης, male and female together, this seems to have been Egyptian (and derived from thence by Orpheus) according to that elegant passage in the Asclepian dialogue concerning God; Ηκεν ἐνθος, γινομεν υπο οὐσίαν, ἐν τοις σειρασισι κυκτικευτης πλησιμίας, semper voluntatis suae praevarit, parit semper quicquid voluntur prœcreare: He therefore, who alone is all things, and most full of the secundity of both sexes, being always pregnant of his own will, always produceth whatsoever he pleaseth. Again, when death is thus described in it, παραπεκάδια το σώμα εις ἄλλοιν καθότι εἴδος, ἢ εἴης, εἰς ἄφαξι γενεάς, to be nothing else but the change of the body, and the form or life's passing into the invisible: this agreeth with that in the eleventh book or chapter, τῆς μελαβολῆς ἄκαλπλον ἐναι, διὰ τὸ μὴ σώμα διαλειμματον, τῶν δὲ σώμα εἰς τὸ ἄφαξι χαρίτι: That death is nothing but a change, it being

being only the dissolution of the body, and the life or soul's passing into the invisible or inconspicuous. In which book it is also affirmed of the world, γινέται μετ' αυτή γαρ τοι νεμασθαι ει τω αυτω, that every day some part or other of it goes into the invisible, or into Hades; that is, does not utterly perish, but only disappears to our sight, it being either translated into some other place, or changed into another form. And accordingly it is said of animals, in the twelfth book, διαλεγομεν, έξω με απολυομαι, αλλά μεν εις εξω καιναι, that they are dissolved by death, not that they might be destroyed, but made again anew. As it is also there affirmed of the world, that it doth περιπτωσι και εις ισατον αποτελεσθαι, make all things out of itself, and again unmake them into itself; και διαλεγομεν παλιν ανοικει, and that dissolving all things it doth perpetually renew them. For that nothing in the whole world utterly perishes, as it is often declared elsewhere in these Trismegistic writings, so particularly in this twelfth book of Ficinus, ομοιοι τω καινη αματαισθαι, το δι μειν αυτου διελευθημενα, ειτε εις τεχνην και απολυομαι. The whole world is unchangeable, only the parts of it being alterable; and this so, as that none of these neither utterly periseth, or is absolutely destroyed; ομοιοι τω καινη αματαισθαι, ειτε εις τεχνην και απολυομαι το υπό, αποτελεσθαι, ειτε εις τοινατον ενατον το εκλεγεσθαι. For how can any part of that be corrupted, which is incorruptible, or any thing of God perish or go to nothing? all which, by Cæsennbon's leave, we take to have been originally Egyptian doctrine, and thence in part afterwards transfused into Greece. Moreover, when in the Pæaner, God is styled more than once, παν αισθητος, light and life, this seems to have been Egyptian also, because it was Orphical. In like manner the appendix to the sermon in the mount, called ῥωμαϊκα χρυσιμε, or the occult cantion, hath some strains of the Egyptian theology in it, which will be afterwards mentioned.

The result of our present discourse is this, that though some of the Trismegistic books were either wholly counterfeited, or else had certain supposititious passages inserted into them by some Christian hand, yet there being others of them originally Egyptian, or which, as to the substance of them, do contain Hermical or Egyptian doctrines (in all which one supreme Deity is every where asserted) we may well conclude from hence, that the Egyptians had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme Deity. And herein several of the ancient fathers have gone before us; as first of all Justin Martyr, Πολυομοιαν παντοφελον τοι θεεν, δομοφελεις, Ἠρμης διε καθημενος και Χρυσιμος ληγεις, ξηροι νοειτος μεν ετι χαλεπον φρασει δι αυτοτος; Ammon in his books calleth God most hidden, and Hermes plainly declareth, that it is hard to conceive God, but impossible to express him. Neither doth it follow that this latter passage is counterfeit, as Cæsennbon concludes, because there is something like it in Plato's Timæus, there being doubtless a very great agreement betwixt Platonism and the ancient Egyptian doctrine. Thus again St. Cyprian; Hermes quoque Trismegistus unus Deum sequitur, eunque ineffabilem e ineffectabilem conjicietur; Hermes Trismegist also acknowledgeth one God, confessing him to be ineffable and inexpressible, which passage is also cited by St. Austin. Laëntianus likewise; Thoth antiquissimus & ineffectissimus omni generi. De Idol. non. [p. 226. O. per]

Lib. 1. pag. 54. [Divin. Intro. cap. 50.]

§. LXXXVII. p. 126. Tom. IX. Oper. [p. 42.]

Col. orat. ad Gracos, p. 57: Oper. 2 De Baptismo contra Donatistas, Lib. VI. 3 De Baptism's contra Donatistas, Lib. VI. 4 Cæsennbon contra Donatistas, Lib. VI. 5 Cæsennbon contra Donatistas, Lib. VI. 6 Cæsennbon contra Donatistas, Lib. VI.
That the Egyptians acknowledged, besides their many gods, one supreme and all-comprehending Deity, needs not to be proved from these Trismegistick writings (concerning which we leave others to judge as they find caufe) it otherwise appearing, not only because Orpheus (who was an undoubted affirter of monarchy, or one first principle of all things) is generally affirmed to have derived his doctrine from the Egyptians; but also from plain and express testimonies. For besides Apollonius Tyaneus his affirmation concerning both Indians and Egyptians, before cited, Plutarch throughout his whole book de Iside & Osride, supposes the Egyptians thus to have asserted one supreme Deity, they commonly calling him τὸν πρῶτον Θεόν, the first God. Thus in the beginning of that book he tells us, that the end of all the religious rites and mysteries of that Egyptian goddes Isis, was, ὅ τοι πρῶτος, αὐτῷ καὶ μετ' αὐτῆς διαθέτεται, διὸ σοφίαν παρακάλει εὐτυχία παρ' αὐτῇ καὶ μετ' αὐτῆς διαθέτεται. The knowledge of that first God, who is the Lord of all things, and only intelligible by the mind, whom this goddes exhorted men to seek, in her communion. After which he declareth, that this first God of the Egyptians was accounted by them an obscure and hidden Deity, and accordingly he gives the reason, why they made the crocodile to be a symbol of him; μεν ό δὲ θανάτῳ ὢν οἰκεῖον, τὰς ὀδοὺς ἐμφατείς λέγει καὶ διαρκείᾳ παρακάλεται, εἰ τὸ κτήτος κατεργάσει, διὰ τοῦ πρώτου ἐν ἁλώνισμα. Because they say the crocodile is the only animal, which living in the water, both his eyes covered by a thin transparent membrane, falling down over them, by reason whereof it sees and is not seen; which is a thing, that belongs to the first God, to see all things, himself being not seen. Though Plutarch in that place gives also another reason why the Egyptians made the crocodile a symbol of the Deity; οὐ μὴ εἰς ὁ παρακάλες αὐτοῖς ποιήσας αμφίμετρα ὠργῆς τινι, ἀλλὰ μικρὰ ἐκλείποντα γενόμενος μόνος μὲν ἐγγύς ὁ θεος ὁ θεος τὸς λόγος ἀπροσδιότητι ἢ τι, καὶ οὔ ὁ ἀμφίμετρος καταλαβέω καὶ δίκειται ὁ άτελεῖς κατὰ δίκειται. Neither were the Egyptians without a plausible reason for worshipping God symbolically in the crocodile, that being said to be an imitation of God, in that it is the only animal without a tongue.
not in need of speech, and going on through a silent path of justice in the world, does without noise righteously govern and dispense all human affairs. In like manner Horus Apollo in his Hieroglyphicks tells us, that the Egyptians acknowledging a πατεράρχητος κοινωνικάς, an omnipotent being that was the governor of the whole world, did symbolically represent him by a serpent, in whose skin once lay the secret of nature, that gave all things of the Deity appears again resolved into him. And Philo Byblius, from Sanchoniathon, gives the same reason why the serpent was defined by Taut or the Egyptian Hermes, ὁ θάνατον καὶ ἡ ταυτίσις αὐτῶν, because it is immortal, and resolved into itself. Though sometimes the Egyptians added to the serpent also a hawk, thus complicating the hieroglyphick of the Deity; according to that of a famous Egyptian priest in Eusebius, τὸ λεπτὸν ὄν μετηρίων ἥνα, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν ἱερογλυφικὴν τῆς Θείας προσεχείς, that the first and divinest being of all is symbolically represented by a serpent having the head of an hawk. And that a hawk was also sometimes used alone for a hieroglyphick of the Deity, appeareth from that of Plutarch, that in the porch of an Egyptian temple at Sais, were ingraven these three hieroglyphicks, a young man, an old man, and an hawk; to make up this sentence, that both the beginning and end of human life dependeth upon God, or Providence. But we have two more remarkable passages in the aforementioned Horus Apollo, concerning the Egyptian theology, which must not be pretermitted; the first this, παρ' αὐτοῖς τὰ παράλογα τὸ δίκαιον ἔστι πνεύμα, that according to them, there is a spirit passing through the whole world, to exit, God. And again, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἡ ἐρεχθείς ἕως μεν ἔστις ὑπερήφανος, it seemeth to the Egyptians, that nothing at all confuseth our God. In the next place, Jamblichus was a person, who had made it his business to inform himself thoroughly concerning the theology of the Egyptians, and who undertakes to give an account thereof, in his answer to Porphyrius his epistle to Anebo an Egyptian priest; whose testimony therefore may well seem to deserve credit. And he first gives us a summary account of their theology after this manner; ἡ πρῶτη ἐγκηδίως ἐκμετάλλευσα, καὶ καθ' ἱεροθεματίταις τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ δυνάμεις ταύτα τῆς κοινωνίας, τῆς τόσον καὶ τῇ τῶν αὐτῶν τοιούτων δυνάμεων παράλογας εἰς ἀυτούς, ἀρχής αὐτῶν ἐκ τῆς ὑπερήφανος ταύτας ἀναμνήσεως, καὶ ἡ ἱερογλυφικά, ἡ ἱεροθεμάταις ταύτα τῶν ἔστι, ἔστις ἡ ἱεροθεμάταις. And plumed.

1 Lib. I. cap. LXI. p. 77.
4 De Iide & Olide, p. 365.
5 Lib. I. cap. LXIV. p. 77, & Lib. I. cap. XIX p. 27.
Hermes tells

...all the powers and elements in the world. For being above the world, and transcending the same, immaterial, and incorporeal, supernatural, unmade, indivisible, manifested wholly from himself, and in himself, be ruleth over all things and in himself containeth all things. And because he virtually comprehends all things, therefore does he impart and display the same from himself. According to which excellent description of the Deity, it is plain, that the Egyptians ascribing one God that comprehends all things, could not possibly suppose a multitude of self-existent Deities. In which place also the same Jamblichus tells us, that as the Egyptian hieroglyphick for material and corporeal things was mud or floating water, so they pictur'd God, in loto arbore sedentem super lutum; fitting upon the late-tree above the watery mud. Quod iam nomin Dei eminens talissimam, qui. fit ut nulla modo attingat lutum ipsum. Demonstratque Dei imperium intellectuale, quia lotti arboris omnium sunt rotundia tam frendes quam fructus, &c. Which signifies the transcendent eminency of the Deity above the matter, and its intellectual empire over the world; because both, the leaves and fruit of that tree are round, representing the motion of intellect. Again, he there adds also, that the Egyptians sometimes pictured God fitting at the helm of a ship. But afterward in the same book, he sums up the queries, which Porphyris had propounded to the Egyptian priest, to be resolved concerning them, in this manner; velis solis, 

...and all things. In answer to which Porphyrian queries, Jamblichus thus begins; 

And as you order, so order, and as you command, so command, and as you cry, so cry, and as you mighty, so mighty, and as you ever, so ever. In which words Jamblichus, and those others that follow after, though there be some obscurity (and we may perhaps have occasion further to consider the meaning of them elsewhere) yet he plainly declares, that according to the Egyptians, the first original of all things was a perfect unity above intellect; but intimating wihal, that besides this first unity, they did admit of certain other divine hypostases (as a perfect intellect, and mundane soul) subordinate thereunto, and dependent on it, concerning which he thus writeth afterwards; 

The Egyptians.
gyptians acknowledge, before the heaven, and in the heaven, a living power (or soul) and again they place a pure mind or intellect above the world. But that they did not acknowledge a plurality of coordinate and independent principles is further declared by him after this manner; "καὶ οὖν έκ θεος άνεφέν αρχά των πελατείων ἡ πέτρα τῶν ἀρχών" Αἰγυπτίων περισσατεία, αὖ ἴδες ἁρησταί, καὶ θέλειν εἰς πλήθος, τοῦ πολλοῦ αὕτης αὖ ἴδες διακαταραμένης, ή μεταχεί το αἰρής καὶ πάσης πτέρας ἐπικαταραμένης ὑπά τιος ἀριστεραίς μέτρω, καὶ τούς αὐτότατοι ἄνικτας πάσαν αὐτής. And thus the Egyptian philosophy, from first to last, begins from unity; and thence defends to multitude; the many being always governed by the one; and the infinite or undeterminate nature every where mastered and conquered by some finite and determined measure; and all ultimately, by that highest unity, that is the first cause of all things. Moreover, in answer to the last Porphyrian question concerning matter, whether the Egyptians thought it to be unmade and self-exilient or made, Jamblichus thus replies, Ἡνι εἰς παράγειν το Είδος αὖτις ἐπιστήμης ἐπικαταραμένης. That according to Hermes and the Egyptians, matter was also made or produced by God; ab essentialitate succidit ac subsistit materialitate, as Scultellius turns it. Which paillage of Jamblichus, Proclus Pag. 117. upon the Thea Eaus (where he afferts that God was άρρητος αὐτής τῆς θεότητος, the unneffable cause of matter) takes notice of in this manner; καὶ τούς Αἰγυπτίων παράξεις τα αὐτά πεπρώκειν αὐτής φύσις ο γά τοι Θεός Ιάμβλιχος ἅπερερνυς, ὡς ἡ Ἐμος ἐκ τῆς θεότητος τούτο πράξειν παράξεις βελτευομενος, καὶ ὡς ἡ εἰκος και τὰ τοῦ Ματων τούτο παράξειν πεπρωκειν τῆς θεοτητος ἐκείνην. And the tradition of the Egyptians agreeth herewith, that matter was not unmade or self-exilient, but produced by the Deity: for the divine Jamblichus bas recorded, that Hermes would have materiality to have been produced from essentiality, (that is, the passive principle of matter from that active principle of the Deity:) and it is very probable from hence, that Plato was also of the same opinion concerning matter: viz. because he is supposed to have followed Hermes and the Egyptians. Which indeed is the more likely, if that be true, which the same Proclus affirmeth concerning Orpheus, ος το θεός ορφειος κατά τον θεόν τον λόγον ἀπο τῆς αἰσθητης τῶν μορφῶν ὑπόστατος παραγεν τού θεον, that Orpheus also did, after the same manner, deduce or derive matter from the first hypostasis of intelligibles, that is, from the supreme Deity. We shall conclude here in the last place with the testimony of Damaclius, in his book of Principles 2, writing after this manner concerning the Egyptians, Αἰγυπτίως ἡ δὲ μὲν Ἑλληναις καὶ άρνεις ἣ γεγονεί ου καὶ Αἰγυπτίως υπάρχοντος Φιλόσοφοι γραμμάτεις, ἡ θεομοικία αὐτῶν τού ἀληθείας ψευδαρμομενας ἀλλοποιοις Ιονισιωτες μίας τοις θεοτητης λόγοις. Eudemus hath given us no exact account of the Egyptians; but the Egyptian philosophers, that have been in our times, have declared the hidden truth of their theology, having found in certain Egyptian writings, that there was, according to them, one principle of all things, praised under the name of the unknown darkness, and that thrice repeated: which unknown darkness is a description of that supreme Deity, that is incomprehensible.

But that the Egyptians amongst their many gods did acknowledge one supreme, may sufficiently appear also, even from their vulgar religion and theology; in which they had first a peculiar and proper name for him as fuch.

* Sect. VIII. cap. III. p. 159.  
Hammon the Egyptian Jupiter.  Book I.

such. For as the Greeks called the supreme God Ζεύς, the Latins Jupiter or Jove, so did the Egyptians call him Hammon or Ammon, according to Herodotus, whose testimony to this purpose hath been already cited, and confirmed by Origen, who was an Egyptian born. Thus also Plutarch in his book de Iside, τῶν πολλῶν νομιζόντων, ἵνα παρ' Αμονίους θύων τῇ Δίος ἐπι, τὸν Ἀμω, ὅ παράγοντο; ἥμεν Ἀμων οὐγομεν. It is supposed by most, that the proper name of Zeus or Jupiter (that is, the supreme Deity) amongst the Egyptians is Amous, which we Greeks pronounce Hammon. To the same purpose Hesychius, Ἀμων ὁ Ζεύς, Ἀμωνίων, Ammon, according to Aristotle, is the same with Zeus. Whence it came to pass, that by the Latin writers Hammon was vulgarly called Jupiter Hammon. Which Hammon was not only used as a proper name for the supreme Deity by the Egyptians, but also by the Arabs and all the Africans, according to that of Lucean 4, Quamvis Ribiapum populis Arabumque beatis Gentibus, atque Indis, unus fuit Jupiter Ammon.

Wherefore not only Marmarica (which is a part of Africa, wherein was that most famous temple of this Ammon) was from thence denominated Ammonia, but even all Africa, as Stephanus informs us, was sometimes called Ammonis from this god Ammon, who hath been therefore styled Ζεύς Ἀμων, the Lybian Jupiter 1.

Indeed it is very probable, that this word Hammon or Ammon was first derived from Ham or Cham the son of Noah, whose posterity was chiefly seated in these African parts, and from whom Egypt was called, not only in the Scripture, the land of Ham, but also by the Egyptians themselves, as Plutarch testifieth, Ξυνίζ or Chemia, and as St. Jerome, Ham; and the Coptes also to this very day call it Chemi. Nevertheless this will not hinder, but that the word Hammon, for all that, might be used afterwards by the Egyptians, as a name for the supreme God, because, amongst the Greeks Zeus or in like manner was supposed to have been at first the name of a man or hero, but yet afterwards applied to signify the supreme God. And there might be such a mixture of heroology or history, together with theology, as well amongst the Egyptians, as there was amongst the Greeks. Nay, some learned men's conjecture, and not without probability, that the Zeus of the Greeks also was really the very same with that Ham or Cham the son of Noah, whom the Egyptians first worshipped as an hero or deified man; there being several considerable agreements and correspondencies between the poetick fables of Saturn and Jupiter, and the true scripture-story of Noah and Cham; as there is likewise a great affinity betwixt the words themselves, for as Chem signifies heat or fervour, so is Ζεύς derived by the Greek Grammarians from ζέον. And thus will that forementioned testimony of Herodotus in some sort be verified, that the Greeks received the names of most of their gods, even of Zeus himself, from the Egyptians.

Perhaps

1 Lib II cap. XLIII. p. 125.
2 Or rather Celsus in Origen contra Celsum, Lib V. p. 261.
3 Tom II. Oper. p. 354.
4 Lib. IX. ver. 517, 518.
6 Vide Bochart, ubi supra Lib. IV. cap. I. p. 204, 205. & Lib I. cap. I. p. 6, 7. &c.
7 Vide Bochart, ubi supra, Lib. I. cap. I.

Lib. I. cap. I. p. 6, 7.
Hammon a hidden and invisible Deity.

Perhaps it may be granted also, that the sun was sometime worshipped by the Egyptians, under the name of Hammon; it having been in like manner sometimes worshipped by the Greeks under the name of Zeus. And the word very well agreeeth herewith, Ἁμμών in the Hebrew language signifying not only heat, but the sun; from whence Αμώνι χυς was derived. Nevertheless, it will not follow from hence, that therefore the visible sun was generally accounted by the Egyptians the supreme Deity, no more than he was amongst the Greeks: but, as we have often occasion to observe, there was in the Pagan religion a confused jumble of herology, phylogeny, and theology all together. And that the notion of this Egyptian god Ammon was neither confined by them to the sun, nor yet the whole corporeal world or nature of the universe (as some have conceived) is evident from hence, because the Egyptians themselves interpreted it, according to their own language, to signify that which was hidden and obscure, as both Manetho an ancient Egyptian priest, and Hecataeus (who wrote concerning the philosophy of the Egyptians) in Plutarch agree: Manetho μάν ο Σεβέννιτες τὸ κινωριμῶν ωρίζει καὶ τὴν κρύφην ὑπὸ πάντων ὑπήνευσεν τῇ Φωνῇ. ᾿Εκαταίος δὲ Ἀθηνίτης Φωί τὸν καὶ πρὸς αλλὰ πέπεμμε τῷ φώνα ἔχοντές τις Ἀιγύπτιος, ὡς τῷ ὥρακαλλῆσαι, προσκλητικῶς γὰρ ἔγινε τῇ Φωνῇ ἐν τῷ πρῶτῳ ξίνῳ ὥς ἀφθαρτὶ καὶ κινωριμῶν ὤτι, προσκλητικῶς καὶ ὕγιακαλλῆσαι, ἐφικτῇ γείσαι καὶ δὴλον αὐτοῖς, ᾿Ἀμών Αἴγυπτιος. Manetho Sebennites conceives the word Amoun to signify that which is hidden; and Hecataeus affirment, that the Egyptians use this word, when they call any one to them that was distant or absent from them: wherefore the first God, because he is invisible and hidden, they, as it were inviting him to approach near, and to make himself manifest and conspicuous to them, call him Amoun. And agreeably hereunto, Jamblicbus gives us this account of the true notion of this Egyptian God Ammon, σ ᾿Ημώνις νῦν, καὶ τῷ αἰθέριῳ προστάτῃ, καὶ σοφίᾳ ἐκπαιδευμένου μείν ἐν γον.κι, καὶ τῷ ἀφανείᾳ τῷ κινωριμῶν λόγῳ δύναμιν εἰς φῶς ἐγγόνως, Ἀμών καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἀιγυπτίων πλαστὸν Ἀμώνειας. The demiurgical intellect, and president of truth, as with wisdom it proceedeth to generation, and produceth into light the secret and invisible powers of the hidden reasons, is, according to the Egyptian language, called Hammon. Wherefore we may conclude, that Hammon, amongst the Egyptians, was not only the name of the supreme Deity, but also of such a one as was hidden, invisible and incorporeal.

And here it may be worth our observing, that this Egyptian Hammon was in all probability taken notice of in scripture, though vulgar interpreters have not been aware thereof. For thus we understand that of Jeremiah xlvi. 25. The Lord of hosts, the God of Israel faith, behold I will give the mountain of Zion for a sanctuary, and the hiddenues of the house of Jacob for a tabernacle. The Lord will deliver his people out of the hand of all their enemies, and will utterly destroy all them that vex his people; and they shall be as though he had not made them to be a people. And the Lord shall be king over all the earth: in that day shall there be one Lord, and his name shall be one. For the multitude of all nations shall know, that I am Jehovah; and they shall declare my name among the nations; and shall say, the Lord reigneth. And he shall be for a sanctuary to the Lord in the land of Jacob. And Judah shall be a sanctuary, and Zion a holy place. 

1 De Idide & Osride p. 354. Tom. II. 2 De Myster. Επιγρ. Seft. VIII. c. III. Oper. P. 159.
veral nations and places were themselves commonly denoted and signified by the names of those their respective gods. With which kind of language the scripture it self also completh; as when the Moabites are called in it, the people of Chemosh, Numbers xxii. and when the gods of Damascus are said to have smitten Abaz, because the Syrians smote him, 2 Chron. xxviii. Accordingly whereunto also, whatsoever was done or attempted against the several nations or countries, is said to have been done or attempted against their gods. Thus Moab’s captivity is described, Jeremy xlvi. Thou shalt be taken, and Chemosh shall go into captivity. And the overthrow of Babylon is predicted after the same manner, in the prophecy of Isaiah, chap. xlvi. Bell boweth down, Nebo stoopeth, themselves are gone into captivity. And also the same is threatened in that of Jeremy, ch. li. I will visit Bell in Babylon, and will bring out of his mouth that which he hath swallowed up, and the nations shall not flow unto him anymore, for the wall of Babylon shall be broken down. Now Bell, according to Herodatus 1, was a name for the supreme God amongst the Babylonians, as well as Ammon was amongst the Egyptians; who notwithstanding by both of them was worshipped after an idolatrous manner. And therefore as in these latter places, by the visiting and punishing of the Babylonians, so in that former place of Jeremy, by the visiting of Ammon, and the gods of Egypt, is understood the visiting of the Egyptians themselves; accordingly as it is there also expressed. No was, it seems, the metropolis of all Egypt; and therefore Ammon the chief god of those ancient Egyptians, and of that city, was called Ammon of No. As likewise the city No is denominated from this god Ammon in the scripture, and called both No-Ammon and Ammon-No. The former in the prophecy of Nahum, chap. iii. Art thou better than No-Ammon? or that No in which the god Ammon is worshipped? Which is not to be understood of the oracle of Ammon in Marcara, as some have imagined 2 (they taking No for an appellative, and so to signify habitation;) it being unquestionably the proper name of a city in Egypt. The latter in that of Ezekiel, chap. xxx. I will pour out my fury upon Sin, the strength of Egypt, and will cut off Hammon-No. In which place as by Sin is meant Pelythus, so Hemmon-No, by the Seventy, is interpreted Diospolis, the city of Jupiter; that is, the Egyptian Jupiter, Hemmon. Which Diospolis was otherwise called the Egyptian Thebes, (anciently the metropolis of all Egypt) but whose proper name, in the Egyptian language, seems to have been No; which from the chief god there worshipped was called both No-Ammon and Hammon-No; as that god himself was also denominated from the city, Ammon of No. And this is the rather probable, because Plato tells us expressely, that Ammon was anciently the proper or chief god of the Egyptian Thebes or Diospolis, where he speaks of Theuth or Thoth the Egyptian Hermes, in these words; βασιλικὸς αὐτὸ τοῦ Αἴγυπτου θεὸς Θαμου, εἷς τῶν μεγάλων τῶν τῶν Βαβυλῶν τῶν άρχων τῶν οὖν Ελλήνων Αἴγυπτικῶν Θεῶν χαλεπός ήτο τῶν Ετῶν Λοιπῶν. Thamus was then king over all Egypt, reigning in that great city (the metropolis thereof) which the Greeks call the Egyptian Thebes, and whose God was Ammon. But whereas the prophet Nahum (who seems to have written after the completion of that judgment

1 This seems to be a mistake for Diogenes Sideratus, who mentions it, Lib. II. p. 69.

judgment upon No, predicted both by Jeremy and Ezekiel) describes the place, as situate among the rivers, and having the sea for its wall and rampart; whence many learned men have concluded, that this was rather to be understood of Alexandria than Dæsopolis, (notwithstanding that Alexandria was not then in being, nor built till a long while after, in Alexander the Great's time :) This may very well, as we conceive, be understood of Egypt in general, whole metropolis this No was; that it was situate amongst the rivers, and had the seas for its wall and rampart, the Red and Mediterranean. And thus much for the Egyptian Jupiter, or their supreme Deity, called by them Hammon.

There is an excellent monument of Egyptian antiquity preserved by Plutarch, and others, from whence it may be made yet further evident, that the Egyptians did not suppose a multitude of unmade, self-existent deities, but acknowledged one supreme, universal and all-comprehending Numen. And it is that inscription upon the temple at Sais; Ἔγώ εἰμί τῶν τὸ γεγονός, καὶ ὁ, καὶ ένδομεν, καὶ τὸ ἵππον τέλος οὐκί τινος; ἀπάντων, I am all that hath been, is, and shall be, and my peplum or veil no mortal hath ever yet unwoven. Which though perhaps some would understand thus, as if that Deity therein described were nothing but the transfigured matter of the whole corporeal universe, according to that opinion of Cheremon before mentioned and confuted; yet it is plain, that this could not be the meaning of this inscription: first, because the God here described is not a mere congeries of disunited matter, or aggregation of divided atoms, but it is some one thing, which was all: according to that other inscription upon an altar dedicated to the goddes Isis, which we shall also afterward make use of, Tibi, una, quae ex omnioribus. To thee, who being one, art all things. Again, in the Deity here described, there is both a veil or outside, and also something hidden and recondite; the sense seeming to be this, I am all that was, is, and shall be; and the whole world is nothing but my self veiled; but my naked and unveiled brightness no mortal could ever yet behold or comprehend. Which is just as if the sun should say, I am all the colours of the rainbow (whole mild and gentle light may easily be beheld) and they are nothing but my simple and uniform luster, variously refracted and abated; but my immediate splendour and the brightness of my face no mortal can contemplate, without being either blinded or dazzled by it. Wherefore this description of the Deity may seem not a little to resemble that description, which God makes of himself to Moses, Thou shalt see my back-parts; but my face shall not be seen. Where there is also something exterior and visible in the Deity, and something hidden and recondite, invisible and incomprehensible to mortals. And Philo thus glosseth upon those words, αὐτός μοι ἐστι σωφρός, τὸ αὐτόμορφον ὡς αὐτοῦ τῷ Θεῷ γνωστόν, τὸν δὲ συμμετοχήν οὐκ εἶναι ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ κατοίκεσθαι, bro de Προ- πτάμενον των αὐτόμορφων προν αὐτῶν παρέχων θεότητα. It is sufficient for a wise man to know God fugis] à posteriori, or from his effectus; but whatsoever will needs behold the naked essence of the Deity, will be blinded with the transcendent radiance and splendour of his beams. Whereas, according to Philo, the works of God, as manifesting the attributes of

of his power, goodness and wisdom, are called the back-parts of the Deity; so are they here in this inscription called the pepulum, the veil and exterior garment of it, or else God himself veiled. Wherefore it is plain, that the Deity here described cannot be the mere visible and corporeal world as senses and inanimate, that being all outside and exposed to the view of sense, and having nothing hidden or veiled in it. But thirdly, this will yet be more evident, if we do but take notice of the name of this God, which was here described, and to whom that temple was dedicated; and that was in the Egyptian Language Neith, the same with Ἀθήνη among the Greeks, and Minerva among the Latins; by which is meant wisdom or understanding: from whence it is plain, that the inscription is to be understood not of such a god as was merely sensuous matter (which is the god of the Atheists) but a mind. Athenagoras 1 tells us, that the Pagan Theologers interpreted τὸ Ἀθήνη, or Minerva, to be τὸ Φερδεν διὰ πάντων ὑιονωτάτων, wisdom or mind passing and diffusing itself through all things; than which there cannot be a better commentary on this inscription. Wherefore it may be here observed, that those Pagans, who acknowledged God to be a mind, and incorporeal being separate from matter, did notwithstanding frequently confide him, not abstractly by himself alone, but concretely together with the result of his whole fecundity, or as displaying the world from himself, and diffusing himself through all things, and being in a manner all things. Accordingly, we learn'd before from Horus Apollo, that the Egyptians by God meant a spirit diffusing itself through the world, and intimately pervading all things; and that they supposed that nothing at all could confine without God. And after this manner, Jamblichus in his Mysteries 2 interprets the meaning of this Egyptian inscription: for when he had declared that the Egyptians did, both in their doctrine and their priestly hierurgies, exhort men to ascend above matter, to an incorporeal Deity the maker of all, he adds, ὕφηγότατο δὲ ἰηταῖς τοῦ ὀδοὺ τῆς ἐναίσθησιν, νομολογεὶς δὲ Βίβλων προφήτων Ἀμούν θεαίτε, ἐν αὐτοῖς εύσων ἀναγιγματικά, ἐν ἀγωγοτηθείσιν γεγραμμένοι κατὰ Σείν τῆς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, τοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐσίας πάρειχε το θείου διάθηκα τοῦ θεοῦ. Hermes also propounded this method, and Bythis the prophet interpreted the same to king Ammon, having found it written in hieroglyphick letters in the temple of Sais in Egypt; as he also there declared the name of that God, who extends or diffuses himself through the whole world. And this was Neith, or Athena, that god thus described, I am all that was, is, and shall be, and my pepulum or veil no mortal could ever uncover. We cannot but take notice also that whereas the Athena of the Greeks was derived from the Egyptian Neith, that she also was famous for her pepulum too, as well as the Egyptian Goddes. Pepulum (faith Servius) est proprium pulla pilla feminae, Minerva concreta; Pepulum is properly a woman's braid or veil, embroidered all over, and connotated to Minerva. Which rite was performed at Athens, in the great Panathenaicks, with much solemnity, when the statue of this goddes was also by those noble virgins of the city, who embroidered this veil, cloathed all over therewith. From whence we may probably conclude, that the statue of the Egyptian Neith also, in
the temple of Sais, had likewise, agreeably to its inscription, such a peplum or veil cast over it, as Minerva or Arthenis at Athens had; this hieroglyphically to signify, that the Deity was invisible and incomprehensible to mortals, but had veiled itself in this visible corporeal world, which is, as it were, the peplum, the exterior variegated or embroidered vestment of the Deity. To all which considerations may be added, in the last place, what Proclus hath recorded, that there was something more belonging to this Egyptian inscription, than what is mentioned by Plutarch; namely these words, ἧς ἐν εἰκόνι κάρτιν, ἥν ἡ γενεσία, and the sun was the fruit or offspring, which I produced; from whence it is manifest, that according to the Egyptians, the sun was not the supreme Deity, and that the God here described, was, as Proclus also observeth, ὁμογενῆς Ζέας, a demiurgical deity, the creator of the whole world, and of the sun. Which supreme incorporeal deity was notwithstanding, in their theology, said to be all things, because it diffused it self thorough all.

Wherefore, whereas Plutarch cites this passage out of Hecateus, concerning the Egyptians, τοῦ περὶ τοῦ Σίου τῷ πατὶ τοῦ κόσμου νομοτοσίου, that they take the first God, and the universe, for one and the same thing; the meaning of it cannot be, as if the first or supreme God of the Egyptians were the senecles corporeal world, Plutarch himself in the very next words declaring him to be αὐτοῖς ἥν εἰκόνιμον, invisible and hidden; whom therefore the Egyptians, as inviting him to manifest himself to them, called Hammon; as he elsewhere affirmeth, That the Egyptians first God, or supreme Deity, did see all things, himself being not seen. But the forementioned passage must needs be understood thus, that according to the Egyptians, the first God, and τὸ Πάν or the universe, were synonymous expressions, often used to signify the very same thing; because the first supreme Deity is that, which contains all things, and diffuseth it self through all things. And this doctrine was from the Egyptians derived to the Greeks, Orpheus declaring, ἂν τῷ πάνω, that all things were one; and after him Parmenides and other philosophers, ἂν τῇ πάνω, that one was the universe or all, and that τῇ πάνω ἦν ἰδαίε, that the universe was immovable; they meaning nothing else hereby, but that the first supreme Deity, was both one and all things, and immovable. And thus much is plainly intimated by Aristotle in these words, τῷ πάνῳ ἰδαίε ἔκ τοῦ πάνου ἐκ τοῦ πάνου ἰδαίε. There are some, who pronounced concerning the whole universe, as being but one nature; that is, who called the supreme Deity τῷ πάνῳ or the universe, because that virtually contained all things in it.

Neverthelcs τῷ πάνῳ, or the universe, was frequently taken by the Pagan theologers also, as we have already intimated, in a more comprehensive sense, for the Deity, together with all the extent of its secundity, God as displaying himself in the world; or, for God and the world both together; the latter being look'd upon as nothing but an emanation or efflux from the former. And thus was the word taken by Empedocles in Plutarch, when he affirmed, ὅ τῷ πάνῳ ἰδαίε τοῦ κόσμου, ἄλλο, ἐκ τοῦ τοῦ πάνῳ μὲν, that
Pan, God diffused through all. Book I.

the world was not the universe, but only a small part thereof. And according to this sense was the god Pan understood both by the Arcadians and other Greeks, not for the mere corporeal world as sensibles and inanimate, nor as ended with a plattick nature only (though this was partly included in the notion of Pan also) but as proceeding from a rational and intellectual principle, diffusing it self through all; or for the whole system of things, God and the world together, as one deity. For that the Arcadick Pan was not the corporeal world alone, but chiefly the intellectual ruler and governour of the same, appears from this testimony of Macrobius ¹: Hanc Deum Arcades colunt, appellantes τοῦ τῆς θεού κατὰ, non sylvarum dominum, sed universae substantiae materialis dominatorem: The Arcadians worship this god Pan (as their most ancient and honourable god) calling him the lord of Hyle, that is, not the lord of the woods, but the lord or dominator over all material substance. And thus does Phormatus ² likewise describe the Pan of the other Greeks, not as the mere corporeal world, sensibles and inanimate; but as having a rational and intellectual principle for the head of it, and presiding over it; that is, for God and the world both together, as one system; the world being, but the efflux and emanation of their Deity. The lower parts of Pan (faith he) were rough and goatish, because of the asperity of the earth; but his upper parts of a human form, because the other being rational and intellectual, is the Hegemonick of the world: adding hereunto, that Pan was feigned to be joyful or lascivious, because of the multitude of spermatick reasons contained in the world, and the continual mixtures and generations of things; to be clothed with the skin of a libbard, because of the bespangled heavens, and the beautiful variety of things in the world; to live in a desert, because of the singularity of the world; and lastly, to be a good demon, by reason of the ως-αι ων τοΰ λόγου, that supreme mind, reason, and understanding, that governs all in it. Pan therefore was not the mere corporeal world sensibles and inanimate, but the Deity as displaying itself therein, and pervading all things. Agreeable to which, Diodorus Siculus ³ determines, that Πω and Ζω were but two several names for one and the same deity, (as it is well known, that the whole universe was frequently called by the Pagans Jupiter, as well as Pan.) And Socrates himself in Plato ⁴ directs his prayer, in a most devout and serious manner, to this Pan; that is, not the corporeal world or sensibles matter, but an intellectual principle ruling over all, or the supreme Deity diffusing it self through all; he therefore distinguishing him from the inferior gods: ο θεος πά ν αυτό τον Μονήν έτέωσε, δοιπέρε τοι, ἐναμένε τοι, τὸ κατὰ τοῦ καθ' ἀλλαξάν τάξιν, τοῖς τοῖς ἐναμένε τοῖς ἐναμένε τοῖς. O good (or gracious) Pan, and ye other gods, who preside over this place, grant that I may be beautiful or fair within, and that those external things, which I have, may be such as may best agree with a right internal disposition of mind, and that I may account him to be rich, that is wise and just. The matter of which prayer, though it be excellent, yet it is paganically directed to Pan (that is, the supreme god) and the inferior gods both together. Thus we see that as well, according to

² Lib. I. p. 7.
⁴ In Phadro p. 558. Opera.
to the Greeks, as the Egyptians, the first or supreme God, and ὁ θεός or the universe, were really the same thing.

And here we cannot but by the way take notice of that famous and remarkable story of Plutarch's in his Defect of Oracles, concerning daemons lamenting the death of the great Pan. In the time of Tiberius (faith he) certain persons embarking from Asia for Italy, towards the evening failed by the Echinades, where being becalmed, they heard from thence a loud voice calling one Thamos, an Egyptian mariner amongst them, and after the third time concluding him, when he came to the Palodes, to declare, that the great Pan was dead. He with the advice of his company resolved, that if they had a quick gale, when they came to the Palodes, he would pass by silently; but if they should find themselves there becalmed, he would then perform what the voice had commanded: but when the ship arrived thither, there neither was any gale of wind nor agitation of water. Whereupon Thamos looking out of the hinder deck towards the Palodes, pronounced these words with a loud voice, ὤ μήτες Πάν ἡθὸν, the great Pan is dead; which he had no sooner done, but he was answered with a choir of many voices, making a great howling and lamentation, not without a certain mixture of admiration. Plutarch, who gives much credit to this relation, adds, how licentious Tiberius the emperor was, first concerning the truth thereof, and afterwards, when he had satisfied himself therein, concerning the interpretation; he making great enquiry amongst his learned men, who this Pan should be. But the only use, which that philosopher makes of this story, is this, to prove that daemons having bodies as well as men, (though of a different kind from them, and much more longeve) yet were notwithstanding mortal; he endeavouring from thence to solve that phenomenon of the defect of oracles, because the daemons, who had formerly haunted those places, were now dead. But this being an idle fancy of Plutarch's, it is much more probably concluded by Christian writers, that this thing coming to pass in the reign of Tiberius, when our Saviour Christ was crucified, was no other than a lamentation of evil daemons (not without a mixture of admiration) upon account of our Saviour's death, happening at that very time; they not mourning out of love for him that was dead, but as sadly prefaging evil to themselves from thence, as that which would threaten danger to their kingdom of darkness, and a period to that tyranny and domination which they had so long exercised over mankind; according to such passages of scripture as these, Now is the prince of this world judged; and having spoiled principalities and powers (by his death upon the cross) be triumphed over them in it. Now our Saviour Christ could not be called Pan, according to that notion of the word, as taken for nothing but the corporeal word devoid of all manner of life, or else as endowed only with a placitick nature; but this appellation might very well agree to him, as Pan was taken for the λόγος προεξος τῷ κόσμῳ, that reason and understanding, by which all things were made, and by which they are all governed, or for Φιλόσοφος διὰ τιττως εἴσοδος, that divine wisdom, which diffuseth itself through all things.
things. Moreover, Pan being used not so much for the naked and abstract Deity, as the Deity as it were embodied in this visible corporeal world, might therefore the better signify God manifested in the flesh, and clothed with a particular human body, (in which respect alone, he was capable of dying,) Neither indeed was there any other name, in all the theology of the Pagans, that could so well befit our Saviour Christ as this.

We have now made it manifest, that according to the ancient Egyptian theology, (from whence the Greekish and European was derived) there was one intellectual Deity, one mind or wisdom, which as it did produce all things from it self, so doth \( \text{παν} \) \( \text{δείκνυσιν} \) \( \text{συν} \) \( \text{διακονον} \), contain and comprehend the whole, and is it self in a manner all things. We think it in the next place to obserue, how this point of the old Egyptian theology, \( \text{vix} \). God's being all things, is every where insifted upon throughout the Hermaick or Trismegistick writings. We shall begin with the Afteleian dialogue or the \( \tau\iota\mu\alpha\iota\varsigma \rho\upsilon \xi\sigma\tau\iota \nu \), translated into Latin by Apuleius, in the entrance of which, the writer having declared, Omnia unius esse, \( \& \) unum esse omnia, that all things were of one, and that one was all things, he afterwards adds this explication thereof; \( \text{Nonne boc dixi}, \) Omnia unum esse, \( \& \) unum omnia, utpote quia in creature suerint omnia, antequam creditis omnia? Nec immemor omnis est diènis omnia, cujus membra sunt omnia. \( \text{Hujus itaque, qui est omnis omnia, vel ipses est Creator omnium, in tota bac disputatione curato meminijs} \). Have we not already declared, that all things are one, and one all things? Forasmuch as all things exist in the Creator, before they were made; neither is he improperly said to be all things, whose members all things are. Be thou therefore mindful in this whole disputation of him, who is one and all things, or was the creator of all. And thus afterwards does he declare, that all created things were in the Deity before they were made; \( \text{Idcirco non erant quando nata non erant, sed in} \) eo jam tunc erant unde nasci habuerunt; they did not properly then exist before they were made, and yet at that very time were they in him, from whom they were afterwards produced. Again, he writes thus concerning God, \( \text{Non sper totius majestatis effectorem, omnium rerum patrem} \) \( \text{vel} \) \( \text{deminum, uno posse quamvis est multum composito nomine nuncupari} \). \( \text{Hunc voca patius omni nomine, si quidem sit unus \& omnia; ut necesse sit aut omnia ipsius nomine, aut ipsius omnium nomine nuncupari} \). \( \text{Hic ergo folus omnia, \&c. I cannot hope sufficiently to express the author of majesty, and the father and lord of all things, by any one name, though compounded of never so many names. Call him therefore by every name, forasmuch as he is one and all things; so that of necessity, either all things must be called by his name, or be by the names of all things. And when he had spoken of the mutability of created things, he adds, Solus deus ips in se, \& a se, \& circum se, totus est plenus atque perfectus, itque sua firma stabilitas est; nec aliquis impulsa, nec loco moveri potest, cum in eo sunt omnia, \& in omnibus ipses est folos. God alone in himself, and from himself, and about himself, is altogether perfect; and himself is his own stabilita. Neither can he be moved or changed, by the impulse of any thing, since all things are in him, and be alone in all things. Lastly, to omit other places, \( \text{Hic sensibilis mundus receptaculum est omnium sensibilium specierum, qualitatum, vel} \)
vel corporum; que omnia sine Deo vegetari nen posseunt: Omnia enim Deus, & a Deo omnia, & sine hoc, nec est aliquid, nec est, nec erit; omnia enim ab eo, & in ipsa, & per ipsum—Si totum animadvertes, vera ratione perdiveris, mandam ipsum senitis, & quae in ea sunt omnia, a superiori tulo mundo, quasi vestimenta, esse contieta. This sensible world is the receptacle of all forms, qualities, and bodies, all which cannot be vegetated and quickened without God; for God is all things, and all things are from God, and all things the effect of his will; and without God there neither was any thing, nor is nor shall be; but all things are from him, and in him, and by him—and if you will consider things after a right manner, you shall learn, that this sensible world, and all the things therein, are covered all over with that superior world (or Deity) as it were with a garment. As for the other Trimegistic books of Ficinus his edition, the third of them called ıρδος λιγος, is thus concluded: το γαρ ἐνων ἐκ ξιμικας ενυπης, Φιτει αυστηφωρομενι εν γαρ τ' άνω η Φοινικησειν-να τον. The divinity is the whole mundane campages, or constitution; for nature is also declared in the fifth book written upon this argument, δι άπερ χον τος Φωερεταλες ιτιος, that the invisible God is most manifest, we read thus, έδώ γαρ ειν ει παλιν εκεινον, οι έν οιν αυτως, έπεζω σε τω σωματικυ μη ανδα τωι μεγα ορατω Φωερετος αυτως εμπερατως τος μη άνα ιπειει εις εικονι σ. For there is nothing in the whole world, which he is not; he is both the things that are, and the things that are not; for the things that are, he hath manifested; but the things that are not, he contains within himself. And again, τε δ ο αυστηφωρομεν η το πολυστοικυς μακρος ει

Praef. II. 7. 8. 9. 10.

things, that is, he is both the things that are, and the things that are not; for the things that are, he hath manifested, but the things that are not, he contains within himself. And again, τε δ ο αυστηφωρομεν η το πολυστοικυς μακρος ει
forth from himself. Again, afterwards in the same book, τι νεκρα τοτε χρόνος, ὃ ρτε αποκελυθήσει τι των ωτων των δικαιωμάτων, αποκελυθήσει τα ταγονον τε ὁ ὁκρατί, ὁ ὃτε αὐτόν ωνής ὑπός, ὃς αὐτός οὐνός. There shall never be a time, when anything that is, shall cease to be; for when I say anything that is, I say anything of God, for God hath all things in him, and there is neither anything without God, nor God without anything. Book the tenth, τι γαρ ἔτι θεός, χτι πατής, χτι το ἀγαθόν, ἡ τα τῶν παντών εἰσιν ἐν ἑτι ὑπόνοις ἀλλά ὑπάρχεις αὐτῷ τῶν ωτῶν. What is God, but the very being of all things that yet are not, and the sustenance of things that are? And again, ὁ θεός, χτι πατής το ἀγαθό, το εἰσιν τα πάντα, God is both the father and good, because he is all things.

Book the eleventh, αὐτερὸς γὰρ ὅτι ἐκ ἑτι εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἐγγο, αὐτός ἐκ νέος ποιεῖν εἰ γαρ χωρεῖσθαι αὐτῷ, πάντα μὲν συνεπείκων, πάλαι δὲ τενούθενει αναγκή. God acting immediately from himself is always in his own work, himself being that which he makes; for if that were never so little separated from him, all would of necessity fall to nothing and die. Again, πάλαι εἰσὶ ἐν τῷ θεῷ, χὰ ὃς ἐν τῷ θεῷ κατιμοῦν, all things are in God, but not as lying in a place. And further, since our own soul can by cogitation and fancy become what it will, and where it will, any thing, or in any place, τοῦτο ὑπὲρ τῶν τοῦ ἐν τῷ θεῷ, ὅτε παραδίδαται πάντα ἐν ἑκατόν καθὼς, τὸ καθ᾽ αὐτῷ ὑπὸν ὑπὸν. Thou may consider God in the same manner, as containing the whole world within himself, as his own conceptions and cogitations. And in the close of that chapter, that, which is also thence cited by St. Cyril, is to the same purpose; ἀναθήματος ὁ θεός, ζυνόμενος τῇ τι τῆς αὐτοῦ φανερώθησιν: ὥστε τὰ ἑτον πάντα ἑποίηχθε, ἕως τὰ πάντα αὐτῶν βλέπης· τοῦτο εἰς τό ἀγαθόν τῷ θεῷ· τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ ὁ λόγος τοῦ αὐτοῦ φανεροῦσα διὰ πάντων. Is God invincible? Speak worthily of him, for who is more manifest than he? for this very reason did he make all things, that thou mightest know him through all things: this is the virtue and goodness of the Deity, to be seen through all things. The mind is seen in thinking, but God in working or making. Book the twelfth, οὐκετι το ἀγαθόν δικαίως διάγος· διαγος (ἰκαιον γὰρ μάλα, ὅ τι τρεῖς, ἀληθῶς ὃς περιόγοις βοής, τὰ πάντα καθώς, οὐς λόγους ἢθιγχαῖος) ἔσται γὰρ κατὰ πᾶτε λέγοντος, ὅτι ἐν ἑτι τὰ πῶλα. I have heard the good demen (for be alone, as the first begotten god, beholding all things, speak divine words.) I have heard him sometimes saying, that one is all things. Again in the same chapter, ὧς ὡς σύμματος κάτως ὡς ποιόν υπόκρισις· ὥς συστάσεις τῶν τάξεις, ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ παίδος, παράξεια εἰς τὴν καθίσματα, τοῦ ὑπὸ ἐν τῷ εἰκὰ παῖδος τίμησεν, ὑπὸ τοῦ παιδίου, ὑπὸ τῶν κατὰ μέρος, ὃ χριστός τοῦ ἐν τῷ μέρῃ τοῦ καθούς. This whole world is intimately united to him, and observing the order and will of its father, both the fullness of life in it; and there is nothing in it through eternity (neither whole nor part) which does not live; for there neither is, nor hath been, nor shall be, any thing dead in the world. The meaning is, that all things vitally depend upon the Deity, who is said in scripture to quicken and enliven all things. τοῦ ἐν ὑπὸ διὰ τοῦ παῖδος, τῆς κατασκευῆς, χριστός ὃς μὴν ἐν ὑπὸ διὰ τῆς καθίσματος, διὰ τῶν παιδίων, διὰ τῶν μερῶν, διὰ τῆς κατοικίας. This is God, the universe or all. And in this universe there is nothing which he is not: wherefore there is neither magnitude, nor place, nor quality, nor figure, nor time about.

about God, for be is all or the whole, (in those things belong to parts.) And the Arcane Caution, though that thirteenth book, to which it is subjoined, be supposititious, yet harps much upon this point of the Egyptian theology, that God is all: ἐκ τῆς κόσμου κύριος, ἐκ τῶν πάντων ἐκεῖνοι. Where it as Haramon men. And that all found, declared things, earth, though thefe, the followed, things, earth, alle. And again, All the powers, that are in me, praise the one and the all. Book the fifteenth, ὅποιο· ἐπιστρεφόμεν το πάντα ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου, ἐκ τῶν πάντων ἐκείνοις. If any one go about to separate the all from the one, he will destroy the all, or the universe, for all ought to be one. Book the sixteenth, ἀφοῦ τοὺς ὕπατοι, τοῖς ἑαυτής ἐφοίτητοι, τοῖς τῶν ἔθνων ἑστάται, ἡ πατέρα, ἡ περίβολος, ἡ πάντα ὑπάτη τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ, τοῦ Ἐλισαβέτα τα πάντα, το πάντων γάρ το πλήρωμα ἐν ίση, ἐκ τῶν ἑαυτής. I will begin with a prayer to him, who is the Lord and maker and father and bound of all things; and who being all things, is one; and being one, is all things; for the fulness of all things is one and in one. And again, ὅποιο μεῖκτο τοῦ Θεοῦ πάντα ἐκ τής τοῦ Ἐλισαβέτα τό πάντων, τό πάντων, ἐκ τοῦ Ἐλισαβέτα τοῦ πάντων. All things are parts of God, but if all things be parts of God, then God is all things; wherefore be making all things, doth, as it were, make himself.

Now, by all this we see, how well these Trismegistic books agree with that ancient Egyptian inscription in the temple of Sais, that God is all, that was, is, and shall be. Wherefore the Egyptian theology thus undoubtedly affecting one God that was all things; it is altogether impossible, that it should acknowledge a multitude of self-existent and independent deities.

Hitherto we have taken notice of two several Egyptian names for one and the same supreme Deity; Hammon and Neith; but we shall find, that, besides these, the supreme God was sometimes worshipped by the Egyptians under other names and notions also; as of Isis, Osiris, and Serapis. For first, though Isis have been taken by some for the moon, by others for the whole earth, by others for Ceres or corn, by others for the land of Egypt, (which things, in what sense they were defined by the Egyptians, will be elsewhere declared) yet was she undoubtedly taken also sometimes for an univerfal and all-comprehending Numen. For Plutarch affirms, that Isis and Neith were really one and the same god among the Egyptians, and therefore the temple of Neith or Minerva at Sais, where the forementioned inscription was found, is called by him the temple of Isis, so that Isis, as well as Neith or Minerva among the Egyptians, was there described, as that God, who is all that was, is, and shall be, and whose veil no mortal hath ever uncovered; that is, not a particular God, but an univerfal and all-comprehending Numen. And this may be yet further confirmed from that ancient inscription and dedication to the goddess Isis, still extant at Capua:

TIBI.
VNA. QVAE.
E. OMNIA.
DEA. ISIS.

Where

In Lvdde & Obr. p. 534. Tom. II. Oper.
Where the goddess Isis is plainly declared to be Ἰсидα ἀναπνεούσα, one and all things, that is, a universal and all comprehending Deity. And with this agreeth also that oration of this Goddess Isis in Apuleius; En adsum tuis commota, [Lib. XI. p. 243.]

...
wisdom, and the latter power and majesty (as Plutarch tells us 1) who also is thus described in Apuleius, *Deus deorum magnorum potior, & majorum summus, & summorum maximus, & maximorum regnatur*, Ofiris: *That God who is the chiefest of the greater Gods, and the greatest of the chiefest, and which reigneth over the greatest.* Wherefore the same Apuleius 2 also tells us, that Isis and Ofiris were really one and the same supreme Numen, though considered under different notions, and worshipped with different rites, in these words; 3 *Quanquam connexa, ino vero unica, ratio Numinis, religiosis-que effet, tamen teleæ discernens esse maximum: Though Isis and Ofiris be really one and the same divine power, yet are their rites and ceremonies very different. The proper notion of Ofiris being thus declared by Plutarch, 4 *τὸ πρῶτον ἐνυπότατον πάντων, ὃ τ'αγαθῷ πάντω ίσι, that first and biggest of all beings, which is the same with good. Agreeably whereunto, Jamblichus 5 affirmeth, ἀγαθόν πολιτικόν ἀν'Οφίς κύλλει, that God, as the cause of all good, is called Ofiris by the Egyptians. Lastly, as for Serapis, though Origen 6 tells us, that this was a new upstart Deity, set up by Ptolemy in Alexandria, yet this God in his oracle 7 to Nicocerion the King of Cyprus, declares himself also to be a universal Numen, comprehending the whole world, in these words, ἐρανός κόσμως κυρίων, &c. to this sense; The hurry heaven is my head, the sea my belly, my ears are in the ether, and the bright light of the sun is my clear piercing eye. And doubtless he was worshipped by many under this notion. For as Plutarchus 8 wrote thus concerning him, *Σέραπις νόμα τα τῷ χάος τοικών, That Serapis was the name of that God, which orders and governs the whole world; so doth Plutarch himself conclude, that Ofiris and Serapis were ἐναφων ἂν ὁς Ισία μιας ὑπάρχει, both of them names of one God, and the same divine power. Accordingly whereunto Diodorus Siculus 9 determines, that these three, Hammon, Ofiris and Serapis, were but different names for one and the same Deity, or supreme God. Notwithstanding which, Porphyrius 10, it seems, had a very ill conceit of that power which manifested it self in the temple of this god Serapis, above all the other Pagan gods, he suspecting it to be no other than the very prince of evil demons or devils: *Τὸν δὲ τοιχοντα ψαλάμων ἐν οἷς ὑπὸ τὸν Σεράπην ὑποτισμένον ὑπὸ ἐν τοῖς συμ- θέκοις μούνοι ανακειόμενος, &c. We do not vainly or without ground suspect and conjecture, that the evil demons are under Serapis as their prince and head: this appearing (faith he) not only from those rites of appeasement used in the worship of this God, but also from the symbol of him, which was a three-headed dog, signifying that evil demon, which ruleth in those three elements, water, earth and air. Neither indeed can it be doubted, but that it was an evil demon or devil, that delivered oracles in this temple of Serapis as well as elsewhere among the Pagans, however he affecteth to be worshipped as the supreme God.*

1 De Ifide & Oliride, p. 354, & p. 371.  
Tom. II. Oper.  
2 *Metamorphos. Lib. XI. p. 258.*  
3 Ibid. p. 256.  
4 De Ifide & Ofir. p. 372.  
5 *De Myle. Egypt. Sect. VIII. cap. III. p. 139.*  
8 *De Ifide & Opif. p. 362.*  
9 Ibid. p. 361, 362.  
10 Vide Lib. I. cap. XXV. p. 21.  
Besides all this, Eusebius himself from Porphyrius informs us, that the Egyptians acknowledged one intellectual Demiurgus, or maker of the world, under the name of Cneph, whom they worshipped in a statue of human form, and a blackish sky-coloured complexion; holding in his hand a girdle and a sceptre, and wearing upon his head a princely plume, and thrusting forth an egg out of his mouth. The reason of which hieroglyphick is thus given, ὅτι λόγῳ δουσέρετο καὶ κυριμός, καὶ ὁ Φανεχ, καὶ ὁ Σωφρονις, καὶ Ὁμιλεύσε, καὶ ὁ Κυνεχλή κείται. Because that wisdom and reason, by which the world was made, is not easy to be found out, but hidden and obscure. And because this is the fountain of life and king of all things; and because it is intellectually moved, signified by the feathers upon his head. Moreover, by the egg thrust out of the mouth of this God, was meant the world, created by the eternal λόγος, and from this Cneph was said to be generated or produced another God, whom the Egyptians call Phtha, and the Greeks Vulcan; of which Phtha more afterwards. That the Egyptians were the most eminent affirers of the Cosmogonia, or temporary beginning of the world, hath been already declared; for which cause the scholiasts upon Ptolemy thus perstringeth them, περιτοι, εἰδοκοι λέγων γίνεσθι Ἀγωνίοις κείμην, the Egyptians were wont to talk perpetually of the genesis or creation of the world. And Ajclepius, an ancient Egyptian writer, in his Myriogenes, affirms, that according to the Egyptian tradition, the sun was made in Libra. But that the Egyptians did not suppose the world to have been made by chance, as Epicurus and other atheistical philosophers did, but by an intellectual Demiurgus called by them Cneph, is evident from this testimony of Porphyrius. Which Cneph was look’d upon by them as an unmade and eternal Deity, and for this very cause the inhabitants of Thebais refused to worship any other God besides him, as Plutarch informs us in these words; οὐ εἴ τις λέγων τὴν τιμωρείνον ζωήν, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας συναρχεῖσαν τελεῖς, μόνες δὲ μὴ δόμοι τὸς Ἀσαίδες καταμέγος, ὡς ἡνικός θεὸν ἕκαστα νομίζετος, ἄλλα τοῖς κακῷς αὐτοῦ κἂν, ἄρχοντον δίκα καὶ ἄνδρων. Whilst the other Egyptians paid their proportion of tax imposed upon them, for the nourishment of those sacred animals, worshipped by them, the inhabitants of Thebais only refused, because they would acknowledge no mortal God, and worshipped him only, whom they call Cneph, an unmade and eternal Deity.

Having now made it undeniably manifest, that the Egyptians had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme universal and unmade Deity, we shall conclude this whole discourse with the two following observations; first, that a great part of the Egyptian Polytheism was really nothing else but the worshipping of one and the same supreme God, under many different names and notions, as of Hammon, Neith, Isis, Osiris, Serapis, Kneph, to which may be added Phtha, and those other names in famillius, of Eiston and Eneph. And that the Pagans universally over the whole world did the like, was affirmed also by Apuleius, in that forecited passage of his, Nomen unicum, multiformi specie, ritu vario, nomine multijuge, totus venera-
veneratur orbis, the whole world worshippeth one only supreme Nument in a multiform manner, under different names, and with different rites. Which different names for one and the same supreme God might therefore be mistaken by some of the sottish vulgar amongst the Pagans, as well as they have been by learned men of these later times, for so many distinct, unmade and self-existent deities.

Nevertheless, here may well be a question started, whether amongst those several Egyptian names of God, some might not signify distinct divine hypostases subordinate; and particularly, whether there were not some footsteps of a trinity to be found in the old Egyptian theology? For since Orpheus, Pythagoras and Plato, who all of them asserted a trinity of divine hypostases, unquestionably derived much of their doctrine from the Egyptians, it may reasonably be suspected, that these Egyptians did the like before them. And indeed Athanasius Kircherus makes no doubt at all hereof, but tells us that, in the Pamphylian obelisk, that first hieroglyphick of a winged globe, with a serpent coming out of it, was the Egyptian hieroglyphick of a triform Deity, or trinity of divine hypostases; he confirming the same, from the testimony of Abenephius an Arabian writer, and a Chaldaick fragment imputed to Sanchoniathon; the globe being laid to signify the first incomprehensible Deity, without beginning or end, self-existent; the serpent the divine wisdom and creative virtue; and lastly, the wings that active spirit, that cherishteth, quickneth, and enliveneth all things. How far credit is to be given to this, we leave others to judge; but the clearcut footsteps that we can find any where of an Egyptian trinity is in Sambichus his book, written concerning their mysteries; which whole place therefore is worth the setting down: *Kat' ἀκρω ὑπ' ηὐθυ προστάτη τε [Ἐρυμής] Σιου τοῦ Ἡμῶν, τοῦ ἐπερανίου Σιουν ὁρκέσσου, οὗ θεοί ποῖς εἰς χρόνον ἔστησε, καὶ τῶν ἱερόν τῆς �_basename='chap'.iv.' name='cnephi-or-emeph-and-ptha' page='353'>οικίας τοῦ Ἡμῶν ἔστησε. Τάμα δὲ ἐν ἀμφετῶ, ἐν δὲ Φερίν τοῦ πρῶτων μάγους προστάτη, δὲ καὶ Εὐνάθ ιερουμαζεῖ, ἐν δὲ τοῦ πρῶτον ἐς τοὺς καὶ τοῦ πρῶτον ἑσεῖς, ἐναὶ δὲ ἀκρω λέγεται. Εἰπὶ δὲ τούτων — ὁ ἰθυμυθήτος ὑπὸς καὶ τῆς ἀκρωτος προτάτης, καὶ σέφων ἐρχομείη μὲν ἐς τοὺς ἱερούς, καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν τῶν κηρυκτῶν λόγων ὄνομα εἰς Φερίν ὑπέρω, ἄμων κατὰ τοῦ ἔπερανίου ἱερουμαθιαν κυρίαν, κυρίαν ὁ ἰθυμυθήτος ἑσεῖς καὶ τεχνητοτεῖς Φηλαν, Ἑλληνεῖς δὲ εἰς Ἑρακλείου μέλαν λαμβάνουσα τοῦ Φθαν, τῆς τεχνητής μόνον προστάτους, σέφων δὲ ποτίσας ὁ. ὁ οἰς κείσας, καὶ ἄλλως αἱ ἄλλαι ὄνομας τε καὶ ἱερατεῖα ἐπωνυμίας ἐκεῖ. According to another order or method, Hermes places the god Emeph *, as the prince * and ruler over all the celestial gods, whom he affirmeth to be a mind understanding himself, and converting his cogitations or intellectutions into himself. Before which Emeph *, he placed to one indivisible, whom he calleth Eicton, in * which is the first intelligible, and which is overstepped only by silence. After which two, Eicton and Emeph *, the demigreek mind and president of truth as * with wisdom it proceeded to generations, and bringeth forth the hidden powers of the occult reasons into light, is called in the Egyptian language Ammon; as it artificially affects all things with truth, Ptha (which Pth, the Greeks attending only to the artificialities thereof, call Hepheustus or Vulcan) as it is productive of good, Osiris, besides other names that it hath, according to its other * or Cneph. Z. z. 2. or Cneph. or Cneph.* or Cneph. or Cneph.* or Cneph.
powers and energies. In which passage of Jamblicbus¹ we have plainly three
divine hypostases, or universal principles subordinate, according to the Her-
maick theology; first, an indivisible unity called Eidoj; secondly, a perfect
mind, converting its intellects into it self, called Emeph or Hemphia; and
thirdly, the immediate principle of generation, called by several names, ac-
cording to its several powers, as Pbiba, Ammon, Osiris, and the like: so that
these three names with others, according to Jamblicbus, did in the Egyptian
theology signify, one and the same third divine hypostasis. How well these
three divine hypostases of the Egyptians agree with the Pythagorick or
Platonick trinity, of first, νόος or τάγοθος, unity and goodness it self, se-
condly, νοήμαν, mind, and thirdly ψυχας, soul, I need not here declare. Only
we shall call to mind what hath been already intimated, that that reason or
wildom, which was the Demiurgus of the world, and is properly the second of
the forementioned hypostases, was called also among the Egyptians, by an-
other name, Cnepb; from whom was said to have been produced or be-
gotten the god Pbiba, the third hypostasis of the Egyptian trinity; so
that Cnepb and Emepe are all one. Wherefore we have here plainly an
Egyptian trinity of divine hypostasis subordinate, Eidoj, Emepe (or Cnepb)
and Pbiia. We know not what to add more to this of Jamblicbus, concern-
ing an Egyptian trinity, unless we should insist upon those passages, which
have been cited by some of the fathers to this purpoce out of Hermaick or
Trismegistick books, whereof there was one before set down out of St. Cyril;
or unless we should again call to mind that citation out of Damascius*, ἅπαν
ολοις ἄρχει σκέτος ἀγωνίας ὑπερανίας αὐτοῦ τῶν τριῶν διακριθέντων ὕπος,
that according to the Egyptians, there is one principle of all things praised under the name of the
unknown darkness, and this thrice repeated. Agreeably to which, Augustinus Steu-
cbus produces another passage out of the fame philosophick writer; that the
Egyptians made, ὡς τῶν ἀρχῶν σκέτων ὑπὲρ τῶν τᾶν πνεύματος, σκετός ἀγωνίας,
τῆς τριών ἐπιφάνειας, the first principle of all, to be darkness above all knowledge and
understanding (or unknown darkness) they thrice repeating the fame. Which
the forementioned Steuchus takes to be a clear acknowledgment of a trinity of
divine hypostases in the Egyptian theology.

Our second observation is this, that the Egyptian theology as well as the
Orphick (which was derived from it) asserting one incorporeal Deity, that
is all things; as it is evident, that it could not admit a multitude of self-
existent and independent deities, so did the seeming polytheism of these Eg-
pytians proceed also in great measure from this principle of theirs not right-
ly understood; they being led thereby, in a certain sense, Seiouni, to perfor-
nate and deify the several parts of the world, and things of nature, bestowing
the names of gods and goddeses upon them. Not that they therefore wor-
shipped the inanimate parts of the world as such, much less things not subst-
tial, but mere accidents, for so many real, distinct, personal deities; but be-
cause conceiving that God, who was all things, ought to be worshipped in all
things (such especially as were most beneficial to mankind) they did, ac-
cording to that Asclepian and Trismegistick doctrine before-mentioned, call

¹ De Mysler. Ægypt. Sect. VIII. cap. III. p. 158, 159.
God by the name of every thing, or every thing by the name of God. And that the wiser of them very well understood, that it was really one and the same simple Deity, that was thus worshipp'd amongst them by piece-meal, in the several parts of the world, and things of nature, and under different names and notions, with different ceremonies, is thus declared by Plutarch: De Is. & Os. Eiiipwv, ἤ Ἱσαὶ εἶναι, καὶ Τυφών τολῆμαι τῆς ὑμνῆς, γὰρ ἔθνως ἡ ἁπάτη τεκμηρίζεσθαι. 351. ἐνιαίοις, καὶ διαφόροις καὶ ἀφαιροῖς τῶν ἱερῶν λόγων, διὸν ἦν ἤσπερ συνάγει. καὶ συναντήσας, ἔξω ἑκάστου τῶν τελευτῶν Σύλλογος. Ησίς εἶναι έν Ελληνίδαις, ὃς οὐκ εἴπερ γνωρίζεται. And Typhon is the enemy to this goddess, who being puffed up by ignorance and error, doth distract and disperse the holy doctrine (of the simple Deity) which Isis collects together again, and makes up into one, and thus delivers it to those who are initiated into her sacred mysteries, in order to deification. In which words, Plutarch intimates, that the Egyptian fable, of Osiris being mangled and cut in pieces by Typhon, did allegorically signify the dissection and distraction of the simple Deity, by reason of the weakness and ignorance of vulgar minds (not able to comprehend it altogether at once) into several names and partial notions, which yet true knowledge and understanding, that is, Isis, makes up whole again, and unites into one.

XIX. It is well known, that the poets, though they were the prophets of the Pagans, and pretending to a kind of divine inspiration, did otherwise embue the minds of the vulgar with a certain sense of religion, and the notions of morality, yet these notwithstanding were the grand depravers and adulterators of the Pagan theology. For this they were guilty of upon several accounts. As first, their attributing to the gods, in their fables concerning them, all manner of human imperfections, passions and vices. Which abused of theirs the wiser of the Pagans were in all ages highly sensible of and offended with, as partly appears from these free passages vented upon the stage:

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To this sense: Since mortal men are punished by the gods for transgressing their laws, is it not unjust, that ye Gods, who write these laws, should yourselves live without law? And again,

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Nulla
Let men no longer be blamed for imitating the evil actions of the gods; for they can only be justly blamed, who teach men to do such things by their examples.

Secondly, the poets were further guilty of degrading the religion and theology of the Pagans, by their so frequently perverting and deifying all the things of nature and parts of the world, and calling them by the names of those gods, that were supposed to preside over them; that is, of the several divine powers manifested in them. This Plutarch\(^1\) taxes the poets with, where giving directions for young men reading of their writings, he thus seasonably cautions against the danger of it: \textit{τέτοιος ὁ θεὸς, ὁ χρήσιμος, οἱ μέλλοντες ἐξ τῶν ποιητῶν ἔφηβοισθεναι ὡς μὴ βλασφημουσία, τὸ γενόμενον πᾶς τοῖς τῶν ζῴων όνομαί ὡς ποινηὶ χρώμαι.}—\textit{χρώμαι οἱ τοῖς τῶν ζῴων ὀνόματι οἱ ποιηταὶ χρωμαί.} ποτὲ μὲν αὐτῶν ἑτεραὶ ἐνοπτίζομεν τῇ ἐνυπνείᾳ, ποτὲ δὲ δυνάμεις τινὲς, ὅσοι τις ὑπερήφανοι οὖν καθηγούμενες, ὄρθωσιν προσαγορεύσαι.} It is very profitable and necessary, if we would receive good from the writings of the poets, and not hurt, that we should understand how they use the names of the gods in different senses. Wherefore the poets sometimes use the names of the gods properly, as intending to signify thereby the gods themselves, and sometimes again they use them improperly and equivocally, for those powers which the gods are the givers and dispensers of, or the things which they preside over. As for example, Vulcan is sometimes used by the poets for that God or divine power, which prevides over fire and the arts that operate by fire, and sometimes again the word is taken by them for fire it self. So Mars, in like manner, is sometimes used for the God, which prevides over military affairs, and sometimes again it signifies nothing else but war. An instance whereof is there given by Plutarch out of Sophocles:

\begin{align*}
\text{Tυφλὸς ραδέ, ἡ γυναῖκες, ὃς ὀρέον Ἀρη,} \\
\text{Σὺς προσώπα, πάντα τιμεῖς κακά.}
\end{align*}

\text{Mars (O Mulieres) cecus hirsutō suis} \\
\text{Velut ore frendens, cuntēa commiferet mala.}

And we might give this other instance of the same from Virgil,

\begin{align*}
\text{Fuit toto Mars impius arbor.}
\end{align*}

For the God of war, that is, the divine providence that prevides over military affairs, could not be called impious or wicked, but it is war it self that is there so styled.

Indeed we shall afterwards make it appear, that the first original of this business, proceeded from a certain philosophick opinion amongst the Pagans.

\(^1\) De audiendis Poetis p. 22. Tom. II. Oper.
Chap. IV.

of the Pagan Theology.

Pagans, that God was diffused throughout the whole world, and was himself in a manner all things; and therefore ought to be worshipped in all things: but the poets were principally the men, who carried it on thus far, by perforating the several inanimate parts of the world and things of nature, to make such a multitude of distinct gods and goddesses of them. Which humour, though it were chiefly indulged by them, ψευδαγωγίας εστιν, only for the delight and pleasure of the reader, besides gratifying their own poetick fancies; yet was it a matter of dangerous consequence, as the fame Plutarch gravely and soberly advises, in his book de Iside, it begetting in some gross and irrational superstition (that is, in our Christian language, idolatry) and carrying others on to downright impiety and atheism. But this will be afterwards also again insifted on.

Wherefore, in the next place, we shall observe, that the poets did also otherwise deprave the theology of the Pagans, so as to make it look somehow more Aristocratically, and this principally two manner of ways; first, by their speaking so much of the gods in general and without distinction, and attributing the government of the whole world to them in common, so as if it were managed and carried on, communis consilio decemum, by a common-council and republic of gods, wherein all things were determined by a majority of votes, and as if their Jupiter, or supreme god, were no more amongst them, than a speaker of a house of lords or commons, or the chairman of a committee. In which they did indeed attribute more to their inferior deities, than, according to their own principles, they ought.

And secondly, (which is the last depravation of the Pagan theology by these poets) by their making those, that were really nothing else but several names and notions of one and the same supreme Deity, according to its several powers manifested in the world, or the different effects produced by it, to be so many really distinct persons and gods; insomuch as sometimes to be at odds and variance with one another, and even with Jupiter himself. This St. Boefi seems to take notice of, in his oration, how young men may be profited by the writings of the Greeks; πάντων δὲ ὁμιῆς αὕτη Θεὸς το διαλέγων οἱ (ποιηταίς) προείπον, η μάλις ἄτοι, ἢς ἀντι πολλοῖ το αὐτῶν διηγομένη, ἢ τέτων ἀπό ομοιότατος. But least of all will we give credit to the poets, where they discourse concerning the gods, and speak of them as many (distinct and independent) persons, and that not agreeing amongst themselves neither, but siding several ways, and perpetually quarrelling with one another.

Notwithstanding all which extravagancies and miscarriages of the poets, we shall now make it plainly to appear, that they really afferted, not a multitude of self-existent and independent deities, but one only unmade Deity, and all the other, generated or created gods. This hath been already proved concerning Orpheus, from such fragments of the Orphick poems, as have been owned and attested by Pagan writers: but it would be further evident, might we give credit to any of those other Orphick verses, that are found cited by

by Christians and Jews only (and we cannot reasonably conclude all these to be counterfeit and supposititious) amongst which we have this for one 1,

Eis is' αυτερινη, ινδε δυχουσα παντα τηνυλαι,

There is one only unmade God, and all other gods and things are the off-spring of this one. Moreover, when God, in the fame Orphick fragments, is styled Μητρ-πατηρ, both father and mother of all things (accordingly as it was observed before) that both the Orphick and Egyptian theology made the supreme Deity especially, to be ἀρρηφωθηναι, hermaphroditical, or male and female together; this, as Clement Alexandriaus 2 rightly interprets the meaning of it, was to signify, την ει μη δυτων γινεσ, the production of things out of nothing, or from the Deity alone, without any pre-existent or self-existent matter.

But we shall pass from Orpheus to Homer. Now it is certain, that Homer's Gods were not all eternal, unmade and self-existent, he plainly declaring the contrary concerning the gods in general; that they had a Genesis, that is, a temporary production, as in that forecited verse of his 3,

'Ωαειον τε Στου γινεσιν, &c.

The ocean from whence the gods were generated; where, by gods are meant all the animated parts of the world superior to men, but principally (as Eustathius observes) the stars, Στων αυτι δησιων, gods (faith he) are here put for stars. And as the same philologer further adds, the gods or stars do, by a synecdoche signify all things, or the whole world, αυτι τε παντων δι αυτω μεσ, a part being put for the whole, accordingly as the same poet elsewhere 4 declares his sense, speaking likewise of the ocean,

Οι γινεσις παντεσοι τηνυλαι,

Which was the original of all things, or from whence (not only the gods, but also) all other things were generated. Wherefore the full meaning of Homer was this, that the gods or stars, together with this whole visible world, had a temporary production, and were at first made out of the ocean, that is, out of the watry chaos. So that Homer's Theogonia, as well as Hesod's, was one and the same thing with the Cosmogonia; his generation of gods the same with the generation or creation of the world, both of them having, in all probability, derived it from the Mecaick Cabala, or tradition. And Eustathius tells us, that, according to the ancients, Homer's ἀπυφονια, described II. ο. was αυτου της κοσμογειας, an obscure signification of the Cosmogenia, or Cosmogonia.

Nevertheles

2 Stromatum Lib. V. p. 744.
3 Ibid. e. ver. 201 & 202.
4 Ibid. ver. 246.
thus generated from the ocean or watry chaos, yet this is to be understood only of the inferior Gods, and he is supposed to be distinguished from them, who in the same poet is frequently called, ο Θεός κατ' ιερχίω, God by way of eminency, (to whom he plainly acribes omnipotence) and Ζέας, or Jupiter, whom he styles τάφητον άνάτον, the most powerful of all, and πάντα Θεών, the first and chiefest of the gods, and ταύτα Θεῶν and κράτοις, the highest of gods and governors, and whom he affirmeth infinitely to transcend the gods, II. 6. ¹

And to reign as well over gods as men, II. a. ²

Laftly, whom he maketh to be πατὴρ Θεών, the father of the Gods as well as men; that is, nothing less than the creator of them and the whole world. He therefore, who thus produced the gods and stars out of the ocean or watry chaos, must needs be excluded out of that number of gods, so as not to have been himself generated or made out of it. Thus have we before observed, that ο Θεός, or the gods in general, are frequently taken, both by Homer and other Greek writers, in way of distinction from ο Θεός, or Jupiter, that is, for the inferior gods only.

It is true indeed, that others of the Pagan gods, besides Jupiter, were by the Latins in their solemn rites and prayers styled pares, fathers; and as Jupiter is nothing else but Jovis pater, contrasted into one word, so was Mars called by them Marspater, and Saturnus, Janus, Neptunus and Liber had the like addition also made to their names, Saturnuspater, Januspater, Neptunuspater, Liberpater: and not only so, but even their very heroes also (as for example, Quirinus) had this honourable title of father bestowed on them; all which appeareth from those verses of Lucilius, ³

Ut nemo sit nostrum, quin aut pater optimus divum, 
Aur Neptunus pater, Liber, Saturnus pater, Mars, 
Janus, Quirinus pater nomen dicatur ad unum.

Notwithstanding which, here is a great difference to be observed, that though those other gods were called Fathers, yet none of them was ever called, either by the Greeks πατὴρ Θεών, or by the Latins, pater optimus divum, save only Zeus or Jupiter, the supreme Deity.

And that Homer was thus generally understood by the Pagans themselves to have asserted a divine monarchy, or one supreme Deity ruling over all, may further appear from these following citations. Plutarch in his Platonick questions, ⁴ εἰ τον Ευνωρίκην Αδίων Ταύτων κακαί, πρώτην ο μω Μοήθης τοι τῶν ζωής τοῦ Τάφητος κράτοις Θεών, ζέας τοι κράτοις προεικείτε. Zenocrates called Jupiter, Hypatou, or the biggest; but before him Homer styled that God, who is the prince A a a of

of all princes, ὑπὸ τοῦ λαοῦ, the highest of rulers or governors. Again, the same Plutarch de Iphid & Osiride, Τὸς ὁ Ὀμήρος ἀπὸ παλαιὸν ἠθαλὸν καὶ καταφέρον ἀλλοιταν, ὥστε ἡ θύμονι ὡς Ὀμήρος τὸν ἁριχτὸν, καὶ βασιλείαν πάντων Ζύγου ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν άυξε ἢ μιστρα καλοῦ, οἷον ὅ τι μὲν ὑπάρχῃ τὰ κράτει αὐτῷ, τῷ οἱ μήτερ τῷ τὸ εὐδαίμων καὶ τῷ Ποσέιδών συμφώνων! The Egyptians, when they described Osiris by those hieroglyphics of an eye and a scepter, did by the former of them signify Providence, and by the latter Power; as Homer, when he calls that Z.ē or Jupiter, who ruleth and reigneth over all things, ὑπατοῦ and μήτερ, feems by the word ὑπατοῦ to denote his power and sovereignty, but by μήτερ his wisdom and knowledge. To Plutarch may be added Proclus, who, upon Plato's Timæus, having proved that, according to that philosopher, there was τὸ κόσμον πατέων ὕπο τῆς δικαιοσύνης, one only maker of the whole-world, affirms the fame likeness of that divine poet Homer, (as he there styles him) ὅτι διὰ τῶν δικαιοσύνης ὑπατοῦ πατέων καὶ πατρίδοις αὐτῶν καὶ θεοί αὐτῶν ἑπεμβάλει καὶ ὑπάρχουσιν εἰσάγοντες ὅλον θεοτροφον. That he also throughout all his poetry praises Jupiter, as the highest of all rulers, and the father both of gods and men, and attributes all demigurgical notions to him. Whereupon he concludes in this manner, ὅτι ὁ θεὸς τὸν κόσμον ὑπάντον τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἱεροσολογίας ἱπερθυμόνεις καὶ τὴν Διά τῆς ἰκανον ἱεροσολογίας ἀποκαλοῦσαν. And thus we have made it manifest, that all the Greekish theology universally ascribes to Z.ē, or Jupiter, the making of all things. Lastly, Aristotle himself confirmeth the fame with his testimony, where he writes of the paternal authority after this manner, ἢ τῶν τέκνων ἀρχὴ βασιλεία* διὸ καλῶς Ὀμήρος τὸν Δία προσηγόρευσεν εἰπών,

τὸν βασιλεία τῶν ἀπαντῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλεύον ἀκμαίον και παλαιὸν ἡ ἀληθεία τῶν αὐτῶν ὑπὸ πάντας τὸ προσηγόρευσαι προς τὸ νεώτερον, καὶ ὁ γενόμενος πρὸς τὸ τέκνον. The paternal power or authority over children is a kingly authority: wherefore Homer, when he intended to set forth Jupiter's kingly power over all, very well called him the father of men and gods. For he, that is king by nature, ought both to differ from those that be reigneth over, and also to be of the same kind with them; as the senior is to the junior, and be that begetteth to his off-spring. Where Aristotle's senes seems to be this, that Jupiter had therefore a natural and not acquired kingly power over all the Gods, because they were all his off-spring and begotten by him, as well as men. In which passage therefore Aristotle plainly acquits and frees Homer from all suspicion of atheism.

As for Hesiod, if we had not already sufficiently prov'd from his Theogonia, that all his Gods (that is, his inferior deities) were generated and made, as well as men, it might be made unquestionably evident from this verse of his in his Opera,

*ὅς ὄμοιος γενάκας ἔγοραῖοι ἔγοραῖοι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ,

When the Gods and mortal men, were both together, alike made or generated. Where the word ὄμοιος is thus interpreted by the Greek scholiasts, ἀντὶ τῆς μισθήσεως.
only of inferior Gods.

...and in to acte γένες, i.e. the Gods and men, were both alike made from the same root or stock. And though it followeth immediately after,

Χρόσιοι μία παντεῖνα γένες, μερίκων αδράπων Ἀθανατοί παντεῖν, ὁλομυθία δόματ' ἔχοτες,

That first of all a golden age of men was made by the immortal Gods; yet Mo- schopulus there notes, 'Ἀθανατοί παντεῖν, ὁ Ζεὺς μόνος ἐποίησεν, ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἴναμον φανερωμένων λέγει ὁ πάντως τὸς Ἐπεί, τὸ τ SQLiteDatabase πάντως τῆς ὁμοίως ἀκροβαρ- ρίων. The immortal gods made; the true meaning (saith he) is, that Jupiter alone made this first golden age of men; as may be proved from other places in the same poet; and though he spoke of the gods in general, yet doth he but transfer that, which was the work of one upon all of the like kind. And there are several other instances of this poet's using Ζεὺς for Ὑπότος, gods for god. But it is possible, that Hesiod's meaning might be the same with Plato's, that though the inferior mundane gods were all made at first by the supreme God, as well as men, yet they being made something sooner than men, did afterwards contribute also to the making of men.

But Hesiod's Theogonia, or generation of gods, is not to be understood universally neither, but only of the inferior gods, that Ζεὺς or Jupiter being to be excepted out of the number of them, whom the same Hesiod, as well as Homer, makes to be the father of gods, as also the king of them, in these words 2,

Ἀὔτος γὰρ πάντων βασιλεὺς καὶ κοίμων ἐστὶν Ἀθανάτων.

And attributes the creation of all things to him, as Proclus writeth upon this place,

'Οὐ τε διὰ βροτοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁμοῦ, &c.

By whom all mortal men are, δι' ὑπὸ πάντως, καὶ ὑπὸ κοιμώματος πάντως τῷ Διδωμορωμένων, by whom all things are, and not by chance; the poet, by a synecdoche, here ascribing the making of all to Jupiter. Wherefore Hesiod's Theogonia is to be understood of the inferior Gods only, and not of Ζεὺς or Jupiter, who was the father and maker of them (though out of a watery chaos) and himself therefore αὐτοψυκτον, self-existent or unmade.

In like manner, that Pindar's gods were not eternal, but made or generated, is plainly declared by him in these words;

"Εἰ πάντως, δι' Ἵππων γένες, ἐκ
Μιᾶς δ' ἐποίησεν
Μεταφέροντες.

1 In Timothe, p. 550. Oper.
2 In Timothe, p. 550. Oper.
3 Apud Clement. Alexandr. in Cohortat. A a a 2

Nom. Od. 6. [p. 120. Ed. Schmidii.]
Pindar a divine Theogonist. Book I.

Unum Hominum, unum Deorum genus,
Et ex una spiramus
Mater utrique.

There is one kind both of gods and men, and we both breathe from the same mother, or spring from the same original. Whereby the common mother of both gods and men, the scholiast understands the earth and chaos, taking the gods here for the inferior deities only, and principally the stars. ¹

This of Pindar's therefore is to be understood of all the other gods, that they were made as well as men out of the earth or chaos, but not of that supreme Deity, whom the same Pindar elsewhere calls Σεικός, the most powerful of the Gods, and τοῦ πάντων κόσμου, the lord of all things, and ἀρχὸν, the cause of every thing, and ἀρχοντικὸς Σεικόν, that God who is the best artificer, or was the framer of the whole world, and as Clemens Alexandrinus tells us, ἡ τρισω, or the universe. Which God also, according to Pindar, Chiron instructed Achilles to worship principally, above all the other gods.

Pyth. Od. 6.
[p. 260]

The sense of which words is thus declared by the scholiast, ἓξερετός τοῦ μεγαλόφωνος αὐτοῦ καὶ μεγαλοφωνίστης τοῦ Δίω, οὕτω τὸς ἄλλος τεῦχος τιμάν καὶ σέβεται. That he should honour and worship the loud-founding Jupiter, the lord of thunder and lightning, transcendently above all the other gods. Which by the way confutes the opinion of those, who contend, that the supreme God, as such, was not at all worshipped by the Pagans.

However, this is certain concerning these three, Homer, Hesiod, and Pindar, that they must of necessity either have been all absolute Atheists, in acknowledging no eternal Deity at all, but making senseless Chaos, Night and the Ocean, the original of all their gods without exception, and therefore of Jupiter himself too, that king and father of them; or else assert one only eternal unmade self-existent deity, so as that all the other gods were generated or created by that one. Which latter doubtless was their genuine sense; and the only reason, why Aristotle and Plato might possibly sometime have a suspicion of the contrary, seems to have been this, their not understanding that Mosack Cabala, which both Hesiod and Homer followed, of the world's, that is, both heaven and earth's, being made at first out of a wary chaos; for thus is the tradition declared by St. Peter, ep. II. ch. 3.

There might be several remarkable passages to the same purpoce, produced out of those two tragick poets, Æschylus and Sophocles; which yet, because they have been already cited by Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus,

There is in truth one only God, who made heaven and earth, the sea, air, and winds, &c. After which followeth also something against image-worship; that though this be such as might well become a Christian, and be no where now to be found in those extant tragedies of this poet (many whereof have been lost) yet the sincerity thereof cannot reasonably be at all suspected by us, it having been cited by so many of the ancient fathers in their writings against the Pagans, as particularly Athenagoras, Clemens Alexandrinus, Justin Martyr, Eusebius, Cyril and Theodoret; of which number Clemens tells us, that it was attested likewise by that ancient Pagan historiographer Hecaterus. But there are so many places to our purpose in Euripides, that we cannot omit them all in his Supplices we have this, wherein all men's absolute dependence upon Jupiter, or one supreme Deity, is fully acknowledged.

We have also this excellent prayer to the supreme governor of heaven and earth, cited out of the same tragedian:

"Ω Ζεῦ, τί φοβα τῆς ταλαίπωρης Βοστᾶς;
Φρονείν λύγεις; σὺ γὰρ ἐκεῖην ἔκρινας,
Δεῦμεν τε τοιαύτα, ἄν σὺ τῇ χάινης Σίλω.

Miseros quid homines, O deum rex & pater,
Sapere arbitramur? Pendet e nutu tuo
Res nostra, facinusque illa que visum tibi.

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"Σοί τῶν πάντων μεθεύτης Χρῆ,
Πάλαιν τε Φίλω Ζεὺς ἐτή 'Αίδης
Οὐραμαίμε, & τίργεις;
Σὺ γὰρ οἱ τοι τῆς ἐναέως,
Σκήνησο τὸ Δίος μεθαίμεστον,
Χειμῶν 5 "Αίδη μεθεύτες ἄγχεις;
Πέμψοι μεν φῶς ψυχαίς αὐράν
Ταῖς βολοκομαίς ἄδαλπ προκαβεῖν
Πάντων ἐπιλατον, τίς ἔστα τικὼν,
Τόσι δεῖ μακάμεν εὖ Σκευινιν,
Εἰςνίν μὲ χάρων ἀνθραπολίν."

Tibi

3 Ver. 714, 715, 716.
Tibi (culoorum domino) vinum,  
Salsanque molam sfero, seu Ditis,  
Tu sue Jovis nomine gaudes:  
Tu namque des superos inter  
Sceptrum tradias sublime Jovis;  
Idem regnum terrestre tenes.  
Te lucem animis infunde virum,  
Sciunt volup quo fata mentis  
Lustit ortu, quae causa mali;  
Cui caelicium rite litando  
Requiem fiet habere laborum.

Where we may observe that Zv$ and "Aiv$, Jupiter and Pluto, are both of them supposed to be names equally belonging to one and the same supreme God. And the sum of the prayer is this, That God would infuse light into the souls of men, whereby they might be enabled to know, what is the root, from whence all their evils spring, and by what means they may avoid them.

Lastly, there is another devotional passage, cited out of Euripides¹, which contains also a clear acknowledgment of one self-existent being, that comprehends and governs the whole world:

Στού αυτοφο, του ιν αισθησιόν  
'Ρόμβος, πόταμον θυσίαν επιλόγισας',  
"Οι πέρι μυν θύσιν, πέριν αφθειαν  
Νίκαιολόχις, δικρίτως τά联网ν  
"Οξάλωσιδιλεχίς, αμφιχροτίς,

Thou self-sprung being, that dost all enfold,  
And in thine arms heaven's whirling fabric hold!  
Who art encircled with resplendent light,  
And yet art mantled o'er in shady night!  
About whom, the exultant flarry fires  
Dance nimbly round in everlasting gyres.

For this sense of the third and fourth verses, which we think the words will bear, and which agrees with that Orphick passage

Περί γα λαφ χαλαίνη ει χριστόλα,  
That God being in himself a most bright and dazzling light, is respectively to us, and, by reason of the weakness of our understanding, covered over with a thick cloud; as also with that in the scripture, clouds and darkness are round about him: I say, this sense we chose rather to follow, as more rich and august, than that other vulgar one, though grammatically and poetically good also; That successive day and night, together with a numberless multitude of stais, perpetually dance round about the Deity.

Aristophanes in the very beginning of his Plutus distinguisheth between Ζv$ and Σττ, Jupiter and the gods;
And we have this clear testimony of Terpander, cited by Clemens Alexandrinus, Zев ἡμῖν δύνασθαι, Zев παρά τίνι, Thou Jupiter, who art the original of all things, thou Jupiter who art the governour of all. And these following verses are attributed to Menander:—

Τίν οὖν πάνω κύριον γενικότατον
Καὶ παρά, τότε δικτίλιν πιθεύς μένον,
Ἄρχων τοιότων εὐγένετο καὶ μία-ορά.

Rerum universarum imperatorem & patrem,
Solum perpetuo coele more suppliciter decet,
Artificem tanctum & largitorem copiae.

Where men are exhorted to worship the supreme God only, as the sole author of all good, or at least transcendently above all the other gods. There are also two remarkable testimonies, one of Hermesianax an ancient Greek poet, and another of Aratus, to the same purpose; which shall both be reserved for other places.

Wherefore we pass from the Greek to the Latin poets, where Ennius first appears, deriving the Gods in general (who were all the inferior deities) from Erebus and Night, as supposing them all to have been made or generated out of Chaos, nevertheless acknowledging one, who was

---Divìnumque hóminumque pater, rex,---

both father and king of gods and men, that is, the maker or creator of the whole world, who therefore made those gods together with the world out of Chaos, himself being unmade.

Plautus in like manner sometimes distinguishes betwixt Jupiter and the gods, and plainly acknowledgeth one omnipotent Deity,

Est profetio Deus, qui que nos gerimus, auditeque & videt.

Which passage very much resembles that of Manlius Torquatus in Livy, Est cælestis nomen, es magne Jupiter; a strong asseveration of one supreme and universal Deity. And the same Plautus in his Rudens clearly afferts one supreme monarch and emperor over all, whom the inferior Gods are subservient to;

Qui gentes omnes marisque & terras mover,
Ejus sunt civis civitate cielitum;
Qui est imperator divinum atque hominum Jupiter,
Is nos per gentes alium aliud dispersat,
Hominum quo facta, mores, pietatem & fidem
Nosiamus.---

--- Qui---

Qui falsas lites falsis testimoniis
Petunt, quique in jure abjurant pecuniam,
Eorum referimus nona exscripta ad Iovem.
Catidie Ille sit, quis hic quaerat malum.
Iterum Ille eam reum judicatam judicat.
Bonos in alii tabulis exscriptos habet.
Atque hoc fcelefti illi in animum inducent suum
Iovem se placare posse donis, bogiis;
Sed operant & summum perdunt, quia
Nibil Ei acceptum est à perjuris supplici.

Where Jupiter, the supreme monarch of gods and men, is said to appoint other inferiour gods under him, over all the parts of the earth, to observe the actions, manners and behaviours of man every where; and to return the names both of bad and good to him. Which Jupiter judges over again all unjust judgments, rendring a righteous retribution to all. And though wicked mens conceit, that he may be bribed with sacrifices, yet no worship is acceptable to him from the perjurious. Notwithstanding which, this poet afterwards jumbles the supreme and inferiour gods all together, after the usual manner, under that one general name of gods, because they are all supposed to be co-governours of this world;

Facilis, quia pius est, à Diis supplicans,
Quam qui fcelestis est, inveniet veniam sibi.

Again the same poet elsewhere brings in Hanno the Carthaginian with this form of prayer addressing himself to Jupiter or the supreme god;

Jupiter, qui genus colis alifque bonum, per quem vivimus
Vitale ævum; quem penesès pies vitaeque sunt bonum omnium,
Da diem bunc jospitem, quefó, rebus meis agundis.

In the next place, we have these verses of Valerius Soranus, an ancient and eminent poet, full to the purpose, recorded by Varro 1;

Jupiter omnipotens, regem rex ipsi delinque,
Progenitor genitrixque deum, Deus UNUS & OMNIS.

To this sense: Omnipotent Jupiter, the king of kings and gods, and the progenitor and genitrix, the both father and mother of those gods; one God and all gods. Where the supreme and omnipotent Deity is styled progenitor & genitrix deorum, after the same manner as he was called in the Æþric theology μνησθάτω καὶ ἀμφότεροι, that expression denoting the gods and all other things to have been produced from him alone, and without any pre-existent matter. Moreover, according to the tenour of this Ethnick theology, that one God was all gods and every god, the Pagans supposed, that when ever any inferior deity was worshipped by them, the supreme was therein also at once worshipped and honoured.

1 De Linguâ Latinâ, p. 71. Edit. 1581. in 8vo.
CHAP. IV. in the Monarchy of the whole.

Though the sense of Ovid hath been sufficiently declared before, yet we cannot well omit some other passages of his, as that grateful and sensible acknowledgment,

\[\text{Quod loquor & spiro, calorque & lumina solis} \]
\[\text{Apicio (possumne ingratus & immemor esse?)} \]
\[\text{Ipse dedit.} \]

And this in the third of his Metamorph.

\[\text{Ille pater restitue deum, cui dextra trifusis} \]
\[\text{Ignibus armata est, qui nutu concutit orbem.} \]

Virgil's theology also may sufficiently appear from his frequent acknowledgment of an omnipotent Deity, and from those verses of his before cited out of Æn. 6. wherein he plainly afferts one God to be the original of all things, at least as a soul of the world; Servius Honoratus there paraphrasing thus, \[\text{Deus est quidam divinus spiritus, qui per quatuor fusus elementa gignit univerfa; God is a certain spirit, which, infused through the four elements, begeteth all things.} \] Nevertheless, we shall add from him this also of Venus her prayer to Jupiter, Æn. 1.

\[\text{—O qui res hominumque deumque} \]
\[\text{Æternis regis imperii, & fulmine terres!} \]

Which Venus again, Æn. 10. bespeaks the same Jupiter after this manner,

\[\text{O pater, O hominum divumque æterna potesfas!} \]

Where we have this annotation of Servius, \[\text{divumque æterna potesfas, propter aliorum numinum discretionem; Jupiter is here called the eternal power of the gods, to distinguish him from all the other gods, that were not eternal, but made or generated from him.} \]

Neither ought Horace to be left out, in whom we read to the same purpose, Lib. 1, Od. 12.

\[\text{Quid prius dicam solitis parentis} \]
\[\text{Laudibus? qui res hominum & deorum,} \]
\[\text{Qui mare & terras, variisque mundum Temperat boris,} \]
\[\text{Unde nil majus generatur ipso,} \]
\[\text{Nec viget quiequam simile aus secundum:} \]
\[\text{Proximos illi tamen occupavit Pallas honores,} \]

And again, 3. Lib. Od. 4.

\[\text{Qui terram inertem, qui mare temperat} \]

\[\text{Bbb Ventosum} \]

\[\text{Metamorph. Lib.XIV. verf. 172.} \]
Epicurus the only Philosopher

Where from those words of Horace, felitis parentis laudibus, it appears, that the one supreme Deity, the parent and maker of all things, was then wont to be celebrated by the Pagans as such, above all the other gods. And whereas those Pagans vulgarly ascribed the government of the seas particularly to Neptune, of the earth and Hades or Inferi (which are here called trisitia Regna) to Pluto, those being here attributed by Horace to one and the same supreme and universal Deity; it may well be concluded from thence, that Jupiter, Neptune and Pluto, were but three several names or notions of one supreme Numen, whose sovereignty notwithstanding was chiefly signified by Jupiter. Which same is to be said of Pallas or Minerva too, that signifying the eternal wisdom, that it was but another name of God also, though look'd upon as inferior to that of Jupiter and next in dignity to it; unless we should conclude it to be a second divine hypothesis, according to the doctrine of the Pythagoreans and Platonists (probably not unknown to Horace) as also to that Scripture Cabala, I was set up from everlasting, or ever the earth was; when there were no depths, I was brought forth, &c. But of this more afterward.

Lastly, we shall conclude with Manilius, who lived in the same Augustean age, and was a zealous opposer of that atheistical hypothesis of Epicurus and Lucretius, as appears from these verses of his;

1 Qvis credat tantas opérum fine numine moles,
   Ex minimis cæcoque creatum sedere mundum?

Wherefore he also plainly affirms one supreme Deity, the framer and governour of the whole world, in this manner, lib. 2.

2 Namque canam tacitá naturam mente potentem,
   Infusumque Deum colo, terrīque, fertique,
   Ingeniīm equealī moderantem façere molem,
   Totumque alternō consenſu vivere mundum,
   Et rationis agi motu, quum SPIRITUS UNUS
   Per cænas hābitet partes, atque irriget orbem,
   Omnia pervolitans, corpusque animale fiturget, &c.

And again,

Hoc opus immensi conſtruitum corpore mundi
Vis animæ divina regit, sacroque meatu
Conspirat Deus & tacita ratione gubernat.

And lib. 4. 3

—— Faciem coeli non invidet orbi
Ipse Deus, vultusque suos, corpusque recludit,

Semper

1 Lib. 1, ver. 492, 493.
2 Ver. 61, &c.
3 Ver. 515.
Semper volvendo, seque ipsum inculcat & offert;
Ut bene cognoscat poift, manufactaque videndo,
Qualis eae, docetque suas attendere leges.
Ipse vocat nostras animos ad sydera mundus,
Nee patitur, quia non condit, sua jura laterc.

Where notwithstanding, we confess, that the whole animated world, or rather the soul thereof, is, according to the Stoical doctrine, made by Manilius to be the supreme Numen.

XX. We now pass from the poets of the Pagans to their philosophers. A modern writer concerning the religion of the Gentiles, affirmeth this to have been the opinion of very eminent philosophers, That even all the minor gods of the pagans did exist of themselves from eternity unmade; they giving many reasons for the same. But how far from truth this is, will (as we conceive) appear sufficiently from the sequel of this discourse. And we cannot conclude otherwise, but that this learned writer did mistake that opinion of Aristotle and the latter Platonists, concerning the eternity of the world and gods, as if they had therefore asserted the self-existence of them; the contrary whereunto hath been already manifested. Wherefore we shall now make it unquestionably evident by a particular enumeration, that the generality of the Pagan philosophers, who were Theists, however they acknowledged a multiplicity of gods, yet asserted one only self-existent Deity, or a universal Numen, by whom the world and all those other gods were made. There being only some few Ditheists to be excepted, (such as Plutarch and Atticus,) who, out of a certain softness and tenderness of nature, that they might free the one good God from the imputation of evils, would needs set up, besides him, an evil soul or demon also in the world self-existent, to bear all the blame of them.

And indeed Epicurus is the only person, that we can find amongst the reputed philosophers, who, though pretending to acknowledge gods, yet professedly opposed monarchy, and verbally asserted a multitude of eternal, unmade, self-existent deities; but such as had nothing at all to do, either with the making or governing of the world. The reason whereof was, because he would by no means admit the world to have been made by any mind or understanding. Wherefore he concluded,

Natvm rerum, hand divina mente coortam,

That there was no God the beginner or raider of the world. But nevertheless, that he might decline the odium of being accounted an Atheist, he pretended to assert a multitude of gods unmade and incorruptible, such as were unconcerned in the fabric of the world. Wherein first it is evident, that he was not serious and sincere, because he really admitting no other principles of things in his philosophy, besides atoms and vacuum, agreeably thereunto, could acknowledge no other gods than such as were compounded out of atoms, and therefore corruptible. And thus does Origen declare the doctrine of God, 2

1 Sir Edward Herbert, de religione Gentilium, Cap. XIV. p. 228.
of Epicurus, not indeed as he pretended to hold it, but as, according to the tenor of his principles, he must have held it, had he really asserted any gods at all, or to Eptiupun Sevi, ovbeto  εξ ατόμων τοικατονίας, και το ουν εκ τη συνάρτι α ἱκλητον, ἔργαντος τῆς Φιλοσοφίας ατόμως απετείλαι; Epicurus his gods being compounded of atoms, and therefore by their very constitution corruptible, are in continual labour and toil, struggling with their corruptive principles. Nevertheless if Epicurus had in good earnest asserted such a commonwealth of gods, as were neither made out of atoms, nor yet corruptible; so long as he denied the world to have been made by any mind or wisdom (as we have already declared) he ought not to be reckoned amongst the Theifts, but Atheists.

Thales the Miliary was one of the most ancient Greek philosophers, who that he admitted a plurality of gods in some sense, is evident from that saying of his cited by Ariostoτε, πάλιν Σευν πληρει, all things are full of gods. But that notwithstanding he asserted one supreme and only unmade or self-existent Deity, is also manifest from that other apothegm of his in Laertius, προετοιμασε ταξινον ο θεός, ανάγεντα γαρ God is the eldest of all things, because he is unmade. From whence it may be concluded, that all Thales his other gods were generated, and the off-spring of one sole unmade Deity.

Pherecydes Syrus was Thales his contemporary, of whom Ariosto in his Metaphysics hath recorded, that he affirmed το γεννήσαν πρωτών αριστών, that the first principle, from whence all other things were generated, was the best or an absolutely perfect being; so as that in the scale of nature, things did not ascend upwards from the most imperfect to the more perfect beings, but on the contrary descend downwards from the most perfect to the less perfect. Moreover, Laertius informs us, that this was the beginning of one of Pherecydes his books, Ζητε μν καλ χρήσει εις αλί, και χρήσια του Jupiter, and Time, and the Earth always were. Where notwithstanding, in the following words, he makes the earth to be dependent upon Jupiter; though some reading χρήσια here instead of χρήσις, seem to understand him thus, that Jupiter and Saturn, really one and the same Numen, was always from eternity. However, there is in these words an acknowledgment of one single and eternal Deity.

Pythagoras was the most eminent of all the ancient philosophers, who, that he was a Polytheist as well as the other Pagans, may be concluded from that beginning of the golden verses (though not written by him),

'Αληθέας μου πρώτα Σευν ύμη, ως διάκεισαι,
Τίμα, και σευν ὁμον ἔπεισ' ήσας ἄγιαν;
Τας τε καταχθειάς σιέ εδαιμονες,  ἤνομα μηγών.

Wherein men are exhorted in the first place to worship the immortal gods, and that accordingly as they were appointed by law; after them the heroes, and last of all the terrestrial demons. And accordingly

Laertius

1 De Animâ, lib. I. cap. VIII. p. 37. Tom. II. Oper.
2 Lib. I. segm. 35. p. 21.
3 Lib. XII. cap. IV. p. 436. Tom. IV. Oper.
4 Lib. I. segm. 119. p. 76.
Laertius gives this account of Pythagoras: his piet"; thus: 
That he conceived men ought to worship both
the gods and the heroes, though not with equal honour. 
And who those gods of Pythagoras were, the same writer also declareth, 
thus: That they were, in part at least, the sun, and moon, and stars.

Notwithstanding which, that Pythagoras acknowledged one supreme and
universal Numen, which therefore was the original of all those other gods,
may partly appear from that prayer in the golden verses, which, whether
written by Philolaus or Lycis, or some other follower of Pythagoras, were
undoubtedly ancient and agreeable to his doctrine.

Upon which Hierocles thus writeth, 
this name, malis jubeas vel solviet omnes: 
Omnibus manitur vel quonam demone monistra.

Zei πάτερ, δι' ἑπόλλων τε καθὼς λύσινας άπολύεις
Εἰ πάσιν δεῖξαι οἷς τοῦ δαίμον κέρδαι.

Jupiter alme, malis jubeas vel solviet omnes:
Omnibus manitur vel quonam demone monistra.

This very name Zeus is a convenient symbol or image of the demiurgical nature. And they,
who first gave names to things, were by reason of a certain wonderful wisdom of
their s a kind of excellent statuaries; they by those several names, as images,
lively representing the natures of things. Moreover, that this Pythagoric
prayer was directed to the supreme Numen and king of gods, Jamblichus
thus declares in his Protrepticks: in θεός τότος μία μὲν ἀρίστη καθάλαξιν ἡ
τοῦ θείου ὀνομασία τῇ μεμισθίᾳ τοῖς εὐεργετοῖς τῶν ἰδιῶν, ἦν μάλιστα τοῖς
τρισίδεκα αἰώνιον θείον. Here is an excellent exhortation of these golden verses to the
pursuit of divine felicity, mingled together with prayers and the invocation of
the gods, but especially of that Jupiter, who is the king of them. Moreover, the
fame may further appear from those Pythagoric fragments, that are still
extant; as that of Ocellus Lucanus, and others, who were Moralists, in which
as gods are sometimes spoken of plurally, so also is God often singularly
used for that supreme Deity, which containeth the whole.

But this will be most of all manifest from what hath been recorded con-
cerning the Pythagoric philosophy, and its making a monad the first prin-
ciple.

1 Vide e.tiam 23. p. 506. 3 Cap. III. p. 10. Edit. Arcei. 4 These are publish'd by Dr. Tho. Gale in
2 Segm. 27. p. 59. Amsterd. 1688. in 8vo.
Pythagoras his Monad.

BooK I.

ciple. It is true indeed, that the writer de Placitis Philosophorum doth affirm Pythagoras to have affirmed two substantial principles self-existent, a Monad and a Dyad; by the former of which, as God is confessed to have been meant, so the latter of them is declared with some uncertainty, it being in one place interpreted to be a diæmon, or a principle of evil; ¹ Pythagoras τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸν μιν μονάδα Θεόν, τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα, ἢτις ἢ ἢ ἢ τὰ τῶν φύσεων, αὐτὸς ὁ γὰρ τὸν ἀρχηγὸν διάδα δαίμων, τὸ κύκλον, &c. Pythagoras his first principle is God and Good, which is the nature of unity, and a perfect mind; but his other principle of duality is a demon or evil. But in another place expounded to be matter, πάλιν τὴν μονάδα καὶ τὴν ἀρχήν διάδα τῶν ἀρχῶν ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητικοὺς αἰτίους καὶ εἰδικοὺς, (ἡπεὶ ἢ ἢ ἢ ἢ τοῦ παν.-

tικοῦ τῆς ἁλικοῦ (ὑπερ ἢ μὲν ἢ ὡματικός κόσμου) Pythagoras his principles were a monad and infinite duality: the former of them an active principle, Mind or God; the latter passive and matter. And Plutarch in some other writings of his declares, that the first matter did not exist alone by it self dead and inanimate, but acted with an irrational soul; and that both these together made up that wicked demon of his. And doubtless, this book de Placitis Philosophorum was either written by Plutarch himself, or else by some disciple and follower of his according to his principles. Wherefore this account, which is therein given of the Pythagoric doctrine, was probably infected with that private conceit of Plutarch's, that God and a wicked demon, or else matter, together with an irrational soul, self-existent, were the first principles of the universe. Though we do acknowledge that others also, besides Plutarch, have supposed Pythagoras to have made two self-existent principles, God and matter, but not animate, nor informed, as Plutarch supposed, with any irrational or wicked soul.

Notwithstanding which, it may well be made a question, whether Pythagoras by his Dyad meant matter or no; because Malebuis or Porphyrius, in the life of Pythagoras, thus interprets those two Pythagoric principles of unity and duality; τὸ αἰτίου τῆς συμπαθείας καὶ τῆς συμμεταφυσίας, καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης τῶν ἀκετῶν κατὰ ταυτά, καὶ θεσμῶν ἐξουσίας, ἐν προσεγγίσεσιν, γὰρ γὰρ τὸ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρη ἐν τοῖς οὐ- ποίησις, ὑποκρίνεται των μέρων καὶ οὐκαίρων, κατὰ μεταμεταφυσίαν τὸ πρῶτον αἰτία τῆς τῆς ἐνιαίας καὶ αὐτοτής καὶ παράτοσις τῶν μερῶν καὶ ἐν μεταφυσία καὶ ἀλλατίων ἔκτος ὑποκρίνεται καὶ μονάδος καὶ διάδα δαίμων. The cause of that sympathy, harmony, and agreement, which is in things, and of the conservation of the whole, which is always the same and like itself, was by Pythagoras called unity or a monad (that unity, which is in the things themselves, being but a participation of the first cause:) but the reason of alterity, inequality, and unconfant irregularity in things; was by him called a Dyad. Thus, according to Porphyrius, by the Pythagoric Dyad is not so much meant matter, as the infinite and indeterminate nature, and the passive capability of things. So that the Monad and Dyad of Pythagoras seem to have been the same with Plato's πάνος and ἀπηρα, his finite and infinite in his Philebus; the former of which two only is substantial, that first most simple being, the cause of all unity, and the measure of all things.

CHAP. IV. the sole Principle of all things.

However, if Pythagoras his Dyad be to be understood of a substantial matter, it will not therefore follow, that he supposed matter to be self-existent and independent upon the Deity, since, according to the best and most ancient writers, his Dyad was no primary but a secondary thing only, and derived from his Monad, the sole original of all things. Thus Diogenes Laertius tells us 1, that Alexander, who wrote the successes of philosophers, affirmed he had found in the Pythagorick Commentaries, ἀρχόν µὲν τῶν ἀκτίων, μοῖχα ἐκ τῆς μονάδος, ἀνέργοις δύνατα, ἢ τοῦ ἄνω τῆς μονάδος ἀκτίων ὕψις σπουδή. That a Monad was the principle of all things, but that from this Monad was derived infinite duality, as matter for the Monad to work upon, as the active cause. With which agreeeth Hermias 2, affirming this to be one of the greatest of all the Pythagorick mysteries, that a Monad was the sole principle of all things. Accordingly whereunto, Clemens Alexandrinus cites this passage 3 out of Thearidas, an ancient Pythagorean, in his book concerning nature, Ἀ ἀρχή τῶν ἔντων, ἀρχή μὲν ἔντων ἀλήθεια, μία. Κέινα γὰρ εἰς ἀρχήν 611. [p. 728. Τι ἐκ τοῦ µιᾶς µοίον, The true principle of all things was only one; for this was in the beginning one alone. Which words also seem to imply the world to have had a novility of existence or beginning of duration. And indeed, however Ocelius Lucanus writes, yet that Pythagoras himself did not hold the eternity of the world, may be concluded from what Porphyrius 4 records of him, where he gives an account of that his superfluous abstinence from beans; ὅτι τῆς πρῶτης ἀρχῆς καὶ γενετος ταρασσόμενον, καὶ πολλὰς ἀλύσας ἄνθρωπους καὶ συνηπεριμένας καὶ συσπεσμένας εἰς τὰ γεῖν, κατὰ ἄλλον γένεσιν καὶ ἀκάρδης συνήπερι τό τε ἐκ τοῦ µιᾶς µοίον, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς συνῆπερ εἰς τὸ ἔκ τε καὶ καὶ γενετος τὰς ἀλλὰς ἀλλὰς ἀλλὰς ἀλλὰς τοιαύταις. That at the beginning things being conjoined and mingled together, the generation and secretion of them afterwards proceeded by degrees, animals and plants appearing; at which time also, from the same purified matter, sprung up both men and beans.

Pythagoras is generally reported to have held a trinity of divine hypostases: and therefore when St. Cyril 5 affirmeth Pythagoras to have called God ζύγων τῶν ὅλων κόσμων, καὶ πάνων κόσμου, the animation of the whole heavens, and the motion of all things; adding, that God was not, as some supposed, ἀπὸ τῆς διακόμασης, καὶ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ ὁ θεός ἐν ὅλω, without the fabric of the world, but whole in the whole, this seems properly to be understood of that third divine hypostasis of the Pythagorick trinity, namely the eternal Psyshe. Again, when God is called in Plutarch 6, according to Pythagoras, αὐτὸς ὁ νῦς, mind it self, this seems to be meant properly of his second hypostasis, the supreme Deity, according to him, being something above Mind or Intellecf. In like manner when in Cicero 7, Pythagoras his opinion concerning the Deity is thus reprented, Deum esse animum per naturam rerum omnium intentum & comman- tendum, ex quo animi nostri carerentur; That God was a mind pervading through the whole nature of things, from whom our souls were, as it were, decreed or cut

cut out; and again, *ex univer$e mente divina delicato esse animos no$tr(os*;
this in all probability was to be understood also either of the third or second
divine hypostasis, and not of the first, which was properly called by him το

*De Placit. Philof. Lib I. cap. VI. p. 381.*

IV. Opera.}
pounded of plenty and poverty, was in plain language no other than the love of desire, which, as Aristotle affirmeth, is μετὰ λύπης, accompanied with grief and pain. But that Orphick and Pythagorick love was nothing else but πάνω and ἐπιφάνεια, infinite riches and plenty, a love of redundancy and overflowing fulness, delighting to communicate itself, which was therefore said to be the oldest of all things and the most perfect, that is, the supreme Deity; according to which notion also, in the Scripture itself, God seems to be called love, though the word be not there ἀγάπη, but ἀγάπη. But to say the truth, Parmenides his love (however made a principle somewhere by Aristotle 1) seems to be neither exactly the same with the Orphick, nor yet with the Platonick love, it being not the supreme Deity, and yet the first of the created gods; which appears from Simplicius 2 his connecting these two verses of his together in this manner:

'Ει δὲ μέα τῶν δαίμων οὐ πάλιν καβεῖν,

τὰτιν ἡ Θεῷν αἰτίων εἰς τὸν Φύσιν, λέγων

Πρώτον μεν ἐγώ Θεῶν μνείσχαλο πάλιν

In the midst of these elements is that God, which governeth all things, and whom Parmenides affirmeth to be the cause of gods, writing thus; God first of all created Love, before the other gods. Wherefore by this love of Parmenides is understood nothing else, but the lower soul of the world, together with a plastick nature, which though it be the original of motion and activity in this corporeal world, yet it is but a secondary or created god; before whole production, necessity is laid by those Ethnick theologers to have reigned: the true meaning whereof seems to be this, that before that divine spirit moved upon the waters, and brought things into an orderly system, there was nothing but the necessity of material motions, unguided by any orderly wisdom or method for good (that is, by love) in that confused and floating chaos.

But Pythagoras, it seemeth, did not only call the supreme Deity a Monad, but also a Tetrad or Tetractys; for it is generally affirmed, that Pythagoras himself was wont to swear hereby: though Porphyrius and Jamblichus and others write, that the disciples of Pythagoras swore by Pythagoras, who had delivered to them the doctrine or Cabala of this Tetractys. Which Tetractys also in the golden veres is called ποιη ἀνάδυς Φύσις, the fountain of the eternal nature, an expression, that cannot properly belong to any thing but the supreme Deity. And thus Hierocles, οὐκ ἐγὼ εἰπον ο μὴ τῆς τερατην, ἀν ἄμφης, ἓς ἅγιος ἀγγέλλω, ἐργάζομαι, δηλοριγον τοις θεοί, ἕς αἰτία τῷ Τετράκτυς, ὅθεν νοτίζω, αἰτία τῷ ποιητῶ, καὶ αἰσθήτῳ Θεό. There is nothing in the whole world, which doth not depend upon the Tetractys, as its root and principle. For the Tetrad is, as we have already said, the maker of all things; the intelligible God, the cause of the heavenly and sensible God, that is, of the animated world or heaven. Now the latter Pythagoreans and Platonists endeavour to give reasons, why God should be called Tetras or Tetractys, from certain mysteries in that number four, as

Chap. IV. others, the Youngest God. 375


2 Comment. in Aurea Cæmina Pythag. p. 170, 171.

p. 269.
for example; First, because the Tetrad is δεκαδας, the power of the Decad, it virtually containing the whole Decad in it, which is all numbers or beings; but the bottom of this mystery is no more than this, that one, two, three, four, added all together, make up ten. Again, because the Tetrad is an arithmetical medity betwixt the Monad and the Hebdomad; which Monad and Hebdomad are said to agree in this, that as the Monad is ingenit or unmade, it being the original and fountain of all numbers, so is the Hebdomad said to be, not only πανωσας, but ἄνωτα, a motherless, as well as virgin number. Wherefore the Tetrad lying in the middle betwixt the ingenit Monad, and the motherless virgin Hebdomad; and it being both begotten and begetting, say they, must needs be a very mysterous number, and fitly represent the Deity. Whereas indeed it was therefore unfit to represent the Deity, because it is be

gotten by the multiplication of another number; as the Hebdomad therefore doth not very fitly symbolize with it neither, because it is barren or be

gets nothing at all within the Decad, for which cause it is called a virgin. Again, it is further added, that the Tetrad fitly resembles that, which is

solid, because, as a point answers to a Monad, and a line to a Dyad, and a

superficies to a Triad, (the first and most simple figure being a triangle;) so the Tetrad properly represents the solid, the first pyramid being found in it. But upon this consideration, the Tetrad could not be so fit a symbol of the incorporeal Deity, neither as of the corporeal world. Wherefore these things being all so trifling, flight and phantastical, and it being really aburd for

Pythagoras to call his Monad a Tetrad; the late conjecture of some learned men amongst us
ds seems to be much more probable, that Pythagoras his Tetra
dys was really nothing else but the Tetragrammaton, or that proper name of the supreme God amongst the Hebrews, conflating of four letters or con

fonants. Neither ought it to be wondered at, that Pythagoras (who besides his travelling into Egypt, Persia and Chaldea, and his sojourning at Sidon, is

affirmed by Josehbus, Porphyrius and others, to have conversed with the Hebrews alfo) should be so well acquainted with the Hebrew Tetragrammaton, since it was not unknown to the Hetrurians and Latins, their Jove being cer

tainly nothing else. And indeed it is the opinion of some philologers, that even in the Golden Verfes themselves, notwithstanding the seeming repugnancy of the syntax, it is not Pythagoras, that is sworn by, but this Tetra
dys or

Tetragrammaton; that is, Jova or Jebovah, the name of God, being put for God himself, according to that received doctrine of the Hebrews נג' יבש

& יבש נג', that God and his name were alone; as if the meaning of those words,

were this; By the Tetragrammaton or Jovah, who hath communicated [himselkcer] the fountain of the eternal nature to our human souls; for these, according to the Pythagorick doctrine, were said to be εκ μεντε δινω ναρτε & δελ

bate, i. e. nothing but derivative streams from that first fountain of the divine mind.

Wherefore

Wherefore we shall now sum up all concerning Pythagoras in this conclusion of St. Cyril's; 

\[\text{[TEXT NOT CLEARLY TRANSPARENT]}\]

Next to Pythagoras in order of time, was Xenophanes the Colophonian, the head of the Eleatic sect of philosophers, who, that he was an affirter both of many gods and one God, sufficiently appears from that verfe of his before cited, and attested both by Clemens Alexandrinus \(^1\), and Sextus the philosopher.

\[\text{[TEXT NOT CLEARLY TRANSPARENT]}\]

That he moveth the whole world without any labour or toil, merely by mind. Besides which, Cicero \(^2\) and others tell us, that this Xenophanes philosophizing concerning the supreme Deity, was wont to call it \(\gamma \nu \pi \alpha \nu \), one and all, as being one most simple Being, that virtually containeth all things. But Xenophanes his Theosophy, or divine philosophy, is most fully declared by Simplicius out of Theophrastus in this manner; 

\[\text{[TEXT NOT CLEARLY TRANSPARENT]}\]

Heraclitus his God, 

Book I.

faith, that God always remaineth or resteth the same, he understandeth not this of that rest which is absolute to motion, and which belongeth to such things as may be moved; but of a certain other rest, which is both above that motion and its contrary. From whence it is evident, that Xenophanes supposed (as Sextus the philosopher also affirmeth) God to be incorporeal, a being unlike to all other things, and therefore of which no image could be made. And now we understand, that Aristele 1 dealt not ingenuously with Xenophanes, when from that expression of his, that God was σφυρωμένος, or sphery-form, he would infer, that Xenophanes made God to be a body, and nothing else but the round corporeal world animated; which yet was repugnant also to another physical hypothesis of this same Xenophanes, ἀπείρος ὄλος εἰς κύκλον, that there were infinite suns and moons; by which moons he understood planets, affirming them to be all habitable earths, as Cicero tells us 2. Wherefore, as Simplicius resolves, God was said to be σφυρωμένος, or sphery-form, by Xenophanes, only in this sense, as being παλαιοθύμοι θύμως, every way like and uniform. However, it is plain, that Xenophanes aspiring one God, who was all, or the universal, could not acknowledge a multitude of partial, self-existent Deities.

Heraclitus was no clear, but a confounded philosopher (he being neither a good naturalist nor metaphysician) and therefore it is very hard, or rather impossible, to reconcile his several opinions with one another. Which is a thing the less to be wondered at, because, amongst the rest of his opinions, this also is said to have been one, that contradictories may be true; and his writings were accordingly, as Plato intimates, stuffed with unintelligible, mysterious nonsense. For first, he is affirmed to have acknowledged no other substance besides body, and to have maintained 4, that all things did flow, and nothing stand, or remain the same; and yet in his epistles (according to the common opinion of philosophers at that time) doth he suppose the pre- and post-existence of human souls in these words τάχα η ψυχή μακεντείλαι ἀπόλυτον ἵνα τίς ἔντι τῷ θεται χῦντι; 3 ὡσπερ εὐφύμιος ἡσυχία, ἀναμμένοις τῷ πάπρῳ χώρῳ, ἣν-ναεῖθάνα περιβάλλει τοὺς άνθρώπους τοὺς σώματα τεθεῖνε τούς, ὃ δέχεται, &c. My soul seemeth to vaticinate and prefigure its approaching dismission and freedom from this its prison; and looking out, as it were, through the cracks and crannies of this body, to remember those its native regions or countries, from whence descending it was clothed with this flowing mortal body; which is made up and confipated of phlegm, choler, serum, blood, nerves, bones and flesh. And not only to, but he also there acknowledgeth the soul's immortality, which Stoicks, allowing its permanency after death, for some time at least, and to the next conflation, did deny: διᾶς τοῦ ἁμαρτεία τοῦ σώματος ἡ λόγια ἡ ψυχή διέται, άλλα ἡ ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου ἀνθρώπων, έἰς ἀνθρώπους μετάσχοι διέπεται, εἰς με αἰθήμοι δόμη, ἐν πολιτείαις. This body shall be totally changed to something else; but my soul shall not die or perish, but being an immortal thing, shall fly away mounting upwards to heaven; those ethereal houses shall receive me, and I shall no

1 Vide Libr. de Xenophane, Zonone &c cap. XXIX. p. 53.
2 Vide Platon. in Convivio, p. 521.
longer converse with men but gods. Again, though Heraclitus ascertained the fatal necessity of all things, yet notwithstanding was he a strict moralist, and upon this account highly esteemed by the Stoics, who followed him in this and other things; and he makes no small pretence to it himself in his epistle to Hermodorus 1, that he was the priest and oracle of the gods, adorned with honours given to him by the Athenians, which are mentioned by Plutarch, and again by Strabo. In the meantime, he exerted himself in the public service, and laboured for the reformation of the nation; and having the sagacity and talents to advantage, he did not fail to make himself conspicuous in affairs of state and law. He wrote in prose, and for the most part in aphorisms; and his writings are said to have been more than a thousand. 

I have already had my difficult labours and conflicts as well as Hercules; I have conquer'd pleasures, I have conquer'd riches, I have conquer'd ambition; I have subdued cowardice and slavery; neither fear nor intemperance can control me; grief and anger are afraid of me, and fly away from me. These are the virtues, for which I am crowned, not by Eurystheus, but as being made master of my self. Lastly, though Heraclitus made fire to be the first principle of all things, and had some odd passages imputed to him, yet notwithstanding was he a devout religionist, he supposing, that fire matter of the whole universal animamtem esse & Deum, to be an animal and God. And as he acknowledged many gods, according to that which Aristotlē 2 recordeth of him, that when some palling by had elipied him sitting in a smoky cottage, he bespake them after this manner. Introitio, nam & hic dixit, Come in, I pray, for here there are gods also; he supposing all places to be full of gods, demons and souls: so was he an undoubted afferrer of one supreme Nomen, that governs all things, and that such as could neither be represented by images, nor confined to temples. For after he had been accused of impiety by Euthycles, he writes to Hermodorus in this manner 3, All, if we dare to speak, we believe and think, that fire is the cause of all things, and that to all things it is given to give themselves and to have the power of being; and men and gods, and all things that are mortal, and all things that are immortal, and all things that are not, are in this one thing, and they have the power of being, and of giving themselves, and of living; and they are living, and they are having their powers, and are they having their powers from fire, and they are living from fire. And the heavens and the earth, and all things that are in the heavens and the earth, and all things that are not in the heavens and the earth, and all things that are mortal, and all things that are immortal, and all things that are not, are of this one thing, and they have the power of being, and of giving themselves, and of living; and they are living, and they are having their powers, and are they having their powers from fire, and they are living from fire.

But O you unwise and unlearned! teach us first what God is, that so you may be believed in accusing me of impiety: tell us where God is? Is he shut up within the walls of temples? Is this your piety to place God in the dark, or to make him a stranger God? O you unskilful! know ye not, that God is not made with hands, and hath no bosom or luminary to stand upon, nor can be enclosed within the walls of any temple; the whole world, variegated with plants, animals and stars being his temple? And again, if we inquire, Euhemerus, or the other thing, that we may know the place of God, and of the heavens, and of the earth, and of all things that are on the heaven, and of all things that are in the earth, and of all things that are not on the heaven, and of all things that are not in the earth, and of all things that are mortal, and of all things that are immortal, and of all things that are not, we shall not know what God is; is there no God without altars? or are bones the only witness of him? No, his own works give testimony to him, and principally the sun, night and day bear witness of him; the earth bringing forth fruits, declares him; the circle of the moon, that was made by him, is a heavenly testimony of him.

In the next place, Anaxagoras the Clazomenian philosopher comes to be considered, who was the predecessor of the Ionick order (after Thales) as Anaximander.
Anaxagoras his one infinite Mind,  

Book I

mander, Anaximenes and Hippo, were (as hath been already observed) Materialists and Atheists; they acknowledging no other substance besides body, and resolving all things into the motions, passions, and affections of it. Whence was that cautious advice given by Janlibchus, ορατήμα τοις Ἱπποκοῖνοις. They, the Ionick philosophers, prefer the Italic philosophy, which contemplates incorporeal substances by themselves, before the Ionick, which principally considers bodies. And Anaxagoras was the first of these Ionicks, who went out of that road; for seeing a necesity of some other cause, besides the material (matter being not able so much as to move it, and much less if it could, by fortuitous motion, to bring it self into an orderly system and compages;) he therefore introduced Mind into the Cosmopoeia, as the principal cause of the universe; which Mind is the same with God. Thus Themistius, speaking of Anaxagoras, τοις Ἰουνίους προτότιμον ἐπεκεκομίσαν, τοὺς ιονικούς, τοις τά σώματα προ- 

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Indeed it may well be made a question, whether or no, besides this supreme and universal Deity, Anaxagoras did acknowledge any of those other inferior gods, then worshipped by the Pagans? Because it is certain, that though he assered infinite Mind to be the maker and governor of the whole world, yet he was accused by the Athenians for Atheism, and besides a mulct imposed upon him, banished for the fame; the true ground whereof was no other than this, because he affirmed the sun to be nothing but a mass of fire, and the moon an earth, having mountains and valleys, cities and houses in it; and probably concluded the fame of all the other stars and planets, that they were either fires, as the sun, or habitable earths, as the moon; wherein, supposing them not to be animated, he did consequently deny them to be gods. Which his ungodding of the sun, moon and stars, was then look'd upon by the vulgar as nothing less than absolute atheism; they being very prone to think, that if there were not many understanding beings superior to men, and if the sun, moon, and stars were not such, and therefore in their language gods, there was no God at all. Neither was it the vulgar only, who condemned Anaxagoras for this; but even those two grave philosophers Socrates and Plato did the like; the first in his apology made to the Athenians, where he calls this opinion of Anaxagoras absurd; the second in his book of laws, where he complains of this doctrine as a great inlet into atheism, in this manner: \[\text{De Leg. L. 10} \text{Leg. L. 10} \text{De Leg. L. 10} \text{De Leg. L. 10}\]

\[\text{p. 886.} \text{p. 886.} \text{p. 886.} \text{p. 886.}\]

When you and I, endeavouring by arguments to prove, that there are gods, speak of the sun and moon, stars and earth, as gods and divine things, our young men, presently, being principled by these new philosophers, will reply, that these are nothing but earth and stones (tenfeles and inanimate bodies) which therefore cannot mind nor take notice of any human affairs. Where we may observe these two things first, that nothing was accounted truly and properly a god amongst the Pagans, but only what was endowed with life and understanding. Secondly, that the taking away of those inferior Gods of the Pagans, the sun, moon, and stars, by denying them to be animated, or

\[\text{Or rather Plato, p. 362.} \text{Or rather Plato, p. 362.} \text{Or rather Plato, p. 362.} \text{Or rather Plato, p. 362.}\]
Moreover, it is true, that though this Anaxagoras were a professed Theist, he asserting an infinite self-existent Mind to be the maker of the whole world, yet he was severely taxed also by Aristotle and Plato, as one not thorough-paced in theism, and who did not so fully, as he ought, adhere to his own principles. For whereas, to assert Mind to be the maker of the world, is really all one as to assert final causality for things in nature, as also that they were made after the best manner; Anaxagoras, when he was to give his particular account of the phenomena, did commonly take himself to material causes only, and hardly ever make use of the mental or final cause, but when he was to seek and at a loft; then only bringing in God upon the stage. Socrates his discourse concerning this in Plato's Phaedo is very well worth our taking notice of: Hearing one sometime read (faith he) out of a book of Anaxagoras, ὃς ἦς ἐγὼ εὐδοκέομαι τε καὶ πάντως οὖν, that Mind was the order and cause of all things, I was exceedingly pleased herewith, concluding, that it must needs follow from thence, that all things were ordered and disposed of as they should, and after the best manner possible; and therefore the causes even of the things in nature (or at least the grand strokes of them) ought to be fetched from the τὸ βίον, that which is absolutely the best. But when afterwards I took Anaxagoras his book into my hand, greedily reading it over, I was exceedingly disappointed of my expectation, finding therein no other causes assigned, but only from airs, and others, and waters, and such like physical and material things. And be seemed to me to deal, just as if one having affirmed, that Socrates did all by mind, reason and understanding, afterward undertaking to declare the causes of all my actions, as particularly of my sitting here at this time, should render it after this manner; because, forsooth, my body is compounded of bones and nerves, which bones being solid, have joints in them at certain distances, and nerves of such a nature, as that they are capable of being both intended and remitted; wherefore my bones being lifted up in the joints, and my nerves some of them intended and some remitted, was the cause of the bending of my body, and of my sitting down in this place. He in the mean time neglecting the true and proper cause hereof, which was no other than this; because it seemed good to the Athenians to condemn me to die, as also to my self most just, rather to submit to their sentence and undergo their punishment, than by flight to escape it; for certainly otherwise these nerves and bones of mine would not have been here now in this posture, but amongst the Megarensians and Boeotians, carried thither τὸ βίον, by the opinion of the best; had I not thought it better to submit to the sentence of the city, than to escape the same by flight. Which kind of philosophers (faith he) do not seem to me, to distinguish between the true and proper cause of things, and the cause fine quan non, that without which they could not have been effected. And such are they, who devise many odd physical reasons for the firm settlement of the earth, without any regard to that power, which orders all things for the best, (as having ὅμοον ἔστι, a divine force in
CHAP. IV. to Material than to Mental Causes.

in it; but thinking to find out an Atlas far more strong and immortal, and which can better hold all things together, to γας ἀφρότος καὶ τὸ δίκρινος οὐδὲν ξυλίνῳ. Good and fit, being not able, in their opinions, to hold, or bind any thing.

From which passage of Plato's we may conclude, that though Anaxagoras was so far convinced of Theism, as in profession to make one infinite Mind the caufe of all things, matter only excepted; yet he had notwithstanding too great a taint of that old material and atheistical philosophy of his predeceffors, still hanging about him, who resolved all the phenomena of nature into physical, and nothing into mental or final causes. And we have the rather told this long story of him, because it is so exact a parallel with the philosophick humour of some in this present age, who pretending to affert a God, do notwithstanding discard all mental and final causality from having any thing to do with the fabric of the world; and reduce all into material necessity and mechanism, into vortices, globuli and ftriate particles, and the like. Of which Christian philosophers we must needs pronounce, that they are not near so good Theftis as Anaxagoras himself was, though so much condemned by Plato and Aristole; forasmuch as he did not only affert God to be the caufe of motion, but also the governour, regulator, and methodizer of the same, for the production of this harmonious system of the world, and therefore τὰ ἔστιν ἀναλογίας αἰώνων, the caufe of well and fit. Whereas these utterly reject the latter, and only admitting the former, will needs suppose heaven and earth, plants and animals, and all things whatsoever in this orderly compages of the world, to have resulted meerly from a certain quantity of motion, or agitation, at first impressed upon the matter, and determin'd to vortex.

XXXI. The chronology of the old philosophers having some uncertainty in it, we shall notrupolously concern ourselves therein, but in the next place consider Parmenides, Xenophanes his auditor, and a philosophick poet likewise, but who convering much with two Pythagoreans, Amenias and Diochethes, was therefore look'd upon as one, that was not a little addicted to the Pythagorick sect. That this Parmenides acknowledged many Gods, is evident from what has been already cited out of him; notwithstanding which, he plainly afferted also one supreme, making him, as Simplicius tells us, ἀνάξιος Σιων, the caufe of all those other gods, of which Love is said to have been first produced. Which supreme Deity Parmenides, as well as Xenophanes, called, τὸ τὸ παν, one that was all, or the univerfe; but adding thereunto of his own, that it was also ἀνδορθος, immovable.

Now though it be true, that Parmenides his writings being not without obscurity, some of the ancients, who were less acquainted with metaphysical speculations, understood him physically; as if he had afferted the whole corporeal univerfe to be all but one thing, and that immovable, thereby destroying, together with the diversity of things, all motion, mutation and action; which was plainly to make Parmenides not to have been a philosopher, but a mad man: yet Simplicius, a man well acquainted with the D d d opinions
opinions of ancient philosophers, and who had by him a copy of Parmenides his poems, (then scarce, but since lost) affirms us, that Parmenides dreamt of no such matter, and that he wrote ο περὶ τῇ Φυσικῇ τοιχίσμῃ ἀλλά περὶ τῷ ὄνων ὄν, or ο περὶ τῆς θείας ὑποτροχίας, not concerning a physical element or principle, but concerning the true Eus, or the divine tendency: adding, that though some of those ancient philosophers did not distinguish τὰ Φυσικὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπὸς Φεσων, natural things from supernatural; yet the Pythagoreans, and Χυροθοιά, and Parmenides, and Empedocles, and Ανακογορος, did all ἄνακογον, handle these two distinctly, κατὰ τῇ ἄνακογο ν.κ.ἔνωσις τῆς ποιήδος, however, by reason of their obscurity, it was not perceived by many; for which cause they have been molt of them misrepresented, not only by Pagans, but also by Christian writers. For, as the same Simplicus informs us, Parmenides pronounced two several doctrines, one after another; the first concerning theological and metaphysical things, called by him ἀληθὲς, truth; the second concerning physical and corporeal things, which he called δὲ ἰόν, opinion. The transition betwixt which was contained in the veres of his;

In the former of which doctrines, Parmenides affected one immoveable principle; but in the latter, two moveable ones, fire and earth. He speaking of souls also as a certain middle or vinculum betwixt the incorporeal and the corporeal world, and affirming that God did τὰς ψυκὰς περὶ τε ἐν τῷ ἰκόνως ἐπὶ τῇ ἀνής, τολὴ ἀνάκαλα, sometimes send and translate souls from the invisible to the invisible regions, and sometimes again, on the contrary, from the invisible to the visible. From whence it is plain, that when Parmenides affected his one and all immoveable, he spake not as a physiologer, but as a metaphysician and theologist only. Which indeed was a thing so evident, that Ariftoteles himself, though he had a mind to obscure Parmenides his senfe, that he might have a fling at him in his Physicks, yet could not altogether dissimble it. For when he thus begins, θερε μυτί σεστίνες εἴτε οὐκ ἢ σεστίνες, as Parmenides and Melissus affirm, or else moveable, ἀπὸ τῶν φυσικῶν, as the Naturalists or Physiologers; he therein plainly intimates, that when Parmenides and Melissus made one immoveable the principle of all things, they did not write this as Phyphilogers. And afterwards he confesseth, that this controversy, whether there were one immoveable principle, does not belong to natural philosophy, but to some other science. But this is more plainly declared by him elsewhere, writing concerning Parmenides and Melissus after this manner; εἰ τῇ ἀλλὰ λέγον ταὐτά, ἀλλὰ τοῖς φυσικῶς εἰς τοῖς υμίσιν λέγειν, τὸ γαρ εἶναι ἀλή τῷ ὄνων ἀγιότητα, ἀλλὰ ἀλή τοῖς φυσικῶς ἀγιότητα, μᾶλλον, ἐς τῇ ὑπότασιν πεποίησεν, as the Physicists interpret; Though it be granted, that Parmenides and Melissus otherwise said well, yet we must not imagine them to have spoken physically. For this, that there

* Phyфизικοὶ Αὐστελλίατ. Lib. I. cap. II p. 446.  
* De Caio, Lib. IIII. cap. I. p. 668.  
* Tom. I. oper.
CHAP. IV. One and All, immovable.

there is something unmade and immovable, does not so properly belong to physicists, as to a certain other science, which is before it.

Wherefore Parmenides, as well as Xenophanes his master, by his one and all, meant nothing else but the supreme Deity, he calling it also immovable. For the supreme Deity was by these ancient philosophers (style, first to be, and more, a unity and monad, because they conceived, that the first and most perfect being, and the beginning of all things, must needs be the most simple. Thus Eudorus in Simplicius¹ declares their sense: ἀρχὴ ἦν ἐπαγγέλματι τῶν πάντων τῷ ἔννοιαν καὶ τῶν ἐν ἐννοιᾳ πάσιν, ἐξ αὐτῷ γενειμένως, τῷ δὲ ἐνδικτέον ἑαυτῷ. These ancients affirmed, that the one, or unity, was the first principle of all; matter itself, as well as other things, being derived from it; they meaning by this one that highest or supreme God, who is over all. And Syrianus to the same purpose, οἱ δὲ λόγοι τῶν ἀπαθών τῷ ὀνόματι ἐν Θεόν Οὐκε ὑποτεθήκατο, ἐὰν ὑπάρχῃ τὸς ἐν καθ' ἀκίνητον, ἐγὼ Παρμενίδης τῷ ὑπόθετον ἐπικρήφη. Those divine men called God the One, as being the cause of unity to all things, as likewise he was of being and life. And Simplicius concludes, that Parmenides his ὁ ὁμοίως, one Ens, was a certain divine principle, superior to mind or intellect, and more simple, λέγεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑποτεθήκατο πάντων ἀκίνητος, F. 31 Gr. διὸ δὲ ὁ λόγος ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑποτεθήκατο, ἐντὸς πάλιν καὶ μᾶκα ἐν ὑπάρχῃ τοιούτῳ καταλήμνη. ἂν, ἐς ὑπάρχῃ τῷ Παρμενίδης τῇ ὑποτεθήκατο. It remaineth therefore, that that intelligible, which is the cause of all things, and therefore of mind and understanding too, in which all things are contained and comprehended compendiously and in a way of unity, I say, that this was Parmenides his one Ens or Being.

In the next place, Parmenides, with the others of those ancients, called also his ὁμοίως, one Ens or first most simple Being, all, or the universe; because it virtually contained all things, and, as Simplicius writes, πάλιν διακρίμενος ἐν ὑπάρχῃ ἐν τῷ ἀκίνητῳ, all things are from this one, distinctly displayed. For which cause, in Plato's Parmenides, this one is said to be, ἐν πάλιν πᾶλιν ὑπάρχῃ, συνενεκτόν ὑπάρχῃ, distributed into all things, that are many. But that Parmenides by his ὁμοίως, one and all, or the universe, did not understand the corporeal world, is evident from hence, because he called it ἔννοια, or indistinct, and, as Simplicius observes, supposed it to have no magnitude; because that, which is perpetually one, can have no parts.

Wherefore it may be here observed, that this expression of ὁμοίως, one being all, hath been used in very different senses: for as Parmenides and Xenophanes understood it of the supreme Deity, that one most perfect and most simple being was the original of all things; so others of them meant it atheistically, concerning the most imperfect and lowest of all beings, matter or body, they affirming all things to be nothing but one and the same matter diverly modified. Thus much we learn from that place of Aristotle's in his Metaphysics, ὁποῖον μὲν ἐν ὑπὸ τὸ ἔννοια τῷ μίκοι τοῖς φύσεις ἐν, ὑπὸ τοῖς ἔσχισι, ἐν. L. i. c. 7. [P. τοῖς ζητομαχεῖσιν ἐν μεταφυσικῇ ἐχθροῖς, ὑπὸ τοῖς πολλάχως ἀυτοτάτοις, They, cu. 274. Tom. affirm one to be all in this sense, as if all things were nothing but one and the same matter, and that corporeal and ended with magnitude, it is manifest, that they

Parmenides *his Trinity*  
Book I.

*L. 6.* 1. &  
*L. 7.* 7.  

They err sundry ways. But here is a great difference betwixt these two to be observed, in that, the atheistical afferrers of one and all (whether they meant water or air by it, or something else) did none of them fuppofe their one and all to be immoveable, but moveable: but they, whose principle was one and all immoveable (as Parmenides, Melissus and Zeno) could not possibly mean any thing else thereby, but the Deity; that there was one moft simple, perfect and immutable being incorporeal, which virtually contained all things, and from which all things were derived. But Heraclitus, who is one of those, who are faid to have afferted ᾿τὸν ἔνα ἅλον, that one was all, or that the universe was but one thing, might possibly have taken both these fenses together (which will alfo agree in the Stoical hypotheses) that all things were both from one God, and from one fire; they being both alike corporeal. Theifics, who fuppofed an intellectual fire to be the first principle of all things.

And though Aristotle in his *Physics* quarrels very much with Parmenides and Melissus, for making one immoveable principle; yet in his *Metaphysics* himself doth plainly clofe with it, and own it as very good divinity, that there is one incorporeal and immoveable principle of all things, and that the supreme Deity is an immoveable nature: ἂν οὐκ ἤκουσαν τις ἄγιον ταύτα, ἀλλὰ ἀεὶ ἄστρον γενόμενον, ἀνάλογον ὡς ἐν τῷ πάντω καὶ τῷ πάσιν, καὶ ἅμα ἂν ἐν πάντω ἀναμφίπολον ἄρχων. If there be any fuch substance as this, that is separate (from matter, or incorporeal) and immoveable (as we fhall afterwards endeavour to fhow that there is) then the divinity ought to be placed here, and this must be acknowledged to be the first and moft proper principle of all. But let any fhou'd fufpect, that Aristotle, if not Parmenides alfo, might, for all that, hold many fuch immoveable principles, or many eternal, uncreated and self-exiftent beings, as fo many partial caufes of the world; *Simplicius* affures us, μη γεγονός ὁ τόπος ἀκάθαρτος καὶ ἀκατάλογος τὰς ἀρχὰς λέγων, i.e. that though divers of the antient philosophers afferted a plurality of moveable principles (and sorne indeed an infinity) yet there never was any opinion entertained among philosophers, of many, or more than one, immoveable principles. From whence it may be concluded, that no philofopher ever afferted a multitude of unmade, self-exiftent minds, or independent deities, as co-ordinate principles of the world.

Indeed Plotinus feems to think, that Parmenides in his writings, by his ἡ Δόξα, or ens, did frequently mean a perfect mind or intellect, there being no true entity (according to him) below that, which understandeth; (which mind, though incorporeal, was likened by him to a sphere, because it comprehends all within it self, and because intellect is not from without, but from within :) But that when again he called his *On* or *Ens* one, he gave occasion thereby to fome, to quarrel with him, as making the fame both one and many; intellect being that, which contains the ideas of all things in it. Wherefore Parmenides his whole philosophy (faith he) was better digefted and more exactly and diffinctly fet down in Plato's *Parmenides*, where he acknowledge three unitieis subordinate, or a trinity of divine hypoftascs; ὁ παρνιόν ἐξ ἐνίκην τριάδος ἐστιν.
of Divine Hypotheses.

Chap. IV.

Parmenides, 

Parmenides in Plato, speaking more exactly, distinguished three divine unities subordinate; the first of that, which is perfectly and most properly one; the second of that, which was called by him one-many; the third of that, which is thus expressed, one and many. So that Parmenides did also agree in this acknowledgment of a trinity of divine or archetypical hypothesises. Which observation of Platonius is, by the way, the beft key, that we know of, for that obscure book of Plato's Parmenides. Wherefore Parmenides thus afferting a trinity of divine hypothesises, it was the firit of those hypothesises, that was properly called by him, τὸ τὰς, one the universe or all: that is, one most simple being, the fountain and original of all. And the second of them (which is a perfect intellect) was, it seems, by him called, in way of diſtinction, τὸ πολλὰ or πολλότα, one-many or one all things; by which all things are meant the intelligible ideas of things, that are all contained together in one perfect mind. And of those was Parmenides to be understood also, when he affirmed, that all things did stand, and nothing flow; not of singular and fenfible things, which, as the Heraclitticks rightly affirmed, do indeed all flow; but of the immediate objects of the mind, which are eternal and immutable: Aritotle himself acknowledging, that no generation nor corruption beſongth to them, since there could be no immutable and certain science, unlefs there were some immutable, neceffary and eternal objects of it. Wherefore, as the fame Aritotle alfo declares, the true meaning of that controversy betwixt the Heraclitticks and Parmenideans, Whether all things did flow, or some things fland? was the fame with this, Whether there were any other objects of the mind, besides singular fenfibles, that were immutable? and consequently, whether there were any fuch thing as science or knowledge which had a fimitude and stability in it? For those Heraclitticks, who contended, that the only objects of the mind were singular and fenfible things, did with good reafon consequently thereupon deny, that there was any certain and confant knowledge, since there can neither be any definition of singular fenfibles, (as Aritotle 1 writes) nor any demonstration concerning them. But the Parmenideans, on the contrary, who maintained the fimitude and stability of science, did as reafonably conclude thereupon, that besides singular fenfibles, there were other objects of the mind, universal, eternal and immutable, which they called the intelligible ideas, all originally contained in one archetypal mind or understanding, and from thence participated by inferior minds and souls. But it must be here acknowledged, that Parmenides and the Pythagoreans went yet a step further, and did not only suppose those intelligible ideas to be the eternal and immutable objects of all science, but alfo, as they are contained in the divine intellect, to be the principles and caufes of all other things. For thus Aritotle declares their fefe, αὐτίκα τὰ ἑνὸς τοῖς ἀλλαῖς, and again, τὸ τὰ τῆς ἑνὸς τοῖς ἀλλαῖς. τοῖς ἑνὸς τοῖς ἀλλαῖς. The ideas are the caufes of all other things; and, the effence of all other things below is imparted to them from the ideas, as the ideas themſelves derive their effence from the first unity:

those ideas in the divine understanding being look'd upon by these philosophers, as the paradigms and patterns of all created things. Now these ideas being frequently called by the Pythagoreans *Numbers*, we may from hence clearly understand the meaning of that seemingly monstrous paradox or puzzling *Grîphus* of theirs, that *Numbers* were the causes and principles of all things, or that all things were made out of Numbers; it signifying indeed no more than this, that all things were made from the ideas of the divine intellect, called Numbers; which themselves also were derived from a *monad* or unity: Aristotle somewhere intimating this very account of that assertion, τὰς ἀριθμὸς αἰτίας εἶναι τοῖς ἐλλοις τὰς ἔνας, that *Numbers were the causes of the essence of other things*, namely, because τὰ εἰδء ἀριθμοὶ, the ideas were numbers. Though we are not ignorant, how the Pythagoreans made all the numbers within the decad, to be symbols of things. But besides these two divine hypotheses already mentioned, *Parmenides* seems to have asserted also a third, which, because it had yet more alteration, for distinction fake was called by him, neither τοις πᾶσι, one the universe or all; nor τοις πᾶσιν, one-all things; but τοις πᾶσιν, one and all things: and this is taken by P'lotinus to be the eternal *Psyche*, that actively produceth all things, in this lower world, according to those divine ideas.

But that *Parmenides*, by his one-all immoveable, really understood nothing else but the supreme Deity, is further unquestionably evident from those verfes of his cited by *Simplicius*, but not taken notice of by *Stephanus* in his *Poësis Philosophica*, of which we shall only set down some few here.

---'*Ως ἀρχηγὸς οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἀνώλιθροι ισ-ιν,  
Οἰδεῖν τὸν ὑδάτινον ἐν τοῖς αἰει ἐπικαίων ἁλών  
Ἤν τουχηι: Τοῦκ γὰρ γένος ἀριθμοὶ αὐτὰ ἔναι;  
Αὐτὰρ ἀληθέν τοις μέγας ἐν πειρασι δέσμων,  
Τευτόν τ' ἐν τοιχῷ τε μένου, κατὰ έκαστο τε κεῖται. &c.'

In which, together with those that follow, the supreme Deity is plainly described as one simple, solitary, and most simple being, unmade or self-existent, and necessarily existing, incorporeal and devoid of magnitude, altogether immutable or unchangeable, whose duration therefore was very different from that of ours, and not in a way of flux or temporary succession, but a constant eternity, without either past or future. From whence it may be observed, that this opinion of a standing eternity, different from that flowing succession of time, is not so novel a thing as some would persuade, nor was first excogitated by Christian writers, schoolmen or fathers, it being at least as old as *Parmenides*; from whom it was also afterwards received and entertained by the best of the other Pagan philosophers; however it hath been of late so much decreed, not only by Theistical writers, but other precocious and conceited wits also, as non-sense and impossibility.

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Chap. IV. Finite; Melissus bis Infinite.

It is well known, that Melissus held forth the very same doctrine with Parmenides, of one immovable, that was all, which he plainly affirmed to be incorporeal likewise, as Parmenides did; καὶ τὸ Μέλισσ τὸν Ὁσον, δεικνύον ὑμῖν ὑπόεμεν, ἔν τινυ ἐν τῷ ἔχων, ἔν τῷ δὲ ἑκέντρῳ, ἔν τῷ ἄλλῳ: Melissus also declared, that hisSimple. Ar. one Enis must be devoid of body, because if it had any crassities in it, it Phy 5 19. would have parts. But the only difference that was between them was this, that Parmenides called this one immovable that was all, πεπερασμένον, finite or determined, but Melissus άπίστω, infinite; which difference notwithstanding was in words only, there being none at all as to the reality of their sense: whilst each of them endeavoured in a different way, to set forth the greatest perfection of the Deity; there being an equivocation in those words finite and infinite, and both of them signifying in one sense perfection, but in another perfection.

And the disagreeing agreement of these two philosophers with one another, Parmenides and Melissus, as also of Xenophanes with them both concerning the Deity, is well declared by Simplicius after this manner; οὐδὲν ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ χρήμα ὁ λόγως παρεκκλήσα, τοίς πνεύμασιν, ἐπιλέξας, τῶν Πτομ. Phy 4 1. καὶ τοῦ διδάσκων δοκιμάσας οἱ πάλαι, περὶ τῶν τῶν ἁρμῶν ὅρων, ἐνωρίως ἐνομιζόμενοι, Αρ. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν περὶ τῆς ψυκῆς ἐπὶ παρευτεῖν, ὡς Χυπήραν παρ' Παρμενίδης ἐγέραν: ο οτι παρμενίδης ἐν λόγῳ καὶ πεπερασμένον άπάντω γὰρ τότε τό πλάθων προπάδισην, καὶ τό πάθος ὅρω καὶ πέρας αἰτίας, κατα τό πέρας μεταλ- 

of his Parmenides; whereas Parmenides and Melissus, attending to its stability and constant immutability, and its being perhaps above energy and power, praised it as immoveable. From which of Simpliciurn it is plain, that Parmenides, when he called God *παριστάραν*, finite and determined, was far from meaning any such thing thereby, as if he were a corporeal being of finite dimensions, as some have ignorantly supposed; or as if he were any way limited as to power and perfection; but he understood it in that sense, in which *φαίος* is taken by Plato, as opposite to *ἀτομία*, and for the greatest perfection, and as God is said to be *παριστάραν καὶ μέτοχον ἀξίωμα*, the term and measure of all things. But Melissus calling God *ἀτείρον*, infinite, in the sense before declared, as thereby to signify his inexhaustible power and perfection, his eternity and incorruptibility, both therein more agree with our present theology, and the now received manner of speaking. We have the rather produced all this, to shew how curious the ancient philosophers were in their inquiries after God, and how exact in their descriptions of him. Wherefore however Anaximander's Infinite were nothing but eternal senseless matter (though called by him the τὸ Σῖώ, *the divining thing of all*) yet Melissus his *ἀτείρον*, or Infinite, was the true Deity.

With Parmenides and Melissus fully agreed Zeno Eleates also, Parmenides his scholar, that one immoveable was all, or the original of all things; he meaning thereby nothing else but the supreme Deity. For though it be true, that this Zeno did excogitate certain arguments against the local motion of bodies, proceeding upon that hypothesis of the infinite divisibility of body, one of which was famously known by that name of *Achilles*, because it pretended to prove, that it was impossible (upon the hypothesis) for the swift-footed *Achilles* ever to overtake the creeping *Snail*; (which arguments of his, whether or no they are well anwered by Aristotle, is not here to our purpose to inquire) yet all this was nothing else but *in infinitum* a sportful exercise of Zeno's wit, he being a subtle logician and disputant, or perhaps an endeavour also to shew, how puzzling and perplexing to human understanding, the conception even of the most vulgar and confessed phenomena of nature may be. For that Zeno Eleates by his one immoveable that was all, meant not the corporeal world, no more than Melissus, Parmenides, and Xenophanes, is evident from Aristotle writing thus concerning him: *τὸ τούτου ἄνθρωπον* an argument which our one Eun, which neither was moved, nor moveable, meaneth God. Moreover the same Aristotle informs us, that this Zeno endeavoured to demonstrate, that there was but one God, from that idea, which all men have of him, as that which is the best, the supreme
EMPEDECLES is said to have been an emulator of Parmenides also, which
must be understood of his metaphysicks, because in his physiologic (which
was atomical) he seems to have transcended him. Now that Empedocles
acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen, and that incorporeal too,
may be concluded from what hath been already cited out of his philosophick
poems. Besides which the writer De Mundo 1 (who, though not Ariflotie,
yet was a Pagan of good antiquity) clearly affirmeth, that Empedocles de-
+ived all things whatsoever from one supreme Deity; \( \text{τὰ \gamma \ ή \ αἰὲς} \) ό-
πάσια, \( \gamma \ \text{ἡ \ πόρις,} \) \( \gamma \ \text{τὰ \ ἐν \ ὑπατί,} \) \( \text{ὁν \ ἄγειτη \ Ἐν \ υπάτι \ ἐκ \ οὐ}
tο \ τὸν \ κάσμιον \ πε-\( \chiον \ ιον \). \) \( \text{εἰ \ γ \ καλὰ \ τὸν \ Φυσικών \ \'Εμπε-
\d\text{δοκλία,}\)

All the things, that are upon the earth, and in the air and water, may truly be
called the works of God, who ruleth over the world. Out of whom, according
to the physical Empedocles, proceed all things that were, are, and shall be, viz.
plants, men, beasts and gods. Which notwithstanding we conceive to be
rather true as to Empedocles, as his sense, than his words; he affirming, as it seems,
in that cited place, that all these things were made, not immediately out of
God, but out of contention and friendship; because Simplicius, who was fur-
nished with a copy of Empedocles his poems, twice brings in that cited paffage
of his in this connexion:

1. \( \text{Ἐν \ δὲ \ κόσμῳ \ διάμερθαι \ κύρι \ ἄθροι \ πάντα \ πάλαι,} \)
2. \( \text{Σὺν \ δὲ \ ἰδὼν \ ἑι ἄν \ διαλύομεν \ πολυτενταί,} \)
3. \( \text{Ἐξ \ τῶν \ γὰρ \ παλη \ ὅποι \ \ν, \ ὁ \ πάλαι \ τέ \ ἵ \ γ \ ἵ \ γ,} \)
4. \( \text{Δύναται \ τε \ βιολάσται,} \) \( \gamma \ \text{ἀφέρει \ \πώ \ \γυναικές,} \)
5. \( \text{ὁ \ προς \ το \ αἰο \ \πο \ \νο \ \φαί \ \χι \ \ναίς,} \)
6. \( \text{Καὶ \ τε \ \πο \ \πο \ \δη \ \χι \ \να \ \τι \ \τι \ \φέ \ \τοι,} \)

Things are divided and segregated by contention, but joined together by friendship;
from which two (contention and friendship) all that was, is and shall be, pro-
cceeds; as trees, men and women, beasts, birds and fishes, and last of all, the
long-lived and honourable gods. Wherefore the sense of Empedocles his words
here was this; that the whole created world, together with all things belonging
to it, viz. plants, beasts, men and gods, was made from contention and

friendship. Nevertheless, since, according to Empedocles, contention and friendship did themselves depend also upon one supreme Deity, which he with Parmenides and Xenophanes called Τὸ ὅν, or the very One; the writer De Mundo might well conclude, that, according to Empedocles, all things whatsoever, and not only men, but Gods, were derived from one supreme Deity. And that this was indeed Empedocles his sense, appears plainly from Aristotle in his Metaphysics, Τὸνεῦ τινα τοῦ περὶ Ἀριστοτέλης Ἑπεξεργάζεται IV. Ὀπερ [L. 3. c. 4.

Empedocles makes contention to be a certain principle of corruption and generation: nevertheless, he seems to generate this contention it self also from the very One, (that is, from the supreme Deity.) For all things, according to him, are from this contention, God only excepted; be writing after this manner, from which (that is, contention and friendship) all the things that have been, are, and shall be (plants, beasts, men and gods) derived their original. For Empedocles it seems supposed, that were it not for νίκη, discord or contention, all things would be one: so that, according to him, all things whatsoever proceeded from contention or discord, together with a mixture of friendship, save only the supreme God, who hath therefore no contention at all in him, because he is essentially τὸ ὅν, unity itself and friendship. From whence Aristotle takes occasion to quarrel with Empedocles, as if it would follow from his principles, that the supreme and most happy God was the least wife of all, as being not able to know any thing besides himself, or in the world without him; (as he supposed) autó, τὸν ἐνθαμνισταίον ἠτόκον ἄτόκον ᾽Αριστοτέλης Ἐπεξεργάζεται τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀλλὰ, τὸ δὲ γὰρ γὰρ ἐξ οὗ ἐξίην ἀν ἐξίην τοῖς ὁμοίοις τῷ ἐμὸι, τῷ ἐμοί, τῷ ἐμὸι, τῷ ἐμὸι, τῷ ἐμὸι.

Γαν μὲν γὰρ (Ἔσοι) γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ὀνόματος, ὑπὲρ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν, &c.

This therefore happens to Empedocles, that, according to his principles, the most happy God is the least wife of all other things, for he cannot know the elements, because be hath no contention in him; all knowledge being by that, which is like: himself writing thus; We know earth by earth, water by water, air by air, and fire by fire; friendship by friendship, and contention by contention. But to let this pass; Empedocles here making the gods themselves to be derived from contention and friendship, the supreme Deity, or most happy God, only excepted, (who hath no contention in him, and from whom contention and friendship themselves were derived) plainly acknowledged both one unmade Deity, the original of all things under the name of τὸ ὅν, the very One, and many other inferior gods, generated or produced by him; they being juniors to contention, or discord, as this was also junior to unity, the first and supreme Deity. Which gods of Empedocles, that were begotten from contention (as well as men and other things) were doubtfuls the stars and daemons.

Moreover,
Moreover, we may here observe, that according to Empedocles his doctrine, the true original of all the evil, both of human souls and demons (which he supposed alike lapseable) was derived from that υιός, discord and contention, According to that which is necessarily contained in the nature of them, together with the ill use of their liberty, both in this present and their pre-existential state. So that Empedocles here trode in the footsteps of Pythagoras, whose praises he thus 23. loudly sang forth in his poems;

"Ηδ' εὶ τὸς ἐν κειστιν αὐτῷ περίσσεις εἶδος, 
Ό; δι' τὴν πραγματικήν αὐτῷ πλῆθος,
Παντὼν τὸ μάλιστα σαφῶν ἐπιγνῶς ἐγγον, &c.

Herum de numero quidam presstantia norat
Plurina, mentis opes amplas sub peitere servans,
Omnia vestigans sapientium docta reperta, &c.

XXII. Before we come to Socrates and Plato, we shall here take notice of some other Pythagoreans, and eminent philosophers, who clearly affected one supreme and universal Numin, though doubtless acknowledging withal, other inferior gods. Philo in his book De mundi Opificio, writing of the Hebdom- p. 23. &p. 22. mad or Septenary number, and observing, that, according to the Pythag- reans, it was called both a motherless and a virgin number, because it was the only number within the Decad, which was neither generated, nor did it self generate, tells us, that therefore it was made by them a symbol of the supreme Deity, οὐδὲν ἐπικότητος τῶν ἀκόμη τῆς ἑγερμονίας τῶν θεωτάτων. The Pythagoreans likened this number to the prince and governour of all things, or the supreme monarch of the universe; as thinking it to bear a resemblance of his immutability: which fancy of theirs was before taken notice of by us. However, Philo hereupon occasionally cites this remarkable testimony of Philolaus the Pythagorean; Βετò γὰς, Ὄμοιοι, ἱματία ἡ, ἱματίων ἀπάντων ὁ Θεὸς, οὐκ αἰτὶ ὦ, τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ τὸ θεῖον, ἀξίων, ἄνωτέρων, ἀρχιαρχήν, ἀρχήν τοῦ ἄλλου. God (faith he is the prince and ruler over all, always one, stable, immovable, like to himself, but unlike to every thing else. To which may be added what in Stobæus is further recorded out of the fame Philolaus; γιὰς ὥστε ο κόσμος ἐν θανάτοις τῶν θεῶν ἀκολουθεῖ. This world was from eternity, and will remain to eternity, one governed by one, which is cognate and the best. Where notwithstanding he feemeth, with Ocellus, to maintain the world's pre-eternity. And again, ὅτι θαλά, ἐνωθεὶς, κατοικεῖ τοῦ θεοῦ κατοικεῖ τὸν κόσμον ὑπὲρ τοῦ γένους τὸν φυσικόν. Wherefore, said Philolaus, the world might well be called the eternal energy or effect of God, and of successive generation.

Jambllichus, in his Protrepticks, cites a passage out of Archytas another Pythagorean, o the same purpose; διὸ; ἀναλάμβανεν τὸς τῷ ἔν, πᾶλι τῷ γίγνεται ὑπὸ μικρὸν τε ἀπὸ αὑτοῦ ἀρχαῖον, ἔτεος εἰς αὐτὸν καλλίσταν κατασχέτεοι, ἐνὶ διανομειρέοι ἑπισή- ται τῷ ἔνθε τῇ ἱπποδρομίᾳ, &c. Wherefore is able to reduce all kin's of things under one and the same principle, this man seems to me to have found out an excellent specula, or high station, from whence he may be able to take a large view and prospect of God, and of all other things; and be shall clearly perceive, that God
is the beginning and end, and middle of all things, that are performed according to justice and right reason. Upon which words of Archytas Jamblichus thus glosseth: Archytas here declares the end of all theological speculation to be this, not to rest in many principles, but to reduce all things under one and the same head. Adding tωιαντὴ ἑπισκοπή τῷ ὑπὸ, τὸ καθ' ἑαυτόν πρωτότοκον, τὸ αὐτὸν τῷ πρωτότοκῳ, ἔχουσιν τοῖς ἑαυτῷ νομοῖς, ὑπὸ ἑαυτῶν διὰ τοῦ πρωτοτόκου, οἵ καὶ πρωτοτόκῳ νομιζόντως ἐπὶ τῷ πρωτοτόκῳ. That this knowledge of the first unity, the original of all things, is the end of all contemplation. Moreover, Stobæus cites this out of Archytas his book of principles, for viz. That besides matter and form, ἀγαθουσία τῶν ἐμάθην αἰτίας, τῶν κακῶσιν ἑπισκοπήν πρῶτων ἐπὶ τῷ μορφῷ, τοῖς δὲ τῶν πρωτῶν δυνάμεις, οἵ καὶ πρωτοτόκῳ νομιζόντως ἐπὶ τῷ πρωτοτόκῳ νομιζόντως ἐπὶ τῷ πρωτοτόκῳ. There is another more necessary cause, which moving, brings the form to the matter; and that this is the first and most powerful cause, which is fitly called God. So that there are three principles, God, Matter and Form; God the artificer and mover, and Matter that which is moved, and Form the art introduced into the Matter. In which same Stobean exception it also follows afterwards, διὶ νῦν τι κρέσσον ἔνας, νῦν δὲ κρέσον ἐγὼ ὁ παρὰ ἀντικρωμών θεόν, that there must be something better than Mind; and that this thing better than Mind is that, which we (properly) call God.

Timæus Locrus his God. Book I.

Ocellus also in the same Stobæus thus writeth, σωζέσθαι τῷ μύλῳ σκέπτερα φίλοι, ταύτας δ' αἰτίας ψυχής τῶν δι' ἄλογον ἀφήμων, ταύτας δ' αἰτίας ὁ Θεός, τῆς δ' ἁμοίας ἡ τῶν πολιῶν ὄμοια, ταύτας δ' αἰτίας νομοί. Life contains the bodies of animals, the cause of which life is the soul; concord contains houses and cities, the cause of which concord is law; and harmony contains the whole world, the cause of which mundane harmony is God. And to the same purpose Arisøneas, ὡς ὁ συγκεντρών τῶν τέκνων, οὕτως ὁ θεός πολὺ ἀκροβούνην. As the artificer is to art, so is God to the harmony of the world. There is also this passage in the same Stobæus cited out of an anonymous Pythagorean, Θεός μὲν ἐγὼ ἐγώ καὶ πρωτός, δειοὶ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου, God is the principle, and the first thing; and the world (though it not the supreme God) yet is it divine.

Timæus Locrus, a Pythagorean senior to Plato, in his book concerning nature, or the soul of the world, (upon which Plato’s Timæus was but a kind of commentary) plainly acknowledgeth both one supreme God, the maker and governor of the whole world, and also many other gods, his creatures and subordinate ministers; in the close thereof, writing thus concerning the punishment of wicked men after this life, ἀπανταὶ δὲ ταύται ἐν δεύτερο περιόδῳ ὁ Νεμεῖς συνεδρία τε ὁ διαίμος πελαμπίναις χρονίας τε, τοῖς ἑπόπλαις τῶν ἁθρωτικῶν οἷς ἡ πάντων ἁγιάζει Θεός ἐπιστρέφει διάκειται κώσμως συμπληρωμάτως ἐκ Θεω τῷ ἁθρωτικῷ τῶν τε ἀπίθανων ζωών, ὁ δὲ ἀδαμασχομένη ποτ εἰκάσθαι τῶν ἁθρωτικῶν ἐν ἑρωμένῳ ἀγαθῶν καὶ αἰειών. All these things hath Nemesis decree to be executed in the second circuit by the ministry of vindictive terrestrial demons, that are overseers of human affairs; to which demons that supreme God, the ruler over all, hath committed the government and administration of the world. Which world is completed and made up of gods, men and other animals, all created according to the best pattern of the eternal and unmade idea. In which words of Timæus there are these three several points of the Pagan theology contained; first, that there is
one supreme God, eternal and unmade, the creator and governor of the whole world, and made it according to the best pattern or exemplar of his own ideas and eternal wisdom. Secondly, that this world created by God is compounded and made up of other inferior gods, men, and brute animals. Thirdly, that the supreme God hath committed the administration of our human affairs to demons and inferior gods, who are constant inspectors over us, some of which he also makes idle of for the punishment of wicked men after this life. Moreover, in this book of Timæus Locrus the supreme God is often called ὁ Θεὸς, and sometime ὁ ἐξημερωμένος Θεὸς, in way of eminency; sometime Νόημα· Mind, sometime ἀγαθόν, the very Good; sometime ἰδέα, the Principle of the best things; sometime διαμορφώσαν τῆς πλευρῆς τοῦ θεοῦ, the Maker of the better, (evil being supposed not to proceed from him); sometime κατά τοῦ θεοῦ, the best and most powerful Cause; sometime ἀβατοικόν, the Prince and Parent of all things. Which God, according to him, is not the soul of the world neither, but the creator thereof, he having made the world an animal, and a secondary generated God: ὁ δὲ ὑπηλικός ἔρεως γενέσις ποιεῖν, τὸν ἐπικατοικίσαν, ἐποίκα θράσσεισιν ἐτὸς ἄλλως αιτίως, ἐκ τοῦ ἀυτοῦ συντεταγμένως ἔτους, ἐποίκα δήλετο αὐτῷ διάλύων. God willing to make the world the best, that it was capable of, made it a generated god, such as should never be destroyed by any other cause but only by that God himself, who framed it, if he should ever will to dissolve it. But since it is not the part of that which is good to destroy the best of works, the world will doubtless ever remain incorruptible and happy, the best of all generated things, made by the best cause, looking not at patterns artificially framed without him, but the idea and intelligible essence, as the paradigms, which whatsoever is made conformable to, must needs be the best, and such as shall never need to be mended. Moreover, he plainly declares, that this generated god of his, the world, was produced in time, so as to have a beginning, πρὸς ὁμοιοί τὸν ἀκριβέστατον, ἐκ τοῦ ἐνα πατρί της ἀληθείας τοῦ θεοῦ, ὁ Θεὸς δαμηγορός τοῦ ἐξημερωμένου, before the heaven was made, existed the idea, matter, and God the opifex of the best. Wherefore, whatever Ocellus and Philolaus might do, yet this Timæus held not the world’s eternity; wherein he followed not only Pythagoras himself (as we have already showed) but also the generality of the first Pythagoreans, of whom Aristeides pronounces without exception, γενέσις γὰρ τοῦ κόσμου, that they generated the world. Timæus indeed in this book seems to affect the pre-eternity of the matter, as if it were a self-existent principle together with God; and yet Clemens Alexandrinus cites a passage out of him looking another way, αὖλι ἀληθείας γὰρ τῆς ἀκριβείας τῆς ἐκλειστοῦ καθολικοῦ ἀΟΤ αὐτῷ, καὶ τοῦ ἐπικατοικίσαν, τοῦ ἐξημερωμένου, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ ἐπικατοικίσαν, τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀόρατον. Ed. Potteri. 

Met. L. 1 c. 7. [p. 276. Tom. IV. Oper.]

Stron. s p. 604. [p. 718.]

παθεῖς τότε οὖς, Τιμαιος ὁ Φωκης ἐκ τοῦ Φωκηνοῦ συμμετέχοντας κατὰ λίγον ὁδὸν μετεξαφινεῖ καὶ ὁ Θεὸς ἀναλαμβάνει του παθοῦς. Μεία ἀρχή πάλαιν ἐν τῷ αἰώνι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκτός. ἦν ὁ Θεὸς ἀιώνιος. Τιμαιος Λωκροδ. ὁ Καστρίτης ἐκ τοῦ Φωκηνοῦ συμμετέχοντας κατὰ λίγον ὁδὸν μετεξαφινεῖ καὶ ὁ Θεὸς ἀναλαμβάνει του παθοῦς. Μεία ἀρχή πάλαιν ἐν τῷ αἰώνι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκτός. ἦν ὁ Θεὸς ἀιώνιος. 

Would you hear of one only principle of all things amongst the Greeks? Timæus Locrus, in his book of nature, will bear no witness thereof; be there in express words writing thus, There is one principle of all things unmade: for if it were made, it would not be a principle, but that would be the principle, from whence it was made. Thus we see, that Timæus Locrus affected one eternal and unmade God, the maker of the whole world, and besides this, another generated god, the world it self animated, with its several parts;
It hath been already observed, that Onatus, another Pythagorean, took notice of an opinion of some in his time, that there was one only God, who comprehended the whole world, and no other gods besides, or at least, none such as was to be religiously worshipped; himself in the mean time affecting, that there was both one God and many gods; or, besides one supreme and universal Name, many other inferior and particular deities, to whom also men ought to pay religious worship. Now his further account of both these assertions is contained in these following words; τοι δέ λέγοντες ἐν Θεον εἰμι, ἀλαῖ μὴ πολλαὶς ἀμαρτάνους τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον ἄξωμα τῆς Σειώς ὑπερήφανον ἐστὶ συμβεβηκέν, ἔχων δὲ ἄρης ἡ ἡ ηκαστεία τῶν ὄρων, καὶ κράτισσον καὶ καθυπατέρον εἰμιν τῶν ἁλλῶν τοι ἀλλοί θεοί πολί τῶν περιτῶν καὶ οὐκανόν ἐκεῖνο ὑπὸν ἄπειρον ὄμοσιν, ἡμεῖς ἡμείς ἑαυτοῖς ἐπίμοιος καὶ κυριαρχεῖς, ἣν τῷ γονιόν, ἣν πάλαις καὶ πάλαις καθήμενος καί ἀφεν δὲ τῶν ἀντιπαρατύπων ἡμείς, ὅσοι καὶ ἐντόπιοι, τοι κατάρχοις καὶ λιγοχρήσται, ἔπειται φάνη, ἐπιστρέψοντας πάντας τῶν καθήκοντος καὶ μᾶλλον τῶν αὐτῶν τό τέρημα ἡ, τῷ ἄρχον, τῷ καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἀλλ' οὐκ ὀκεῖον συνεταχθεῖ οἰ γεγος ἐπί τῶν ἀρχών, ἰδίας ἀρχηγοὺς ἀρχηγοὺς ὄγκου τοι τοι τίνι τινι συναγίαν, ἠδὲ στρατηγοῖ οἱ πολεμοῦσιν, ἀμφιπολείρους ἀρχηγοὺς, τοι μιν στρατηγοῖ, τοι ἂν κυριαρχοίν. They who maintain, that there is only one God, and not many gods, are very much mistaken, as not considering aright, what the dignity and majesty of the divine transcendency chiefly consisteth in, namely, in ruling and governing those which are like to it (that is, gods) and in excelling or surpassing others, and being superior to them. But all the other gods, which we contend for, are to that first and intelligible God but as the dancers to the Corypheus or Chorus, and as the inferior common soldiers to the captain or general; to whom it properly belongeth, to follow and comply with their leader and commander. The work indeed is common, or the fame to them both, to the ruler, and them that are ruled; but they that are ruled could not orderly conspire and agree together into one work, were they destitute of a leader; as the fingers and dancers could not conspire together into one dance and harmony, were they destitute of a Corypheus; nor soldiers make up one orderly army, were they without a captain or commander.
And as the supreme God is here called by Onatus the Corypheus of the gods, so is he in like manner by the writer De Mundo styled the Corypheus of the world, or the Prescentor and Prefuttor of it, in these words: κορυφαῖος ἐν Χρόνος, κορυφαῖος κατάξεως, sumptuæies quos ο χρόνος κυρίας, εἰς ήτο ηγομένων, εν διάφοροις φωναῖς εὐμεταλλουσας καθότις, μιαν ἁμαρτιαν ἀμμαλικὴν καθοίκισαν ἕως ἄχως ἄρτι το σύμπαν διηπότως. Σωιήνα τα ἱκανὸν ἐνδοιμασίων ὑπὸ τα διαφοράξας ἑν χρυσάκια προσαχρόν. Οὕτως, κινεῖται μὲ τα ἄκρα αὐτὲς ὃ σύμπαν προφών: As in a chorus, when the Corypheus or Prescentor hath begun, the whole choir compounded of men, and sometimes of women too, followeth, singing every one their part, some in higher and some in lower notes, but all mingling together into one complete harmony; so in the world God, as the Corypheus, the Prescentor and Prefultor, beginning the dance and music, the stars and heavens move round after him, according to those numbers and measures, which he prescribes them, all together making up one most excellent harmony.

It was also before observed, that Eschylus the Pythagorean, and Archelaus the successor of Anaxagoras (who were both of them Atomists in their physiology) did affect the world to have been made at first, and still to be governed by one divine Mind; which is more than some Atomists of ours in this present age, who notwithstanding pretend to be very good Theists, will acknowledge. We shall, in the next place, mention Euclides Megarensis, the head of that sect called Megareick, and who is said to have been Plato's master for some time after Socrates his death; whose doctrine is thus set down by Laertius: οὐ δὲ ἐν το ἀγαθὸν οὐδέποτε, γεννητοι δειματα καθέλενον οτε μεν γὰρ Φωνά, οτε δὲ Θεόν, η ξαστὸς Νέον, ὑ τα λοιπά. τα δι άτικα-κείμενα τὸ ἁγαθόν, ἁμέρι, μη ἴ ἔι Φάσιν. Which we understand thus, That Euclides (who followed Xenophanes and Parmenides) made the first principle of all things to be one the very Good, called sometimes Wisdom, sometimes God, sometimes Mind, and sometimes by other names; but that he took away all, that is opposite to good, denying it to have any real entity: that is, he maintained, that there was no positive nature of evil, or that evil was no principle. And thus do we also understand that of Cicero, when he represents the doctrine of the Megaricks after this manner, Id bonus solum esse, quod effect Unum, & Simile, & Idem, & Semper; to wit, that they spake this concerning God, that Good or Goodness itself is a name properly belonging to him, who is also One, and Like, and the Same, and Always; and that the true good of man consisteth in a participation of, and conformity with this first Good. Which doctrine Plato seems to have derived from him, he in like manner calling the supreme Deity by those two names, τὸ ἐν and τὸ ἄγαθον, the One and the Good, and concluding true human felicity to consist in a participation of the first Good, or of the divine Nature.

In the next place we shall take notice of Antístenes, who was the founder also of another sect, to wit, the Cynick; for he, in a certain physiological treatise

Antifthenes his One Natural God. Book I.

 Cic. De N. D. treatife, is said to have affirmed, \textit{Eros populares deos multos, sed naturalem God: or, as it is expressed in Laelanius, Unum eft naturalem Deum, quantum gentes & urbibus habcant popularibus; That there was but one natural God, though nations and cities had their several popular ones. Wherefore Velleius the Epicurean in Cicero\textsuperscript{1} quarrels with this \textit{Antifthenes}, as one, who destroyed the nature of the gods, because he denied a multitude of independent deities, such as Epicurus pretended to assert. For this of \textit{Antifthenes} is not so to be understood, as if he had therein designed to take away all the inferior gods of the Pagans, which had he at all attempted, he would doubtless have been accounted an Atheist, as well as Anaxagoras was; but his meaning was, only to interpret the theology of the Pagans concerning those other gods of theirs, that were or might be look'd upon as absolute and independent; that these, though many popular gods, yet indeed were but one and the same natural God, called by several names. As for example, when the Greeks worshipped Zeus, the Latins \textit{Jovis}, the Egyptians \textit{Hannons}, the Babylonians \textit{Bel}, the Scythians \textit{Pappius}; these were indeed many popular gods, and yet nevertheless all but one and the same natural God. So again, when in the self-same Pagan cities and countries, the respective laws thereof made mention of several gods, as supreme and absolute in their several territories, as \textit{Jupiter} in the heavens, \textit{Juno} in the air, Neptunus in the sea; or as being chief in several kinds of functions, as \textit{Minerva} for learning, Bellona for war, &c. (for this \textit{Aristotle} takes notice of in his book against Zeu\textsuperscript{2}, \textit{Kai t\'on \\ ups, po\ell\'a kai\' h\'e\'a, ak\' k\'l\'o\'n o\'i Sei}, That according to the laws of cities and countries, one god was best for one thing, and another for another) \textit{Antifthenes} here declared concerning these also, that they were indeed many popular, or civil gods, but all really one and the same natural God.

To \textit{Antifthenes} might be added Diogenes Sinopensis, of whom it is recorded by \textit{Laertius\textsuperscript{3}}, that observing a woman too superstitiously worshipping the statue or image of a god, endeavouring to abate her superstition, he thus spake her; \textit{A\'an kai\' ep\'a, t\'as g\'o\'nas, me pere \'E\'n \'o\'m\'a t\'e\'o\'m\'a i\'e\'o\'m\'a (p\'a\'n\'a r\'a\'a i\'e\'o\'m\'a a\'t\'a\' pi\'h\'e\'n) i\'e\'o\'m\'a\'n; \textit{Take you not care, O woman, of not behaving your self unseemly, in the sight of that God, who stands behind you; for all things are full of him: thereby giving her occasion, more to mind and regard that supreme and universal Numen, that filleth the whole world and is every where.

XXIII. It hath been frequently affirmed, that \textit{Socrates} died a martyr for one only God, in opposition to those many gods of the Pagans; and \textit{Tertullian\textsuperscript{4}}, for one, writeth thus of him, \textit{Propietre\'e damnatus est Socrates, quae deos deffruebat; Socrates was therefore condemned to die, because he destroyed the gods. And indeed that \textit{Socrates} affircted one supreme God, the maker and governour of the whole world, is a thing not at all to be doubted. In his

\textsuperscript{1} De Natur. Deor. Lib. I. Cap. XIII.  
\textsuperscript{2} Cap. IV. p. 782. Tom. II. Oper.  
\textsuperscript{3} Lib. VI. segm. 57. p. 535.  
\textsuperscript{4} In Apologet. cap. XIV. p. 144. Edit. Havercamp.
his discourse with Aristodemus, in Xenophon's first book of Memoirs 1, he convinced him, that the things of this world were not made by chance, but by Mind and Counsel; οὐ δὲ τοιαύτα πάντα ἐισὶν ταύτα οὐκ ὑπ'ίκειον, κ' Ἰο- 


derval, τὸν Πτολέμασιν. I am now convinced from what you say, that the things of this world were the workmanship of some wise artificer, who also was a lover of 

animals. And so he endeavoured to perswade him, that this mind and un- 

derstanding, which is in us, was derived from some mind and understanding in the univerfe, as well as that earth and water, which is in us, from the earth and water of the univerfe: σὺ δὲ σκέπτεσθαι Φρονίμων, τι δοκεῖς ἐμεῖν, ἀνάλογον, δή ἐστὶν 

δεύτερον Φρονίμων εἰκα, εἰσὶ οὖν τὰ τοῦ μικρῶν μέρες ἐν τῷ σώματι πολλαῖς ὅπως ἐμεῖν, κ' 

ὑπερβάλλεται, τόπον δοξάς, καὶ τῶν ἀλλων ὅποιοι μεγάλων ὄσον ἐκεῖνο μικρῶν μέρες πλά-


Do you think that you only have wisdom in your self, and that there is none any 

where else in the whole world without you? though you know that you have but 

a small part in your body of that vast quantity of earth which is without you; 

and but little of that water and fire, and fo of every other thing, that your body is 

compounded of, in respect of that great mass and magazine of them, which is in 

the world. Is mind and understanding therefore the only thing, which you fancy, 

you have, some way or other, luckily got and snatch'd unto your self, whilst 

there is no such thing anywhere in the world without you; all those infinite 

things thereof being thus orderly disposed by chance? And when Aristodemus 

afterward objected, that he could not see any artificer that made the world, 

as he could those artificers, which made all other human things, Socrates thus 

replies, ἵνα γὰρ τὸν σκέπτεται οὗτος ψυχὴν ὅρας, ἂ τῷ σώματι κρῖσιν ἐς ὑπερβάλλεται, 

καὶ κατάγει τῷ ἐπέκριτον συγκεκρίθην. Ὅτι δὲ γενόμην ἑλλαθεῖ τῷ χειρὶ πάντα πράξεις. Neither do you see 

your own soul, which rules over your body, so that you might for the same rea- 

son conclude your self to do nothing by mind and understanding neither, but all 

by chance, as well as that all things in the world are done by chance. Again, 

when he further disputed in this manner against the necessity of worshipping 

the Deity, οὐχ ὑπερβαλλεῖ τὸ γαμονίον, ὃ Σωκρατέοι, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖοι μεγαλοπρεπέστεροι ἁγίασί, ὡς 

τῆς ἱερᾶς Σερπάτειος προείληκα. I defy not the Deity, O Socrates, but think him 

to be a more magnificent being than that he should stand in need of my worship 

of him: Socrates again answers, ὅσοι μεγαλοπρεπέστεροι ἁγιάσασθαι της πασίπληστοι τιμῶν 

τότε. How much the more magnificent and illustrious that being is, which 

takes care of you, so much the more, in all reason, ought it to be honoured by you. 

Lastly, Aristodemus discovering his disbelieve of providence, as a thing, which 

seemed to him incredible, if not impossible, that one and the same Deity 

should be able to mind all things at once, Socrates endeavours to cure this dis- 

belief of his in this manner; ὅλα ἄλλα, κατάλαβε, ὅτι δέ οὐ γενναὶ ἐκ τοῦ σοῦ 

σώματος ὅπως ἔδειξεν μελάχριεν κατετάκτα, ὣς οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ Βούς της πάλιν ὅπως 

ἀπὸ αὐτῆς τῆς ἱερᾶς Σερπάτειος καὶ μὴ τοῦ συν μεν οὕτως δοκεῖν, ἢ τὸ παλλά 

φύλαξ εἴμησθαι, τοῦ δὲ τῷ Θεῷ ἐξελαμβάνον αὐτῶν εἰς οὔτως πάλιν ὅρας. Confide- 

r, friend, I pray you, if that mind, which is in your body, does order and dispose it 

every way as it pleaseth; why should not that wisdom, which is in the univerfe, be 

able to order all things therein also, as seemeth best to it? And if your eye can 

discern 

1 P. 575. Oper. Thbe Words are not Socrates's to Aristodemus, but Aristodemus's to Socrates.  

2 P. 574.  

3 P. 575.
That Socrates was a Martyr for

Book I.

discern things several miles distant from it, why should it be thought impossible for the eye of God to behold all things at once? Lastly, if your soul can mind things both here and in Egypt, and in Sicily; why may not the great mind or wisdom of God be able to take care of all things, in all places? And then he concludes, that if Aristodemus would diligently apply himself to the worship of God, he should at length be convinced, if not testi on y in the Eutheides, of the existence of the gods, and the godhead of the Deity, for great a Being, as that he can, at once, see all things, and bear all things, and be present everywhere, and take care of all affairs. Moreover, Socrates, in his discourse with Euthydemus, in Xenophon's fourth book, speaks thus concerning that invisible Deity, which governs the whole world: if the God, who is the ruler of the whole universe, and who containeth the whole world (which are all good and excellent things) and who continually supplieth us with them, be, though he be seen to do the greatest things of all, yet notwithstanding is himself invisible and unseen. Which ought the less to be wondered at by us, because the sun, who seemeth manifest to all, yet will not suffer himself to be exactly and distinctly viewed, but if any one boldly and impudently gaze upon him, will deprive him of his sight; as also because the soul of man, which most of all things in him partaketh of the Deity, though it be that, which manifestly rules and reigns in us, yet is it never seen, unless we partake of it, as Origen saith; for he saith, as Origen saith, that man is composed of two parts, the one visible to the eyes of God, the other invisible to men. Which particulars he considers, ought not to despise invisible things, but to honour the supreme Deity, taking notice of his power from his effects. Where we have to do with him, as also before to God, plainly put for the supreme Deity. And we did the rather set down these passages of Socrates here, concerning God and Providence, that we might shame those, who, in these latter days of ours, are so atheistically inclined, if at least they have any pudor or shame left in them.

But, notwithstanding Socrates his thus clear acknowledging one supreme and universal Numen, it doth not therefore follow, that he rejected all those other inferior gods of the Pagans, as is commonly conceived. But the contrary thenceunto appeareth from the very passages of his now cited, wherein there is mention made of other gods beides the supreme. And how conformable Socrates was to the Pagan religion and worship, may appear from those last dying words of his, (when he should be most serious,) after he had drunk the poison, wherein he required his friends to offer a votive cock for him to Asclepius: for which Origen thus perstringeth him, if thou wilt worship

P. 271.

Philosophiæque prius in hoc mundo, et in hac mundo, in hoc mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac mundo, in hac world.

P. 633.
concerning the soul, and discoursed concerning the happiness of the future state to those who live well, do afterward sink down from these great, high, and noble things, to a superstitious regard of little, small, and trifling matters, such as the paying of a cock to Ἀεσκουπίς. Where notwithstanding, Origen doth not charge Socrates with such gross and downright idolatry, as he does elsewhere, for his sacrificing to the Pythian Apollo, who was but an inferior daemon. And perhaps some may excuse Socrates here, as thinking, that he looked upon Ἀεσκουπίς no other than as the supreme Deity, called by that name, as exercising his providence over the sicknefs and health or recovery of men, and that therefore he would have an eucharistic sacrifice offered to him in his behalf, as having now cured him, at once, of all diseases by death. However Plato informs us, that Socrates, immediately before he drank his poison, did λέγειν τοῖς θεοῖς, τὸν μελλόντα τῷ ἱερῷ ιείναι εἶτε ἵναι· pray (not to God, but to the gods, that is, to the supreme and inferior Gods both together, as in Plato's Phædrus he did to Pan, and the other tutelar gods of that place) that his translation from hence into the other world might be happy to him. And Xenophon, in his Memoirs, informs us, that Socrates did, both in his words and practice, approve of that doctrine of the Pythian Apollo, That the rule of piety and religion ought to be the law of every particular city and country; he affirming it to be a vanity for any man to be singular herein. Lastly, in his own apology, as written by Plato, he professes to acknowledge the sun, moon and stars for gods; condemning the contrary doctrine of Anaxagoras, as irrational and absurd. Wherefore we may well conclude this opinion, of Socrates his being condemned for denying the many gods of the Pagans, or of his being a martyr for one only God, to be nothing but a vulgar error.

But if you therefore demand, what that accusation of impiety really was, which he was charged with, Socrates himself, in Plato's Euthyphro, will inform you, that it was for his free and open condemning those traditions concerning the gods, wherein wicked, dishonest and unjust actions were imputed to them. For when Euthyphro, having accused his own father as guilty of murder (merely for committing a homicide into prifon, who happened to die there) would justify himself from the examples of the gods, namely Jupiter and Saturn, because Jupiter, the best and justest of the gods, had committed his father Saturn to prifon for devouring his sons, as Saturn himself also had castrated his father Ceres for some miscarriages of his, Socrates thus bespeaks him: Αὖμ, Ἐύθυφρο, τὸ εἶπος μὲ ἑώρακα τὸν θεόν Ἰππόων, ὅτι τὰ τιμία προϊόντα αὐτῶν εἰς τὶς ἔννοις λογικά, ὅπερ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀποδίχομαι, &c. Is not this the very thing, O Euthyphro, for which I am accused? namely, because when I hear any one affirming such matters as these concerning the gods, I am very loth to believe them, and speak not publicly to declare my dislike of them? And can you, O Euthyphro, in good earnest think, that there are indeed wars and contentions among the gods, and that those other things were also done by them, which poets and painters commonly impute to them? such as the Peplum or veil of Minerva, which in the Panathenaicks is with great pomp and ceremony brought into

1 Vide Orig. adverf. Cætis, Lib. VII. 3 Lib. IV. p. 634 Oper.
4 P. 49.
into the Acropolis, is embroidered all over with? Thus we see, that Socrates, though he afferted one supreme Deity, yet he acknowledged, notwithstanding, other inferior created gods, together with the rest of the Pagans, honouring and worshipping them; only he disliked those poetick fables concerning them (believed at that time by the vulgar,) in which all manner of unjust and immoral actions were fathered on them; which, together with the envy of many, was the only true reason, why he was then accused of impiety and atheifm.

It hath been also affirmed by many, that Plato really afferted one only God and no more, and that therefore, whensoever he speaks of gods plurally, he must be understood to have done this, not according to his own judgment, but only in a way of politick compliance with the Athenians, and for fear of being made to drink poison in like manner as Socrates was. In confirmation of which opinion, there is also a paffage cited out of that thirteenth epiffle of Plato's to Dionyfius, wherein he gives this as a mark, whereby his ferior epiffles, and fuch as were written according to the true fence of his own mind, might by his friends be diftinguifhcd from those, which were otherwife; τὰ τιν, γὰρ σπουδαία ἐπιστολὰς Θεὸς ἀρκεῖ, οὗτοι δὲ τὰς ἱέρον. When I begin my epifles with God, then may you conclude I write ferioufly; but not fo when I begin with gods. And this place seems to be therefore the more authentick, becaufe it was long fince produced by Eufebius to this very purpofe, namely to prove, that Plato acknowledged one only God; ὁ δὲ θεός εἰς τὸν Θεόν εἰςδὲ, τοι καὶ συμμίας Ἐλληνικος, τῆς τῶν πλειονὸν εὐθέως χρεώνει προσηνέχει, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον ἐπιστολῆς, ἵνα ἡ σύμβολα δοθή, τῶν τε ἐκ σποδῶν αὐτῶν γραφομένων, καὶ τῶν ἀλλων ἀπεφρασμένων. It is manifefl, that Plato really acknowledged one only God; however, in compliance with the language of the Greeks, he often fpake of gods plurally, from that epifle of his to Dionyfius, wherein he gives this fymbol or mark, whereby he might be known to write ferioufly, namely, when he began his epifles with God, and not with Gods.

Notwithstanding which, we have already manifefted out of Plato's Timæus, that he did in good earnest affert a plurality of gods; by which gods of his are to be understood animated or intellectual beings superior to men, to whom there is an honour and worship from men due; he therein declaring, not only the sun, and moon, and stars, but alfo the earth itfelf (as animated) to be a god or goddefs. For though it be now read in our copies, προτε-τάτων σωμάτων, that the earth was the oldfet of all the bodies within the heavens; yet it is certain, that anciently it was read otherwife, προτεσπεντά-των Θεῶν, the oldfet of the gods; not only from Proclus and Cicero, but alfo from Laertius 1 writing thus: γὰρ δὲ προτεσπεντάτων μὴ εἶναι τῶν τῶν ἑρωικῶν Θεῶν, ναιδεῖα δὲ ἀναμέγηκα, ὡς νυκτὰ καὶ ἥμαρτον ποιῶ, ἵκανε δὲ ἵνα τῷ μεῖον, καὶ ἀνέστη πρῶτον μέσον. Though Plato's gods were for the moft part fiery, yet did be fuppofe the earth to be a god or goddefs too, affirming it to be the oldfet of all the gods within the

1. III. segm. 75. p. 211.
CHAP. IV. **nevertheless a Monarchist.**

*the heavens, made or created to distinguish day and night, by its diurnal circumscription upon its own axis, in the middle or centre of the world.* For Plato, when he wrote his *Timæus*, acknowledged only the diurnal motion of the earth, though afterwards he is said to have admitted its annual too. And the same might be further evinced from all his other writings, but especially his book of laws (together with his *Epinomis*) said to have been written by him in his old age, in which he much infills upon the godships of the sun, moon and stars; and complains, that the young gentlemen of Athens were then so much infected with that Anaxagorean doctrine, which made them to be nothing but inanimate stones and earth; as also he approves of that then vulgarly received custom of worshipping the rising and setting sun and moon, as gods, to which, in all probability, he conformed himself: *Ἀνατελλων τι τιλιο τη γελο, πρες δυσμας γυτον, πρεκυλοις ἵμα ρη πρωσυλιτης Ἑλληνων την Βαρβαρων παλιον, εν συμφερας παντοις ἤρων και εις εντερα, ως οτι ραλης γυτον, κηδαμη υπολιον ἵνα τιτον αν λατεν.* The prayers and adorations, that are used both by the Greeks and all Barbarians, towards the rising and setting sun and moon (as well in their prosperities as adversities) declare them to be unquestionably esteemed gods. Wherefore we cannot otherwise conclude, but that this thirteenth epistle of Plato to *Dionysius*, though exact, it seems, before Eusebius his time, yet was supposititious and counterfeit by some zealous but ignorant Christian: as there is accordingly a *Nebulæ*, or brand of bafardy, prefixed to it in all the editions of Plato's works.

However, though Plato acknowledged and worshipped many gods, yet is it undeniably evident, that he was no Polycharhist, but a Monarchist, an affirter of one supreme God, the only *αὐτοποιος*, or self-originated being, the maker of the heaven and earth, and of all those other gods. For first, it is plain, that, according to Plato, the soul of the whole world was not it self eternal, much less self-existent, but made or produced by God in time, though indeed before its body, the world, from these words of his: *τω φυσις ως ὡς Πλατ. Tim. p. κινων υπαρκον επιρρεχομεν λεγον, ετως ημεροκαιριον ἃ δι θεου ευκατεριστε, ὃ ἐστιν τις νεεσθα,* [p. 529. Oper.] *και την προσωπην ἐπεργαζόμενον ψυχον τοιαυτην ἃς αυτοφυαν εκροισαν ευσεβησαν.* God did not fabricate or make the soul of the world, in the same order that we now treat concerning it, that is, after it, as junior to it; but that, which was to rule over the world, as its body, being more excellent, he made it first, and senior to the same. Upon which account Aristotle quarrels with Plato as contradicting himself, in that he affirmed the soul to be a principle, and yet supposes it not to be eternal, but made together with the heaven: *αλαλε μην αυτολιθρ. Met.* Plάτων γε ουτως λεγειν, ἦν εφαται ἀρχην ειναι ἐντε νεκτε αὐτό ευτε κατοι τιμων, υπερι τη μέση απο ρα γυτο τη ἡμαται ψυχη. *Neither is it possible for Plato here to extricate himself, *[p.478.Tom. Oper.] who sometimes declares the soul to be a principle, as that which moves it self, and yet affirms it again not to be eternal, but made together with the heaven. For which cause some Platonists conclude, that Plato affetered a double *ψυχη*, one the third hypostasis of his trinity, and eternal; the other created in time, together with the world, which seems to be a probable opinion. Wherefore, since, according to Plato, the soul of the world, which is the chief of all his inferior gods, was not self-existent, but made or produced by God in time,
Plato's one God the Maker

Book I.

all those other gods of his, which were but parts of the world, as the sun, moon, stars and daemons, must needs be so too. But left any should suspect, that Plato might, for all that, suppose the world and its gods not to have been made by one only unmade God, but by a multitude of co-ordinate, self-existent principles, or deities conspiring; we shall observe, that the contrary hereunto is plainly declared by him, in way of answer to that quere, whether or no there were many and infinite worlds, (as some philosophers had maintained,) or only one? he revolving it thus, πότερον ἐν ὀφθαλμιν ἢ ἡ ὁροθεσία το παράδειγμα ἡ θεομνικὸς ἢ το αἴγο χαῖρεν ἢ ἡ ὕπερθεσις ἢ τὸ παράδειγμα ἡ ἀρχή τοῦ κόσμου, μεθ' ἑτέρῳ διάφοροι νόμοι ἢ ἀν ποτ' ἐν, &c., ἢ δι' τὸν καθά τὴν μορφήν, ὅμοιος ἢ τὸ πατέλει ἐσάρω, διὰ τοιαῦτα ἢ το ὅ, ἢ το πατέρον ἐποίησε ο πατὴρ κόσμος, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ὅμοιος ὑπόκις γεγονέν, ἢ τα ἢ τε οὐκαίνεται Whether have we rightly affirmed, that there is only one heaven, (or world) or is it more agreeable to reason, to hold many or infinite? We say there is but one, if it be made agreeable to its intellectual paradigm, containing the ideas of all animals and other things in it; for there can be but one archetypal animal, which is the paradigm of all created beings: wherefore, that the world may agree with its paradigms in this respect of solitude or oneliness, therefore is it not two, nor infinite, but one only begotten. His meaning is, that there is but one archetypal Mind, the Demiurgus, or maker of all things that were produced, and therefore but one world.

And this one God, which, according to Plato, was the maker of the whole world, is frequently called by him, in his Timæus and elsewhere, ὁ Θεός, God, or the God, by way of excellency; sometimes ο Δημιουργός, the Architect or Artificer of the world; sometimes ὁ Πατέρος τῆς παντὸς, the Maker and Father of this universe, whom it is hard to find out, but impossible to declare to the vulgar; again, ο ὃ ἐκείνων ἡμῖν, the Creator of nature; τὸ παντὸς Ἀρχή, the sole Principle of the universe; πάντων Ἀρχή, the Cause of all things; ὁ πάντων ἀρχή, Mind, the king of all things; ὁ θεὸς τῶν ἄνθρωπων ἀρχή, the sovereign Mind, which orders all things, and passes through all things; τὸ παντὸς Ἀρχὴ, the Governor of the whole; τὸ ὃ ἐκείνος ἡμῶν, οὗ τα ἐκείνων, that which always is, and was never made; ὁ πατέρος Θεός, the first God; ὁ μέγιστος Δημιουργός, and ὁ μέγιστος ἀρχή, the greatest God, and the greatest of the gods; ο νόμος γεγονός, he that generated or produced the fun; ὁ ὄ, ὁ ἐκείνος, ὁ ὅ, ὁ πατὴρ τὰ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐκτὸς ἑκένων, and whatsoever else we please, only by interpoling a looking-glass. Lastly, he is called ὁ πατέρος τῆς ἀλλα ἢραχαί, ἢ ἐκείνων, ὁ πατέρος τῆς ἀλλα ἢραχαί, ἢ ἐκείνων, he that causeth or produceth both all other things, and even himself; the meaning whereof is this, he, that is αὐτοῦ, (as the fame Plato also calls him) a self-originated Being, and from
no other cause besides himself, but the cause of all other things. Neither doth Laertius Firmianus himself refuse to speak of God after this very manner; that se ipsum fecit, and that he was ex se ipso procreatus, & prop-terea talis, qualam se essse voluit; that he made himself; and that being procreated from himself, he therefore was every way such as he willed himself to be. Which unual and bold strain of theology is very much infilled upon by Plotinus, En. 6. 1. S. in his book, Περὶ τῶν ἁλακώτων τοῦ εἰνός, concerning the will of the first One, or P. 749. [ ap. XIV. p. 750.] unity; he there writing thus of the supreme God, αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ παρ' αὐτῷ, καὶ δ' αὐτῷ αὐτὸς; He is the cause of himself, and he is from himself, and himself is for himself. And again, αὐτός ἐστιν ὄς οὐ ποιῶς ἑαυτῷ, καὶ πρῶς ἕυμαι, καὶ οὐκ ὡς τίς ἐστίν ἔστιν ὑμωμενες, ἀλλ' ὡς ὠλεις αὐτῶς. This is he, who is the maker of himself, and is lord over himself; (in a certain sense) for he was not made that, which another willed him to be, but he is that, which he willed himself to be.

Moreover, αὐτός δ' τοῦτο ὅπερ γίνακται, τότε δ' ἐστιν ὑποτίτος αὐτῷ, εἰπτ' ὑμωμενες P. 751. μετά γὰρ δ' ὥσπερ μᾶλλα αὐτοῦ, ὁλ' τάλα μὲν ἔστιν, ἐκτὸς ἄφαρ ὑμωμενα αὑτῶς. ὥστ' ἀφαὶ ὡς ὑμωμενα εἰσίν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐνεργείς αὐτοῖς καὶ ὡς αὐτὲς ὠλείς, &c. The supreme Deity loving himself as a pure light, is himself what he loved; thus, as it were, getting and giving subsistence to himself, he being a standing energy. Wherefore, since God is a work or energy, and yet he is not the work or energy of any other being, he must needs be (in some sense) his own work or energy; so that God is not that, which he happened to be, but that which he willed himself to be.

Thus also a little before, ἀνακτοίν ἐν τῷ βαλκβτῷ καὶ τῷ ἥκειν τὸ δ' ὠλείς παρ' P. 748. αὐτῷ, ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶς πάρ' αὐτῷ, ὡς αὐτὸν πεποιηκίας αὐτοῦ, ὁ λόγος ἀνωτέρω εἰ γὰρ ἡ βαλκβτῆς παρ' αὐτῷ, καὶ σὺν ἐγερέω αὐτῷ, αὐτὴ δ' ταὐτον τῇ ὑποτίτει ἀυτῶν αὐτοῦ ἐνεργεῖται ὑποτίτει ἀυτοῦ, ὡς εἰκ' ὁπερ ἐνεργῇ ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὁπερ ἐνεργῇ αὐτοῖς. We must of necessity make will and essence the same in the first being. Wherefore, since his willing is from himself, his being must needs be from himself too; the confluence of which ratioation is this, that He made himself. For if his volition be from himself, and his own work, and this be the same with his hypothetis or substance; he may be then said to have given subsistence to himself. Wherefore he is not what he happened to be, but what he willed himself to be.

But, because this is so unual a notion, we shall here set down yet one or two passages more of this philosopher's concerning it; ἐκ ἐστιν τῆς ἐπομενής αὐτοῦ P. 747. ἐστι, ὁλ' εἴσευε αὐτώ τῷ ὅπερ ἔστι τῇ ἐπομενή. ἐκ τοῦ ὠλείς ἐστίν ὑμωμενες καὶ ὥστ' ἐστιν αὐτῶν λαθεϊν, ἀνεὼ τῇ ἐπομενή ἐστίν ὑμωμενες δ' ἐστίν καὶ πρῶς ἕως αὐτῶν ἐστίν, ἐπομενή αὐτῶν εἰσὶ, καὶ τότε αὐτὸ ὁπερ ἐστίν τῇ ἐπομενής καὶ τῇ ἐπομενής καὶ τῷ ἔτοι ἐστίν, ὃ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐκτὸς ἔστιν ἐπομενή, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ ὥς ἐνεργῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ γαρ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπομενῇ, τῷ ἔτοι ἐστίν καὶ γαρ ἐτ' ὑποθεμενά ἐλίθια αὐτῷ ὅτι ἐπομενή μειώεται καὶ ἐμεισθαι αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ ἐκαθαρίζεται τοῦ ἀυτῶς φύσιν ἐις ἄλλα, μέτα αὐτῷ πεποιηκίας ἐλίθια, καὶ ἐγείρεται αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ ἐκάθαρτος τοῦ ἀυτῶς φύσιν εἰς ἄλλα, καὶ γαρ αὐτῶν πεποιηκίας ἐλίθια, καὶ ἐμεισθαι αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ ἐκάθαρτος τοῦ ἀυτῶς φύσιν. The essence of the supreme God is not without his will, but his will and essence are the same; so that God concurreth with himself, himself being willing to be as he is, and being that which he willedeth; and his will and himself being one and the same. For himself is not one thing (as happening to be that which he is) and that he would will to be another: For what

could God will to be, but that which he is? And if we should suppose, that it were in his own choice to be what he would, and that he had liberty to change his nature into whatsoever else he pleased, it is certain, that he could neither will to be any thing else besides what he is, nor complain of himself as being now that which he is out of necessity, be being indeed no other but that, which himself hath willed, and doth always will to be. For his will is his essential goodness; so that his will doth not follow his nature, but concur with it; in the very essence of this good there is noth thing contained his choice, and willing of himself to be such. Lastly, Παν ἄρα θεός, καὶ άκει τὸ μὴ βαλεόμενον, ἢ τὸ πρὸ βαλεόμενον ἀρα' πρῶτον ἄρα' βαλεόμενον αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ ἔγκλιτον ἄρα' καὶ οἶον ἐγκλιτον, καὶ τὸ τῇ βαλεόμενον ἐπίκεισθαι τῇ βαλεόμενῃ ἑγεῖται ἑγεῖται ἤ ἐνετίθεν αὐτῷ. God is all will, nor is there any thing in him which he doth not will, nor is his being before his will, but his will is himself, or be himself the first will. So that he is as he would himself, and such as he would, and yet his will did not generate or produce any thing that was not before. And now we may in all probability conclude, that Laelianus derived this doctrine from Plato and Plotinus; which, how far it is to be either allowed of or excus'd, we leave others to judge, only we shall observe, that, as the word αυτοθες, frequently attributed to God by Christians as well as Pagans 2, seems to imply as much; so the scope and drift of Plotinus, in all this, was plainly no other, than partly to let forth the self-existence of the supreme Deity after a more lively manner, and partly to confute that odd conceit, which some might possibly entertain of God, as if he either happened, by chance, to be what he is, or else were such by a certain necessity of nature, and had his being imposed upon him: whereas, he is as much every way what he would will and chuse to be; so as he had made himself by his own will and choice. Neither have we fet down all this, only to give an account of that one expression of Plato's, that God causeth himself and all things, but also to shew how punctually precise, curious and accurate some of these Pagans were in their speculations concerning the Deity.

To return therefore to Plato: though some have suspected that trinity, which is commonly called Platonick, to have been nothing but a mere figment and invention of some later Platonists; yet the contrary hereunto seems to be unquestionably evident, that Plato himself really asserted such a trinity of universal and divine hypostases, which have the nature of principles. For first, whereas, in his tenth book of Laws, he professedly opposing Atheists, undertakes to prove the existence of a Deity, he does notwithstanding there attend no higher than to the Pfyche, or universal mundane soul, as a self-moving principle, and the immediate, or proper cause of all that motion, which is in the world. And this is all the god, that there he undertakes to prove. But in other places of his writings he frequently afferts, above the self-moving Pfyche, an immovable and standing Nous or Intellec, which was properly the Demiurgus, or architeconick framer of the whole world. And lastly, above this multiform Intellec, he plainly afferts yet a higher hypostasis, one most simple and most absolutely perfect Being; which he calls τὸ ἰν, in

Chap. IV. properly the King of all things.

in opposition to that multiplicity, which speaks something of imperfection in it, and ῥᾴδια, goodness itself, as being above mind and understanding; the first intelligible, and an infinite secundity together with overflowing bigness. And accordingly in his second epistle to Dionysius does he mention a trinity of divine hypostases, all together. Now the words ὁ θεός and ὁ Θεός, God and the divinity in Plato, seem sometimes to comprehend this whole trinity of divine hypostases, as they are again sometimes severally applied to each of them, accordingly as we have already observed, that Zeus or Jupiter in Plato is not always taken for the first and highest hypostasis in his trinity, but sometimes the second hypostasis of mind or intellect is meant thereby, and sometimes again his third hypostasis of the universal and eternal Psyche; Nevertheless the first of these three hypostases is that, which is properly called by the Platonists πατὴρ τῆς Θεότητος, the fountain of the Godhead, and by Plato himself, ὁ πάτερ βασιλεὺς, pater ὑπὲρ πάλιν ἐγνήν, ὁ ἐμφανεῖς πατὴρ. The king of all things, about whom are all things, and for whose sake are all things, and the cause of all good and excellent things.

And this first divine hypostasis, which in Plato's theology is properly ὁ πατήρ, the original Deity, is largely instilled upon by that philosopher in the sixth of his Politicks, under the name and title of ἡ ὑπόγεια, the good; but principally there illustrated by that resemblance of the sun, called by that philosopher also a heavenly God, and said to be the offspring of this highest good, and something analogous to it in the corporeal world, ὅ, τι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ ὑπόγειῳ ἀναγκάζεται, πρὸς τὸν κόσμον καθὼς ἐν τῷ ἀρχαῖον πρὸς τὸν υἱόν καθὼς ἐν τῷ ὑπόγειῳ. This is the same in the intelligible world to intellect (or knowledge) and intelligibles, that the sun is in the sensible world to sight and visibles. For, as the sun is not sight, but only the cause of it; nor is that light, by which we see, the same with the sun itself, but only ὁ λόγος, a sun-like thing; so neither is the supreme and highest good (properly) knowledge, but the cause of knowledge; nor is intellect (precisely considered as such) the best and most perfect being, but only ἡ ὑπόγεια, a boniform thing. Again, As the sun gives to things not only their visibleness, but also their generation; so does that highest good, not only cause the cogniscibility of things, but also their very essences and beings. Ὁ υἱὸς ὑπὸ τῆς ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλὰ ἐγκαθιστά τέκνης ὑποσειῆς, περὶ ὑποσειῆς, ἐν ὑποσειῆς ὑποσειοῦσας. This highest good being not itself properly essence, but above essence, transcending the same, both in respect of dignity and power. Which language and concept of Plato's some of the Greek fathers seem to have entertained, yet so as to apply it to the whole Trinity, when they call God ὑποσειίον, or super-essential. But the meaning of that philosopher was, as we conceive, no other than this, that this highest good hath no particular characteristicall upon it, limiting and determining of it, it being the hidden and incomprehensible source of all things. In the last place, we shall observe, that this first divine hypostasis of the Platonick trinity is by that philosopher called, τὸ θεόν ὑποσειίον ἐκ τῶν ὑποσειίων εἶναι, ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ προδότου, the father of the prince, and cause of all things. Wherein we cannot but take notice of an admirable correspondence between the Platonick

Epist. II. ad Dionys. p. 707. Oper.
Platonick philosophy and Christianity, in that the second hypothesis of both their trinities (called also sometimes κύριος by the Platonists, as well as κύριος) is said to be the immediate cause of all things; and the Demiurgus, the architect, maker or artificer of the whole world.

Now to Plato we might here join Xenophon, because he was his equal, and a Socrateick too, (though it seems there was not so good correspondence betwixt them;) which Xenophon, however in sundry places of his writings he acknowledge a plurality of gods, yet doth he give plain testimony also of one supreme and universal Numen; as this particularly 1, οὗ πάντα σείων κυρίων ἄτερμων, οὗ μόνος μέγας τις, οὗ διάκοτος φύσις, οὗ οίκος έίς ίση μορφή φανής. He that both agitates all things, and establishes the frame of the whole world, though he be manifest to be great and powerful, yet is he, as to his form, inconspicuous.

XXIV. In the next place we come to Aristotle: who, that he acknowledged more gods than one (as well as the other Pagans) appears from his using the word so often plentifully. As particularly in this passage of his Nicomachian Ethicks; ή οἳ τελεῖα εὐδαιμονία, οἳ τελεῖα τις εὖν εὐφεία, ό τι ποιεῖν ό ποιεῖν εὐθεία, οἳ τοῦτον εἴποι τῷ κυρίῳ τοῦτον εἴποι ό φύσις, ή τοῦτον οἳ τοῦτον εἴποι τῷ κυρίῳ τοῦτον εἴποι ό φύσις, οἳ τοῦτον οἳ τοῦτον εἴποι τῷ κυρίῳ τοῦτον εἴποι ό φύσις. But the god is of a perfect in nature, and is in himself, and is equal to all. And whether it be in the gods, of justice amongst one another; as if it was not ridiculous to suppose the gods to make contrats and bargains among themselves, and the like. Or else thereof justice and magnanimity; as if the gods had their fears, dangers and difficulties to encounter withal. Or those of liberality; as if the gods had some such thing as money too, and there were among them indigent to receive alms. Or lastly, shall we attribute to them the actions of temperance? But would not this be a reproachful commendation of the gods, to say, that they conquer and master their vicious lufts and appetites? Thus running through all the actions of moral virtue, we find them to be small, and mean, and unworthy of the gods. And yet we all believe the gods to live, and consequently to all, unless we should suppose them perpetually to sleep, as Endymion did. Wherefore if all moral actions, and therefore much more mechanical operations be taken away from that which lives and understands, what is there left to it besides contemplation? To which he there adds a further argument also of the same thing: Because other animals, who are deprived of contemplation, partake not of happiness. For to the gods all their life is happy;

Chap. IV. his Polytheism. 409

to men so far forth, as it approacheth to contemplation; but brute animals, that do not at all contemplate, partake not at all of happiness. Where Aristotle plainly acknowledges a plurality of gods, and that there is a certain higher rank of beings above men. And by the way we may here observe, how from those words of his, ζην τε πάντες ὑπελήφαν Σέις, All men suppose the gods to live, and from what follows in him, that opinion of some late writers may be confuted, that the Pagans generally worshipped the immanent parts of the world as true and proper gods: Aristotle here telling us, that they universally agreed in this, that the gods were animals, living and understanding beings, and such as are therefore capable of contemplation. Moreover, Aristotle in his Politicks, writing of the means to conserve a tyranny, as he calls it, sets down this for one amongst the rest; ητι οὐ τὰ πέποντα ἦν ἡ Σέις Φανουσα ἄλλα παράκλατα διεχόντως, ὡς τοις ἐς μόρος Φανος, τὸ παιδί τι παρόν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνάπτυκτων, ἵνα διαδικάζων νομίζων εἰναι τῶν ἀνάπτυκτων ἀνθρώπων καὶ Φανοινόν τῶν Σέις, καὶ ἐπι- εισελέσθων ὑποτε, ὡς συμμάχον ἦσον καὶ τοις Σέις. For a prince or monarch to seem to be always more than ordinarily sedulous about the worship of the gods: because men are less afraid of suffering any injustice from such kings or princes, as they think to be religiously disposed, and devoutly affected towards the gods. Neither will they be so apt to make conspiracies against such, they supposing, that the gods will be their abettors and assistants. Where the word διήκοιαν seems to be taken in a good sense, and in way of commendation for a religious person; though we must confess, that Aristotle himself does not here write so much like a διήκοιαν, as a meer politician. Likewise in his first book de Caelo, he writeth thus; πάντες διῆκοιαν πρὸ τοις σέου ἔχοντα ὑπελήφαν, ἕκ τῶν τῶν ἀναπτύκτων τοῖς σέου τοῖς ἀποδιδότας, ἢς Βαρέαξ τον Σέινον ἑλλήνων, ὡς τοις ἀναπτύκτων τοις σέους [P. 615]. συναιτήσσαν. εἰπέ τοι τοις Σέις, ὡστε σέινον, &c. All men have an opinion or persuasion, that there are gods. And they, who think so, as well Barbarians as Greeks, attribute the highest place to that which is divine, as supposing the immortal heavens to be most accommodate to immortal gods. Wherefore if there be any divinity, as unquestionably there is, the body of the heavens must be acknowledged to be of a different kind from that of the elements. And in the following book he tells us again, That it is most agreeable τῷ μαντείῳ πρὸ τοῖς σέου, to that vaticination, which all men have in their minds concerning the gods, to suppose the heaven to be a quintessence distinct from the elements, and therefore incorruptible. Where Aristotle affirmeth, that men have generally μαντεία, a vaticination in their minds concerning gods; to wit, that themselves are not the highest beings, but that there is a rank of intellectual beings, superior to men, the chief of which is the supreme Deity; concerning whom there is indeed the greatest μάντεια or vaticination of all.

We acknowledge it to be very true, that Aristotle does not so much insist upon daemons, as Plato and the generality of Pagans in that age did; and probably he had not so great a belief of their existence; though he doth make mention of them also, as when in his Metaphysicks, speaking of bodies compounded of the elements, he infames in ζην τε νός ἀνάπτυκτα, animals and daemons, and elsewhere he infinates them to have airy bodies, in these
words; ἡτὶνοτος γὰρ ἂν τις, ἣ διὰ τῶν αἰῶν. η ἐν τῷ ἄξιν ζωής θαλαττῶν ἐστι, ἢ ἀπαρνητικὰ, Some perhaps would demand a reason, why the soul that is in the air, is better and more immortal than that in animals. However, whether Aristotle believed these lower daemons or no, it is certain, that he acknowledged a higher kind of gods, namely the intelligences of all the several spheres, if not also the souls of them and the stars; which spheres being, according to the astronomy then received, forty seven in number, he must needs acknowledge at least so many gods. Besides which, Aristotle seems also to suppose another sort of incorporeal gods, without the heavens, where, according to him, there is neither body, nor place, nor vacuum, nor time; in these words; ὅτι ἐν τῷ θαλαττῶν ἐστὶ, αὐτὰ ποιεῖ γενάλκειν, ἢ ἀπαρνητικὰ, ἡ ἄξιν ζωής ἐν τῶν ιδίων ἔστι, ἀλλ’ ἀπαρνητικαὶ θάλαττα ἡ ἀπαρνητικὰ, ἡ τῶν ἄξιν ἂν ζωής καὶ καταχαρικάν θαλάσσαι τῶν ἀπαρνητικαί αἰῶνα. They, who exist there, are such as are neither apt to be in a place, nor to wax old with time, nor is there any change at all in those things above the biggest here; but they being impalpable and unalterable, lead the best and most self-sufficient life, throughout all eternity. But this passage is not without supposition of being supposititious.

Notwithstanding all which, that Aristotle did asser one supreme and universal Numen, is a thing also unquestionable. For though it be granted, that he useth the singular θεός, as likewise τὸ θεόν and τὸ δαίμονον, many times indefinitely, for a god in general, or any divine being; and that such places as these have been oftentimes mistaken by Christian writers, as if Aristotle had meant the supreme God in them; yet it is nevertheless certain, that he often useth those words also emphatically, for one only supreme God. As in that of his Metaphysics, οὗ τὸ γὰρ θεός δοκεῖ τῷ θεῷ πάνιν τινι καὶ αἴφαι τινις God seemeth to be a cause and certain principle to all things. And also in his De Anima, where he speaks of the soul of the heavens, and its circular motion: ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐστὶ τὸ βίον κρίσιν γὰρ ἐργαὶ τῶν θεῶν διὰ τὸ τόποι τὰ διὰ τὸν κύκλως ποιεῖν θεόν ἐργαὶ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ τὸ βίον αὐτὴ τὰ κάκια τῷ μένει, κακίστα δὲ τῶν οὗ ολλάς. Neither is that a good cause of the circular motion of the heavens, which they (that is the Platonists) call τὸ βίον, because it is better, that it should be so than otherwise; as if God therefore ought to have made the soul of the world, such, as to move the heaven circularly, because it was better for it to move so than otherwise: but this being a speculation that properly belongs to some other science, we shall no further pursue it in this place. Thus afterwards again, in the same book, συμβαίνει δ’ ἐτεροπλοῦντες χ’ ἀφορμοῖς εἰς τὸν Σωθόμη, μάλιστ’ ἔγερν τὰ διὰ τῶν παραδείγματα ἐν τῇ φυσικῇ, τὸ θεός, τὰ δ’ θεός πάνιν, εἰ πάντων γὰρ ἐκατόν. It follows from Empedocles his principles, that God must needs be the most unwise of all, be alone being ignorant of that (out of which all other things are compounded) νεῦσα, or contentious (because himself is nothing but φύσιν, unity and friendship) whereas mortal animals may know or conceive all things, they being compounded of all. Which same passage we have again also, in his
Of one universal Numen.

is Metaphysicks, from whence it was before cited to another purpose. To this might be added another place out of his book of Generation and Corruption, to whom the scholars of his time, the Pythagoreans, ascribed the name of God hath filled up the whole, or universe, and constantly supplies the same, having made a continual successive generation. Lastly, to daewa is sometimes plainly used by Aristotle also, not for the divinity in general, or any thing that is divine, but for that one supreme Deity, the governor of the whole world. Thus in that passage of his Rhetorick to Alexander, τοίο τινα δακτερον των λειτουργων, ημι, οι μεγατετεις του αυτοκος. This is that, wherein we mean differ. from other animals, having received the greatest honour from God, that though they be endued with appetite and anger and other passions, as well as we, yet we alone are furnished with speech and reason.

Over and besides which, Aristotle in his Metaphysicks (as hath been already observed) professedly opposeth that imaginary opinion of many independent principles of the universe; that is, of many unmade self-existent deities; he confuting the same from the phenomena, because ἄλτης περι; [P. 833. Oper.] ἴστιν οὖσα, all things are plainly co-ordered to one, the whole world conspiring into one agreeing harmony; whereas if there were many principles or independent Deities, the system of the world must needs have been incoherent, and in conspiring, like an ill-agreeing drama, botched up of many impertinent interferences. Whereupon Aristotle concludes after this manner, τα δι θεα σέβαλλην καινων πολιτείαιν,

The things will not be ill administered (which was then it seems a kind of proverbial speech) and according to Homer, the government of many is not good, (nor could the affairs of the world be ever carried on under it) therefore there is one Prince or Monarch over all. From which passage of Aristotle's it is evident, that though he asserted τοῦ ἔθεσι, a multiplicity of gods in the vulgar sense, as hath been already declared, yet he absolutely denied τοῦ ἔθεσι, and τοῦ ἔθεσι, a polyarchy or mundane aristocracy, that is, a multiplicity of first principles and independent deities. Wherefore though Aristotle doated much upon that whimsy of his, of as many intelligibles, or eternal and immovable minds (now commonly called intelligences) as there are movable spheres of all kinds in the heavens, (which he sticks not also sometimes to call principles;) yet must he of necessity be interpreted to have derived all these from one supreme universal Deity, which, as Simplicius expresseth it, is ἄμετρον ἄκρων, the principle of principles; and which comprehends and contains those inferior deities under it, after the same manner as the primum mobile, or highest sphere, contains all the lesser spheres within it: because otherwise there would not be ἐν Κοίτας, one prince or monarch over the whole; but the government of the world would be a polykæarrany or aristocracy of gods, concluded to be an ill government. Moreover, as Plotinus represents Aristotle's sense, it is not conceivable, that so many independent
pendent principles should thus constantly conspire, περὶς ἐν ἔφον τῶν τῆς παρὰς  

Aristotle's first immoveable Mover. Book I.

Now this highest principle, as it is αἰώνιος σῶς, an immoveable essence, is by Aristotelē the first place supposed to be ἀνίκτωρ κυβερνήτης, the principle of motion in the universe, or at least of that chiefest motion of the primum mobile  

pent in the heavens, and whole heaven. Which first mover being concluded by him to be but one, he doth from thence infer the singularity of the heaven or world, ὅπου ἄνω τὸῦ ἄνω, τὸ πρῶτον κυβερνήτης τὸ οὕτως ὁμαλῶς ἀλλὰ ἀπόρητον τῷ πρῶτῳ κυβερνήτῃ, τὸν κυβερνήτης τινὰ ἀνάμεσα ἐν μόνῳ. εἰς ἄνω χώρας μᾶλλον. There is one numerically first immoveable mover and no more; and therefore there is but one movable neither, which doctrine of Aristotle's, there seems to be a great difference betwixt his philosophy and that of Plato's; in that Plato makes the principle of motion in the heavens and whole world to be a self-moving soul, but Aristotelē supposed it to be an immovable mind or intellect. Nevertheless, according to Aristotelē's explication of himself, the difference betwixt them is not great, if any at all; Aristotle's immoveable mover being understood by him, not to move the heavens efficiently, but only objectively and finally, ὡς ἐξετικώς, as being loved. Which conceit of his Proclus upon Plato's Timæus pertringeth after this manner; τῶν παρ

P. 167.

[Cap. XVII. p. 241 Ed. Fabricii.]
His Cause of Well and Fit.

Wherefore, as well according to Plato's hypothesis, as Aristotle's, it may be affirmed of the supreme Deity, in the same Boetius his language, that,

---Stabilisique manens dat cum sa moveri.

Being itself immovable, it causeth all other things to move. The immediate efficient cause of which motion also, no less according to Aristotle than Plato, seems to have been a mundane soul; however Aristotle thought not so fit to make this soul a principle; in all probability, because he was not so well assured of the incorporeity of souls, as of minds or intellects.

Nevertheless this is not the only thing, which Aristotle imputed to his first and highest immovable principle, or the supreme Deity, its turning round of the primum mobile, and that no other wise than as being, loved, or as the final cause thereof, as Proclus supposed; but he, as well as Anaxarogas, affected it to be also, τὸ ἐν ἴα γάλακτος αἰτίαν, the cause of well and fit, or τὸ ἐν ἴκα τῆς ἐρωτάσεως, ἅλλα ἀμεν τὸ ἐν, that without which there could be no such thing as well; that is, no order, no aptitude, proportion and harmony in the universe: He declaring excellently, that εἰ μὴ ἤματα τὰ ἡ ἁἱδῆνα ἀλλα, εἰ ἐκείναι ἁς ἢ τάξεις, ἅλλα ἀμεν τὸν ἁς ἢ τάξεις ἁς ἢ τάξεις, Unless there were something else in the world besides sensible, there could be neither beginning nor order in it, but one thing would be the principle of another infinitely, or without end. And again in another place already cited, τὸ ἐν ἴα γάλακτος, ἦνωτον ὑπὸ τούτοις ἐκείνως ἐκείνως, &c. εἰ ἀμεν ἁλλα ἢ ἁς ἢ ἁς ἢ ἁς ἢ τάξεις, εἰ ἤματα τὸ ἐν οἰκεία παράδοχα καλλον ἀκατάσκολον κατακόρους, It is not at all likely, that either fire or earth, or any such body, should be the cause of that well and fit that is in the world; nor can so noble an effect as this be reasonably imputed to chance or fortune. Wherefore himself, agreeably with Anaxarogas, concludes, that it is Nous or Mind, which is properly αἰτίαν τὸ καλόν, ἢ ὅσον, the cause of well and right; and accordingly does he frequently call the supreme Deity by that name. He affirming likewise, that the order, pulchritude and harmony of the whole world dependeth upon that one highest and supreme Being in it, after the same manner as the order of an army dependeth upon the general or emperor, who is not for the order, but the order for him. Which highest Being of the universe is therefore called by him also, conformably to Plato,

2 Lib. X. p. 669. 3 Ibid. Lib. XIV. Cap. X. p. 484. 485.
2 Lib. VII. Cap. III. p. 266. Tom. VI. Opera. 3 Tom. VI. Opera.
Mind according to Aristotle,  Book I.

Plato, in phaenomena, the separate good of the world, in a way distinct from that intrinsic to or inherent good of it, which is the order and harmony itself: 'Evistonasthi de, x trofev eimi, 7 tis ooi Phusis to yndaih x to
'deis; pote ev xarismenon ti, x autod xat autod; 7 tis tazin; 7 xaristeis
绉 per spartexia, kal gora ev tis tazexi to ev kai o sparten, param
'v tos. If tis tazin, alla 'ekiv di tis tazexi to tis xaristeis.
7 xaristeis xôi. It is to be considered also, what is the good
and best of the universe; whether its own order only? or something separate and existing by itself? or rather both of them together? As the good of an army consists both in
its order, and likewise in its general or emperor, but principally in this
latter, because the emperor is not for the order of the army, but the order
of the army is for him; for there are things co-ordened together with God, and respectively to him.
Wherefore since Aristotle's supreme Deity, by what name forever called, whether mind or good, is the proper efficient cause of all that
well and fit, that is in the universe, of all the order, pulchritude, and
harmony thereof; it must needs be granted, that besides its being the final
cause of motion, or its turning round the heavens by being loved, it was also
the efficient cause of the whole frame of nature and system of the world.
And thus does he plainly declare his sense, where he applauds Anaxagoras
for maintaining Nêu ev xoi x to xoev x to tis tazexis xaristeis
atov, that mind is the
cause not only of all order, but also of the whole world: and when himself po-
positively affirms, x tov xazexis xaristeis eis to deis x o
Phusis, that from such a
principle as this, depends the heaven, and nature. Where by heaven is meant
the whole world, and by nature that artificial nature of his before insisted on,
which doth nothing in vain, but always acteth for ends regularly,
and is the instrument of the divine mind. He also somewhere affirmeth, that if the
heavens or world were generated, that is, made in time, so as to have had a
beginning, then it was certainly made, not by chance and fortune, but by
such an artificial nature as is the instrument of a perfect mind. And in his
Physicks, where he contends for the world's ante-ernity, he concludes ne-
evertheless, 

Lib. 2, c. 6.
[P. 474-
Tom I,
Oper.]
Ar. de An.
L. 1, c. 7.
[P. 16, Tom II, Oper.]

for maintaining Nêu ev xoi x to xoev x to tis tazexis xaristeis
atov, that mind is the
cause not only of all order, but also of the whole world: and when himself po-
positively affirms, x tov xazexis xaristeis eis to deis x o
Phusis, that from such a
principle as this, depends the heaven, and nature. Where by heaven is meant
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such an artificial nature as is the instrument of a perfect mind. And in his
Physicks, where he contends for the world's ante-ernity, he concludes ne-
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Lib. 2, c. 6.
[P. 474-
Tom I,
Oper.]
Ar. de An.
L. 1, c. 7.
[P. 16, Tom II, Oper.]
to that vulgar sense of many in those days of ours; as if he were indeed an understanding or perceptive being, and that perfectly omnipresent, but yet nevertheless such, as acted all things arbitrarily, being not determined by any rule or nature of goodness, but only by his own fortuitous will. For, according to those ancient philosophers, that, which acts without respect to good, would not be so much accounted mens as dementia, mind, as madness or folly; and to impute the frame of nature or system of the world, together with the government of the same, to such a principle as this, would have been judged by them all one, as to impute them to chance or fortune. But Aristotle and those other philosophers, who called the supreme God Θεός or Mind, understood thereby that, which of all things in the whole world is most opposite to chance, fortune, and temerity; that which is regulated by the τὸ τῷ ἀλλὸ ἀλλιώτερον, the well and fit of every thing, if it be not rather the very rule, measure, and essence of fitness itself; that which acts all for ends and good, and doth every thing after the best manner, in order to the whole. Thus Socrates in that place before cited out of Plato’s Phaedo, interprets the meaning of that opinion, that Mind made the world, and was the cause of all things: ἐπὶ τῶν ἀκόλουθων, εἰ τοῦτο ἔστι Θεός, τὸν θεόν πάντα καθεστῶν, καὶ Ἀθήνης ταξιδεύσαι ἀπὸ τοῦ καθεστώτος. That therefore every thing might be concluded to have been disposed of after the best manner possible. And accordingly Theophrastus, Aristotle’s scholar and successor, describeth God after this manner, τὸ πρῶτον καὶ Σοφία τοῦ Θεοῦ, πάντα τὰ ἀλατοὶ αὐτόματα, That first and divine Being of all, which will bring all the best things. Whether of these two hypotheses concerning God, one of the ancient Pagan philosophers, that God is as essentially good as wisdom, or, as Plotinus after Plato calls him, decency and fitness itself; the other, of some late professors of Christianity, that he is nothing but arbitrary will, omnipotent and omnipresent; I say, whether of these two is more agreeable to piety and true Christianity, we shall leave it to be considered.

Lastly, it is not without probability, that Aristotle did, besides the frame of nature, and fabric of the world, impute even the very substance of things themselves aff to the divine efficiency, (nor indeed can there well be any doubt of any thing save only the matter;) partly from his affirming God to be a cause and principle to all things, and partly from his commend- ing this doctrine of Anaxagoras, ἂν τὸ ἀλλιώτερον αὐτῖκα αὐτῆς ἄλλο τῷ ἀλλιώτερον ἑαυτοῦ τῆς ἁμαρτίας. For, That Mind was, together with well and fit, the cause and principle of things themselves. However, that Aristotle’s inferior gods at least, and therefore his intelligences of the lesser spheres, which were incorporeal substances, were all of them produced or created by one supreme, may be further confirmed from his definition of his in his rhetorick, τὸ διὰ τούτου ἐλέειν ἐν τούτῳ ἄλλῳ ἀλλήλον, ἀλλήλῳ ἂν ὑπὲρ, ἂν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄλλου. The divinity is nothing but either God or the work of God. Where Θεός is unquestionably used in way of eminency for the supreme Deity, as in those other places of Aristotle’s before cited, to which sundry more might be added, as, τὰ τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄλλου, ἐν τούτῳ ἄλλῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄλλου. But God possesseth all good things, and is self-sufficient: and again where he speaks of things, that are more than praise-worthy, τῶν τῶν ἀλλῆλοι τοῦ ἄλλου, ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ, ἐν τούτῳ ἄλλῳ, ἐν τούτῳ.
Furthermore, Aristotle declares, that this speculation concerning the Deity does constitute a particular science by itself, distinct from those other speculative sciences of physiology, and the pure mathematicks; so that there are in all three speculative sciences, distinguished by their several objects, physiology, the pure mathematicks, and theology or metaphysics: the former of these, that is, physiology, being conversant \( \textit{προς} \) \( \chiλος\textit{ισα μιν, αλλ' νε} \) \( \textit{αρχίναι, about things both inseparable from matter, and moveable; the second (\textit{viz.} geometry, or the pure mathematicks) προς \textit{ανακόκκινα μιν, αλλ' ω} \textit{κειμενα, about things immovable indeed, but not really separable from matter, so as to exist alone by themselves; but the} \textit{third and last, προς \textit{κωιδισι ακοικια, Concerning things both immovable and separable from matter,} that is, incorporeal substances immovable: this philosopher there adding, \( \textit{ει γαρ} \) \( \textit{τοις} \) \( \textit{ενδιαφερομενοις} \) \( \textit{θυγηματα, ει} \) \( \textit{δε} \) \( \textit{τις} \) \( \textit{αισθανομενοι, αυτη προσφικη, καλος} \) \( \textit{πρας} \textit{θην.} \)

That if there were no other substance besides these natural things, which are material and moveable, then would physiology be the first science; but if there be any immovable substance, the philosophy thereof must needs in order of nature be before the other. Lastly, he concludes, that as the speculative sciences in general are more noble and excellent than the other, so is theology or metaphysics the most honourable of all the speculatives. Now the chief points of the Aristotelick theology, or metaphysical doctrine concerning God, seem to be these four following. First, that though all things be not ingent or unmade, according to that in his book against Xenophanes, \( \textit{α δια} \textit{και} \textit{ου} \textit{καλιωσεν} \textit{επι ιερα αλα} \textit{παντα} \textit{ετερ} \textit{οις, κα τοις κακοις γιγαντιας ιερα ει} \textit{ιερα. There is no necessity, that all things should be unmade, for what binders but that some things may be generated from other things? Yet there must needs be something eternal and unmade, as likewise incorruptible, because \( \epsilonι \) \( \tauαριοι υπερη \) \( \textit{φωταλι, παντα} \) \( \textit{φωταλι. If all substances were corruptible, then all might come to nothing. Which eternal, unmade (or self-existent) and incorruptible substance, according to Aristotle, is not senseless matter, but a perfect mind. Secondly, that God is also an incorporeal substance, \( \textit{αληθεια} \textit{των} \) \( \textit{αδιακο} \textit{σεσαρκωσεων, separate from senseless, and not only so, but, according to Aristotle's judgment likewise,} \textit{αληθεια} \textit{ει, and} \textit{αμορφοι} \textit{αι, and} \textit{αμακρινθι, indivisible, and devoid of parts, and magnitude. Nor can it be denied, but that besides Aristotle, the generality of those other ancients, who ascribed incorporeal substance, did suppose it likewise to be unextended, they dividing substances (as we learn from Plato) into \( \textit{διαινοησεις, και ανωτερων αυτων, distant and in-} \textit{διοντι, or extended and unextended substances. Which doctrine, whether true} \)
true or no, is not here to be discussed. Thirdly, ῥατορόν νόες καὶ νοτιες, That Met. lib. iv.
in God intellect is really the same thing with the intelligibles. Because the divine c. 7. & c. 9.
Mind being (at least in order of nature) senior to all things, and architectural
of the world, could not look abroad for its objects, or find them any
where without itself, and therefore must needs contain them all within it-
self. Which determination of Aristotle's is no less agreeable to Theism
than to Platonism; whereas, on the contrary, the Atheists, who assert mind
and understanding as such, to be in order of nature junior to matter and
the world, do therefore, agreeably to their own hypothesis, suppose all in-
tellection to be by way of passion from corporeal things without, and no
mind or intellect to contain its intelligibles, or immediate objects within
ὑσία, his essence and act or operation the same; ὁμοια εὐεραν ὑσίαν ταξιον καὶ τ. c. 6.
ὑσία ἦσον, there must therefore needs be some such principle as this, whose
essence is act or energy. From which theorem Aristotle indeed endeavors to
cestablish the eternity of the world, that it was not made in νοτιες, καὶ ὀριοῦ
πατωσε, καὶ ἐν μιᾷ ὅλῃ, from night, and a confused chaos of things, and from
nothing; that is, from an antecedent non-existence, brought forth into be-
ing; because God, who is an immovable nature, and whose essence is act
or energy, cannot be supposed to have rested or slept from eternity, doing
nothing at all, and then, after infinite ages, to have begun to move the
matter, or make the world. Which argumentation of Aristotle's perhaps
would not be inconsiderable, were the world, motion, and time, capable of
existing from eternity, or without beginning. Of which more elsewhere.
However, from hence it is undeniably evident, that Aristotle, though af-
fering the world's eternity, nevertheless derived the same from God, be-
cause he would prove this eternity of the world from the essential energy
immutability of the Deity.

We shall now conclude all concerning Aristotle with this short summary,
which himself gives us of his own creed and religion, agreeably to the tra-
dition of his Pagan ancestors; παραδοθαι υπο των ἀφρηχιων και των νιων, 6τι Met. Lib. 14.
Σειτ τε εαυτον, και περικειται το θεων την ἀληθευνει τε δε λοιπα μαθικες παντα προς. c. 8.
ὑποθεσα προς την πειρατη των παλαιων, και την εις τους νόμους και το συμφωνον χρησιν ἀν [P. 493-]
θριπποιδεις τη γας τουτος και των αλλων ζωων ωριον τατι λεγομεναι, και τωτοις ἡτοικ
ἀκολουθια και παραπλησια. It hath been delivered down to us from very ancient
times, that the stars are gods also; besides that supreme Deity, which contains
the whole nature. But all the other things were fabulously added hereunto,
for the better persuasion of the multitude, and for utility of human life and po-
litical ends, to keep men in obedience to civil laws. As for example, that these
gods are of human form, or like to other animals; with such other things as
are consequent hereupon. In which words of Aristotle these three things
may be taken notice of. First, that this was the general persuasion of the
civilized Pagans from all known antiquity downwards, that there is one το
θεων, which comprehends the whole nature. Where το θεων is by Aristotle
plainly taken for the supreme Deity. And his own sense concerning this
particular is elsewhere thus declared after the same manner, where he speaks
of order, harmony, and proportion; ἡ των τούτων διάκες ἐγεν, ἦτοι καὶ ταῦτα σαφές το παν, this is the work of divine power, which also contains this universe. Which Divinity containing and comprehending the whole nature and universe, must needs be a single and solitary Being; according to that expression of Horace before cited,

Nec viget quicquam similae aut secundum;

That, which hath nothing like it, nor second to it. The next thing is, that according to the Pagan tradition, besides this universal Numen, there were certain other particular and inferior deities also, that is, understanding beings superior to men; namely the animated stars or spheres, according to the vulgar apprehension, though Aristotelis philosophy would interpret this chiefly of their immovable Minds or Intelligences. Lastly, that all the rest of the Pagan religion and theology, those two things only excepted, were fabulous and fictitious, invented for the better persuasion of the vulgar to piety, and the conserving of them in obedience to civil laws; amongst which this may be reckoned for one, that those gods are all like men or other animals; and therefore to be worshipped in images and statues of those several forms; with all that other fabulous Farrago, which depended hereupon. Which being separated from the rest, the πάτερος τόσος, or ancient tradition of their Pagan progenitors, would remain comprized within those two particulars above mentioned, namely, that there is one supreme Deity, that contains the whole universe, and that besides it, the animated stars or their minds are certain inferior gods also.

To Aristotile may be here subjoined Speusippus and Xenocrates, his equals and corivals, they being Plato’s succiffors; together with Theophrastus, his own scholar and succiffor. Concerning the former of which it is recorded in Cicero, that agreeably with Plato, he asserted vim quandam, qu’a omnia regenur, eamque animalcm, one animal and intellectual force, by which all things are governed; by reason whereof, Velleius the Epicurean complains of him, as thereby endavouring, evellere ex animis cognitionem dorum, to pluck out of the minds of men the notion of gods; as indeed both he and Plato did destroy those Epicurean gods, which were all supposed to be independent and to have no sway or influence at all upon the government of the world; whereas neither of them denied a plurality of subordinate and dependent deities, generated or created by one supreme, and by him employed as his ministers in the economy of the universe: for had they done any such thing as this, they would certainly have been then condemned for Atheistics. And Xenocrates his theology, is thus represented in Stoheus, τὴν Μονάδα καὶ τὴν Διάδα Σειών, τὴν μετ’ ὧς αρδεύει πατρὸς ἐχοσιν τάξιν, ἡ τῶν προσωποφωνί καὶ Ζωή, καὶ Παθής, καὶ Νοῦ, ὅτι ἐστὶν αὐτῷ περ- τερες τινὰ τῶν Ἐχοσιν μπροστὶς Σειών δικαίως, τῆς ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἄνεμος ὑγιαίνετο, πτος ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πολικὴ τοῦ παντοῦ, &c. That both a Monad and Dyad were gods, the one masculine, having the order of a father, which he callèth Ζήν and Mind,
CHAP. IV. and Theophrastus, Monarchists.

Mind, and which is also to him the first God; the other feminine, as it were the mother of the gods, which is to him the soul of the universe: besides which he acknowledgeth the heaven to be divine, that is, animated with a particular soul of its own, and the fiery stars to be celestial gods, as he asserted also certain sublunary gods, viz. the invisible demons. Where instead of the Platonick trinity, Xenocrates seems to have acknowledged only a duality of divine hypostases; the first called a Monad and Mind, the second a Dyad and Soul of the universe. And lastly, we have this testimony of Theophrastus, besides others, cited out of his Metaphysicks, ἵνα γὰρ πάντας δεσμούς, δή, ἄναξία καὶ ἐστὶν ἄγαν, There is one divine principle of all things, by or from which all things subsist and remain.

XXV. The Stoicks and their chief doctors, Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus, were no better naturalists and metaphysicians than Heraclitus, in whole footsteps they trode; they in like manner admitting no other substance besides body, according to the true and proper notion thereof, as that which is not only ἄξιωτος, distant and extended, but also ἀντιπαθέος, resisting and impermeable. So that, according to these Stoicks, the souls not only of other animals, but of men also, were properly corporeal, that is, substances impermeably extended, and which differed from that other part of theirs, commonly called their body, no otherwise than that they were ἄριστος άριστος καὶ λεπτομερής, a more thin and subtle body, and πέτωμα ὑδάτων, a hot and fiery spirit: it being supposed by these philosophers, that cogitation, reason, and understanding, are lodged only in the fiery matter of the universe. And though the generality of these Stoicks acknowledged human souls to have a certain permanency after death, and some of them till the next configuration, (unknown perhaps they should be cruished and broken all to pieces, in their passage out of the body, by the down-fall of some tower, fteeples, or the like upon them) yet did they all conclude against their immortality, there being nothing at all immortal with them (as shall be afterwards declared) save only Jupiter, or the one supreme Deity. And as for the punishment of wicked souls after death, though some of them seem to have utterly exploded the same, as a meer figment of poets, (insomuch, that Epictetus himself denies there was any Acheron, Cocytus, or Phlegethon) yet others granted, that as the better souls after death did mount up to the stars, their first original, so the wicked wandred up and down here in certain dark and miry subterraneous places, till at length they were quite extinct. Nevertheless, they seem to have been all of this persuasion, that the frightening of men with punishments after death was no proper nor accommodate means to promote virtue, because that ought to be pursued after for its own sake, or the good of honesty, as vice to be avoided for that evil of turpitude which is in it, and not for any other external evil consequent thereupon. Wherefore Chrysippus reprehended Plato for subjoining to his republick such affrightful stories of punishments after death, ὃτις Πλατ. de ὅλις ἄνθρωποι ἀναφέρον τῷ άντά τῶν Ἐλον φῶν, τῆς ἄνθρωπος, τῶν Κυκαλαθίνων τῆς Ἐπίκτητος. Arri. in Epictet. Lib. III. Cap. XIII. p. 1040.

1 These are the words of Chrysippus, preserved by Plutarch, Libro de Repugnantia, p. 293. corum, p. 1052. Tom. II. Oper.
The Stoicks, Corporealists; Book I.

...they reason and corpora, and the ancient anima corporis ... certain parts of

1. Epistles, p. 399. Tom II. Oper.
2. Seneca, Epistles, CXIII. p. 422. Tom II. Oper.
3. Cicero de Nat. Deor. Lib. II. Cap. XXXI.

"Chrysippus affirmeth, that Plato (in the person of Cephalus) does not rightly determine men from injustice by the fear of divine punishments and vengeance after death; since this opinion (of torments after death) is liable to much exception, and the contrary is not without probabilities; so that it seems to be but like to women's frightening of children from doing unhappy tricks, with these by their doings of Acco and Alphito. But how fondly these Stoicks doated upon that hypothesis, that all was body, may appear from hence, that they maintained even accidents and qualities themselves to be bodies; for voice and found, night and day, evening and morning, summer and winter, nay, calends and nones, months and years, were bodies with them. And not only so, but also the qualities of the mind itself, as virtue and vice, together with the motions and affections of it, as anger and envy, grief and joy; according to that passage in Seneca 1, Corporis bona sunt corpora; corpora ergo sunt & quae animi, nam & hic corpus est; The goods of a body are bodies; now the mind is a body, and therefore the goods of the mind are bodies too. And with as good logick as this did they further infer, that all the actions, passions, and qualities of the mind, were not only bodies, but also animals likewise: Animam consfat animal esse, cum ipsa efficac, ut simul animalia; virtus autem nihil aliquid quum animus taliter fe habens, ergo animal est. It is manifest, that the soul is an animal, because it is that, by which we are made animals; now virtue and vice are nothing else but the soul; and so affected or modified, and therefore these are animals too. Thus we see what fine conclusions these doaters upon body (though accounted great masters of logick) made; and how they were besoiled in their ratiocinations and philosophy.

Nevertheless, though these Stoicks were such foolish Corporealists, yet were they not for all that Atheists; they revolting, that mind or understanding, though always lodged in corporeal substance, yet was not first of all begotten out of nesciefs matter, so or so modified, but was an eternal unmade thing, and the maker of the whole mundane system. And therefore as to that controversy so much agitated amongst the ancients, whether the world were made by chance, or by the necessity of material motions, or by mind, reason and understanding; they avowedly maintained, that it was neither by chance nor by material necessity, but divind mente, by a divine and eternal mind every way perfect. From which one eternal mind they also affirmed human souls to have been derived, and not from nesciefs matter; Prudentiam & mentem à diis ad homines pervenisse 2, that mind and wisdom descended down to men from the Deity. And that Ratio nihil aliud est, quum in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus merita 3; Reason is nothing else but part of the divine spirit merged into a human body: so that these human souls were to them no other than μαγνη ἐν τού ἀναπογραφα 4, certain parts of

1. Epistles, CVI. p. 399. Tom II. Oper.
2. Seneca, Epistles, CXIII. p. 422. Tom II. Oper.
3. Cicero de Nat. Deor. Lib. II. Cap. XXXI.
of God, or deceptions and avulsions from him. Neither were the reasons, by which these Stoicks would prove the world to have had a divine original, at all contemptible, or much inferior to those, which have been used in these latter days; they being such as these: first, that it is no more likely this orderly system of the world should have been made by chance, than that Ennius his Annals, or Homer's Iliads might have resulted from the fortuitous projection or tumbling out of so many forms of letters, confounded all together; there being as much continued and coherent sense, and as many several combinations in this real poem of the world, as there is in any phantastick poem made by men. And since we see no houses or cities, nobooks or libraries anywhere made by the fortuitous motions of matter, it is a madness to think, that this admirable compages of the whole world should first have resulted from thence. Again, there could not possibly be such an agreeing and conspiring cognition of things, and such a universal harmony throughout the whole world, as now there is, nisi ea uno divino, & continua-toperfectior, quae non tất all contained by one and the same divine spirit: which is the most obvious argument for the unity or onelinefs of the Deity. They reasoned also from the scale of nature, or the gradual perfeftion of things in the universè, one above another; that therefore there must be something absolutely perfect, and that either the world itself, or something prefiding over it, was a principio sapiens, wife from the beginning, or rather without beginning, and from eternity. For as in the growth of plants and animals, Natura sua quodam itinere ad ultimum per-venit, nature by a continual progress, and journeying forwards, arrives at length to the greatest perfection, which those things are respectively capable of; and as those arts of picture and architecture aim at perfection; ut in omni natura necessè est absolvi aliquid & perfeft, so in the nature of the whole universè there must needs be something absolutely perfect, reach'd unto. Necessè: est præstantem aliquam esse naturam, qua nihil est melius; since there is such a gradual ascendent and scale of perfections in nature, one above another, there must needs be some most excellent and perfect Being, than which nothing can be better, at the top of all, as the head thereof. Moreover, they disputed So-cratically, after this manner: Unde arripuit homo vitam, mentem & ratio-nem? Whence did man snatch life, reason, or understanding? Or from what was it kindled in him? For is it not plain, that we derive the moisture and fluidity of our bodies from the water that is in the universe, their consistency and solidity from the earth, their heat and activity from the fire, and their spirituality from the air? Illud autem, quod vincit hæc omnia, rationem, mentem & coniilium, &c. ubi invenimus? unde futilimus? An cetera mundus babebit omnia? How all these things, our reason, mind and understanding, where did we find it? or from whence did we derive it? Hath the universe all these other things of ours in it, and in a far greater proportion? and hath it nothing at all of that, which is the most excellent thing in us? Nibil quod animi, quae-que rationis est expert, id generare ex se potest animantes compotegque rationis, mundus autem generat animantes composes rationis: Nothing

1 Cicero de Nat. Dier. Lib. II Cap. XIII. p. 2973. Tom. IX. Oper. 2 Id. ibid. Cap. IV, VI, VIII, IX.
The Stoical Argumentations

Book I.

that is devoid of mind and reason, can generate things animant and rational; but the world generates such, and therefore itself (or that which contains it, and presides over it) must needs be animant and rational, or intellectual. Which argumentation is further set home by such similitudes as thefe: Si ex oliva modulatè canentes tibie nascerentur, non dubitares, quin effet in oliva tibicinis quedam scientia. Quid si planati fiducias ferrent numerosa sonantes, idem filicet cenferes in planatis insulâ musicam. Car igitur mundus non animans factiensque judicetur, cum ex se procreat animantes atque sapientes? If from the olive-tree should be produced pipes sounding harmoniously, or from the plain-tree fiddles, playing of their own accord musically, it would not at all be doubted, but that there was some musical, either skill or nature, in those trees themselves: why therefore should not the world be concluded to be both animant and wife (or to have something in it which is so) since it produced such beings from itself? And though perhaps some may think that of Cotta's here to have been a smart and witty repartee 1. Querit Socra
des, unde animam arripuerimus, si nulla fuerit in mundo? Et ego quero, unde orationem? unde numeros? unde cantus? nisi erit logici folum cum luna putemus, cum proprius accesserit: aut ad harmoniam canere mundum, ut Pythagoras exi
dlinit. Socrates demandeth, whence we snatch'd soul, life, and reason, if there were none in the world? and I demand (faith he) whence did we snatch speech, music, and numbers? Unless perhaps you will suppose the sun to con
cert with the moon, when he approaches near her in the Syzygicus; or the world to sound harmonically, as Pythagoras conceived. Yet this, how smart soever it may seem, was really but an empty flash of Academick wit, without any solidity at all in it, as shall be manifested afterward. Lastly, the Stoicks endeavoured to prove the exiflence of a God after this manner, Ut nulla pars corporis nostrî est, qua non sit minor quam resmetissi fumus, sic mundum universum pluris esse necesse est quam partem aliquam univerfi: As there is no part of our body, which is not inferior in perfection to ourselves, so must the whole universe needs be supposed to be better and more perfect than any of the pars thereof. Wherefore since it is better to be endowed with life and understanding, than to be devoid thereof, and these are pure perfections; they being in some manner in the parts, must needs be much more in the whole. Nullius sensus carecntis pars potest esse sentientis; No part of that, which is utterly dead and stupid, can have life and understanding in it. And it is a madness for any man to suppofe, Nihil in omni mundo melius esse quam se, that there is nothing in the whole world better than himself, or than mankind; which is but a part thereof. Now Cotta here again exercises his jeering Academick wit after the same manner as before; Hoc sit placer, jam efficies, ut munus opimè librum legere videantur, &c. Illo modo exam dissermus, mathematicus, musificus, omni denique defirina referimus, postremo philosophus eft mundus. By this same argument you might as well prove, that the world is also book-learned, an orator, a mathematician, a musician, and last of all a philofopher. But neither this objection of his nor that former have any firmitude at all in them: because though an effect cannot be better or more perfect than its cause, nor a part than the whole; and therefore whatsoever there is of

1 Id. ibid. Lib. III. Cap. XI. p. 306.4. Tom. IX. Opera.
of pure perfection in any effect, it must needs be more in the cause; yet as
to those things there mentioned by Cotta, (which have all a plain mixture of
imperfection in them) as they could not therefore formally exist in that, which
is absolutely perfect, so is it sufficient, that they are all eminently and vir-
tually contained therein.

By such argumentations as these (besides that taken from the topic of
preference and divination) did the ancient Stoics endeavour to demonstrate
the existence of a God, or a universal Numen, the maker and governor of
the whole world; and that such a one, as was not a mere plastick or metho-
dical and senfles, but a conscious and perfectly intellectual nature. So that
the world to them was neither a mere heap and congeries of dead and flu-
pid matter fortuitously compacted together; nor yet a huge plant or vege-
table, that is, ended with a spheramick principle only; but an animal in-
formed and inlivened by an intellectual soul. And though, being Corpo-
realists, they sometimes called the whole world itself or mundane animal,
God; and sometimes the fiery principle in it, as intellectual, and the Hege-
monick of the mundane soul; yet was the God of the Stoicks properly,
not the very matter itself, but that great soul, mind and understanding, or
in Seneca's language, that ratio incorporeal, that rules the matter of the
whole world. Which Stoical God was also called as well Theaoda as Nœs,
good as mind; as that which is a most moral, benign, and beneficent being;
according to that excellent Cleanethian description of him, in Clemens Alexan-
drinus:

Τ'αγαθον ἐρωτάς μειόν ιπτον ἐστι ἴθνε δὲ,
Tetæumon, ἐκικον, οἰνον, ἶσοιες,
Κρατόν ἑαυτῷ, Ἰηθομοσ, οιλον, δίον, &c.

But this maker and governor of the whole world was most commonly
named by the Stoicks Zeus and Zen, or Jupiter; some of them conclu-
ding, that therefore there was but one Zeus or independent Deity,
because the whole world was but one animal governed by one soul; and
others of them endeavouring, on the contrary, to prove the unity and singu-
larity of the world from the onelines of this Zeus, or the supreme Deity,
supposed and taken for granted, and because there is but one fate and provi-
dence. Which latter consequence, Plutarch would by no means allow of,
he writing thus concerning it, where he pleads for a plurality of worlds;
κ' μὲν τάρτα ἄλλα τῶν Στοικών τὸ μὲν Φειδίακ, Εὐθαγομίον ὑπὸ Ἐμπαρικίαν μὲν μὲν κ' D. Def. Or.
Πρόνοια, κ' ἂν πολλ' Δ'ες κ' Ζώνες ἑσωτερικ', πλεονάζον ὁ τῶν κόσμων; τῆς γὰρ ἀνάρχης p. 425.
pollai ἐνεκεί Δ' ες ἐν πλεονες ἐν κόσμου, κ' μ' ἐν τ' ἑσωτερικ', ἀρχηγοῖς πολλόν ἡ ἡμῶν
τῶν ἑαυτοῦ, οἷον ὁ πατὴρ ἡμῶν κ' ἀρχηγὸς ὁ πάτηρ ἐποιείκοσίμον, &c. Neither
is it at all considerable, what the Stoicks here object against a plurality of
worlds, they demanding, how there could be but one fate, and one providence,
and one Jove, (or independent Deity) were there many worlds? For what ne-
cessity is there, that there must be more Zens or Joves than one, if there were
more worlds? and why might not that one and the same God of this universe,
I i i
called

The Stoicks acknowledged only Book I.

called by us the Lord and Father of all, be the first prince, and highest governor in all those worlds? Or what binders, but that a multitude of worlds might be all subject to the fate and providence of one Jupiter, or supreme God, himself infesting and ordering them every one; and imparting principles and spermatick reasons to them, according to which all things in them might be governed and disposed? For can many distinct persons in an army or chorus be reduced into one body or polity? and could not ten or fifty, or a hundred worlds in the universal be all governed by one reason, and be ordered together in reference to one principle? In which place these two things are plainly contained; first, that the Stoicks unquestionably asserted one supreme Deity, or universal monarch over the whole world; and secondly, that Plutarch was so far from giving any entertainment to the contrary opinion, that he concluded, though there were ten or fifty, or a hundred worlds, yet they were all subject to one supreme, solitary, and independent Deity.

But however, though these Stoicks thus unquestionably asserted one sole independent and universal Numen, the monarch over the whole world; yet did they notwithstanding, together with the other Pagans, acknowledge a plurality of gods; they concluding, πάλιν μετά των θεών καὶ δαίμονων, That all things were full of gods and daemons. And so far were they from falling short of the other Pagans, as to this polytheism or multiplicity of gods, that they seem rather to have surpassed and outstripped them therein. Plutarch, making mention of their τοῦ θεοῦ πληθὺς θεών, their so great multitude of gods; and affirming them, ἐμπνευσθεὶς τοῦ λόγου θεών τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, τοῦ γῆς, τῶν αἰθών, τοῦ Σαλατιλα, to have filled the whole heaven, earth, air, and sea with gods. Nevertheless, they plainly declare, that all this their multiplicity of gods (one only excepted) was generated or created in time by that one, called Zeus or Jupiter, who was not only the spermatick reason, but also the soul and mind of the whole universe; and who from himself produced the world, and those gods, out of non-existence into being. And not only so, but that also in the successive conflagrations they are all again resolved and swallowed up into that one. Thus Plutarch in his defect of oracles, writing of the mortality of daemons, τῶν Στοιχείων γυνώσκομεν, ὃ μόνον κατὰ δαίμονα, τοῦ λόγος ὑπὰ άλλακτικοῦ έκλαίμεν, ἀλλὰ τῶν θεών, διὸν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ πληθύνοντος οὐρανοῦ, τοῦ θαύματος, τῆς ἀλλικάς ἡ γεννώμεν ἡ Θεοπράσεια νομοίς. We know the Stoicks to maintain this opinion, not only concerning daemons, but also the gods themselves, that they are mortal. For though they own such a multitude of gods, yet do they acknowledge only one of them eternal and incorruptible; affirming concerning all the rest, that as they were made in time, so they shall be again corrupted and destroyed. Plutarch himself there defends the mortality of daemons, but this only as to their corporeal part, that they die to their present bodies, and transmigrate into others, their souls in the mean time remaining immortal and incorruptible; but the Stoicks maintained the same as well concerning gods as daemons; and that in such a manner, as that their very souls, lives, and personalities, should be utterly extinguished and destroy'd. To the

the same purpose Plutarch again writeth, in his book of Common Notions P. 1075.
against the Stoicks, Χρυσίππος Κλέασθείς ἑμπεπληκτάτες (οὗ ἐπὶ εἰπεῖν) τῷ λόγῳ Σεω, τὸν ἔρωμεν, τὴν γῆν, τὸν αἷμα, τὴν Θαλάσσα, ὡδίνα τῶν τοῦ θεῶν θεώσεων, ἦν αύτίνος ἀπολείποιται, πῶς μου τὰς διός ἐκ τὸν πάντας καθαλλήσας τῆς ἀλής, &c. ταῦτα δὲ ἐκ ὧς ἄλλα πολλά τῶν αὐτῶν συλλογίζομαι ἐνὶ τὰς ὑπάρξεως αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῖς ἀόμασιν ἐπειτο, ἀλλὰ αυτοὶ μέγα βοώντες τοῖς περὶ Σεω, καὶ προσοέμεν, εἰμαχομένες, τε καὶ ψευτικοι γιραμακαὶ, διαρρήσαντες μὲν αὐτοί, τε Σεω ἀπαίνας εἰκα γενοῦτο, καὶ Φαρσαλομαῖνος ὑπὸ τῶν, τικός κατὰ αὐτοῖς, εἰς τε κηρύς ἡκατεροῦν ὄλοις. Chryseippus and Cleanthes, having filled the whole heaven, earth, air and sea with gods, leave not one of these their so many gods incorruptible nor eternal, save Jupiter only, into whom they confine all the rest; thereby making him to be a bellum and devourer of gods; which is as bad, as if they should affirm him to be corruptible, it arguing as much imperfection for one to be nourished and preserved by the consumption of other things into him, as for himself to die. Now this is not only gathered by way of consequence from the other principles of the Stoicks, but it is a thing, which they expressly assert, and with a loud voice proclaim in all their writings concerning the gods, providence, fate and nature; that all the gods were generated, (or made in time) and that they shall be all destroyed by fire; they supposing them to be meltable, as if they were waxen or leaden things. This indeed is essential to the Stoical doctrine, and from their principles inseparable and unavoidable; forasmuch as they held all to be body, and that in the successive conflagrations all corporeal systems and compounds shall be dissolved by fire; so that no other Deity can then possibly remain safe and untouched, save Jupiter alone, the fiery principle of the universe, animated or intellectual. Here therefore there is a considerable difference to be observed betwixt these Stoicks and the other Pagan Theists; that whereas the others for the most part acknowledged their gods to have been made in time by one supreme univerfal Nunner, but yet nevertheless to be immortal, and to continue to eternity; the Stoical Pagans maintained, that all their other gods, save Jupiter alone, were not only razed, but also θαρσάλωμεν, such as should be as well corrupted as they were generated, and this so also, as that their very personalties should be utterly abolished and annihilated; all the Stoical gods in the conflagration being as it were melted and confounded into one.

Wherefore during the intervals of the successive conflagrations, the Stoicks all agreed, that there is no more than one God (Zeus or Jupiter) left alone, (there being then indeed nothing else besides himself) who afterwards produceth the whole mundane system, together with all the gods, out of himself again. Chryseippus in Plutarch affirmeth, τοῦ μὲν αἵρεσιν τοῦ Δία ηον καΘημ, τὶ δὲ ζωὴ τῶν Ποιον, ὅπως ἦν ἐκτίμασις γένεια, μόνος Ἐρθατος ὦλα τοῦ Δία τῶν Σεω, αὐξημένη ἐκ τῆς προοιμίας, ἐπὶ ὁμα γεγονέως, ἐπὶ μιᾶς τῆς τοῦ αἰῶνος διακελεύς ἀμφοτέρως. That as Jupiter and the world may be resembled to a man, so may providence be to the soul: when therefore there shall be a conflagration, Jupiter of all the gods being alone incorruptible and then remaining, will retire and withdraw himself into providence; and so both together remain in that same ethereal su/iurance. Where notwithstanding Jupiter
piter and providence are really but one and the same thing. And Seneca wrote thus concerning the life of a wise man in solitude, *Quaeis futura
erit vita fapientis, si fine amicis relinquatur, in custodiam conceledus, aut in
defension littus ejtctus? Quaeis eft Jovis, cum rejoluto mundo, & DIS IN
UNUM CONFUSIS, paulisper cellane natura, acuifcit fibi, cogitationibus suis
traditus? If you ask, what would be the life of a wise man either in a prison,
or desert? I answer, the same with that of Jupiter, when the world being re-
solved, and the GODS all CONFOUNDED into ONE, and the course of na-
ture ceasing, he reflecteth in himself, conversing with his own cogitations. Arri-
ianus his Epiftetus likewise, ipeaking of the same thing, ironically intro-
duces Jupiter, bemoaning himself in the conflagration as now left quite
alone, after this manner; T&l<;x &yod, ÆteTheo &xyo, Æte the 'A7r77p7v, Æte the
'ApOLLONIA, Æte Æl98 Æxalidov, Æyov, Æpapev. Alas, I am now left all alone; I
have neither Juno, nor Minerva, nor Apollo with me; neither brother nor
fon, nor nephew, nor kinfman (neither God nor goddes) to keep me company.
He adding also, according to the fene of the Stoicks, that in all these suc-
cessive conflagrations, ÆZov a&tao oayto s6ves, Æp Ypoxaei idg ovto, Æp inove
the diouupiv ovto, Æia is, kai Æv epiplariv y6vetai prapatnaia ovto, Jupiter being left
alone, converseth only with himself, and reflecteth in himself, considering his own
government, and being entertained with thoughts becoming himself. And thus
have we made it unquestionably evident, that the Stoicks acknowledged
only one independent and felf-existent Deity, one universal Numen, which
was not only the creator of all the other gods, but also, in certain alternate
vicissitudes of time, the decreator of them; he then swallowing them up,
and devouiring them all into himself, as he had before produced them toge-
ther with the world out of himself.

It is granted, that these Stoicks as well as the other Pagans did religi-
one worship more gods than one, that is, more understanding beings im-
perior to men. For it was Epiftetus* his own exhortation, loox StoO, pray
to the gods. And the fame philofopher f thus describeth the disposition of a
perfon rightly affected, l4<;v oiy&<; 11 miw os<;ov p&dov tov Ævov, I would willingly
know, what is my duty, firft to the gods, and then to my parents, and other rela-
tions. And they are M. Antoninus his precepts3, 'A<;9<; STeO, reverence the
gods, and 4 in 2p&<; SToO; epikaloO, In every thing implore the aid and affiace
of the gods. And accordingly in that close of his first book 1, himself does
thankfully acribe many particular benefits to the gods in common; 7a&
tov tov Ævov to v7wvov v&<;<;ov, &c. I owe to the gods, that I had good progeni-
tors and parents, &c. Where, amongft the reft, he reckons up this for one,
that he never was any great proficient, either in poetry or rhetoric; be-
cause these would probably (had he succeeded in his pursuit of them) have
hindred him from the attainment of far better things. And after all his enu-
meration, he concludeth thus, v7aWv yap t7vta Ævov v7O<;vov xai t&<;7<;v aeiOa,
For all these things need the affiace of the gods and fortune, viz. because
they are not in our own power.

Neither

* Apud Arriar. Lib. I. Dissert. I. p. 84.
Neither can it be denied, but that they did often derogate from the honour of the supreme God, by attributing such things to the gods in common, (as the donors of them,) which plainly belong to the supreme God only. As when Epictetus makes reason in men to be a gift of the gods; L. 3, c. 24. ἢ μὲν οὖν λόγος ἐπὶ ζαυχάρια κακοθεμίας διδάσκει ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ; Is reason therefore given us by the gods merely to make us miserable and unhappy? And when he again imputes virtue to them; Haft thou overcome thy luft, thine intemperance, thine anger? τοῖς μείζονις αἰτίαις θεσεῖς, η ἡ πρατεία ἡ ὑπάρχει L. 4, c. 3. Χά, ταῦτα ἐκ ζαυχάρας γίνεται, καθάπω τοῦ Θεοῦ. How much greater cause then hast thou of offering sacrifice, than if thou hast got a consulship or presidship? for these things come only from thyself, and from the gods. Though the reason of these speeches of theirs seems to have been no other than this, because they took it for granted, that those understanding beings, superior to men, called by them gods, were all of them the instruments and ministers of the supreme God in the government of the world; and had therefore some kind of stroke or influence, more or less, upon all the concerns of mankind. Whence it came to pass also, that they often used those words God and gods promiscuously and indifferently: as one and the same celebrated speech of Socrates is sometimes expressed singularly, εἰ ταύτη τῇ Ἱερῷ θυσίᾳ, if God will have it so, let it be so, (Arr. Epist. l. 1, c. 29. and l. 4, c. 4.) and sometimes again plurally, εἰ τοῖς θεοῖς τοις θεοῖς, if the gods will have it so.

Wherefore, notwithstanding the many gods of those Stoicks, they worshipped for all that one supreme, that is, one universal Nomen, that contains and comprehends the whole world, who was variously described by them, sometimes as the nature and reason of the whole world; ὁ τῶν άντων. L. 9. θεῖως φύσις προεστῶτα θεῶν, the nature of the whole, the oldest of all the gods; [§. 1, pag. and η τὰ ἄλω φύσεις, that nature which governs all things; ο τῶν άντων. L. 262.] τῶν θεῶν ἐναποιδιαί τῶν λόγων, that reason which governs the substance of all; ὁ δὲ τῆς φύσεως ἐναποιδιαί λόγος, that reason which governs the substance of the universe, and through all eternity, orders and dispenses all according to his pointed periods. Sometimes is he called ο τῶν θεῶν αἰτία, the cause of all things; sometimes τὸ θεῦμα φυσικό, the begemnentick and ruling principle of the Anton l. 9. whole world, and το θεῦμα το πάντα, the prince of the world. Again, ο θεῖως φύσις, the governor of the whole, as in this of Epictetus; ο καλὸς θεῖσος, L. 1. 7. §. ο καλὸς τὸ θεῖως, the god of the whole, in this other religious passeage of the name philosophers, ο θεῖως, p. 336. ο αριστοτέλει, το θεῖως, p. 326. ο τοίς πόλεοις, a good man submits his mind to the governor of the whole l. 1. c. 12. universe, as good citizens do theirs to the law of the city. Also ο διατάσσως, ο τοις πόλεωις τοις πόλεωις ἔτεις θεῖας, to give order to all; in this other religious passeage of the name philosophers, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολιτείας, το πολι-
The Stoicks honoured.  

**Book I.**

L. 8 §. 45. of M. Antoninus, μὴ μὸνον συμπεντὴχοί τοὺς περὶ ἐχομένων αἵτινες, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφορευόμενοι τῷ πε-  

Anton. p. 123. 

[Sci. 54. τοῖς περὶ ἐστιν, that, as our bodies breathe the common air, so should our souls suck and draw into vital breath from that great mind, that comprehends the universe, becoming as it were one spirit with the name. He is 

Ant. p. 257. 

[Lib. V § 32. also called by them ὁ τῷ ἀλώ νός καὶ διάλογος, the mind and understanding of the 

whole world, μία πάντων πάντων, one intellectual fountain of all things, 

Anton. l. 7. 

§ 7. 

[Sci. 9. p. other Pagans, αἰτίας, or God, emphatically and in way of eminency, as 

in this of Epictetus, μετὰ τὸν Θεόν Θεῖον, καὶ τοῦ καλύπτε 

will nothing but what God wills, and then who can be able to hinder thee? 

L. 2. c. 38. 

[Pag. 225.] 

...whence the government of the whole world is called by them Διὸς διόνυσις, 

the government or economy of Jupiter. Lastly, this supreme God is sometimes distinguished by them from the other gods, expressly and by name; 

as in this of Epictetus, ἐρω τῷ ὁμοίῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίῳ Θεῷ, ὁ Θεός ἡ τῶν 

μετὰ 'ικανος, I have, whom I ought to be subject to, whom to obey, God and 

those, who are next after him; that is, the supreme and inferior gods. So 

likewise, where he exhorteth not to desire things out of our own power, 

...καὶ τῶν Διὸ ἐχθρών αὐτὰ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Θεῶν, ἐκείνου παρὰ θέου, ἐκείνου καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, 

Let Jupiter alone with these things, and the other gods, deliver them up to 

be ordered and governed by them. And so again, where he personates-one, 

that places his happiness in those things without him, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τῶν 

καὶ τῶν Θεῶν καὶ Θεῶν, τῶν Διῶ τῶν Θεῶν ἄλλως, I then shall fit lamenting, and speaking 

evil of every one, even Jupiter himself and the other gods. 

And it must in reason be supposéd, that this Jupiter, or universal Numen 

of the world, was honoured by these Stoicks far above all their other particular 

gods; he being acknowledged by them to have been the maker or 

creator of them as well as the whole world, and the only eternal and 

immortal God: all those other gods, as hath been already declared, being as 

well corruptible, mortal, and annihilable, as they were generated or cre- 

Dr. N. D. 1. 


ated. For though Cicero's Lucilius Balbus, where he pretends to repres- 

[Cap. XXX. 

pag. 2099. 

Tom. IX. 

Oper.] 

the doctrine of the Stoicks, attribute the very first original of the world to 

a plurality of gods, in these words, Dicoigitur providentia Deorum mun- 

dum & omnes mundi partes, & initio constitutas esse, & omni tempore admi- 

nistrari; yet unquestionably Cicero forgot himself herein, and rather spoke 

the 

the language of some other Pagans, who, together with the generation of the world, held indeed a plurality of eternal (though not independent) Deities, than of the Stoicks, who asserted one only eternal God; and supposed, in the reiterated confagurations, all the gods to be melted and confounded into one, so that Jupiter being then left alone, must needs make up the world again, as also all the other gods out of himself. And thus does Zeno in Laertius describe the Cosmogonia, τὸν θεὸν ἄντι ἀληθινὸν ὑπόθεν, ὑπὸ θεὸν κτισθένταν, Παραβάλλεται, ὑπὸ θεόν ἀρχήν, Χριστόν ἀντίς, That God as first being alone by himself, converted the fiery sub stance of the world by degrees into water, that is, into a croucher Chaos; out of which water, himself afterwards, as the spermatick reason of the world, formed the elements and whole mundane system. And Cicero himself elsewhere, in his de Legibus, attributes the first original of mankind cautiously, not to the gods in common, but to the supreme God only, hoc animal providam, &c., quem vocamus hominem, praecella quadam conditione generatum esse, à SUMMO DEO: and this, rather according to the sense of the Stoicks, than of the Platonists, whose inferior generated gods also (being first made) were supposed to have had a stroke in the fabrication of mankind, and other animals. Thus Epicurus plainly ascribes the making of the whole world to God, or the one supreme Deity, where he mentions the Galileans, that is, the Christian, their contempt of death, though imputing it only to custom in them, and not to right knowledge; (as M. Antoninus likewise ascribes the fame to Sapi L. 11. §. παραβάλλεται, meer obstinacy of mind) υπὸ μακακὸς μὲν δικαία τις ὑπὸ δικαίων, υπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ γαλλλικοῦ, υπὸ λόγον δὲ τὸ αἰσχροῦς ὑπὸ τὸν δικαίον, &c. υπὸ τὸν πάλαι πνευμά τινι τοῦ κόσμου, υπὸ τοῦ γαλλλικοῦ. Can some be so affected out of madness, and the Galileans out of custom? and can none attain thereunto by reason [P. 300] and true knowledge, namely, because God made all things in the world, and the whole world itself perfect and unbindernace; but the parts thereof for the use of the whole, so that the parts ought therefore to yield and give place to the whole. Thus does he again elsewhere demand, τον κόσμον τοὺς πνεύματα, κατέστη δὲ τὴν, &c. Who made the fun? Who the fruits of the earth? Who the seasons of the year? Who the agreeable fitness of things? Wherefore thou having received all from another, even thy very self, dost thou murmur and complain against the donor of them, if he take away any one thing from thee? Did he not bring thee into the world? shew thee the light? bestow sense and reason upon thee? Now the fun was the chief of the inferior Stoical gods, and therefore he being made by another, all the rest of their gods must needs be so too.

And thus is it plainly expressed in this following citation, εἴ τις τῷ δόματι τότε ὑπὸ τοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντοτε προφητεύει, υπὸ τοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ πάντοτε. If any one could be thoroughly sensible of this, that we are all made by God, and that as principal parts of the world, and that God is the father of both men and gods, he would never think meanly of himself, knowing that he is the son of Jupiter also. Where Θεός is plainly put for the supreme God, and Θεῖοi for the inferior gods only. Again, he thus attributes the making of man and government of the whole world to God, or Jupiter only. 'Ο Θεός;
And that these Stoicks did indeed religiously worship and honour the supreme God above all their other gods, may appear from fundry instances. As first, from their acknowledging him to be the sovereign legislator, and professing subjection and obedience to his laws, accounting this to be their greatest liberty. Thus Epistelus, eis  ἐμὸν ὑδίδεις ἐξοντὶς ἡλευσίσωμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀν, ἵνανκα αὐτῷ τὰς ἱστολὰς, ἢκίτι ὑδίδεις δολαγωγήσαι με δύναι. No man hath power over me, I am made free by God, (by becoming his subject) I know his commandments, and no man can bring me under bondage to himself. And again, τάκτα ἐπιτηδεύων ἗λει ἐκείνων, ἵνα ἐπῆκα δικαια γὰρ Θεῷ, μήτη παρὴκμα τοῖς ἱστολαῖς, &c. These things would I be found employing myself about, that I may be able to say to God; Have I transgressed any of thy commandments? have I used my faculties and anticipations (or common notions) otherwise than thou requiredst?

Again, from their acknowledging him to be the supreme governor of the whole world, and the orderer of all things in it by his fate and providence, and their professing to submit their wills to his will in every thing; Epistelus somewhere thus bespeaks the supreme God, μοί ἐμαμφάσαμεν τοῦ δικαίους; ἰδότας ἐν ἐξίλτασι, ἡκίσκαλλα, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ Ἰκών πένθος ἰγκομήσαμεν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἡκίσκαλλα ἁπαξιον ηκαῖα, ἢτι σὺ ἐν θεολασίᾳ, ἰδοτὸ ἂπιθυμεῖ ἀτεχνική μητὶ μετὰ ἑνίκα συγκεκαίρει εἰς; μή τ' ἐπενεπιθηνων σοι θυατερων τῷ προσώπῳ, ἐκμαέ&πτω ἐν ἐπιτάσσεις, ἢτις σαρκίσεως οὐ με Θείας ἀπελθεῖν εἰς τῆς παραγρίφεσις; ἀετίμου χάριν σοι ἱερὰ πάσα, ἢτις ἰεροτείνας με συμπαραγρίφεσις σοι, ἢτις ἱερὰ τοι, σοι, ἢτις τῆς δικαιοαποκοιμήσεις ζῶν μειωμένους ταῦτα ἐπαθώντα, ταῦτα εἰκανομηθὼν κυκλάων θῶς θανάτῳ. Did I ever complain of thy government? I was sick when thou wouldst have me to be, and so are others, but I was so willingly. I was poor also at thy appointment, but rejoicing; I never bore any magnificacy, or bad any dignity, because thou wouldst not have me, and I never defied it. Didst thou ever see me the more dejected or melancholy for this? Have I appeared before thee at any time with a discontented countenance? Was I not always prepared and ready for whatsoever thou requiredst? Wilt thou now have me to depart out of this festival solemnity? I am ready to go; and I render thee all thanks for that thou hast honoured me so far as to let me keep the feast with thee, and behold thy works, and observe thy economy of the world. Let death seize upon me no otherwise employed, than thus thinking and writing of such things. He likewise exhortsa others after this manner, τέλειον ἄναρμαι παρεῖ; τὸ Θεὸν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι χρεω μοι λατανεῖς ἡ ἑλείς, ὁμογενεῖς ζαλίς, ἤ ἡ ἑλείς ἤ ἡ ἑλείς ἤ ἡ ἕλεις εἰπεῖν παρεῖμαι, ὅπως ἑλείς ὧν, ἤ ἑλείς ἤ ἡ ἑλείς εἰπεῖν παρεῖμαι, ἤ ἑλείς ἤ ἡ ἑλείς, ἤ ἡ ἑλείς,

The same is likewise manifest from their pretensions to look to God, and refer all to him; expecting aid and assistance from him, and placing their confidence in him. Thus also Epictetus, Κύριω μην ἐχεις ταύτης επιστολὴν ἀπο. L. ii. c. 19. τίλαται ὡμᾶς ἐξερήσεις, εὐθαμοινότας, εἰς τὸν Θεὸν ἀβορωματα, εἰ ποιῆς μικρὰς κὰ'
μεγάλων. My design is this, to render you free and undisturbed, always looking at God, as well in every small, as greater matter. Again the same Stoick concludes, ὥς ἐν ἀλλοις ἐξελεύνει λόγων, Φίλων, ἐπίστολαι, &c. εἰ μὴ P. ii. c. 16. πρὸς μοῦν τὸν Θεὸν ἀποκλεισε, ἐκεῖνος μόνον προφανῶντα, τοῖς ἐκείνοις προφανομένου. A man will never be able otherwise to expel grief, fear, despair, envy, &c. than by looking to God alone, and being devoted to him, and the observance of his commandments. And he affirment of Hercules, that this great piece of piety was so long since observed by him, τῶν Δικ. αὐτῶν παθέσεως L. 3. c. 24. ἐκέλευ, χ' πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἀφέων ἐσυντάξεται & ἐπράτει, that as he called Jupiter, or P. 310. the supreme God, his father, so did be whatsoever he did, looking at him. Thus M. Antoninus speaketh of a double relation that we all have; one πρὸς τοὺς συμβηκούς, to those that live with us; and another πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν L. 8. § 23. αὐτές α' τε μιμόμεθαι πάντω πάνω, to that divine cause, from which all things. Sect. 27. p. happen to all, As likewise he affirmeth, ἡ αὐτοκλητία τοι ἐν τῇ ἀκροκοπῇ, &c. that no human thing is well done without a reference L. 3. § 11. to God. And he excellently exhorteth men, εἰς τέκνην, καὶ προσανατολεῖν, τῷ 87. αὐτὸ πράξας κοινωνία μετασκεύασθαι ἐπι πράξεις κοινωνίας αὐτοῦ συν μνήμης τῷ Θεῷ. To be L. 6. § 5. delighted and satisfied with this one thing; in doing one action after another, 172. tending to a common good, or the good of human society; together with the remembrance of God. Lastly, he declareth his own confidence in the supreme Deity in these words; Παρ' τὸ σοι, Ἰ αγνωστά, I trust and rely upon the the governor of the whole world. [Sect. 10. p. 174.]

This may be concluded also from their thanking the one supreme God for all, as the author of all good, and delightfully celebrating his praises. Epictetus declares it to be the duty of a good man, χαῖρεν ἐχειν ὑπὲρ πάνων τῷ Θεῷ, to thank God for all things. And elsewher he speaketh thus: εἰ L. 4. c. 7. τοι ἔχουσαι, ἀλλὰ τί ἐδώ ἡμᾶς ποιεῖ τι, στοιχεῖα ἔχειν τῷ Ὑιίῳ, τῇ εὑρήματι [Pag. 401.] εἰ ἐπεκμελείσθην τὰς χάριτας; ἐκ ἑαυτῷ εἰς κατατάξεις, μένειν, καταθέτεις, εἰς οἰκονομίαν, ἑαυτὸν ὑπετελεῖεν L. 1. c. 16. τοῦ ὑποκομίου τοῦ εἰς τὸν Θεόν; μέγας δὲ τοῦ Ἁλώνιον ὑπεράξην ταῦτα, ὃ τῶν τῶν ἐγγονίων μέγας τῶν Ἁλώνιον ἔδωκε, καὶ εἰς τὸν ἁγιασμὸν ταῦτα ἡμᾶς εὐθυμοῦσθαι, εἰς τὸν ἐγγονίων Ἀλώνιον νὰ δοθῇ τῷ ἢ δεδομένῳ ἂν, τῷ τοι ἐν πάντων, εἰς τοῦ ὑποκομίου μέγας τοῦ Θεοῦ, &c. εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἡμᾶς, ἀπὸ τῶν τῶν ἁγιασμὸν, εἰς τὸν κόσμον, νὰ ἔοι μονοτρόποι εἰμί, ὑπεράξην με οἷς του Θεοῦ. Had we understanding, what should we do else but both pub-
K k k
lickly
lickly and privately praise God, bless him, and return thanks to him? Ought not they, who dig, plow, and eat, continually sing such a hymn to God as this? Great is that God, who gave us these organs to cultivate the earth withal; great is that God, who gave us hands, &c. who enabled us to grow undiscernibly, to breathe in our sleep. But the greatest and divinest hymn of all is this, to praise God for the faculty of understanding all these things. What then if for the most part men be blinded, ought there not to be some one, who should perform this office, and sing a hymn to God for all? If I were a nightingale, I would perform the office of a nightingale; or a swan, that of a swan: but now being a reasonable creature, I ought to celebrate and sing aloud the praises of God, that is, of the supreme Deity.

Lastly, the fame is evident from their invoking the supreme God as such, addressing their devotions to him alone without the conjunction of any other gods; and particularly imploring his assistance against the assaults of temptations, called by them phantacies. To this purpose is that of Ἐπίδειτος, μίμας ὁ ἄγων ἠτί, Εἰκό τὸ ἐγών, ὑπὲρ βασιλείας, ὑπὸ λευκαίνης, τῷ Ζεὺς μιμασθείς, ἔθεν ἐπικαλεῖτο βοηθήσας κυπαρίστης, ὡς τὸς Διὸς κόσμος ἐν χρυσῷ οἱ πλεόνες. This is a great conflict or contention; it is for liberty and for a kingdom. Now remember the supreme God; call upon him as thy helper and assistant, as the mariners do upon Caistor and Pollux in a tempest. He recommends also this form of devotional address, or divine ejaculation, which was part of Cleanthes his litany, to be used frequently upon occasion, "Αγεῖδόμε, ὁ Ζεὺς, ὣς ὑπὸ τὴν πρεσβυείαν ὅποιον πόλιν, Εἰκό δὲ τὸν ἐνόπλους ἀνακώμων, Εἰκό δὲ τὸν ἐνόπλους ἀνακώμων. Lead me, O Jupiter, and thou Fate, whithersoever I am by you defined; and I will readily and cheerfully follow, who, though I were never so reluctant, yet must needs follow. Where Jupiter and Fate are really but one and the same supreme Deity, under two different names. And therefore the sense of this devotional ejaculation was no less

Duc me parens, celsaque dominator poli, Quaeque placuit, nulla parendi is mora, Assum impiger; fac nolle, comitabor genem, Maleusque patiar, quad pati licuit bono.

But because many are so extremely unwilling to believe, that the Pagans ever made any religious address to the supreme God as such, we shall here set down an excellent and devout hymn of the same Cleanthes to him; the rather, because it hath been but little taken notice of. And the more to gratify the reader, we shall subjoin an elegant translation thereof into Latin verse; which he must owe to the muse of my learned friend Dr. Duport.
Chap. IV. Hymn to the Supreme God.

"Ex Cæ gaudete spes, Æcum mihi mannae laecostes
Mætus, ota gavit te æcum æcieae æme æemæmæi.
Tui si cuæspectæ haetau æcum æcieae æmæmæi.
Siø æeæ æcum æcieae æmeæææmææmæmæ.

Ω æcum æmæææ æmææææmææ æmeææææmææmæmæ.

Omnipotens semper virtus, tu Jupiter auter
Nature, certæ qui singula lege guvernas!
Rex salve. Te nempe licet mortalibus agris
Cunctis compellare; omnes tua namque propago
Nos simul, aeterne quæsi imago voceæ & echo
Tantum, quotquot humi spirantes repimus; ergo
Te cantabo, tuum et robur fine fine celebrans.

Quipple tuæ hic tatus, terram qui circuit, orbis
Paret (quequo agis) imperio, æc abtemperat ultro
Invictis telem manibus tibi tale ministrum,
Anceps, ignitum, baud morturum denique fulmen.
Iste eadem illius totæ & naturae tremiscit;
Illo & communem rationem dirigis, òque

Magne pater divum, cui nomina multa, sed una
Omnipotens semper virtus, tu Jupiter auror
Nature, certa qui singula lege guvernas!
Rex salve. Te nempe licet mortalibus agris
Cunctis compellare; omnes tua namque propago
Nos simul, aeterne quæsi imago voceæ & echo
Tantum, quotquot humi spirantes repimus; ergo
Te cantabo, tuum & robur fine fine celebrans.

Illo & communem rationem dirigis, òque

Mundi
Cicero

Book I.

Mundi agitat molem, magno se corpore misceens:
Tantus tu rerum dominus, restorque supremus.
Nec sine te factum in terris, Deus, aut opus ullum,
Æterne nec dio sit, nec per curula ponti,
Errare aequa fio, nisi quæ gens impia parat.
Confusa in sepe tu dirigis ordine certo;
Alpice te ingratis & inde tua gratia rebus;
Felicie harmonia, tu silicet, omnia in unum
Sic bona mixta multis compingis, ut una resurgat
Cum torum ratio communis & utque perennans:
Quam refugit, spernitus hominum mens lavo malorum.
Heu miseri! bona qui quaerunt sibi semper & optant,
Divina tam honum banc communem & denique legem,
Nec sperare oculis, nec fando attendere curant:
Cum sit parerent poterant traducere vitam
Cum ratione & mente bonam: nunc sponte feruntur
In mala præcipites, trabis & sua quemque voluptas.
Hunc agit ambitio, ludisque immensa cupidio,
Illum & avariae, & amor vesanus babendi,
Blanda libido alium, venereque licentia dulcis:
Sic alio tendunt alii in diversa ruentes.
At tu, Jupiter alme, tonans in nubibus atris,
Da sapere, & mentem misiris mortalibus aufer
Infamam, hanc tu pelle pater; da apprendere posse
Consilium, fretus quo tu omnia rite gubernas:
Nos ut honorati pariter, tibi demus honorem,
Perpetuis tua fata hymnis praeterea canentes,
Ut fas est homini; nec enim mortalibus ullum,
Nec superis, majus poterit contingere donum,
Quam canere aeterno communem carmine legem.

XXVI. It would be endless now to cite all the testimonies of other philosophers and pagan writers of latter times, concerning one supreme and universal Numen. Wherefore we shall content ourselves only to instance in some of the most remarkable, beginning with M. Tull. Cicero; whom tho' some would suspect to have been a Sceptick as to theism, because in his de natura deorum he brings in Cotta the Academick, as well opposing L. Lucil. Balbus the Stoick, as C. Velleius the Epicurean; yet from sundry other places of his writings, it sufficiently appears, that he was a dogmatick and hearty Theist; as for example, this in his second book of Divin

of many independent Gods.

studinum persequi potest, quas fiæri putet? Who is so mad or stupid, as when he looks up to heaven, is not presently convinced, that there are gods? or can persuade himself, that those things, which are made with so much mind and wisdom, as that no human skill is able to reach and comprehend the artifice and contrivance of them, did all happen by chance? To which purpose more places will be afterwards cited. However, in his philosophick writings it is certain, that he affected to follow the way of the new academy, &c. on foot by Carneades; that is, to write sceptically, partly upon prudential accounts, and partly for other reasons intimated by himself in these words; Qui requirit quid quaue de re ipsa sentiantur, curiosius id faciant quam necesse est. Non enim tam authoritas in disputando quam rationis momenta [Cap. V. p. 2386.] quaerenda sunt. Quinetiam obstat plerunque ilis, qui discre ver volunt, autoritas eorum, qui se docere profinentur. Desinunt enim suum judicium addibere, iisque habent rationem, quod ab eo, quem probat, judicatum vident: They, who would needs know, what we ourseives think concerning every thing, are more curious than they ought, because philosophy is not so much a matter of authority as of reason: and the authority of those, who profess to teach, is oftentimes an hindrance to the learners, they neglecting by that means to use their own judgment, securely taking that for granted, which is judged by another whom they value. Nevertheless, Ciceron in the close of this discourse De natura deorum (as St. Augustine) alio observeth) plainly declares himself to be more propenfe and inclinable to the doctrine of Balbus, than either that of Velleius or Cotta; that is, though he did not affent to the Stoical doctrine or theology in every point, (himself being rather a Platonift than a Stoick) yet he did much prefer it before, not only the Epicureism of Velleius, but also the scepticism of Cotta. Wherefore Augustine Stueclus, and other learned men, quarrel with sundry passages of Cicero's upon another account, not as atheistical, but as seeming to favour a multitude of independent gods; he sometimes attributing not only the government of the world, and the making of mankind, but also the first constitution and fabric of the whole world, to gods plurally. As when he writeth thus: Ut perpetuum mundi est et ornatus, magna addibita cura est ad providentia deorum: For the perpetual adorning of the world, great care hath been taken by the providence of the gods: And at dis immortali: hominibus proviximus esse, &c. That the immortal gods have provided for the convenience of mankind, appears from the very fabric and figure of them. And that place before cited, Dico De N. D. 125. igitur providentia deorum mundum & omnes mundi partes initio constitutas esse; I say, that the world and all its parts were at first constituted by the providence of the gods. And lastly, where he states the controversy of that book De p. 195. Lamb. N. D. thus: Utrum dii nihil agant, nihil moliantur? An contra ab bis & a principio omnia facta, & constituta sint, & ad infinitum tempus regantur atque moveantur? Whether the gods do nothing at all, but are void of care and trouble? Or whether all things were at first made and constituted, and ever since are moved and governed by them? Notwithstanding which, it is evident, that this learned orator and philosopher plainly acknowledged the monarchy of the whole, or one supreme and universal Numen over all. And that first
from his so often using the word God in the singular, emphatically and by way
2 Leg. p. 335 of eminency; as Ips Deo nihil minus gratum, quam non omnibus patere a se
[Cap. X. p. 3352. Tom. IX. Oper.]
placeandum & cœlendum viam: Nothing can be less grateful to God himself, than
D.N. D. I. 2. that there should not be a liberty open to all (by reason of the costliness of fa-
[Cap. LXVI. Curius, Fabricius, &c. Curius and Fabricius had never been such men as they
P. 3548] were, had it not been for the divine affiance. Again, Comoda, quibus utinam,
Pro S. Ref. lucemque quà fruimur, spiritumque quem ducimus, à Deo nobis dari atque imper-
[Cap. XLV. tiri vidimus; We must needs acknowledge, that the benefits of this life, the light
p. 449. Tom. III. Oper.] which we enjoy, and the spirit which we breathe, are imparted to us from God.

And to mention no more, in his version of Plate's Timæus, Deos alios in
terra, alios in terra, alios in religios mundi partes spargens Deus quasi serebat;
\[\text{or} \]
-God distributing gods to all the parts of the world, did as it were few some
gods in the earth, some in the moon, &c. Moreover, by his making such de-
scriptions of God as plainly imply his oneness and singularity, as in his Oraet.
P. 356 Lamb. pro Milone. E réponse, esse profecto illa vis: neque in his corporibus, aique in bac imbe-
[Cap. XXXI. cillitate nostrâ, inquit quiddam, quod vigeat & sentiat, & non inest in bac tanto
P. 284. Tom. III. Oper.] nature tamque præclara motu. Nisi forté idcirco esse non putant, quia non ap-
paret nec certior: proinde quos nostrum ipsum mentem, qua sapimirus, qua pro-
vidimus, qua bac ipsa agimus & dicimus, videre, aut planè qualis & ubi sit,
sentire possumus. There is, there is certainly such a divine force in the world;
neither is it reasonable to think, that in these gross and frail bodies of ours
there should be something, which bath life, sense, and understanding, and yet no
such thing in the whole universe; unless men will therefore conclude, that there
is none, because they see it not: as if we could see our own mind, (so whereby
we order and dispose all things, and whereby we reason and speak thus) and perceive
what kind of thing it is, and where it is lodged. Where, as there is a strong
self-aversion of the existence of a God, so is his singularity plainly implied,
in that he supposes him to be one mind or soul acting and governing the
whole world, as our mind doth our body. Again, in his Tusculan Questions,
L. 1. p. 126. Néc vero Deus ipse alio modo intelligi potest, nisi mens soluta quædam, & libera,
[Cap. XXVII segregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia sentiens & movens: Neither can
p. 2604. God himself be understood by us otherwise, than as a certain loose and free
Tom. V. III. Mind, segregated from all mortal concretion, which both perceives and moves all
Oper.] Tusc. L. 1. things. So again in the same book, Hecigitur & alia innumerabilia cum
cernimus, possumusque dubitare, quin his praést alicuius vel effector, si bac nata
[Cap. XXIX. sunt ut Platonis videtur; vel semper fuerint, ut Aristotelis placet, moderator
p. 2606.] tantis operis & munusris? When we behold these and other wonderful works of

nature, can we at all doubt, but that there presided over them, either one maker
\[\text{or} \]
of all, if they had a beginning, as Plato conceiveth; or else, if they always were,
as Aristotele suppofeth, one moderator and governor? And in the third De Le-
gibus, Sine imperio nec domus uita, nec cœtivitas, nec genis, nec dominium universum
Genus sacer, nec rerum natura omnis, nec ipse mundus potest. Nam & hic Deo
[Cap. I. P. pareat, & buic obedienti maria terreae, & dominium oita juvus supremae legis
3389. Tom. obtinentur: Without government, neither any house, nor city, nor nation,
IX. Oper.] nor mankind in general, nor the whole nature of things, nor the whole itself could
subsist. For this also obeyeth God, and the seas and earth are subject to him,
\[\text{or} \]
-and the life of man is disposed of by the commands of the supreme law. Else-
where
where he speaks of Dominans ille nobis Deus, qui nos vetat binc injurias suae [Cap. L. V.]

demigrare; That God, who rules over all mankind, and forbids them to depart

hence without his leave. Of Deus, cujus numinis parent omnia; That God, whose
divine power all things obey. We read also in Cicero of fumus or supremus Deus,
the supreme God, to whom the first making of man is properly imputed
by him; of Summi rectoris & dominii Numin, the divine power of the su-
preme Lord and governor; of Deus proptorn, and rerum omnium proptornens
Jupiter, The most powerful God, and Jupiter, who hath power over all things;
of Princeps ille Deus, qui omnes binc mundum regit, fict animus humanus id
corpus cui praepotitus est; That chief or principal God, who governs the whole
world in the same manner as a human soul governeth that body, which it is set
over. Wherefore, as for those passages before objected, where the govern-
ment of the world, as to the concernments of mankind at large, is ascribed
by Cicero to gods plurally, this was done by him and other Pagans, upon no
other account but only this, because the supreme God was not supposed by
them to do all things himself immediately in the government of the world,
but to assign certain provinces to other inferior gods, as minister under
him; which therefore sharing in the economy of the world, were looked
upon as co-governours thereof with him. Thus when Balbus in Cicero, to
excuse some seeming defect of providence, in the prosperities of wicked
and the adversities of good men, pretended, Non animadvertere omnia Deus, ne
reges quidem; That the gods did not attend to all things, as neither do kings; Cat-
ta amongst other things replied thus, Fac divinam mentem esse discentam,
calam varitant, terram tuentem, maria moderantem, cur tam multis deos nibil
agere & ceffare potuerit? Cur non rebus humanis aliquos otiosos deos praeferit,
quia à te, Balbe, innumerabiles explicati sunt? Should it be granted, that the di-
vine Mind (or supreme Deity) were distracted with turning round the heavens,
observing the earth, and governing the seas, yet why does he let so many other
gods to do nothing at all? Or why does he not appoint some of those idle gods
over human affairs, which, according to Balbus and the Stoicks, are innume-
rous? Again, when the immortal gods are said by Cicero to have provided
for the convenience of mankind in their first constitution, this doubtless is to
be understood according to the Platonick hypothesis, that the gods and de-
mons being first made by the supreme God, were set a work and employ'd
by him afterward in the making of man and other mortal animals. And
lastly, as to that, which hath the greatest difficulty of all in it, when the whole
world is said by Cicero to have been made by the providence of the gods,
this must needs be understood also of those eternal gods of Plato's, accord-
ing to whose likenes or image the world and man are said to have been
made; that is, of the trinity of divine hypostales, called by Amelius Plato's
three minds and three kings, and by others of the Platonists the first and
second and third God, and the to πρωτον ατιναι, and io δεύτερον ατιναι, &c. the
first and second cause, &c. And it may be here observed, what we learn from
S. Cyril, that some Pagans endeavoured to justify this language and doctrine
of theirs, even from the Mosaic writings themselves, Σωτήρ τοις υπολοχοίς Contra Jul.
τῶν τούτων οὐκ ἔχειν, ὡς καθ' οὗτοι ομοιόμενοι, οὕτως καθ' ομοιωσόν, they l. 1.
suspecting.

suspecting, that the God of the universe being about to make man, did there before the other gods, (τοίς μεθ' αυτῷ διηθέντος) in manus suam, which were secondary and inferior to him) after this manner, Let us make man according to our own image and likeness. Which S. Cyril, and other Christian writers understand of the trinity. Now those eternal gods of Plato, according to whose image the world and man is said by him to have been made, and which, (though one of them were properly called the Demiurgus) yet had all an influence and cauability upon the making of it, were (as hath been already observed) not so many independent and self-originated deities, but all derived from one first principle. And therefore Cicero following Plato in this is not to be suspected upon that account, to have been an assertor of many independent gods, or partial creators of the world; especially since in so many other places of his writings, he plainly owns a divine monarchy.

We pass from M. Tullius Cicero to M. Terentius Varro his equal, a man famous for polymathy or multifarious knowledge, and reputed unquestionably (though not the most eloquent, yet) the most learned of all the Romans, at least as to antiquity. He wrote one and forty books concerning the antiquities of human and divine things; wherein he transcended the Roman Pontifices themselves, and discovered their ignorance as to many points of their religion. In which books he distinguished three kinds of theology, the first mythical or fabulous, the second physical or natural, and the last civil or popular: the first being most accommodative to the theatre or page; the second to the world, or the wiser men in it; the third to cities or the generality of the civilized vulgar. Which was agreeable also to the doctrine of Scævola, that learned Pontifex, concerning three sorts of gods, poetical, philosophical, and political. As for the mythical and poetical theology, it was cenfured after this manner by Varro; In ea sunt multa contra dignitatem & naturam immortalium fœta. In hoc enim est, ut Deus alius ex capite, alius ex femore fit, alius ex guttis sanguinis natus. In hoc ut Dii furati sunt, ut adulteraverint, ut ferierint homini. Denique, in hoc omnà Diis attribuuntur, quae non modo in hominem, sed etiam in contemptissimum hominem cadere posseint. That, according to the literal sense, it contained many things contrary to the dignity and nature of immortal beings; the genealogy of one god being derived from the head, of another from the thigh, of another from drops of blood: some being represented as thieves, others as adulterers, &c. and all things attributed to the gods therein, that are not only incident to men, but even to the most contemptible and flagitious of them. And as for the second, the natural theology, which is the true, this Varro conceived to be above the capacity of vulgar citizens; and that therefore it was expedient, there should be another theology calculated, more accommodative for them, and of a middle kind betwixt the natural and the fabulous, which is that which is called civil. For he affirm, & Mulia esse vera, quae vulgo feire non fit uile, & quaedam, quæ tamó falsa sint, aliter existimare populum expediát; That there were many things true in religion, which it was not convenient for the vulgar to know; and again, some things, which, though false, yet it was expedient they should be believed by them. As Scævola, the Roman Pontifex, in like manner, would not have the vulgar to know, that
that the true God had neither sex, nor age, nor bodily members. *Expedire igitur exstitimat* (faith St. Afsfin of him) fall in religious civitates, quod di- cere etiam in libris rerum divinarum iis Varro non dubitat. *Scaevola therefore judged it expedient, that cities should be deceived in their religion; which also Varro himself doubts not to affirm in his books of divine things. Where- fore this Varro, though disapproving the fabulous theology, yet out of a pious design, as he conceived, did he endeavour to assert, as much as he could, the civil theology, then received amongst the Romans, and to vindic- ate the fame from contempt: yet nevertheless so, as that, *Si eam civitatem nocam constitucet, ex naturae potius formâ, deos & deorum nomina se suisse dedicaturum, non dubitet confiteri: If be were to constitute a new Rome him- self, he doubts not to confess, but that he would dedicate gods and the names of gods after another manner, more agreeably to the form of nature or natural theology.* Now what Varro's own sense was concerning God, he freely de- clared in those books of Divine Things; namely, that he was the great soul and mind of the whole world. *Thus St. Afsfin, Hi soli Varroni viden- tur animadvertisse quid effet Deus, qui crediderunt eum esse animam, motu ac ratione mundum gubernantem: Those alone seem to Varro to have understood what God is, who believed him to be a soul, governing the whole world by motion and reason. So that Varro plainly asserted one supreme and universal Numen, he erring only in this (as St. Afsfin conceives) that he called him a soul, and not the creator of soul, or a pure and abstracit mind. But as Varro acknowledged one universal Numen, the whole animated world, or rather the soul thereof, which also he affirmed to be called by several names, as in the earth, Tellus; in the sea, Neptune, and the like: so did he also admit (together with the rest of the pagans) other particular gods, which were to him nothing but parts of the world animated with souls superior to men: *A summo circuitu toti, usque ad circulum lunae, altheraeas animas esse astra ac stellas, eosque ccelites deos, non modo intelligi esse, sed etiam videri: inter lune vero gyrum & nimborum cacumina aeræas esse animas, sed eas animo non audis videri; & vocari heros, & lates, & genios: That from the biggest circuit of the heavens to the sphere of the moon there are ethereal souls or animals, the stars, which are not only understood, but also seen to be celestial gods; and between the sphere of the moon and the middle region of the air, there are aerial souls or animals, which though not seen by our eyes, yet are discovered by our mind, and called heroes, lates, and genii. So that, ac- cording to Varro, the only true natural gods were, as himself also deter- mined, *anima mundi, ac partes ejus; first, the great soul and mind of the whole world, which comprehended all; and secondly, the parts of the world animated superior to men. Which gods also he affirmed to be wor- shipped cœlius, more purely and chastly, without images, as they were by the first Romans for one hundred and seventy years: he concluding; *Qui primi simulacra deorum populii popuerunt, eos civitatis suis & metum dem- jites & errorem addidisse; prudenter exstitimans (faith St. Afsfin) deos facile pode in simulacrorum soliditate contenti: That those nations, who first set up images of the gods, did both take away fear from their cities, and add error*
L. Anneus Seneca, the philosopher, was contemporary with our Saviour Christ and his Apostles, who, though frequently acknowledging a plurality of gods, did nevertheless plainly assert one supreme, he not only speaking of him singularly, and by way of eminency, but also plainly describing him as such; as when he calls him Formatorum universi; restaurum & arbitrium & custodem mundi; ex quo suspensa sunt omnia; animum ac spiritum universi; mundani huys operis dominum & arsificem; cui nomen omne convertit; ex quo nata sunt omnia; cuius spiritu vivimus; totum suis partibus inditur, & se susffinentem sua vi; cuius consiflio hic mundo providetur, ut incoecufius cat, & aetas suas explicet, cujus decreto omnia fiant; divinationem spiritum & fumma maxima & minima equali intentione diffinim; Deum potentem omnium; Deum illum maximum potentissimumque, qui ipfe veftit omnia; qui ubique & omnibus profìo eft; cali & deorum omnium Deum; ac quo fita numina, qui singularia adoramus & colimus, suspensa sunt: and the like. The framers and former of the universe, the governor, dispencer and keeper thereof: him, upon whom all things depend; the mind and spirit of the world; the artificer and lord of this whole mundane fabric; to whom every name belongeth; from whom all things spring; by whose spirit we live; who is in all his parts, and sustains him by his own force; by whose counsel the world is provided for, and carried on in its course constantly and uninterruptedly; by whose decree all things are done; the divine spirit, that is diffused through all things both great and small with equal intention: the God, whose power extends to all things; the greatest and most powerful God, who doth himself support and uphold all things; who is present every where to all things; the God of heaven, and of all the gods, upon whom are suspended all those other divine powers, which we singly worship and adore. Moreover, we may here observe from St. Austin, that this Seneca in a book of his against superfluities (that is now lost) did not only highly extol the natural theology, but also plainly confine and condemn the civil theology then received amongst the Romans, and that with more freedom and vehemency than Varro had done the fabulous or theatrical and poetical theology. Concerning a great part whereof he pronounced, that a wise man would observe such things, tangam legibus suas, non tanguam diis grata; only as commanded by the laws (he therein exercising civil obedience) but not at all as grateful to the gods.

M. Fabius Quintilianus, though no admirer of Seneca, yet fully agreed with him in the same natural theology, and sets down this, as the generally received notion or definition of God, Deus esse spiritum omnibus partibus immittum. That God is a spirit mingled with and diffused through all the parts of the world; he from thence inferring Epicurus to be an Atheist, notwithstanding that he verbally affected gods, because he denied a God according to this generally received notion, he bestowing upon his gods a circumscribed human form, and placing them between the worlds. And the junior Pliny, though he were a persecutor of the Christians, he concluding, qualecumque
quae cumque esset quod sit faterentur, pericvaciam certe & inflexilum obstationem debere juris: that whatsoever their religion were, yet notwithstanding their stubbornness and inflexible obstinacy ought to be punished; and who compelled many of them to worship the images of the emperor, and to sacrifice and pray to the statues of the Pagan gods, and lastly to blaspheme Christ; yet himself plainly acknowledged also one supreme universal Numen, as may sufficiently appear from his penegyrick oration to Trajan, where he is called Deus ille, qui manifextus ac praefens colun ac sydera infides; that God, who is present with, and inhabits the whole heaven and stars*: himself making a solemn prayer and supplication to him, both in the beginning and close thereof, and sometimes speaking of him therein singularly and in a way of eminency; as in these words, Occultat utrorumque femina Deus, et plerumque bonorum malorumque causa sub diversa specie latent: God biddeth the seeds of good and evil, so that the causes of each often appear disguifed to men. L. Apuleius also, whose pretended miracles the Pagan endeavoured to confirm their religion by, as well as they did by those of Apollonius, doth in fundry places of his writings plainly affert one supreme and universal Numen: we shall only here fet down one: Curn fummus deorum cuncta hac De Philof. non solam cogitationum ratione confideret; sed prima, media, & ultima oreat; compertaque intima providentiae ordinations universitate & confiantia regat: Since the biggest of the gods does not only confider all these things in his mind and cogitation, but also pass through and comprehend within himself the beginning, middle, and end of all things, and constantly govern all by his occult providence. Lastly Symmachus, who was a zealous stickler for the reftitution of paganism, declared the Pagans to worship one and the fame God with the Chriftians, but in feveral ways; he conceiving, that there was no neceffity God fhould be worfhipped by all after the fame manner. Aquum est, quicquid omnes colunt, UNUM putari: eadem spectamus offra; commune colunt est; idem nos mundus involvit; quid interef, qua quisque prudentia verum requirit? Uno itinere non poteft perveniri ad tam grande secretum. We ought in reason to think, that it is one and the fame thing, which all men worfhip; as we all behold the fame fars, have the fame common heaven, and are involved within the fame world. Why may not men purfue one and the fame thing in different ways? One path is not enough to lead men to fo grand a secret. The scene whereof is thus elegantly expressed by Prudentius:

Uno omnes sub sole fiti, vegetamur eadem
Aere, communis cumulis viventiibus aura.
Sed quid sit qualiffe Deus, diversa fecut
Querimus; atque viis longe diftantibus unum
Imus ad occultum; fuus eft nos cuique genti,
Per quod iter properans eft ad tam grande profundum.

And again afterward,

Secretum fed grande nequit rationis operta

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P. 285.
[Contra Symmachum Lib. II. verf. 85]

P. 308.
[Verf. 847]

And the beginning of Prudentius his confutation is this,

1 Longè aliud verum est. Nam multa ambago viarum
Anfraëus dubios habet, & perplexius errat.
Sola errore caret simplex via, necia fieri
In diverticum, bis vis nec pluribus aetere, &c.

We shall now instance also in some of the latter Greek writers. Though the author of the book De Mundo were not Aristotle, yet that he was a Pagan, plainly appears from some passages thereof; as where he approves of sacrificing to the gods, and of worshipping heroes and dead men; as also because Apuleius would not otherwise have translated so much of that book, and incorporated it into his De Mundo. He therefore does not only commend this of Heraclitus, in πάντων ὦ, ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ πάση, That there is one harmonious system made out of all things, and that all things are derived from one; but doth himself also write excellently, concerning the supreme God, whom he calleth τὸ τῶν ὅλων συνεκκλησίαν αἰτία, the cause, which containeth all things, and which begins after this manner; ἀρχὴν μὲν ὁ τις λέγεται πάντοτε ἄνωθεν ἀναβάτως, τις ἐν θεοῦ τὰ πάντα, ὡς οὗ τῇ ἄριστην οὐσίαν τῆς Φοίνικος, αὐτὴ ἐκ τοῦ συνεκκλησίαν αἰτίαν ἐγκυμονεῖ τῆς ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις. It is an ancient opinion or tradition, that hath been conveyed down to all men from their progenitors, that all things are from God, and consift by him; and that no nature is sufficient to preserve itself, if left alone, and devoid of the divine assistance and influence. Where we may observe, that the Apuleian Latin version, altering the sense, renders the words thus; Vetus opinio est, atque in cogitatione omnium bonum penitus incidunt, Deum esse: originis non habere anfcorem; Deumque esse salutem & perseverantium earam, quas efferent, rerum. So that whereas, in the original Greek, this is said to be the general opinion of all mankind, That all things are from God, and subsist by him, and that nothing at all can conferve itself in being without him; Apuleius, correcting the words, makes the general sense of mankind to run no higher than this; That there is a God, who hath no author of his original, and who is the safety and preservation of all those things, that were made by himself. From whence it may be probably concluded, that Apuleius, who is said to have been of Plutarch's progeny, was infected also with those paradoxical opinions of Plutarch's, and consequently did suppose all things not to have been made by God, nor to have depended on him (as the writer De Mundo affirmeth) but that there was something besides God, as namely the matter and an evil principle, uncreated and self-existent. Afterwards the same writer De Mundo elegantly illustrates, by similitudes, how God by one simple motion and energy of his own, without any labour or toil, doth produce and govern all the variety of motions in the universe; and how he doth.
Chap. IV. and Plutarch; their Testimonies.

doth συνάψιν τῷ τῶν ἀλών ἁρμονίαν τῷ συνθείαιν, contain the harmony and safety of the whole. And lastly he concludes, εἰπή οὐ κεφαλήτης, ἐν ἄλλω δι[P. 864]πέρ ῥεῖ. πίνεις, in χρόνον παρέχεσθαι, in τόλμα νέος, in στρατευτικόν ἁγιάζων, τούτο τοιούτος εἰ κάτω. That what a pilot is to a ship, a charioteer to a chariot, the Coryphæus to a choir, law to a city, and a general to an army; the same is God to the world. There being only this difference, that whereas the government of some of them is toilsome and solicitous, the divine government and converserage of the world is most easy and facil; for as this writer adds, God being himself immoveable, moveth all things; in the same manner as law, in itself immoveable, by moving the minds of the citizens, orders and disposes all things.

Plutarchus Chersonensis (as hath been already declared) was unluckily engaged in two false opinions, the first of matter’s being ingenit or uncreated, upon this pretence, because nothing could be made out of nothing; the second of a positive substantial evil principle, or an irrational soul and daemon self-existent, upon this ground, because it is believed of God, and of all the things in the world, that he is the supreme creator of all things, who is therefore often called by him, God, in way of eminency, as when he affirmeth εἰς χρηματεῖα τὸν θεόν, that God doth always all the geometricks; that is, do all things in measure and proportion: and again, ἀθανάτας ἀμφιμενίας, that all things are made by God, according to harmony; and that τὸ τῆς ἀθανάτου καλλιτέχνες, God is called a harmonist and musician: And he hath these epithets given him, ὁ μεγαλεύθερος, the Great God; and ὁ θεὸς ἀληθῶς θεός, the highest or uppermost God, and ὁ πρῶτος θεὸς, the first God, and ὁ γνώσις ἐστι, the unmade self-existent God; all the other Pagan gods, according to him, having been made in time, together with the world. He is likewise styled by Plutarch, χωρίῳ τῶν τε, of the sea of copulence: and his standing and permanent duration, without any flux of time, is excellently described by the same writer, in his book concerning the Delphick inscription. Lastly, Plutarch affirmeth, that men generally pray to this supreme God for whatsoever is not in their own power, ἵνα μὴ πάσει ἦσθι, παρεῖναι τfoundland.

Dio Chrysostomus, a sophist, Plutarch’s equal, though an acknowledger of many gods, yet nevertheless attesteth, βασιλεύοντα θεὸν, that the whole world is under a kingly power or monarchy, he calling the supreme God, [Ed. Morell.] sometime, τὸν κατὰ ὀλίγον αὑτόν βασιλεύοντα, τὸν ἀληθεύοντα τῷ ἀληθεύοντα, P. 210. the

1. De Fato, p. 572. Tom II. Oper.
3. Vide euand. de Música, p. 1147. Tom. II.
the common king of gods and men, their governor and father, τοῦ πάσης κρατοῦσας
Σιών, the God that rules over all, τοῦ παπίτος καὶ μέγιστος θεόν, the first and greatest
God, τοῦ καταφυγόντος παπίτωτά τον ὄλων, τοῦ καταφυγόντος παπίτωτά τον ὄλων, ήμεθεν, &c.
The chief president over all things, who orders and guides the whole heaven and
world, as a wise pilot doth a ship, τοῦ τοῦ ζωματικοῦ Τεχνόματος ζωματικοὶ εἰκονέως, ή τις ἄλις
διετῶν υίοις, the ruler of the whole heaven, and lord of the whole essence;
and the like. And he affirming that there is a natural prolepsis in the
minds of men concerning him, περί τῆς τινὸς τῶν καθόλου τιθέμενος, ην μάλιστα
τοῦ παπίτος ζωματικοῦ, παπίτοι μέν καὶ ἐν πρώτοις θέασαν καὶ ἐκτίμαν καὶ τιθέμεν τοῦ ζωματικοῦ
αυτοῦ γένεις ζωματικοῖς μὲν Ἑλληναῖς, εἰμάρισεν καὶ οἰμάρισεν ἐν
παῖς τοῦ λόγου γεγονότα κατὰ Θεόν, ἀκινητὰ δεδοκαλαὶ καὶ ματαιομένης;
Concerning the nature of the gods in general, but especially of that supreme ruler
over all, there is an opinion in all human kind, as well Barbarians as Greeks,
that is naturally implanted in them as rational beings, and not derived from
any mortal teacher. The meaning whereof is this, that men are naturally
possessed with a persuasion, that there is one God, the supreme governor of
the whole world, and that there are also below him, but above men,
many other intellectual beings, which these Pagans called gods.

That Galen was no Atheist, and what his religion was, may plainly appear
from this one passage out of his third book De Ufu Partium, to omit many
others; Ἀλλ' ἀλλ' γὰρ ἢς εἴπη ποιόντος μεταμορφομένος ψευδομάτων, οἱ σωφρονιστὲς
ἀρθικὸν χρώματι, καὶ μιαίοντες φανταμίας άρχον, ὁ ἵµα τοῦ φύσιςτάκιος άρχον
όμνον ἀληθῶς προδώτα, καὶ νομίζου τὸν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐνδυσίους εἰκόνις τοὺς οἰκο-
τοµέας αὐτὸς παρόλους κατασκευαζόμενος, ή τὰ άλλα μορία μίσα Θυατείαις καὶ κατατα-
άλλ' εἰ δύναι μὲν αὐτούς προδώτως, εἴπεται δὲ τοῖς άλλοις ἠθεοτάταις, οἷος μὲν ἦν τὴν
σοφίαν, οἷος δὲ τὴν ὑπάκουαν, ὅποιας ἐν τῇ ζευγαίας τὸν γὰρ ἀριθμὸν κομμένον ἀπαίσια
τὸν ἐνδυσίους κόσμον καὶ μεθύου Φθείρων τῶν ἀρχών, τὸν τελεστὴν χρηστότητος ἐν
δυνάμει τίμημα, τόντα μὲν ὡς ἀγαθοὺς ἤμιν ὑμειαῖν τὸ θ' ὡς αὐτὰ κοσμεῖνιν,
παῖς ἐκείνων, ἄριστα σοφίας τοῦ δὲ ὁδοιποιόν περὶ πόλεις, οἰκολόγων αἰσθήσεως.
Should I any longer insinuate upon such brutish persons as these, the wise and sober
mind justly condemn me, as deifying this holy oration, which I compose as a
true hymn to the praise of him that made us; I conceiving true pietie and reli-
gion towards God to consist in this, not that I should sacrifice many beatoms,
or burn much incense to him, but that I should myself first acknowledge, and
then declare to others, how great his wisdom is, how great his acknowledge, and
how great his goodness. For that he would adorn the whole world after this
manner, enquiring to nothing that good, which it was capable of, I conclude to be
a demonstration of most absolute goodness, and thus let him be praised by us as
good. And that he was able to find out, how all things might be adorned after
the best manner, is a sign of the greatest wisdom in him. And lastly, to be able
to effect and bring to pass all these things, which he had thus decreed, argues an
inseparable power.

Maximus Tyrius, in the close of his first dissertation, gives us this short
representation of his own Theology; Ἐκείνυς δὲ συνεξεῖ θέλομεν ζωματικῆς ἡμερῶν τοῖς ἡμέρας
συνεχείας, ἦμα προτείου ἄρχων; Ἐντός ἄρχων ἰέρων καὶ βασιλεῶν ἄρχον ἡμερῶν προτεῖνον ἐκείνυς ἡμέρας
συνεχείας, ἦμερας αἰώνοις.
Chap. IV. Maximus Tyrius, Aristides,

Aristides, the famous Adrianian sophist and orator, in his first oration or hymn vowed to Jupiter, after he had escaped a great tempest, is so full to the purpose, that nothing can be more: he, after his proem, beginning thus: Zeus the all-power, he who is king, he who is the great, he who is the first, he who is mighty, he who is the ready. And when the gods uplifted the ocean, and all the gods and those gods, whole and many, the father of gods and men, the son and friends of God.

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by sense or by the mind. But Jupiter first of all made himself; for he was not educated in the flowery and odoriferous caves of Crete, neither was Saturn ever about to devour him, nor instead of him did he swallow down a stone. For Jupiter was never in danger, nor will he be ever in danger of any thing. Neither is there any thing older than Jupiter, no more than there are sons older than their parents, or works than their opificers. But he is the first and the oldest, and the prince of all things, being made from himself; nor can it be declared when he was made, for he was from the beginning, and ever will be his own father, and greater than than to have been begotten from one another. As he produced Minerva from his brain, and needed no wedlock in order thereunto, so before this did he produce himself from himself, needing not the help of any other thing for his being. But on the contrary, all things began to be from him, and no man can tell the time; since there was not then any time when there was nothing else besides, and no work can be older than the maker of it. Thus was Jupiter the beginning of all things, and all things were from Jupiter, who is better than time, which had its beginning together with the world.

And again, ως ἤ ζήν ἦντο φίλα ἀπερροή τὸς Διός τὰ πᾶντα πάλαι δόμων ἐκαστι ἔχει, καὶ ἀπερροή κατὰ τὴν ὅρμην εἰςεξόντα, ἀποὰ ἐς αὐτὸ ἀνικητὴς, καὶ πάλαι ἐς αὐτὸ ἀναπτήν ἥρα τὸ ἀναπτήν τοῦ τοῦ κυρίων ἡμῶν τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ, ὡς ἀναπτήν τὸ πᾶνα ἑαυτοῦ, &c. εἰς θώοις μὲ, αὐθάρατο ἐπι- μελήτας, ἀνεξάρτητος ἢ νόμον ἀναπτήν τῇ ἡμῶν ἀναπτήν, &c. τὰ πᾶνα ἡ παράκλησις Διός μετα, καὶ ἀπαλλάθην εἰς ἑαυτοῦ, Διός τῆς ἐγγον, &c. All the several kinds of gods are but a defluxion and derivation from Jupiter; and, according to Homer's chain, all things are connected with him and depend upon him. He, amongst the first, produced love and necessity, and the most powerful holders of things together, that they might make all things firmly to cobere. He made gods to be the curators of men, and he made men to be the worshippers and servers of those gods. All things are every where full of Jupiter, and the benefits of all the other gods is his work, and to be attributed to him, they being done in compliance with that order, which he had prescribed them.

It is certain, that all the latter philosophers after Christianity, whether Platonists or Peripateticks, though for the most part they affected the eternity of the world, yet univerally agreed in the acknowledgment of one supreme Deity, the caufe of the whole world, and of all the other gods. And as Numenius, Plotinus, Ancelius, Porphyrius, Proclus, Damaecius and others, held also a trinity of divine hypotases, so had some of those philosophers excellent speculations concerning the Deity, as particularly Plotinus; who notwithstanding that he derived matter and all things from one divine principle, yet was a contender for many gods. Thus in his book inscribed against the Gnocecks: χρή ὡς ἀπικεκ νὰ αὐτὸν περιβαλλεταίς γένεσις, μὴ μόνον ἐν αὐτῷ νομίζειν αὐτοῖς ὑπάλλας γενέσις, ὅτω γὰρ ἵνα οἶνος, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐθάρατες ἀλλακτικῆς, ἔτι καὶ διαμενος ἀρχαῖος εἰςιν πολὺ ἀπὸ μὲλλόν θεῖν, τοῖς τε ἐν τῷ τῇ διὰ καὶ βάπτισις: παῦνον δὲ μάλιστα τὸν ἡμερῶν τεῦθε τῷ παῦνο, ψυχον μακραντάτων ἑν- τεῦθεν δέ ἐν ὑπὸ τοὺς υπάλλας ὑμεὶς διεισκεῖτε, οὐ κατασταί δὲ ὑπὲρ, τοῦ μὲν τοῦ τινὶ βασιλείᾳ.
not to be contradicted into one.

Every man ought to endeavour with all his might, to become as good as may be, but yet not to think himself to be the only thing that is good, but that there are also other good men in the world, and good demons, but much more gods; who, though inhabiting this inferior world, yet look up to that superior; and most of all, the prince of this universe, that most happy soul. From whence he ought to ascend yet higher, and to praise those intelligible gods, but above all that great king and monarch; declaring his greatness and majesty by the multitude of gods, which are under him. For this is not the part of them, who know the power of god, to contradict all into one, but to shew forth all that divinity, which himself hath displayed, who remaining one, makes many depending on him; which are by him and from him. For this whole world is by him, and looks up perpetually to him, as also doth every one of the gods in it. And Themisius, the Peripatetic, (who was so far from being a Christian, that, as Petavius probably conjectures, he perfringes our Saviour Christ under the name of Empedocles, for making himself a God) doth not only affirm, that one and the same supreme God was worshipped by Pagans, and the Christians, and all nations, though in different manners; but also, that God was delighted with this variety of religions: ταυτή όρασις γένεσε τή ποιμεία των τώ παντών υπόλοιπον γένεσιν ἄλλος ὦρασις τοῖς πολιτείαις, ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδὴ ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδὴ ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐντοιχίζεται ἄλλος ἔστις ἐπειδή ἐ

We shall conclude therefore with this full testimony of St. Cyril, in his first book against Julian; ἐπεισόδιον ἐναργείας, ὅτι ἐὰν τοῖς Ἐλληνοις Φιλοσόφοις εἰσόδωσι, ἐνα μὲν ἠδοξία ὅθεν ἠδοξία συμπαθείας, τοῖς τῶν ἀλλων δημιουργοῖς, ἐνα πάλιν ἐπικίνησιν κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῖς, υπερτοὶ τοῖς τούτοις ἀθροιστεῖ. It is manifest to all, that among philosophers, who philosophize in the Greek way, it is universally acknowledged, that there is one God, the maker of the universe, and who is by nature above all things; but that there have been made by him, and produced into generation, certain other gods (as they call them) both intelligible and jennisible.

XXVII. Neither was this the opinion of philosophers and learned men only, amongst the Pagans, but even of the vulgar also. Not that we pretend to give an account of all the most fictitious vulgar amongst them, who, as they little considered their religion, so probably did they not understand that mystery of the Pagan theology (hereafter to be declared) that many of their gods were nothing but several names and notions of one supreme Deity, according to its various manifestations and effects; but because, as we conceive, this tradition of one supreme God did run cur-
Vulgar Pagans acknowledg'd

BOOK I.

Moreover, Aristotle himself hath recorded this in his Politicks; that all men affirmed the gods to be under a kingly power; or, that there is one supreme king and monarch over the gods. And Maximus Tyrius declareth, that as well the unlearned as the learned, throughout the whole Pagan world, universally agreed in this, that there was one supreme God, the father of all the other gods: Et qusegraq ηκκλησίαν των τεχνών τών, κελέτως ἄπαντας ἀθρόος δι' ἡσσήσαρικος ἑνώ αποκρισίως ἐφεί τ' θεον, οἷς ἀλλ' ἑμι μὲν ἀν τ' ἔρημοι εἰς ἴππον, ἄλλο δὲ και τ' ἄθαλον τοιούτου, καὶ τ' τοιούτου ἄλλο, καὶ τ' τοῖς θαλασσοῖς ἄλλος ἄλλες, ἄλλος ἑμί δὲ εἰς τ' Σκύθων, ὡς τ' Ἐλλάκτων, μὲν τ' Πόροις, ὥς τ' Ἡπείρους, ἀλλὰ οἷς οὖν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλως, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ εἰς τούτων ψεῦδον μεταφέρει, παλαιοὶ εἰς πάσης διαφοράμεσι, οὐ τ' ἄλλα ποιήσωμεν, οτ' τ' κακὸν ὄλον, οτ' τ' αἰχθό, οτ' τ' καλὸν νῦνος μὲν γράφομεν οὗτος οἷς καὶ εἰκόνικι, καὶ κατὰ Φιλαδίας διατίμημα καὶ σπαραστικαὶ μὲν γὰρ οὗτος καὶ δορικοὶ ποιηταὶ τούτους, ἄλλας οὕτως πολῖς πόλεις, ἄλλας οὕτως πολίοις εἰσὺς, οὐδὲ αὖρι αὖρι, οὐδὲ αὐτός αὐτοῖς ἐν τοιούτω ἐπεκλῆρος, τῇ τάσει τῇ διαφορέᾳ, οὐ οἷς οἷς ἐν παρισ τῇ ὁμοίωσιν ὑμῖν ὑπὲρ τής ὁθονος εἰς παντὶ Πάντοις Βασιλεῖ τις Πατὴρ, καὶ Ἰσίοι τοιοῦτῳ Στίχῳ, συνάχθηκτος θείω - τοίνυν ἐν 'Ελλον καὶ ἐν Βάσιλεις θείω, καὶ ἐν άκτομήκιν καὶ ἐν Σαλωτικαῖς, καὶ ὁ σοφός, καὶ ὁ σοφός. If there were a meeting called of all these several trades and professions, a painter, a statuary, a poet, and a philosopher, and all of them were required to declare their sense concerning God, do you think, that the painter would say one thing, the statuary another, the poet another, and the philosopher another? No nor the Scythian neither,
neither, nor the Greek, nor the Hyperborean. In other things we find men speaking very discordantly to one another, all men as it were differing from all. The same thing is not good to all nor evil, honest nor dishonest. For law and justice itself are different everywhere; and not only one nation doth not agree with another therein, but also not one city with another city, nor one house with another house, nor one man with another man, nor lastly any one man with himself. Nevertheless, in this so great war, contention, and discord, you may find every where throughout the whole world, one agreeing law and opinion. That THERE IS ONE GOD THE KING AND FATHER OF ALL, and many gods, the sons of God, co-reigners together with God. These things both the Greek and the Barbarian alike affirm, both the inhabitants of the continent, and of the sea-coast, both the wise and the unwise. Nothing can be more full than this testimony of Maximus Tyrius, that the generality of the Pagan world, as well vulgar and illiterate, as wise and learned, did agree in this, that there was one supreme God, the creator and governor of all. And to the same purpose was that other testimony before cited out of Dio Chrysostomus, περί δὲ Ζεὺς τῆς τε καθὼς φύσεως, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ πάντων γένους, ἡκύριοι ἔτελε τῆς Θεότητος, τῆς Εὐλογίας, τῆς Μόρφου τῆς Βασιλείας, &c. That concerning the nature of the gods in general, but especially concerning that prince of all things, there was one agreeing persuasion in the minds of all mankind, as well Barbarians as Greeks. Where Dio plainly intimates also, that there was a more universal consent of nations in the belief of one God, than of many gods.

It hath been already observed, that the several Pagan nations had vulgarly their peculiar proper names for the one supreme God. For as the Greeks called him Zeus or Zen, the Latins Jupiter or Jovis, so did the Egyptians, Africans, and Arabians, Hammon. Which Hammon therefore was called by the Greeks the Zeus of the Africans, and by the Latins their Jupiter. Whence is that in Ciceron's De natura Deorum 1, Jovis Capitolini nobis alia species, alia Afris Ammonis Jovis, the form of the Capitoline Jupiter with us Romans is different from that of Jupiter Ammon with the Africans. The name of the Scythian Jupiter also, as Herodotus tells us, was Pappus or father. The Persians likewise had their Zeus παππος, as Xenophon styles him, their country-Zeus or Jupiter (namely Mitbras or Ormofades) who in the same Xenophon is distinguished from the sun, and called in Cyrus his proclamation in the Scripture, The Lord God of heaven, who had given him all the kingdoms of the earth. Thus the Babylonian Bel is declared by Berosus (a priest of his) to have been that God, who was the maker of heaven and earth. And learned men conceive, that Baal (which is the same with Bel, and signifies Lord) was first amongst the Phenicians also a name for the supreme God, the Creator of heaven and earth, sometimes called Beel samed, The Lord of heaven. As likewise that Molech, which signifies king, was, amongst the Ammonites, the king of their gods; and that Marnas (the chief God of the Gazites, who were Philistines) and signifies the Lord of men, was that from whence the Cretians derived their Jupiter, called the Father of gods and men.

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Origen indeed contended, that it was not lawful for Christians to call the supreme God by any of those Pagan names, and probably for these reasons, because those names were then frequently bestowed upon idols, and because they were contaminated and defiled by absurd and impure fables. Nevertheless, that learned father does acknowledge the Pagans really to have meant τὸν Σιδῆρα τὸν Πάντα, the God over all, by those several names: which yet Laelanius Firmianus would by no means allow of as to the Roman Jupiter, worshipped in the Capitol, he endeavouring to confute it after this manner: Vana est persueo eorum, qui nomen Jovis summum Deo tribuunt. Solent enim quidam errores suas hac excusatione defendere; qui convivit de uno Deo, eum id negare non possint, ipsum colere persuant, verum hoc sibi placere ut Jupiter nominetur, quo quid absurdum? Jupiter enim sine contubernio conjuges filiisque, eoli non solus. Unde quid fit apparent, nec fas est hominem esse transserare, ubi nec Minerva est utra nec Juno. It is a vain persuasion of these, who would give the name of Jupiter to the supreme God. For some are wont thereby to excuse their errors, when they have been convinced of one God, so as that they could not contradict it, by saying, that themselves worshipped him, he being called by them Jupiter: then, what can be more absurd? since Jupiter is not worshipped without the partnership of his wife and daughter. From whence it plainly appears what this Jupiter is, and that the name ought not to be transferred thither, where there is neither any Minerva nor Juno. The ground of which argumentation of Laelanius was this, because the great Capitoline temple of Jupiter had three Sacella or lesser chapels in it, all contained under one roof, Jupiter's in the middle, Minerva's on the right hand, and Juno's on the left; according to that of the poet:

Irina in Tarpeio fulgent confortia templi.

Which Juno, according to the poetick theology, is said to be the wife of Jupiter, and Minerva his daughter, begotten not upon Juno, but from his own brain. Where it is plain, that there is a certain mixture of the mythial or poetical theology, together with the natural, as almost every where else there was, to make up that civil theology of the Pagans. But here (according to the more recidit and arcane doctrine of the Pagans) these three Capitoline gods, Jupiter, Minerva, and Juno, as well as some others, may be understood to have been nothing else but several names and notions of one supreme Deity, according to its several attributes and manifestations; Jupiter signifying the divine power and sovereignty, as it were created and enthroned in the heavens; Minerva, the divine wisdom and understanding; and Juno the same Deity, acting in the lower parts of the world. Unless we would rather, with Macrobius, physiologize them all three, and make Minerva to be the higher heaven, Jupiter the middle æther, and Juno the lower air and earth, all animated; that is, one God, as acting differently in these three regions of the world. Which yet seems not so congruous, because it would place Minerva above Jupiter.

Chap. IV. Trinity; or Cabiri.

Nevertheless it may justly be suspected, as G. I. Vossius ¹ hath already observed, that there was yet some higher and more sacred mystery in this Capitoline trinity, aimed at, namely, a trinity of divine hypostases. For these three Roman or Capitoline gods were said to have been first brought into Italy out of Phrygia by the Trojans, but before that into Phrygia by Dar- danus, out of the Samothracian island; and that within eight hundred years after the Noachian flood, if we may believe Eusebius. And as these were called by the Latins Dii Penates, which Macrobius thus interprets ², Dii per quos penitus spiramus, per quos abherramus corpus, per quos rationem animi possidemus, that is, the gods, by whom we live, and move, and have our being; but Varro in Arnebius ³, Dii, qui sunt intrinsecus, atque in intimis penetralibus caeli, the gods, who are in the most inward recesses of heaven: so were they called by the Samothracians Καβίριος, or Cabiri, that is, as Varro ⁴ rightly interprets the word סִּינִי דְּבִּקָר, or divi potes, the powerful and mighty gods. Which Cabiri being plainly the Hebrew כַּבִּירִים, gives just occasion to suspect, that this ancient tradition of three divine hypostases (unquestionably entertained by Orphus, Pythagoras, and Plato amongst the Greeks, and probably by the Egyptians and Persians) sprung originally from the Hebrews; the first of these divine hypostases, called Jove, being the fountain of the godhead; and the second of them, called by the Latins Minerva, (which, as Varro ⁵ interprets it, was, that wherein idea & exempla rerum, the ideas and first exemplars or patterns of things were contained) justly expressing the divine Logos; and the third Juno, called amor ac deliciam Jovis, well enough answering (as Vossius thinks) to the divine Spirit.

But LaStantius hath yet another objection against the Roman Jupiter’s p. 63. being the supreme God; Quid? quod bujus nominis proprietas non divinam vim sed humana exprimit? Juvans enim Junonemque a Juvando esse dixit Cicero interpretatur. Et Jupiter quoque Juvans pater dieitur. Quod nomen in Deum inferior convenit, quia iuvarbre honinis est, &c. Nemo Se Deum prae- catur, ut se adjacet, sed ut servet, &c. Ergo non imperitus modo, sed etiam impius est, qui nominate Jovis virtutem iuvarbre potestatis imminuit. What if we add, that the propriety of this word Jupiter does not express a divine, but only a human force? Cicero deriving both Jove and Juno alike a juvando, that is, from helping: for Juvans Pater, or a helping father, is not a good description of God; forasmuch as it properly belongeth to men to help. Neither doth any one pray to God to help him only, but to save him. Nor is a father said to help his son, whom he was the begetter of, &c. Wherefore he is not only unskillful, but impious also, who, by the name of Jove or Jupiter, diminishes the power of the supreme God. But as this of LaStantius seems otherwise weak enough; so is the foundation of it absolutely ruinous, the true etymon of Jupiter (though Cicero knew not so much) being without peradventure, not Juvans Pater, but Jovis pater. Jove the father of gods and men; which Jovis is the very Hebrew Tetragrammaton (however these Romans came by it) only altered by a Latin termination.

⁴ De Linguâ Latin. Lib. IV. p. 66.
⁵ Apud Augullinum de Civitate Dei, Lib. VII. Cap. XXVIII. p. 141. Tom. VII. Oper.
nation. Wherefore, as there could be no impiety at all in calling the supreme God Jove or Jovis, it being that very name, which God himself chose to be called by; so neither is there any reason, why the Latins should not as well mean the supreme God thereby, as the Greeks did unquestionably by Zeus, which will be proved afterwards from irrefragable authority.

Especially if we consider, that the Roman vulgar commonly bestowed these two epithets upon that Capitoline Jupiter (that is, not the senilest statue, but that God, who was there worshipped in a material statue) of Optimus and Maximus, the best and the greatest; they thereby signifying him to be a being infinitely good and powerful. Thus Cicero in his De Nat. D'orum, Jupiter à poetis dictur divum atque bovinum pater, à majoribus autem nostris optimus maximus. That same Jupiter, who is by the poets stylled the father of gods and men, is by our ancestors called the best, the greatest.

And in his Orat. pro S. Roscio, Jupiter optimus maximus, cujus nutu & arbitrio calum, terra, marisque reguntur; Jupiter the best, the greatest, by whose beck and command, the heaven, the earth, and the seas are governed. As also the junior Pliny, in his panegyrick oration, parens bovinum deorum, optimi prius, deinde maximi nomine colitur; The father of men and gods is worshipped under the name, first of the best, and then of the greatest. Moreover Servius Honoratus informs us, that the Pontifices in their publick sacrifices were wont to address themselves to Jupiter in this form of words; Omnipotens Jupiter, feu quo alio nomine appellari volueris; Omnipotent Jupiter, or by what other name soever thou pleasest to be called. From whence it is plain, that the Romans, under the name of Jupiter, worshipped the omnipotent God. And, according to Seneca, the ancient Hetrurians, who by him distinguished from philosophers, as a kind of illiterate superfluous persons (in these words, Hec absum Etruscis & philosophis communia sunt, in illo differentiis) had this very same notion answering to the word Jupiter, namely, of the supreme monarch of the universe. For first he sets down their tradition concerning thunderbolts in this manner; Fulmina dictum à Jove mitti, & tres illi manubias dant. Prima (ut aiunt) monent & placata est, & ipsus confilio Jovis mittitur. Secundam quiem mitterat Jupiter, sed ex conflitii sententiis; duodecim enim deos advocat, &c. Tertiam idem Jupiter mitterat, sed ambiguitas in confilium dis, quas superiores & involutos vocant, quae vaslat, &c. The Hetrurians say, that the thunderbolts are sent from Jupiter, and that there are three kinds of them; the first gentle and monitory, and sent by Jupiter alone; the second sent by Jupiter, but not without the counsel and consent of the twelve gods, which thunderbolt doth some good, but not without harm also; the third sent by Jupiter likewise, but not before he hath called a council of all the superior gods: and this utterly wafles and destroys both private and publick states. And then does he make a commentary upon this old Hetrurian doctrine, that it was not to be taken literally, but only so as to impress an awe upon men, and to signify, that Jupiter himself intended nothing but good, he inflicting evil not alone, but in partnership with others, and when the necessity of the case required. Adding in the last place, Ne hoc quidem crediderunt (Etruscis) Jovem qualem in Capitolio, &c in eis in eis aditus

1 Lib. II. Cap. XXV. p. 292. Tom. IX. Oper. 2 Cap. XLV. p. 948. Tom. III. Oper.
As nothing is more frequent with Pagan writers, than to speak of God singularly, they signifying thereby the one supreme Deity, so that the same was very familiar with the vulgar Pagans also, in their ordinary discourse and common speech, hath been recorded by divers of the fathers. Tertullian in his book de Testimonia Animae, and his Apologet. instanceth in several of these forms of speech than vulgarly used by the Pagans; as Deus videt, Deos commuitt, Deus reddet, Deus inter nos judicabit, Quod Deus vult, Si Deus voluerit, Quod Deus dederit, Si Deus dederit, and the like. Thus also Minutius Felix, Cum ad caelum manus tendunt, nihil aliud quum Deum dicunt, Et magnus est, & Deus verus est, &c. vulgi iute naturalis forma, et Christiani confessionis oratio? When they stretch out their hands to heaven, they mention only God; and these forms of speech, He is great, and God is true; and, If God grant (which are the natural language of the vulgar) are they not a plain confession of Christianity? And lastly Laëantius, Cum iuvent, & cum optant, & cum gratias agunt, non deos multos, sed Deum nominant; add ipsa veritas, cogente natura, etiam ab invitio pejoribus erumpit: When they swear, and when they wish, and when they give thanks, they name not many gods, but God only; the truth, by a secret force of nature, thus breaking forth from them, whether they will or no. And again, Ad Deum confessit, à Deo pejiter auxilium, Deus ut subveniat orat. Et quis ad extremam mendicandi necessitatem redactus, viatum preciosum exposit, Deum solum obtestatur, & per ejus divinum atque unicum numen hominum sibi misericordiam querit: They fly to God, aid is desired of God, they pray that God would help them; and when any one is reduced to extremest necessity, be

1 Lib. IV.
3 Cap. XVII p. 175.
5 Institut Divin. Lib II. Cap. I. p. 159.
de begs for God's sake, and by his divine power alone implores the mercy of men. Which same thing is fully confirmed also by Proclus upon Plato's Timeus; where he observes, that the one supreme God was more universally believed throughout the world in all ages, than the many inferior gods: 

Moreover, we learn from Arrianus his Epistelus, that that very form of prayer, which hath been now so long in use in the Christian church, Kyrie Eleison, Lord have mercy upon us, was anciently part of the Pagans litany to the supreme God, either amongst the Greeks, or the Latins, or both, τὸν Θεὸν ἐπικαλομοίναι, (faith Epistelus) δέομαι αὐτῷ, Κύριε ἡλικεν, invoking God, we pray to him after this manner, Lord have mercy upon us. Now this Epistelus lived in the times of Adrian the emperor; and that this passag of his is to be understood of Pagans, and not of Christians, is undeniable manifest from the context, he there speaking of those, who used auguria or divination by birds. Moreover, in the writings of the Greekish Pagans, the supreme God is often called Κύριος, or Lord. For, not to urge that passage of the πλατειαν διάλογον, or Aulelian Dialogue, cited by Laetantius; where we read of ὁ Κύριος καὶ πάνω πάντες, the Lord and maker of all, Menander in his Ματύριον fyleth the supreme God, τὸν δόξα πάνων Κύριον γεννάτον, the most universal Lord of all. And Ofiris in Plutarch is called ἀνώτατον Κύριον, the Lord of all things. And this is also done absolutely, and without any adhesion, and that not only by the LXX, and Christians, but also by Pagan writers, thus in Plutarch's de Iside & Osiride, we read of τοῦ πέρατος, καὶ ΚΥΡΙΟΤ, καὶ
Litany, to the supreme God.

The knowledge of the first Intelligible, and the Lord, that is, of the supreme God. And Oromafdes is called ο Κύριος, the Lord, in Plutarch's life of Alexander; as Νομικος, by Aristotle, that is, the supreme ruler De An. 1. 1. over all. Thus likewise Plato in his sixth epistle ad Hermian, &c. styles his Κύριος the first divine hypothesis, or the absolutely supreme Deity, το Κύριόν, ο Πατέρας, ο Θεός, ο Οκτώ Κύρια, or eight, Devi, Elohim, Lord, Father, and God. Again, Jamblicbus writeth thus of the supreme God, ἡ πάντων παρά τα τον πάντα τον μεγαλόν θεόν, It is confessed, that in the printed copy thus, ἡ πάντων παρά τα τον πάντα τον μεγαλόν θεόν. Lastly, Clement of Alexandria tells us, that the supreme God was called not by one only name, but by divers diversly, namely, ὁ Κύριος, ὁ Θεός, ὁ Θεός, ὁ Δευτέρος, ὁ Κύριος, Either the One, or the Good, or Mind, or the very Ens, or the Father, or the Demiurgus, or the Lord. Wherefore, we ought to conclude, that this Kyrie Eleison, or Domine Miserere, in Arrianus, was a Pagan litany or supplication to the supreme God. Though from Mauritius the emperor's stratagemata it appears, that in his time a Kyrie Rigalt. Geoff. Eleison was wont to be sung so by the Christian armies before battle.

And that the most false and idolatrous of all the Pagans, and the worshippers of so many gods amongst them, did notwithstanding generally acknowledge one supreme Deity over them all, one universal Numin, is positively affirmed, and fully attested by Aurelius Prudentius, in his Apotheos, in these words;

Ecquis in Idolo recubans inter sacra mille,
Ridiculose deos venerans, salve, cæspite, ibure,
Non putat esse Deum summum, & super omnia solum?
Quamvis Saturnis, Junonis, & Cynthiae,
Portentosque alios, sumantes conserat aras;
Attamen in cæsum quattuor suscept, in uno
Constituit jux sanna Deo, cui ferviat ingens
Virtutum ratio, variis instructa minisiris.

We are not ignorant, that Plato in his Cratylus, where he undertakes to give the etymologies of words, and amongst the rest of the word Σεία, witteth in this manner, concerning the first and most ancient inhabitants of Greece; they seemed to him, like as other Barbarians at that time, to have acknowledged no other gods than such as were visible and sensible, as the sun and the moon, and the earth, and the stars, and the heaven. Which they perceiving to run round perpetually, thence they called them Σεία, from Σείος, that signifies to run. But that when afterward they took notice of other invisible gods also, they bestowed the same name of Σείοι upon them likewise. Which passage of Plato's Eusebios somewhere would make use of, to prove, that the Pagans universally acknowledged no other gods but corporeal and inanimate, plainly contrary to that philosopher's meaning, who as he no where affirms, that any nation ever was so barbarous, as to worship Ννιν  

The Sun, according to Macrobius, Book I.

Senile and inanimate bodies, as such, for gods, but the contrary; so doth he there distinguish from those first inhabitants of Greece, and other Barbarians, the afterward civilized Greeks, who took notice of invisible gods also. However, if this of Plato should be true, that some of the ancient Pagans worshipped none but visible and sensible gods, (they taking no notice of any incorporeal beings;) yet does it not therefore follow, that those Pagans had no notion at all amongst them of one supreme and universal Numen. The contrary thereunto being manifest, that some of those Corporealists looked upon the whole heaven and Either animated as the highest God, according to that of Euripides cited by Cicero.

As also that others of them conceived, that subtil fiery substance, which permeates and pervades the whole world, (supposed to be intellectual) to be the supreme Deity, which governs all; this opinion having been entertained by philosophers also, as namely the Heracliticks and Stoicks. And lastly, since Macrobius, in the person of Vettius Postextatus, refers so many of the Pagan gods to the sun; this renders it not improbable, but that some of these Pagans might adore the animated sun, as the sovereign Numen, and thus perhaps invoke him in that form of prayer there mentioned, "Him propter, etiam O omnipotent sun, the mind and spirit of the whole world, &c. And even Cleanthes himself, that learned Stoick, and devout religionist, is suspected by some to have been of this persuasion.

Nevertheless, we think it opportune here to observe, that it was not Macrobius his design, in those his Saturnalia, to defend this, either as his own opinion, or as the opinion of the generality of Pagans, that the animated sun was absolutely the highest Deity, (as some have conceived;) nor yet to reduce that multiplicity of Pagan gods, by this device of his, into a feeming monarchy, and nearer compliance with Christianity; he there plainly confining his discourse to the did duntaxat, qui sub coelo sunt, that is, the lesser sort of mundane gods; and undertaking to shew, not that all of them neither, but only that many of them were reducible to the sun, as polyonymous, and called by several names, according to his several virtues and effects. For, what Macrobius his own opinion was, concerning the supreme Deity, appeareth plainly from his other writings, particularly this passage of his commentary upon Scipio's dream, where he describeth the highest sphere and starry heaven was called Summus Deus, the supreme God; Quod hunc extimum globum, summum Deum vocavi, non ulla accipienda est, ut ipse prima causa, & Deus illa omnipotentissimus exsistimetur; cum globus ipse, quod cælum est, anima sit fabrica, anima ex mente princeps, mens ex Deo, qui verum summum est, procrescit sit. Sed summum quidem dixit ad caeterorum ordinem, qui subjiciunt; Deum vero, quod non modo immortale animal ac divinum sit, plenum indicite ex illa purissima mente rationis.

not the supreme Deity.

neat quod virtutes omnes, que illam prime omnipotentiam summilitatis sequuntur, aut ipsa faciat, aut continat; ipsam devique Jovem veteres vocaverunt, & apud theologos Jupiter est mundi anima. That the utmost sphere is here called the supreme God, is not so to be understood, as if this were thought to be the first cause, and the most omnipotent God of all. For this flarly sphere being but a part of the heaven, was made or produced by soul. Which soul also proceeded from a perfect mind or intellect; and again, Mind was begotten from that God, who is truly supreme. But the biggest sphere is here called the supreme God, only in respect to those lesser spheres or gods, that are contained under it; and it is styled a God, because it is not only an immortal and divine animal, full of reason derived from that purest Mind, but also because it maketh or containeth within itself all those virtues, which follow that omnipotence of the first summity. Lastly, this was called by the ancients Jupiter, and Jupiter to theologists is the soul of the world. Wherefore though Macrobius, as generally the other Pagans, did undoubtedly worship the sun as a great God, and probably would not stick to call him Jupiter, nor παντοκρατοριον neither (in a certain sense) omnipotent, or the governor of all, nor perhaps Deum summum, as well as the flarly heaven was so styled in Scipio's dream, he being the chief moderator in this lower world; yet nevertheless, it is plain, that he was far from thinking the sun to be primam causam, or omnipotentiissimum Deum; the first cause, or the most omnipotent God of all.

He acknowledging above the sun and heaven, first, an eternal Psyche, which was the maker or creator of them both; and then above this Psyche, a perfect mind or intellect; and lastly, above that mind a God, who was vere summus, truly and properly supreme, the first cause, and the most omnipotent of all gods. Wherein Macrobius plainly Platonized, afferting a trinity of archical or divine hypotahas. Which same doctrine is elsewhere also further declared by him after this manner; Deus, qui prima causa est, & Somn. Scip. vocatur unus omnium, quæque sunt, quæque videntur esse, principium & origo. t. p. 14. eft. Hic superabundanti majestatis seceruditate de se mentem creavit. Hæc [P. 73.] mens, quæ Noë vocatur, quæ patrem inspiciat, plenam similitudinem servat auctoribus, animam verò de se creat posteriora repiciens. Rursus anima pariet, quam intueri induitur, ac paulatim regrediente receptu in fabricam corporum, in corporea ipsa degenerat: God, who is and is called the first cause, is alone the fountain and original of all things, that are or seem to be; be by his superabundant fecundity produced from himself mind, which mind, as it looks upward towards its father, bears the perfect resemblance of its author, but as it looked downward, produced soul. And this soul again, as to its superior part, resembles that mind, from whence it was begotten; but working downwards, produced the corporeal fabric, and abesth upon body. Besides which, the same Macrobius tells us, that Summi & principis omnium Dei nulium simulacrum fuscit antiquitas, quia supra animam & naturam eft, quo nihil fatis de fabulis verenire; de diis autem ceteris, & de anima, nun frustra se ad fabulosa concevuntur. The Pagan antiquity made no image at all of the biggest God, or prince of all things, because he is above soul and nature, where it is not lawful for any fabulosity to be intromitted. But as to the other gods, the soul of the world, and those below

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below it, they thought it not inconvenient here to make use of images, and fiction or fabulosity. From all which it plainly appears, that neither Macrobins himself, nor the generality of the ancient Pagans, according to his apprehension, did look upon the animated sun as the absolutely supreme and highest Being.

And perhaps it may not be amiss to suggest here, what hath been already observed, that the Persians themselves also, who of all Pagan nations have been most charged with this, the worshipping of the sun as the supreme Deity, under the name of Mithras, did notwithstanding, if we may believe Eustathus', (who wrote the history of Mithras at large,) acknowledge another invisible Deity superior to it, (and which was the maker thereof, and of the world whole) as the true and proper Mithras. Which opinion is also plainly confirmed not only by Herodotus, distinguishing their Jupiter from the sun, but also by Xenophon in sundry places, as particularly where he speaks of Cyrus his being admonished in a dream of his approaching death, and thereupon addressing his devotion by sacrifices and prayers, first to the Zeus palæo, the Persian Jupiter, and then to the sun, and the other gods. 'Εν δ' άλλω τε πατρί ται τω θεῷ τοσούτων τοις άλλωσι σαϕέως έπι τον άγνωστον, άναμίαν δ' Πέρσας Ἠρωδ., δώτω ενεκτεργόν, Ζεύς παλαιός ή πλείον πάντες θεοί, έκδεδε τάδε χάριτερα, &c. He sacrificed to their country (or the Persian) Jupiter, and to the sun, and to the other gods, upon the tops of the mountains, as the custom of the Persians is; praying after this manner: Thou, our country Jupiter, (that is, thou Mithras or Oromed) and thou sun, and all ye other gods; accept, I pray you, these my eucharistic sacrifices, &c. And we find also the like prayer used by Darius in Plutarch, Zeus palæo Perseow, Thou our country Jupiter, or supreme God of the Persians. Moreover, Herodotus and Curtius record, that in the Persian pomp and procession there was wont to be drawn a chariot sacred to Jupiter, distinct from that of the sun. But Cyrus his proclamation in the book of Esdras putteth all out of doubt; since that Lord God of heaven, who is there said to have given Cyrus all the kingdoms of the earth, and commanded him to build him a house at Jerusalem, cannot be understood of the sun.

The Ethiopians in Strabo's time may well be looked upon as Barbarians, and yet did they not only acknowledge one supreme Deity, but also such as was distinct from the world, and therefore invisible; he writing thus concerning them, Θεόν ομοιότατον τούτον μεν θεόν άλλουν, τούτων δέ ευώτι τον απίστολον των πάντων, τού δέ θεόν, αλάμφορον τις, άσ' δ' επιστευσά τον ελεγχόν τον βασιλέως θεός ομοιότατον. They believe, that there is one immortal God, and this the cause of all things; and another mortal one, anonymous; but for the most part they account their benefactors and kings gods also. And though Caesar confirms of the ancient Germans, Dionum numero eos solos divum, quos servunt, & quorum opibus aperit juvantur, Solem, & Vaticanum, & Lunam; yet is he contradicted by Tacitus, who, coming after him, had better information: and others have recorded, that they acknowledged one supreme God, under the name of Thun first, and

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Chap. IV. Plutarch's Agreement of Pagan Religions.

and then of Themists, and Thebists. Lastly, the generality of the Pagans at this very day, as the Indians, Chinese, Sianenses and Guineans, the inhabitants of Peru, Mexico, Virginia, and New England, (some of which are sufficiently barbarous) acknowledge one supreme or greatest God; they having their several proper names for him, as Parmifer, Fritto, Wiraocba, Pachacamac, Vitziliputzli, &c. though worshipping withal other gods and idols. And we shall conclude this with the testimony of Josephus: De proc. In-Hoc commune apud omnes peire Barbaros est ut Deum quidem omnium rerum sup- dor. Sal. 1. 5, premum et summe bonum fateantur; spiritum vero quorumdam perverorum 479, non obscura opinio est, qui ad nostris Barbaris Zupay vocari solent. Igitur & quos ille fummus, idemque sempiternus rerum omnium opifex, quem illi ignorantiones colunt, per omnia doceri debent; non quantum ab illo, illiusque fidelibus ministris angelis, eftgent gens caco daemonorum. This is common almost to all the Barbarians, to confess one supreme God over all, who is perfectly good; as also they have a persuasion among them of certain evil spirits, which are called by our Barbarians Zupay. It therefore they ought to be first well instructed, what that supreme and eternal maker of all things is, whom they ignorantly worship; and then how great a difference there is betwixt those wicked demons, and bis faithful ministers, the angels.

XXVIII. It hath been already declared, that according to Themistius and Symmachus, two zealous Pagans, one and the same supreme God was worshipped in all the several Pagan religions throughout the world, though after different manners. Which diversity of religions, as in their opinion it was no way inconvenient in itself, so neither was it ungrateful nor unacceptable to Almighty God, it being more for his honour, state, and grandeur, to be worshipped with this variety, than after one only manner. Now, that this was also the opinion of other ancients Pagans before them, may appear from this remarkable testimony of Plutarch's in his book De Iside, where defending the Egyptian worship, (which was indeed the main design of that whole book;) but withal declaring, that no inanimate thing ought to be looked upon or worshipped as a God, he writeth thus: ο γάρ ἐν Ρ. 377. ὃν ἄφρον υπεράρατος θεόν ἡ τοι; τὸ δὲ συμμετέχειν οὐκ ἔχει παράξεις αἰώνια ἡ διάρκης, οἷς ἐνεναιμεύετο, οὐ έτέρων παρά εἶναι, καὶ Βαρθάδες καὶ Ελλακτας, καὶ νοτίας καὶ βορείας ἀλλά ἀφροίς ἡλίως, ἥ σελάκ, ἥ τριγλ, καὶ τη, καὶ Τελασκα, κοινὰ πάσιν, οὐρανίζει τι ἀλλωσ ἢ ἀλλώς, ὦνος ΕΝΟΣ ΛΟΤΟΥ τε παῦτά καισάμωτι καὶ ΜΙΑΣ ΠΡΩΝΟΙΑΣ ἀπαντημένης, καὶ θεάματες ὑπερήφανος ἐπὶ πάντας τεταγμένοις, ἔβρεος παρά εὔπρεπες κατὰ τοὺς γεγονοὺς τιμαῖς καὶ ποτηρίσαις καὶ συμβολοὺς χειρότα καθεμάλλη, οἱ μὲν άλμισθοίς, οἱ δὲ τρεχωμάτοις, εἰς τὸ δεῖν νῦν ἑκάτερα ἕκατον αὐτοῦν. No inanimate thing ought to be esteemed for a God, but they, who bestow these things upon us, and afford us a continual supply thereof for our use, have been therefore accounted by us gods. Which gods are not different to different nations; as if the Barbarians and the Greeks, the southern and the northern inhabitants of the globe, had not any the same, but all other different gods. But as the sun, and the moon, and the heaven, and the earth, and the sea are common to all, though called by several names in several countries; so ONE REASON ordering these things, and ONE PROVIDENCE dispensing all, and the inferior subervices ministers thereof, having bad several names and honours bestowed upon them by
the laws of several countries have been everywhere worshipped throughout the whole world. And there have been also different symbols consecrated to them, the better to conduct and lead on mens understandings to divine things; though this hath not been without some hazard or danger of casting men upon one or other of these two inconveniences, either superstition or atheism. Where Plutarch plainly affirms, that the several religions of the Pagan nations, whether Greeks or Barbarians, and among these the Egyptians also, as well as others, consisting in nothing else, but the worshipping of one and the same supreme mind, reason, and providence, that orders all things in the world, and of its opusculi divinae; eti panta teagymnai, its subservient powers or ministers, appointed by it over all the several parts of the world; though under different names, rites, and ceremonies, and with different symbols.

Moreover, that Titus Livius was of the very same opinion, that the Pagan gods of several countries, though called by several names, and worshipped with so great diversities of rites and ceremonies, yet were not for all that different, but the same common to all, may be concluded from this passage of his, where he writeth of Hannibal: Nescio an mirabilior fuerit in adversis, quam secundis rebus. Quippe qui misit ex colluzione omnium gentium, quibus alius ritus, alia sacra, ali PROPE dii essent, ita uno vinculo copulaverit, ut nulla sedition existerit. I know not whether Hannibal were more admirable in his adversity or prosperity, who having a mixt colluziones of all nations under him, which had different rites, different ceremonies, and almost different gods from one another, did notwithstanding so unite them all together in one common bond, that there happened no sedition at all amongst them. Where Livy plainly intimates, that though there was as great diversity of religious rites and ceremonies among the Pagans, as if they had worshipped several gods, yet the gods of them all were really the same, namely, one supreme God, and his ministers under him. And the same Livy elsewhwhere declares this to have been the general opinion of the Romans and Italians likewise at that time; where he tells us, how they quarrelled with Q. Fulvius Flaccus, for that when being censor, and building a new temple in Spain, he uncovered another temple dedicated to Juno Lacinia amongst the Brutii, and taking off the marble-tiles thereof, sent them into Spain to adorn his new erected temple withal; and how they accused him thereupon publickly in the senate-house in this manner, Quod ruinis templorum templo adscriptae, tanquam non idem ubique dii immortales essent, sed spoliis aliorum alii colendi exornandique: That with the ruins of temples be built up temples; as if there were not every where the same immortal gods; but that some of them might be worshipped and adorned with the spoils of others.

The Egyptians were doubtless the most singular of all the Pagans, and the most oddly discrepant from the rest in their manner of worship; yet nevertheless, that these also agreed with the rest in those fundamentals of worshipping one supreme and universal Numen, together

\[ \text{Lib. XLI. Cap. III. p. 1113.} \]
gatherer with his inferior ministers, as Plutarch lets himself industriously to maintain it, in that formentioned book de Isis; so it was further cleared and made out (as Damaeus informs us) by two famous Egyptian philosophers, Asclepiades and Heraicus, in certain writings of theirs, that have been since lost: Ἀγαθίας δὲ ὁ μὲν Ἑὐδήμων ἀνὴρ ἄρει δειδαὶ ἐγερεὶ: Οἱ δὲ Ἀγαθίας καθ' ἀκατὸν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων μεταφωνήσαντος, ἑξελέγοντος ἀπὸ τῶν τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου μικρομετρίας, εἰς ὑπαρχόντος ἐν Ἀ-
γαθίας, ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων, ὡς εἰπ' αὐτῷ ἡ μία μὲ τῶν ἀλλῶν αρχή, σκῆτος ἄρει, καὶ τιμῆσθαι, καὶ τοῖς ἐπιταιντιοίς ἔτι τι 

CHAP. IV. Asclepiades, his Symphony of Theologies. 461

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[Vide Woflí Anedonta Heraicus, Tom. III. p. 160]
and to the same Supreme Numen: and the second thus, Varius
custodes urbibus mens divina distribuit; that the divine Mind appointed
guardian and tutelar spirits under him, unto cities and countries. He there
adding also, that fatus cuique mos oft, fuan cuique jus, that every nation had
their peculiar modes and manners in worshipping of these; and that these ex-
ternal differences in religion ought not to be stood upon, but every one to
observe the religion of his own country. Or else these two fundamental
points of the Pagan theology may be thus expressed; first, that there is one
self-originated Deity, who was the ἀνθρωπος, or maker of the whole world;
secondly, that there are besides him other gods also, to be religiously wor-
shipped (that is, intellectual beings superior to men) which were notwith-
standing all made or created by that one. Sōkheus thus declareth their

[Lib. I. p. 4.] senē: το πλῆθος τῶν ζῴων ἢ το ἁμαινεῖν, ἄμα το κόσμον γράφειν, That
the multitude of gods is the work of the Demiurgus, made by him, together
with the world.

XXIX. And that the Pagan theologers did thus generally acknowledge
one supreme and universal Numen, appears plainly from hence, because
they supposed the whole world to be an animal. Thus the writer de Placitis
Philos, and out of him Sōkheus, οί μίν ἄλλοι πάντες ἡμῖν τὸν κόσμον ἐν πε-
ναίς διοικήσεωιν, Λευκίππος ὁ δὲ Ἀραχώνος ἤπειρος, ὡς ὦτον τὰ ἀτόμα ἐνε-
ρύω, ἢ τὸ κοιν一句话, ὡς ἡμῖν τὸν κόσμον ἐν κοινε̊ς διοικήσεωιν, Φιλος ὃς τὰν ἄλογον. All others
assert the world to be an animal, and governed by providence; only Leucippus,
Democritus and Epicurus, and these, who make atoms and vacuum the prin-
ciples of all things, differing, who neither acknowledge the world to be ani-
mated, nor yet to be governed by providence, but by an irrational nature.
Where, by the way, we may observe the fraud and juggling of Gaianous,
who takes occasion from hence highly to extol and applaud Epicurus, as
one who approached nearer to Christianity than all the other philosopher,
in that he denied the world to be an animal; whereas, according to the
language and notions of those times, to deny the world's animation, and
to be an Atheist or to deny a God, was one and the same thing; because all
the Pagans, who then affected providence, held the world also to be anim-
ated: neither did Epicurus deny the world's animation upon any other ac-
count than this, because he denied providence. And the ground, upon
which this opinion of the world's animation was built, was such as might
be obvious even to vulgar understandings; and it is thus expressed by Pla-
tinus, according to the sense of the ancients: ἔστιν τὸν ὑπὸ τὸν ἀνθρωπον ἄλογον,
ἥμως ὁ μῖν ἄλλοι πάντες ἐκεῖνον τὸ παίδεως, ἄψευχον ἱμβατον πᾶς γὰρ ἂν ὁ 
μῖν ἄλλοι πάντες ἐκεῖνον τὸ παίδεως ἄλογον, οὗτοι οἱ πάντες ἐκεῖνον τὸ παίδεως ἄλογον. It is absurd to affirm,
that the heaven or world is inanimate, or devoid of life and soul, when we ourselves, who have but
a part of the mundane body in us, are endured with soul. For how could
a part have life and soul in it, the whole being dead and inanimate? Now,
if the whole world be one animal, then must it needs be governed by
one soul, and not by many. Which one soul of the world, and the
whole mundane animal, was by some of the Pagan theologers (as namely
World to be one Animal.

namely the Stoics) taken to be the πρῶτος θεός, the first and highest God of all.

Nevertheless, others of the Pagan theologers, though asverting the world's animation likewise, yet would by no means allow the mundane soul to be the supreme Deity; they conceiving the first and highest God to be an abstract and immovable mind, and not a soul. Thus the Panegyrist, cited also by Gyraldus, invokes the supreme Deity doubtingly and cautiously, as not knowing well what to call him, whether a soul or mind: Τε, summe rerum fator, cujus tota nomina sunt, quot gentium linguis esse voluerit; quem enim te ipse dici velis, scire non possimus: sic in te quaedam vis mensque divina est, quae tota infusa mundo omnibus insensibus elementis, & sine ullo extrinsecus accedente vigoris impulsu, per te ipsa movetur; sic aliqua supra omne calem potestas es, quae hoc opus totum ex altiore naturae arce despiciat: Τε, inquam, oramus, &c. Thou supreme original of all things, whom hast as many names as thou hast pleased there should be languages; whether thou best a certain divine force and soul, that infused into the whole world art mingled with all the elements, and without any external impulse moved from thyself; or whether thou best a power elevated above the heavens, which looked down upon the whole work of nature, as from a higher tower; thee we invoke, &c. And as the supreme Deity was thus considered only as a perfect mind superior to soul, so was the mundane soul and whole animated world called by these Pagans frequently δεύτερος θεός, the second God. Thus in the Aeneanum Dialogue, or Perfect Oration, is the Lord and maker of all said to have made a second God visible and sensible, which is the world.

But for the most part, they who asverting a God, superior to the soul of the world, did maintain a trinity of universal principles, or divine hypostases subordinate; they conceiving, that as there was above the mundane soul a perfect mind or intellect, so that mind and intellect, as such, was not the first principle neither, because there must be νοστος in order of nature before νοσιν, an Intelligible before Intellect. Which first Intelligible was called by them, το τοια τοιουτος, the One, and the Good, or unity and goodness itself substantial, the cause of mind and all things. Now as the Ταγαθον, or highest of these three hypostases, was sometimes called by them ο πρῶτος θεός, the first God, and νοσιν or Intellect ο δεύτερος θεός, the second God; so was the mundane soul and animated world called τεταρτος θεος, the third God. Thus Numenius in Proclus upon Plato's Timeus, Νομένιες μην γαρ τρεις σιγαφλήνσας Θεος, Pag. 93. τατια μην καλεί τον πρωτον, τατια δε τον δεύτερον, τοιασιδα δε τον τριτονο το γαρ καλος κατ αυτο το τριτον εστι Θεος, ως κατ αυτον εγινομενοι δυος, διε τριατον ο δευτερος Θεος, το ε δε εωεσφέρουνοι τριτος; Numenius praising three gods, calls the father the first God, the maker the second, and the work the third. For the world, according to him, is the third God; as he supposest also two opifiers, the first and the second God. Plotinus in like manner speaks of this also, as very En. 3. 14. familiar language amongst those Pagans, χρονος, και οικον μεν Θεος, &c τος σωμαται λόγον, § 6. τεταρτος τε, and the world, as is commonly said, is the third God.
But neither they, who held the supreme Deity to be an immovable mind or intellect, superior to the mundane soul, (as Aristotle and Xenocrates) did suppose that mundane soul and the whole world to have depended upon many such immovable intellects self-existent, as their first cause, but only upon one: nor they, who admitting a trinity of divine hypostases, made the supreme Deity properly to be a Monad above Mind or Intellect, did conceive that intellect to have depended upon many such monads, as first principles co-ordinate, but upon one only. From whence it plainly appears, that the Pagan theologers did always reduce things under a monarchy, and acknowledge not many independent deities, but one universal Numen (whether called soul, or mind, or monad) as the head of all. Though it hath been already declared, that those Pagans, who were Trinitarians, especially the Platonists, do often take those three hypostases sub-ordinate (a monad, mind, and soul) all together, for the το Στίων, or one supreme Numen; as supposing an extraordinary kind of unity in that trinity of hypostases, and so as it were a certain latitude and gradation in the Deity.

Where by the way two things may be observed concerning the Pagan theologers; first, that according to them generally the whole corporeal system was not a dead thing, like a machine or automaton artificially made by men, but that life and soul was mingled with and diffused thorough it all: insomuch that Aristotle himself taxes those, who made the world to consist of nothing but monads or atoms altogether dead and inanimate, as being therefore a kind of Atheists. Secondly, that how much sooner some of them supposed the supreme Deity and first Cause to be elevated above the heaven and corporeal world, yet did they not therefore conceive, either the world to be quite cut off from that, or that from the world, so as to have no commerce with it, nor influence upon it; but as all proceeded from this first cause, so did they suppose that to be closely and intimately united with all those emanations from itself, (though without mixture and confusion) and all to subsist in it, and be pervaded by it. Plutarch, in his Platonick Questions, propounds this amongst the rest, Τιδε ποτε τοι τον Ανοικτων Στου πατερα πατων και παιδον προετοιν; Why Plato called the highest God the father and maker of all? To which he answers in the first place thus, πατερα του μεν θεου γεννητον και των ανθρωπων πατηρ εστιν, παιδευς δι των αλογων και των απουκων. That perhaps he was called the father of all the generated gods, and of men, but the maker of the irrational and inanimate things of the world. But afterward he adds, that this highest God might therefore be styled the father of the whole corporeal world also, as well as the maker, because it is no dead and inanimate thing, but endued with life; ἵμαρσε γὰρ γίνοις ἢ γίνοις ἢ συγκεντρωθαι ἐναρξας, ἀπελλαγαί τὸ μενόμενον ἤγεναι, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ γεννητανος αἰσχρὸν ἡ δύναμις ἤγεναι πρὶν το τεκωδοσίας, καὶ συνεχὶ τὴν φύσιν, αἵταπα μας καὶ σφετέρος διὰ τω τεκωδοσίας. Επεὶ τούτων ἐν πατρικίας ο εύσμος, ἢπὶ συναρμολογίας παρέχεσθαι διότι, ἀλλ' ἢ των αυτῶν μοιρὰ κελλη ζωότητας καὶ θεότητας, ἢ το θεου ἱερατιστημένος αὕτη ἢ καταπτερωθῇ.
Chap. IV.

From the Deity.

The work of an artificer, as an architect or statuary, as soon as it is produced, departed from and is removed from the maker thereof, as having no intrinsic dependence upon him; whereas from him, that begetted, there is a principle and power infused into that which is begotten, and mingled therewith, that containeth the whole nature thereof, as being a kind of avulsion from the begetter. Wherefore since the world is not like to those works, that are artificially made and compacted by men, but hath a participation of life and divinity, which God hath infused into it, and mingled with it. God is therefore rightly styled by Plato, not only the maker, but also the father of the whole world as being an animal. To the same purpose also Plotinus, ὁ γενόμενος δὴ οὐν οίκος τις καλέσ ὡς ποικίλης, ἂν ἀπείρηθη τι πεποιηκότος, ὡς ἀυτοὶ καταλύοντες τούτων τοις ἐπιστήμοναῖς. (En. 4. l. 3.) autóς ἔχει καὶ τοιχῆς καταλύοντες, ἢ κρατῶν, ἢ ἔκχοντος, ἢ εἰμάνεις ἀλλὰ ἢ έκχων, κεῖται γὰρ ἐν τῷ τοιχῶν καταλύοντες. (P. 379.)

The world being made as a large and stately edifice, was neither cut off and separated from its maker, nor yet mingled and confounded with him. For as much as he still remaineth above, presiding over it. the world being so animated, as rather to be possessed by soul, than to possess its, it lying in that great Physic, which surrounded it, as a net in the waters, all mixed with life. Thus Plotinus supposing the whole corporeal world to be animated, affirmed it neither to be cut off from its maker, (by which maker he here understands the mundane soul) nor yet that mundane soul itself to be immersed into its body the world, after the same manner as our human souls are into these bodies; but so to preside over it, and act it, as a thing elevated above it. And though, according to him, that second divine hypostasis of Nous or Intellect be in like manner elevated above this mundane soul, and again, that first hypostasis or supreme Deity, (called by him unity and goodness) above Intellect; yet the corporeal world could not be said to be cut off from these neither; they being all three (-monad, mind, and soul) closely and intimated united together.

XXX. The Hebrews were the only nation, who before Christianity for several ages professedly opposed the polytheism and idolatry of the Pagan world. Wherefore it may be probably concluded, that they had the right notion of this Pagan polytheism, and understood what it consisted in, viz. Whether in worshipping many unmade, self-originated deities, as partial creators of the world; or else in worshipping, besides the supreme God, other created beings superior to men? Now Philo plainly understood the Pagan polytheism after this latter way; as may appear from this passage of his in his book concerning the Confusion of Languages, where speaking of the supreme God, (the Maker and Lord of the whole world) and of his δυνάμεις δύναμις, his innumerable assistant powers, both visible and invisible, he adds, καὶ παραλλήλας ὅποις τοῖς τοις ἐπίστημον καταλύοντες, τοῖς τοῖς μικροῖς φύσιν, ἢ μόνον άλλα ἐξεχώνοντο, ἀλλὰ γἐ Ροές. 345. τα κάλλης τοῖς τοῖς καταλύοντες. (W. 110.)
with admiration of both these worlds, the visible and the invisible, have not only deified the whole of them, but also their several parts, as the sun, and the moon, and the whole heaven, they not scrupling to call these gods. Which notion and language of theirs Moses rejected in those words of his, Thou Lord the king of gods; he thereby declaring the transcendency of the supreme God above all those his subjects called gods. To the same purpose Philo writeth also in his Commentary upon the Decalogue, 

*Page 753.*

"Wherefore removing all such impudence, let us worship no beings, that are by nature brothers and germans to us, though ended with far more pure and immortal essences than we are. For all created things, as such, have a kind of germam and brotherly equality with one another, the maker of all things being their common father. But let us deeply infix this first and most holy commandment in our breasts, to acknowledge and worship one only highest God. And again afterwards, so do we also, as by mention, so by supposition, so in sumptuaries seculars, so in fictitious, so in autors, also departing to the赦 Maker, to the Succasion, so in temporal, so in religious, so in various, so in many, so in all, and the whole heaven and world, and the principal parts of them as gods, err, in that they worship the subjects of the prince, whereas the prince alone ought to be worshipped. Thus, according to Philo, the Pagan polytheism consisted in giving religious worship, besides the supreme God, to other created understanding beings, and parts of the world, more pure and immortal than men.

Flavins Josephus, in his Judaick Antiquities, extolling Abraham's wisdom and piety, writeth thus concerning him; προτερ η τοιαυτα της φυσις μεν προσκυνησε, ει δη και παρακοριεις και διακοκοι, εις θεου των γενεων, καθε δι' αυτων, ετει δη πατη οικοτος των ολων και πρωτον τυτο του θεον αλαταν αλοι συλλειτωμα ει αυτωι, εις του αυτωτου τοματι ει τω τω θεον θεον. Wherefore removing all such impudence, let us worship no beings, that are by nature brothers and germans to us, though ended with far more pure and immortal essences than we are. For all created things, as such, have a kind of germam and brotherly equality with one another, the maker of all things being their common father. But let us deeply infix this first and most holy commandment in our breasts, to acknowledge and worship one only highest God. And again afterwards, so do we also, as by mention, so by supposition, so in sumptuaries seculars, so in fictitious, so in autors, also departing to the θεον, to the Succasion, so in temporal, so in religious, so in various, so in many, so in all, and the whole heaven and world, and the principal parts of them as gods, err, in that they worship the subjects of the prince, whereas the prince alone ought to be worshipped. Thus, according to Philo, the Pagan polytheism consisted in giving religious worship, besides the supreme God, to other created understanding beings, and parts of the world, more pure and immortal than men.

agreeth with what we read in Scripture concerning Abraham, that he called
upon the name of the Lord, יֳי, the God of the whole world; that is, Gen. 21. 23.
he worshipped no particular created beings, as the other Pagans at that
time did, but only that supreme univerfal Numen, which made and con-
tained the whole world. And thus Maimonides interprets that place,
Abraham began to teach, that none ought to be religiously worshipped, face only the God §. 7.
of the whole world. Moreover, the fame Josephus afterwards in his twelfth
book 1 brings in Aristæus (who seems to have been a secret profelyted Greek)
pleading with Ptolemæus Philadæphus, in behalf of the Jews, and their li-
BERTY, after this manner: τὸν βασιλέα ής διητοίζει, τὸ ἔργων τες νόμοις αὐτοῖς,
τὸν γὰρ ἀπαντᾷ συναπόκτων ήδι, καὶ άτοι καὶ άτείς σεβόμεθα, Ζώνα καλούσας αὐτὸν,
τοιμός καὶ τῷ σῶμας εἴμαι τῷ θεῷ, τῷ ιερίκων αὐτῷ νομαίνει: It would well
agree with your goodness and magnanimity, to free the Jews from that mi-
serable captivity, which they are under: since the fame God, who governeth your
kingdom, gave laws to them, as I have by diligent search found out. For both
they and we do alike worship the God, who made all things, we calling him
Zene, because he gives life to all. Wherefore for the honour of that God,
whom they worship after a singular manner, please you to indulge them the li-
BERTY of returning to their native country. Where Aristæus also, according to
the fene of Pagans, thus concludes: Know, O king, that I intercede not for
these Jews, as having any cognition with them, παντων ὁ θερισίων δημώδεσιν
ἐν Θεί, καὶ μιασκων αὐτοῦ κόμων τοις εὐποιούσις, ἐπὶ τέτω καὶ σε παρακαλῶ,
but all men being the workmanship of God, and knowing, that he is delighted
with beneficence, I therefore thus exhort you.

As for the latter Jewifh writers and Rabbins, it is certain, that the gene-
rality of them suppos'd the Pagans to have acknowledged one supreme and
universal Numen, and to have worshipped all their other gods only as his
minifters, or as mediators between him and them: Maimonides in Halacoth 2
describeth the rife of the Pagan polytheifm in the days of Enôh,
after this manner: בְּכָו אָנָה תֵּשֵׁל כִּי חוּדֶה מְשֻׁתָּה נוֹדֶל וּכְבֵּרָה יִתֵּה דְיַה
אות הרוחмыш עשו מה ושלשיה היו היה והיה הרוחмыш ℨ: חוּדֶה מְשֻׁתָּה
אות הרוחмыш עשו מה ושלשיה היו היה והיה הרוחмыш ℨ: חוּדֶה מְשֻׁתָּה
ירשלי ב用手 מתכשטי אלוליסים הלאחדות האל 하יל על תבל תמונת חכמה והלך
ולשון כתום והשלשמה ימי רומיוים ולשון clas מסלול כתום והשלשמה ימי רומיוים
ולשון כתום והשלשמה ימי רומיוים ולשון clas מסלול כתום והשלשמה ימי רומיוים
וסכתי כיבר וכיבר יריIEL ב用手 מתכשטי אלוליסים הלאחדות האל 하יל על תבל תמונת חכמה
In the days of Enôh, the sons of men grievously erred, and the wisemen of that age be-
came brutish, (even Enôh himself being in the number of them;) and their er-
ror was this, that since God had created the stars and spheres to govern the
world, and placing them on high, had bestowed this honour upon them, that they
should be his minifters and subfervient instruments, men ought therefore to praise
them, honour them, and worship them; this being the pleafure of the bleffed
God, that men should magnify and honour thefe, whom himself hath magnified
and honoured, as a king will have his minifters to be reverenced, this honour re-
dounding to himself. Again, the fame Maimonides in the beginning of the
second chapter of that book writeth thus ;

1 Cap. II. §. II. P. 566. Tom. I. Oper. 2 i. e. De Idololatria, Cap. I. §. 1. p. 3.
The Paganans many Gods. Book I.

The foundation of that commandment against strange worship (now commonly called idolatry) is this, that no man should worship any of the creatures whatsoever, neither angel, nor seraph, nor star, nor any of the four elements, nor any thing made out of them. For though be, that worships these things, knows, that the Lord is God, and superior to them all, and worships these creatures no otherwise than Enos and the rest of that age did, yet is he nevertheless guilty of strange worship or idolatry. And that, after the times of Enos also, in succeeding ages, the polytheism of the Pagan nations was no other than this, the worshipping (besides one supreme God) of other created beings, as the ministers of his providence, and as middles or mediators betwixt him and men, is declared likewise by Maimonides (in his More Nevuchim) to have been the universal belief of all the Hebrews or Jews; nor the worship of the gods and goddesses of their ancestors, and all the acts performed to them, are less than acts of the highest communion, nor the authorities of the same, and the reason which is the foundation of all the Hebrews' worship, is that they were not to make the heavens and earth, but they worship these creatures and images only, as the representation of something, which is a mediator between God and them. Moses Abelda, the author of the book entitled, "Aulor Emor Gnolath Tanid, resolves all the Pagan polytheism and idolatry into these two principles, one of which respects God, and the other men themselves: He that worshipeth the gods to them, and attributeth to them the power and majesty of the creator of heaven and earth; or he that worshipeth the images of metal, or stone, or wood, or whatever else, or he that worships the images of the gods or goddesses, or the images of men or beasts; he is guilty of that sin which is called Idolatry. The idolaters first argued thus in respect of God: that since he was of such transcendent perfection above men, it was not possible for men to be united to, or have communion with him, otherwise than by means of certain middle beings or mediators; as it is the manner of earthy kings, to have petitions conveyed to them by the bands of mediators and intercessors. Secondly, they thus argued also in respect of themselves: that being corporeal, so that they could not apprehend God abstracly, they must needs have something sensible to excite and stir up their devotion and fix their imagination upon. Joseph Albo, in the book called Ikkarim, concludes that Abraham, and the other idolatrous kings of Israel and Judah worshipped other gods upon those two accounts mentioned by Maimonides and no otherwise, namely that the supreme God was honoured by worshipping of his ministers, and that there ought to be certain middles and mediators betwixt him and men,
worshipped as Mediators.

As if he should say, all the Gen-
Pagans Knowledge of one Supreme Book I.

tiles know, that they are the only supreme God, but their error and folly confADesth in this, that they think this vanity of worshipping inferior gods, to be a thing agreeable to thy will. And thus also Kimchi in his Commentaries, 

Proverbs, Book i. ii. which and yet, and Jews or i. ii. and Israelites superior to all those other gods and idolaters know, that there is one God superior to all those other gods and idolaters worshipping by them; and in every place are there free-will offerings brought to my name, even amongst the Gentiles. And Kimchi agreeeth with him herein, 

Therefore have all the Gentiles, and all their gods, in the Scripture to this purpose, so that many of the Gentiles and Israelites, who are very learned, have acknowledged the same to be true. Although the Pagans worshipped the best of heaven, yet do they confess me to be the first cause, they worshipping them only as in their opinion certain mediators betwixt me and them. Whether either of these two places of scripture does sufficiently prove what these Jews would have, or no; yet, however, is it evident from their interpretations of them, that themselves supposèd the Pagans to have acknowledged one supreme Deity, and that their other gods were all but his creatures and ministers. Nevertheless, there is another place of scripture, which seems to found more to this purpose, and accordingly hath been thus interpreted by Rabbins and others, Psal. 65. 6. where God is called כְּמָלֵךְ כְּלֵי יְהוָה אֲלֵי אֲהֻלּוֹת כַּלַּמַּכְו אֲלֵי אֲבְרָהָם אֵל אֲוָא כְּמָלֵךְ אָלָם אֲלֵי אֲבְרָהָם אֲלֵי אֲוָא The confidence of all the ends of the earth, and of them that are afar off in the sea, that is, even of all the Pagan world.

Thus we see plainly, that the Hebrew doctors and Rabbins have been generally of this persuasion, that the Pagan nations anciently, at least the intelligent amongst them, acknowledged one supreme God of the whole world; and that all their other gods were but creatures and inferior ministers; which were worshipped by them upon these two accounts, either as thinking, that the honour done to them redounded to the supreme; or else that they might be קְנֵה וְלֹא רְחֵם, their mediators, and intercessors, orators, and negotiators with him. Which inferior gods of the Pagans were
were supposed by these Hebrews to be chiefly of two kinds, angels, and stars or spheres. The latter of which the Jews, as well as Pagans, concluded to be animated and intellectual: for thus Maimonides expressly, 

"They are animated beings, not only are clothed with the splendours of the heavens and the stars, but are all animated beings, and none other."

The stars and spheres are every one of them animated, and endued with life, knowledge and understanding. And they acknowledge him, who commanded and the world was made, every one of them, according to their degree and excellency, praising and honouring him, as the angels do. And this they would confirm from that place of Scripture, N. b. ix. 6. Thou, even thou art Lord alone; thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens with all their host, the earth with all things that are therein, the seas and all that is therein, and thou preferrest them all; and the host of heaven worshippeth thee: the host of heaven being commonly put for the stars.

XXXI. But lastly, this same thing is plainly confirmed from the Scriptures of the New Testament also; that the Gentiles and Pagans, however polytheists and idolaters, were not acquainted with the knowledge of the true God, that is, of the one only self-existent and omnipotent Being, which comprehended all things under him: from whence it must needs follow, that their other many gods were all of them supposed to have been derived from this one, and to be dependent on him.

For first, St. Paul in his epistle to the Romans 1 tells us, that these Gentiles or Pagans did τὸν ἀληθινὸν καὶ ἀληθὴν καθέστω, hold the truth in unrighteousness, or unjustly detain and imprison the same. Which is chiefly to be understood of the truth concerning God, as appears from that which follows, and therefore implies the Pagans not to have been unfurnished of such a knowledge of God, as might and ought to have kept them from all kinds of idolatry, however, by their default it proved ineffectual to that end; as is afterwards declared; ἐκ ἑαυτοῦ ὑπέκαθεν τὸν Ἑβραίον ἐκ τῆς γνώσεως, They liked not V. 28, to retain God in the agitation, or practical knowledge of him. Where there is a distinction to be observed between γνώσεως and ἐπιγνώσεως, the knowledge and the agitation of God; the former whereof, in this chapter, is plainly granted to the Pagans, though the latter be here denied them, because they lapsed into polytheism and idolatry; which is the meaning of these words, μεταλαξαί τὸν ἀληθινὸν τῷ Ἑβραίῳ, They changed the truth of God V. 25. into a lie. Again, the same Apostle there affirmeth, that the τὸ γνωρίζω τῷ Ἑβραίῳ ἦν ἐν αὐτοῖς, That, which may be known of God, was manifest within them, God himself having shewed it unto them. There is something of God unknowable and incomprehensible by all mortals, but that of God, which is knowable, his eternal power and godhead, with the attributes belonging thereunto, is made manifest to all mankind from his works. The invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, being clearly seen and understood by the things that are made. Moreover, this Apostle expressly declareth the Pagans to have known God, in that ceniture, which he giveth of them,
pagans. 

De Decal. p. 753.

V. 21. dióti gróútes tòv Xóv, ὥσ ὡς Θεὸν ἐξήγησαν, that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God; because they fell into polytheism and idolatry. Though the Apostle here instancest only in the latter of those two, their changing the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds and beasts, and creeping things. The reason whereof is, because this idolatry of the Pagans, properly so called, that is, their worshipping of stocks and stones, formed into the likeness of man or beast, was generally taken amongst the Jews for the grossest of all their religious miscarriages. Thus Philo plainly declareth; οὐκ εἴην ὡς, καὶ σελήνη, καὶ τὸ σύμπαντος ὡς ῥαμείς τε καὶ κόσμος, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὀλοκληρωτῶν μερῶν ὡς Θεόν περευοτεί τε καὶ ἔχοντες, διαμαρτάνει μὲν (πῶς γὰρ οὐ, τὰ ὑπηκοόν τὸ κινοῦτος εἰκώνιοις) ἐκατέρω οἱ τῶν ἀλλων ἀδικοῦντες, τῶν ἁμα καὶ ἄθικα ναὸς καὶ τὰς παραπληρώματα ἅλας μορφωθῶντων, &c. Whosover worshipping the sun, and, moon, and the whole heaven, and world, and the chief parts thereof, as gods, do unquestionably err (they honouring the subjects of the prince) but they are guilty of the least iniquity and injustice than those, who form wood and stone, gold and silver, and the like matters, into statues to worship them, &c. of which affection he afterwards gives this account, τὸ γὰρ κάλλιστον θεώρειν τὸν ψυχής ἐξήγησαν, τὸν περὶ τὸν ἐν τῇ προσθήκῃ ἀλληλοδιάλεκτον, because these have cut off the most excellent fulcrum of the soul, the persuasion of the ever-living God, by means whereof, like unballasted ships, they are tossed up and down perpetually, nor can be ever able to rest in any safe harbour. And from hence it came to pass, that the polytheism of the Pagans, their worshipping of inferior gods (as stars and demons) was vulgarly called also by the Jews and Christians idolatry, it being so denominated by them à fame fide; sic. Lastly, the Apostle plainly declares, that the error of the Pagan superstition universally confounded (not in worshipping many independent gods and creators, but) in joining creature-worship, as such, some way or other, with the worship of the creator; τινὲς ὁμαλῶς τότε ἐκλατρεύον τῇ θεῷ παρὰ τὰ τῶν κληρονομία, which words are either to be thus rendred; They [religiously] worshipped the creature, besides the Creator, that preposition being often used in this sense, as for example, in this of Aristotle, where he affirmeth concerning Plato, that he did τὸν ἐν μεν ὡς ὁ δὲ αρχηγός παρὰ τοῖς πράγματα ποιομένοι, (not make numbers to be the things themselves, as the Pythagoreans had done, but) unity and numbers to be besides the things; or τῶς ἀρχηγὸς παρὰ τὰ αἰσθήματα, numbers to exist by themselves, besides the sensibles: he by numbers meaning, as Aristotle himself there expounds it, τὰ σων, the ideas contained in the first intellect (which was Plato's second divine hypostasis) as also by τὸ νῦν, ὁ τοῖς εἰδώλεσιν ἔπεμψε εἰς τὸν ἄνειον, that ipsum unum, or unity, which gives being to these ideas, is understood Plato's first divine hypostasis. Or else the words ought to be translated thus; And worshipped the creature above or more than the creator, that preposition παρὰ being sometimes used comparatively, so as to signify excess, as for example in Luke xiii. 2. Think you that these Galileans were ἀμαρίσοι παρὰ πάντας τῶν Γαλατῶν, sinners beyond all the Galileans? And ver. 4. Think you, that those eighteen, upon whom the tower of Siloam fell, were δείχνοντες παρὰ πάντας, debtors above all the men, that excelled in Jerusalem? According to either of which interpretations, it is sup-
God, testified in Scripture.

Besides this we have in the Acts of the Apostles an oration, which St. Paul made at Athens in the Areopagitick court, beginning after this manner; Tit. men of Athens, I perceive, that ye are every way more than ordinarily religious; for the word δειονοσιον seems to be taken there in a good sense, it being not only more likely, that St. Paul would in the beginning of his oration thus capture benevolentiam, conciliate their benevolence, with some commendation of them, but also very unlikely, that he would call their worshipping of the true God by the name of superstition, for so it followeth; for as I passed by and beheld your sacred things (or monuments) I found an altar with this inscription, Αγαθωτος Θεω, TO THE UNKNOWN GOD. It is true, that both Philostratus and Paulyanis write, that there were at Athens, Αγαθους Θεου θωμας, altars of unknown gods: but their meaning in this might well be, not that there were altars dedicated to unknown gods

The Athenians unknown God,

Book I.

plurally, but that there were several altars, which had this singular inscription, TO THE UNKNOWN GOD. And that there was at least one such, besides this scripture-record, is evident from that dialogue in Lucian’s works, intitled Philopatria

†, where Critias useth this form of oath, Ἔστε τῶν ᾿Αγνοτῶν ἐν ᾿Αθηναῖς, No, by the unknown god at Athens: and Triphoun in the close of that dialogue speaketh thus *, Ὡς εἴδει δὲ τοῦ ἐν ᾿Αθηναῖς ᾿Αγνοτῶν ἐφευρέσθη, καὶ προσκυνήσας, ἕτερα εἰς σοφοὺς ἀληθείας, τῶν εὐχαριστήσων, ὡς καταμνησθήσας, &c. But we having found out that unknown God at Athens, and worshipped him, with hands stretched up to heaven, will give thanks to him, as having been thought worthy to be made subject to this power. Which passages, as they do unquestionably refer to that Athenian inscription either upon one or more altars, so does the latter of them plainly imply, that this unknown God of the Athenians was the supreme governor of the world. And so it follows in St. Paul’s oration, ὅτι ἐφευρέσθην ἐν ᾿Αθηναῖς, τῶν ἐν θαλαμῷ ῥυμίων γὰρ ἦν, Whom therefore you ignorantly worship (under this name of the Unknown God) him declare I unto you, the God that made the world, and all things in it, the Lord of heaven and earth. From which place we may upon firm scripture-authority conclude these two things; first, that by the unknown God of the Athenians was meant the only true God, he who made the world and all things in it; who in all probability was therefore styled by them, ᾿Αγνοτῶν Θεός, the Unknown God, because he is not only invisible, but also incomprehensible by mortals; of whom ῾Ιωσεφυς against Appion 3 writeth thus, that he is ἐνθαμμένον ἐν μεσίν ἡμῶν γνῶσιμόν, τοὺς δὲ κατά γενέσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ, to us only by the effects of his power, but as to his own essence, unknowable or incomprehensible. But when in Dion Cassius the God of the Jews is said to be ᾿αἰνότος καὶ ἀνώτατος, not only invisible but also ineffable, and when he is called in Lucan, Incertus Deus, an Uncertain God, the reason hereof seems to have been, not only because there was no image of him, but also because he was not vulgarly then known by any proper name, the Tetragrammaton being religiously forbidden amongst the Jews in common use, that it might not be profaned. And what some learned men have here mentioned upon this occasion, of the Pagans sometimes sacrificing προσκυνήσας Θεῷ, to the proper and convenient God, without signifying any name, seems to be nothing to this purpose; that proceeding only from a superstitious fear of these Pagans (supposing several gods to prelude over several things) left they should be mistaken, in not applying to the right and proper God, in such certain cases, and so their devotion prove unsuccessful and ineffectual. But that this unknown God is here said to be ignorantly worshipped by the Athenians, is to be understood chiefly in regard of their polytheism and idolatry. The second thing, that may be concluded from hence, is this, that these Athenian Pagans did προσκυνήσας, religiously worship the true God, the Lord of heaven and earth; and so we have a scripture-confutation a fo of that opinion, that the Pagans did not at all worship the supreme God.

Lastly, St. Paul citing this passage out of Aratus a heathen poet, concerning Zeus or Jupiter,

For we are his off-spring, and interpreting the fame of the true God, in whom we live and move, and have our being; we have also here a plain Scripture-acknowledgment, that by the Zeus of the Greekth Pagans was sometimes at leaft meant the true God. And indeed that Aratus his Zeus was neither a man born in Crete nor in Arcadia, but the maker and supreme governor of the whole world, is evident both from the antecedent and the subsequent verses. For Aratus his phenomena begins thus,

Ex Dios 

(which in Tully’s version is ab Jove musarum primordia) and then follows a description of this Zeus or Jupiter:

To this sense, Him, of whom we men are never silent; and of whom all things are full, be permeating and pervading all, and being every where; and whose beneficence we all constantly make use of and enjoy; for we also are his off-spring. Where Theon the scholiast writeth thus: παντός πεπόντος ο Ἀρατος τοῦ τῶν ἄνδρων διεξεχεικέναι μίλλους ζησιν, τὸν παλαιά τῶν 

that Zeus, the father and maker of them: for by Zeus is here to be understood the Demiurgus of the world; or, as he afterwards expresseth it, ὁ τὸ πάλιν ἐνθεμένος ζησε, the God who made all things. Notwithstanding which, we must confess, that this scholiast there adds, that some of these passages of the poet, and even that cited by the Apostle, τὸ γὰρ γίνον 

that is, the air; but without the least shadow of probability, and for no other reason, as we conceive, but only to shew her philological skill. However this is set down by him, in the first place, as the genuine and proper sense of those words, πεπόντα, τὴν θεοῦ τῷ Ζευσιν εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸς τοῦτο ἐγκατακριβέ 

This agreeeth with that title of Jupiter, when he is called the father of gods and men: for if he made us, and all these other things for our use, we may well be called his, and also style him our father and maker. And that this was the only notion, which the poet here had of Zeus or Jupiter, appears undeniably also from the following words; as,
The Natural and True Theology, Book I.

Who, as a kind and benign father, sheweth lucky signs to men; which to understand of the air were very absurd. And,

Als^s ɣας τα'γε σ'ματι εν ʰρεχω ʰστρίφειν,
"Ας ʰμα διανοίας'' ισσίψιας δ' εἰς εἰναυτόν
'Αςφας''

For he also hath fastened the signs in heaven, distinguishing constellations, and having appointed stars to rise and set at several times of the year.

And from this,

Τῦ μιν αἰ τρώτον τε εὐ θοταυν ἱλάσκωλαι,

Therefore is he always propitiated and placated both first and last. Upon which the scholiast thus, ἵδος δὲ αὐτὸ τῶν σωσθῶν, τῷ τῶν μὲν πρῶτων σωσθῶν εἰναι ἴδον τῶν Ὀλυμπίων, διατετάν τῆς κρωνώς, καὶ τρίτον Δίος σωτήρας. This perhaps refers to the libations, in that the first of them was for the heavenly gods, the second for heroes, and the last for Jupiter the Saviour. From whence it plainly appears also, that the Pagans in their sacrifices (or religious rites) did not forget Jupiter the Saviour, that is, the supreme God.

Lastly, from his concluding thus;

Χαρ' πάτερ μέγα Σαῦρα, μεγ' ἁμφότεραν ὑμιάρ'

Where the supreme God is saluted, as the great wonder of the world, and interest of mankind.

Wherefore it is evident from Aratus his context, that by his Zeus or Jupiter was really meant the supreme God, the maker of the whole world; which being plainly confirmed also by St. Paul and the Scripture, ought to be a matter out of controversy amongst us. Neither is it reasonable to think, that Aratus was singular in this, but that he spake according to the received theology of the Greeks, and that not only amongst philosophers and learned men, but even the vulgar also. Nor do we think, that that prayer of the ancient Athenians, commended by M. Antoninus, for its simplicity, is to be understood otherwise, ὕπτον θεοῦ ὕπ τίλια Ζεύ, κατά τῆς ἀρέσι τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ποιδῶν, Rain, rain, O good (or gracious) Jupiter, upon the fields and pastures of the Athenians: upon which the emperor thus, ὅτι μὲν εἰ καὶ εὐχεθείη, ὡς ἄνθρωπος καὶ θεοφόρος: We should either not pray at all (to God) or else thus plainly and freely. And since the Latins had the very same notion of Jupiter, that the Greeks had of Zeus, it cannot be denied, but that they commonly by their Jupiter also understood the one supreme God, the Lord of heaven and earth. We know nothing, that can be objected against this from the Scripture, unless it should be that passage of St. Paul', In the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God. But the meaning thereof is no other than this, that the generality of the world before Christianity, by their natural light, and contemplation of the works of God, did not attain to 1 Corinth. I. 21.
such a practical knowledge of God, as might both free them from idolatry, and effectually bring them to a holy life.

XXXII. But in order to a fuller explication of this Pagan theology, and P. 314, 315. giving yet a more satisfactory account concerning it, there are three heads requisite to be insisted on; first, that the intelligent Pagans worshipped the one supreme God under many several names; secondly, that besides this one God, they worshipped also many gods, that were indeed inferior deities subordinate to him; thirdly, that they worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods, in images, statues and symbols, sometimes abusively called also gods. We begin with the first, that the supreme God amongst the Pagans was *polyonymous*, and worshipped under several personal names, according to several notions and considerations of him, from his several attributes and powers, manifestations, and effects in the world.

It hath been already observed out of *Origen*, that not only the Egyptians, but also the Syrians, Persians, Indians, and other Barbarian Pagans, had, beside their vulgar theology, another more arcane and recondite one, amongst their priests and learned men; and that the same was true concerning the Greeks and Latins also, is unquestionably evident from that account, that hath been given by us of their philosophick theology. Where, by the vulgar theology of the Pagans, we understand not only their mythical or fabulous, but also their political or civil theology, it being truly affirmed by St. *Austin* concerning both these, *Et civilis & fabulosa ambæ fabulose sunt*. ambæque civiles; *That both the fabulous theology of the Pagans was in part their civil, and their civil was fabulous*. And by their more arcane or recondite theology, is doubtless meant that, which they conceived to be the natural and true theology. Which distinction of the natural and true theology, from the civil and political, as it was acknowledged by all the ancient Greek philosophers, but most expressly by *Antistines*, *Plato*, *Aristotle*, and the Stoicks; so was it owned and much insisted upon, both by *Scævola*, that famous Roman *Pontifex*, and by *Varro*, that most learned antiquary; they both agreeing, that the civil theology then established by the Roman laws was only the theology of the vulgar, but not the true; and that there was another theology besides it, called by them natural, which was the theology of wise men and of truth: nevertheless granting a necessity, that in cities and commonwealths, besides this natural and true theology (which the generality of the vulgar were incapable of) there should be another civil or political theology, accommodate to their apprehensions; which civil theology differed from the natural, only by a certain mixture of fabulosity in it, and was therefore looked upon by them as a middle, between the natural, and the fabulous or poctical theology.

Wherefore it was acknowledged, that the vulgar theology of the Pagans, that is, not only their fabulous, but even their civil also, was oftentimes very discrepant from the natural and true theology; though the wise men amongst them, in all ages, endeavoured as much as they could, to diffemble and
and disguise this difference, and by allegorizing the poetick fables of the gods, to bring that theology into some seeming conformity with the natural and philosophick; but what they could not in this way reconcile, was by them excused upon the necessity of the vulgar.

The fabulous theology both of the Greeks and Romans did not only ger-enerate all the other gods, but even Jupiter himself also, their supreme Nu-men, it assigning him both a father and a mother, a grandfather and a grandmother. And though the Romans did not plainly adopt this into their civil theology, yet are they taxed by St. Au-jun \(^1\) for sufferings the statue of Jupiter’s nurse to be kept in the Capitol for a religious monument. And however this differ’d nothing at all from that atheifick doctrine of Ev-en-eru\(^2\). That all the gods were really no other than mortal men, yet was it to-lerated and connived at by the politicians, in way of necessary compliance with the vulgar, it being so extremely difficult for them to conceive any such living being or animal, as was never made, and without beginning. Info-much, that Callimachus \(^3\), who would by no means admit of Jupiter’s sepulchre, either in Crete or Arcadia (but look’d upon it as a foul reproach to him) for this reason,

\[\Sigma i ~f ~\delta ~we, ~i\tau\iota ~\gamma\div \omega ~\alpha\nu\iota,\]

*Because he was immortal and could never die; did notwithstanding himself attribute a temporary generation and nativity to him, as Origen \(^4\) and others observe. Nevertheless, the generality of the more civilized and intelligent Pagans, and even of the poets themselves, did all this while constantly re-tain thus much of the natural and true theology amongst them, that Jupiter was the father both of gods and men; that is, the maker of the whole world, and consequently himself without father, eternal and unmade, according to that Peleadean oracle before cited out of Pausanias,*

\[Ze\iota ~\nu, ~Ze\iota ~\iota\iota, ~Ze\iota ~\varepsilon\omicron\tau\omicron\alpha\omicron\sigma\tau\omicron\nu.\]

Again the civil theology of the Pagans, as well as the poetick, had not only many phantaftick gods in it, but also an appearance of a plurality of independent deities; it making several supreme in their several territories and functions; as one to be the chief ruler over the heavens, another over the air and winds, another over the sea, and another over the earth and hell; one to be the giver of corn, another of wine; one the god of learning, another the god of pleasure, and another the god of war; and so for all other things. But the natural theology of the Pagans (so called) though it did admit a plurality of gods too, in a certain sense, that is, of inferior deities subordinate to one supreme; yet did it neither allow of more independent deities than one, nor own any gods at all, but such as were natu-ral, that is, such as had a real existence in nature and the world without, and

\(^1\) De Civitate Dei, Lib. V. Cap VII. p. 119.  
\(^2\) Apud Augutin. ubi supra.  
\(^3\) Hymno in Jovem. Verf. 9.  
\(^4\) Adverf. Celsum, Lib. III. p. 137.
and not in men's opinion only. And these Varro¹ concluded to be no other than first, the soul of the world, and then the animated parts thereof superior to men; that is, one supreme universal Numen unmade, and other particular generated gods, such as stars, daemons, and heroes. Wherefore all the other gods besides these are frequently exploded by Pagan writers (as Cicero and others) under the name of Dii Poetici, that is, not philosophical, but poetical gods, and Dii Commentitii and Fictitii, that is, not natural and real, but feigned and fictitious gods. They in the mean time giving this account of them, that they were indeed nothing else but so many several names and notions of one supreme Numen, according to his several powers and various manifestations, and effects in the world; it being thought fit by the wisdom of the ancient Pagan theologers, that all those manifold glories and perfections of the Deity should not be huddled up, and as it were crowded and crumpled together, in one general acknowledgment of an invisible Being, the Maker of the world, but that they should be distinctly and severally displayed, and each of them adored singly and apart; and this too (for the greater pomp and solemnity) under so many personal names. Which perhaps the unskilful and fottish vulgar might sometimes mistake, not only for so many real and substantial, but also independent and self-existent deities.

We have before proved, that one and the same supreme God, in the Egyptian theology, had several proper and personal names given him, according to several notions of him, and his several powers and effects; that blischus himself, in that passage already cited, plainly affirming thus much; the demiurgic mind and president of truth, as with wisdom it proceedeth to generation, and bringeth forth the hidden power of the occult reasons, contained within itself, into light, is called in the Egyptian language Ammon; as it artificially effects all things with truth, Pitha; as it is productive of good things, Oliris; besides which it hath also several other names, according to its other powers and energies: as namely, Neith, (or according to Proclus his copy, Nehitis, Nelsbas) the tutelar god of the city Sais, from whence probably the Greek 'Athen was derived, (the Athenians being said to have been at first a colony of these Saiites) and this is the divine wisdom diffusing itself thorough all. So likewise Serapis, which though some would have to be the sun, is by others plainly described as an universal Numen. As Ariiphides in his eighth oration upon this god, 93: Serapis; Οἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς μεγαλός πολίτες Αἴγυπτος πόλεως πολίτες, καὶ ἵνα τότε άθω- καλῶς Δίας, ότι ἐκ ἀπολειπέτη οὐνάμει περίτη άλλα οίδα πάντων ἦκεν, καὶ τὸ παν- πλήγμενον τῶν γορίν Θεῶν οἷον οἱ δήμοι οὐνάμει; τὸ πρὸς τύχον, καὶ άλλα ἀπ᾿ άλλα ἀθρατίως παλαιός, οὐδὲ παπάς καυκάζων πάντων, ἀκαθά ταῖς ἔσχα τίξης. They, who inhabit the great city in Egypt, call upon this god Serapis as their only Jupiter, be being supposed to be no way defective in power, but to pervade all things, and to fill the whole universe. And whereas the powers and honours of the

The supreme God polyonymous, Book I.

The other gods are divided, and some of them are invoked for one thing, and some for another; this is looked upon by them as the Corypheus of all the gods, who contains the beginning and end of all things, and who is able to supply all wants. Cneoph is also described by Eusebius 1 as that divine intellect, which was the demiurgus of the world, and which giveth life to all things, as he is by Plutarch 2 said to be οὐκ ἔχων & unmade; so that this was also another Egyptian name of God; as likewise was Emeb and Eitfon in Jamblicbus 3, though these may be severally distinguished into a trinity of divine hypotheses. Lastly, when Isis, which was sometimes called Multimammea, and made all over full of breasts, to signify her feeding all things, thus describes herself in Apuleius 4, Summa numinum, prima calitum, deorum dearunque facies uniformis, cuius numer unicum multiforini specie, ritu vario, nomine multijugo tois veneratur orbis; as she plainly makes herself to be the supreme Deity, so doth she intimate, that all the gods and godesses were compondiously contained in her alone, and that she (i. e. the supreme God) was worshipped under several personal names, and with different rites, over the whole Pagan world. Moreover, this is particularly noted concerning the Egyptians by Damascius 5 the philopher, that, τὸ νῦν ἄγισθακέν εἰ; πολλὰς θείας ἴδοι γένης, They multiplied the first intelligible (or the supreme Deity) breaking and dividing the same into the names and properties of many gods. Now, the Egyptian theology was in a manner the pattern of all the rest, but especially of those European theologies, of the Greeks and Romans.

Who likewise, that they often made many gods of one, is evident from their bestowing so many proper and personal names upon each of those inferior gods of theirs; the sun, and the moon, and the earth; the first whereof, usually called Apollo, had therefore this epithet of πολυόμορφος, commonly given to him, the god with many names. Which many proper names of his Macrobius insineth upon in his Saturnalia, though probably making more of them than indeed they were. And the moon was not only so called, but also Dana, and Lucina, and Hecate, and otherwise; insomuch that this goddess also hath been styled Polyonymous as well as her brother the sun. And lastly, the earth, besides those honorable titles, of Dea dea, and magna dea, and mater deorum, The good goddess, and the great goddesses, and the mother of the gods, was multiplied by them into many goddesses, of Vesta, and Rhea, and Cybele, and Ceres, and Proserpina, and Ops, &c. And for this cause was she thus described by Αζεβίλυς 6; 

Kal Γαία πολλῶν οὐομάτων μονή μία 

Et Tellus multerum nominum facies una.

Now if these inferior gods of the Pagans had each of them so many personal names bestowed upon them, much more might the supreme God be polyonymous among them; and so indeed he was commonly styled, as that learned

learned Grammarians Hesychius intimates, upon that word Πολυωνυμον, τοια μετάλω ονομάζοντας, ας ιπνοδέους Απόλλωνος, they called the Monad thus, and it was also the epithet of Apollo; where, by the Monad, according to the Pythagoric language, is meant the supreme Deity, which was thus styled by the Pagans Πολυωνυμον, theBeing that hath many names. And accordingly Cleantches thus beginneth that forecited hymn of his to him,

Κώτερα θεοκρατος, πολυωνυμον,

Thou most glorious of all the immortal gods, who art called by many names. And Zeno, his master, in Laertius, expressly declareth, ο Θεος πολλαί προσηρεξιας ονομάζεται κατά τάς δυνάμεις. God is called by many several names, according to his several powers and virtues; whose instances shall be afterwards taken notice of. Thus also the writer De Mundo, Ει δε διοο πολυωνυμος ισι, καλομαζόμενος τοις πάσιν πάντων ονομα τουτος νοομιμι. God, though he be but one, is polyonymous, and variously denominated from his several attributes, and the effects produced by him. Quæcumque voles (faith Seneca) illi propria nomina appatibus, vim aliquam effeuntque cælestium rerum continentium. Tot appellations ejus profunt e<j>s quot munera: You may give God whatsoever proper names you please, so they signify some force and effect of heavenly things: He may have as many names, as be bath manifestations, offices and gifts. Macrobius 

also, from the authority of Virgil, thus determines, Unius Dei effeptus varios pro variiis con-fendos esse (or as Vossius corrects it, censeri) numinis, That the various effects of one God were taken for several gods; that is, expressed by several personal names; as he there affirmeth, the divers virtues of the sun to have given names to divers gods, because they gave occasion for the sun to be called by several proper and personal names. We shall conclude with that of Maximus Madaurenensis, before cited out of St. Auguin, Hujus virtutes per mundanum opus diffusas nos multos vocabulis invocabamus, quoniam nomen ejus proprium ignoramus. Ita fin, ut dnum ejus quasi quae dam membra carptim variis supplicationibus prosequimur, totum colere profecto videamus. The virtues of this one supreme God, diffused throughout the whole world, we (Pagans) invoke under many several names, because we are ignorant what his proper name is. Wherefore we thus worshipping his several divided members, must needs be judged to worship him whole, we leaving out nothing of him. With which latter words feemeth to agree that of the Poet, wherein Jupiter thus bespeaks the other gods;

Caecile, mea membra, Dei; quos nostra potestas
Officiis divisa facit.

Where it is plainly intimated, that the many Pagan gods were but the several divided members of the one supreme Deity, whether, because according to the Stoical sense, the real and natural gods were all but parts of the mundane soul; or else because all those other fantastic gods were nothing but several personal names, given to the several powers, virtues, and offices of the one supreme.

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1 Lib. VII. Segm. 147. p. 458.
2 Epift. ad Augustin. Vide Augustin, Oper.
Now the several names of God, which the writer De Mundo 1 instanceth in, to prove him polyonymous, are first of all such as these; Deum, and and Ἀρεωτζής, the Thunderer and Lightener, Τέιος, the Giver of rain, Ἐπαυγμεών, the乙方ower of fruits, Πάλαις, the Keeper of cities, Μιλιχίς, the Mild and Placable, under which notion they sacrificed no animals to him, but only the fruits of the earth; together with many other such epithets, as Φίλας, Εὐνής, Στράτης, Τροπαῦχος, Καδεῖνες, Παλαιμώκορ, &c. and lastly, he is called Σάτης and Ελβίρις; Saviour and Juster. Answeraably to which, Jupiter had many such names given him also by the Latins, as Viator, Invictus, Opitulus, Stator; the true meaning of which last, (according to Seneca 2) was not that, which the historians pretend, quod posset votum susceptum, acies Romanorum fugientium sitis, because once after vows and prayers offered to him, the flying army of the Romans was made to stand; sed quod sit beneficio ejus omnia, but because all things by means of him stand firm and are established. For which fame reason he was called also by them (as St. Austin informs us 3) Centupeda, as it were, standing firm upon an hundred feet; and Tigillus, the beam, prop, and supporter of the world. He was flewed also by the Latins (amongst other titles) Almus and Ruminus, i. e. He that nourisheth all things as it were with his breaths. Again that writer De Mundo addeth another sort of names, which God was called by; as "Ἀπάρεκτος, Necessity, because he is an immovable essence, though Cicero gives another reason for that appellation, Interdum Deum necesse tatem appellant, quina nihil alter esse possit, atque ab eo consistuisse fit; they sometimes call God Necessity, because nothing can be otherwise than as it is him appointed. Likewise "Ἐγκύλος, because all things are by him connected together, and proceed from him unbindedly. Ἑξομολογίας, because all things in the world are by him determined, and nothing left infinite (or undetermined.) Μοίρης, because he makes an apt division and distribution of all things. "Ἀγγελίας, because his power is such, as that none can possibly avoid or escape him. Lastly, that ingenious fable, (as he calls it) of the three fatal fitters, Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, according to him, meant nothing but God neither, τάς ἐπὶ πάσας ἐτῶς ὑπὸ ἐλαχίστου τι, τῶν ὀδών ὤ ὁ Ὀμός, κατὰ τίς ἐπὶ τῶν ἑκάστων Πλατωνίστου. All this is nothing else but God, as the noble and generous Plato also intimates, when he affirmeth God to contain the beginning, and middle, and end of all things. And both Cicero and Seneca tell us, that, amongst the Latins, God was not only called Fatum, but also Natura, and Fortuna. Quid aliud est natura (faith Seneca 4) quam Deus, & divina ratio, toti mundo & partibus ejus inserta? What is nature else, but God and the divine Reason, inserted into the whole world and all its several parts? He adding, that God and nature were no more two different things, than Annaeus and Seneca. And, Nonnullum Deum (faith Cicero 5) Fortunam appellat, quod efficit multa improvisa, & nec opinata nosis, proper obsecuramentem ignorantiamque causorum; They sometimes call God also by the name of Fortune, because he surpriseth us in many events, and bringeth to pass things unexpected to us, by reason of the obscurity of causes and our ignorance. Seneca thus concludes concerning these, and the like names of God, Omnia ejusdem

2 De Beneficis, Lib. IV. Cap. VII. p. 427.  
4 Ut supra.  
5 Acad. Quæst. Lib. I. Cap. VII. p. 213.3.
Chap. IV. according to his universal Notion.

483.

ejusdem Dei nomina sunt, variè utentis sua potestate; these are all names of one
and the same God, variously manifesting his power.

But concerning most of these forementioned names of God, and such as c. D. 1. 7.
are like to them, it was rightly observed by St. Aushin, that they had no c. 11.
such appearance or shew of many distinct gods; Hec omnia cognomina im-
potuerant uni Deo, propter causas potestatisque diversas, non tamen propter tot
res, etiam tot deos cum esse coegerunt, &c. Though the Pagans imposed all
these several names upon one God, in respect of his several powers, yet did
they not therefore seem to make so many gods of them; as if Victor were one
god, and Invictus another god, and Centupeda another god, and Tigillus
another, and Ruminus another, &c. Wherefore there are other names of
God used amongst the Pagans, which have a greater show and appearance
of so many distinct deities, not only because they are proper names, but also
because each of them had their peculiar temples appropriated to them, and
their different rites of worship. Now these are of two sorts; first, such as
signify the Deity according to its universal and all-comprehending nature;
and secondly, such as denote the same only according to certain particular
powers, manifestations, and effects of it in the world. Of the first kind
there are not a few. For first of all, PAN, as the very word plainly im-
plies him to be a universal Numen, and as he was supposed to be the Har-
monies of the whole world, or to play upon the world as a musical instru-
ment, according to that of Orpheus ¹ (or Onomacritus)

'Αμονιάν νόμοιο νέινω φιλοταίρων μολπήν.

So have we before showed, that by him the Arcadians and Greeks meant, not
the corporeal world inanimate, nor yet as endued with a senseless nature on-
ly, but as proceeding from an intellectual principle or divine spirit, which
framed it harmoniously, and as being still kept in tune, acted and govern-
ed by the same. Which therefore is said to be the universal pastor and
shepherd of all mankind, and of the whole world, according to that other
Orphick passage,

Βίοκον ἀνθρώπων γένος, ἡ ἄνεμων γαῖας.

Paeanum humanum genus, ac sine limite terram.

And this Pan Socrates, in Plato's Phaedrus, plainly invokes as the supreme
Numen. Pan therefore is the one only God (for there cannot possibly be
more than one Pan, more than one all or universal) who contained all
within himself, displayed all from himself, framing the world harmoniously,
and who is in a manner all things.

Again, JANUS, whom the Romans first invoked in all their sacrifices
and prayers, and who was never omitted, whatsoever god they sacrificed
unto, was unquestionably many times taken for a universal Numen, as in
this of Martial ²,

———Nitidique fator pulcherrime mundi.

And again in this of Ovid:

Quicquid ubique vides, calum, mare, nubila, terras,
Omnia sunt nostra clauia patente manu:
Me penes est unum vasti custodia mundi.

From which passages it also appears, that Janus was not the meer sense-les and inanimate matter of the world, but a principle presiding over it. And without doubt all the beginnings of things were therefore referred to this Janus, because he was accounted the most ancient god, and the beginning of all things. St. Austin concluding him to be the same with Jupiter, therefore quarrels with the Pagans (that is, with their civil theology) for thus making two gods of one: Cum ego Janus mundus sit, & Jupiter mundus sit, unusque sit mundus, quare duo dii sunt Janus & Jupiter? Quare seorsum habent templum, seorsum aras, diversa sacra, dissimilia simulacra? Si propter ha, quia alia vis est primordiorum, alia causaorum, ex illa Jovis numen accepit: nunquid si unus homo in diversis rebus duas habeat potestates, aut duas artes, (quia singularum diversa vis est) ideo duo dicuntur artifices &c. Since therefore Janus is the world, and Jupiter is the world, and there is but one world, how can Janus and Jupiter be two gods? Why have they their temples apart, their altars apart, distinct sacred things, and statues of different forms? If because the force of beginnings is one, and the force of causes another, be it therefore called Janus from the former, and Jupiter from the latter; I ask whether or no, if one man have two several arts about different things, he therefore be to be called two artificers? Or is there any more reason, why one and the same god, having two powers, one over the beginnings of things, and another over the causes, should therefore be accounted two gods? Where, when Jupiter and Janus are both said to be the world, this is to be understood properly not of the matter, but the soul or mind of the world, as St. Austin himself elsewhere declares; Sit Jupiter corporeo hujus mundi animus, qui universam iisiam molem, ex quatuor elementis constitutam atque compatiendam, implet & movet; Let Jupiter be the mind of this corporeal world, which both filleth and moveth that whole bulk, compounded and made up of the four elements. Nevertheless, as the soul and body both together are called the man, so was the whole animated world, by the Pagans, called God. Now the forementioned argumentation of St. Austin, though it be good against thePagans civil theology, yet their other arcane and natural theology was unconcerned in it, that plainly acknowledging all to be but one God, which for certain reasons was worshipped under several names, and with different rites. Wherefore Janus and Jupiter, being really but different names for one and the same supreme God, that conjecture of Solarus seems very probable, that the Romans derived their Janus from Zæus, the Ætolian Jupiter.

GENIUS was also another of the twenty select Roman gods; and that this was likewise a universal Numen, containing the whole nature of things, appears
appears from this of Festus, Genium appellabant Deum, qui vim obtrineret rerum omnium genendarum; they called that God, who hath the power of begetter or producing all things. Genius. And St. Agfin also plainly de- clareth Genius to be the same with Jupiter; that is, to be but another name for the one supreme God; Cum alio loco [Varro] dicit, Genium esse unius; juque animum rationalem; talem autem mundi animum Deum esse, ad hoc idem unique revocat, ut tanquam universalis Genius, ipse mundi animus esse creadtur. His of igitur, quem appellant Jovem. And afterwards, Restat ut eum singulariter & excellenter dicant deum Genius, quem dicunt mundi animam; ac per hoc Jovem. When Varro elsewhere calleth the rational mind of every one, a Genius, and affirmeth such a mind of the whole world, to be God; be plainly implieth, that God is the universal Genius of the world, and that Genius and Jupiter are the same. And though Genius be sometimes used for the mind of every man, yet the god Genius, spoken of by way of excellency, can be no other than the mind of the whole world, or Jupiter.

Again, that CHRONOS or SATURN was no particular Deity, but the univerfal Numen of the whole world, is plainly affirmed by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, where commending the fertility of Italy, he writeth thus; οὖν δὲ θηγομένῳ τῶν παλαιῶν ὑπολειπέν τῷ Ἀρμόν τῷ χρύσιν ταυτίν, τῶν μὲν Ῥωμ. Αριστ. ἀνάξαν τῶν, οἰκεῖας εἶναι πάσης τοῦ χρόνου ἀπόκρυπτος, ή πληρωτῆς αὐθεντικός: εἰτε. 1. p. 24. Χρόνιον οὕτω διὰ καὶ θεόν, οὔς Ἐλληνες άζωνικόν, εἰτε Κρόνιον οὔς Ῥωμαίοι, πάσαν δὲ τιμιο-

ληφτά τιν τῷ κάμπτει φύσιν. έπόσαν ἐν τε αὐτοκράτορι Wherefore it is no wonder, if the ancients thought this country to be sacred to Saturn, they supposing this god to be the giver and perfesser of all happiness to men; whether we ought to call him Chronos, as the Greeks will have it, or Cronos as the Romans; be being either way such a god, as comprehends the whole nature of the world. But the word Saturn was Hetrurian (which language was originally Oriental) and being derived from Ζῆν; signifies hidden I to that by Saturn was meant that hidden principle of the universe, which containeth all things; and he was therefore called by the Romans Deus Latius, the hidden God; as the wife of Saturn in the pontifical books is Lata Saturni, and the land itself (which in the Hetrurian language was Saturnia) is in the Roman Latium; from whence the inhabitants were called Latins, which is as much as to say, the worshippers of the hidden God. Moreover, that Saturn could not be inferior to Jupiter, according to the fabulous Theology, is plain from hence, b.cause: he is therein said to have been his Father. But then the question will be, how Saturn and Jupiter could be both of them one and the same univerfal Numen? To which there are several Answers. For first, Plato who propounds this difficulty in his Cratylus, solves it thus; That by Jupiter here is to be understood the soul of the world, which, according to his theology, was derived from a perfect and eternal mind or intellect (which Chronos is interpreted to be) as Chronos also depended upon Uranus or Calus, the supreme heavenly God, or first original Deity. So that Plato here finds his Trinity of divine hypostases, archical and univerfal, Υἱς, and Υγις, in Uranus, Chronos, and Zeus; or Calus, Saturn, and Jupiter. Others conceive, that according to the plainer

and more simple sense of Hesiod's Theogonia, that Jupiter, who, together with Neptune and Pluto, is said to have been the son of Saturn, was not the supreme Deity, nor the soul of the world neither, but only the Aether, as Neptune was the sea, and Pluto the earth. All which are said to have been begotten by Chronos or Saturn the son of Uranus; that is as much as to say, by the hidden virtue of the supreme heavenly God. But the writer De Mundo, though making Jupiter to be the first and supreme God, yet (taking Chronos to signify immensity of duration, or eternity) will have Jupiter to be the son of Chronos in this sense, because he doth diuinu & aiou saitpomousi òc 

12. tinw aivos, continue from one eternity to another; so that Chronos and Zeus are to him in a manner one and the same thing. But we are apt to think, that no ingenious and learned Pagan, who well understood the natural theology, would deny, but that the best answer of all to this difficulty is this, that there is no coherent sense to be made of all things in the fabulous theology. St. Austin, from Varro, gives us this account of Saturn, that it is he, who produceth from himself continually the hidden seeds and forms of things, and reduceth or receiveth them again into himself; which some think to have been the true meaning of that fable concerning Saturn his devouring his male-children, because the forms of these corporeal things are perpetually destroyed, whilst the material parts (signified by the female) still remain. However, it is plain, that this was but another Pagan adumbration of the Deity, that being also sometymes thus defined by them, as St. Austin likewise informs us, Sinus quidam naturæ in seipso contineos omnis, A certain bosom, or deep hollow, and inward recess of nature, which containeth within itself all things. And St. Austin himself concludes, that according to this Varronian notion of Saturn likewise, the Pagans Jupiter and Saturn were really but one and the same Numin. De Civ. D. I. 7. c. 13. Wherefore we may with good reason affirm, that Saturn was another name for the supreme God amongst the Pagans, it signifying that secret and hidden power, which comprehends, pervades, and supports the whole world; and which produces the seeds or feminal principles and forms of all things from itself. As also Uranus or Coelus was plainly yet another name for the same supreme Deity; (for the first divine hypostasis) comprehending the whole.

In the next place, though it be true, that Minerva be sometimes taken for a particular god, or for God according to a particular manifestation of him in the Aether, (as shall be shewed afterwards;) yet was it often taken also for the supreme God, according to his most general notion, or as a universal Numin diffusing himself through all things. Thus hath it been already proved, that Neith or Neithas was the same amongst the Egyptians, as Athena amongst the Greeks, and Minerva amongst the Latins; which that it was a universal Numin, appears from that Egyptian inscription in the temple of this god, I am all that was, is, and shall be. And according y Abenagoras tells us, that Athena of the Greeks was, ζεφωτις εἰκόνος τεύχος θεοῦ, Wisdom paffing and diffusing itself through all things: as in the book of Wisdom it is called, ζεφωτις τεύχος, the ArtiBex of all things, and is said δίκαιον εἰς τῆς εἰκόνος, to pass and move through all things. Wherefore this Athena

Athena or Minerva of the Pagans was either the first supreme Deity, a perfect and infinite Mind, the original of all things; or else a second divine hypostasis, the immediate off-spring and first-begotten of that first original Deity. Thus Aristides in his oration upon Minerva, πάντα μὲν ἐκ ταύτα ἀλήθειας εἰς Ἀθηνᾶς καθάλλαν δέ εἰπεν, τοῦ πάντων δημιουργὸς ὁ βεβαιότατος παύς ἐγι μόνον δὲ μόνων. οὐ γὰρ ἐξερχόμεν ἐστιν ὁμόλογον ποιήσειν αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ αὐκολογήσεις αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτοῦ, αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἀυτὸ γένος τῇ γῇ τίνις τοῖς ἔστιν ὅπερ ἐγι μόνον βεβαιώσεις γνωσά τοίς παύσει, ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμολογίῳ, τὰ τῷ γίνεσθαι γονιμόν, &c. Wherefore all the most excellent things are in Minerva, and from her: but to speak briefly of her, this is the only immediate off-spring of the only maker and king of all things; for he had none of equal honour with himself, upon whom he should bestow her, and therefore residing into himself, he begot her and brought her forth from himself; so that this is the only genuine off-spring of the first father of all. And again, Ποιδαγδόρι οἱ γὰρ Φήσι, ἀντικαταστάσεις τὸν τὰς ἐποίησεν Ἀθηνᾶς μὲν γὰρ εἰς μείζον ἡ δέ, τῶν ἁγίων ἀλλοις ἄλλα ἐπιτέθευς πρῶτον παρὰ τὸ πατρὸς παραδόθενσα αὐτῷ ἔπηγεν τίνες ὡς τοῖς οὖς ἐποιήσαις ὑπὸ τῶν οὗτος, καὶ εὐσεβῶς ὅπως ἄλλο τίτω δην Πινδάρος affirmed concerning Minerva, that sitting at the right-hand of her father, she there received commands from him to be delivered to the gods. For she is greater than the angels, and commandeth them some one thing and some another, accordingly as she had first received of her father; she performing the office of an interpreter and introducer to the gods, when it is needful. Where we may observe by the way, that this word angel came to be in use amongst the Pagans from Jews and Christians, about this very age that Aristides lived in; after which we meet with it frequently in the writings of their philosophers. Lastly, Aristides thus concludes his oration upon Minerva; ἄνθρωπον τὸν κύριον τὰς ἐποίησαν Ἀθηνᾶς τοῖς αὐτῶν τῇ τέτοιᾳ ὁμολογίᾳ εἰς τὸν Ποιδαγδόριον ἐποίησεν τῷ Διὸς ἐκ κοινής ἕρμην τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τῇ τούτῳ, ἡμικεράνθη ὁπερ τὸν τῆς κυριαρχίας τῶν ἑνών ἐποίησα τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναγόμενον ἐποίησεν τῷ τούτῳ τῷ Διὸς ἐπεκάλεσεν ἐκ τῆς ἐποίησαν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς. He that from what we have said will determine, that Minerva is as it were the power and virtue of Jupiter himself, will not err. Wherefore (not to enumerate all the minute things belonging to Minerva) we conclude thus concerning her, that all the works of Jupiter are common with Jupiter and Minerva. Wherefore that conceit, which the learned and industrious Veftius conceived somewhere seems to favour, that the Pagans universal Numen was no other than a fentlefs nature, or spermatick reason of the whole world, undirected by any higher intellectual principle, (which is indeed no better than downright atheism) is plainly confuted from hence, they making wisdom and understanding, under these names of Neith, Athena, and Minerva, to be either the absolutely supreme Deity, or the first begotten off-spring of it.

To Minerva may be added Apollo, who, though often taken for the sensible fun animated, and so an inferior Deity, yet was not always understood in this sense, nor indeed then when he was reckoned amongst the twelve Consentes, because the sun was afterwards added to them, in the number of the eight select gods. And that he was sometimes taken for the supreme universal Numen, the maker of the sun and of the whole world, is plainly testified

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1 Pag. 192.
2 De Idololatr. Lib. VII. Cap. I. p. 718.
Moreover Urania Aphrodite, the Heavenly Venus or Love, was a universal Numen also, or another name of God, according to his more general notion, as comprehending the whole world; it being the same with that *Eros, or Love, which Orpheus, and others in Aristotle, made to be the first original of all things: for it is certain, that the ancients distinguished concerning a double Venus and Love. Thus Paufanias in Plato's Sympoion, ἦ μὴ γέ πι πρεσβύτεραι καὶ θανάτου ὁμοίως θυωράτω, ἥν ὅδ' καὶ ἔφηκόν ἐπισυναγαγόμεν, ἥ δὲ νεώτεραι, Δίος καὶ Δίων, ἥν ἐς ποιήσαμεν καλόν, Λυκαρίου δὲ καί Ἑρμία, τὸ δ' ἐν τούτῳ συνεργόν, παρέξασθαι ὅρκῳ καλείτας, τὸ δ' υφαίσθην. There are two Venus's, and therefore two Loves; one the older and without a mother, the daughter of Uranus or heaven, which we call the heavenly Venus; another younger, begotten from Jupiter and Dione, which we call the vulgar Venus: and accordingly are there of necessity two loves, answering to these two Venus's, the one vulgar and the other heavenly. The elder of these two Venus's is in Plato laid to be senior to Japhet and Saturn, and by Orpheus the oldest of all things, and πάντα γανέως, the first begetter of all. Upon which account, perhaps, it was called by the oriental nations Mithra or Genitrix, as being the fruitful mother of all. This was also the same with Plato's τὸ πρώτον καλὸν, the first fair; the cause of all pulchritude, order and harmony in the world. And Paufanias the writer tells us, that there were temples severally erected to each of these Venus's or Loves, the heavenly and the vulgar; and that Urania, or the heavenly Venus, was so called, ἵνα μὴ ἐν τῷ συμβρότῳ καθαρῷ καὶ ἀπαλαμάμπῳ πᾶν σώματα, because the love belonging to it was pure and free from all corporeal affection: which, as it is in men, is but a participation of that first Urania, or heavenly Venus and Love, God himself. And thus is Venus described by Euripides in Stobaeus, as the supreme Numen:

Thus also by Aeschylos, Ἐραθέσθ', ὅπερ μὴν ἄνων ἡμέρας, &c. *Eros μὴ γέρας καὶ μάρτυρας, &c.

To this sense, Do you not see, how great a God this Venus is? but you are never able to declare her greatness, nor to measure the vast extent thereof. For this is she, which nourisheth both thee and me, and all mortals, and which makes heaven and earth friendly to confine together, &c. But by Ovid this is more fully expressed, in his Fastorum 4:

Ilia

* In Hymno in Venerem, p. 141. Oper.
* In Beoic. Lib. IX. Cap. XVI. p. 742.
* Lib. IV. vers. 91.
Where all the gods are said to have been created or made by Venus, that is, by the one supreme Deity. But lastly, this is best of all performed by Severinus Boetius, a Christian philosopher and poet, in this manner:

Quod mundus stabili fide
Conordes variat vices,
Quod pugnantia semina
Fœdus perpetuum tenet;
Quod Phœbus rœsœm diem
Currur provebit aureo: &c.
Hanc rerum seriem ligat,
Terras ac pelagus regens,
Et calo imperitans, AMOR, &c.
Hic si frenea remiferit,
Quicquid nunc amat invicem,
Bellum continuo geret.
Hic sancto populos quoque
Juniores sedere continet;
Hic & conjugii sacrum
Castis usitit amoribus, &c.
O felix hominum genus,
Si vestros animos AMOR,
Quo calum regitur, regat.

And to this Urania, or heavenly Venus, was near of kin also that third Venus in Pausanias called "Ἀναρέφως, and by the Latinus Venus verticordia, pure and chaste Love, expulsive of all unclean lufts, to which the Romans consecrated a statue, as Valerius M. tells us, (L. 8. c. 15.) quo facilis virginitum mulierumque mentes à libidine ad pudicitiam converterentur; to this end, that the minds of the female sex might then the better be converted from lust and wantonness to chastity. We conclude therefore, that Urania, or the heavenly Venus, was sometimes amongst the Pagans a name for the supreme Deity, as that which is the most amiable being, and first pulchritude, the most benign and fecund begetter of all things, and the constant harmonizer of the whole world.

Again, though Vulcan, according to the most common and vulgar notion of him, be to be reckoned amongst the particular gods, yet had he also another more universal consideration. For Zeno in Laertius¹ tells us, that the supreme God was called "Ἡρας" or Vulcan, κατὰ τὸν εἰς τὸ τεχνεύτων τῷ διάτασ

¹ Lib. VII. segm. 147. p. 458.
Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, Book I.

s in α'εενοκα αυτος, as his Hegemonick acted in the artificial fire. Now Plutarch 1 and Stobæus 2 testify, that the Stoicks did not only call nature, but also the supreme Deity itself, (the architect of the whole world) τρικον πυς, an artificial fire, they conceiving him to be corporeal. And Jamblicus 3 making Ptitha to be the same supreme God, amongst the Egyptians, with Osiris and Hammon, or rather, more properly, all of them alike the soul of the world, tells us, that Hephaestus, in the Greekish theology, was the same with this Egyptian Ptitha; Ἐλληνες εἰς Ηέρωνος μεταλαμβάνοντο τὸν Φθη, τῷ τετρακῳ χρόνῳ περισσάλλων, amongst the Greeks Hephaestus (or Vulcan) answers to the Egyptian Ptitha. Wherefore as the Egyptians by Ptitha, so the Greeks by Hephaestus, sometimes understood no other than the supreme God, or at least the soul of the world, as artificially framing all things.

Furthermore, Seneca gives us yet other names of the supreme Deity, according to the sense of the Stoicks; Hunc & liberum patrem, &c. Herculem, quod vis ejus invicta sit; Mercurium, quia ratio penes eft, numerique, & ordo, & scientia. Furthermore, our philosophers take this author of all things to be Liber Pater, Hercules, and Mercury; the first, because he is parent of all things, &c. the second, because his force and power is unconquerable, &c. and the third, because there is in and from him reason, number, order, and knowledge. And now we see already, that the supreme God was sufficiently polyonymous amongst the Pagans; and that all these, Jupiter, Janus, Genius, Saturn, Calus, Minerva, Apollo, Aphrodite Urania, Hephaestus, Liber Pater, Hercules, and Mercury, were not so many really distinct and substantial gods, much less self-existent and independent ones; but only several names of that one supreme universal and all-comprehending Numen, according to several notions and considerations of him.

But besides these, there were many other Pagan gods called by Servius diti speciales, special or particular gods; which cannot be thought neither to have been so many really distinct and substantial beings (that is, natural gods) much less self-existent and independent, but only so many several names or notions of one and the same supreme Deity, according to certain particular powers and manifestations of it. It is true, that some late Christian writers against the polytheism and idolatry of the Pagans, have charged them with at least a trinity of independent gods, viz. Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, as sharing the government of the whole world amongst these three, and consequently acknowledging no one universal Numen. Notwithstanding which it is certain, that according to the more arcane doctrine, and Cabala of the Pagans, concerning the natural true theology, these three considered as distinct and independent gods, were accounted but diti poetici & commentitii, poetical and fictitious gods, and they were really esteemed no other, than so many several names and notions of one and the same supreme Numen, as acting variously in those several parts of the world, the heaven, the sea, the earth, and hell. For first, as to Pluto and Hades, called


De Ben. I 4. c. 8.
also by the Latins Orcus, and Dis, (which latter word seems to have been a contraction of Dives to answer the Greek Pluto) as Balbus in Cicero\(^1\) attributes to him, omnem vim terrenam, all terrene power, so others commonly assign him the regimen of separate souls after death. Now it is certain, that, according to this latter notion, it was by Plato underfoot no otherwise than as a name for that part of the divine providence, which exercises itself upon the souls of men after death. This Ficinus observed upon Plato’s Cratylus, Animadvertere praeceteris, Plutonium hic significare praecipue providentiam divinam ad separatas animas pertinentem: You are to take notice, that by Pluto is here meant that part of divine providence, which belongeth to separate souls. For this is that, which, according to Plato, binds and detains pure souls in that separate state, with the left vinculum of all, which is not necessity, but love and desire; they being ravished and charmed as it were with those pure delights, which they there enjoy. And thus is he also to be understood in his book of laws, writing in this manner concerning Pluto: τοῦ τοιευτοῦ Ζεὺς, ἀλλὰ τιμητός, οἷς ὅσα ἤκου τῶν ἄνθρωπων γένει ἄριστον κοιμώμα (P. 642.) ψυχή καὶ σώματι, διαλύεται ὡς ἐν τῇ κριτίᾳ, οἷς ἐγὼ ζωὴν ἄν σωσθῇ λέγω. Neither ought military men to be troubled or offended at this God Pluto, but highly to honour him, as who always is the most beneficent to mankind. For I affirm with the greatest sincerity, that the union of the soul with this terrestrial body is never better than the dissolusion or separation of them. Pluto therefore, according to Plato, is nothing else but a name for that part of the divine providence, that is exercized upon the souls of men, in their separation from these earthly bodies. And upon this account was Pluto styled by Virgil\(^2\), the Stygian Jupiter. But by others Pluto, together with Ceres, is taken in a larger sense, for the manifestation of the Deity in this whole terrestrial globe; and thus is the writer de Mundo \(^3\) to be understood, when he tells us, that God or Jupiter is ὕσιμος τε καὶ χάριν, πάσης ἑτέρομος ὅν θυσεῖς τε καὶ τίχες, ἐπὶ πάνων αὐτὸς αἰτήτω ὅτι: Both celestial and terrestrial, he being denominated from every nature, forasmuch as he is the cause of all things. Pluto therefore is Ζεὺς χάριν or καλακτήποι, the terrestrial (also as well as the Stygian and subterranean) Jupiter; and that other Jupiter, which is distinguished both from Pluto and Neptune, is properly Ζεὺς ὑσιμός, the heavenly Jupiter, God as manifesting himself in the heavens. Hence is it, that Zeus and Hades, Jupiter and Pluto are made to be one and the same thing, in that passage, which Julian\(^4\) cites as an oracle of Apollo, but others impute to Orpheus.

Eis Ζεὺς, τῆς Ἀίδου, Jupiter and Pluto are one and the same God. As also that Euripides, in a place before produced, is so doubtful, whether he should call the supreme God (τοῦ πάνω μυθέων, that takes care of all things here below) Zeus or Hades:

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\(^2\) Æn. Lib. VII. ver. 327.
\(^4\) Orat. IV.
Whether thou hast rather be called Jupiter or Pluto.

Lastly, Hermesianax the Colophonian poet, in those verses of his (afterward to be set down) makes Pluto in the first place, (with many other Pagan gods) to be really one and the same with Jupiter.

That Neptune was also another name of the supreme God, from another particular consideration of him, namely, as acting in the seas, (at least according to the ancane and natural theology of the Pagans,) is plainly declared by divers of the ancients. Xenocrates in Stobaeus \(1\), and Zeno in Laertius \(2\), affirm, that God as acting in the water is called Posidone or Neptune.

To the same purpose Balbus in Cicero: Sed tamen bis fabulis spretis ac repudiatis, Deus pertinentis per naturam cujusque rei, per terras Ceres, per maria Neptunus, aliis per alia, potenter intelligi, qui qualesque sint, &c. But these poetick fables concerning the gods being despised and rejected, it is easy for us to understand, how God passing through the nature of every thing, may be called by several names, as through the earth Ceres, (and Pluto) through the seas Neptune; and through other parts of the world by other names: so that all these titular gods were but so many several denominations of one supreme Deity. And Cotta afterward thus represents the sense of this theology, Neptunum esse dicit animum cum intelligentia per mare pergenterm, idem de Cerere: Your meaning is, Neptune is a mind, which with understanding passes through the sea, and the like of Ceres through the earth. Lastly, to name no more, Maximus Tyrius agreeth also herewith, καλὸς τὸν μὲν Δία τὸν περιστάτον, &c. τὸν δὲ Ποσιδόνως, πανίμα διὰ γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης τὸν, ὁνομάζων αὐτὸν τῷ σάτι καὶ τῷ ὀρμωνίῳ. You are to call Jupiter that princely mind, which all things follow and obey, &c. and Neptune that spirit, which passing through the earth and sea, causes their state and harmony.

Lastly, that these three Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, were not three really diflinct substantial beings, but only so many several names for one supreme God, (according to the true and natural theology of the Pagans) is thus plainly declared by Pausanias in his Corinthiacks \(3\); he there expounding the meaning of a certain statue of Jupiter with three eyes, (called the country Jupiter of the Trojans) in this manner: τριες δὲ ὀφθαλμοῖς ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῷ δὲ ἀν τῆς τεκμαίρον ἀυτοῦ Δίῳ γὰρ ἐν ὑθραι ἁπαθείαι, ὅτος μὲν λόγος καὶ τὴς πάσης ἐν ἀνθρώπων. Οὐ δὲ ἀρχεῖν φατίν ὑπὸ γῆς, ἐγὼ ἐπος τοὺς Ὄρμης Δία οὐκοίμας καὶ τοῦτον,

Zeis τε καλαχθιόνας, ἦ ἐπαυτὴ Περσηφόνεια.

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common speech of all men makes Jupiter to reign in the heaven. Again, he that is, said to rule under the earth, is in a certain verse of Homer, called Zeus or Jupiter too, namely the infernal or subterraneous Jupiter together with Proserpina. And lastly, Æschylus, the son of Euphorion, calls that God, who is the king of the sea also, Jupiter. Wherefore this statue did Jupiter with three eyes, to signify, that it is one and the same God, which rules in those three several parts of the world, the heaven, the sea, and the earth. Whether Paufanias were in the right or no, as to his conjecture concerning this three-eyed statue of Jupiter, it is evident, that himself, and other ancient Pagans acknowledged Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, to be but three several names, and partial considerations of one and the same God, who rules over the whole world. And since both Proserpina and Ceres were really the same with Pluto, and Salacia with Neptune; we may well conclude, that all these, Jupiter, Neptune, Salacia, Pluto, Proserpina, and Ceres, though several poetical and political gods, yet were really taken but for one and the same natural and philosophical God.

Moreover, as Neptune was a name for God, as manifesting himself in the sea, and ruling over it, so was Juno another name of God, as act in the air. This is expressly affirmed both by Xenocrates in Stobaeus 1, and Zeno in Laertius 2. And St. Austin 3 propounding this quere, why Juno was joined to Jupiter as his wife and sister, makes the Pagans answer thus to it, Quia Jovem (inquinat) in aether accipimus, in aere Junonem; because we call God in the ather Jupiter, in the air Juno. But the reason, why Juno was feminine and a goddess, is thus given by Cicero 4, Efferantur autem eam, Junonique tribuuntur, qui nihilo ejus aere motius; they emmennated the air, and attributed it to Juno a goddess, because nothing is faster than it. Minerva was also sometimes taken for a special or particular God, and then was it nothing (as Zeno informs us) but a name for the supreme God, as passing through the (higher) ather: which gave occasion to St. Austin thus to ob- c. D. 1. 4. ject again the Pagan theology; Si atheris patriem superiorum Minerva tenere dicitur, & hae occasione fingere poetas, quod de Jovis capite nata sit, cur non ergo ipsa aeterni decrem regina deputatur, quod sit Jove superior? If Minerva was to posses the biggest part of the ather; and the poets therefore to have feigned her to have been begotten from Jupiter's head, why is she rather called the queen of the gods, since she is superior to Jupiter? Furthermore, as the supreme God was called Neptune in the sea; and Juno in the air, so by the same reason may we conclude, that he was called Vulcan in the fire. Lastly, as the sun and moon were themselves sometime worshipped by the Pagans for inferior deities, they being supposed to be animated with particular souls of their own; so was the supreme God also worshipped in them both, (as well as in the other parts of the world) and that under those names of Apollo, and Diana. Thus the Pagans appointing a God to preside over every part of the world, did thereby but make the supreme God polyonymous, all those gods of theirs being indeed nothing but several names of him. Which theology of the ancient Pagans, Maximus Tyrius, treating

1. Ubi supra.
2. Ubi supra.
concerning Homer's philosophy (after he had mentioned his tripartite empire of the world, shared between Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto) thus declareth; εἴροις δ' ἀν ἰάλλας παρ᾽ Ὀμήρῳ δέχατον ἤρεισις πολυδόσπον συμμάτων. ἤν ὁ μὲν ἄνέκοε ὡς μοῦν ἄκαί, ὁ δὲ Φιλόσοφος ὡς πραγμάτων ἐστὶν αὑτῷ καὶ δεῖται δέχατο ἀλλὰ 'Ἄθρις λαύθαι, &c. You may find also in Homer other principles, and the originals of several names; which the ignorant hear as fables, but a philosopher will understand as things and realities. For he assigns a principle of virtue and wisdom, which he calls Minerva; another of love and desire, which he calls Venus; another of artificialness, and that is Vulcan, who rules over the fire. And Apollo also with him presides over dancings, the muses over songs, Mars over war, Αἰελος over winds, and Ceres over fruits. And then does he conclude thus, καὶ σῶλον μέρος Ὀμήρος Ἀείλου, καὶ δυνάμεα διάφορον, καὶ ἀγχοτί ζησμον, ἀλλὰ πάντα μεγάλα θείων συμμάτων, καὶ θείας λόγως, καὶ θείας τίμης. So that no part neither of nature, nor of the world, is to Homer godless (or void of a God) none definite of a ruler, or without a superior government; but all things full of divine names, and of divine reason, and of divine art. Where his θεία οὐφαλχα, his divine names, are nothing but several names of God, as manifesting himself variously in the several things of nature, and the parts of the world, and as presiding over them.

Wherefore, beside those special gods of the Pagans, already mentioned, that were appointed to preside over several parts of the world, there are others, which are but several names of the supreme God neither, as exercising several offices and functions in the world, and bestowing several gifts upon mankind: as when in giving corn and fruits, he is called Ceres; in bestowing wine, Bacchus; in men's recovery of their health, Αἰελος; in presiding over traffic and merchandizing, Mercury; in governing military affairs, Mars; in ordering the winds, Αἰελος; and the like.

That the more philosophick Pagans did thus really interpret the fables of the gods, and make their many poetical and political gods to be all of them but one and the same supreme natural God, is evident from the testimonies of Antifbeses, Plato, Xenocrates, Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, (who allegorized all the fables of the gods accordingly) and of Scacela the Roman Pontifex, of Cicero, Varro, Seneca, and many others. But that even their Poets also did sometimes venture to broach this arcane theology, is manifest from those fragments preserved of Hermesianax the Colophonian amongst the Greeks, and of Valerius Soranus amongst the Latins; the former thus enumerating the chief Pagan gods, and declaring them to be all but one and the same Numen:

Πλάτων, Περσεφόνη, Δήμαρχη, Κύπρις, Εὐώτες, Τριτωνες, Νήκταρ, Τιθός, Καϊμοχαίτης,
'Ερυθής, Ζήτους τε κυτός, Πάν, Ζέυς τε καὶ Ἡρη,
'Αρτεμίς, Νίπτάργαν Ἀπόλλων, εἰς Θεός ἐτε.

Pluto, Persephone, Ceres, & Venus alma, & Amores, Tri-
The latter pronouncing universally, that *Jupiter Omnipotens* is

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Deus unus & omnes,

one God, and all gods. Whether by his *Jupiter* he here meant the soul of the world only, as *Varro* would interpret him, agreeably to his own hypothesis, or whether an abstract mind superior to it; but probably he made this *Jupiter* to be all gods, upon these two accounts; first, as he was the begetter and creator of all the other natural gods, which were the Pagans inferior deities, (as the stars and daemons;) secondly, as that all the other poetical and political gods were nothing else but several names and notions of him.

We shall add, in the last place, that St. *Austin*, making a more full and particular enumeration of the Pagan gods, and mentioning amongst them many others besides the select Roman gods, (which are not now commonly taken notice of,) does pronounce universally of them all, according to the sense of the more intelligent Pagans, that they were but one and the same *Jupiter*; *Ipse in ætherè* *fit* Jupiter, *ipse in æcre Juno, ipse in mari Neptunus*, *De Civ. D.* *in inferioribus etiam maris ipse Salacia, in terra Pluto, in terra inferiorem Proserpina, in focis domesticis Vesta, in fabrorum fornace Vulcanus, in divinantis Apollo, in merce Mercurius, in Jano initiator, in Termino terminator, Saturnus in tempore, Mars & Bellona in bellis, Liber in vinceis, Ceres in frumentis, Diana in silvis, Minerva in ingenii*. *Ipse fit pœtrimod etiam illa turba quas plebei orum deorum, ipse præfì nomine Liberi virorum seminibus, & nomine Liberei faminarum*. *Ipse fit Diespiter, qui partum perducat ad diem: ipse fit dea Mena, quam praecacrens membris faminarum, ipse Lucina, quæ ad parturientibus invitatur, ipse opem ferat nascentibus, excipiens eos suo terre, & vocetur Opis. Ipse in vagitu os aperiat, & vocetur, Deus Vagitanus. Ipse levet de terra, & vocetur dea Lenana. Ipse cunas tueat & vocetur dea Cunina. Sit ipse in deabus illis, quæ fata nascentibus canunt, & vocetur Carmentes. Profìt fortunis, voceturque Fortuna*. In *Divina Ruminam mammam parvulis immulgate, in Diva Potina potionem immiscat, in Diva Educa escam prebeat*. *De paurore infantium Paventia numeptetur*. *De ipsa que venit Venilia; de voluptate Volupia*. *De aetu Agenoria*. *De stimulis, quibus ad nimium aetum bona impellitur, dea Stimula nominetur*. *Strenua dea æt, ære num faciendo. Numeria que numerare docet, Camæna que canere. Ipse sit & Deus Confus prebendo consilia; & Dea Sentia sententias inspirando. Ipse dea Juventas, que pos spectatæm excipiatur juvenilis atatis exordia. Ipse sit Fortuna Barbata, que adullos barba induit, quos bonus vel certo velutur. Ipse in Jugatino Deo conjugēs jungat; & cum virgini uxori zona solvitur, ipse vocetur & dea Virginenss invocetur*. *Ipse sit Mutinus, qui or apud Graecos Priapus, sit non pudet. Hic omnia que dixi, & quaecumque non dixi, hi omnes dii diesque fit*.

fit unus Jupiter; five sunt, ut quidam volum, omnia ipsa partes ejus, quae eiusmod
quibus eum placet esse mundi animum; quae virtutes ejus, quae sententia
velut magnum animu multorumque doctorum est. Let us grant, according to the Pa-
gons, that the supreme God is in the other Jupiter; in the air Juno; in the
sea Neptune; in the lower parts of the sea Salacia; in the earth Pluto; in
the inferior parts thereof Proserpina; in the domestic hearths Vesta; in the
smiths forges Vulcan; in divination Apollo; in traffick and merchandise Mer-
cury; in the beginnings of things Janus; in the ends of them Terminus; in
time Saturn; in wars Mars and Bellona; in the vineyards Liber; in the
corn-fields Ceres; in the woods Diana; and in wits Minerva. Let him be also
that troop of plebian gods; let him preside over the seeds of men under the
name of Liber, and of women under the name of Libera; let him be Diespiter,
that brings forth the birth to light; let him be the goddess Menec, whom they
have set over womens monthly courses; let him be Lucina, invoked by women in
child-bearing; let him be Opis, who aids the new-born infant; let him be
Deus Vagitanus, that opens their mouths to cry; let him be the goddess Le-
vana, which is said to lift them up from the earth; and the goddess Cunina,
that defends their cradles; let him be the Carmentes also, who foretell the
fates of infants; let him be Fortune, as predicting over fortuitous events; let
him be Diva Rumina, which suckles the infant with the breasts; Diva Potina,
which gives it drink; and Diva Educa, which affords it meat; let him be cal-
led the goddess Paventia, from the fear of infants; the goddess Venilia, from
hope; the goddess Volupia, from pleasure; the goddess Agenoria, from aching;
the goddess Stimula, from provoking; the goddess Streunus, from making strong
and vigorous; the goddess Numeria, which teacheth to number; the goddess
Cameria, which teaches to sing; let him be Deus Confus, as giving counsel;
and Dea Santia, as inspiring men with sense; let him be the goddess Juventas,
which has the guardianship of young men; and Fortuna Barbata, which open
some more than others liberally besoweth beards; let him be Deus Jugatinus,
which joins man and wife together; and Dea Virginensis, which is then in-
voked, when the girdle of the bride is loosed; lastly, let him be Mutinus also
(which is the same with Priapus amongst the Greeks) if you will not be ashamed
to say it. Let all these gods and goddesses, and many more (which I have not
mentioned) be one and the same Jupiter, whether as parts of him, which is
agreeable to their opinion, who hold him to be the soul of the world; or else as
his virtues only, which is the sense of many and great Pagan doctors.

But that the authority and reputation of a late learned and industrious writer,
G. I. VeJiis, may not here stand in our way, or be a prejudice to us,
we think it necessary to take notice of one passage of his, in his book de
Theologia Gentili, and freely to censure the same; where, treating concerning
that Pagan goddess Venus, he writeth thus: Ex philosophica de diis doctrina,
Venus est vel Luna (ut vidimus) vel Lucifer, sive Hesperus. Sed ex poeica ac
civilis, supra hys casos flatumuntur mentes quaedam à syderibus diversa: quomodo
Jovem, Apollinem, Juro nem, Venerem, e terroque Deos Consentes, considerare
jubet Apuleius. Quippe cos, (inquit) natura vifibus notitis denegavit: necnon
mamen intellecfu eos mirabundi contemplamur, acie mentis acris contem-
plantes.

plants. Quid apertius dic, quan ab eo per Deos Confentes intelligi, non corpora celestia vel subcelestia, sed sublimiores quemdam naturam, nec nisi animalis conspicuum? According to the philosophick doctrine concerning the gods, Venus is either the Moon, or Lucifer, or Hesperus; but according to the poetick and civil theology of the Pagans, there were certain eternal minds, placed above the heavens, distinct from the stars: accordingly as Apuleius requires us to consider Jupiter and Apollo, Juno and Venus, and all those other gods called Confentes, be affirming of them, that though nature had denied them to our sight, yet notwithstanding, by the diligent contemplation of our minds, we apprehend and admire them. Where nothing can be more plain (faith Vossius) than that the Dei Confentes were understood by Apuleius, neither to be celestial nor subcelestial bodies, but a certain higher nature perceptible only to our minds. Upon which words of his we shall make these following remarks: first, that this learned writer seems here, as also throughout that whole book of his, to mistake the philosophick theology of Scévola and Varro, and others, for that which was physiologically only; (which physiological theology of the Pagans will be afterwards declared by us.) For the philosophick theology of the Pagans did not deify natural and sensible bodies only, but the principal part thereof was the affirming of one supreme and universal Numen, from whence all their other gods were derived. Neither was Venus, according to this philosophick and arcane theology, taken only for the moon, or for Lucifer or Hesperus, as this learned writer conceives, but, as we have already proved, for the supreme Deity also, either according to its universal notion, or some particular consideration thereof. Wherefore the philosophick theology, both of Scévola and Varro, and others, was called natural, not as physiologically only, but (in another sense) as real and true; it being the theology neither of cities, nor of stages or theatres, but of the world, and of the wise men in it: philosophy being that properly, which considers the absolute truth and nature of things. Which philosophick theology therefore was opposed, both to the civil and poetical, as consisting in opinion and fancy only. Our second remark is, that Vossius does here also seem incongruously to make both the civil and poetical theology, as such, to philosophize; whereas the first of these was propely nothing but the law of cities and commonwealths, together with vulgar opinion and error; and the second nothing but fancy, fiction and fabulosity. Poetarum iusta sunt, faith Cotta in Ciceron; nos autem philosophi esse volumus, rerum inventores, non fabularum. Those things belong to poets, but we would be philosophers, authors of things (or realities) and not of fables. But the main thing, which we take notice of in these words of Vossius is this, that they seem to imply the Confentes, and select, and other civil and poetical gods of the Pagans, to have been generally accounted so many substantial and eternal minds, or understanding beings supercelestial and independent; their Jupiter being put only in an equality with Apollo, Juno, Venus, and the rest. For which, since Vossius pretends no other manner of proof than only from Apuleius his de Deo Socratis, who was a Platonic philosopher; we shall here make it evident, that he was not rightly understood by Vossius neither: which yet ought not to be thought any derogation

Apuleius his Reduction of the Book I.

gation from this eminent philologer, (whose polymathy and multifarious learning is readily acknowledged by us) that he was not so well verfed in all the niceties and punctilios of the Platonick School. For though Apuleius do in that book, besides those visible gods the stars, take notice of another kind of invisible ones, such as the twelve Confentes, and others, which (he faith) we may animis conjecture, per varias utilitates in vita agenda, animadversas in suis rebus, quibus earum singuli curant; make a conjecture of by our minds from the various utilties in human life, perceived from those things, which each of these take care of: yet that he was no bigot in this civil theology, is manifest from hence, because in that very place, he declares as well against superstition, as irreligious prophaneenes. And his design there was plainly no other, than to reduce the civil and poetick theologies of the Pagans into some handsome conformity and agreement with that philosophical, natural, and real theology of theirs, which derived all the gods from one supreme and universal Numen: but this he endeavours to do in the Platonick way, himself being much addicted to that philosophy. Hos deos in sublimi aetheris vertice locatos, Plato excipit, mat veros, incorporeales, animales, fine ullo neque fine neque exordio, sed pror- sus ac retro eviternos, corporis contagione sunt quidem natural remotos, ingenio ad summam beatitudinem porrefto, &c. Quorum parentem, qui omnium rerum dominator atque author est, solum ab omnibus nemibus patiendi aliquid gerendive, nulla vice ad alicujus rei mutua obsftrum, cur ego nunc dicere exerciar? Cum Plato celebri facundia preditus, frequentissime predictit, buus solum mojeslatis incredibili quadam nimientet. & ineffabili, non posse penuria sermenis humani quavis oratione. vel modicé comprehendi. All these gods placed in the highest ether Plato thinks to be true, incorporeal, animal, without beginning or end, eternal, happy in themselves without any external good. The parent of which gods, who is the Lord and author of all things, and who is alone free from all bonds of doing and suffering, why should I go about in words to describe him? Since Plato, who was endued with most heavenly eloquence, equal to the immortal gods, does often declare, that this highest God, by reason of his excells of majesty, is both ineffable and incomprehensible. From which words of Apuleius it is plain, that according to him, the twelve Confentes, and all the other invisible gods were derived from one original Deity, as their parent and author. But then if you demand, what gods of Plato these should be, to which Apuleius would here accommodate the civil and poetick gods contained in those two verses of Ennius,

Juno, Vesta, Minerva, Ceres, Diana, Venus, Mars,
Mercurius, Jovis, Neptunus, Voleanus, Apollo.

and the rest of this kind, that is, all their other gods (properly so called) invisible? we reply, that these are no other than Plato's ideas, or first paradigms and patterns of things in the archetypal world, which is the divine Intellect (and his second hypotasis) derived from his first original Deity, and most simple monad. For as Plato writeth in his Timaeus, ανάγκη τοῦ τὸν κόσμον, ένόια των ένων, This sensible world:
world must needs be the image of another intelligible one. And again afterwards,
twixt the gods autó, eis émiastipta ó ἐμφασις ἐξ ζύγεω, τοῦ μὲν οὖ ἐν μέρεσ εἰς τῆς μορφῆς Platon in Tim. ὁμοίως καλαστίως ἀπελευθεροῦσα τὴν ἴδιαν καλάκατον δὲ ἐν τῆς ἔκκλησι ἡμῶν. οxffffffřyjirxp^ovlx^ καθὼς ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ἡμῶν ἡμᾶς χαίρει τελέλευσάν τίνι; 

Wherefore Plato himself, here and elsewhere speaking obscurely of this
intelligible world, and the ideas of it, no wonder, if many of his Pag-
van followers have absurdly made so many distinct animals and gods of
them. Amongst whom Apuleius accordingly would refer all the civil and
politic gods of the Pagans (I mean their gods, properly so called invis-
ible) to this intelligible world of Plato's, and those several ideas of it. Nei-
ther was Apuleius singular in this, but others of the Pagan theologers did the
like; as for example, Julian in his book against the Chriftians; θεὸς ἐνυμάως
Πάνταν τῶν ἐμφασιῶν, ἑλπίζον, ἑστὶ σελήνη, ἄγεσαι ἑστὶν ἑραίως, ἀλλ' ἦταν τῶν ἐμφασιῶν ἑστὶν ἑστὶν ἐπιστῶς ὁ φαβορίζως τοῖς ἐμφασιοῖς ἡμῶν, ταυτάτης μὲν φαβορίζοι τὸ τάλιθν, η δὲ φαβορίζοι τοῖς ἐμφασιοῖς ἡμῶν σελήνη, ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐκατόν, ἐκεῖνος εἰς τοῦς ἑμφασιοὺς εἰκόνας ἐν τοῖς ἐμφασιοῖς Θεοὶ ἐνυπαρχόντος καὶ συνυπάρχόντος, ἡ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ τῶν ἑμφασιῶν γνωσθεῖσα, καὶ προεδροῦσα, ὁ Πάντων ὁλικοὶ εἰκόνας ἐν Φωνεῖς οἱ φαβορίζοις τὸ παρ' ἀκτίος. ἐκεῖνος πρὸς τοῖς ἐμφασιοῖς ἐλήμων, ἑστὶ, τῶν ἐμφασιῶν διπλωτι' κεινος δὲ ἐμφασιοῦς ἑμφασιοῦς ὑπὸς ἑστὶν, ἐκεῖνος τοῖς ἐμφασιοῖς ἀραίον, καὶ γηθος, καὶ Ἑλλαστή, ἡ ἄγεσαι γενόμεν, τα τετοίου ἐρεχθείπα. Plato indeed speak-
etb of certain visible gods, the sun, and the moon, and the stars, and the hea-
ven; but these are all but images of other invisible gods; that visible sun,
which we see with our eyes, is but an image of another intelligible and in-
visible one; so likewise the visible moon, and every one of the stars, are but the
images and resemblances of another moon, and of other stars intelligible.
Wherefore Plato acknowledged also these other invisible gods, inexplicit and co-
existing with the Demiurgus, from whom they were generated and produced.
That Demiurgus in him thus be speaking these invisible and intelligible gods;
Ye gods of gods, that is, ye invisible gods, who are the gods and causes of the
visible gods. There is one common maker therefore of both these kinds of gods;
who first of all made a heaven, earth, sea, and stars, in the intelligible world,
as the archetypes and paradigms of these in the sensible. Where St. Cyril in
his Confutation writeth thus: οὐκε μὲν διὰ τοῦτον ὁ μειωδός ἡμῶν Ἰουλιανός, ταῖς ἱδιὰς βελεσθαι καλαστίως, ὡς ποιέ μὲν ὑς εἰς, ἥς ὑπεξανεῖ καὶ οὕτως διαφυγέας Platon, τοῖς ἑστὶν ὑποκείμενοι εἰς Ἰουλιανός ἐνεργεῖαι πλοῦτο ὑποπέρ ὑπερούσατι καὶ τοῖς αὐτῶν μακραίας ἀπαραδόνει εἰς Ἐφεσίου τοῦ ἔπι τοῦ ἐν λόγῳ οἱ τούτοι περικυκλοῦσά τα γαρ εἰς ἥν ἐχρήσται, ὥς τίνι ἐν Αρίστων, τηρεῖται γαρ ἄριτ τε, καὶ ἐν ἰνα, ἐνώς προς τοῦ λόγου. Τίτις οὖν excellente Julianus, by his intelligible and invisible gods, seems here to mean these ideas, which Plato sometimes contends to be sub-
stances, and to subsist alone by themselves, and sometimes again determinat

S. Cyril.

cont. jul. 1, 2. p. 65.
to be nothing but notions or conceptions in the mind of God. But however the matter be, the skillful in this kind of learning affirm, that these ideas have been rejected by Plato's own disciples; Aristotle disferring them as figments, or at least such, as being mere notions could have no real causality and influence upon things. But the meaning of this Pagan theology may be more fully understood from what the same St. Cyril thus further objecteth against it: 

'Prosecuapae & otis ki tov efwaxwv h tòv nòtov generateis òstis o tòv òxov Óxov, o gh v h exeias teçkstamwv, òtis tovou kai òtis autòs. Dúmállhigmnwv évagwv, tov òti kaiémwv geneseiwn òstis o génwv Óxov, pòs èk autu genvndith Phisò autòs, suggarwkhv te òtis evnaptexwv autòs, pòs, eisprh ma, tov génwv Óxov suggarwkhv te génwv; evnaptexi òtis kàtò pouv tróptov; òti èk òtis genvndith Phisò autòs, suggarwkhv teçkstamwv tov òxov Óxov, suggarwkhv autòs, òtis evnaptexwv autòs, pòs èk autu genvndith Phisò autòs.'

Whereof seems to be this: Julian addeth, that the God of the universe, who made heaven and earth, is like the Demiurgus, both of these sensible, and of the other intelligible things. If therefore the ingenit God be like the creator of both, how can be affirm those things, that are created by him, to co-exist with, and inexist in him? How can that, which is created, co-exist with the ingenit God? but much less can it inexist in him. For we Christians indeed affirm, that the unmade Word of God doth of necessity co-exist with, and inexist in the father, it proceeding from him, not by way of creation, but of generation. But this defender of Platonick trifles, acknowledging the supreme God to be ingenit, affirmeth, notwithstanding, those things, which were made and created by him, to inexist in him; thus mingling and confounding all things. Where notwithstanding, Julian, and the Platonick Pagans would in all probability reply, that those ideas of the intelligible and archetypal world (which is the first ous, or Intelligel) proceeding from the highest hypophafis, and original Deity, by way of necessary and eternal emanation, are no more to be accounted creatures, than the Christian Logos; and therefore might, with as little absurdity, be said to exist with and in that first original Deity. But besides, the same Julian, elsewhere in that book of his, accommodates this Platonick notion also to the Pagan gods in particular, in like manner as Apuleius had done before, he writing of Æsculapius, after this canting way: 'o gèv Zèv, òwv tov ou tov, èk èk tov tòv Æsculapiou xeràngwv, èk èk tov tòv Æsculapiou. O Æsculapiou, èk èk tov Æsculapiou èk èk tov Æsculapiou. O Æsculapiou, èk èk tov Æsculapiou, èk èk tov Æsculapiou. O Æsculapiou, èk èk tov Æsculapiou, èk èk tov Æsculapiou.'

'Jupiter, among the intelligible things, generated out of himself Æsculapius, and by the generative life of the sun manifested him here upon earth, he coming down from heaven, and appearing in a human form, first about Epidaurus, and from thence extending his salutary power or virtue over the whole earth. Where Æsculapius is, first of all, the eternal idea of the medicinal art or skill generated by the supreme God in the intelligible world; which afterward, by the vivific influence of the sun, was incarnated, and appeared in a human form at Epidaurus. This is the doctrine of that Julian, who was so great an opponent of the incarnation of the eternal Logos, in our
our Saviour Jesus Christ. Neither was this doctrine of many intelligible gods, and powers eternal, (of which the archetypal world consisted) first invented by Platonick Pagans, after the times of Christianity, as some might suppose; but that there was such a thing extant before amongst them also, may be concluded from this passage of Philo's: 

*De Confus.* 1. 345. Par.

Φιλός άμφιθετη περι αυτον έξης δύναμις αφριζή η σωφρόνης τυ γενομενη πάσης. 

Moreover, by these powers, and out of them, is the incorporeal and intelligible world compounded, which is the archetype of this visible world, that consisting of invisible ideas, as this doth of visible bodies. Wherefore, some admiring, with a kind of astonishment, the nature of both these worlds, have not only defined the whole of them, but also the most excellent parts in them, as the sun, and the moon, and the whole heaven, which they scruple not at all to call gods. Where Philo seems to speak of a double sun, moon, and heaven, as Julian did, the one sensible, the other intelligible. Moreover, Plotinus himself sometimes complies with this notion, he calling the ideas of the divine Intellect υπος θεος, intelligible gods; as in that place before cited, where he exhorteth men, ascending upward above the soul of the world, έις υπολικη, ρωτης, to praise the intelligible gods, that is, the divine Intellect, which, as he elsewhere writeth, is both εις ρωτης, one and many.

We have now given a full account of Apuleius his senec in that book de Deo Socratis, concerning the civil and poetical Pagan gods; which was not to afford a multitude of substantial and eternal deities or minds independent in them, but only to reduce the vulgar theology of the Pagans, both their civil and poetical, into some conformity with the natural, real, and philosophick theology; and this according to Platonick principles. Wherein many other of the Pagan Platonists, both before and after Christianity, concurred with him; they making the many Pagan invisible gods to be really nothing but the eternal ideas of the divine intellect, (called by them the parts of the intelligible and archetypal world) which they supposed to have been the paradigms and patterns, according to which this sensible world, and all particular things therein, were made, and upon which they depended, they being only participations of them. Wherefore, though this may well be looked upon as a monstrous extravagancy in these Platonick philosophers, thus to talk of the divine ideas, or the intelligible and archetypal paradigms of things, not only as substantial, but also as so many several animals, persons and gods; it being their humour thus upon all flight occasions to multiply gods: yet nevertheless must it be acknowledged, that they did at the very same time declare all these to have been derived from one supreme Deity, and not only so, but also to exist in it; as they did likewise at other times, when unconcerned in this business of their Pagan polytheism.

* Vide Ennead. V. Lib. VIII. Cap. IX p. 550.*
lytheifm, freely acknowledge all these intelligible ideas to be really nothing else but νομανη, conceptions in the mind of God, or the first Intellect, (though not such flight accidental and evanid ones, as those conceptions and modifications of our human souls are) and consequnetly not to be so many distinct substances, persons, and gods, (much less independent ones) but only so many partial considerations of the Deity.

What a rabble of invisible gods and goddesses the Pagans had, besides those their dii nobiles, and dii majorum gentium, their noble and greater gods (which were the Confentes and Seleiti) hath been already shewed out of St. Austin, from Varro, and others; as namely, Deus Mena, Deus Vagitanus, Dea Levana, Dea Cunina, Diva Rumina, Diva Potina, Diva Paventina, Dea Venilia, Dea Agenoria, Dea Stimula, Dea Streuna, Dea Numeria, Deus Confus, Deus Senta, Deus Jugatimus, Deus Virginus, Deus Mutinus. To which might be added more out of other places of the name St. Austin, as Deus Deverra, Deus Domiducus, Deus Domitius, Deus Maniurina, Deus Pater Subigus, Deus Mater Prema, Deus Pertunda, Deus Rufina, Deus Collatina, Deus Valonia, Dea Seia, Dea Segestia, Dea Tutilina, Deus Nodotus, Deus Volotina, Dea Patena, Dea Holotina, Dea Flora, Dea Latuaria, Dea Matura, Dea Runcina. Besides which, there are yet so many more of these Pagan gods and goddesses extant in other writers, as that they cannot be all mentioned or enumerated by us; divers whereof have very small, mean, and contemptible offices assigned to them, as their names for the most part do imply; some of which are such, as that they were not fit to be here interpreted. From whence it plainly appears, that there was μηδεν τοσο, nothing at all without a God to these Pagans, they having so strong a persuasion, that divine providence extended itself to all things, and expressing it after this manner, by assigning to everything in nature, and every part of the world, and whatsoever was done by men, some particular god or goddess by name, to preside over it. Now, that the intelligent Pagans should believe in good earnest, that all these invisible gods and goddesses of theirs were so many several substantial minds, or understanding beings eternal and unmade, really existing in the world, is a thing in itself utterly incredible. How could any possibly persuade themselves, that there was one eternal unmade mind or spirit, which, for example, essentially presided over the rackings of infant's cradles, and nothing else? another over the sweeping of houses? another over ears of corn? another over the hulks of grain? and another over the knots of straw and grass, and the like? And the case is the very same for those other noble gods of theirs (as they call them) the Confentes, and Seleiti; since there can be no reason given, why those should, all of them, be so many substantial and eternal spirits self-existent or unmade, if none of the other were such. Wherefore, if these be not all so many several substantial and eternal minds, so many self-existing and independent deities, then must they, of necessity, be either several partial considerations of the Deity, viz. the several manifestations of the divine power and providence peripatized, or else inferior ministers of the same. And thus have we already shewed
thoughed, that the more high-flown and Platonick Pagans (as Julian, Apuleius, and others) understood these Confentes and select gods, and all the other invisible ones, to be really nothing else, but the ideas of the intelligible and archetypal world, (which is the divine intellect;) that is indeed, but partial considerations of the Deity, as virtually and exemplarily containing all things; whilst others of them, going in a more plain and easy way, concluded these gods of theirs to be all of them but several names and notions of the one supreme Deity, according to the various manifestations of its power in the world; as Seneca expressly affirmeth, not only concerning fate, nature, and fortune, &c. but also Liber Pater, Hercules, and Mercury, (before mentioned by him) that they were omnia ejusdem Dei nomina, variæ mentis fulæ potestate, all names of one and the same God, as diversly using his power; and as Zeno in Laertius concludes of all the rest: or else, (which amounts to the same thing,) that they were the several powers and virtues of one God fictitiously perfonated and deified; as the Pagans in Eusebius apologize for themselves, that they did θεοτοι τὰς ἀσώτατα Pr. Ev. l. 3. ἰδαίμονες αὐτῷ τῇ ἔναγμα τὰν ὁμοίως, deify nothing but the invisible powers of that God, c. 15. p. 121 which is over all. Nevertheless, because those several powers of the supreme God were not supposed to be all executed immediately by himself, but by certain other Ἰππότα ἰδάιμοι, subervient ministers under him, appointed to preside over the several things of nature, parts of the world, and affairs of mankind, (commonly called daemons;) therefore were those gods sometimes taken also for such subervient spirits or daemons collectively; as perhaps in this of Epiphanes, πότε ὁ Ξυμ. ἑνενεχεί; ἐνων αὐτῷ L. i. c. 2. δόξη, ὁ βέλτης, ἢ τὸν Ἀρκων σε ἑνέκατον ὁ Σιώκος τὰρμαντὸν αὐθέντον ἀλλάμενον, ἀλλά ὁ 85. τὸν Αἰλοῦ. When will Zephyrus, or the west wind, blow? When it seemeth good to himself or to Αἰεώλος; for God bath not made thee steward of the winds, but Αἰεώλος.

But for the fuller clearing of the whole Pagan theology, and especially this one point thereof, that their Πολυθεία was in great part nothing else but Πολυφώνεια, their polytheism, or multiplicity of gods, nothing but the pollyony of one god, or his being called by many personal proper names, two things are here requisite to be further taken notice of; first, that, according to the Pagan theology, God was conceived to be diffused throughout the whole world, to permeate and pervade all things, to exist in all things, and intimately to act all things. Thus we observed before out of Horus Apollo, that the Egyptian theologers conceived of God, as τῷ πανίκῳ κόσμῳ τὸ δίκαιον πανόμι, a spirit pervading the whole world; as likewise they concluded ἅγα Γαία μετέχει δίκαιον συνεσκαπε, that nothing at all consified without God. Which same theology was universally entertained also amongst the Greeks. For thus Diogenes the Cynick, in Laertius, αὐτῷ πάσα πλῆκτος, All things are full of him. And Aristotle, or the writer De Plantis, makes God not only to comprehend the whole world, but also to be an inward principle of life in animals; τῆς ἐν ἰερῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐν τῷ θαυμάσθη τῷ ζηώτῃ τῷ ἄλοιπῳ τῷ ἐν τῷ ἐναγμῷ περιου, τὸν ἅλως, τῷ θερμῷ, τῷ πλανάταιρι. T t t

2. Lib. VII. segm. 147. p. 458.
5. Lib. VI. segm. 37. p. 335.
What is the principle in the life or soul of animals? Certainly no other than that noble animal (or living being) that encompasses and surrounds the whole heaven, the sun, the stars, and the planets. Sextus Empiricus thus represents the sense of Pythagoras, Empedocles, and all the Italic philosophers; μη μόνον ἡμών πρὸς ἀλλήλην ἐν πρὸς τὰς ἔδεις ἑαυτῷ τίνα κατατεῖχεν, ἀλλὰ ἐν πρὸς τὰ ἄλλο ἐντὸς τῶν ἄκρων ἐν γὰρ ὑπάρχουν πνεύμα το ὥσ πᾶσι κάσμω δύνας, ψυχεῖς πέρτοι, το καὶ ἐνα μής πρὸς ἐκείνων. That we men have not only a conjunction amongst ourselves with one another, but also with the gods above us, and with brute animals below us; because there is but one spirit, which, like a soul, pervades the whole world, and unites all the parts thereof together. Clements Alexandrines writeth thus of the Stoicks, ἄλικα πάντα ὑλικά, ἀλλὰ τὰ αἰτίματα τοῦ θείου δίκαιων λύγας; They affirm, that God doth pervade all the matter of the universe, and even the most vile parts thereof, which that Father seems to dislike; as also did Tertullian, when he represented their doctrine thus; Stoici volunt Deum se per materiam descursisse, quomodo mel per foavos, the Stoicks will have God so to run through the matter, as the honey doth the combs. Strabo testifies of the ancient Indian Brachmans, πείζει ποιλών ταύτας ἅθλινων ἀμμότεσιν, ὅτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἁμμῷ οἱ θεοί ἄμματος, ὡς τε διὰ τούτων κατέδεον ἄθλινος λείψανος, δι' αὐτὸς διαποτικοὶ τοιαῦτα. That in many things they philosophized after the Greekish manner, as when they affirm, that the world had a beginning, and that it would be corrupted, and that the maker governor thereof pervades the whole of it. The Latins also fully agreed with the Grecians in this: for though Seneca somewhat propounds this question, Ultime extrinseca operi quo circumjacentem sit Deus, an tu initi? Whether God be only extrinsically circumjacent to his work, the world, or inwardly infusing do pervade it all? yet himself elsewhere answers it, when he calls God, Divinum Spiritum per omnia, maxima, ac minima, equali intentione diffusum: A divine spirit, diffused through all things, whatever small or greatest, with equal intention. God, in Quintillian's theology, is Spiritus omnium partium immittus; and Ille fuses per omnes rerum naturae partes spiritus, a spirit which infinuates itself into, and is mingled with all the parts of the world, and that spirit, which is diffused through all the parts of nature. Apuleius likewise affirneth, Deum omnia permeare, That God doth permeate all things; and that Nulla res est tam prestantiab rum virtus, que viduata Dei auxilio, sui natura contenta sit; There is nothing so excellent or powerful, as that it could be content with its own nature alone, void of the divine aid or influence. And again, Dei praetantiam, non jam cogitatio sola, sed occuli, & aures, & sensibilis substantia comprehendet; That God is not only present to our cogitation, but also to our very eyes and ears, in all these sensible things. Servius, agreeably with this doctrine of the ancient Pagan, determineth, that Nulla pars elementi sine Deo est, That there is no part of the elements devoid of God. And that the poets fully closed with the same theology, is evident from those known passages of theirs, Jovis omnibus plena, and µετὰ τὸν καθὰ ἄργοι, &c. &c. All the things of nature, and parts of the world, are full of God; as also from this of Virgil,
Lastly, we shall observe, that both Plato and Anaxagoras, who neither of them confounded God with the World, but kept them both distinct, and affirmed God to be οὐδὲν μεταγενέσθων, unmingled, with any thing; nevertheless Cratyl. p. 413. concluded, αὐτὸν πᾶλη καστοιν τα πέρα ημα πάντως τι πέρα, τι έπες διαλεγοντος, that he did order and govern all things, passing through and pervading all things; which is the very fame with that doctrine of Christian theologers, τον θεον εις πάντως αμιγας δικαζον, that God permeates and passes through all things, unmixedly. Which Plato also there, in his Cratylus, plainly making δικαζον to be a name for God, etymologizeth it from αλλα, i.e. passing through all things, and thereupon gives us the best account of Heraclitus his theosophy, that is any where extant, (if not rather a fragment of Heraclitus his own) in these words; ἀκο synonym, το παν ἅπας ἤνα ρωσίν, τό μήν πολύ αὐτον ὑπολαμβανοι τοιοτόν τι ἐπηκε, ὡς πετάλλο. η χρονιάν εἰς το τετο παντος ἄνὴν διεξε. οί θεομα τα γραφεται λαμβανει. ἐγια ν ταχυσυν το ἀττο παντος ἢ χαθο αν δικαζοτα ἀλλος δια το άτος παντος ει μη λεπροτατο περ άτος, οί την αυτο μονονν ευεία, µη ταχυσυν, ούς γραφας δικαζον ειτη τοις τιποτας. ἤπει δι καταπληκτοποιει τα ἀλλα παντα διεξε, το το δομα εκληθεν ορθας δικαζον. υπερανεια ενεκα, των τον τα δικαζον προσαλειον.) The owh who affirm the universe to be in constant motion, suppose a great part thereof to do nothing else but move and change; but that there is something, which passes through and pervades this wholesome universe, by which all those things that are made, are made: and that this is both the most swift and most subtile thing; for it could not otherwise pass through all things, were it not so subtile, that nothing could keep it out or hinder it; and it must be most swift, that it may use all things, as if they stood still, that so nothing might escape it. Since therefore this doth preside over, and order all things, permeating and passing through them, it is called δικαζον, quasi διανο; be the letter Cappa being only taken in for the more sound pronunciation. Here we have therefore Heraclitus his description of God, namely this, το λεπροτατον ου τα ταχυσυν, δια πεταλος διεξε, οι θεομα τα γραφεται λαμβανει, that most subtile and most swift substance, which permeates and passes through the whole universe, by which all things that are made, are made. Now, faith Plato, some of these Heracliticks say, that this is fire, others that it is heat; but he, deriding both these conceits, concludes, with Anaxagoras, that it is a perfect mind, unmixed with any thing; which yet permeating and passing through all things, frames, orders, and dilsipotes all.

Wherefore this being the universally received doctrine of the Pagans, that God was a spirit or substance diffused through the whole world, which permeating and inwardly acting all things, did order all; no wonder if they called him, in several parts of the world and things of nature, by several names; or, to use Cicero's language; no wonder, if Deus pertinens per naturam cujusque rei, per terras Ceres, per maria Neptune, &c. if God pervading the nature of every thing, were in the earth called Ceres, in the sea Neptune, in the air Juno, &c. And this very account does Paulus Orojus (in his historick work against the Pagans, dedicated to St. Aulus) give of

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the original of the Pagan polytheism; Quidam, dum in multis Deum credunt, mulis Deos, indiffero timore, finxerunt; That some, whilst they believe God to be in many things, have therefore, out of an indifferent fear, feigned many gods: in which words he intimates, that the Pagans many gods were really but several names of one God, as existing in many things, or in the several parts of the world, as the same ocean is called by several names, as beating upon several shores.

Secondly, The Pagan theology went sometimes yet a strain higher, they not only thus supposing God to pervade the whole world, and to be diffused through all things (which as yet keeps up some difference and distinction betwixt God and the world) but also himself to be in a manner all things. That the ancient Egyptian theology, from whence the theologies of other nations were derived, ran so high as this, is evident from that excellent monument of Egyptian antiquity, the Saithick inscription often mentioned, I am all, that was, is, and shall be. And the Trismegistick books inscribing so much every where upon this notion, that God is all things (as hath been observed) renders it the more probable, that they were not all counterfeit and supposititious; but that, according to the testimony of Jamblichus, they did at least contain δεις Ερμήνευς, some of the old Theutical or Hermial phi-

lofophy in them. And from Egypt, in all probability, was this doctrine by Orpheus derived into Greece, the Orphick verses themselves running much upon this strain, and the Orphick theology being thus epitomized by Timo-
theus the chronographer; That all things were made by God, and that him-

self is all things. This purpose it is that of AEschylus,

Grot. Exc.    Zεὺς 'έστιν αλήθες, Ζεὺς δ' γινη, Ζέως δ' ηρανος,
P. 57.   Ζείης τοι τα πάντα, χτός, τς των δ' θ' υπέστρευν.

Et terra, & aether, & poli arx est Jupiter,
Et cuncta solus, & aliquld sublimius.

And again,

Ποτι μοι υς πυρ φιλεθαι
'Απλαγων φρονηθε, ποτι δ' ουδε, ποτι δι φροθε
Και οντων αυτως πυρεται πορεμφεχθε,
Ανειμο, νυφει τε, καμφαπτη, βροτη, βροχη.

Nunc ut implacabilis
Apparet ignis: nunc tenebris, nunc aqua
Par ille cerni: simulat interdum seram,
Tenuitra, ventos, fulmina, & nibila.

As also this of Lucan, amongst the Latins,

Superos quid quacrimus ultra?
Jupiter est qudecunque vides, quacunque moveris.

Whercunto agree also these passages of Seneca the philosopher, Quid est Deus? Quod vides totum, & quod non vides, totum. And Sic solus est omnis opus


Tom. I. Oper.
chap. IV.  Theology, that God is all things.

What is God? he is all that you see, and all that you do not see. And be alone is all things, be containing his own work not only without, but also within. Neither was this the doctrine only of those Pagans, who held God to be the soul of the world, and consequently the whole animated world to be the supreme Deity, but of those others also, who conceived of God as an abstract mind, superior to the mundane soul, or rather as a simple Monad, superior to mind also; as those philosophers, Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Melissus, who described God to be one and all things, they supposing, that, because all things were from him, they must needs have been first in a manner in him, and himself all things. With which agree the author of the Asclepian Dialogue, when he maketh Unus omnia, and Creator omnium. One all things, and the Creator of all things, to be but equivalent expressions; and when he affirmeth, that before things were made, In eo jam tunc erant, unde nasci baberunt; They then existed in him, from whom afterwards they proceeded. So likewise the other Trismegistic books, when they give this account of God’s being both all things that are, and all things that are not, τά μὲν γὰρ υἱά τοῦ θεοῦ εκτὸς, τά δὲ μὴ δόλα ἐξαιτοῦ ζωῆς, because those things, that are, he hath manifested from himself, and those things, that are not, he still containeth within himself; or, as it is elsewhere expressed, he doth ἀσκοῖται, hide them and conceal them in himself. And the Orphick verses gave this same account likewise of God’s being all things, Πάντα τὸ δὲ θεὸς, &c. because he first concealed and hid them all within himself before they were made, and thence afterward from himself displayed them, and brought them forth into light: or because

Ζνῶς δ’ ιν γατίρι, σύτι πεφυκε,

before they were produced, they were all contain’d together in the womb of God.

Now this was not only a further ground of that seeming polytheism amongst the Pagans, which was really nothing but the polyonymy of one God, and their perforating his several powers; but also of another more strange and puzzling phenomenon in their theology, namely, their perforating also the parts of the world inanimate, and things of nature, and bestowing the names of gods and goddesses upon them. It was before observed out of Moschopisus, that the Pagans did ἐν ὑμνίμι τότε τῶν ἐν ναμί κεκρίμεν εἶχον, καὶ τοῦ ἐπικάτωλα τῶν κεκρίμεν κληλα, call the things in nature, and the gods, which presided over them, by one and the same name. As for example, they did not only call the god, which presided over those arts that operate by fire, Hephaestus or Vulcan, but also fire itself: and Demeter or Ceres was not only taken by them for that god, who was supposethed to give corn and fruits, but also for corn itself. So Dionysus or Bacchus did not only signify the god that giveth wine, but also wine itself. And he instancing further in Venus, and Minerva, and the Muses, concludes the fame universally of all the rest. Thus L. 5. [A. 236.] Arnobius, in his book against the Pagans, in usu sermonis vestri, Martem pro pugna appellateis, pro aqva N. pneunum, Liberum Patrem; pro vino, Cere- rem pro pane, Minervam pro flamine, pro obs-cnis libidinis Venerem. Now we will not deny, but that this was sometimes done metonymically, the ef-
The Parts of the world, and Things

Book I

De If. & Of.  
De N. D. l.  
P. 222.  
[Cap. XXIII.  
P. 2987 ]

De Decal.  
P. 751, 752.

efficient cause, and the ruling or governing principle, being put for the effect, or that which was ruled and governed by it. And thus was war frequently styled Mars; and that of Terence may be taken also in this sense, *Sine Ce-

And Plutarch (who declares his great dislike of this kind of language) conceives, that there was no more at first in it than this, ὴδε χρόνος τόν ὥραμεν βλέπει Πλάτωνος, καὶ ἔθελεν Φαρσάν Πλάτωνος, ἵνα Μέναμεισίν τοὺς ὑπόκριτας τὰ Μνασίδα ποιήσαντα ὑποτεθευμένων, ὅτι τῶν ἔτους ὄνομασ-

As we, when one buys the books of Plato, commonly say, that he buys Plato; and when one acts the plays of Menander, that he acts Menander; so did the ancients not spare to call the gifts and effects of the gods, by the names of those gods respectively, thereby honouring them also for their utility. But he grants, that afterward this language was by ignorant persons abused, and carried on further, and that not without great impiety; οἱ δὲ ὑπὲρ ὁλαῖπαντον θεοποιήματα καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖο ἀποκεφάλεσθαι, τοῦ τάτη τά πάντα τῶν κάρτων, τῶν περιπετειών τῶν ἀνικότερων καὶ ἀπτοκρίσεων, τῶν γενεσιῶν καὶ παραδόσεων μὲν ἀλλ' ἡμοῦ ἡμών τόπων, αἰώνων καὶ αρχαῖων εἰς παραδόσεις δοξῶν αὐτὸς ἐπικεφαλίζεται. Their followers mistak-

Where Plutarch well condemns the vulgar both amongst the E-

gyptians and Greeks, for that, in their mournful solemnities, they foolishly attributed to the gods the passions belonging to the fruits of the earth, thereby indeed making them to be gods. Nevertheless the inanimate parts of

Theophilus also thus represents the religion of the Pagans, as first deifying corporeal inanimate things, and then bestowing those proper personal names upon them: ἐπειδὴ ἡμᾶς γαρ οἱ μὴ τὰς πτωμάς αὐράκες, γη, κυ̃δωρ, κυ̃αρά, κυ̃πος· οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι καὶ σελήνη καὶ τὰς ἀλλὰ πλανήτας, αὐτῷ αἴτησι· οἱ δὲ μένος τὸν κόσμον, οἱ δὲ πάσης κόσμου τοῦ καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ προεξερχόντος, τοῦ γενεσίου τῆς μεγάλης πόλεος, τοῦ προεξερχόντος τῆς ἀληθίνης στρατείας, τοῦ καθιστίνθης δὲ ὁ ἅγιος, ἡ ἀστυνόμος αὐτῷ αἰνειά, παροικα-

Sce. *Iβίδ. οἱ δὲ τῶν ἄνθρωπων, ἦλευθεροὶ καὶ παρακλητοὶ, &c. Some have deified the four elements, the earth, the water, the air and the fire: Some the sun and the moon, and the planets and fixed stars: others the heaven, others the whole world. But that biggest and most ancient Being, the parent of
of all things, the chief prince of this great city, and the emperor of this invincible army, who governeth all things salutiferously, him have they covered, concealed, and obscured, by beflowing counterfeit personal names of gods upon each of these things. For the earth they called Proserpin, Pluto, and Ceres; the sea Neptune, under whom they place many demons and nymphs also as his inferior ministers; the air Juno; the fire Vulcan; the sun Apollo; the moon Diana, &c. and difpelling the heaven into two hemispheres, one above the earth, the other under it, they call thefe the Dioscuri, feigning them to live alternately one one day, and the other another. We deny not here, but that the four elements, as well as the sun, moon, and stars, were supposed by some of the Pagans to be animated with particular souls of their own, (which Ammianus Marcellinus 1 seems principally to call spiritus elementorum, the spirits of the elements, worshipped by ̓Iulian) and upon that account to be fo many inferior gods themselves. Notwithstanding which, that the inanimate parts of thefe were also deified by the Pagans, may be concluded from hence; because Plato, who in his Cratylus etymologizeth Dionysus from giving of wine, and elsewhere calls the fruits of the earth ̓ Δ νυμμρες, De Leg. p. 783. the gifts of Ceres, doth himself nevertheless, in compliance with this vulgar speech, call wine and water as mingled together in a glass (or cup) to be drunk, gods: where he affirmeth, that a city ought to be ̓ ςμνομ νενυτες De Leg. 1. 6. of himself. It may be, he might have feen the same done by the gods, and that to be ̓ ναυξας, και ̓ κεννιμος και ζεί, και ̓ κεννιμος και ̓ ιτε νυτες, ναυξας, και δανομος αεως, αγαθω πομα και μετροι ανεχεος χιαυ, so temper'd, as in a cup, where the furious wine poured out bubbles and sparkles, but being corroded by another sober god, (that is, by water) both together make a good and moderate potion. Cicero also tells us, that before the Roman admirals went to sea, they were wont to offer up a sacrifice to the waves. But of this more afterward. However, it is certain, that mere accidents, and affections of things, were by these Pagans commonly perfonated and deified; as Time, in Sophecles his Ele&tra 2, is a god; ̓ ξανος γας νομμαες; God, for Time is an easy god; and Love, in Plato's Symposium, where it is wondered at, that no poet had ever made a hymn ̓ ανα τιλενων ουν ̓ τοταυαν ου την Λυς, to Love, being such and so great a god. Though the fame Plato, in his Philebus, when Protarchus had called Pleasure a goddess too, was not willing to comply so far there with vulgar speech; ̓ αν ην ινος και ου, ̓ Προταρκας, ην υπο των διαν ουν αεως εν ει τι που ηρων, αλλα περι τη μεγιστης φθαντη και των μεν ουν Άρεστην, ονι εκεινη διαον, τοτε τοπομενονω την ην ινον ουν ην ̓ ει τι ̓ ποικιλον My fear, O Protarchus, concerning the names of the gods is extraordinary great: wherefore, as to Venus, I am willing to call her what she pleases to be called; but Pleasure, I know, is a various and multiform thing. Wherefore it cannot be denied, but that the Pagans did in some sene or other deify or theologize all the parts of the world, and things of nature. Which we conceive to have been done at first upon no other ground than this, because God was supposed by them, not only to permeate and pervade all things, to be diffused thorough all, and to act in and upon all, but also to be himself in a manner all things; which they expressed after this way, by perforoning the things of nature severally, and

a Vide Lib. XXI. Cap. I. p. 263.  
The Pagans

and bestowing the names of gods and goddesses upon them. Only we shall here observe, that this was done especially (besides the greater parts of the world) to two sorts of things: first, such in which human utility was most concerned: thus Cicero, *Multae aliae naturae deorum ex magnis beneficiis eorum, non sole causas, & a Graecis sapientibus, & a maiori benignis, constitutae nominatique sunt*: Many other natures of gods have been constituted and nominated, both by the wise men of Greece, and by our ancestors, merely for the great benefits received from them. The reason whereof is thus given by him; *Quia quicquid magnum utilitatem generi afferret humano, id non solum divina bonitate erga homines fieri arbitrabantur*: Because they thought, that whatsoever brought any great utility to mankind, this was not without the divine goodness. Secondly, such as were most wonderful and extraordinary, or surprizing; to which that of Seneca seems pertinent, *Magnorum fluminum capita veneramur: subita & ex abrupto vaeus amnis eruption aras habeat; colonitur aquarum calentium fontes; & magna quaedam vel opacitas vel immensa altitudine sacravit*. We adore the rising heads and springs of great rivers: every sudden and plentiful eruption of waters out of the hidden caverns of the earth hath its altars erected to it; and some pools have been made sacred for their immense profundity and opacity.

Now, this is that, which is properly called the Physiological Theology of the Pagans, their personating and deifying (in a certain sense) the things of nature, whether inanimate substances, or the affections of substances. A great part of which Physiological Theology was allegorically contained in the poetick fables of the gods. *Eusebiius indeed was of opinion, that those poetick fables were at first only historical and herological, but that afterwards some went about to allegorize them into physiological senses, thereby to make them seem the less impious and ridiculous: τινα εν τα της παλαιας

*Theologiae, ου μεθαλαλοντες την της Χθες κα της Παλαιας, ιερας κα της παραπεριπτωτης, λογικωτης τα φιλοσοφικα κα της μεσοπολημης, την δυ Φωσικωτης την περι Σεμων ιεραις εξαυται εις ποιησιος, ευρηκτως κα της ιερολογιας της μεσιως προσεπικοσιως, &εκ. Εικαπται την την θεον εις το πατρικιν, αναγεννησις προθυμηθης, εις Φωσικας ιεραις κα της Ιερος της μεσιως μεταποιησιος: Such was the ancient theology of the Pagans (namely, historical, of men deceased, that were worshipped for gods) which some late upstarts have altered, devising other philosophical and physiological senses of these histories of their gods, that they might thereby render them the more specious, and hide the impiety of them. For they being neither willing to abandon those poperies of their forefathers, nor yet themselves able to bear the impiety of these fables (concerning the gods) according to the literal sense of them, have gone about to cure them thus by physiological interpretations. Neither can it be doubted, but that there was some mixture of herology and history in the poetick mythology; nor denied, that the Pagans of latter times, such as Porphyrius and others, did excogitate and devise certain new allegorical senses of their own, such as never were intended; Origen, before both him and Porphyry, noting this of the Pagans, that when the absurdity of their fables concerning the gods was objected and urged against them, some of them did *την της απολογιας εις αλλαγιας καταφεκων, apologizing for these things, betake themselves to allegories. But*
But long before the times of Christianity, those first Stoicks, Zeno, Cleanthes and Chryssippus, were famous for the great pains, which they took in allegorizing these poetick fables of the gods. Of which Cotta in Cicero thus: Magnam molestiam suscipit & minime necessarium primus Zeno, post Cleanthes, deinde Chryssippus, commentitiorum fabularum reddere rationem, & vocabulorum, cum quidquid ita appellatum fit, causas explicare. Quod cum facitis, illed professo confitemini, longe alterem se habere atque hominum opinio sit; eos qui Dii appellantur, rerum naturas esse, non figuram Deorum. Zeno first; and after him Cleanthes and Chryssippus, took a great deal more pains than was needful, to give a reason of all those commentitious fables of the gods, and of the names that every thing was called by. By doing which they confessed, that the matter was far otherwise than according to mens opinion, in as much as they, who are called gods in them, were nothing but the natures of things. From whence it is plain, that, in the poetick theology, the Stoicks took it for granted, that the natures of things were perforated and deified, and that those gods were not animal, nor indeed philosophical, but fictitious, and nothing but the things of nature allegorized. Origen also gives us a taste of Chryssippus his thus allegorizing, in his interpreting an oblique picture or table of Jupiter and Juno, in Samos; Λεγει γαρ την ιατρον συγγραμματιν το θεον χιλοσφητε, ότι της σπερματικης λατος τη δει η υλη παραδειγματιν, έχει ει λατον, εις καιρασκοςκας των θουν θαν γαρ η ει τη κατα τον Σλων γραφη, τη Πη, κη θ Ζεις ο Ζεις ο Ζεις. This grave philosopher, in his writings, faith, that matter having received the sphericall reasonings of God, containeth them within itself for the adorning of the whole world; and that Juno, in this picture in Samos, signifies Matter, and Jupiter God. Upon which occasion that piuous father adds, κη δια τουτα ειν εινει, κη δια της τωτης μοβες κη αλλας μοριες, κη μικεις ουμαλως δειμενς Δια καιλιν τον επι παρε τη Θεον, αλλα καιρον ευσεβικου εις τον ορωματικον ασκουμενος, οτε μικεις ουμαλως ΧΑΡΟΥΝΕΙ ΤΑ ΘΕΙΑ. For the sake of which, and innumerable other such like fables, we will never endure to call the God over all by the name of Jupiter, but, exercising pure piety towards the Maker of the world, will take care not to defile divine things with impure names. And here we see again, according to Chryssippus his interpretation, that Hera or Juno was no animal nor real God, but only the nature of matter perforated and deified; that is, a mere fictitious and poetick god. And we think it is unquestionably evident from Hesiod's Theogonia, that many of these poetick fables, according to their first intention, were really nothing else but physiology allegorized; and consequently those gods nothing but the natures of things perforated and deified. Plato himself, though no friend to these poetick fables, plainly intimates as much, in his second De Rep. κη Στοιχ. [P. 430.] γαρ, οταν Ωμος πεποιηκεν η παραδειγματιν εις τον τολαμ, ιν η υποσκας πεποιηκεν η, εκ ι ευρυ μπορουν η η γαρ νεκε, κη ονος το κρες ει, τη τη υπονοια και ε μη. The fightings of the gods, and such other things, as Homer hath feigned concerning them, ought not to be admitted into our commonwealth, whether they be delivered in way of allegory, or without allegories; because young men are not able to judge, when it is an allegory, and when not. And it appears from Dionyfus Halicarnass. that this was the general opinion concerning the Greekish fables, that some of them were physically, and some tropologically allegorical: De Nat. Deor. Lib. II. Cap. XXIV. p. 3089. Tom. IX. Oper.
This Physiological Theology

Book I.

L. ii. p. 68.

N. D. l. 2. p. 223.

vitus religionis, illa que uno nomine Latria Graec appellatur. Neither do
the Pagans sufficiently excuse their sacrilegious rites and images from hence,
because they elegantly (and ingeniously) interpret, what each of those things
signifieth. For this interpretation is referred to the creature, and not to the
Creator, to whom alone belongeth religious worship, that which by the Greeks
is called Latria. And again in his book de Civ. D. 1. 6. c. 8. Aetniam ba-
bent fia physiologicas quasdam (sicunt antiqui) id est, naturalium rationum inter-
pretationes. Quasi verò nos in bae disputatione physiologiam quaramus, &
non theologiam; id est, rationem naturae, & non Dei. Quamvis enim qui
verum Deus est, non opinione sed natura fit Deus; non tamen omnis natura
Deus est. But the Pagans pretend, that these things have certain physiological
interpretations, or according to natural reasons; as if in this disputation we
sought for physiology, and not theology, or the reason of nature, and not of
God. For although the true God be not in opinion only, but in nature God, yet
is not every nature God. But certainly the first and chief ground of this,
practice of theirs, thus to theologize physiology, and deify (in one sense or
other) all the things of nature, was no other than what has been already in-
timated, their supposing God to be not only diffused thorough the whole
world, and in all things, but also in a manner all things; and that there-
fore he ought to be worshipped in all the things of nature, and parts of
the world.

Wherefore these personated Gods of the Pagans, or those things of na-
ture deified by them, and called gods and goddesse, were for all that by
no means accounted, by the intelligent amongst them, true and proper gods.
Thus Cotta in Cicero; Cun fruges Cererem, vinum Liberum dicimus, gé-
Dei N. D. l.3. were nos quidem sermonis usitum usitato: sed ecquem tam amement esse putas,
p. 345. qui illud, quaeveatur, Deus esse credat? Though it be very common and
familiar language amongs us, to call corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus, yet who
can think any one to be so mad, as to take that to be really a god, which
be feeds upon? The Pagans really accounted that only for a God, by the
worshipping and invoking whereof they might reasonably expect benefit
to themselves, and therefore nothing was truly and properly a God to them,
but what was both substantial, and also animant and intellectual. For Plato L. 10. De Leg.
writes, that the atheistic wits of his time therefore concluded the sun,[p. 665,]
and moon, and stars, not to be gods, because they were nothing but earth
and stones (or a certain fiery matter) devoid of all understanding and sense;
and for this cause, eventhewolyophysion pæramatov Phoovilzv òvómx, unable to
take notice of any human affairs. And Ariejotló affirmeth concerning the
gods in general, ἐν τε πάντες ἐναληθασαν αὐτῶς, καὶ ἐνεφεί άξα, &c. That all
men conceived them to live, and consequently to be, since they cannot be supposed
to sleep perpetually as Endymion did. The Pagans univerally conceived
the gods to be happy animals; and Ariejotló there concludes the happi-
nesses of them all to consist in contemplation. Lucretius himself would not
debar men of that language (then vulgarly received amongst the Pagans)
of calling the sea Neptune, corn Ceres, wine Bacchus, and the Earth the

mother
mother of the gods too, provided that they did not think any of these, for
all that, to be truly and really gods:

Hic quisque mare Neptunum, Cereremque vocare
Constituit fruges, & Bacchi nomine abutit
Mavolt, quam laticis proprium preferre vocavem;
Concedamus, ut hic terrarum dimittet orbem
Effe deum matrem, dum non sit re tamen apse.

And the reason, why the earth was not really a goddess, is thus given by him;

Terra quidem vero caret omni tempore sensu.

Because it is constantly void of all manner of sense. Thus Balbus in Cicero
tells us, that the first thing included in the notion or idea of a god is this,
Ut sit animans, That it be animant; or endued with life, sense, and under-
standing. And he conceiving the stars to be undoubtedly such, therefore
concludes them to be gods: Quoniam tenuissimus est aether, & semper agitatur
& viget, necesse est, quod animal in eo gignatur, idem quoque sensu acerrimo
effe. Quare cum in aethere astra gignatur, consentaneum est in ista sensum
& intelligentiam. Ex quo efficitur in deorum numero astra esse ducenda. Be-
cause the aether is most subtile, and in continual agitation, that animal, which is
begotten in it, must needs be endued with the quickest and sharpest sense. Where-
fore since the stars are begotten in the aether, it is reasonable to think them to
have sense and understanding; from whence it follows, that they ought to be
reckoned in the number of gods. And Cotta in the third book affirms, that
all men were so far from thinking the stars to be gods, that multi ne ani-
mantibus quidem esse concedant, many would not so much as admit them to be ani-
mals; plainly intimating, that unless they were animated, they could not
possibly be gods. Lastly, Plutarch, for this very reason, absolutely con-
demns that whole practice of giving the names of gods and goddesses to
inanimate things, as absurd, impious, and atheistical; οἷος καὶ άνω της ἐφαίτιας, αὐξήσατο, καὶ αὐξήσατο, καὶ θεομομένης θεομιμήσας ὅποιον τινάς διομένυ καὶ
θεομομένων φύσεως καὶ φράγματων οὐκαίτο θεῶν ἐπιφέρει, τούτα μία γὰρ αὐτὰ
νοστιμίας ἡς ἐν ὑπὸ, ἐν τῷ ἁπλαῖς, καὶ καὶ ἡ ἱερὰ ἔστε οὗτος οὗτος οὗτος οὗτος οὗτος οὗτος οὗτος οὗτος οὗτος οὕτως. They, who give the
names of gods to senseless and inanimate natures and things, and such as are
destroyed by men in the use of them, beget most wicked and atheistical opinions
in the minds of men; since it cannot be conceived, how these things should be
gods, for nothing, that is inanimate, is a god. And now we have very good
reason to conclude, that the distinction or division of Pagan gods (used by
some) into animal and natural (by natural being meant inanimate) is ut-
terly to be rejected, if we speak of their true and proper gods; since no-
things was such to the Pagans but what had life, sense, and understanding.
Wherefore those personated gods, that were nothing but the nature of things
deified, as such, were but dii commentii & fictitii, counterfeit and fictitious
gods; or, as Origen calls them in that place before cited, τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ ἀναπλάσ-
ματα, συμφάλαιοι δέξια δοκοῦντα ἀπὸ τῶν παραμάτων, figments of the Greeks (and
other Pagans) that were but things turned into persons and deified. Neither can
can there be any other sense made of these personated and deified things of nature, than this, that they were all of them really so many several names of one supreme God, or partial confiderations of him, according to the several manifestations of himself in his works. Thus, according to the old Egyptian theology before declared, God is said to have both no name, and every name; or, as it is expressed in the Asclepian Dialogue, Cum non possit uno quamvis et multis composito nomine nuncupari, potius omni nomine vocandus est, sedi demit sit unus & omnia, ut necessi sit, aut omnia ipsum nomine, aut ipsum omnium nomine nuncupari. Since he cannot be fully declared by any one name, though compounded of never so many, therefore is it rather to be called by every name, he being both one and all things: so that either every thing must be called by his name, or he by the name of every thing. With which Egyptian doctrine Seneca 1 seemeth also fully to agree, when he gives this description of God, Cui nomen omne convenit, He to whom every name becometh; and when he further declares thus concerning him, Quae- cunque voles illi nomina aptabis; and, Tot appelliones ejus possunt esse, quot munera, You may give him whatsoever names you please, &c. and, There may be as many names of him as there are gifts and effects of bis: and lastly, when he makes God and nature to be really one and the same thing, and every thing we see to be God. And the writer De Mundo 2 is likewise con- fonant hereunto, when he affirmeth, that God is μανον φωςων οντες πάντων αυτος οντως ον, or, may be denominated from every nature, because he is the cause of all things. We say therefore, that the Pagans in this their theologizing of physiolog, and deifying the things of nature and parts of the world, did accordingly call every thing by the name God, or God by the name of every thing.

Wherefore these personated and deified things of nature were not them- selves properly and directly worshipped by the intelligent Pagans (who acknowledged no inanimate thing for a God) so as to terminate their worship ultimately in them; but either relatively only to the supreme God, or else at most in way of complication with him, whose effects and images they are, so that they were not so much themselves worshipped, as God was worshipped in them. For these Pagans professed, that they did, τον οφρα- Julian Orat. τον μη παραγον, μηδε ωσπερ τα βοσκουμενα σωματα, look upon the heaven (and the world) not lightly and superficially; nor as mere brute animals, who take notice of nothing, but these sensibler phantasms, which from the objects obtrude themselves upon them; or else, as the same Julian, in that oration, again more fully expresseth it, τον οφραν ως ωσπερ οππος και βοσκος ορθως, ήτι των. 286. άλογων και αμαθών ζωων αλλα ις αυτε το φανερο τον αρχιν θεοward an opponent of. Not view and contemplate the heaven and world, with the same eyes that oxen and horses do, but so as from that, which is visible to their outward senses, to discern and discover another invisible nature under it. That is, they professed to behold all things with religious eyes, and to see God in every thing, not only as pervading all things, and diffused thorough all things, but also as being in a manner all things. Wherefore they looked upon the whole world as a sacred thing, and as hav- ing a kind of divinity in it; it being, according to their theology, no-

thing but God himself visibly displayed. And thus was God worshipped by the Pagans, in the whole corporeal world taken all at once together, or in the univerfe, under the name of Pan. As they also commonly conceived of Zeus and Jupiter, after the same manner; that is, not abstractly only (as we now use to conceive of God) but concretely, together with all that which proceedeth and emaneth from him, that is, the whole world. And as God was thus described in that old Egyptian monument, to be all that was, is, and shall be, so was it before observed out of Plutarch, that the Egyptians took the first God, and the universe, for one and the same thing; not only because they suppos’d the supreme God virtually to contain all things within himself, but also because they were wont to conceive of him, together with his overflowing, and all the extent of his fecundity, the whole world displayed from him, all at once, as one entire thing. Thus likewise do the Pagans in Plato confound τὸν μίγμαν θεόν, and ὄλον τὸν κόσμον, the greatest God, and the whole world together, as being but one and the same thing. And this notion was so familiar with these Pagans, that Strabo himself, writing of Moses, could not conceive of his God, and of the God of the Jews, any otherwise than thus, τὸ περὶ ὑμῶν ἡμῶν ἄπωλλα, τῇ γῇ, τῇ Ὕλαπλαν, ὦ καλέμεν ἄραολ καὶ κόσμον, καὶ τῆν τῶν ὥκων φίλων, namely, that which containeth us all, and the earth, and the sea, which we call the heaven and world, and the nature of the whole. By which notwithstanding, Strabo did not mean the heaven or world inanimate, and a senseless nature, but an understanding Being, framing the whole world, and containing the same, which was conceived together with it; of which therefore he tells us, that, according to Moses, no wise man would go about to make any image or picture, resembling any thing here amongst us. From whence we conclude, that when the same Strabo, writing of the Persians, affirmeth of them, that they did τὸν ἐξων ἐνεργὸν Δία, take the heaven for Jupiter; and also Herodotus before him, that they did κυκλῳ πίνακα τῇ ἐξων Διά καλεῖν, call the whole circle of the heaven Jupiter, that is, the supreme God; the meaning of neither of them was, that the body of the heaven inanimate was to them the highest God, but that though he were an understanding nature, yet framing the whole heaven or world, and containing the same, he was at once conceived together with it. Moreover, God was worshipped also by the Pagans, in the several parts of the world, under several names; as for example, in the higher and lower æther, under those names of Minerva and Jupiter; in the air, under the name of Juno; in the fire, under the name of Vulcan; in the sea, under the name of Neptune, &c. Neither can it be reasonably doubted, but that when the Roman sea-captains sacrific’d to the waves, they intended therein to worship that God, who acteth in the waves, and whose wonders are in the deep.

But besides this, the Pagans seemed to apprehend a kind of necessity of worshipping God thus, in his works, and in the visible things of this world, because the generality of the vulgar were then unable to frame any notion or conception at all of an invisible Deity; and therefore unless they were detained in a way of religion, by such a worship of God as was accommodated

commodate and suitable to the lownels of their apprehensions, would unavoidably run into atheism. Nay, the most philosophical wits amongst them confessing God to be incomprehensible to them, therefore seemed themselves also to stand in need of some sensible props, to lean upon. This very account is given by the Pagans, of their practice, in Euthybius: Pr. Ec. I. 3. 

That God being incorporeally and invisibly present in all things, and pervading or passing through all things, it was reasonable, that men should worship him, by and through those things, that are visible and manifest. Plato likewise represents this as the opinion of the generality of Pagans in his time, τὸν μὲν τῶν θεῶν καὶ ὄλον τὸν κόσμον θαυμάζει De Leg. I. 7. 

That as for the greatest God, and the whole world, men should not busily and curiously search after the knowledge thereof, nor pragmatically inquire into the causes of things, it being not pious for them so to do. The meaning whereof seems to be no other than this, that men ought to content themselves to worship God in his works, and in this visible world, and not trouble themselves with any further curious speculations concerning the nature of that, which is incomprehensible to them. Which though Plato professeth his dislike of, yet does that philosopher himself elsewhere plainly allow of worshipping the first invisible God in those visible images, which he hath made of himself, the sun and moon, and stars. 

Above all corporeal things; τίς τὸς θεὸν ἢ τὸ ἄρτις, ἢ τὸν θεὸν ἢ τὸ ἄρτις σῶμα (καλα μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα ἡ Σεπτίς, ὡτὲ εἰς ἦν ἄρκεσιν ἢ ἐκορεῖν, ἢ πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον ἠμορμέον) ἀλλὰ ἡ τῶν ἐπεκείν πάντων ἐλεύθερον δεῖ, ἢ ύπερορθία τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἡπὶ τὸν θεὸν τῶν, &c. The end of your journey (faith he) is not the heaven, nor those shining bodies in the heaven; for though those be beautiful and divine, and the genuine offspring of that supreme Deity, framed after the best manner, yet ought these all to be transcended by you, and your head lifted up far above the starry heavens, &c. Nevertheless, he closes his discourse thus: ἐγὼ ἐμαυτός τὸν τῶν πατρὸς ἢ θεομεροῦ Σικός, ἐνεχθεὶς τὰ ἔχοντα ἢ τὴν παρόπιον ὄργανα, ἢ προπαλαίκα τὰ ἔχοντα, παλλά ἢ παντοδαπὰ υδάθεα, οὐκ ἔστι οὐκ οἰκεῖσθαι τὸν τοσοφαῖν ἀγαθονίαν τούτου μὲν κατ' οὐρανόν καὶ σέρεον φῶς, &c. But if you be too weak and unable to contemplate that father and maker of all things; it will be sufficient for you for the present to behold his works, and to worship his progeny or offspring, which is various and manifold. For there are not only, according to the Bacchanalian poet, thrybi thousand gods, all the sons and friends of the supreme God; but innumerable. And such in the heaven are the stars, in the ether demons, &c. Lastly, Socrates himself also did not only allow of this way of worshipping God, (because himself is invisible) in his works that are visible, but also commend the same to Euthydemus: ἦν δὲ γὰρ ἀληθῆ λίγα, ὡς οὖν τὰ πάντα ὧν ἐν πᾶν ὑπεκοιλία ἢ μὴ θαυμάζεις ἢς ἡ μορφὰς τῶν ἔχεις, ἢ ἢ θαυμάζεις τοὺς ἔχεις αὐτῶν ἐγὼ ἀνεπιστημώνικος ἔχωσαν mor. t. 4. 

That I speak the truth, yourself shall know, if you will not flay expecting, till you see the forms of the gods themselves, but count it sufficient for you beholding their works to worship and adore them. Which he afterward particularly applies to the supreme God, who made and containeth the whole
whole world, that being invisible, he hath made himself visible in his works, and consequently was to be worshipped and adored in them. Whether Socrates and Plato, and their genuine followers, would extend this any further than to the animated parts of the world, such as the sun, moon, and stars were to them, we cannot certainly determine. But we think it very probable, that many of those Pagans, who are charged with worshipping inanimate things, and particularly the elements, did notwithstanding direct their worship to the spirits of those elements, as Ammianus Marcellinus tells us Julian did, that is, chiefly the souls of them, all the elements being supposed by many of these Pagans to be animated, (as was before observed concerning Proclus;) and partly also those daemons, which they conceived to inhabit in them, and to preside over the parts of them; upon which account it was said by Plato, and others of the ancients, that πάντα ζών πλήρες, all things are full of gods and daemons.

XXXIII. But that those physiological gods, that is, the things of nature personated and deified, were not accounted by the Pagans true and proper gods, much less independent and self-existent ones, may further appear from hence, because they did not only thus personate and deify things substantial, and inanimate bodies, but also mere accidents and affections of substances. As for example, first, the passions of the mind; τὰ πάντα ζών ἐν ψυχή, in the soul; ἐν ψυχῆς, of the soul, faith S. Greg. Nazianzen; They accounted the passions of the mind to be gods, or at least worshipped them as gods; that is, built temples or altars to their names. Thus was Hope, not only a goddess to the poet Theognis;" Εἰπεὶ εἰς θεράπωσιν μόνης ζών ζηνακῇ ζεῖν ἐπιμένει, Εἰπεὶ δὲ ὑπερμαντόν ἐκφοβολμένος ζεῖν; (where he fancifully makes her to be the only Numen, that was left to men in heaven, as if the other gods had all forsworn those mansions and the world;) but also had real temples dedicated to her at Rome, as that consecrated by Attilius in the Forum Ælia; and others elsewhere, wherein she was commonly pictured or feigned, as a woman, covered over with a green pall, and holding a cup in her hand. Thus also Love and Victory were gods or goddesses too, as likewise were care, memory, opinion, truth, virtue, piety, faith, justice, clemency, concord, victory, &c. Which Victory was, together with Virtue, reckoned up amongst the gods by Plautus in the prologue of his Amphitryon; and not only so, but that there was an altar erected to her also, near the entrance of the senate-house at Rome, which having been once demolished, Symmachus earnestly endeavoured the restorations thereof, in the reign of Theodosius; he amongst other things, writing thus concerning it, Nemo coelestis neget, quam profetetur optandum; Let no man deny that of right to be worshipped, which he acknowledged to be wifed for, and to be desirable. Befides all which, Echo was a goddess to these pagans too, and so was Night (to whom they sacrificed a cock) and Sleep and Death itself, and very many more such affections of

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2 In Sententias, Ver. 1151, 1152. p. 115. Vide Vossium. de Idololatriz. Lib. VII.
3 Epistolar. Lib. IX. Epist. LXI. p. 441.
things, of which Vesius has collected the largest catalogue, in his eighth book de Theologia Gentili. And this personating and deifying of accidental things was so familiar with these Pagans, that, as St. Chrysostome hath observed, St. Paul was therefore said by some of the vulgar Athenians to have been a fetter forth of strange gods, when he preached to them Jesus and the resurrection, because they supposed him, not only to have made Jesus a God, but also Anastasis, or resurrection, a goddess too. Nay, this humour of theologizing the things of nature transported these Pagans so far, as to deify evil things also, that is, things both noxious and vicious. Of the former Pliny, H. N. I. 2. thus; Inferi quoque in genera describuntur, morbique, & multe etiam pestes, c. 7. dum esse placatas trepido metu cupinus. Ideoque etiam publice febri in palatino dedicatum est, Orbonae ad edem larium ara, & male fortune Excubillis. So great is the number of these gods, that even hell, or the state of death itself, diseases and many plagues are numbered among them, with a trembling fear we desire to have these pacified. And therefore was there a temple publickly dedicated in the palace to the Fever, as likewise altars elsewhere ereffed to Orbona, and to evil fortune. Of the latter, Balbus in Cicero; Deus ex genere Cupidinis & Voluptatis, & Lubantine Veneris, vocabula consecrata N. D. I. 2. sunt, viitiofarum rerum & non naturalium. Of which kind also are those names of lust, and pleasure, and wanton venery, things vicious, and not natural, consecrated and deified. Cicero, in his book of laws, informs us, that at Athens there were temples dedicated also to lust, and impudence, but withal giving us this censure of such practices, Deus omnia ejusmodi detestanda & Gruter's Edition a little otherwise.

Moreover, as these things of nature, or natures of things, were sometimes deified by the Pagans plainly and nakedly in their own appellative names, so was this again sometimes done disguisedly, under other counterfeitt proper names: as pleasure was deified under the names of Volupia, and of Lubentina Venus; time, (according to the opinion of some) under the name of Cronos or Saturn, which as it produceth all things, doth devour all things into itself again; prudence or wisdom likewise, under the names of Athina or Minerva. For it is plain, that Origen understood it thus, when Celsus not only approved of worshipping God Alc. Ch. 1, but also commended it as a thing highly pious; he making this reply;[viap] ἐνθιηθεῖν ἄλιον ὡς καλὸν ήτι δεμίουγον, &c. [Athenan metaxi metaxi taoosomion, iuµboeptanov ou 'Ελλήνως λόγος, εἶτι ἐν ψυχωισι, ἑτε χάρις υπνοιῶν, φάνωλες ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Δώο γενεαδίκει νεφαλῶν, καὶ ἐκ παλιμπίων, &c. We speak well of the sun, as a good work of God's, &c. but as for that Athena or Minerva, which Celsus here joineth with the sun, this is a thing fabulously devis'd by the Greeks, (whether according to some mystical, arcane, and allegorical sense, or without it) when they say that he was begotten out of Jupiter's brain, the arm. And again afterwards, ἵνα δὲ γαρ ἐπανδυνάμεναι ὧν ηλιοῦλοι φάνωλες εἶναι ἡ Αθηνᾶ, If it be granted, that by Athena or Minerva be tropologically meant prudence, &c. Wherefore, not only

Lib. II. Cap. XI. p. 3554. Tom. IX. Oper.
only according to the poetical, but also to the political and civil theology of the Pagans, these accidental things of nature, and affections of substances, perforated, were made so many gods and goddesses; Cicero himself in his book of laws approving of such political gods as thefe: Bene vero, quod mens, pietas, virtus, fides, confecratur mun. quorum omnium Romae dedicata publice templa funt, ut illa, qui habeant (habent autem omnes boni) deos ipfos in animis suis collocatos putent. It is well, that mind, piety, virtue, and faith, are confecrated, (all which have their temples publicly dedicated at Rome) that so they, who poffefs these things, (as all good men do) may think, that they have the gods themselves placed in their minds. And himself makes a law for them in his own commonwealth, but with a cautionary provifion, that no evil and vicious things be confecrated amongst them: Afi olla, proper que datur boini adscenfus in caele, mentem, virtutem, pietalem, fiden, carumque laudum delubra funto. Nec ulla vitiorum solemnia obvenio. Let them also worship those things, by means whereof men ascend up to heaven; and let there be shrines or temples dedicated to them. But let no religious ceremonies be performed to vicious things.

Notwithstanding all which, according to that theology of the Pagans, which was called by Varro natural, (whereby is meant not that which was physiological only, but that which is true and real) and by Scaevola philofophical; and which is by both oppofed, not only to the poetical and fabulous, but also to the political and civil: I fay, according to this theology of theirs, these accidental things of nature deified could by no means be acknowledged for true and proper gods; because they were so far from having any life and fenfe in them, that they had not fo much as υπόσαυς καί οὐκ, any real fubftance or substantial effence of their own. And thus does Origen dispute against Minerva's godship, as tropologically interpreted to prudence, nec di καὶ τροπολογηθαι καὶ λαβηθαι φρονιμαι ειναι η Άθηνα, παραμεταφερεν τις αυτης την υπόσαυς και την φόινικα, καθηκον τροπολογομαι των. If Athena or Minerva be tropologized into prudence, then let the Pagans show what substantial effence it hath, or that it really subsists according to this tropology. Which is all one, as if he should have faid, let the Pagans then shew, how this can be a god or goddef, which hath not fo much as any substantial effence, nor subsists by itself, but is a meer accidental affection of substances only. And the fame thing is like-wifc urged by Origen, concerning other fuch kind of gods of theirs, as Memory the mother of the muses, and the Graces all naked, in his first book; where Celfus contended for a multiplicity of gods againft the Jews; that thefe things having not υπόσαυς και οὐκ, any substantial effence or fubftance, could not poftibly be accounted gods, and therefore were nothing else, but Ἑλληνικά ἀναπλάσματα ςωματοποιηθετα ἀπό των πραγμάτων, meer fragments of the Greeks, things made to have human bodies, and so perforated and deified. And we think, there cannot be a truer commentary upon this paffage of Origen's, than thefe following verses of Prudentius, in his second book againft Symmachus;

_Derice._

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CHAP. IV. but several Names of God.

Define, si pudor est, gentilis ineptia, tandem
Res incorporeas simulatis fingere membris:

Let the Gentiles be at last ashamed, if they have any shame in them, of this their folly, in describing and setting forth incorporeal things with counterfeit human members. Where accidents and affections of things, such as victory was, (whose altar Symmacbus there contented for the restauration of) are by Prudentius called res incorporeas, incorporeal things, accordingly as the Greek philosophers concluded, that νοέται were ἀδύναμοι, qualities incorporeal. Neither is it possible, that the Pagans themselves should be insensitive hereof; and accordingly we find, that Cotta in Cicero doth for this reason utterly banish and explode these gods out of the philosophick and true theology: Num censes igitur subtiliorem rationem opus esse ad haec refellenda? Nam mentem, fidem, iussi, virtutem, bonorem, victoriam, salutem, concordiam, ceteraque ejusmodi, rerum vim habere videmus, non deorum. Aut enim in nobis metiens ipsis, ut mens, ut spec, ut fides, ut virtus, ut concordia; aut optanda nobis sunt, ut bonus, ut salus, ut victoria. Quare autem in his vis deorum sit, tum intelligam, cum cognovero. Is there any need, think you, of any great subtility to confute these things? For mind, faith, hope, virtue, honour, victory, health, concord, and the like, we see them to have the force of things, but not of gods. Because they either exist in us, as mind, hope, virtue, concord; or else they are desired to happen to us, as honour, health, victory, (that is, they are nothing but mere accidents or affections of things) and therefore how they can have the force of gods in them, cannot possibly be understood. And again, afterwards he affirmeth, Eos, qui dii appellantur, rerum naturas esse, non figuris deorum, that those, who, in the allegorical mythology of the Pagans, are called gods, are really but the natures of things, and not the true figures or forms of gods.

Wherefore since the Pagans themselves acknowledged, that those personated and deified things of nature were not true and proper gods; the meaning of them could certainly be no other than this, that they were so many several names, and partial considerations of one supreme God, as manifesting himself in all the things of nature. For that vis or force, which Cicero tells us, was that in all these things, which was called God or deified, is really no other, than something of God in every thing that is good. Neither do we otherwhise understand those following words of Balbus in Cicero, Quarum rerum, quia vis erat tanta, ut sine Deo regi N. D. l. 2. non posset, ipsa res deorum nomen obtinet: Of which things because the force [Cap. XXIII. p. 2988.] is such, as that it could not be governed without God, therefore have the things themselves obtained the names of gods; that is, God was acknowledged and worshipped in them all, which was paganically thus signified, by calling of them gods. And Pliny, though no very divine person, yet Nat. H. l. 2. being ingenious, easily understood this to be the meaning of it; Fragilis c. 7. & laboriosa mortalitas in partes ipsa digestis, infirmitatis suae memor, ut por-

The Pagans breaking and crumbling Book I.

tionibus quique coloret, quo maximè indigeret; frail and toilsome mortality has thus broken and crumbled the Deity into parts, mindful of its own infirmity; that so every one, by parcels and pieces, might worship that in God, which himself most stands in need of. Which religion of the Pagans, thus worshipping God, not entirely all together at once, as he is one most simple being, unmixed with any thing, but as it were brokenly, and by piece-meals, as he is severally manifested in all the things of nature, and the parts of the world, Prudentius thus perstringeth in his second book against Symmachus;

Tu, me preterito, meditaris numina mille,
Que simules parere meis virtutibus, ut me
Per varias partes minus, cui nulla recidi
Pars aut forma poteft, quia sum substantia simplex,
Nec pars effe quae.

N. 236.
[p. 289.]

That Osiris was the supreme Deity, see the Egyptian Inscription, in Thes. Smyr. Mach. c. 47, Περις τατοιον πατρω Βασιλεως; Deipneus Osiris the most ancient king of all things.

From which words of his we may also conclude, that Symmachus the Pagan, who determined, that it was one thing, that all worshipped, and yet would have victory, and such like other things, worshipped as gods and goddefses, did by these, and all those other Pagan gods before mentioned, understand nothing but so many several names, and partial confiderations of one supreme Deity, according to its several virtues or powers: so that when he sacrificed to victory, he sacrificed to God Almighty, under that partial notion, as the giver of victory to kingdoms and commonwealths. It was before observed out of Plutarch, that the Egyptian fable of Osiris being mangled and cut in pieces by Typhon, did allegorically signify the same thing, viz. the one simple Deity's being as it were divided (in the fabulous and civil theologies of the Pagans) into many partial confiderations of him, as so many nominal and titular gods; which Isis notwithstanding, that is true knowledge and wisdom, according to the natural or philosophick theology, unites all together into one. And that not only such gods as these, victory, virtue, and the like, but also those other gods, Neptune, Mars, Bellona, &c. were all really but one and the same Jupiter, acting severally in the world, Plautus himself seems sufficiently to intimate in the prologue of his Amphitryo in these words;

Nam quid ego memorem, ut alios in tragœdis
Vidi, Neptunum, Virtutem, Victoriæmar,
Martem, Bellonam, commemorare qua bona
Vobis fecisset? Quis benefacitis meus pater,
Deum regnator, arcbitefius omnibus.

Whereas there was before cited a paffage out of G. I. Vossius his book de Theolog. Gent, which we could not understand otherwife than thus, that the generality of the Pagans by their political (or civil) gods, meant so many eternal minds independent and self-exiftent; we now think ourselves concerned to do Vossius so much right, as to acknowledge, that we have since met
met with another place of his in that same book, wherein he either corrects
the former opinion, or else declares himself better concerning it, after this
manner; that the Pagans generally conceived their political gods to be so
many substantial minds (or spirits) not independent and self-existent, nor
indeed eternal neither, but created by one supreme Mind or God, and ap-
pointed by him to preside over the several parts of the world, and things
of nature, as his ministers. Which fame thing he affirmeth also of those
defiled accidents and affections, that by them were to be understood so
many substantial minds or spirits created, presiding over those several things,
or dispenfing of them. His words in the beginning of his eighth book, (where he speaks concerning these affections and accidents defiled by the Pa-
gans) are as followeth: *Hujufmodi deorum propé immensa est copia. Ac in
civiliquidem theologiaconsideravi solen, tanquam mentes quedam, hoc bono-
ris à summDeo fortiss, ut affectionibus ipsis praecipitur. Nempe crediderunt
Deum, quem optimum max. vocabant, non per se omnia curare, quo paño, ut
dicebant, plurimum beatitudini ejus decedere, sed, inftar regis, plurimos ba-
bere minijros & ministras, quorum singulos buic iltice cura prefecisset. Sic
jusfitia, quæ & Aftraea ac Themis, præfeta erat æsibus cunctis, in quibus
justitia attenderetur; Comus curare creditus est comellationes; et sic in ca-
teris id genus diis, nomen ab ea affectione fortiss, cujus cura cuique comissa
credereetur. Quo paño si consideraretur, non alter differential à spiritibus fivne
angelis bonus malifique, quam quod bi reverà à Deo conditi sint; ille vero men-
tes, de quibus nunc loquimur, sint fragmentum mentis humanae, pro numero
affectiorum, in quibus vis esse major videtur, comminificentis mentes aßectio-
nibus singulis præefias. Facile autem facerdotes sfa commenta perfuaderemip-
plicioribus potuerunt, quia fatis videtur verifimile, summæ illi menti, deorum
omnia regi, innumeratas servire mentes, ut ed perfellior sit summi dei beati-
tud, minusque curis implicitur; inque tot fulmannatum numero, summæ num-
nis majefias magic eluceat. Ac tali quidem opinio erat theologica civilis. Of
such gods as these there was an innumerable company among the Pagans. And
in their civil theology they were wont to be considered, as certain minds (or
spirits) appointed by the supreme God, to preside over the affections of things;
they supposing, that God, whom they called the best, and the greatest, did not
immediately himself take care of every thing, since that must needs be a diffraction
to him, and a hinderance of his happiness; but that he bad, as a king, many be-
and ße-ministers under him, which had their several offices assigned to them.
Thus justice, which was called also Aftraea and Themis, was by them thought
to preside over all those actions, in which justice was concerned; and Comus
over all revellings, and the like. Which gods, if considered after this man-
ner, will no otherwise differ from angels good and bad, than only in this, that
these latter are beings really created by God, but the former the figments of
men only; they, according to the number of affections, that have any greater
force in them, devising and imagining certain minds to preside over each of
them. And the vulgar might therefore be the more easily led into this persuasion
by their priests, because it seemed reasonable to them, that that supreme Mind,
who is the king of all the gods, should have many other minds as their subfervient
ministers under him, both to free him from solicitors care, and also to add to his
grandeur

* Pag. 735;
The Pagans Political Gods, sometimes  

Book I.

grandeur and majesty. And such was the doctrine of the civil theology. Where, 

though Vossus speak particularly of that kind of Pagan gods, which were 

nothing but affections and accidents deified, (which no man in his wits 

could possibly suppose to be themselves true and proper gods, they having 

no subsistence of their own) that these by the generality of the vulgar Pa-

gans were conceived to be so many created minds or spirits, appointed by 

the supreme God, to preside as his ministers over those several affections of 

substances; yet does he plainly imply the fame of all those other political 

gods of these Pagans likewise, that they were not looked upon by them, as 

so many unmade, self-existent, and independent beings, but only as inferior 

minds or spirits, created by the supreme God, and by him appointed to pre-

side over the several parts of the world, and things of nature, and having 

their several offices assigned to them. Wherefore, as to the main, we and 

Vossus are now well agreed, viz. that the ancient Pagans asserted no such 

thing as a multitude of independent deities; so that there only remain some 

particular differences of smaller moment betwixt us.

Ourselves have before observed, that Aelus was probably taken by Epic-
tetus in Arrianus, (not indeed for one, but) for many created ministers of 

the supreme God, or demons collectively, appointed by him to preside over 

the winds, in all the several parts of the world. And the Pagans in St. 

Austiin seem to interpret those deified accidents, and things of nature, after 

the fame manner, as the names of certain unknown gods or demons, (one 

or more) that were appointed to preside over them respectively, or to dif-

penfe the fame. Quoniam seiebant majores mosredi nemini talia, nisi aliquo Deo 

largiente concedi, quorum deorum nomina non inveniebant, earum rerum nomi-
nibus appellabant deos, quas ab ipsis sentiebant dari; aliqua vocabula inde fleten-
tes; sicut a bello Bellonam nuncipaverunt, non Bellum; sicut a cunis Cuninam, 

non Cunam; sicut a segetibus Segetiam, non Segetem; sicut a pomis Pomo-
nam, non Pomum; sicut a bobus Bobonam, non Bovem. Aut certe nulla voca-
buli declinatione sicut res ipsa nominantur; ut Pecunia dicta est dea, quae dat 

pecuniam, non omnino pecunia dea ipfa putata: Hac virtus, quae dat virtutem, 

bomor qui hominem, concordia que concordiam, victoria que victoriarum dat. Ita, 
inquinunt, cum felicitas dea dicitur, non ipsis que datur, sed numen illud atten-

ditur, a quo felicitatem datur. Because our forefathers knew well, that these things 

do not happen to any, without the special gift and favour of some god; there-
fore were these gods, whose names they knew not, called from the names of those 

very things themselves, which they perceived to be bestowed by them, there being 

only a little alteration made in them; as when the God, that causeth war, was 
called not Bellum, but Bellona; the God, which presideth over infants cradles, 

not Cuna, but Cunina; that which giveth corn, Segetia; and that which af-

fordeth apples, Pomona, &c. But at other times, this was done without any 
declension of the word at all, they calling both the thing, and the god, which is 

the bestower of it, by one and the self-same name. As Pecunia doth not only 
signify money, but also the goddess, which giveth money; Virtus, the goddess, 

which giveth virtue; Honor, the god, that bestoweth honour; Concordia, the 
goddess, that causeth concord; Victory, the goddess, which affordeth victory. So 

also
also when Felicity is called a goddess, by it is not meant that thing, which is given, but that divine power, from whence it is given. Here, I say, the Pagans may seem to have understood, by those deified things of nature, certain inferior gods or daemons (one or more) the ministers of the supreme God, appointed by him to preside over those several things respectively, or to dispence the same. Neither can we deny, but that in so much ignorance and diversity of opinions, as there was amongst the Pagans, some might possibly understand those political gods, and deified things also, after the way of Polybus, for so many single minds or spirits, appointed to preside over those several things respectively throughout the whole world, and nothing else. Nevertheless, it seemeth not at all probable, that this should be the general opinion amongst the civilized Pagans, that all those gods of theirs were so many single created minds or spirits, each of them appointed to preside over some one certain thing every where throughout the whole world, and nothing else. As for example, that the goddess Victory was one single created spirit, appointed to below victory, to whosoever at any time enjoy'd it, in all parts of the world; and so, that the goddess Justice should be such another single mind or spirit, created to dispence justice every where, and meddle with nothing else. And the like of all those other accidental things, or affections deified, as virtue, honour, concord, felicity, &c.

And Laelianius Firmianus, taking notice of that profession of the Pagans, De Fal. Rel. to worship nothing but one supreme God, and his subservient ministers, generated or created by him, (according to that of Seneca in his exhortations, Genuifae regni sui ministros deum; That the supreme God had generated other inferior ministers of his kingdom under him, which were called by them also gods) plainly denies all the Pagan gods save one, to be the created ministers of that one supreme, he making this reply; Verum bi neque dixit, neque desse voceare, aut colo volunt, &cc. Nec tanies illi sunt, qui vulgo voluntur, quorum & exiguis & certos eft numeros. But these ministers of the divine kingdom, or subservient created spirits, are neither gods, nor would they be called gods, or honoured as such, &cc. Nor indeed are they those gods, that are now vulgarly worshipped by the Pagans, of which there is but a small and certain number. That is, the Pagan gods are reduced into certain ranks, and the number of them is determined by the utilities of human life; of which their noble and select gods are but a few. Whereas, faith he, the ministers of the supreme God are, according to their own opinion, not twelve nor twenty, nor three hundred and fixty, but innumerable, stars and daemons.

Moreover, Aristotle, in his book against Zeno, (supposing the idea of God to be this, the most powerful of all things, or the most perfect being) ob- jeeteth thus, that according to the laws of cities and countries, (that is, the civil theology) there seems to be no one absolutely powerful being, but one God is supposed to be most powerful as to one thing, and another as to another: ἐὰν δὲ οὖν ἔπειράται ἵπποι πρόκειται τού θεόν θαλάσσαι τίποτα ὑπεράνων καὶ βιβλίαν ἄλλων, δέν χείρ ποιεῖ κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἄλλα πολλά κρύπτει ἐκεῖ ἀλλὰ ἄλλων οἱ Στίχοι ἕκατον ἐκ τὸ δόκοις εἰρήθει τούτῳ κατὰ τὸ στὰ τῆς φωνῆς ὑμητί. Whereas Zeno takes it for granted, that
The Pagans Political Gods, generally Book I.

that men have an idea in their minds of God, as one the most excellent and most powerful being of all; this doth not seem to be according to law, (that is, the civil theology) for there the gods are mutually better one than another, respectively as to several things; and therefore Zeno took not this consent of mankind, concerning God, from that which vulgarly seems. From which passage of Aristotle's we may well conclude, that the many political gods of the Pagans were not all of them vulgarly looked upon as the sub-fervient ministers of one supreme God; and yet they generally acknowledging, (as Aristotle himself confesseth) a monarchy, and consequently not many independent deities, it must needs follow, as Zeno doubts if would reply, that these their political gods were but one and the same supreme natural God, as it were parcelled out, and multiplied: that is, receiving several denominations, according to several notions of him, and as he exerciseth different powers, and produceth various effects. And this we have sufficiently proved already to have been the general sense of the chief Pagan doctors; that these many political and popular gods were but the polyphony of one natural God, that is, either partial considerations of him, or his various powers and virtues, effects and manifestations in the world, severally peronated and defined.

And thus does Vossius himself afterwards confess also; that according to the natural theology, the many Pagan gods were but so many several denominations of one God; though this learned philologer doth plainly straiten and confine the notion of this natural theology too much, and improperly call the God thereof the nature of things; however, acknowledging it such a nature, as was endued with senses and understanding. His words are these; Dispar vero sententia theologorum naturalium, qui non alius numen agnoscet, quod naturam rerum, eoque omnia gentium numina referant, &c. Nempe mens eorum fuit, sic natum esse occupata circa bane vel illam affectioem, ita numina nonique deorum variare. Cum igitur ubicunque vim aliquam majorem viderent, ita divinum aliquid crederent; eò etiam devenere, ut immanem deorum deorumque fingentem custodiam. Sagaciores interim hic cuncta, unum esse numen diebant; sed rerum naturam, qua licet una fuerit, pro variis tamen effectis varia fortitute nominabant, varia etiam affectur cultu. But the case is very different as to the natural theologers, who acknowledged no other God, but the nature of things, and referred all the Pagan gods to that. For they conceived; that as nature was occupied about several things, so were the divine powers and the names of gods multiplied and diversified. And where-evet they saw any greater force, there did they presently conceive something divine, and by that means came they at length to feign an innumerable company of gods and goddesses. But the more sagacious in the mean time affirmed all these to be but one and the same God; to wit the nature of things, which, though really but one, yet according to its various effects, both received divers names, and was worshipped after different manners. Where Vossius calls the supreme God of these natural theologers the nature of things, as if the natural theology had been denominated from phyicks, or natural philosophy only; whereas we have already shewed, that the natural theology
logy of Varro and Seneca, was of equal extent with the philosophick; whose only Numen, that it was not a blind and unintelligible nature of things, doth sufficiently appear from that history thereof before given by us: as also that it was called natural in another sense, as real, and as opposite to opinion, fancy and fabulosity, or what hath no reality of existence any where in the world. Thus does St. Athenius distinguish between natura deorum, the true nature of the gods, and hominum instituta, the instituts of men concerning them. As also he sets down the difference between the civil and natural theology, according to the mind of Varro, in this manner: Fieri potest, ut in urbe, secundum bid. falsas opiniones ea colantur & credantur, quorum in mundo vel extra mundum natura sit nusquam: It may come to pass, that those things may be worshipped and believed in cities, according to false opinions, which have no nature or real existence anywhere, either in the world, or without it. Wherefore, if instead of this nature of things, which was properly the god of none but only of such atheistical philosophers, as Epicurus and Strato, we substitute that great Mind or Soul of the whole world, which pervadeth all things, and is diffused thorough all, (which was the true God of the Pagan Theists;) this of Veslius will be unquestionably true concerning their natural theologers, that, according to them, those many poetical and political gods before mentioned were but one and the same natural or real god; who, in respect of his different virtues, powers and effects, was called by several names, and worshipped after different manners; yet nevertheless so, as that, according to those Theologers, there were really also many other inferior ministers of this one supreme God, (whether called minds or demons,) that were supposed to be the subservient executioners of all these several powers of his. And accordingly we had before this full and true account of the Pagans natural theology set down out of Prudentius:

--- In uno
Constituit jus eum Deo, cui serviat ingens
Virtutum ratio, variis instituta ministris.

viz. That it acknowledged one supreme omnipotent God, ruling over all, who displayed and exercised his manifold virtues and powers in the world, (all severally personated and deified in the poetick and civil thelogies) together with the subservient ministry of other inferior created minds, understanding beings, or demons, called also by them gods.

It is very true, as we have already declared, that the more high-flown Platonick Pagans did reduce those many poetical and political gods, and therefore doubtles all the personated and deified things of nature too, to the Platonick ideas, or first paradigms and patterns of things in the archetypal world, which they affirmed to have been begotten from the supreme Deity, that is, from the first hypothesis of the Platonick trinity; and which were commonly called by them numina Soli, intelligible gods, as if they had been indeed so many distinct substances and persones. And, as we have also proved out of Phile, that this high-flown Paganick theology was ancientser than

\[ Yyy \]

either

--- In Apotheosis, ver. 191.
either Julian or Apuleius; so do we think it not unworthy our observation here, that the very same doctrine is, by Celsus, imputed also to the Egyptian Theologers, as pretending to worship brute animals no other wise than a

The Egyptians also reduced

Book I.

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Orig. Cels. fymbles of those eternal Ideas; ζφι τε φιμας τω μη Αναπτωμω χαλαστων.

L. 3. p. 120. και το πολεμικαι και δι θεου παρεχομα ταιν αισθηματα επαν του θεου ειδους, και εις (δε δουσι οι πολλοι) ζων ειμαι τα διαλεκτα σηραλεων Celsus also addeth, that we Christians deride the Egyptians without cause, they having many mysteries in their religion, for as much as they profess, that perseving brute animals are not worshipped by them, but the eternal ideas. According to which of Celsus it should seem, that this doctrine of eternal ideas, as the paradigms and patterns of all things here below in this sensible world, was not proper to Plato, nor the Greeks, but common with them to the Egyptians also. Which eternal ideas, however suppos'd to have been generated from that first divine hypostasis of the Platonick and Egyptian trinity, and called intelligible gods, were nevertheless acknowledged by them, all to exist in one divine intellect, according to that of Platonius, και ους το νυ τα νοημα Νηλο, That the intelligibles exist no where of themselves, without Mind or Intellect; which Mind or Intellect being the second divine hypostasis, those intelligible and invisible gods, (however generated from God) yet are therefore said by Julian, in his book against the Christians, both to co-exist with God, and to in-exist in him. To which purpose also is this other passage of Julian's in his sixth oration, παντα γαρ αυτως εισε, ειπερ και εις οι τοις αισθηματα ειτε εις αισθημα τοις αισθημα, or in the sensible things, the causes of all things, that any way are; whether of immortal things immortal; or of corruptible and perishing things, not corruptible but eternal also, and always remaining; which therefore are the causes of their perpetual generation, and new production. Now these causes of all things contained in God are no other than the divine Ideas. Wherefore, from hence it plainly appears, that these Platonick and Egyptian Pagans, who thus reduced their multiplicity of Gods to the divine ideas, did not therefore make them to be so many minds or spirits, really distinct from the supreme God, (though dependent on him too) but indeed only so many partial considerations of one God, as being all things, that is, containing within himself the causes of all things. And accordingly we find in

Or. Cels. p. Origen, that, as the Egyptian Theologers called their religious animals, symbols of the eternal ideas, so did they also call them symbols of God. Τα των Αναπτωμα συμμελεστων και τα περι των αισθημα εις των αισθημα εις θεους εις των ουτων και ιδιαι κεμελεω, Celsus applauds the Egyptian Theologers talking so magnificently and mysteriously of those brute animals worshipped by them, and affirming them to be certain symbols of God.

And now we have given some account of the Polyonomy of the one supreme God, in the theologies of the Pagans; or of his being called by many proper, personal names, carrying with them an appearance of so many several Gods. First, that God had many several names bestowed upon him, from many different

* Ennead. V. Lib. V. p. 519.
different notions and partial confederations of him, according to his universal and all-comprehending nature. Janus, as the beginning of the world, and the first original of the gods. Whom therefore that ancient lyric poet Septimius Apber, accordingly thus invoked:—

O cate rerum Sator! O PRINCIPIUM DEORUM!
Stridula cui limina, cui cardinei tumulus,
Cui referata mugiunt aurea clausura mundi:

Genius, as the great mind and soul of the whole world. Saturn, as that hidden source and principle, from which all forms and lives issue forth, and into which they again retire; being there laid up as in their secret store-house: or else, as one of the Egyptian or Hermaick writers expresseth it, that which doth υπάλληλον τις εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀντίβουλον, make all things out of itself, and unmake them into itself again; this Hetrurian Saturn, answering to the Egyptian Hammon, that likewise signified hidden, and is accordingly thus interpreted by Jamblicbus 4, ο ὁ τεθείμενος λόγος ἄνωθεν εἰς Φάς ἀρχαί, be that bringeth forth the secret power of the hidden reasons of things (contained within himself) into light. God was also called Athenæa or Minerva, as wisdom diffusing it self through all things: and Aphrodite Urania, the heavenly Venus or Love. Thus Phanes, Orpheus his supreme God, (so called according to Laquantus 1) quia cum adue nihil esset, primus ex infinito apparuerit; because when there was yet nothing, he first appeared out of that infinite abyss; but according to Proclus, because he did inætum τας νοστρινες Ιναδασ, discover and make manifest the intelligible unities (or ideas) from himself; for we think the conjecture of Athenæus Kircherus 2 to be more probable than either of these, that Phanes was an Egyptian name;) this Phanes, I say, was in the Orphick and Egyptian theology, as Proclus upon Plato's Timæus informs us, filled ἀρχαί ψεω, tender and soft Love. And Pherecydes Syrus 3 likewise affirmed, οι θεοί τηρητυκα αι Ταυρικα πλήρως ἀπεκρινας, that Jupiter was turned all into love, when he went about to make the world. Besides which, there were other such names of the supreme God, and more than have been mentioned by us; as for example, Summanus amongst the ancient Romans, that afterward grew obloque: of which St. Austin thus; Romani ver-C. D. I. 4. et eres necio quem Summanum, cui noturna fulmina tribuebant, coluerunt magis 22. [P. 82. Tom. VII. Oper.] quam Jovem, ad quem diurna fulmina pertinebant. Sed postquam Jovi tempium insignire ac sublime construendum est, propter ædes dignitatem, sic ad cum multitudine confluxit, ut vix inveniatur, qui Summanum nomen, quod audiri jam non potest, se sulum legisse meminerit. The ancient Romans worshipped I know not what god, whom they called Summanus more than they did Jupiter. But after that a stately and magnificent temple was erected to Jupiter, they all betook themselves thereto; in so much that the name of Summanus, now not at all heard, is scarcely to be found in ancient writings.

Again, as the Pagans had certain other gods, which they called special; so were these but several names of that supreme God also, according to

Y y y 2 particular

1 Apud Terentium Maurum de Litteris, &c, inter Grammaticos veteres à Pufchico editos, p. 2396.
4 In OEdipo Egyptiano, p. 498.
5 Apud Proclum in Comment. in Timæus III. p. 159.
particular considerations of him, either as presiding over certain parts of the world, and acting in them; or as exercising certain special powers and virtues in the world; which several virtues and powers of one God, personated and deified by the Pagans, tho' they had an appearance all of many distinct gods, yet were they really nothing but several denominations of one supreme God; who as yet is considered as a thing distinct from the world and nature.

But lastly, as God was supposed by these Pagans, not only to pervade all things, and to fill all things, but also, he being the cause of all thing, to be himself in a manner all things; so was he called also by the name of every thing, or every thing called by his name: that is, the several things of nature and parts of the world were themselves verbally deified by these Pagans, and called gods and goddesse: Not that they really accounted them such in themselves, but that they thought fit in this manner to acknowledge God in them, as the author of them all. For thus the Pagans in St. Austin's Usage adone, inquinunt, maiores nostros infipientes fuisse credendum est, ut haec neficient munera divina esse, non deos? Can you think, that our Pagan ancestors were so sottis, as not to know, that these things are but divine gifts, and not gods themselves? And Cicero also tells us, that the meaning of their thus deifying these things of nature, was only to signify, that they acknowledged the force of all things to be divine, and to be governed by God; and that whatsoever brought any great utility to mankind, was not such without the divine goodness. They conceiving also, that the invisible and incomprehensible Deity, which was the cause of all things, ought to be worshipped in all its works and effects, in which it had made it self visible, accordingly as they declare in that place of Eusebius before cited in part; μή τὰ ἄρα ματὰ σώματα τὰ ἔσχατα ἐντολή φέροις εἴσηκιν, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐν τέσσερις ἁπάντας ὀφθαλμοῖς, ἀνὸς ἐν τῷ ἐπ᾽ ἐπιστών ἔποιει, ποιητοῖς δυσάμενοι τὰ πάντα ὀφθαλμοῖς, καὶ διὰ πάντων ὀφθαλμοῖς, ἐν τοῖς πάντας ἑπιστήμασιν ἄκομητος δὲ τῶν ἄραις εἰς πάντων ὀφθαλμῶν, τὸ τῆς ἐκκόστιας δίκαιος; τὸ τῷ ὄντος ἐκκόστιας διὰ τῶν διόνυσιον συνεισέχουσιν. That they did not deify these visible bodies of the sun, and moon, and stars, nor the other sensible parts of the world themselves, but those invisible powers of the God over all, that were displayed in them. For they affirm, that that God, who is but one, but yet filleth all things with his various powers, and passeth through all things, forasmuch as he is invisibly and incorporeally present in all, is reasonably to be worshipped in and by those visible things.

Allanarius Bishop of Alexandria, in his book against the Greeks, reduces all the false gods of the Pagans under two general heads; the first, poetical, fictitious or phantastical gods; the second, creatures or real things of nature deified by them. His words are these; τι γὰρ άν δε τὰς τε αἰζέταις λεγομενον Σωσίας, ὅτι άν άν δοθήται, διὰ τῶν θεων ἑπιστήμασιν έτεκτης πανσώματι, &c. Since this reason or discourse of ours hath sufficiently convinced, both the poetical gods of the Pagans to be no gods at all; and also that they, who deify the creatures, are in a great error; and so hath confuted the whole Pagan idolatry, proving it to be mere ungodliness and impiety; there is nothing now
now but the true piety left; be, who is worshipped by us Christians, being the only true God, the lord of nature, and the maker of all substances. From whence we may observe, that, according to Athanasius, the Pagan poetick gods were no real things in nature, and therefore they could be no other, than the several notions and the powers of the one supreme God deified, or several names of him. So that Athanasius his poetick Gods, or οἱ παρὰ ποιήταις μυστασνοι ονομα, Gods fabulously devised by the poets, were chiefly those two kinds of Pagan gods, first mentioned by us; that is, the various considerations of the one supreme Numen, according to its general notion, expressed by so many proper names; and secondly, his particular powers diffused thorough the world, severally personated and deified. Which, considered as so many distinct deities, are nothing but mere fiction and phantacy, without any reality. And this do the Pagans themselves in Athanasius acknowledge: ἵππος γάρ ὁς αὐτὸς τό Πάνινοι, καὶ τά ὄνομα των τούτων, καὶ ὁ εἰς μόνον ἄλλως Ζεὺς, ὁδὲ κόσμος, ὁδὲ Πάνινος, ὁδὲ Ἡρα, ὁδὲ Ἀφροδίτη, ὁδὲ τότες, ὁδὲ οὖσα ὁι ποιηταὶ πρὸς διάφωνα τῶν ἀνθρώπων. They say, that the names of those gods are merely fictitious, and that there does no where really exist any such Jupiter, or Saturn, or Juno, or Mars; but that the poets have feigned them to be so many persons existing, to the deception of their auditors. Notwithstanding which, that third sort of Pagan gods also mentioned by us, which were inanimate substances and the natures of things deified, may well be accounted poetical gods likewise; because though those things themselves be real and not feigned, yet, is their personation and deification meer fiction and fancy: and however the first occasion thereof sprung from this theological opinion or persuasion, that God, who is in all things, and is the cause of all things, ought to be worshipped in all things, especially he being himself invisible; yet the making of those things themselves therefore to be so many persons and gods, was nothing but poetick fiction and phantazy, according as their old mythology and allegorical fables of the gods run much upon this strain.

XXXIV. Hitherto we have declared the sense of the Pagans in general; those also being included, who supposed God to be a being elevated above the world, that they agreed in these two things: First, the breaking and crumbling, as it were, of the simple Deity, and parceling out of the same into many particular notions and partial considerations, according to the various manifestations of its power and providence in the world; by the personating and deifying of which severally they made, as it were, so many gods of one. The chief ground whereof was this, because they considered not the Deity according to its simple nature, and abstractly only, but concretely also with the world, as he displayer himself therein, pervadeth all, and diffuseth his virtues through all. For as the sun, reflected by groffer vapours, is sometimes multiplied, and the same object beheld through a polycrystalline glafs, by reason of those many superficies, being represented in several places at once, is thereby rendered manifold to the spectator; so one and the same supreme God, considered concretely with the world, as manifesting his several powers and virtues in it, was multiplied into several names, not without the appearance of so many several gods. Whereas ἡμεῖς δὲ with those
those ancient Pagans, was the same thing with ἔνοπλοιον, that which hath many names, all one with that which hath many powers: according to this of Callimachus 1 concerning Diana,

\[\text{Δός μοι πανεμόν αἰῶνι, ἁπαξ, φιλάσεω,} \]
\[\text{Καὶ Παντοκράτωρ} \]

And this of Virgil concerning Alesto 2,

\[\text{Tibi nomina mille,} \]
\[\text{Mille nocendi artes.} \]

And accordingly the many Pagan gods are, in Plato's Cratylus, interpreted as the many powers of one God diffused through the world. And the Pagan theologers seemed to conceive this to be more suitable to the pomp, state and grandeur of the supreme God, for him to be considered diffusively, and called by many names, signifying his many several virtues and powers (polyonymy being by them accounted an honour) rather than to be contracted and shrunk all up into one general notion of a perfect mind, the Maker or Creator of the whole world. The second thing, in which the Pagans agreed, is their perforating and deifying all the parts of the world, and things of nature themselves, and so making them so many gods and goddesses too. Their meaning therein being declared to be really no other than this; that God, who doth not only pervade all things, but also was the cause of all things, and therefore himself is in a manner all things, ought to be worshipped in all the things of nature and parts of the world: as also that the force of every thing was divine, and that in all things, that were beneficial to mankind, the divine goodness ought to be acknowledged.

We shall now observe, how both those forementioned principles, of God's pervading all things, and his being all things, which were the chief grounds of the seeming polytheism of the Pagans, were improved and carried on further by those amongst them, who had no higher notion of the supreme Deity, than as the soul of the world. Which opinion, that it found entertainment amongst so many of them, probably might be from hence, because it was so obvious for those of them, that were religious, to conceive, that as themselves consisted of body and soul, so the body of the whole world was not without its soul neither; and that their human souls were as well derived from the life and soul of the world, as the earth and water in their bodies was from the earth and water of the world. Now whereas the more refined Pagans, as was before observed, suppose God to pervade and pass through all things ἄμιμος, unmixedly; these concluded God to be (according to that definition of him in Quintilian, taken in a rigid sense) Spiritum omnibus partibus immitti; a spirit immingled with all the parts of the world: or else in Manilius his language,

\[\text{Insusumque Deum caelo, terrisque fretoque,} \]

\[\text{Infusus} \]

1 Hymn. in Dianam, ver. 5, 6.
2 Æneid. Lib. VII. ver. 524.
Infused into the heaven, earth, and seas: Sacroque meauo consipirate Deum, and intimately to conspire with his own work the world, as being almost one with it. Upon which account he was commonly called Nature also, that being thus defined by some of the Stoicks, Deus mundo permittus; God mingled throughout with the world; and divina Ratio toti mundo infita, The divine reason infused into the whole world. Which Nature notwithstanding, in way of diffinition from the particular natures of things, was called communis natura, the common nature. And it was plainly declared by them not to be a sensible nature; according to that of Balbus in Cicero, Natura est, quæ continet mundum omnem, eunque tuitur; atque ea quidem non sine sensu, atque ratione: It is nature, by which the world is contained and upheld, but this such a nature, as is not without sense and reason. As it is elsewhere said to be perfect and eternal Reason, the divine Mind and Wisdom containing also under it all the λόγος σεπεκακινός, the spermatical principles, by which the things of nature (commonly so called) are effectual. Wherefore we see, that such Naturalists as these may well be allowed to be Theists, (Moses himself in Strabo being accounted one of them;) whereas those, that acknowledge no higher principle of the world, than a sensible nature, (whether fortuitous, or orderly and methodical,) cannot be accounted any other than absolute Atheists. Moreover, this soul of the world was by such of these Pagans as admitted no incorporeal substance, it self concluded to be a body too, but λιπιδατος α τάξις τον, a most subtle and most swift body, as was before observed out of Plato (though endued with perfect mind and understanding, as well as with spermatical reasons) which intimating it self into all other bodies, did permeate and pervade the whole universe, and frame all things, inwardly mingling it self with all; Heraclitus and Hippaphus thinking this to be fire, and Diogenes Apolloniates air; whom Simplicius, who had read some of his then extant works, vindicates from that imputation of atheism, which Hippo and Anaximander lie under.

Again, whereas the more sublimated Pagans affirmed the supreme God to be as Simplicius all, so as that he was nevertheless something above all too, he being above the foul of the world; (and probably Æschylus in that foecited passage of his, is to be understood after this manner, Ζεύς τοι τα ὑαλα και τι των υπερετων, ομοίω, Om- Jupiter is the other, Jupiter is the earth, Jupiter is the heaven; Jupiter is all): so the Pagans, who acknowledged no higher Numen than the soul of the world, made God to be all things in a grosser sense, they supposing the whole corporeal world animated to be also the supreme Deity. For though God, to them, were principally and originally, that eternal unmade soul and mind, which diffused it self through all things; yet did they conceive, that as the human soul and body, both together, make up one whole rational animal, or man; so this mundane soul, and its body the world, did in like manner, both together, make up one entire divine animal, or God.

It is true indeed, that as the human soul doth principally act in some one part of the body, which therefore hath been called the Hegemonicon and

Prin-
To these, the Parts of the World, Book I.

Principal, some taking this to be the brain, others the heart, but Strato in Tertullian ridicules, the place betwixt the eye-brows; so the Stoicks did suppose the great foul or mind of the world, to act principally in some one part thereof, (which what it was notwithstanding they did not all agree upon) as the Hegemonicon or Principale; and this was sometimes called by them emphatically God. But nevertheless they all acknowledged this mundane soul, as the souls of other animals, to pervade, animate, or enliven and actuate, more or less its whole body, the world. This is plainly declared by Laer. in the life of Zeno 2: Totaque ego, dio, animos, animati, quosque gerri, inque, sedem, gressus, avger, act, animus, totaque anima, acting, &c. But Eul. Providence, which actuate, but Stoicks to the supreme God, or the one immortal, or, the whole soul, the whole soul, the whole soul. The Stoicks affirm, that the world is governed by mind and providence, this mind passing through all the parts of it, as the soul doth in us: which yet doth not act in all parts alike, but in some more, in some less; it passing through some parts only as a habit, (as through the bones and nerves) but through others as mind or understanding, (as through that which is called the Hegemonicon or Principale.) So the whole world being a living and rational animal, hath its Hegemonicon or principal part too, which according to Antipater is the ether, to Pouleodinius the air, to Cleanthes the sun, &c. And they say also, that this first God is, as it were, sensibly diffused through all animals and plants, but through the earth it self, only as a habit. Wherefore the whole world, being thus acted and animated by one divine soul, is it self, according to these Stoicks, also the supreme God. Thus Didymus in Eusebius, dioces de non animo perpetuo, deus. The Stoicks call the whole world God, and Origen against Celsus, cum deae. quid deo animo, animat deo. The Greeks universally affirm the world to be a God, but the Stoicks, the first and chief God. And accordingly Manilius 3.

Quod pateat mundum divino nomine verti
Atque ipsum esse Deum:

Whereby it may appear the world to be governed by a divine mind, and also it self to be God. As likewise Senecas the philosopher, Totum hoc, quo continemur, & animam est, & Deus est; this whole world, within which we are contained, is both one thing, and God. Which is not to be understood of the meer matter of the world, as it is nothing but a heap of atoms, or as ended with a plastick and senseless nature only; but of it as animated by such a soul, as beffides sense was originally ended with perfect understanding: and as deriving all its godship from thence. For thus Varro in St. Anulin declares both his own, and the Stoical sense concerning this point, Dictum idem Varro, ab hoc de naturali theologica praetesque, Deum se arbitrari esse animam

1 De Anim., cap. XV. p. 169.
3 Lib. I. vert. 484, 485.
the Parts and Members of God.

Now if the whole animated world be the supreme God, it plainly follows from thence, that the several parts and members thereof must be the parts and members of God; and this was readily acknowledged by Seneca; Membra sumus corporis magni; We are all members of one great body: and Tum hoc Deus est, socii ejus & membri sumus; This whole world is God, and we are not only his members, but also his fellows or companions; as if our human souls had a certain kind of fellowship also with that great soul of the universe. And accordingly, the soul of the world, and the whole mundane animal, was frequently worshipped by the Pagans, in these its several members; the chief parts of the world, and the most important things of nature; as it were by piece-meal. Nevertheless it doth not at all follow from thence, that these were therefore to them really so many several gods; for then not only every man, and every contemptible animal, every plant and herb, and pile of graves, every river and hill, and all things else whatsoever, must be so many several gods. And that the Pagans themselves did not take them for such, Origen observes against that assertion of Celsus; That if the whole were God, then the several parts thereof must needs be gods, or divine L. 5. p. 234; too: *h' evwai. Steia o mouo aiónvpeia, alla *h' palia ta álegrn ñwpw, méra ñúla tokósmu, prèges de tauto & to òóvpa' eii de méra to kósmu kai ioi patomoi, kai ta ývwa, kai ai Ëlkássai: 'ap ipeidó o kósmo Ëía ñw, ñon ëi ioi patomoi ëi ai Ëlkássai Ëía ñw, alla ñi ñúla to òóvpa 'Eláuusses' têis ëi evpàtwtais (ëi ñuxa ñaímwnas, ëi Steia, ñs evkívis ñoumakísw) patomoi ëi Ëlkássas, tautà ñu ëríwte Ëías. Kai to kathedikó Kílaxa zípetetai kai kai 'Eláuusses ñmòd, òta iaxlì õlo ëi ëíaia, pàtwos to méra tóta ëi Ëíaia kata tauta ygr Ëíaia iatè ñw, ëi mýna, ëi ñkódfetes, ëi ñkolíswes, kai tòw to òóvpa eíwos, alla kai to òtw óríwos, kai to òtw tì ñxísws ëpet ëdi oí ëríwtes ëíaia ñuxa to kósmo, ñmòd. From hence it would follow, that not only men must be divine and gods, but also all brute animals too (they being parts of the world) and plants to boot. Nay rivers, and mountains, and seas, being parts of the world likewise, (if the whole world be God) must, according to Celsus, needs be gods also. Whereas the Greeks themselves will not affirm this; but they would only call those spirits or demons, which preside over these rivers and seas, gods. Wherefore this universal affirmation of Celsus is false even according to the Greeks themselves; that if the whole be God, then all the parts thereof must needs be divine or gods. It following from thence, that flies, and gnats, and worms, and all kind of serpents, and birds, and fishes, are all divine animals or gods: which they themselves, who affirm the world to be God, will not affirm.

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1 Epit. XCV. p. 555.
2 Epit. XCVI. p. 323.
Wherefore, though it be true, that the Pagans did many times personate and deify the chief parts of the world, and things of nature, as well as they did the several powers and virtues of the mundane soul, diffused through the whole world; yet did not the intelligent amongst them therefore look upon these, as so many true and proper gods, but only worship them as parts and members of one great mundane animal; or rather, worship the soul of the whole world, their supreme deity, in them all, as its various manifestations. This St. Auflin intimates, when writing against Fausius the Manichean, he prefers even the Pagan gods before the Manichean: *Jam verò colum, & terra, & mare, & air, & sol, & luna, & cetera sydera omnia, hic manifesta oculus apparent, atque iphis fansionibus praefo sunt. Quæ cum Pagani tanquam deos colunt, vel tanquam PARTES UNIUS MAGNI DEI (nam univereturn mundum quidam eorum putant MAXIMUM DEUM) ea colunt, qua sunt. Vos autem, cum ea colatis, quæ omnino non sunt, propinquiores essetis vere pietati, si saltem Pagani essetis, qui corpora colunt, est non colenda, tamen vera. Now the heaven, earth, sea, and air, sun, moon, and stars, are things all manifest and really present to our senses; which when the Pagans worship as gods, or as PARTS OF ONE GREAT GOD, (for some of them think the whole world to be the GREATEST GOD) they worship things, that are; so that you worshipping things, that are not, would be nearer to true piety than you are, were you Pagans and worshipped bodies too; which though they ought not to be worshipped, yet are they true and real things. But this is further instanced upon by the same St. Auflin in his book De C. D. where after that enumeration of the Pagan gods before set down, he thus convinces their folly in worshipping the several divided members, parts and powers, of the one great God, after that manner personated: *Hec omnia quæ dixi, & quœcumque non dixi (non enim omnia dicendà arbitratus sum) hi omnes dixi, quæque fictiûs Jupiter; festa sunt. ut quidam volunt, omnia ipsa partes ejus. festa virtutes ejus. scat eis videtur, quietum cum placet esse mundi animum; quæ sentientia velut magnorum, multorumque doctrinarum est. Hæc, inquam, si ita sunt, quod quale sit, nondum interim quero, sibi pretererent, si unum Deum coelestis prudentiori compendi? Sic enim ejus contemptur, cum ipse coloretur? Si autem metuendum sit, ne praetermissæ festa neglectæ partes ejus irrationaliter, non ergo, ut volunt, velut unus animantius habeat tota vita est, quæ omnes simul continet deos, quasi suis VIRTUTES, vel MEMBRA, vel PARTES: sed quæque pars habet vitam a ceteris separatam, si praeter alteram ivaeta alternare potest, & alia placari, alia concitari. Si autem dictum omnia simul, id est, totum ipsum Jovem potuisse offici, si PARTES ejus non sint, etiam singillatim minutatimque colorentur, multi dicitur. Nulla quippe earum praemitteretur, cum ipse unus, qui habet omnia, coloratur. All these things, which we have now said, and many more, which we have not said (for we did not think it to mention all) all these gods and goddesses, let them be one and the same Jupiter: whether they will have them to be his PARTS, or his POWERS, and VIRTUES, according to the sense of those, who think God to be the soul or mind of the whole world; which is the opinion of many and great doctors. This, I say, if it be so, which, what it is, we will not now examine; what would these Pagans lose, if in a more
more prudent compendium, they should worship one only God? For what of him could be despised, when his whole self was worshipped? But if they fear, let his parts pertermitted, or neglected, should be angry, or take offence; then it is not, as they pretend, the life of one great animal, which at once contains all the Gods, as his virtues, or members, or parts, but every part hath its own life by its self, separate from the rest, since one of them may be angry, when another is pleased, and the contrary. But if it should be said, that altogether, that is, the whole Jupiter might be offended, if his parts were not worshipped all of them severally and singly; this would be foolishly said, because none of the parts can be pertermitted, when he, that hath all, is worshipped.

Thus do the Pagans in Athanæus † also declare, that they did not worship the several parts of the world, as really so many true and proper gods, but only as the parts, or members, of their one supreme God, that great mundane animal (or whole animated world) taken all together as one thing; ἀλλά οὖς ἀναγεννήσας μίαν, ήπειρά ἐκ τούτου λαμβανόμενα, ἐπίσης αὐτά με ἀυτοῦ συμπαθητέον, ὥσπερ ίς πάντα σωφρόνες, ή ἐναποκειόμενα μίαν σώμα, τὸ ὅλον Θεὸν εἰςαί Φάσιν. But the Pagans themselves will acknowledge, that the divided parts of the world, taken severally, are but indigent and imperfect things; nevertheles do they contend, that as they are by them joined all together into one great body, (enlivened by one soul,) so is the whole of them truly and properly God. And now we think it is sufficiently evident, that though these Pagans verbally perfonated and deified, not only the several powers and virtues of the one supreme God, or mundane soul, diffused throughout the whole world, but also the several parts of the world it self, and the natures of things; yet their meaning herein was not to make these in themselves really so many several true and proper gods, (much less independent ones,) but to worship one supreme God (which to them was the whole animated world) in those his several parts and members, as it were by piece-meal, or under so many inadequate conceptions.

The Pagans therefore were plainly divided in their natural theology, as to their opinions concerning the supreme God; some of them conceiving him to be nothing higher than a mundane soul: whereas others of them, to use Origen's language, did ἱπερβαίνειν πᾶσα τὴν αἰσθητὴν φύσιν, ή μεν ἀνα- νεμόμειν ἑξεσάητον Θεὸν, άνα καὶ ἐν τῇ πάσῃ σωματείᾳ ζωτίην αὐτὸν, transcend all the sensible nature, and thinking God not at all to be seated there, look'd for him above all corporeal things. Now the former of these Pagans worshipped the whole corporeal world, as the body of God; but the latter of them, though they had higher thoughts of God, than as a mundane soul, yet supposing him to have been the cause of all things, and so at first to have contained all things within himself; as likewise that the world, after it was made, was not cut off from him, nor subfisted alone by its self, as a dead thing, but was closely united to him, and livingly dependent upon him: these, I say, though they did not take the world to be God, or the body of God, yet did they also look upon it as such, as that which was divine and sacred; and supposed, that God

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was to be worshipped in all, or that the whole world was to be worshipped, as his image or temple. Thus Plutarch, though much disliking the defiling of inanimate things, doth himself nevertheles approve of worshipping God in the whole corporeal world, he affirming it to be ideo ἄριστον καὶ ἄλλωσις τοῦ ἄνωτέρου, a most holy, and most god-becoming temple. And the ancient Persians or Magi, who by no means would allow of worshipping God in any artificial temples made with mens hands, did notwithstanding this worship God, sub die, and upon the tops of mountains, in the whole corporeal world, as his natural temple, as Cicero testifieth: Nec sequor Magos Persarum, quibus autoribus Xerxes insinmamæ templæ Graecis dictur, quae paritibus indicuerunt deos, quibus omnia deberent esse potentia ac libera, quorumque hic mundus omnium templum effec et domicilium: Neither do I adhere to the Persian Magi, by whose suggestion and persuasion Xerxes is said to have burnt all the temples of the Greeks, because they inclosed and shut up their gods within walls, to whom all things ought to be open and free, and whose temple and habitation is the whole world. And therefore when Diogenes Laertius writeth thus of these Magi, that they did, οὐδεὶς ἀποτελείσαί ποῦ ἡ γῆ ἔσται, τούτου θεὸν καταργώντες, make fire and earth and water to be gods, but condemn all statues and images; we conceive the meaning hereof to be no other than this, that as they worshipped God in no temple, save only that of the whole world, so neither did they allow any other statues or images of him, than the things of nature, and parts of the world, such as fire, and earth, and water, called therefore by them, in this sense and no other, gods. For thus are they clearly represented by Clemens Alexandrinus, and that according to the express testimony of Dino; Ὅσιον ἐν ὑπάρχει τῆς Μάγους ἀ θνίων ἄγεν, οὗτοι ἀγάλματα μόνα τῷ παρα καὶ θεόν θεολογίζων, do they account fire and water to be gods, but condemn all statues and images; and therefore they should not be reproved, as some do, for not wrecking their gods; but should be accounted as those that preserved them, as the Egyptians, as the Persians, and as the philosophers, as of old, and as Xtres and Ibides, so as the Egyptians, but only fire and water, as philosophers. Which difference betwixt the Pagan thelogers, that some of them look'd upon the whole world as God, or as the body of God, others only as the image, or the temple of God, is thus taken notice of by Macrobius upon Sermo's dream, where the world was called a temple. Beati autem universus mundus Dei templum vocatur, propter illas, qui abstinent, nihil esse alium Deum, nisi cum ipsum, & caelestia igitur cernimus. Idem ut summi omnipotentiam Dei ostendere posse vix intelligi, numquam posse videri, quocumque humano subjiciatur aspectui templi ejus vocatur; ut qui hic veneratur ut templum, culum tenet maximum debuit conditori; sciaque quisquis in uiam templi putet induci, ritus ebi virendum sacerdotis. The whole world is well called here the temple of God, in way of opposition to those, who think God

De Leg. 1. 2. p. 335.

The World to Join the Body; Book I.

De Iude & Osir. p. 382.

De Prov. Open segm. 6 p. 5.
CHAP. IV. *to others, the Temple of God.*

think God to be nothing else, but the heaven itself, and these heavenly things which we see, (or the whole sensible world animated :) whereas Cicero, that he might shew the omnipotence of the first supreme God to be such as could scarcely be understood, but not at all perceived by sense, be called in whatsoever fallteth under human sight, his temple; so be, that worshippeth these things as the temple of God, might in the mean time remember, that the chief worship is due to the maker and creator of them; as also that himself ought to live in the world like a priest or mytia, holy and religiously. And thus we see, that the Pagans were universally Cofnolatæ, or world-worshippers, in one sense or other; not that they worshipp'd the world as a dead and inanimate thing, but either as the body of God, or at least as the temple or image of him. Neither of which terminated their worship in that, which was sensible and visible only, but in that great mind or soul, which framed and governeth the whole world understandingly; though this was called also by them (not the nature of things, but) φονι ταπ, the common nature, and φονι τα πατος or ταν ζοι, the nature of the universe, because it contained under it the spermatick reasons, or plattick principles of the whole world.

Furthermore, these Pagan Theists universally acknowledging the whole world to be an animal, and that mundane animal also to be a God; tho' of them, who supposed it not to be the first and highest God, did consequently all conceive it, as hath been already observed, to be either a second or at least a third God. And thus Origens, sape δι τον διον καιρον διας ειας Θεου, ετεικε με τον Πιονων, οι δι απο Πλατωνες τον Διονοσον τως δε άτιω του Θεου: The Greeks do plainly affirm the whole world to be a God; some of them, as the Stoics, the first God; others, as the Platonists, (to whom may be added the Egyptians also) the second God, though some of these Platonists call it the third God. Tho' of the Platonists, who called the mundane animal, or animated world, the second god, look'd upon that whole Platonick trinity of divine hypostases (Την την Νως ή την την Ζοις) all but as one first God: but those others of them, who called it a third god, supposed a greater distinction betwixt those three hypostases, and made so many several gods of them; the first, a monad or simple goodness; the second, mind or intellect; the third, psyche or the universal soul, which also without any more ado they concluded to be the immediate soul of this corporeal world, existing likewise from eternity with it.

Now this second god, which was the whole animated world as well to the Egyptians as the Platonists, was by them both said to be, not only the temple and image, but also the son of the first God. That the Egyptians p. 329, 330, called the animated world the son of God, hath been already proved; and that the other Pagans did the like also, is evident from this of Celsum, where he pretends, that the Christians called their Jesus the Son of God, in imitation of those ancient Pagans, who had styled the world so: ὁ τον επικων καινον δε άτιω του Θεου υπερ βαλλον, Μην πολλον εκεινοι, οι δι άτιω του καιρου, και ει την γιαζον τα περται τε αυτω τε καινον προς του δε επικων. Παρα γαρ ζοις ως τε αυτω τε καινον προς του δε επικων. Whence these Christians came to call their Jesus the Son of God, I shall now declare; namely, because our ancestors had called the world, as made by

made by God, the son of God, and God. Now is there not a goodly similitude (think you) betwixt these two sons of God, theirs and ours? Upon which words of his, Origen writeth thus; ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἦν Θεὸς ἡμῶν λέγει, 
παραποιομενας τὰ τερτά τὰ γένη, ως εἰ τῷ γενομένῳ, ἢ ἐν ὧν ἄνδρα ἔσται ἢ γῆν. Celsus supposed us Christians to have borrowed this appellation of the son of God, from the Pagans, they calling the world, as made by God, the son of God, and God. Wherefore these Pagans, who look'd upon the whole animated world only as the second God, and son of God, did unquestionably also worship the first God, in the world, and that probably by perforating and deifying his several parts and members too. Thus do we understand, what that was, which gave occasion to this mistake of late writers, that the Pagans worshipped the imitative parts of the world, as such, for true and proper gods; viz. their not perceiving, that they worshipped these only, as the parts or living members of one great mundane animal, which was to them, if not the first God, yet at least the second God; the temple, image, and son, of the first God.

And now have we, as we conceive, given a full account of the seeming polytheism of the Pagans, not only in their poetical and fabulous, but also their political or civil theology; the former of which was nothing but fancy and fiction, and the conforming of divine to human things; the latter nothing but vulgar opinion and error, together with the laws and institutions of statesmen and politicians, designed principally to amuse the vulgar, and keep them the better in obedience and subjection to civil laws. Besides which, the intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged another theology, which was neither fiction, nor mere opinion and law, but nature and philosophy, or absolute truth and reality; according to which natural and philosophick theology of theirs, there was only one unmade self-originated Deity, and many other created gods, as his inferior ministers. So that those many poetical and political gods could not possibly be look'd upon otherwise, than either as the created ministers of one supreme God, whether taken singly or collectively; or else as the polyonymy and various denomination of him, according to several notions and partial conceptions of him; and his several powers and manifestations of the world perforated and deified. Which latter we have already proved to have been the most generally received opinion of the Pagan theologers; according to that of Euclides the philosopher, ἵνα ἀλλοιωθήσεται ναόμενος, there is one supreme Good (or highest Deity) called by many names: and, according to that of Antisthenes before cited, That the many popular gods were but one and the same natural God, viz. as Laelantius adds, Summe totius artifex, The maker of the whole world.

We shall conclude with repeating what hath been already suggested, that though the intelligent Pagans did generally disclaim their fabulous theology; St. Athan. telling us, that when the absurdities thereof were urged against them, they would commonly make such replies as these, 

Ambigui, inquint.  

fabularum est ista garrulitas; and again, Rursus, inquint, ad fabulas redit; 

1 Apud Diogen. Laert. lib. II. segm. 106. p. 142.
Far be it from us (say they) to think so or so, this is nothing but the garrulity of idle fables, and, You would bring us again to fables. And though they owned another theology besides their civil alfo, which was the natural and philosophical, as the only true; yet did they notwithstanding acknowledge a kind of necessity, that, in those times at least, there should be, besides the natural and philosophical theology, which the vulgar were not so capable of, another theology framed and held forth, that might be more accommodated to their apprehensions. Thus that Roman pontifex Scævola in St. Austin declareth 1: Expedire exiftimat falli in religione civitates, That it was expedient (as he thought) that cities and commonwealths should be deceived in their religion, or have something false or fabulous intermingled with it, he giving this reason for the same, because the natural and philosophick theology contained many things in it, which, though true, yet would be hurtful for the vulgar to know; as for example, Quod verus Deus nec sexum habeat, nec ætatem, nec definita corporis membra; That the true God hath neither sex, nor age, nor bodily members; and that Hercules and Æsculapius, &c., were not gods, but men, obnoxious to the same infirmities with others; and the like. And the learned Varro, in his book of religions 2, publickly maintained the same doctrine: Varro de religionibus loquens, evidenter dicit, multa esse vera, quæ vulgo seire non sit utile; multaque, quæ tamens falsa sint, aliter eximilare populum expedit: & ideæ Græcos teletas & mysteria taciturnitate parietibusque claues, &c. That there were many things true in religion, which it was not convenient for the vulgar to know; as likewise many things false, of which it was expedient they should think otherwise: and that for this cause, the Greeks enclosed their Teletæ or mysteries within walls, and kept them under a seal of secrecy. Upon which of Varro St. Austin thus noteth; Hic certè totum consilium prodidit sapientium, per quos civitates & populi regentur: Varro here plainly discovers and betrays the whole counsel and secrecy of states-men and politicians, by whom cities and nations were governed, and their very arcanum of government, namely this, That people were to be deceived in their religion, for their own good, and the good of their goverours. The same father there adding, That civil demons were much gratified with this doctrine, and liked this fraud and imposture very well, which gave them an advantage to rule and tyrannize, as well over the deceivers as the deceived. Lastly, Strabo also 3, though otherwise a grave and sober writer, speaks freely and broadly to the same purpose; ὥς γὰρ ὄχλον τις νυνικῶν ἢ πάντων ἢ ἡμῖν πλῆθος ἐπαράγων λόγῳ διαθοῖνας νομικὸν πιθοῦς, ἢ προκυκλώσατας μητρὶ θεοῦ τέκνης ἄλλα δὲ χρόνια διαφάνειας, τότε ὁ θεὺς ἔνοικοις λύεις τετηκές. It is not possible, that women, and others of the vulgar sort, should be conducted and carried on towards piety, holiness and faith, merely by philosophick reason and truth; but this must be done by superstition, and that not without the help of fables and prodigious or wonderful narrations. From whence it is plain, that Strabo did not only allow a necessity of a civil theology besides the natural and philosophical, but also of a fabulous and poetical one too. And this is a thing the less to be wondered at in these Pagans, because some Christians also seem to acknowledge a kind of truth herein; Synesius himself writing after this manner:

1 De Civit. Dei, Lib. IV. cap. XXVII. p. 84. Tom. VII. Oper.
2 Apud Augustin. ubi supra, p. 88.
3 Lib. I. p. 18.
XXXV. We have now dispatched the first of those three heads proposed to be insisted on, viz. that the Pagans worshipped one and the fame supreme God, under many personal names, so that much of their polytheism was but feeming and phantastick, and indeed nothing but the polyonymy of one supreme God; they making many poetical and political gods of that one natural God; and thus worshipping God by parts and piece-meal, according to that clear acknowledgment of Maximus Madaurenfs before cited: Unius summii Dei virtutes, per mundanum opus diffusas, nos multis vocabulis invocamus; & dum ejus quaedam membra carpem variis supplicationibus praeguminur, totum colere cideon: The virtues of the one supreme God diffused throughout the whole world, we (Pagans) invoke under many several names; and so professing, with our supplications, his as it were divided members, must needs be thought to worship him whole, we leaving out nothing of him. We shall proceed to the second head proposed, that besides this polyonymy of one supreme God in the poetical and civil theology of the Pagans, which was their feeming and phantastick polytheism, they had another real polytheism also; they acknowledging in their natural and philosophick theology likewise a multiplicity of gods, that is, of substantial understanding beings, superiour to men, really existing in the world. Which though they were called by them gods, yet were they not therefore supposed to be ἀπαντωµεν, unmade and self-existent, or independent beings, but all of them (one only excepted) γενετοι, generated gods, according to the larger notion of that word before declared; that is, though not κατὰ γένους, yet at least, εἰς αὐτὸν γενοι, though not as made in time, yet as produced from a superiour cause. Plutarch propounding this for one amongst his Platonic questions, why ὁ ἄνωτα ὦς, the highest and supreme God, was called by Plato, both the father and maker of all things, gives this reply to it in the
d words

1 In Encomio Calvitiei, p. 73. Oper. Edit. Ixivii.


3 Apud Augustin. Epist. XVI. p. 15. Tom. II. Oper.
words before cited. The name Θείας τῶν γενεσίων κόσμου τῶν ἀληθῶν πατρός ἤγου (οὕς ὁ Ἀριστακλῆς πατρός ἤγου) πατρός ἤγου τῶν ἀληθῶν κόσμου, that perhaps he was said to be the father of all the generated gods, and of men, (as he is also styled in Homer) but the maker of all other irrational and inanimate beings. From which passage of Plutarch's it plainly appears, that the ὁ ἀνωτάτῳ Θείας the one highest God, being every way ἒντόνης, unmade and unproduced, was thought to be the maker or father of all the other gods, therefore called γενεσίως. Which is further plainly declared elsewhere by the same Plutarch in these words; πάρεγγε Συμφόροι. l. s. τῶν ἀληθῶν κόσμου, that Plato calleth the one unmade and eternal God the father and maker of the world, and of all other things generated. And though some of those many gods of Plato's were by him also called ζ.aws, or eternal, yet were they likewise γενεσίως, in another sense, that is, produced and derived, by way of emanation, from that one, who is every way ἐντόνης, underived and independent upon any other cause. And thus Proclus universally pronounces; Τὸ ἀνωτάτῳ Θείας, the highest God, made, or in way of eminency; as likewise were those other inferior, or generated gods, in way of distinction from him, called Θείας, the gods. And accordingly the sense of Celsus is thus represented in Origen, Θείας δημιουργοίς. Τὸ ἄλλα τοῦ κόσμου σωματός, μόνης θεωρίας έγκεφαλίας Θείας: That the gods were the makers of the bodies of all animals, the souls of them only being the work of God. Moreover, those inferior gods are styled by Ammianus Marcellinus, σαντίας ποίητας, substantial powers, probably in way of distinction from those other Pagan gods, that were not substantial, but only so many names and notions of the one supreme God, or his powers severally perfonated and deified, which substantial powers of Am. Marcellinus 1, (as divination and prophecy was, by their means, imparted to men) were all said to be subject to that one sovereign Deity called Θείας: whom (faith he) the antient Theologers feated in cubili & solem Jovis, in the bed-chamber and throne of Jupiter; as indeed some of the poets have made her to be the wife of Jupiter, and others his sister. And Anaxarchus in Plutarch styles her πάρεγγεν τοῦ Δαίσ, Vitr. Alex. Jupiter's aiffessor, though that philosopher abfed the fable, and groflly de- [p. 596. Tom. 1. Opera.] proved the meaning of it, as if it signified πάρεγγεν τοῦ περίκλην ὕπο τοῦ μεγάλου Σιλυόν ἡ δίκαια, That whatsoever is done by the sovereign power, is therefore just and right: whereas the true moral thereof was this, that justice or righteousnefs fits in council with God, and in his mind and will, prescribes laws to nature and the whole world. Θείας therefore was another name of God, amongft the Pagans, according to his univerfal consideration, besides those before mentioned: and when Plato, in his

1 Hilliar. Lib. XXI. cap. I. p. 265.
Themis; the Eternal Law, or God. Book I.

De Dea The-mis, p. 39.

book of laws, would have men to swear by the names of those three gods, Jupiter, Apollo, and Themis; these were but so many several partial notions of the one supreme Deity; the meaning thereof being no other than this, as Pighius observeth, Timore divino, veritate ipsa, ac aequitate sancti debere juramenta. In Jove enim summis numinis petentem, falsi ac perjurii vindicem; in Apolline veritatis lumen; in Themide, jus, iust, atque iicitum esse intelligitur. Est enim Themis ipsa lex aeterna atque universalis, mundo ac naturae praescripta; or, according to Cicero, Ratio rei summi Jovis. And Ficinus, in his commentary as to the main agreeeth herewith. So that, when the Pagan theologers affirmed the Nomen of Themis to preside over the spirits of the elements, and all those other substantial powers, from whom divination was participated to men; their meaning therein was clearly no other than this; that there was one supreme Deity ruling over all the other gods, and that the divine Mind, which prescribeth laws to nature and the whole world, and contains all the fatal decrees in it, according to the evolution of which things come to pafs in the world, was the fountain, from whence all divination proceeded; as these secrets were more or les imparted from thence to those inferiour created spirits. The philosophy of the Pagan theology amongst the Greeks was plainly no other than this; that there is one unmade self-existent Deity, the original of all, and that there are many other substantial powers or spirits, created by it, as the minifters of its providence in the world: but there was much of poetry, or poetick phaney, intermingled with this philosophy, as the flourish to it, to make up their Pagan theology.

Thus, as hath been before declared, the Pagans held both one God, and many gods, in different fenes; one unmade self-existent Deity, and many generated or created gods; Onatus the Pythagorean declaring, that they, who affected one only God, and not many, understood not what the dignity and majesty of the divine transcendency consisted in, namely in ruling over gods; and Platonius conceiving, that the supreme God was most of all glorified, not by being contracted into one, but by having multitudes of gods, derived from him, and dependent on him; and that the honour done to them redounded unto him. Where there are two things to be distinguished; first, that, according to the Pagan Theists, God was no solitary being; but that there were multitudes of gods, or substantial powers, and living understanding natures, superior to men, which were neither self-existent, nor yet generated out of matter, but all generated or created from one supreme. Secondly, that so much as these were all supposed to have some influence, more or les, upon the government of the world, and the affairs of mankind, they were therefore all of them conceived to be the due objects of men’s religious worship, adoration and invocation; and accordingly was the Pagan devotion scattered amongst them all. Nor were the Gods of the oriental Pagans neither meer dead statues and images, as some would conclude from the Scripture, but living understanding beings, superior to men, (though worshipped in images) according to that reply of the Chaldeans,


deans in Daniel to Nebuchadnezzar, when he required them to tell his
dream. There is none other, that can shew this thing before the king, except those
Gods, whose dwelling is not with flesh; that is, the immortal gods, or who are
exalted above the condition of human frailty. Though some conceive, that
these words are to be understood of a peculiar sort of gods; namely, that
this was such a thing, as could not be done by those demons and lower aerial
gods, which frequently converse with men, but was referred to a higher rank
of gods, who are above human converse. Now, as to the former of these
two things, that God is no solitary being, but that there are multitudes of
understanding beings superior to men, the creatures and ministers of one
supreme God; the Scriptures both of the Old and New Testament fully agree
with the Pagans herein. Thousands and thousands minister unto him, and ten thou-
sand times ten thousand stood before him; and Ye are come to an innumerable company
of angels. But the latter of them, that religious worship and invocation doth
right belong to these created spirits, is constantly denied and condemned in
these writings, that being a thing peculiarly referred to that one God,
who was the creator of heaven and earth. And thus is that prophecy of Jer-
emy to be underfooted, expressed in the Chalday tongue, that to the Jews
might have it in readiness for those Chaldean idolaters, when they came into
Babylon, Thus shall ye say unto them, the gods, that have not made the heavens and
the earth, shall perish from the earth, and from under these heavens. That is,
there shall come a time, when none shall be religiously worshipped any where
upon the face of the whole earth, save only that God, who made the heavens
and the earth, and he without images too. Which prophecy, but in part
yet fulfilled, shall then have its complete accomplishment, when the king-
doms of this world shall become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ.
And thus is the controversy rightly stated betwixt the Pagans and the Chris-
frians by Laelianus: Sed fortasse querat aliquid a nobis, quod apudCicero-
fore, quum nem querit Hortenfius; Si Deus unus est, que se beat solitudo quaeat? Tan-
quam nos, qui unum esse dicitur, desperunt ac solitarium esse dicamus. Habet enim
ministros, quos vocamus nontios. Et est iisdem verum, quod dixisse Senecam supra re-
tuli; genuisse regni iuris ministros Deum. Verum bi neque dixit, neque deos se
vocari aut coli velunt; quippe, qui nibil præter jussum ac voluntatem Dei faciant.
As if we who say, there is but one God, therefore made a solitary and deserted
Deity. Whereas we acknowledge, that God batth his ministers, whom we call
Angels: and we grant that to be true, which was before cited out of Seneca,
that God batth generated or created ministers of his kingdom. But these are
neither gods, nor would they be called gods, nor worshipped; forasmuch as
they only execute the will and command of God. And again afterwards to
the same purpose, Si eos multitudine deificbat, non duodecim dicimus, nec trecento-
ts sexaginta quinque (ut Orpheus) sed innumerales, & argumentum eorum erro-
res in diversum, qui tam paucos patatun. Sciant tamen quonominem appellari de-
beat; ne Deum verum violent, cuius nomen exponunt, dum pluribus tribuant,
&c. If multitude delight them, we say not, that there are twelve, nor yet three
hundred sixty five, as Orpheus, but innumerable. And we tax their error, on the
contrary, who think them to be so few. Nevertheless, let them know, by what name

A a a a 2 they
they ought to be called, lest they violate the true God, whose name is profaned, when it is given to many. From which passages of Laelantius it plainly appeareth, that the main controversy between the Christians and the Pagans was then only this, Whether or no, the created ministers of the supreme God might be called gods, and religiously worshipped. But this Pagan objection against the solitary Deity of the Christians is by some ancient Christian writers also otherwise answered; namely, from those three hypostases or person of the trinity; they affirming upon that account, that though Christians did not acknowledge such a multitude of gods as the Pagans, yet did they not therefore make God a solitary and sterile being, before the creation neither, as the Jews did; but went in a middle way betwixt Jews and Pagans, interpreting Moses also his faciamus hominem, to this sense.

XXXVI. We shall now shew particularly what these many gods of the Pagans were. It hath been often observed, that the Pagans were divided in their philosophick or natural theology, as to their opinions concerning the supreme God; some of them thinking, τὸ Θεὸν ἐγκρημάτων ἐναὶ τῆς ὕλης φύσεως, that the supreme Deity was an abstract being, elevated above nature and the whole world; but others, that he was nothing higher than an anima mundi, or soul of the world. Now the former of these two were chiefly amongst the Greeks, the Pythagoreans and the Platonists, who had accordingly several distinctions amongst them concerning their gods, as between the ὑπεράσµατα Σείοι and the ἰδάσµατα, the super-mundane and the mundane gods; the Σείοι τινὸς and the γενετορίς, the eternal and the generated gods; that word latter being now taken in a narrower and more confined sense, for such as were made in time, or had a beginning of their existence: and lastly, the νοοτοί τινος and the ἀκιδοτοί, the intelligible and the sensible gods. And the ὑπεράσµατα, αἰθιόων and νοοτοί τινος, supermundane, eternal, and intelligible gods, of these Pythagoreans and Platonists, were first of all, and principally, those τρεῖς ἀρχαι ὑποκάτασαι, (as Plotinus calls them) those three divine hypostases, that have the nature of principles in the universe, viz. Tagathon or Hen, Nous and Πσιχε, or Monad, Mind and Soul. That this trinity was not first of all a mere invention of Plato's, but much ancien ter than him, is plainly affirmed by Plotinus in these words; Καὶ ἐνώ τις τῆς λόγου τέτητε μὴ καθότε, μὴ ἐν λόγῳ, ἀλλὰ πᾶς ὁ λόγος εἰρήκεται μὴ ἄκατος τῆς λόγου τῆς ὑποκάτασσας, ἢ περιέχειν τοι ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῆς Παράσιλις περίτετε τῆς τόκως ὑποκάτασσας. That these doctrines are not new, nor of yesterday, but have been very anciently delivered, though obscurely (the discourses now except) being but explanations of them) appears from Plato's own writings; Parmenides before him having insinuated on them.

Now it is well known, that Parmenides was addicted to the Pythagorick sect, and therefore probable, that this doctrine of a divine triad was one of the arcana of that school also. Which is further confirmed from hence, because Numerius a famous Pythagorean entertained it as such. And Mo-
Moderatus (as Simplicius informs us) plainly affirmeth this trinity of principles to have been a Pythagoric cabala: ὁτα γας κατὰ τῶν Πυθαγορευκῶν τὸ τέλευτα. Now Pliny states that Proclus in another place thus fully testifieth; ἀπαντα γένος ἡ Ἑλληνικὴ Θεοθέσιον Πλατ. λογία τῆς "Ὀφικῆς ἡ μηδεμία ἐκκωλησία" περίπτων μὲν Πυθαγόρης παρὰ Ἀγλαοφέμου. That theology of the Greeks was derived from the Orphic cabala, which Proclus in another place thus fully testifieth; ἀπαντα γένος ἡ Ἑλληνικὴ Θεοθέσιον Πλατ. λογία τῆς "Ὀφικῆς ἡ μηδεμία ἐκκωλησία" περίπτων μὲν Πυθαγόρης παρὰ Ἀγλαοφέμου. All the theology of the Greeks was derived from the Orphic Mythisagoria; Pythagoras being first instrued by Aglaophemus in the Orphic Orgia, or mysteries concerning the gods; and Plato being the next, who received a perfect knowledge of all these divine things, both out of the Pythagoric and the Orphic writings. And that a Trinity was part of that Orphic cabala, we have already proved out of Amelius, who affirming (in Proclus) that Plato's three kings were the same with Orpheus his deity, of Phanes, Uranus, and Cronus. Moreover, since all thes three, Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato, travelling into Egypt, were there initiated in that arcane theology of the Egyptians (called Hermaca); it seemeth probable (as was before observed) that this doctrine of a divine triad was also part of the arcane theology of the Egyptians. It hath been also noted, that there were some footstools of such a trinity in the Mithraick mysteries amongst the Persians, derived from Zoroaster; as Likewise that it was expressly contained in the magick or Chaldy oracles, of whatsoever authority they may be. Moreover, it hath been signified, that the Samothracians had very anciently a certain trinity of gods, that were the highest of all their gods, and that called by an Hebrew name too, Cabbirim, or the mighty gods: and that from thence the Roman Capitoline trinity of gods was derived; the second whereof was Minerva, which among the Latins, as Athena amongst the Greeks, was underfoot to signify the divine wisdom. Lastly, the ternary, or triad, was not only accounted a sacred number amongst the Pythagoreans, but also, as containing some mystery in nature, was therefore made use of by other Greeks and Pagans, in their religious rites; as Aristotle in the De Caelo, l. 1. formeth us: διὸ τό τῷ τῆς θυσίας εἰλικρίνειας ὄσπορος νόμος ἐστὶ, καὶ τῶν ἀριστῶν τῶν θεῶν χρηματικὸς τὸν ἀριστὸν. Wherefore from nature, and as it were observing her laws, have we taken this number of three, making use of the same in the sacrifices of the gods, and other purifications.

Now since it cannot well be conceived, how such a trinity of divine hypotheses should be first discovered merely by human wit and reason, though there

Comment. in Timaeum Platon. Lib. II. p. 94.
there be nothing in it (if rightly understood) that is repugnant to reason: and since there are in the ancient writings of the Old Testament certain significations of a plurality in the Deity, or of more than one hypostasis, we may reasonably conclude that, which Proclus affirteenth of this Trinity, as it was contained in the Chaldaick Oracles, to be true, that it was at first ῥεπαραθήτος ένογνώτος, a theology of divine tradition or revelation, or a divine cabala, viz. amongst the Hebrews first, and from them afterwards communicated to the Egyptians and other nations. Neither ought it to be thought any considerable objection to the contrary, because the Platonists, Pythagoreans, and other Pagan theologers, did not express this their Trinity, in the very words of the Athanalian Creed, nor according to the form of the Nicene council. Forasmuch as this mystery was gradually imparted to the world, and that first but sparingly to the Hebrews themselves, either in their written or oral cabala; but afterwards more fully under Christianity, the whole frame whereof was built thereupon. Nevertheless was it not so distinctly and precisely determined, nor so punctually and scrupulously stated among the Christians neither, till after the rising up of heresies concerning it. Nor when all was done, did the orthodox themselves at first universally agree, in the signification of the word ὀμολογεῖν, co-essential or consubstantial. Nor lastly, is it a thing at all to be wondered, at, that in such a difficult and mysterious point as this, there should be some diversity of apprehensions amongst the reputed orthodox Christians themselves; and much less therefore amongst Pagans and Philosophers. However, we freely acknowledge, that as this divine cabala was but little understood by many of those, who entertained it among the Pagans, so was it by divers of them much depraved and adulterated also.

For first, the Pagans universally called this their Trinity, a Trinity of gods, τοῦ Πρώτου, τοῦ Δύτερου, and τοῦ Τρίτου Θεῶν, the first, the second, and the third god; as the more philosophically amongst them called it also a Trinity of causes, and a Trinity of principles, and sometimes a Trinity of opificers. Thus is this cabala of the Trinity styled in Proclus, ἡ τῶν Τριῶν Θεῶν παράδοσις, the tradition of the three gods. And accordingly it is said of Numenius by him, that τοις ανυχίσας θεῖς, he did προηγομένων καλεῖν, αὐτόποι, ἐνογνώτοι, having praised the three gods, tragically or affectedly called them, the grandfather, the son, and the nephew; Numenius thereby intimating, that as the second of these gods was the offspring of the first god, so the third, called the nephew of the first, was derived both from him and from the second; from the first as the grandfather, and from the second, as the father of him. Harpocrates likewise, Atticus, and Amelius, are said by Proclus to have entertained this same cabala or tradition of the three gods, the latter of these styling them βασιλεῖς τρεῖς, and τριάδος δημιουργόν, three kings, and three opificers, or makers of the whole world. In like manner Platonius, speaking of the second of these three hypostases, (that is, τῶν πρώτων min or intellec) calls him δύτερον

In Time. Plat. p. 93.
Ibid.

Enum. 5. 15. c. 3 [p. 522.] Θεῖος, the second god; Καὶ Θείος αὐτὴ ὁ Θεός, ἕγερεν τοῦ Δυτίκου, of the first Εἰκότων, δέ κε ὑπεράσπεται κατὰ στοιχεῖα ἐπὶ καλῆς ὑπὸ σιωπῆς, ζῶον ἐνάκτη ἐν την έικότην, and τὰ κε προσέκοιτε εἰς Πάθος τελικά, καί oὑδε ἐπι Παρίσι ἑπειρεμένοι, ἐκείς ἡ ἔπειρα ἡ μια ἡ μεγίστη.
And this nature is God, I say a second God, offering himself to view, before that other God can be seen, who is seated above, this being as it were the glorious throne of him. For it is not fit, that he should be immediately seated in any that is inanimate; nor in more flesh neither, but that there should be such an immense pulchritude and splendour flaming before him, like the pomp and procession before the great king. He also elsewhere mentions all these three gods together, making this world to be an image of them all: Eκατός ὑπὸ Αἰθήματος ἀπὸ τοῦ καταίστασιν εἰκών, ὁ ἵκουσα ἰδέαν; En. 2. l. 3. &c. ἑκάστων μὲν τῷ πρώτῳ, ἡ δεύτερος, τῷ δὲ τρίτῳ, ἑκάστων μὲν ἡ ἀυτή, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ ὑλῇ, ὁ ἀντά συμβιβασμένης κωμίμοις. Wherefore this world may well be called an image, it depending upon that above, (as an image in a glass) which is threefold. Whereas the first and second God always stand immovably; the third likewise is in it self stable too, but accidentally moved, by reason of the mobility of matter and things below it. And that we may here give a taste of the mystical theology and enthusiasm of these Platonists too, Porphyry in the life of Plotinus 1 affirms, that both Plotinus and himself had sometimes experience of a kind of ecstatic union with the first of these three gods, that which is above mind and understanding: τολάμος ἵκον ἐπὶ τοῦ πρώτου ὑπὸ ὑπερσηφισμοῦ Πτολαμειαῖο ταῖς τε εἰνολίαις, ἢδον ἐκτὸς ἐκ τοῦ μεταβίβασμας, μη τῇ τῶν ἱδεάων ὑπὲρ δὲ ὅπως πάντα τὸ υποτέλειον ἰδρύματος ὁ ὁ τῇ ἡ ἑνοῦ Περίτευμος ἠπατεί λόγῳ περιστάσαι τῇ οἰκίαν. Plotinus often endeavoured to raise up his mind to the first and highest God, that God sometimes appeared to him, who had neither form nor idea, but is placed above intellect, and all that is intelligible; to whom I Porphyry affirm my self to have been once united in the sixtieth year of my age. And again afterwards, τάδε αὐτῷ καὶ σκοποῦ σα, το ἐναγάγας ὑπὸ περιστάσαι τῇ ὑπὲρ τοῦ πάντων τοῦ ὑπὸ, ἔτικε δὲ τετράκις τοῦ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἑνοῦ, αὐτὸ τῇ σκοποῦ τοῦ. Plotinus his chief aim and scope was, to be united to, and conjoined with the supreme God, who is above all, which scope he attained unto four several times, whilst my self was with him, by a certain ineffable energy. That is, Plotinus aimed at such a kind of rapturous and ecstatic union with the Τοῦ τοῦ, and Ταῦτα, the first of the three highest gods, (called the one and the good) as by himself is described towards the latter end of this last book 2, where he calls it ἐνταξεῖ, and παραιτήσαι ἑπτάκις κατέναν, and τὸ καταίστασιν, τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ συνάτριες συνάτριες, a kind of twofold union, and a certain presence better than knowledge, and the joining of our own centre, as it were, with the centre of the universe. Thus we see, that the Platonick trinity is a trinity of gods, of which three gods therefore, the second and the third must of necessity be inferior gods, because otherwise they would be three independent gods; whereas the Pagan theology expressly disclaims a plurality of independent and self-originated deities.

But since, according to the principles of Christianity, which was partly designed to oppose and bear down the Pagan polytheism, there is one only God to be acknowledged; the meaning whereby notwithstanding seems to be chiefly directed against the deifying of created beings, or giving religious worship to any, besides the uncreated, and the creator of all: moreover, since

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1 Cap. XXIII. p. 157. in Fabricii Biblioth. 2 De Bono vel Uno, Ennead. VI. Lib. IX. Grec. Lib. IV. cap. XXVI. cap. X. p. 772.
fince in the scripture, which is the only true rule and measure of this divine cabala of the trinity, though the άγων: or word be said to have been with God, (that is, God the father;) and also it self to be God, (that is, not a creature:) yet it is no where called an other, or second God. Therefore cannot we Christians entertain this Pagan language of a trinity of Gods, but must call it either a trinity of divine hypostases, or subsistences, or persons, or the like. Nevertheless it is observable, that Philo 1, though, according to his Jewith principles, he was a zealous opposer of the Pagan polytheism and idolatry, yet did he not, for all that, scruple to call the θεον λόγον, the divine Word, after the Platonic way, Δύσεων Θεόν, a second God; as not suspecting this to clash with the principles of his religion, or that second commandment of the decalogue, Thou shalt have no other gods before my face; possibly because he conceived, that this was to be understood of creature-gods only: whereas his second God, the divine λόγος or Word, is declared by him to be δύσεως, eternal, and therefore, according to the Jewith theology, uncreated. However, this language of a second and third God is not so excusable in a Jew, as it might be in a Pagan; because the Pagans, according to the principles of their religion, were so far from having any scrupulosity against a plurality of gods, (so long as there was only one fountain of the godhead acknowledged) that they rather accounted it an honour to the supreme God, as hath been already shewed, that he should have many other, not only titular gods under him, but also such as were religiously worshipped: wherefore, besides this second and third God, they also did luxuriate in their other many creature-gods. And indeed St. Augustin doth upon this account seem somewhat to exhume the Pagans for this their trinity of gods, and principles, in these words: Libris enim verbis loquuntur philosophi, nec in rebus ad intelligendum difficilissimae offensionem religiosarum aurium pertineunt. Nobis autem ad certam regulam loqui fas est, ne verborum licentia, etiam in rebus, que in hinc significatur, impiam gignat opinionem. Nos autem non dicimus duo vel tria principia, cum de Deo loquimur; scit nec duos deos vel tres, nobis licitum est dicere, quanvis de unoque loquemur, vel de Filio, vel de Spiritu Sancto, etiam singulum quemque Deum esse factanum. The philosophers use free language; nor in these things, which are extremely difficult to be understood, did they at all fear the offending of any religious and scrupulous ears. But the case is otherwise with us Christians; for we are tied up to phrases, and ought to speak according to a certain rule, lest the licentious use of words should beget a wicked opinion in any concerning those things, that are signified by them. That is, though this might be in a manner excusable in the Pagans, because each of those three hypostases is God, therefore to call them severally gods, and all of them a trinity of gods, and principles; they having no such rule then given them to govern their language by as this, That though the Father be God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, yet are they not three Gods, but one God: yet is not this allowable for us Christians, to speak of a second or third God, or principle, or to call the Holy Trinity a Trinity of Gods, notwithstanding that when we speak of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost severally, we confess each of them to be God.

1 Vide Eusebium, Prepar. Evangel. Lib. VII. cap. XIII. p. 323.
And indeed when the Pagans thus spoke of a first, second and third God, and no more, though having innumerable other Gods besides, they did, by this language, plainly imply, that these three gods of theirs, were of a very different kind from all the rest of their gods; that is, not Σοις χωρίων, but, άοις, not created, but eternal and uncreated ones. And that many of them did really take this whole trinity of gods for the περὶ Θεοὶ in general, the divine Nom- men, and sometimes call it the first God too, in way of distinction from their generated gods, will be showed afterward. So that the Περὶ Θεοὶ, the first God, was used in different senses by these Pagans, sometimes in a larger sense, and in way of opposition to all the γενὸς Σοις, the generated or created gods, or the gods, that were made in time, together with the world; and sometimes again, more particularly, in way of distinction from those two other divine hypostases eternal, called by them the second and third god. Which first of the three gods is also frequently by them called Θεοὶ, God, emphatically and by way of excellency, they supposing a gradual subordination in their principles.

Neither was this trinity of divine subsistences only thus ill-languaged by the Pagans generally, when they called it a trinity of gods; but also the Cabala thereof was otherwise much depraved and adulterated by several of the Platonists and Pythagoreans. For first, the third of these three hypostases, commonly called Ψυχή, is by some of them made to be ψυχή ἰγκόους, the immediate soul of the corporeal world, informing, acting and enlivening it, after the same manner as the souls of other animals do their respective bodies; insomuch that this corporeal world itself, as together with its soul it makes up one complete animal, was frequently called the third god. This Proclus' affirmeth of Numenius the Pythagorean, ὅ γὰρ κόσμος κατ' άντίκο οUBLE ις Θεος, That the world, according to him, was the third god. And Plotinus, being a great reader of this Numenius, seems to have been somewhat infected by him with this conceit also, though contrary to his own principles, from those words before cited out of him, ὃ κόσμος Θεος, ὅσπερ συνθετικός λέγειν, τρίτος, the world, as is commonly said, is the third god.

Now, if the world be not a creature, then is there no created being at all, but all is God. But not only Timæus Locrus, but also Plato himself calls it Θεοὶ γεγονός, that is, a created god, the word γεγονός being here put for that, which, after it once was not, is brought into being; which is the proper notion of a creature. So that the animated world is, by Plato, made to be only the chief of all the γεγονος Σοις, that is, the creature-gods. Wherefore it is plain, that in this trinity of some Platonists and Pythagoreans, wherein the world is made to be the third god, there is a confused jumble of created and uncreated beings together. For the first of those gods is the father and fountain of all, or the original of the god-head. And the second, forasmuch as he is called by them, both ποιητης and ἄρματος, the maker, and the opificer of the whole world, he therefore can be no creature neither:

Comment in Timæum Platon. Lib. II. p. 93.

This is a mistake, for Dr. Cudworth had not cited these words before, but they are to be found in Platonius, Ennead. III. Lib. V. cap. VI. p. 296.
whereas the third, which is said to be the world, was by Numenius himself also expressly called, both πάντα and τὸ δημιουργόν, the work, or thing made, that is plainly, the creature of both the former. Proclus¹ thus fully represents his Senec; Πατέρα μόνον καλεῖ τὸν πατέρα, παντόν δὲ τὸν δεύτερον, πάντακαί δὲ τὸν τρίτον: ἄστι οἵ κατ' αὐτὸν δημιουργοῖς διίδει, θ', τι πρώτος η' το δεύτερος Θεός, το η' δημιουργόν, το τρίτος: Numenius called the first of the three Gods the Father, the second of them the maker, and the third the work, or thing made; so that, according to Numenius, there were two officers, or creators of the world, the first and the second God; and the world itself, (that is, the thing made and created by them both) is said to be the third God.

And that this notion of the Trinity is an adulterated one, may be also further concluded from hence, because, according to this hypothesis, they might have said, that there were three hundred and more gods, as well as that there are three; since all the other γεννηθέν Θεοί, generated gods, might have come into the number too, as well as the world, they being parts thereof, and gods that differ not in kind from it, but only in degree. Wherefore these philosophers ought not to have made a trinity of gods, distinguished from all the rest, but rather first to have distributed their gods into Θεός, and γεννηθέν, that is, eternal or uncreated, and created gods, and then to have subdivided those created gods into the whole world, and the parts thereof animated.

But because it may be here alleged in favour of this spurious hypothesis of the Trinity, that the world was accounted the third God, only by accident, in respect of its soul, which is properly that third God; though Numenius, with others, plainly affirm the world itself, as πάντα and δημιουργόν, as the work and thing made, to be the third; we shall therefore reply to this, that even the soul of the mundane animal itself, according to Timæus, and Plato, and others, is affirmed to be γεννηθεῖς Θεοί, a generated god, that is, such as was produced from non-existence into being, and therefore truly and properly a creature. Which Aristotelê² observing, therefore took occasion to tax Plato as contradicting himself, in making the soul of the world a principle, that is, the third god, and yet supposing it to be ὑπερυφός ἐκ ἄμμον ὡς ἰδανω, not eternal, but made or created together with the heaven, of which something before. Wherefore we conclude, that this ancient Cabala of the Trinity was depraved and adulterated by those Platonists and Pythagoreans, who made either the world itself, or else Φαγαχαί ἔνοχα, an informing soul of the world, to be the third hypostasis thereof, they mingling created and uncreated beings together, in that which themselves, notwithstanding, call a trinity of caufes and of principles.

And we think it highly probable, that this was the true reason, why Phile, though he admitted the second hypostasis of the Platonick and Pythagorick (if not Egyptian) Trinity, called by him Ὑιος; λόγος, the divine Word, and

CHAP. IV. adulterated by some Platonists.

styled ἄνετος Ἡλί, the second God, and, as Eusebius \(^1\) adds, ἄνετος Ἐρμίον, the second cause; yet he would not Platonize or Pythagorize any further, so as to take in that third God, or cause, supposed by many of them to be the soul of the whole world, as an animal; because he must then have offered violence to the principles of his own religion, in making the whole created world a god; which practice is, by him, condemned in the Pagans. It is true, that he somewhere sticks not to call God also the soul of the world, as well as the mind thereof, whether he meant thereby τὸν πρὸ τῷ λόγῳ Θεόν, that God, who is before the Word, or else rather the Word itself, the second God, (according to him the immediate creator and governor of the same;) nevertheless, he does not seem to understand thereby such a deeply immersed soul, as would make the world an animal, and a god, but a more elevated one; that is ἐν Χρίστῳ ὑπερσώμιον, a super-mundane soul.

To this first deprivation of that ἤπαράξαδος Θεός, that theology of divine tradition, and ancient Cabala of the Trinity, by many of the Platonists and Pythagoreans, may be added another, that some of them declaring the second hypostasis of their Trinity to be the archetypal world, or τῶν ἐκ τῶν ἱδεῶν παγών πάνω, as Philo calls it \(^2\), the world that is compounded and made up of ideas, and containeth in it all those kinds of things intelligibly, that are in this lower world sensibly; and further concluding, that all these several ideas of this archetypal and intelligible world are really so many distinct substances, animals and gods, have thereby made that second hypostasis, not to be one God, but a congeries and heap of gods. There are those gods commonly called by them, νοτοὶ Θεοι, intelligible gods, not as before in way of distinction from the αἰώναλ, the sensible gods (which is a more general notion \(p. 337\) of the word) but from those other gods of theirs (afterwards to be inducted on also) called νοτοὶ Θεοι, intellectual gods. Proclus upon Plato's Politeia \(^3\) concludes, that there is no idea of evil, for this reason, because if there were, ὡς τῷ κακῷ ἐν Θεῷ ἡμῶν, ἐπιμετρητὴν πάντα ἐν Θεῷ ἐς Παρμενίδες εἰρήνην, that very idea of evil also would it self be a god, because every idea is a god, as Parmenides hath affirmed. Neither was Plotinus himself, though otherwise more sober, altogether uninfect ed with this fantastick conceit of the ideas being all of them gods, he writing thus concerning the second God, the first Mind or Intellectual, γνώσισθαι ἡ ἠπόθανα σὺν αὐτῷ γενόμενα, τὰ ἀνά τὰ τῶν ἱδεῶν κάλ- \(\mathbf{E n . 5 . 1 . c . 7 .}\)

κτω, πάντως καὶ Θεός νοτοῖς, That he being begotten by the first God, (that is, by way of emanation, and from eternity) generated all entities together with himself, the pulchritude of the ideas, which are all intelligible gods. Apuleius \(^4\) also (as hath been already noted) grobly and fulsomely imputes the same to Plato, in those words; Quas deos Plato exiitiat, veros, incorporales, animales, sine ulla neque sine neque exordio, sed propter ac rerum aniornos, ingenio ad summan beatitudinem porrecto, &c. And he with Julian and others reduce the greater part of the Pagan gods to these ideas of the intelligible, or archetypal world, as making Apollo, for example, to be the intelligible sun, the idea of the sensible; and Diana the intelligible moon, and the like for the rest. Lastly, it hath been observed also, that the Egyptian

\(^1\) Praeparat. Evang. Lib. VII. cap.XIII.  
\(^2\) De Deo Socratis, p. 43.  
\(^3\) De Opificio Mundi, p. 4.

THEOLOGIERS
Ideas made Animals and Gods.  BOOK I.

Theologers pretended, in like manner, to worship these intelligible gods, or eternal ideas, in their religious animals, as symbols of them.

Philo indeed Platonized so far, as to suppose God to have made an archetypal and intelligible world, before he made this corporeal and sensible:

De Mus. Opif.  Βαλεθείς (ο Θεός) τὸν ὑφεξούσι ταύτις κέδρον ἐναπαίηος, προεξετήτω τὸν νουτεο, ὡς ῥήμας ἀσωμάτω ἡ Ἐσπεριστὴν παράδειγμα, τὸν σωματικὸν ἄπεργατηία, προεξετήτω κύκλοις ἀπεκάλυπτηι, τούτα πεσίδνια αἰθέστα γένε, ἀντιορ ἐνεκεῖον νοτα, τοῖς ἐν τοῖς ἀναλόγων κόσμου ἐν τοῖς τοις ὑπονοεῖν ἀόριστοι. God intending to make a visible world, first formed an intelligible one; that so having an incorporeal and most god-like pattern before him, he might make the corporeal world agreeably to the same, this younger an image of that older, that should contain as many sensible kinds in it, as the other did intelligible. But it is not possible (faith he) to conceive this world of ideas to exist in any place. Nay, according to him, Μοῖσες himself philosophized also after the same manner in his Cosmogonia, describing, in the first five Veres of Genesis, the making of an intelligible heaven and earth, before the sensible: πρῶτον ἐν παρέ το νοτό κόσμο ὁ πατὸς ἐν το ἱεροῦ ἀόριστον κόσμου ἡ γῆ ἐν ἀόριστον, καὶ ἀρχή ἡν ἡ ἐν ἀόριστον ἄκοι ὡς χτιμ πενμαῖον, ἡ ἐν ἀποθήκην ὑπολογίαν Φοίνικι, ὃ φάλν ἀρχικὸν ὡς κατοντὸν ὑλὴ παράδειγμα, &c. The Creator first of all made an incorporeal heaven and an invisible earth; the ideas of air and vacuum; incorporeal water and air; and last of all light, which was also the incorporeal and intelligible paradigm of the sun and stars, and that from whence their sensible light is derived. But Philo does not plainly make these ideas of the intelligible and archetypal world to be so many distinct substances and animals, much less gods; though he somewhere takes notice of those, who admiring the pulchritude of both these worlds, did not only deify the whole of them, but also their several parts; that is, the several ideas of the intelligible world also, as well as the greater parts of the sensible, an intelligible heaven and earth, sun and moon; they pretending to worship those divine ideas in all these sensible things. Which high-flown Platonick notion, as it gave sanctuary and protection to the gross-and-soule of all the Pagan superstitions and idolatries, when the Egyptians would worship brute animals, and other Pagans all the things of nature, (inanimate substances, and mere accidents) under a pretence of worshipping the divine ideas in them; so did it directly tend to abolute impiety, irreligion and atheifm; there being few, that could entertain any thoughts at all of those eternal ideas, and scarcely any, who could thoroughly persuade themselves, that these had so much reality in them, as the sensible things of nature; as the idea of a house in the mind of an architect hath not so much reality in it as a material house made up of stones, mortar and timber; so that their devotion must needs fink down wholly into those sensible things, and themselves naturally at length fall into this atheiftick persuasion. That the good things of nature are the only deities.

Here therefore have we a multitude of Pagan gods supermundane and eternal, (though all depending upon one supreme) the gods by them

1 De Confusione Linguar. p. 345.
them properly called verae, intelligible, or the divine ideas. And we cannot but account this for another deprivation of the ancient Mofaick Cabala of the trinity, that the second hypostasis thereof is made to be the archetypal world, and all the divine ideas, as so many distinct substances, animals, and gods; that is, not one God, but a whole world of gods.

But over and besides all this, some of these Platonists and Pythagoreans did further deprave and adulterate the ancient Hebrew or Mofaick Cabala of the trinity, (the certain rule whereof is now only the Scriptures of the New Testament) when they concluded, that as from the third hypostasis of their trinity, called ἡ πρώτη ψυχή, the first soul, there were innumerable other particular souls derived, namely the souls of all inferior animals, that are parts of the world; so in like manner, that from their second hypostasis, called τῷ πρῶτῷ νῷ, the first mind or intellect, there were innumerable other μετατρητές, particular minds, or intellects substantial derived, superior to the first soul; and not only so, but also, that from that first and highest hypostasis of all, called Τῷ ηὔ, and τῇ ηὔ, the one, and the good, there were derived likewise many particular Εὐδοκίαι, and Αγαθοτητες, unities and goodnesses substantial, superior to the first intellect. Thus Proclus in his Theologick Institutions, Mrad ἐν τῷ ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου, ὑπὸ τῷ μετατρῆτος τοῦ πρώτου, οὗτος μετατρῆτος τοῦ πρώτου, ψυχαί. After the first one, (and from it) there are many particular Henades or unities; after the first intellect and from it, many particular Noes, minds or intellects; after the first soul, many particular and derivative souls; and lastly, after the universal nature, many particular natures, and spermatick reasons. Where it may be obiter observed, that these Platonists supposed, below the universal Phyle, or mundane soul, a universal φύσις, or substantial nature also; but so as that besides it there were other particular λόγοι σπειρατικοί, seminal reasons, or plastick principles also.

As for these Noes, and that besides the first universal mind or intellect, there are other particular minds or intellects substantial, a rank of beings not only immutably good and wise, but also every way immovable, and therefore above the rank of all souls, that are self-moveable beings; Proclus was not singular in this, but had the concurrence of many other Platonists with him; amongst whom Plotinus may seem to be one, from this passage of his besides others, ὅτι διάνοιαν ἐδὲ αὐτοῖς, καὶ τῷ πρώτῳ, οὗτος μετατρῆτος τοῦ πρώτου, ψυχαί. Other souls are immortal, and every mind or intellect, we have elsewhere largely p. 63; [En-}

proved. Upon which words Ficinus thus; Hic, & suprad & infrā s/he, per next. VI. lib. verba Plotini notabis, plures esse mentium animarumque substantias inter se di-}
The spurious Platonick Trinity.

Book I.

In Epid. Emb. sides Proclus and others, asserted by Simplicius also; viz. "the highest good (faith he) produceth all things from himself, in several ranks and degrees; the first, the middle, and the last or lowest of all. But the first and the next to himself doth he produce like himself, one goodness many goodnesses, and one unity or benediction many benedictions. And that by these Henades and Autoagathotetes he means substantial beings, that are conscious of themselves, appears also from these following words; to μη δι' αὐτῶν τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου οὐκ οὐκαλογιμώνων, διὰ τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὑπόθεσις, ἡν ἐξέτης τούτων ἁγιασμένη, ἁμικτὰ διὰ τῆς ἁμαμάτητης, ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ αἰεί μακαρίωτητι ἀιώνια, ἣν ἐν τῷ θεῷ, ὃν αὐτοπαλατεῖτο εἰς. Those beings, which are first produced from the first good, by reason of their sameness of nature with him, are immovable and unchangeably good, always fixed in the same happiness, and never indifferent of good or falling from it, because they are all essential goodnesse.

Where afterward he adds something concerning the vis also, that though these were a rank of lower beings, and not autopoiesis, nor essentially goodnesse, but only by participation; yet, being by their own nature also immovable, they can never degenerate, nor fall from that participation of good. Notwithstanding which, we must confess, that some of these Platonists seem to take the word Henades sometimes in another sense, and to understand nothing else thereby but the intelligible idea before mentioned; though the ancient Platonists and Pythagoreans were not wont to call these unities, but numbers.

And now we have discovered more of the Pagans inferior gods, supermundane and eternal, viz. besides those морαί Θεοί, those intelligible gods; troops of Henades and Autoagathotetes, unities and goodnesse; and also of Νοεσ, immovable minds or intellects; or, as they frequently call them, Θεοί έναιδίοι, and Θεοί νεόρα, benadical (or monadical) gods, and intellectual gods.

But since these Noes, or νεόρα Θεοί, are said to be all of them in their own nature a rank of beings above souls, and therefore superiour to that first soul, which is the third hypostasis of this trinity; as all those Henades or Θεοί παράλειοι, those simple monadical gods, are likewise yet a higher rank of beings above the Noes, and therefore superiour to the second hypostasis also, the first mind; and yet all these Henades and Νοεσ, however supposed by these philosophers to be eternal, forasmuch as they are particular beings only, and not univerfal, cannot be placed higher than in the rank of creatures; it follows from hence unavoidably, that both the second and third hypostasis of this trinity, as well the first mind as the first soul, must be accounted creatures also; because no created being can be superiour to any thing uncreated. Wherefore Proclus, and some others of those Platonists, plainly understood this trinity no otherwise, than as a certain scale or ladder of beings in the universe; or a gradual descent of things from the first or highest, by steps downward, lower and lower, so far as to the souls of all animal.
animals. For which cause, Proclus to make up this scale complete, adds to these three ranks and degrees, below that third of souls, a fourth of natures also; under which there lies nothing but the passive part of the universe, body and matter. So that, their whole scale of all that is above body was indeed not a trinity, but a quaternity, or four ranks and degrees of beings, one below another; the first of Henades or Unities, the second of Noes, Minds or Intellecits, the third of Souls, and the last of Natures; these being, as it were, so many orbs and spheres, one within and below another. In all which several ranks of being, they suppos'd one first universal, and unparticipated, as the head of each respective rank, and many particular, or participat'd ones: as one first universal Henade, and many secondary particular Henades; one first universal Nous, Mind or Intellecit, and many secondary and particular Noes or Minds; one first universal Soul, and many particular souls; and lastly, one universal Nature, and many particular natures. In which scale of beings, they deified, beside the first Τὸν and Τὸγινόν, one, and good, not only the first mind, and the first soul, but also those other particular Henades, and Noes universally; and all particular souls above human: leaving out, besides them and inferior souls, that fourth rank of natures, because they conceived, that nothing was to be accounted a God, but what was intellectual and superior to men. Wherein, though they made several degrees of gods, one below another, and called some δίδεις and some ρωμοί, some eternal, and some generated, or made in time; yet did they no where clearly distinguish betwixt the Deity properly so called, and the creature, nor shew how far in this scale the true Deity went, and where the creature began. But as it were melting the Deity by degrees, and bringing it down lower and lower, they made the juncture and commixture betwixt God and the creature so smooth and close, that where they indeed parted was altogether indiscernible; they rather implying them to differ only in degrees, or that they were not absolute but comparative terms, and confituted but in more and less. All which was doubtless a gross mistake of the ancient Cabala of the Trinity.

This is therefore that Platonic Trinity, which we oppose to the Christian, not as if Plato's own trinity, in the very essential constitution thereof, were quite a different thing from the Christian; it fell in all probability having been at first derived from a Divine or Mosaic Cabala; but because this Cabala, (as might well come to pass in a thing so myterious and difficult to be conceived) hath been by divers of these Platonists and Pythagorean's misunderstood, depraved, and adulterated, into such a trinity, as confounds the differences between God and the creature, and removes all the bounds and land-marks betwixt them; sinks the Deity lower and lower by degrees, (still multiplying of it, as it goes,) till it have at length brought it down to the whole corporeal world; and when it hath done this, is not able to stop there neither, but extends it further still to the animated parts thereof, stars and daemons; the design or direct tendency thereof being nothing else, but to lay a foundation for infinite polytheism, cosmolatry,
(or world-idolatry) and creature-worship. Where it is by the way observable, that these Platonick Pagans were the only publick and proffessed champions against Christianitie; for though Celsus were suspected by Origen to have been indeed an Epicurean, yet did he at least perforate a Platonick too. The reason whereof might be; not only because the Platonick and Pythagoric fect was the divinest of all the Pagans, and that which approached nearest to Christianitie and the truth, (however it might by accident therefore prove the worst, as the corruption of the best thing,) and by that means could with greatest confidence hold up the bucklers against Christianitie and encounter it; but also because the Platonick principles, as they might be understood, would, of all other, serve most plausibibly to defend the Pagan polytheism and idolatry.

Concerning the Christian Trinity, we shall here observe only three things; first, that it is not a Trinity of meer names or words, nor a Trinity of partial notions and inadequate conceptions of one and the fame thing. For such a kind of Trinity as this might be conceived in that first Platonick hypothesis it felf, called τὸ τὸ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, the one and the good, and perhaps also in that first perfon of the Christian Trinity; namely of goodnecs, and understanding or wisdom. and will or active power, three inadequate conceptions thereof. 'Tis true, that Plotinus was fo high flown, as to maintain, that the first and highest principle of all, by reafon of its perfect unity and fimplicity, is above the multiplicity of knowledge and understanding, and therefore does not fo much as υπὸ ἑαυτοῦ, in a proper fense, understand it felf: notwithstanding which, this philofopher himfelf adds, that it cannot therefore be faid to be ignorant nor unwise neither; these expressions belonging only to fuch a being, as was by nature intellectual, ἔστι μόνος μόι ἐστι, Intellifus, nisi intelligat, demens merito judicatur. And he feme to grant, that it hath a certain fimple clarity and brightnefs in it, fuperior to that of knowledge; as the body of the fun has a certain brightness fuperior to that secondary light, which streameth from it; and that it may be faid to be νους αὐτῆς, knowledge it felf, that does not understand, as motion it felf does not move. But this can hardly be conceived by ordinary mortals, that the highest and moft perfect of all beings should not fully comprehend it felf, the extent of its own fecundity and power, and be conscious of all that proceedeth from it, though after the moft fimple manner. And therefore this high-flown conceit of Plotinus (and perhaps of Plato himfelf too) has been rejected by latter Platonifts, as phantafical, and unsafe: for thus Simplicius, ἄλλα ὑπὸ γνώσεως ἐναίγει αὐτῆς τῷ ἀγαθῶτατῳ, αὐτὴ δὲ τῷ τῷ ὑπό τῷ παραγόμενον ἀγαθῶτατῳ. But it must needs have alfo the moft perfect knowledge, since it cannot be ignorant of any thing, that is produced from it felf. And St. Augustin, as in like manner, confutes that afertion of fome Christians, that the τὸ θεός, or eternal Word, was that very wisdom and understanding, by which the father himfelf was wife; as making it nothing but an inadequate conception of God. But this opinion, that the Christian Trinity is but a Trinity of words, or meer logical notions, and inadequate conceptions of God, hath been plainly condemned by the Christian Church.
The second thing, that we observe concerning the Christian Trinity, is this, that though the second hypostasis, or person thereof, were begotten from the first, and the third proceedeth both from the first and second; yet are neither this second, nor third, creatures; and that for these following reasons. First, because they were not made εὐ καὶ ἑντρον, as Arius maintained, that is, from an antecedent non-existence brought forth into being, nor can it be said of either of them, Erat quando non erant, that once they were not, but their going forth was from eternity, and they were both coëve and coëternal with the father. Secondly, because they were not only eternal emanations (if we may so call them) but also necessary, and therefore are they both also absolutely undestroyable and unannihilable. Now, according to true philosophy and theology, no creature could have existed from eternity, nor be absolutely undestroyable; and therefore that, which is both eternal and undestroyable, is ἰδίῳ οὖν uncreated. Nevertheless, because some philosophers have asserted (though erroneously) both the whole world's eternity, and its being a necessary emanation also from the Deity, and consequently, that it is undestroyable; we shall therefore further add, that these second and third hypostases or persons of the Holy Trinity are not only therefore uncreated, because they were both eternal and necessary emanations, and likewise are unannihilable; but also because they are universal, each of them comprehending the whole world, and all created things under it: which universality of theirs is the same thing with infinity; whereas all other beings, besides this Holy Trinity, are particular and finite. Now we say, that no intellectual being, which is not only eternal, and necessarily existent, or undestroyable, but also universal, or infinite, can be a creature.

Again, in the last place, we add, that these three hypostases, or persons, are truly and really one God. Not only because they have all essentially one and the same will, according to that of Origen, Ἡ συνενωμένη εἰς τὸν πατέρα τῆς ἁληθείας, καὶ τὸν γὰρ τὴν ἁληθείαν, δίδαξα, δότην ἑκάστη πράγματον, ἐν δὲ τῷ ομοιωτίκῳ τῇ συμφωνίᾳ καὶ τῇ τευτόντωι τῆς βαλάντεως. We worship the father of truth, and the son the truth itself, being two things as to hypostasis; but one in agreement, consent, and sameness of will: but also because they are physically (if we may so speak) one alló; and have a mutual περιχώρισις, and ἀναπαραβία, existence and permutation of one another, according to that of our Saviour Christ, I am in the Father, and the Father in me; and the Father that dwelleth in me, he doth the works. We grant indeed, that there can be no instance of the like unity or oneness found in any created beings; nevertheless, we certainly know from our very selves, that it is not impossible for two distinct substances, that are of a very different kind from one another, the one incorporeal, the other corporeal, to be so closely united together, as to become one animal and person; much less therefore should it be thought impossible for these three divine hypostases to be one God.
This Platonick Trinity, not

Book I.

We shall conclude here with confidence, that the Christian Trinity, though there be very much of mystery in it, yet is there nothing at all of plain contradiction to the undoubted principles of human reason, that is, of impossibility to be found therein, as the Atheists would pretend, who cry down all for nonsence and absolute impossibility, which their dull stupidity cannot reach to, or their infatuated minds easily comprehend, and therefore even the Deity itself. And it were to be wished, that some Religionists and Trinitarians did not here symbolize too much with them, in affecting to rep- resent the mystery of the Christian Trinity as a thing directly contradist- tious to all human reason and understanding; and that perhaps out of de- sign to make men surrender up themselves and confidences, in a blind and implicit faith, wholly to their guidance; as also to debauch their understandings by this means, to the swallowing down of other opinions of theirs, plainly repugnant to human faculties. As who should say, he that believes the Trinity, (as we all must do, if we will be Christians) should boggle at nothing in religion never after, nor scrupulously chew or examine any thing; as if there could be nothing more contradictory, or impossible to human understanding propounded, than this article of the Christian faith.

But, for the present, we shall endeavour only to shew, that the Christian Trinity (though a mystery, yet) is much more agreeable to reason, than that Platonick, or Pseudo-Platonick Trinity before described; and that in those three particulars then mentioned. For first, when those Platonists and Pythagoreans interpret their third God, or last hypostasis of their trinity, to be either the world, or else a Ψυχή τοσώμος, such an immediate soul thereof, as, together with the world its body, make up one animal god; as there is plainly too great a leap here betwixt their second and third hypostasis, so do they debase the Deity therein too much, confound God and the creature together, laying a foundation, not only for cosmo-latry, or world-idolatry in general, but also for the grofsft and most foolish of all idolatries, the wor- shiping of the inanimate parts of the world themselves, in pretence as parts and members of this great mundane animal, and sensible god.

It is true indeed, that Origen and some others of the ancient Christian Writers have supposèd, that God may be said, in some sense, to be the soul of the world. Thus in that book Peri Archon, Sicut corpus nostrum unum ex multis membris aptatur, et ab una anima consistet, ita et universum mundum. veluti animal quoddam immane, opinandum puto; quod quies ab una ani- mä, virtute Dei accipiente tenetur. Quod etiam à sanctâ Scripturâ indicari ar- bitror per illud, quod diuini es perd prophetam; Namque calum et terram ego replico, dicit Dominus? et calum mihi sedes, terra autem scabellum pedum meorum; et quod Salvator, cum ait, Non es jurandum neque per calum, quia sedes Dei est, neque per terram, quia scabellum pedum ejus. Sed et illud quod ait Paulus, Quoniam in ipsa vivimus & movemur & sumus. Quamdeo enim in Deo vivimus, & movemur, & sumus, nisi quod in virtute sed universum confiningit & continet mundum? As our own body is made up
up of many members, and contained by one soul, so do I conceive, that the whole world is to be look’d upon as one huge, great animal, which is contained, as it were, by one soul, the virtue and reason of God. And so much seems to be intimated by the Scripture in sundry places; as in that of the Prophet, Do not I fill heaven and earth? And again, heaven is my throne and the earth my footstool. And in that of our Saviour, Swear not at all, neither by heaven, because it is the throne of God, nor by the earth, because it is his footstool. And lastly, in that of Paul to the Athenians, For in him we live, and move, and have our being. For how can we be said to live and move, and have our being in God, unless because he, by his virtue and power, does confine and contain the whole world? And how can heaven be the throne of God, and the earth his footstool, unless his virtue and power fill all things both in heaven and earth? Nevertheless, God is here said by Origen to be but quasi anima, as it were, the soul of the world: as if he should have said, that all the perfection of a soul is to be attributed to God, in respect of the world; he quickening and enlivening all things, as much as if he were the very soul of it, and all the parts thereof were his living members. And perhaps the whole Deity ought not to be look’d upon, according to Aristotle’s notion thereof, merely as ἡ κυριοτέρος κύριος, an immovable essence; for then it is not conceiveable, how it could either act upon the world, or be sensible of any thing therein; or to what purpose any devotional addresses should be made by us to such an unaffable, inflexible, rocky and adamantine Being. Wherefore all the perfection of a mundane soul may perhaps be attributed to God, in some sense, and he called, quasi anima mundi, as it were the soul thereof: though St. Cyprian would have this properly to belong to the third hypostasis, or person of the Christian Trinity, viz. the Holy Ghost. But there is something of imperfection also plainly cleaving and adhering to this notion of a mundane soul, besides something of Paganity likewise, necessarily consequent thereupon, which cannot be admitted by us. Wherefore God, or the third divine hypostasis, cannot be called the soul of the world in this sense, as if it were so immersed therein, and so passive from it, as our soul is immersed into, and passive from its body; nor as if the world, and this soul together, made up one entire animal, each part whereof were incompleat alone by itself. And that God, or the third hypostasis of the Christian Trinity, is not to be accounted, in this sense, properly the soul of the world, according to Origen himself, we may learn from these words of his; Solum Dei, id est, Patris, & Filii, & Spiritus Sancti, nature, id proprium est; ut sine materiali substantia, & absque ulla corporee ad- jectionis societate, intelligatur subsistere. It is proper to the nature of God alone, that is, of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, to subsist without any material substance, or body, vitally united to it. Where Origen affirming, that all created souls, and spirits whatsoever, have always some body or other vitally united to them; and that it is the property only of the three persons of the Holy Trinity, not to be vitally united to any body, as the soul thereof; whether this affection of his be true or no (which is a thing not here to be discussed) he does plainly hereby declare, that God, or the third hypostasis of the Trinity, is not to be accounted, in a true and proper sense, the soul of the world.
And it is certain, that the more refined Platonists were themselves also of this persuasion; and that their third God, or divine hypostasis, was neither the whole world (as supposed to be animated) nor yet ψυχὴ ιγκόμιν, the immediate soul of this mundane animal, but only ψυχὴ ὑπερκόμις, a supermundane soul; that is, such a thing as though it preside over the whole world, and take cognizance of all things in it, yet it is not properly an essential part of that mundane animal, but a being elevated above the same. For thus Proclus plainly affirmeth, not only of Amelius, but also of Porphyrius himself, who likewise pretended to follow Plotinus therein; μελλε δὲ τὸν Ἀμελίου Ὀ Πορφυρίου τιμὴν ἐκατές, γιὰ τὸν Πλοτίνον συνάδει, τὸν μὲν ψυχὴν τὶν υπερκόμιον ατομικές ημιμονίου, τὸν δὲ τὸν αὐτόν, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, τὸ αὐτὸς τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ υμιμερῆ καὶ τὸ τάσι. After Amelius, Porphyrius thinking to agree with Plotinus, calls the supermundane soul the immediate opificer or maker of the world, and that mind or intellect, to which it is converted, not the opificer himself, but the paradigm thereof. And though Proclus there makes a question, whether or no this was Plotinus his true meaning, yet Porphyrius is most to be credited herein, he having had such intimate acquaintance with him. Wherefore, according to these three Platonists, Plotinus, Amelius, and Porphyrius, the third hypostasis of the Platonick trinity is neither the world, nor the immediate soul of the mundane animal; but a certain supermundane soul, which also was οἰκονόμος, the opificer and creator of the world, and therefore no creature. Now the corporeal world being supposed, by these Platonists also, to be an animal, they must therefore needs acknowledge a double soul, one ψυχὴ ιγκόμιν, the immediate soul of this mundane animal, and another ψυχὴ ὑπερκόμις, a supermundane soul, which was the third in their trinity of gods, or divine hypostases, the proper and immediate opificer of the world. And the same, in all probability, was Plato's opinion also; and therefore that soul, which is the only Deity, that in his book of laws he undertakes to prove, was ψυχὴ ὑπερκόμις, a supermundane soul, and not the same with that ψυχὴ ιγκόμιν, that mundane soul, whose genesis, or generation, is described in his Timeus; the former of them being a principle and eternal; and the latter made in time, together with the world, though said to be older than it, because, in order of nature, before it. And thus we see plainly, that though some of these Platonists and Pythagoreans either misunderstood, or depraved the Cabala of the trinity, so as to make the third hypostasis thereof to be the animated world, which themselves acknowledged to be πολυμα and δημηρφύλωυ, a creature and thing made; yet others, of the refined of them, supposed this third hypostasis of their trinity to be not a mundane, but a supermundane soul, and δημηρφύλων, not a creature, but the creator or opificer of the whole world.

And as for the second particular proposed; it was a gross absurdity in those Platonists also, to make the second, in their trinity of gods, and hypostases, not to be one God, or hypostasis, but a multitude of gods and hypostases; as also was that a monstrous extravagancy of theirs, to suppose the ideas, all of them, to be so many distinct substances and
and animals. Which, besides others, Tertullian in his book de Anima thus imputes to Plato: *Vult Plato esse quasdam substantias invisibiles, incorporeales, supermundiales, divinas, & eternas, quas appellat ideas, id est, formas & exempla, & causas naturalium siiborum manifestorum, & subjacentium corporalium; & illas quidem esse veritates, hae autem imaginis eariun. Plato conceiveth, that there are certain substances, invisible, incorporeal, supermundial, divine and eternal; which he calls Ideas, that is, forms, exemplars and causes of all these natural and sensible things; they being the truths, but the other the images. Neither can it be denied, but that there are some odd expressions in Plato, founding that way, who therefore may not be justified in this, nor I think in some other conceits of his, concerning these ideas; as when he contends, that they are not only the objects of science, but also the proper and physical caues of all things here below; as for example, that the ideas of similitude and dissimilitude are the caues of the likeness and unlikeness of all things to one another by their participation of them. Nevertheless, it cannot be at all doubted, but that Plato himself, and most of his followers very well understood, that these ideas were, all of them, really nothing else but the noëmata, or conceptions, of that one perfect intellect, which was their second hypothesis; and therefore they could not look upon them in good earnest, as so many distinct substances existing severally and apart by themselves out of any mind, however they were guilty of some extravagant expressions concerning them. Wherefore, when they called them ὑοῖα, essences or substances, (as they are called in Philo ὠναϊϊϊται ὑοῖα, the most necessary essences,) their true meaning herein was only this, to signify, that they were not such accidental and evanish things, as our conceptions are; they being the standing objects of all science, at least, if not the causes also of existent things. Again, when they were by them sometimes called animals also, they intended only to signify thereby, that they were not mere dead forms, like pictures drawn upon paper, or carved images and statues. And thus Amelius the So Clem. Al. philosopher, plainly understood that passage of St. John the Evangelist, concerning the eternal λόγος, he pointing the words otherwisethan our copies now do, ἐγώ εἰμι ἐσώτερος ὑμῶν, ὡς ὁ παῖς τὸν ἡττον ζῷον, καὶ ζωήν, καὶ ὁ παῖς τῆς ζωῆς, in whom whatsoever was made, was living, and life, and true being. Lastly, no wonder, if from animals these ideas forthwith became gods too, to such men as took all occasions possible to multiply gods; in which there was also something of that scholastick notion, Quicquid est in Deo, est Deus; Whatsoever is in God, is God. But the main thing therein was a piece of Paganick poetry; these Pagan theologers being generally poffesed with that poetick humour of perfonating things and deiifying them. Wherefore, though the ideas were so many titular gods to many of the Platonick Pagans, yet did Julian himself, for example, who made the most of them, suppose them all ενεργοῦς καὶ οὐνεργοῦς, to co-exist with God and in-exist in him, that is, in the first mind, or second hypothesis of their trinity.

Lastly,

Lastly, whereas Proclus, and others of the Platonists, intermingle many particular gods with those three universal principles or hypostases, of their Trinity, as Noes, Minds, or Intellects superior to the first soul; and Henades and Agathotetes, Unities and Goodnesses superior to the first intellect too; thereby making those particular beings, which must needs be creatures, superior to those hypostases, that are universal and infinite, and by consequence creating of them: this hypothesis of theirs, I say, is altogether absurd and irrational also; there being no created beings essentially good and wise, but all by participation, nor any immoveable, natures amongst them, whose σος is their ἐνηγνου, their essence, their operation; but all mutable and changeable, and probably, as Origen and others of the fathers add, lapifiable and peccable. *Nulla natura est, quae non recipiat bonum & malum, excepta Dei natura, que bonorum omnium fons est; & Christi sapientia, sapientiae enim fons est, & sapientia utique fultitiam recipere non potest; & justitia est, que unquam profepto injuftitiam captat; & verbum est vel ratio, que utique irrationalis effici non potest; sed & lux est, & lucem certum est, quod tendere non comprehendet. Similiter & natura Spiritus Sancti, qua sanéta est, non recipit pollutionem; naturaliter enim vel substantialiter sanéta est. Siqua autem alia natura sanéta est, ex assumptione hoc vel inspiratione Spiritus Sancti babet, ut sanéficeatur, non ex sua natura hoc possidet, sed ut accidet, propter quod & decidere potest, quod accidit. There is no nature, which is not capable both of good and evil, excepting only the nature of God, who is the fountain of all good; and the wisdom of Christ, for he is the fountain of wisdom, and wisdom itself never can receive folly; he is also justice itself, which can never admit of injustice; and the reason and word it itself, which can never become irrational; he is also the light it itself, and it is certain, that darkness cannot comprehend this light, nor infinuate it itself with it. In like manner the nature of the Holy Ghost is such, as can never receive pollution, it being substantially and essentially holy. But whatsoever other nature is holy, it is only such in way of participation and by the inspiration of this Holy Spirit; so that holiness is not its very nature and essence, but only an accident to it; and whatsoever is but accidental, may fail. All created beings therefore having but accidental goodness and wisdom, may degenerate and fall into evil and folly. Which of Origen's is all one, as if he should have said, there is no such rank of beings as Autoagathotetes, essential goodneces, there being only one Being essentially good, or goodness itself. Nor no such particular created beings existing in nature, as the Platonists call Noes neither, that is, minds or intellects immoveable, perfectly and essentially wise, or wisdom itself, whose σος is their ἐνηγνου, whose essence is their operation, and who consequently have no flux at all in them, nor successive action; (only the eternal Word and Wisdom of God being such) who also are absolutely ununitable to any bodies. It is true, that Origen did sometimes make mention of Noes, minds or intellects, but it was in another sense, he calling all souls, as first created by God, and before their lapse, by that name; which was as much as if he should have said, though
though some of the Platonists talk much of their Noes, yet is there nothing answerable to that name, according to their notion of them; but the only Noes really existing in nature, are unfallen, but peccable souls; he often concluding, that the highest rank of created beings are indeed no better than those, which the Platonists commonly call *psyche*, or souls. By which souls he understood first of all, beings in their own nature self-moveable and active; whereas the Noes of the Platonists are altogether immovable and above action. And then again, such beings or spirits incorporeal, as exist not abstractly and separately from all matter, as the Noes of the Platonists were supposed to do, but are vitally unitable to bodies, so as, together with those bodies, to compound and make up one animal. Thus, I say, Origen conceived even of the highest angelical, and arch-angelical orders, that they were all of them *psyche*, souls, united to bodies, but such as were pure, subtile and ethereal: however, he supposed it not impossible for them to sink down into bodies, more gross and feculent. And it is certain, that many of the ancient Christian writers concurred with Origen herein, that the highest created spirits were no naked and abstract minds, but souls clothed with some corporeal indument. Lastly, Origen's souls were also supposed to be, all of them, endowed with *liberum arbitrium*, or free-will, and consequently to be self-improvable and self-impairable, and no particular created spirits to be absolutely in their own nature impeccable, but liable into vicious habits: whereas the Platonick Noes are supposed to be such beings, as could never fall nor degenerate. And the generality of the Christian writers seem'd to have consented, or conspired with Origen in this also, they supposing him, who is now the prince of devils, to have been once an angel of the highest order. Thus does St. Jerome determine: *Sols Deus est, in quem peccatum non cadit; cetera, cum sunt liberi arbitrii, possum in utramque partem suam sibi volantatem.* God is the only Being, that is absolutely incapable of sin; but all other beings, having free-will in them, may possibly turn their will to either way; that is, to evil as well as to good. It is certain, that God, in a sense of perfection, is the most free agent of all, neither is contingent liberty universally denied to him; but here it is made the only privilege of God, that is, of the Holy Trinity, to be devoid of *liberum arbitrium*, namely as it implieth imperfection, that is, peccability and laptibility in it.

It is true, that some of the Platonick philosophers suppose, that even in that rank of beings called by them *Souls*, though they be not essentially immutable, but all self-moveable and active, yet there are some of them of so high a pitch and elevation, as, that they can never degenerate, nor sink down into vicious habits. Thus *Simplicius* for one; *alla τα* μην πρῶτα τοι*ν Ερίτ. ει παρηχθάται, καν οὐκ ου λαγόσ εκείνω θυμομενον, ελάττωσιν αυτούς, συμφόρους τα αυτα ανακατάρτωσιν οὔτε οὐκομόντωσιν, καν τινι ειναι μουσιάδοις προχ οικηον τιμαλλον έκείνω, ἀνθρωπολογικα προς το εν ζειντι επερ άποκτησεις αντι αλλα τινωσ ἀν ανίσις τάχα ην αν ει τραχειος εκείνος;* thus may be answered, as it is good, and so forth.
Different Degrees of Souls.

But the first and highest of souls, which were immediately produced from what are essentially good, although they have some abatement in them, they being not goodness essentially, but deiform of good, nevertheless are they so near a-kin to that highest good of all, as that they do naturally and indiscernibly cleave to the same, and have their volitions always uniformly directed towards it, they never declining to the woefier. Inasmuch that if Proeareph is be taken for the chusing of one thing before another, perhaps there is no such thing as Proeraphis to be imparted to them, unless one should call the chusing of the first goods Proearephis. By these higher souls Simplicius must needs understand, either the souls of the sun, moon and stars, or else those of the superior orders of demoniack or angelick beings. Where though he make a question, whether Proeareph or Deliberation belong to them, yet does he plainly imply, that they have none at all of that lucrative liberum arbitrium or free-will belonging to them, which would make them capable of vice and immorality as well as virtue.

But whatever is to be said of this, there seems to be no necessity at all for admitting that affirmation of Origen's, that all rational souls whatsoever, even those of men and those of the highest angelical orders, are universally one and the same nature, and have no fundamental or essentical difference in their constitution; and consequently that all the difference, that is now betwixt them, did arise only from the difference of their demeanour, or use of that power and liberty, which they all alike once had. So that thrones, and dominions, and principalities, and powers, were all made such by their merits; and human souls, though now sunk so low, yet are not absolutely incapable of commencing angels, or ascending to those highest altitudes: as it is not impossible, according to him, neither, but that the highest angels also, the Seraphim and Cherubim might, in length of time, not only degenerate into devils, but also sink down into human bodies; his reason for which monstrous paradoxe is only this, that the divine justice cannot otherwise well be salved, but God must needs be a πρωτοκολλητής, an accepter of persons, should he have arbitrarily made such vast differences amongst intellectual beings. Which ground he also extendeth so far, as to the human soul of our Saviour Christ himself, as being not partially appointed to that transcendent dignity of its hypostatick union, but by reason of its most faithful adherence to the divine word and wisdom, in a pre-existentstate, beyond all others souls; which he endeavours thus to prove from the Scripture, Quod dilectiois perfectione, & affectus sinceritas, ei inseparabilem cum Deo fecerit unitatem, ita ut non fortuita ficerit, ant cum persone acceptione, animae ejus afferuntio, sed virtutem fuerunt sibi merito delata; audis ad cum propositum diciem, Dilectiis juvetiam & adjici iniquitatem; propter ea unxit te Deus, Deus tuus, oleo loetitiae prae participibus tuis: dilectiois ergo merito angitut oleo loetitiae anima Christi, id eft, cum verbo Dei unum effectur. Unghi namque oleo loetitiae, non aliud intelligitur quam Spiritus Sancti replei. Præ participibus autem dixit; quia non gratia Spiritus sancti propositis ei data eft, sed iphus verbi Dei in ea substantialis inerat plenitudo. That the perfection of love, and sincerity of divine affition,
CHAP. IV. Against Origen's Endless Circuits.

affection, procured to this soul its inseparable union with the God-head, so that
the assumption of it was neither fortuitous nor partial, or with profopolepsy (the
acception of persons) but bestowed upon it jutly for the merit of its virtues;
here (faith he) the prophet thus declaring to him, Thou hast loved righteousness
and hated iniquity; therefore hast God, even thy God, anointed thee with the
oil of gladness above thy fellows. The soul of Christ therefore was anointed
with the oil of gladness, or made one with the Word of God, for the merits of
love and faithful adherence to God, and no otherwise. For to be anointed with
the oil of gladness here properly signifies nothing else, but to be replenished with
the Holy Ghost. But when it is said, that he was thus anointed above his fel-
lois, this intimateth, that he had not the Holy-Ghost bestowed upon him, only
as the prophets and other holy men had, but that the substantial fulness of the
Word of God dwell in him. But this reason of Origen's seems to be very weak;
because if there be a rank of souls below human, specifically differing from
the fame, as Origen himself mult needs confess, (he not allowing the souls of
brutes to have been human souls lapsed, as some Pythagoreans and Platonists
conceived, but renouncing and disclaiming that opinion, as monstrously ab-
\surd and irrational) there can be no reason given, why there might not be
as well other ranks and orders of souls superior to those of men, without the
injustice of profopolepsy; as besides Simplicius, Plotinus and the generality of
other Platonists conceived.

But least of all can we assent to Origen, when from this principle, that
souls, as such, are essentially endowed with liberum arbitrium, or free will,
and therefore never in their own nature impeccable, he infers those endless
circuits of souls upwards and downwards, and so makes them to be never at
reft, denying them any fixed state of holiness and happiness by divine grace;
such as wherein they might be free from the fear and danger of ever losing the
fame. Of whom St. Austin* therefore thus; Illum & propter alia nonnulla,
& maxime propter alternantes sine cessatione beatitudines & miseries, & statutis
secularum interiortis ab his ad ilias, atque ab illis ad illas itus ac reditus inter-
minabiles, non immerito reprehensus ecclesia; quia & hoc quod misericors videbatur,
amitit, faciendo sanatiseras miseras, quibus pasas laerent, & falsas beatitu-
dines, in quibus verum ac securnum, hoc est, sine timore certum sempiterni
boni gaudium non haberent. The church hath deservedly rejected Origen, both
for certain other opinions of his, and especially for those his alternate beatitudes
and miseries, without end, and for his infinite circuits, ascents and descents of
souls from one to the other, in restless vicissitudes and after periods of time.
For as much as thereby he hath quite lost that very title of pitiful, or merciful, which
otherwise he seems to have deserved, by making so many true miseries for the
best of saints, in which they should successively undergo punishment and smart;
and none but false happiness for them, such as wherein they could never have
any true or secure joy, free from the fear of losing that good, which they possess.
For this Origenical hypothesis seems directly contrary to the whole tenour
of the Gospel, promising eternal and everlasting life to those who believe in

* De Civitate Dei, Lib. XXI. cap. XVII. p. 481. Tom VIII. Oper.
The Henades and Noes, Book I.

Christ, and perveringly obey him; 1 John ii. This is the promise, that he bath promised us, even eternal life: and Tit. i. 12. In hope of eternal life, which God, that cannot lie, hath promised. And, God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life: and left all this should be taken for a periodical eternity only, John iii. 26. He, that believeth in me, shall never die. And possibly this might be the meaning of St. Paul, 2 Tim. i. 10. when he affirmeth of our Saviour Christ, That he bath abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light, through the Gospel; not because he was the first; who had discovered, and published to the world, the soul's immortality, which was believed before, not only by all the Pharisaick Jews, but also by the generality of Pagans too; but because these, for the most part, held their endless circuits and transmigrations of souls: therefore was he the first, who brought everlasting life to light, and gave the world assurance, in the faith of the Gospel, of a fixed and permanent state of happiness, and a never-fading crown of glory to be obtained; Him that overcometh will I make a pillar in the temple of my God, and he shall go no more out. Apoc. iii. 12.

Now the reason, why we mentioned Origen here, was because he was a person, not only thoroughly skilled in all the Platonick learning, but also one, who was sufficiently addicted to those dogmata, he being commonly conceived to have had too great a kindness for them; and therefore, had there been any solidity of reason for either those particular Henades or Noes of theirs, created beings above the rank of souls, and consequently, according to the Platonick hypothesis, superiour to the universal Psyche also, (which was the third hypothesis in their trinity, and seems to answear to the Holy Ghost in the Christian;) Origen was as likely to have been favourable thereunto as any other. But it is indeed manifestly repugnant to reason, that there should be any such particular, that is, created Henades, and autoxyadornis essentia, superiour to the Platonick first Mind; or any such Noes, and autostasis, essentia, wisdoms, superiour to their universal Psyche; it being all one, as if, in the Christian Trinity, besides the first person, or the Father, one should suppose a multitude of particular paternities superiour to the second; and also, besides the second person, the Son, or Word, a multitude of particular sons, or words, all superiour to the third person, the Holy Ghost. For this is plainly to make a breach upon the Deity, to confound the creator and creature, together; and to suppose a company of such creaturely gods, as imply a manifest contradiction in the very notion of them.

Wherefore, we shall here observe, that this was not the catholick doctrine of the Platonick school, that there were such Henades and Noes, but only a private opinion of some doctors amongst them, and that of the latter sort too. For first, as for those Henades, as there are not the least footsteps of them to be found any where in Plato's writings, so may it be plainly gathered from them, that he suppos'd no such thing. Forasmuch as, in his second
the first Henad of Henades, and the first Monad of Monades; that is, the first idea of good, and cause of all the ideas. And as for the particular Noes, Minds or Intelleccts, these indeed seem to have crept up somewhat before Plotinus his time; he, besides the passage before cited, elsewhere giving some intimations of them, as Emn. 6. l. 4. e. 4. 'Αλλά πᾶς ψυχαί πολλαί, ηδ' ηνοί πολλοί; p. 847, 848. But how can there be many souls, and many minds, and not only one, but many entia? From which, and other places of his, Ficinus concluded Plotinus himself really to have afferted, above the rank of souls, a multitude of other substantial beings, called ως or νοί, Minds or Intelleccts. Nevertheless, Plotinus saying of them so uncertainly, and making such an union betwixt all these Noes and their particular respective souls, it may well be questioned, whether he really took them for any thing else but the heads and summities of those souls; he supposing, that all souls have a mind in them, the participation of the first Mind; as also unity too, the participation of the first Unity; whereby they are capable of being conjoined with both: δει νοὶ νων in Emn. l. 5. e. 12. ήμίν εἰκος, εὗ νοὶ αρχαί, εὗ αἰτία, εὗ θεὶν οὕτος ηνού ὡσπερ το πάντων, έγ' ενατό ετιν ήμίν δι [Lib. l. p. 492.] τιτο το γαι τοιοῦ τών τίνος ημίν ημείς έπαπλομένα, εὗ συνεργεί, εὗ ανερτήματα ημαρμώμενα εὐπρί- μον δε, ηδ' εἵλανται εἰκόν. There must needs be mind in us, as also the principle and cause of mind, God. Not as if he were divided, but because, though remaining in himself, yet he is also considered in many, as capable to receive him. As the centre, though it remain in itself, yet is it also in every line drawn from the circumference, each of them, by a certain point of its own, touching it. And

1 P. 107. Oper.
by some such thing in us it is, that we are capable of touching God, and of being united to him, when we direct our intention towards him. And in the next chapter he adds, ἐξοιτες τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν ἀνθρωπίνω φασιν, ἀλλ' ἄριστος τῶν τοιαύτων ἐπηρεασθε τὰ πᾶλλα' οὗ τὸ δὲ ἀλος ἐπηρεασθ' ἐκεῖα μὲν ἐτ' ἐν τοῖς ἐπηρεασθ' ἐπη- ρεασθ' αὐτ', ὅπερ ἐς ἄγο τρό τι ἐν ἔννοιᾳ, κ.κ. That though we have these things in us, yet do we not perceive them, being for the most part idle and asleep, as to these higher energies; as some never at all exercise them. However, those do always act; Mind, and that which is before Mind, Unity; but every thing, which is in our souls, is not perceived by us, unless come to the whole, when we dispose our selves towards it, &c. Where Plotinus seems to make the Noes, or Minds, to be nothing else but something in souls, whereby they partake of the first Mind. And it is said of Porphyrius, who was well acquainted with Plotinus his philosophy, that he quite discarded and rejected these Noes or Intelligences, as substances really distinct from the first Mind, and separate from souls. And it is certain, that such minds as these are nowhere plainly mentioned by Plato, he speaking only of minds in souls, but not of any abstract and separate minds, save only one. And though some might think him to have given an intimation of them in his δύναμις ὑποτασσεῖται, (before mentioned) his second about the second things, or second things about the second; yet by these may very well be understood the ideas; as by the third things about the third, all created beings. Wherefore we may conclude, that this Platonick, or rather Pseudo-Platonick trinity, which confounds the differences betwixt God and the creature, and that probably in favour of the Pagan polytheism and idolatry, is nothing so agreeable to reason it self, as that Christian Trinity before described, which distinctly declares, how far the Deity goes, and where the creature begins; namely, that the Deity extends so far as to this whole Trinity of hypostases; and that all other things whatsoever, this Trinity of persons only excepted, are truly and properly their creatures, produced by the joint concurrence and influence of them all, they being really but one God.

But it is already manifest, that all the forementioned deprivations and adulterations of that divine Cabala of the trinity, and that spurious trinity, described, (which, because asserted by some Platonists, was called Platonical; in way of distinction from the Christian) cannot be justly charged, neither upon Plato himself, nor yet upon all his followers univerally. But on the contrary, we shall now make it appear, that Plato and some of the Platonists retained much of the ancient genuine Cabala, and made a very near approach to the true Christian Trinity; forasmuch as their three hypostases, distinguished from all their other gods, seem to have been none of them accounted creatures, but all other things whatsoever the creatures of them.

First therefore we affirm, that Plato himself does, in the beginning of his Timæus, very carefully distinguish betwixt God and the creature, he determining the bounds between them, after this manner: Ἐγὼ δὲ τοιαῦτ' ἐμοὶ δὲ ταὐτ' ἐπαινέω, διαφέρει τις τὸ ἐν μιᾷ ἀκίνητος, γὰρ οὔτως ἐν ἐμι ἐκεῖν' οὔ τί τὸ τυγχάνομεν μὲν δὲν ἐμεντεύομαι.

The Neque but the well judge for theopher, they afterwards, which that former Plato, Deum have ast Ploclus proprium effe. The reason, why Plato, being to treat of the univerfe, begins here with this distinction, was, as Placius well observes, because, in tais kouais ημών .dupoixias αέρικης, to εύα τι ακό εν it is either one of our common notions, or a thing mathematically demonstrable, that there must be something eternal, or which was never made, but always was, and had no beginning. And it is evident by senfe and experience, that all things are not fuch, but that some things are made and perish again, or generated and corrupted. Now the latter Platonists, being strongly proffefled with a prejudice of the world’s eternity, or that it had no beginning, have offered strange violence to Plato’s text in this place, and wrought his words to quite a different f彭fe from what he intended; as if by his το γενο-νόμα, that which is made, he did not at all mean that, which had a beginning, but only that, whose duration is flowing and fuccedive, or temporary, which might notwithstanding be without beginning; and as if he supposed the whole corporeal world to be fuch, which though it hath a fuccedive and temporary duration, yet was without any beginning. And the current ran fo strongly this way, that even Boetius, that learned Christian philosopher, was himself also carried away with the force thereof, he taking it for granted likewise, that Plato held the eternity of the world in this f彭fe, Consf. Phil. that is, its being without beginning: Non reétè quidam (faih he) qui cum l. 5. Prov. 6. audium viijum Placti mundum banve nec behusfe initium temporis, nec habitu- rum effe defeñium, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum fieri coeterum putant. Allud est enim, per interminabilem duci vitam, quod mundo Plato tribuit; allud interminabilis æte totam pariter complexum effe præsentiam; quod divina ment- tis proprium effe manifestum est. Neque Deus conditis rebus antiquior veneri debet, temporis quantitate, sed simplicitis potius propriete nature. Sose, when they bear Plato to have held, that the world had no beginning, nor shall never have an end, do not rightly from thence infer, that Plato therefore made the world co-eternal with God, because it is one thing always to be, and another thing, to possess an endless life all at once, which is proper to the divine mind. Neither ought God to be thought older than the world, in respect of time, but only in respect of the simplicity of his nature. To which purpose he adds afterwards, quæque si digna rebus nomina velimns imponere, Platonem sequentes, Dean quidem æternum, mundum vero dicemus esse perpetuum. Therefore, if we would give proper names to things agreeable to their natures, following Plato, we should fay, that God was eternal; but the world only perpetual. But as this doctrine of the latter Platonists quite frustrates Plato’s design in this place,

3 Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. i. p. 10.
place, which was to prove or assert a God, because if the world had no beginning, though its duration be never so much successive, yet would it not follow from thence, that therefore it must needs have been made by some other cause; so is it directly contrary to that philosopher's own words, himself there declaring, that by his τὸ χρόνον, αἰών, or that which is made, he did not understand only that, whose duration is successive, but also τὸ γενέσθαι ἀρχήν ἡκοῖ, that which had a beginning of its generation, and τὸ ἀπὸ ἀρχῆς τὸν ἀκατάστατον, that which begun from a certain epocha of time; or that which once was not, and therefore must needs be brought into being by some other cause. So that Plato there plainly supposed all temporary beings once to have had a beginning of their duration, as he declareth in that very Timæus of his, that Time itself was not eternal, or without beginning, but made together with the heaven or world; and from thence does he infer, that there must be and must not of necessity be another eternal being, viz. such as hath both a permanent duration, and was without beginning, and was the cause both of time and the world: forasmuch as nothing can possibly be made without a cause; that is, nothing, which once was not, could of it self come into being, but must be produced by some other thing; and so at last we must needs come to something, which had no beginning. Wherefore Plato, thus taking it for granted, that whatsoever hath a temporary and flowing duration, was not without beginning; as also that whatsoever was without beginning, hath a permanent duration or standing eternity; does thus state the difference betwixt an uncreated and created beings, or betwixt God and creature; namely, that creature is that, whose duration being temporary or successive, once had a beginning; and this is his τὸ χρόνον, αἰών, ὡς ἢ ἀκατάστατος, that which is made, but never truly is, and that which ἦ ν αἰῶν τῆς ἀκατάστατος, must of necessity be produced by some cause; but that whatsoever is without beginning, and hath a permanent duration, is uncreated or divine; which is his τὸ ὅ μέν ἡ, ἀιώνιον ὡς ἢ ἀκατάστατος, that which always is, and hath no generation, nor was ever made. Accordingly as God is styled in the septuagint translation of the Mosaic writings, ὁ Θεός, he that truly is.

Now as for this ὁ Θεός ὁ θεός or Θεός, this eternal nature, which always is, and was never made, Plato speaks of it, not singularly only, as we Christians now do, but often in the paganick way plurally also; as when, in this very Timæus, he calls the world τῶν αἰώνων Σὺ τὸν γενέσθαι ἀκατάστατον, a made or created image of the eternal gods. By which eternal gods he there meant doubtless that τὸ πρῶτον, and τὸ δύοτετον, and τὸ τριτον, that first, and second, and third, which, in his second epistle to Dionysius, he makes to be the principles of all things; that is, his trinity of divine hypostases, by whose concurrent efficiency, and according to whose image and likenes, the whole was made; as Plotinus also plainly declareth in these words of his before cited, ὁτὲ μὲν ὁ κόσμος ὁ εἰκὼν ὁ κόσμου, ἢ τὸ πρῶτον ὡς τὸ δύοτετον, ὡς τὸ τριτεττόν. This world is an image always iconized, or perpetually renewed (as the image in a glass is) of that first, second, and third principle, which are always standing; that is, fixed in eternity, and were never made. For thus Eusebius records,
ch. iv. the platonick nous eternal.

... cords, that the ancient interpreters of Plato expounded this first, second and third of his in the forementioned epistle, of a trinity of Gods; τὰ ἀρχαὶ τοῦ παλαιοῦ κόσμου, ἢ τὰ τοῦ παλαιοῦ κόσμου, ἢ τὰ τοῦ παλαιοῦ κόσμου, c. [p.541] ἴτοι τὰ τὸ κόσμου. These things, do, the interpreters of Plato refer to the first God, and to the second cause; and to the third the soul of the world, they calling this also the third God. Wherefore we think there is good reason to conclude, that those eternal or uncreated gods of Plato in his Timæus, whose image or statue this whole generated or created world is said by him to be, were no other than his trinity of divine hypostases, the makers or creators thereof. And it was before (as we conceive) rightly guessed, that Cicero also was to be understood of the same eternal Gods, as Platonizing, when he affirmed; A diis omnia ad principium facta, That all things were at first made by the gods; and a providentia decorum, mundum & omnes mundi partes constitutæ esse; That the world and all its parts were constituted by the providence of the gods 4.

But that the second hypostasis in Plato’s trinity, viz. Mind or Intellect, though said to have been generated, or to have proceeded by way of emanation from the first called Tagethen, the Good, was notwithstanding unquestionably acknowledged to have been eternal, or without beginning, might be proved by many express testimonies of the most genuine Platonists: but we shall here content our selves only with two, one of Plotinus writing thus concerning it, Enn. 5. 1. e. 6. i. τὸ πρῶτον ἀπὸ ὑμῖν ἡ τοῦ κόσμου ἡ τοῦ χρόνου, τοῦ λόγου περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν πνεύματος, κ. c. Let all temporal generation here be quite banished from our thoughts, whilst we treat of things eternal, or such as always are, we attributing generation to them only in respect of causality and order, but not of time. And though Plotinus there speaks particularly of the second hypostasis or Nous, yet does he afterwards extend the same also to the third hypostasis of that trinity, called Psyche, or the mundane soul; which is there laid by him likewise to be the word of the second, as that second was the word of the first; Καὶ τὸ γενόμενον ἀπὸ χαζείσδος Νῦ, Νῦν εὐδοϊ, κ. χρείσθων ἀπὸ τῶν Νῦ, ἢ τὰ μεγάλα μετ’ αὐτῶν, αὐτῷ κ. ἡ ἐπικράτει λόγος ἐν, κ. ἠπεκτείνεται τὸ αὐτὸν ἑκατέρα. That which is generated from what is better than mind, can be no other than mind, because mind is the best of all things, and everything else is after it, and junior to it, as Psyche or Soul, which is in like manner the word of mind, and a certain energy thereof, as Mind is the word and energy of the first good. The other testimony is of Porphyrius, cited by St. Cyril out of the fourth book of his philosophic history, where he sets down the doctrine of Plato after this manner; εἰν' όποιος Πλάτωνος, ὑπερ το Λαγαδον υπερ το, ἢ πρως ὥς ὁ μαθήματος το τοῦ. Cyril. C. δὲ τὰ το πρῶτον τινα ἀληθον ἀνωπόπτων ὁμενόμενον το το πρῶτον τις καθ' εαυτόν πληρωθησαν. 

Nous or Logos called Autopater. Book I.

Plato thus declareth concerning the first good, that from it was generated a certain mind incomprehensible to mortals; in which subsisting by itself, are contained the things, that truly are, and the essences of all beings. This is the first fair, and pulchritude it self, which proceeded or sprung out of God from all eternity as its cause, but notwithstanding after a peculiar manner, as self-begotten, and as its own-parent. For it was not begotten from that, as any way moved towards its generation; but it proceeded from God as it were self-begotten. And that not from any temporal beginning, there being as yet no such thing as time; nor when time was afterwards made, did it any way affect him; for Mind is always timeless, and alone eternal. Here, besides the eternity of Mind or Intellect, the second divine hypostasis in the Platonick trinity, there are other strange and unusual expressions concerning it; for though it be acknowledged to have been generated from the first original Deity, yet is it called autopator and autogénos, its own-parent, and its own-offspring, and said to have sprung out autogénos, self-begotten.

Now because this is so great a riddle or mystery, it is worth the while to consider its true meaning and the ground thereof; which is thus declared by Porphyrius. Mind, though it sprung from the first good or supreme Deity from eternity, yet is it said to be self-begotten, because it did not spring from that, as any ways moved towards its generation, but as always standing still or quiescent. Which doctrine was before delivered by Plotinus after this manner; εὐχερές θεον γενεσίαν, εἰ γὰρ κυνηγεῖ άυτὸ τι γένεσιν, τρίτου αὐτό κάθετο τὸ γνώμενον μετὰ τῷ κάτω ἢ γένεσιν, καὶ αὐτόπτος ἢ ἀνέκουσα ὑφῆ, εἰτὶ αὐτής μετὰ αὐτῆς, εἰ προσωπικός, ὡς θάλατος, ὡς ὅλως κυνηγεῖτο, ὑπερ-κατα, αὐτή. That, which was immediately generated from the first, did not proceed from it as any ways moved towards its generation, because then it would not have been the second, but the third after that motion. Wherefore if there be any second after that first good, it must needs proceed from that first, as remaining immovable, and not so much as attively confessing thereto, nor willing it, which would be motion. Now this in Porphyrius his language is paraphrased to be, a being produced from the first good or original Deity, autogénos, self-begotten, or in a way of self-generation. But the plain meaning thereof seems to be no other than this, that though this second divine hypostasis did indeed proceed from the first God, yet was it not produced thence after a creaturely, or in a creating way, by the arbitrary will and command thereof, or by a particular fiat of the supreme Deity, but by way of natural and necessary emanation. Neither was Porphyrius singular in this language, we finding the very same expression, of autopator and autogénos, self-parent and self-begotten, in Jamblicbus his mysteries; where it is likewise by him applied not to the first principle of all, but to a second divine hypostasis, and εἰ τῷ ἑκεῖ τῷ, εἰ αὐτόπτος οἴκος ἐπος ἔκαστο ὑπερ-κατα, διὸ καὶ αὐτοπάτωρ καὶ αὐτογένος. From this one, the self-sufficient God made himself to shine forth into light; and therefore he is called Sui-Pater, and Scipio-genitus his own father, and self-begotten. But of this God or divine hypostasis in Jamblicbus more afterward. We cannot justify such kind of language as this in the Christian Trinity, because

1 Jamblich. de Myleris Egyptior. Sec. VIII. cap. II. p. 158.
we have no warrant for it from the scripture; though we are not ignorant that some late divines have ventured to call the Christian Logos after the same manner ἄντονων, and eμειψό Deum, God from himself.

Dionysius Petavius having rightly declared the doctrine of Arius, after this manner, that the Father was the only eternal God, and that the Son, or Word, was a creature made by him in time, and out of nothing; that is, after he had not been produced into being; subjoins these words; In ea verbo de Trin. 1. 1. professione, quod supra memoravi, planissime constat, Germanum Platonicum c. 8. § 2. Arium exitisse. From the profession of this doctrine, it is most undeniably manifest (what was before affirmed) that Arius was a Geron or genuine disciple of Plato's. But from what we have now cited out of Plato himself, and p. 58 others of his most genuine followers, it is certain, that Petavius (though otherwise learned and industrious) was herein grossly mistaken, and that Arius was no Platonist at all. And indeed for either Plato or Platonists to have denied the eternity of that second hypostasis of his, called Nous, or Logos, and the Son of the First, would have been all one as if they should have denied the eternity of Wisdom and Understanding itself; because, according to them, this second hypostasis is essentially nothing but ᾠδος φίλος, original Wisdom it self, and consequently, that very Wisdom, by which God himself is wise. Which how far, or in what sense it is true, we do not here dispute. Nevertheless, Athanasius seems to have been truly of the same opinion with them herein, from this passage of his; Καὶ σοφίας τοῦ ἁλλαγίας ἔστι τῆς ημῶν, ἐν τῷ πάλαι ταύτα. p. 56. τεποιήσεως ὑπό τουτούς, &c. Our Lord is both wisdom and truth, neither is he second from any other wisdom; but it is he alone, by whom the Father made all things. And again, ὅτι καὶ λόγος οὗ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου πατρὸς, for the Father of the Word is not properly himself the Word. And ὅτι καὶ λόγος τοῦ λόγου προϊήματος, ὡς γὰρ ὁ λόγος ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, Σοφία γεγένηται ὑπὸ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὡς γὰρ τούτων σιμικτόν, ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ θεοῦ. That was not Word, which produced the Word, for the Word was with God. The Lord is Wisdom, therefore that was not Wisdom, which produced Wisdom, that speaks thus of herself, His delight was with me. But those latter words he citeeth with approbation out of Dionysius Bishop of Alexandria. And the same Athanasius affirmeth Arius, on the contrary, to have maintained, that there was another Word and Wisdom, that Word and Wisdom in our Saviour Christ. To conclude, no Platonist in the world ever denied the eternity of that Nous, or universal Mind, which is the second hypostasis of their trinity; but, on the contrary, as hath been already observed, some of them seemed rather to attribute too much to it, in calling it ἀυτοπάτερος and ἀυτόγονος, its own parent and its own offspring, as that which was self-begotten, though this but in a certain mystical sense; they otherwise not denying it to have proceeded also, from the first good, and to be the offspring thereof. Wherefore Plato, who supposed the world not to have been eternal, affitting the eternity of that second hypostasis of his trinity, thereby plainly made it to be no creature, according to Athanasius his own doctrine, τί ἄλλος ἐστι, ὁ Θεός ὁ πατήρ. Our Lord in the Disputation cum Ario.
None of Plato's

Neither is there any force at all in that testimony of Macrobius 1, who ch Petavius urgeth to the contrary; wherein the first Cause is said de se mentem creasti, to have created Mind from itself; and again this Mind, animam se creasti, to have created from itself soul; because it is certain, that these antient Pagans did not then so strictly confine that word creature, (as we Christians now do) to that narrow sense and notion, of the production of things in time; but used it generally for all manner of production or efficiency. But the chief ground of Petavius's mistake herein, besides his prejudice against Platonism in general, was his not distinguishing betwixt that spurious trinity of some Platonists, wherein the third hypostasis was the whole animated world, (which gave him occasion to write thus, Teritus vero Deus manifestè creatus ab iisdem Platonicis putatur, quem & poïmus nominant;) and that other doctrine of those, who made it not to be the world it self, that is a creature, but the opificer or creator thereof.

But we grant, that there may be some more reason to make a question, whether Plato himself held the eternity of the mundane soul (commonly said to be the third hypostasis of his trinity) or no; because in his Timeus, though he acknowledged it to be senior to the world, yet does he seem to attribute a temporary generation, or nativity to it. Nevertheless, it is no way probable, that Plato's third principle of all things, in his epistle to Dionysius, and that Psychè, or Soul of his, which is the only God, that in his tenth de Legibus he goes about to prove against the Atheists, should ever have not been; and therefore it is most reasonable to compound this business, thus, by supposing, with Plotinus and others, that Plato held a double Psychè, or soul, one ἐγκέμπειος, or mundane, which is, as it were, the concrete form of this corporeal world; whereby this world is properly made an animal, and a second, or created God; another ὑπερμάζον, supramundane, or separate; and which is not so much the form, as the artificer of the world. The first of which two Plotinus, calling it the heavenly Venus, thus describeth; τὸ δὲ ὑπερμάζον, ἀνέστη τῆς μνήμης ὑπόστάσεως, τρεῖς ἐστι θεωδοσίας, Εἰς πάντα ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς πνεύματα τοῖς τῆς ὑπερμάζους ὑπόστασις τῷ ἔκφυγον οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν καθότι τῶν θεῶν τῆς μνήμης πνεύματα, τῷ δὲ ὑπέρματι ἀναπτύσσεται, ἀμέτρητοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπόστασεως, ἀμέτρητος πάντως ἀναπτύσσεται. Τοιαύτης ἐστι τῷ ὑπερμάζον τῆς ὑπόστασεως ταύτης ὑπερμάζους. This heavenly Venus, which they affirm to have been begotten from Saturn, that is, from a perfect Mind or Intelleæ, must needs be that most divine soul (the third archetical hypostasis) which being immediately begotten, pure from that which is pure, always remains above, so that it neither can, nor will ever descend down to these lower things, so as to be immered in them; it being of

1 In Somn. Scipion. Lib. I. cap. XIV. p. 73.
such a nature, as is not inclinable to sink, or lapse downward. A certain separate substance, which doth not at all partake of matter, as the fable intimated, when it called it motherless; and therefore may it well be styled by us, not a demon, but a god. Whence it comes to pass, that this soul can never fall, it being much more closely united and connected with that inmoveable Mind or Intellect, than that light, which is circumjacent about the sun, is connected with the sun. This Venus therefore following Chronus, or rather the father of Chronus, Uranus, acting towards it, and being enamoured with it, begat love, Χορίστος εν έκέινη την Φοίνη έλεγοντες, την πρώτως ἔλλαμπον τῷ φρου τοιού τετον έρωτα τοτον Νυκτιμέβα.

Moreover, as we call this soul it self separate, so is this love of it, or begotten by it, a separate love. After which, he speaks of another soul of the world, which is not separate from it, but closely conjoined therewith, he calling it a lower Venus and Love; namely, that other Venus, which in the fable is said to have been begotten from Jupiter himself (the superior soul of the world) and Dione, a watry nymph. We conclude therefore, that though this lower mundane soul, might, according to Plato, have a temporary production together with the world, or before it; yet that other superior and most divine soul, which Plotinus calls the heavenly Venus and Love, the son of Chronus without a mother, and which was truly the third hypostasis of Plato's trinity, was eternal, and without beginning. And thus, according to the aforementioned principle of Athanasius, none of these three hypostases of Plato's trinity were creatures, but all of them divine and uncreated.

Which to make yet more evident, we shall further observe, first, that Plato himself, in that second epistle of his to Dionysius, after he had mentioned his first, second and third; that is, his trinity of divine hypostases, immediately subjoins these words: Ἡ δὲ άνθρωπος Φοίνη, περί ταύτα έφελκται μαθηθεῖν την αύτια είτη, βλάπτα παρά την αύτης συμφωνίας, δό μοι ίματος εξει τοι δε βασιλείας τιμή, κε νομίζειν έντον τούτον. The mind of man (as parturient) has always a great desire to know what these things are, and to that end it does it look upon things cognate to it, which are all insufficient, imperfect and heterogeneous. But in that King of all things, and in the other, second and third, which I spake of, there is nothing of this kind; that is, nothing like to these created things.

Secondly, the three hypostases of Plato's trinity are, not only all eternal, but also necessarily existent, and absolutely indelible. For the first of them can no more exist without the second, nor the second and third, than original light can exist without its splendour, coruscation, or effulgency. And Plotinus, writing against some Gnosticks in his time, who would make more of these divine hypostases, or principles, than three, concludes, that there can be neither more of them, nor fewer, in this manner: τοιούτη τείχει τής άνθρωπος ιόμα, αλλά ταύτα προστασίας, είτε τούτα μετα τής άυτης πρώτης Ραμής, κατά Φανέρη, μήποτε τούτα τίτικται.[P. 199] ει τούτης μήπως πρώτης είτε άυτή πρώτης, η Φοίνη εκ τούτου πρώτου, η ούδέ τούτο πρώτου, αλλά δι' έτερα άλληλον εδείξο λόγον. λειπού δε είτε τίτικται είτε Άπει.
Plato's Trinity Homoousian. — Book I.

Thirdly, as all these three Platonick hypostases are eternal and necessarily existent, so are they plainly supposed by them, not to be particular, but universal beings; that is, such as do περιχεύον το θέλω, contain and comprehend the whole world under them, and prehend over all things, which is all one as to say, that they are each of them infinite and omnipotent. For which reason are they also called, by Platonick writers, αρχές and ακίνητα, and φύσιογγοι, principles, and causes, and opificers of the whole world. First, as for Νοτις, Mind, or Understanding; whereas the old philosophers before Plato, as Anaxagoras, Archelaus, &c. and Aristotle after him, supposed Mind and Understanding to be the very first and highest principle of all; which also the magick or Chaldee oracles take notice of, as the most common opinion of mankind,

"Ου πρῶτον ἀρχές ἐνίκειν ἀιώνιον ἀνθρώπον,"

That, Mind is generally by all men looked upon, as the first and highest God: Plato considering, that Unity was, in order of nature, before number and multiplicity; and that there must be Νοτις before Νοίος, an Intelligible before Intellect; so that knowledge could not be the first; and lastly, that there is a good transcending that of knowledge, made one most simple Good, the fountain and original of all things, and the first divine hypostasis; and Mind or Intellect only the second next to it, but inseparable from it, and most nearly cognate with it. For which cause, in his Philebus 1, though he agrees thus far with those other ancient philosophers, ὡς οἱ τῶν παντῶν Νούς ἀρχές, that Mind always rules over the whole universe; yet does he add afterwards, ὅτι Νοίος ἐν ἁμαρτος τού πάντων αἰτίας, that Mind is (not absolutely the first principle, but) cognate with the cause of all things; and that therefore it rules over all things, with, and in a kind of subordination to that first principle, which is Ταγαθον, or the Highest Good: Where, when Plato affirms, that Mind, or his second divine hypostasis, is γενότες with the first, it is all one as if he should have said, that it is ευγνώσις, and ὀμοιώσις, and ὀμο- γνώσις, with it; all which words are used by Athanasius, as synonymous with ὀμολογία, co-essential, or con-substantial. So that Plato here plainly and expressly agrees, or symbolizes, not with the doctrine of Arius, but with that of the Nicene council, and Athanasius; that the second hypostasis of the Trinity, whether called Mind, or Word, or Son, is not ἱεροσύνη. 2

Page 50.

Chap. IV. Plato's Third no Creature.

579

And then, as for the third hypostasis, called Psyche, or the superiour mundane soul, Plato in his Cratylus, beftowing the name of Zeus, that is, of the supreme God upon it, and etymologizing the fame from ξιός, adds these words concerning it; ο γὰρ ἵνα οἰκεῖ τοῖς ἄλλοις πάντων, ὡς οἵ τισιν αἰτίας μακάλου τῷ ξιός, ἔστιν ἄλλοι τοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν πάντων: There is nothing, which is more the cause of life to us and other animals, than this prince and king of all things; and that therefore God was called by the Greeks Zeus, because it is by him, that all animals live. And yet that all this was properly meant by him of the third hypostasis of his trinity, called Psyche, is manifest from those words of his that follow; where he expounds the poetick mythology before mentioned, making Zeus to be the Son of Chronos; οὐλογοῦ δὲ, μεταβάλτων τινὸς διακεῖται ἐγγονοῦ τοῦ ζώον τῷ Δίῳ. It is agreeable to reason, that Zeus is the progeny or offspring of a certain great mind. Now ἐγγονος and γενετός are equivalent terms also; and therefore Plato here makes the third hypostasis of his trinity likewise to be δρωσις, co-essential with the second; as he elsewhere made the second co-essential with the first.

It is true, that, by the δημιουργος, or Operator in Plato, is commonly meant Nous or Intellect, his second hypostasis: (Platimus affirming as much, δημιουργος οὐκ ἐστὶ Πλατωνος, The Demiurgus to Plato is Intellect;) Nevertheless, both Amelius, and Plotinus, and other Platonists, called his third hypostasis also δημιουργος, the artificer or operator of the whole word; some of them making him to be the second from Mind or Intellect; others the third from the first Good, the supreme cause of all things; who was by Atticus and Amelius styled Demiurgus also. Wherefore, as was before suggested, according to the genuine and ancient Platonick doctrine, all these three hypostases were the joint-creators of the whole world, and of all things besides themselves; as Ficinus more than once declares the tenour thereof, Τίς χρόνος ὑπόδειγμα τῶν ὑπόθεσεων ὑποκείμενου ἔγγον πολλοὺ, and before him Proclus, πάντα τῶν ἀληθείας τῆς ἐνοχὴς δίκην μετα τὸ ἀτετάκτον, All things depend upon the first One, by Mind and Soul; and accordingly we shall conclude in the words of Periphræs, that the true and real Deity, according to Plato, extends to three divine hypostases, the last whereof is Psyche or Soul.

From all which it appears, that Arios did not so much Platonize, as the Nicene fathers and Athanasius; who notwithstanding made not Plato, but the Scripture, together with reason deducing natural consequences therefrom, their foundation. And that the Platonick trinity was a certain middle thing also betwixt the doctrine of Sabellius and that of Arios, it being neither a trinity of words only, or logical notions, or mere modes, but a trinity of hypostases; nor yet a jumbled confusion of God and creature (things hetero-
But that it may yet more fully appear, how far the most refined Plato-
nick and Parmenidian, or Pythagoric trinity, doth either agree, or disa-
agree with the Scripture doctrine, and that of the Christian church in se-
veral ages; we shall here further observe two things concerning it. The first whereof
is this, that though the genuine Platoniists and Pythagoreans supposed none
of their three archetical hypostases to be indeed creatures, but all of them etern-
al, necessarily exilient, and univerfal or infinite, and consequently creators
of the whole world; yet did they nevertheless affiit an essential dependence of
the second hypostasis upon the first, as also of the third both upon the
first and second; together with a gradual subordination in them. Thus
Plutinus, writing of the generation of the eternal Intellect, which is the
second in the Platonic trinity, and anfwers to the Son or Word in the Chris-
tian: To ή δε αι τελειοι, αι δε αι δεινοι γενεσεις, η ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ ή εισαυ γενεσιν. Τι
δε χρη τετελεισται λεγειν; μιθε δε αυτω γενεσιν, και το μη μη αυτω αυτω.
Mηγες ει μει του Νευς ει Νευς Ανθρωπου. Και γαρ μη αυτο Νευς εικενοι, εν δεικεν αυτο μονο
εικενοι η τα τη ανθρωπου. Και το γενεσιν απο κεινου ενου, ενοι εικενοι. Και κεινου επων
του Νευς, οτι τ' αλλα μει αυτων. Οινου εν γη λογο ενου ει ατεργενη.
That
which is always perfect, generates what is eternal, and that which it gener-
ates, is always less than itself. What shall we therefore say of the most abso-
lutely perfect? Being of all? Does that produce nothing from it self? or rather
does it not produce the greatest of all things after it? Now the greatest of all
things after the most absolutely perfect Being, is Mind or Intellect; and this is
second to it. For Mind beheldeth this as its father, and sancetb in need of
nothing else besides it: whereas that first principle standeth in need of no mind or
intellect. What is generated from that, which is better than mind, must needs
be mind or intellect; because mind is better than all other things, they being
all in order of nature after it and junior to it; as Psyche it self, or the first
soul; for this is also the word or energy of mind, as that is the word and
energy of the first good. Again, the same is more particularly declared by
him, concerning the third hypostasis called Psyche, that as it essentially
dependeth upon the second, so is it gradually subordinate, or some way infe-
rior to it. Φυσικα γαρ γενεσις Νους, της δε τελεινοι. Και γαρ τελειον δολα
γενον ειδο, ευ μη δουλμον ουκ ενα τον αρσιν ειναι. Κεινου δε οισ ραχτεν το τε
ειναι, ενταθε το γενονειν, αλλα ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ δι, ειδολον ειπα αυτω. Perfect Intellect
generates soul; and it being perfect, must needs generate, for so great a power
could not remain sterile. But that, which is here begotten also, cannot be greater
than its begetter; but must needs be inferior to it, as being the image thereof.
Elsewhere the same philosopher, calling the first hypostasis of this trinity
Uranus, the second Chronos, and the third Zeus, (as Plato had done before)
and handsonly allegorizing that fable, concludes in this manner concerning
Chronos, or the second of these; μετακυ ων πατρος τε αμινον, η εικενοι η γενονει.
That he is in a middle state or degree betwixt his father, who is greater, and
his son, who is less and inferior. Again, the same thing is by that philo-
osopher thus ascribed in general, εν τοις γενομενοις ει δε πατος το διον, αλλα
ωρως.
Which gradual subordination and essential dependence of the second and third hypostases upon the first is by these Platonicks illustrated several ways. Ficinus refembles it to the circulations of water, when some heavy body falling into it, its superficies is depressed, and from thence every way circularly wrinkled. Alcin (faith he) sic ferme profuit ex alio, sicqu in aqua circulus dependet à circulo; one of these divine hypostases doth in a manner so depend upon another, as one circulation of water depends upon another. Where it is observable also, that the wider the circulating wave grows, still hath it the more subidence and detumescence, together with an abatement of celerity, till at last all becomes plain and smooth again. But, by the Pagan Platonists themselves, each following hypostasis is many times said to be ἕκχε& ντότον, a print, stamp or impression, made by the former, like the signature of a seal upon wax. Again, it is often called by them, εἰκών, and εἰκόνως, and μιμησις, an image, and representation, and imitation; which if considered in Audibles, then will the second hypostasis be look’d upon as the echo of an original voice; and the third as the repeated echo, or echo of that echo: as if both the second and third hypostases were but certain copies of the first original Deity with abatement; which though not accidental or evanish ones, but substantial, yet have a like dependence one upon another, and a gradual subordination. Or if it be considered in Vifibles, then will the second hypostasis be refembled to the image of a face in a glafs, and the third to the image of that image reflected in another glafs, which depend upon the original face, and have a gradual abatement of the vigour thereof. Or else the second and third may be conceived as two Parthelii, or as a second and third sun. For thus does Plotinus call the universal Pysche, or third hypostasis, εἰκών τοῦ σαλεύτου τῷ θεῷ ἑαυτῷ, the image of Mind (which is the second) retaining much of the splendour thereof. Which similitude of theirs, notwithstanding, they would not have to be squeezed or pressed hard; because they acknowledge, that there is something of diffimilitude in them also, which then would be forced out of them. Their meaning amounts to no more than this, that as an image in a glafs is said εἰκών εἰκών, essentially to belong to something else, and to depend upon it; so each following hypostasis doth essentially depend upon the former or first, and hath a subordination to it. But we meet with no expression in any of these Pagan Platonists for unhandiome and offensive, as that of Philo’s, in his

\[ \text{Ennead. V. lib. I. cap. VI. p. 487.} \]
The distinctive Characters

Book I.

second book of allegories, πανὸς ὁ Πᾶνος αὐτή ἰδιω, ὡς καὶ πάντες ἀρχαιο-κρισίνεις ἐκκυττοι. The Word is the Shadow of God, which be made use of, as an instrument, in the making of the world. Notwithstanding which, the same writer doth call him elsewhere, more honourably, a second God, and the son of the first God. As in the same place he doth also declare, that this shadow and image of God is itself the archetype of other things, αὐτή ὁ Πᾶνος ἡ σκιά, καὶ οὐκ εἰς ἀπεικόνισμα, ἐντός ἐν ἀρχéseσυς, ὡς ὁ Θεός; υποσφάζεις τῷ ἔντος, ὡς καὶ πάντες κυκλώνεια. This Shadow and as it were image (of the first God) is itself the archetype and pattern of other things below it. As God is the pattern of this image, (which we call his shadow;) so is this image it self another pattern or paradigm also. But this dependence and subordination of the divine hypostases is most frequently illustrated in Platonick writings, by the ἱλασμὸς or ἀξιογέματα, the effulgency or out-shining of light and splendour from the sun, and other luminous bodies; the Νούς, or second hypostasis being referred to that radiuous effulgency, which immediately encompassing them, is held together with them, and, as the astronomers tell us, augments their apparent diameter, and makes it bigger than the true, when they are beheld through telescopes, cutting off those luxuriant and circumambient rays. And the third hypostasis is referred to the remotest and more distant splendour, which circling still gradually decresceeth. Thus Plotinus, τῷ δὲ καὶ τῷ ἐν τῷ ἑκάστου μόιον, πε-

But this essential dependence, and gradual subordination of hypostases, in the Platonick trinity, will yet more fully appear from those particular distinctive characters, which are given to each of them. For the first of these is often said to be Ἐν πάντω πᾶν, one before all things; a simple unity, which virtually containeth all things. And as Plotinus writes, αὐτὸς εἶναι πάντα ὡς

[Note: The text appears to be abbreviated or corrupted in places, making it difficult to understand fully.]
the Good, or Goodness itself, above Mind and Understanding; and also ὀπερῆς, above essence, ineffable and incomprehensible. And sometimes also θεός, ἄκλινος, a simple light; the second Νῦ, Λήγε, Σεβί, Unity and Goodness only by participation, or Ἀφανεῖα, Boniform, but essentially and formally; Mind, or Understanding, Reason and Wisdom, all-comprehending, or infinite Knowledge. The third, Ψυχή, Self-moving Soul; Goodness and Wildom by participation, but essentially and formally, infinite Self-activity, or Effectivenes; infinite, active, perceptive and animadversive power. Sometimes it is styled also Ἀφανεῖα and Ἔσος, Venus and Love; but differently from that of the First Good, which is Love too; but a Love of redundancy, or overflowing fulness and fecundity: ὅ γὰρ τίλλον, τὸ μενόν ἐγνεῖν, μὴ ἐκ ἐγνεῖν, μὴ ἐκ ἐγνεῖν, Plut. 494. ὁ οὐρανός ὑπερίπτερος, ὦ τὸ ὑπερπλήξεις αυτῷ πεπολίκε πάθη, That which being absolutely perfec, and seeking, or wanting nothing, as it were, overflowed; and by its exuberant redundancy produced all things. Whereas this latter is a Love of infinite activity. Of the first, it is said, by Plotinus, that it is ὄνωπαγος, above all manner of action, for which cause, the making of the world is not properly ascribed to him, though he be the original fountain of all: according to that of Numenius, Καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερμεγεθί ἐπὶ Χρησί τὸν πρώτον, ἦ τῷ τῷ ὑπερηφάνει. ἄγαν ὑπερίπτερος ἔγενε, ὦ τῷ πρώτῳ ὑπερήφανον. Neither is [p. 357] it fit to attribute the architecture of the world to the first God, but rather to account him the father of that God, who is the artificer. Who again speaks further to the same purpose thus; τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὑπερήφανον ἐστιν ἐγεννήσας ἐγεννήσαν ἐστιν εἰς διάλυσιν ἐκ τοῦ. It is to be acknowledged, that the first God is void of all manner of work or action, being the king of all things. Of the second, to whom the energy of intellect is attributed, it is said, notwithstanding, that his ὁσιός is his ὑνεγος, his essence his operation; and that he is ἄματη ὁσια, though a multiform, yet an immovable nature. He therefore is properly called the Demiurgus, as the contriving architect, or artificer, in whom the archetypal world is contained, and the first paradigm, or pattern of the whole universe. But the third is a kind of moveable deity, τὸ πρῶτον νοῦν μοσίμου (as Plotinus speaks) ὃ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὢ τοῦ ἐγεννήσας ἐπιτεχνείον ἄματα. That, which moveth about Mind, or Intelleft, the light or efficacy thereof, and its print or signature, which always dependeth upon it, and acteth according to it. This is that, which reduces both the fecundity of the first simple Good, and also the immovable wisdom and architectonic contrivance of the second into act or energy. This is the immediate, and, as it were, manuay Opificer of the whole world, and τὸ ἐγεροπον τῷ πνεύμῳ, that which actually governs, rules and presideth over all. Amelius, in that passage of his before cited out of Proclus, calling these three divine hypotases three Minds, and three Kings, styles the first of them, Τοῦ δια, Him that is; the second Τοῦ ἐγεροπον, Him that hath; and the third Τοῦ ὁσιότατα, Him that beholds. In which expreitions, though peculiar to himself, he denotes an essentia dependence, and gradual subordination in them.

Now that which is most liable to exception, in this Platonick scale, or gradation of the Deity, seems to be the difference betwixt the first and the second. For whereas the essentia character of the second is made to
be understanding, reason and wisdom, it seems to follow from hence, that either the first and the second are really nothing else but two different names, or inadequate conceptions of one and the same thing; or else, if they be distinct hypotheses, or persons, that the first of them must needs be as; and and; devoid of mind, reason and wisdom; which would be very absurd. To which, all the reply we can make, is as follows: First, that this is indeed one peculiar arcana of the Platonick and Pythagorick theology, (which yet seems to have been first derived from Orpheus and the Egyptians, or rather from the Hebrews themselves) that whereas the Pagan Theologers generally concluded, ́ναγ θεόν περιελατον, That Mind and Understanding, properly so called, was the oldest of all things, the highest principle and first original of the world; those others placed something above it, and consequently made it to be not the first, but the second. Which they did chiefly upon these three following grounds. First, because understanding, reason, knowledge and wisdom, cannot be conceived, by us mortals, otherwise than so as to contain something of multiplicity in them; whereas it seems most reaonable to make the first principle of all, not to be number or multitude, but a perfect Monad, or Unity. Thus Plotinus, ὁδιγούμεν μὴν νοείν ὀπτerior ὑδίος, ἔριζομεν δι' ὑπό τῶν νοτεών εἰς μὴ ἐφηκαί εἰς τῆς ἀορίστου ὑμάδος ἥν τοῦ ἑνος τοῦ οὐδόν ό οὐδόν ο αἰσθήσεως τοῦτο γὰρ ἐν νοείν. δι' ἅων ἄπλους, ἀλλὰ πολλά, &c. Intellecit, as well as vignon, is in its own nature an indefinite thing, and is determined by the intelligible: therefore it is said, that ideas, as numbers, are begotten from infinite duality and unity, and such is intellecit, which consequently is not simple, but many, it contemplating many ideas; and being compounded of two, that which is understood, and that which understands. And again elsewhere, τὸ πρὸ τῶν κόσμων νοτεών, οὔτε νοείν οὔτε κόσμως νοτεών, ἄπλοες ἐφηκαί δι' ἅων γὰρ εἰς πολλά, πολλά, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολλὸν τοῦτο εἰς ὧν πολλά, &c. The principle of everything is more simple than the thing itself. Therefore the sensible world was made from Intellecit, or the Intelligible; and before this, must there needs be something more simple still. For many did not proceed from many, but this multiform thing Intellecit proceeded from that, which is not multiform, but simple, as number from unity. To this purpose does he also argue in these words, εἰ τὸ σοι τί πλούσιος, δι' ἅ ό τε κόσμῳ τὸ νοείν μὴ εὑρίσκειν τὸ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ πρῶτον εἰς τοῦ ιδίας ἑαυτῷ πολλά, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολλὰ τοῦτο εἰς τὸ πολλά, εἴτε ὅταν ἄριστον, εἴτε ὅταν ἄριστον. If that which understands be many, or contain multitude in it, then that which contains no multitude, does not properly understand; and this is the first thing: but intelleclion and knowledge properly so called are to be placed among things, which follow after it, and are second. And he often concludes, εἰ τὸ δὲ τούτῳ ὅσιν εἰς τὸ γνώσειν. That knowledge (properly so called, by reason of its multiplicity) belongs to the second rank of being, and not the first. Another ground or reason is, because, in order of nature, there must be Νατον before Νοει, something Intelligible before Intellecit; and, from hence does Plotinuses conclude, τὸ νοείν εἰς πρῶτον, ἐς τὸ εὖς, ὡς τοῖς τιμωμένοις και τοῖς τιμωμένως και τοῖς τιμωμένως, ἀλλὰ ἐνεπεραί, μὲν δὲν εἰς τὸ γνώσειν, μὲν δὲν εἰς τὸ σοι εἰς τὸ σοι, εἰς τὸ σοι εἰς τὸ σοι, ἀλλὰ εἰς τὸ σοι, εἰς τὸ σοι, εἰς τὸ σοи, &c. That to understand is not the first, neither in essence, nor in dignity, but the second; a thing in order of nature, after the first God, and springing up from these, as that which is moved with desire towards it. Their third and last ground or reason is, because intelleclion and knowledge are not the highest.
 Chap. IV. not the First, but Second.

higheft Good, that therefore there is some substantial thing, in order of nature superjor to Intellect. Which consideration Plato much insineth upon, in his sixth book De Republica. Now upon these several accounts do the Platonifts confidently conclude, ὅτι θέ κρίτον Λόγον ἕν τῷ ἕναίδες, παρ ἢ Πλάτων p. 512. ἐπειδὴ τίτου εις αὐτὸν ἕν τίτου, That the supreme Deity is more excellent and better than the Λόγος (Reason, or the Word) Intelle& and Sense, be affording these things, but not being these himself. And so the Word made of the Word, πολὺς καὶ πάντα τοί νῦν ἐν πᾶσι τῷ Λόγῳ: πῶς ὡς ἐν ἕναίδες καὶ τῶς τῷ ἐγκαινιάσεως ἐν ἐγκαινιάσεως. That, which was generated from the first principle, was Logos (Word or Reason) manifold, but the first principle it self was not Word: if you demand therefore, bow Word, or Reason, should proceed from that which is not Word or Reason? we answer, as that, which is bonons, from goodness it self. With which Platonick and Pythagorick Doctrine exactly agreeeth Philo the Jew also; οὗ προ' τοῦ Λόγος, Θεὸς κρίτον ἐν πάντας λογικὴ φώς, τῶν τῆς πάντων ἐν τῇ βιοτικίᾳ τῷ τῆς καθέστωτι ἐδώ; οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἐν πάντων ἰκεκριμένως. That God which is before the Word or Reason, is better and more excellent than all the rational nature; neither is it fit, that any thing, which is generated, should be perfectly like to that, which is originally from it self and above all. And indeed, we should not have so much insineth upon this, had it not been by reason of a devout veneration, that we have for all the Scripture-mysteries; which scripture seems to give no small countenance to this doctrine, when it makes in like manner an eternal Word and Wisdom to be the second hypostasis of the divine Triad, and the first-begotten Son, or Off-spring of God the Father. And Athanasius, as was before observed, very much complieth here also with the Platonick notion, when he denies, that there was any λόγος or σοφία, any Reason or Wisdom, before that Word and Son of God, which is the second hypostasis of the Holy Trinity. What then? shall we say, that the first hypostasis, or person in the Platonick trinity, (if not the Christian also,) is ὅνος and ἅλονος, fensless and irrational, and altogether devoid of Mind and Understanding? Or would not this be to introduce a certain kind of mysterious atheism; and under pretence of magnifying and advancing the supreme Deity, monstrously to degrade the fame? For why might not fensless matter, as well be supposed to be the first original of all things, as a fensless, incorpooreal being? Platus therefore, who rigidly and superstitiously adheres to Plato's text here, which makes the first and higheft principle of all to be such a being, as, by reason of its absolute and transcendent perfection, is not only above understanding, knowledge and reason, but also above essence it self, (which therefore he can find no other names for, but only Unity and Goodnes substantial) and consequently, knowledge and wisdom to be but a second, or post-nate thing, though eternal; but notwithstanding, does seem to labour under this metaphysical profundity; he sometimes endeavours to solve the difficulty thereof after this manner, by distinguishing of a double light; the one simple and uniform, the other multiform, or manifold; and attributing the former of these to the supreme Deity, FFFF 2 only;

only, (whose simple original light he resembles to the luminous body of the sun itself;) the latter of them to the second hypostasis, as being the ἀπαθείας, or ἀνοιχτάς, the circumambient fulgor, or outshining splendour of that sun. Thus Enum. s. l. 6. c. 4. τὸ παρηγορούσα τότε τὸ σέμε, ἦ το λέγων, ὅτι ἐκ τῆς ἄναπλως. That from which this multiform light of Νεῦ, or Intellectual (the second hypostasis,) is derived, is ἦ τος ἀναπλως, another more simple light. As he elsewhere accordingly writeth of the first principle, or Supreme Deity, that it is ἐν νόστει ἑπτάσι παρὰ τῷ νῷ νόσου, in knowledge or understanding, but of a different kind from that understanding of the second hypostasis, called Intellectual. Sometimes again, this philosopher subtly distinguishes between νοὴς ἀντὶ, intelligence itself, and τὸ νῷ, or τὸ ἔχον τῷ νῷννιν. That which doth understand, or which hath intelligence in it; making the first principle to be the former of these two, and the second hypostasis of their trinity to be the latter: οὐκ οὖς νοής, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔχον τῷ νῷννιν. τό ὅν πάλιν, ὅν νόσου, ἐν τῷ νῷτὶ, πάντοτε τῷ θεῷ ὀμοιόμενον. Intelligence itself doth not understand, but that which hath intelligence. For in that, which doth understand, there is a kind of duplicity. But the first principle of all hath no duplicity in it. Now that duplicity, which he fancies to be in that, which hath intelligence, is either the duplicity of him, that hath this intelligence, and of the intelligence it self, as being not the same; or else of him, and the ἐν τῷ νῷτῳ, the intelligible, or object of his intelligence: Intellectual supposing an intelligible in order of nature before it. And from this subtility we would infer, that there is a certain kind of imperfection and indigence in that which doth understand, or hath intelligence, ἐνδεικτικὰ τὸ νῷ, διά τῆς τοῦ ὅνων. That which understandeth is indigent as that which feebh. But perhaps this difficulty might be more easily solved, and that according to the tenour of the Platonick hypothesis too, by supposing the abatement of their second hypostasis to confine only in this, that it is not essentially τὰ γάζων, Goodness it self, but only γαζωσιδίας, boniform, or good by participation; it being essentially no higher than Νεῦς, Ἀγών and Σώφια, Mind, Reason and Wisdom; for which cause it is called by those names, as the proper characteristick thereof. Nor as if the first were devoid of wisdom, under pretence of being above it; but because this second is not essentially anything higher. As in like manner, the third hypostasis is not essentially wisdom it self, standing or quiescent, and without motion or action; but wisdom as in motion, or wisdom moving and acting.

The chief ground of this Platonick doctrine of an essential dependence, and therefore gradual subordination, in their trinity of divine hypostases, is from that fundamental principle of their theology, that there is but one Original of all things, and μία πνεύμα τῆς Σεβτάπς, only one Fountain of the Godhead; from whence all other things whatsoever, whether temporal or eternal, created or uncreated, were altogether derived. And therefore this second hypostasis of their trinity, since it must accordingly derive its whole being from the first, as the ἀπαθείας from the φως, the splendour from the original light, must of necessity have also an essential dependence
CHAP. IV. Gradation in the Deity.

dependence upon the same; and consequently, a gradual subordination to it.

For though they commonly affirm their second hypostasis to have been begotten from their first, and their third from their second; yet do they by no means understand thereby any such generation as that of men; where the father, son and grandson, when adulti at least, have no essential dependence one upon another, nor gradual subordination in their nature, but are all perfectly co-equal, and alike absolute. Because this is but an imperfect generation, where that, which is begotten, doth not receive its whole being originally from that, which did beget, but from God and nature; the begetter being but either a channel or an instrument, and having been himself before begotten or produced by some other. Whereas the first divine hypostasis is altogether unbegotten from any other, he being the sole principle and original of all things, and therefore must the second needs derive its whole essence from him, and be generated after another manner, namely in a way of natural emanation, as light is from the sun; and consequently, though co-eternal, have an essential dependence on him, and gradual subordination to him.

Moreover, the Platonists would recommend this their gradation in the deity, or trinity of hypostases subordinate, from hence; because by this means there will not be so vast a chasm and hiatus betwixt God and the highest creatures, or so great a leap and jump in the creation, as otherwise there must needs be. Nor will the whole Deity be screwed up to such a disproportionate height and elevation, as would render it altogether incapable of having any intercourse or commerce with the lower world; it being, according to this hypothesis of theirs, brought down by certain steps and degrees nearer and nearer to us. For if the whole Deity were nothing but one simple monad, devoid of all manner of multiplicity, as God is frequently represented to be; then could it not well be conceived by us mortals, how it should contain the distinct ideas of all things within itself, and that multiformal platform and paradigm of the created universe, commonly called the archetypal world. Again, were the Deity only an immovable mind; as Aristotle's God is ἀκώντη θεία, an absolutely immovable substance, whose essence and operation are one and the same; and, as other theologers affirm, that whatsoever is in God, is God; it would be likewise utterly unconceivable, not only, how there should be any liberty of will at all in God, (whereas the same theologers, contradicting themselves, zealously contend notwithstanding, that all the actions of the Deity are not necessary, and but few of them such,) but also, how the Deity should have any commerce or intercourse with the lower world; how it should quicken and actualize the whole, be sensible of all the motions in it, and act pro renatā accordingly; all which the instincts and common notions of mankind urge upon them. Neither can they be denied, without raising the very foundations of all religion, since it would be to no more purpose, for men to make their devotional addresses to such an
an immovable, inflexible, and unassailable Deity, than to a senseless adamantine rock. But these difficulties (as the Platonists pretend) are all removed by that third hypostasis in their trinity; which is a kind of moveable deity. And thus are all the phenomena of the deity, or the different common notions in the minds of men concerning it, though seemingly repugnant and clashing with one another, yet, in their opinion, fairly reconciled and solved by this trinity of divine hypostases subordinate:

Lastly, they pretend also, that according to this hypothesis of theirs, there may be some reasonable satisfaction given to the mind of man, both why there are so many divine hypostases, and why there could be no more: where, as according to other ways, it would seem to have been a mere arbitrary business; and that there might have been either but one solitary divine hypostasis, or but a duality of them; or else they might have been beyond a trinity, numberless.

The second thing, which we shall observe concerning the most genuine Platonical and Parmenidian trinity, is this; that though these philosophers sometimes called their three divine hypostases, not only τρεῖς Θεοίς, three natures, and three principles, and three causes, and three opificers, but also three Gods, and a first, and second, and third God; yet did they often, for all that, suppose all these three to be really one θεῖον, one Divinity, or Numen. It hath been already proved from Origen and others, that the Platonists most commonly called the animated world the second God, though some of them, as for example Numenius, styled it the third God. Now those of them, who called the world the second God, attributed indeed (not more, but) less divinity to it, than those, who would have it to be the third God. Because these supposed, that soul of the world to be the third hypostasis of their trinity; but the other taking all these three divine hypostases together, for one supreme and first God, called the world the second God; they supposing the soul thereof to be another soul inferior to that first Psyche, which was properly their third hypostasis. Wherefore this was really all one, as if they should have called the animated world the fourth God; only by that other way of reckoning, when they called it a second God, they intimated, that though those three divine hypostases were frequently called three gods, yet were they notwithstanding, really all but one Θεῖον, Divinity or Numen; or, as Plotinus speaks, τὸ ἐκ τῶν Θεῶν τὸ ἄλλο, the divinity which is in the whole world. Thus when God is so often spoken of in Plato singularly, the word is not always to be understood of the first hypostasis only, or the Tagathon, but many times plainly of the ὅριον, and ἔκτερον, and τρίτον, the first, and second and third all together; or that whole divinity, which consisteth or is made up of these three hypostases. And this will further appear from hence, because when the whole world is said in Plato to be the image of the eternal gods, as also by Plotinus, of the first, second and third, by whom it is always produced anew, as the image in a glass is; this is not to be understood, as if the world being tripartite, each third part thereof was severally produced
duced or created by one of those three; nor yet can it be conceived, how there could be three really distinct creations of one and the same thing. Wherefore the world having but one creation, and being created by those three divine hypostases; it follows, that they are all three really but one Creator and one God. Thus when, both in Plato and Platonius, the lives and souls of all animals, (as stars, daemons and men) are attributed to the third hypostasis, the first and great Pysche, as their fountain and cause after a special manner; accordingly as in our Creed, the Holy Ghost is styled the Lord and giver of life; this is not so to be understood, as if therefore the first and second hypostases were to be excluded from having any causality therein. For the first is styled by Plato also, αὐτοῦ ἀπαύγαστον τῶν καλῶν, The cause of all good things; and therefore doubtleschiefly of souls: and the second is called by him and others too, αὐτοῦ καὶ δημιουργοῦ, the cause and artificer of the whole world. We conclude therefore, that souls being created by the joint concurrence and influence of these three hypostases subordinate, they are all really but one and the same God. And thus it is expressly affirmed by Porphyry in St. Cyril, ἀρχή τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τῆς Σεβ. πρωτελείας ζτιῶν εἶναι ι πρὸς τὸν μν. αὐτάτα. Σοῦ τὸ ἀγαθῶν, μετα αὐτῶν δὲ καὶ δύο τριῶν, τῶν δημιουργοῦ τριῶν δὲ τῶν τῶν κόσμων ψυχῶν ἀρχή γὰρ ψυχῆς τῆς Σεβ. πρωτελείας. That the essence of the divinity proceeds or propagates itself (by way of descent downwards) unto three hypostases or subsidences. The highest God is the Tagathon, or supreme God; the second next after him is the Demiurgus so called, the architect or artificer of the world; and the Soul of the world, that is the third: for the divinity extendeth so far as to this soul. Here we plainly see, that though Porphyry calls the three divine hypostases three Gods; yet does he at the very same time declare, that τὸ κύριν ἵπταν. The essence of the Godhead and the Divinity extends it self to all these three hypostases, including the third and last also, (which they call the mundane soul) within the compass of it. And therefore that even according to the Porphyrian theology it self, which could not be suspected to affect any compliance with Christianteity) the three hypostases in the Platonick trinity are ὕποστάσεις, co essentiales, both as being each of them God, and as being all one God. St. Cyril himself also acknowledging as much; where he writeth thus of the Platonists, τρεῖς αρχές ὑποστάσεις ὑποπληκτομέναι καὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ μοίχαι τρεῖς ὑποστάσεως τινὶ πτια ὑπὸ θεοῦ προτέρων ἑχομένης. That supposing three hypostases, which have the nature of principles (in the universe) they extend the essence of God to all these three hypostases.

Indeed many conceive, that the Platonists making the three hypostases of their trinity to be thus gradually subordinate one to another, could not, for that very reason, acknowledge them to be one divinity; but the Platonists themselves do upon this very account, and no other, declare all these three to be one divinity, because they have an essentical dependence and gradual subordination in them; the second being but the image of the first, and the third the image both of the first and second. Whereas, were these three supposed to be perfectly co-equal, and to have no essential dependence one upon another,
How Plato's Trinity,

Book I.

another, they could not by these Platonists be concluded to be any other than three co-ordinate Gods, having only a general or special identity; and so no more one, than three men are one man: a thing, which the Platonick theology is utterly abhorrent from, as that which is inconsistent with the perfect monarchy of the universe, and highly derogatory from the honour of the supreme God and first Cause. For example, should three suns appear in the heaven all at once, with co-equal splendour, and not only so, but also be concluded, that though at first derived (or lighted and kindled) from one, yet they were now all alike absolute and independent; these three could not so well be thought to be one sun, as three that should appear gradually differing in their splendour, two of them being but the Parhelii of the other, and essentially depending on it; forasmuch as the second would be but the reflected image of the first, and the third but the second refracted. At least those three co-equal suns could not so well be thought to be one thing, as the sun, and its first and secondary splendour, (which can neither be beheld without the sun, nor the sun without them) might be accounted one and the same thing.

The Platonists, therefore, first of all suppose such a close and near conjunction betwixt the three hypostases of their trinity, as is no where else to be found in the whole world. To this purpose Platonus, ὃς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὅσον φασιν,

6. [p. 488.] ἦς, ἀλλ' ὁ ὅτι μετ' αὐτοῦ κύρια ἐδεικτῆται ὡς ἀδιάφορος, κοβυνὸν ἐστὶν ἀξιώματος τοῦ μεταίχθεν, ἔτι ἐκ τῆς ῥεσοφθαλμοῦ ὅτως δὲ κύρια ἐκ τοῦ κύριου, ἔτι ἀναλύει σύγκετα αὐτῷ, ὡς ἔτη εἰρήνην ἰερός τῆς ἑπορχοτόριν θεοῦ. Intelefft is said to behold the first good, not as if it were separated from it, but only because it is after it, but so as that there is nothing between them; as neither is there betwixt intellect and soul. Everything, which is be gotten, desires and loves that, which begat it; especially when these two (that which begat, and that which is begotten) are alone, and nothing besides them. Moreover, when that which begat, is absolutely the best thing, that, which is immediately be gotten from it, must needs cohere intimately with it, and so as to be separated from it only by alterity. Which is all one as if he should have said, that these three divine hypostases are so intimately conjoined together, and united with one another, as that they are tantum non, only not, the very self same. Again, the Platonists further declare, that these three hypostases of their trinity are ἀναλυτικόν, absolutely indivisible and inseparable, as the ἀναλυτικόν from the φῶς, the splendour indivisibly conjoined with the light or sun. Which similitude also Athanasius often makes use of to the same purpose. Thirdly, these Platonists seem likewise to attribute to their three divine hypostases just such an ἑπεικισθήναι, circuminfection, or mutual in-being, as Christians do. For as their second and third hypostases must needs be in the first, they being therein virtually contained; so must the first likewise be in the second and third; they being as it were but two other editions thereof; or it self gradually displayed and expanded. But to speak particularly, the first must needs be in the second, the Ταγαθόν in the Nous; and so both of them really one and the same God; because the common notions of all mankind attribute understanding and
and Wisdom to the Deity; but according to the principles of Plato, Platonius, and others, the Deity does not properly understand any where but in the second hypostasis, which is the Mind and Wisdom of it. And the Empericoboresis of the second or third hypostases, was thus intimated by Plato also; Σφια μην ἡ Νείς καί ζωή ὑπό Ψυχής, ἢ ἀν δοτε γένοις. Ωλεκμ ἐν μῖν ἡ το βλησ. p. 30. 
Διὸς εἶναι Φίλου, βασιλικοῦ μὲν Ψυχῆς, βασιλικοῦ δὲ νῦν ἑπιγραμμ. Where have [p. 80] ing spoken of that divine Wisdom and Mind, which orders all things in the world, he adds; But Wisdom and Mind can never be without soul, (that is, cannot act without it;) wherefore, in the nature of Jupiter, is at once contained both a kindly Mind, and a kingly Soul. Here he makes Jupiter to be both the second and third hypostases of his trinity, Nous and Psyche; and consequently those two to be but one God. Which Nous is also said to be both the γνώσις, i. e. of the same kind, and co-essential with the first cause of all things. To conclude; as that first Platonick hypostasis, which is itself said to be above Mind and Wisdom, is properly wise and understanding in the second; so do both the first and the second move and act in the third. Lastly, all these three hypostases, Tagathon, Nous and Psyche, are said by the Platonists to be one Θεὸς, or Divinity; just in the same manner as the centre, immovable distance, and moveable circumference of a sphere, or globe, are all effentially one sphere. Thus Platonius expressly, writing of the third hypostasis, or Psyche; σεμνὸν γὰρ τι ἀγαθόν καὶ ἔπλουτ ἔοιμα, p. 409. [Enn. IV Lib. IV. Cap. XVI.]
ioν χῶκλον προσαρμόζειν κέτορον, εὖ δὴ μετα κέτορον κινήσατο, διάκρισιν ἀδιάπρων ὕπ' αὐτῷ ἐξεί κατ' αὐτόν, eve τὰ μακοτέρα τὸ νῦν κέτορον τεῖσθαι, τοῦ ὅπως κατὰ κύκλου ἀκολούθῳ Ψυχῆς δι' ἑνὲ κύκλου κυμάμενον ἀν ταξιεῖ. For this Psyche, or third hypostasis, is a venerable and adorable thing also; it being the circle fitted to the centre, an indistinct distance, (forasmuch as it is no corporeal thing.) For these things are just so, as if one should make the Tagathon, or first Good, to be the centre of the universe; in the next place, Mind, or Intellect to be the immovable circle, or distance; and lastly, Soul to be that, which turns round, or the whole moveable circumference; as'd by Love, or Desire. These three Platonick hypostases therefore, seem to be really nothing else but infinite Goodness, infinite Wisdom, and infinite active Love and Power, not as mere qualities or accidents, but as substantial things, that have some kind of subordination one to another; all concurring together to make up one Θεὸς, or Divinity, just as the centre, immovable distance, and moveable circumference, concurrently make up one sphere.

We have now given a full account of the true and genuine Platonick and Parmenidian or Pythagoric trinity; from which it may clearly appear, how far it either agreeeth or dißagreeth with the Christian. First therefore, though some of the latter Platonists have partly misunderstood, and partly adulterated that ancient Cabala of the Trinity, as was before declared, confounding therein the differences between God and the Creature, and thereby laying a foundation for infinite polytheism; yet did Plato himself, and some of his genuine followers (though living before Christianity) approach so near to the doctrine thereof, as in some manner to correspond therewith, in those three fundamentals before mentioned. First, in not
making a mere trinity of names and words, or of logical notions and inadequate conceptions of one and the same thing; but a trinity of hypotheses, or subsistences, or persons. Secondly, in making none of their three hypotheses to be creatures, but all eternal, necessarily existent and universal; infinite, omnipotent, and creators of the whole world: which is all one, in the sense of the ancients, as if they should have affirmed them to be Homoousian. Lastly, in supposing these three divine hypotheses, however sometimes pæganically called three gods, to be essentially one Divinity. From whence it may be concluded, that as Arianism is commonly supposed to approach nearer to the truth of Christianity than Photinianism, so is Platonism undoubtedly more agreeable thereunto than Arianism; it being a certain middle thing betwixt that and Sabellianism, which in general was that mark, that the Nicene council also aimed at.

Notwithstanding which, there is a manifest disagreement also betwixt the Platonick Trinity, as declared, and the now received doctrine in the Christian church; consisting in a different explication of the two latter points mentioned. First, because the Platonists dreamed of no such thing at all, as one and the same numerical essence, or substance, of the three divine hypotheses. And secondly, because, though they acknowledged none of those hypotheses to be creatures, but all God; yet did they assert an essential dependence of the second and third upon the first; together with a certain gradual subordination; and therefore no absolute co-equality. And this is the true reason, why so many late writers have affirmed Platonism to symbolize with Arianism, and the latter to have been indeed nothing else but the spawn of the former; merely because the Platonists did not acknowledge one and the same numerical essence, or substance of all their three hypotheses, and asserted a gradual subordination of them; but chiefly for this latter ground. Upon which account some of the ancients also have done the like, as particularly St. Cyril (contra Jul. lib. 1.) he writing thus concerning: Plato ὢν ἐν  ἡ ὑποτάσσω, ἀλλα ἡ τοις περιφερεσάς, ἐν ἡ τοῖς ἤφθασιν, ὑποκάθευθεν τοῖς ἀλληλοις τοῖς ὑποτάσις ὑποτάσσοντας, οὐκ ἐκ δικά· ὡς ἐν ὑποτάσεις. Plato did not thoroughly perceive the whole truth of the trinity, but, in like manner with those who follow Arius, divided the Deity, or made a gradation in it, and introduced subordinate hypotheses: as elsewhere the same pious father also taxes the Platonists, for not declaring the three hypotheses of their trinity to be, in his sense, Homoousian, that is, absolutely co-equal. But though we have already proved, that Platonism can by no means be confounded with Arianism, because it directly confronted the same in its main essentials, which were, Erat quando non erat, or the second hypothesis being made † in eternity, together with its being mutable and labile; since, according to Platonism, the Nous is essentially both eternal and immutable: yet that the most refined Platonism differed from the now received doctrine of the Christian church, in respect of its gradual subordination, is a thing so unquestionably evident, as that it can by no means be dissimulated, palliated, or excused.
Over and besides which, it cannot be denied, but the best of Plato's followers were sometimes also further extravagant in their doctrine of the Trinity, and spoke at random concerning it, and inconsistently with their own principles; especially where they make such a vast and disproportionate distance between the second and third hypostases thereof; they not descending gradually and orderly, but as it were tumbling down from the former of them to the latter. Thus Plotinus himself, when having spoken magnificently of that soul of the world, which is his third hypostasis, he says immediately, "νους τὸν τουτοΰτον σκοτεινως, κατ' αὐτό τίμιον ή θεός. That this soul of ours is also uniform (or of the same species) with that mundane soul, for if any one (faith he) will consider it as in itself, pure and naked, or script from all things adventitious to it, he shall find it to be in like manner venerable. Agreeably whereunto both this same philosopher elsewhere call that mundane soul προβολητέας ἢ διάλειψις, that is, but the elder sister of our human souls. Which, as it rankly favours of philosophick pride and arrogancy, thus to think so magnificently of themselves, and to equalize in a manner their own souls with that mundane soul; so was it a monstrous degradation of this third hypostasis of their trinity, and little other than an absolute creaturizing of the same. For if our human soul be ὑμωνία, of the same kind or species, with the third hypostasis of the trinity; then it is not only ὑμωνία, of like honour and dignity, but also, in the language of the Christian church, ὑμωνίας, co-essential with our human souls, (as our Saviour Christ, according to the Arians in Adanagius, is said to be ὑμωνίας ὑμωνίων ἡ δεύτερη, co-essential with us men.) From whence it will follow, that either that must be a creature, or else our human souls divine. Wherefore, unless these Platonists would confine the Deity wholly to their first hypostasis, which would be monstrously absurd for them, to suppose that first Mind and Wisdom, by which the world was made, to be a creature; they must of necessity make a vast leap or jump between the second and third of their hypostases; the former of them being that perfect Wisdom, which was the Architect or Demiurgus of the world, whilst the latter is only the elder sister of all human souls. Moreover, these Platonists, by their thus bringing down the third hypostasis of their trinity so low, and immersing it so deeply into the corporeal world, as if it were the informing soul thereof, and making it to be but the elder sister of our created souls, did doubtless therein designedly lay a foundation for their polytheism and creature-worship (now vulgarly called idolatry) that is, for their cofino-latry, afro-latry, and demono-latry. For thus much is plainly intimated in this following passage of Plotinus, ὁ ταύτῃ τὸ πόσιον ὑμωνίας. This whole corporeal world is made a god by the soul thereof. And the sun is also a god, because animated; as likewise are all the stars therefore gods. Where he afterwards adds, ὅτι ὁ παλαιότερον ὁ πρόφοτερος τὸν αὐτὸν ἔστω. That which is to these gods, or goddeses, the cause of their being gods, must needs it self be the elder god, or goddef. So that this third hypostasis of the Platonick Trinity, called the mundane soul, is but a kind of linter goddef with the souls of the sun, moon
and stars, though elder indeed than they; they being all made goddessses by her. Where there is a confused jumble of things contradictory together; that Soul of the world being at once supposed to be a sifter to other souls, and yet, notwithstanding, to deify them; whereas this sisterly relation and con-

fanguinity betwixt them would, of the two, rather degrade and creaturize that mundane Soul, which is their third God, or divine hypostasis, than advance and deify those particular created souls. Here therefore we see the inconvenience of these Platonick stories, stories, stairs and gradations in the Deity, that it is a thing liable to be much abused to creature-worship and idolatry, when the distances are made so wide, and the lowest of the Deity is supposed to differ but gradually only from the highest of created beings. And because Porphyrius trode in Plotinus his footsteps here, as elsewhere, this was, in all probability, the true reason, why the Arians (as Socrates recordeth;) were by Constantin called Porphyrianists; not because their trinities were exactly the same, but because Arius and Porphyrius did both of them alike (though upon different grounds) make their trinity a foundation for creature-worship and idolatry. But nevertheless, all this (as many other things) was but heedlessly and inadvertently written by Plotinus; he, as it were, drowsily nodding all the while, as it was also but supinely taken up by Porphyrius after him: it being plainly inconsistent with the genuine tenour of both their hypotheses, thus to level the third hypostasis of the trinity with particular created souls, and thereby to make so disproportionate a distance, and so vast a chasm, betwixt it and the second. For Plotinus himself, when in a more sober mood, declares, that third hypostasis not to be the immediate, informing soul of the corporeal world, but a higher separate soul, or superior Venus, which also was the Demiurgus, the maker, both of other souls, and of the whole world. As Plato had before expresly affirmed him to be the Inspirer of all life, and Creator of souls, of the Lord and Giver of life: and likewise declared, that among all these things, which are ἀνθρώπιναι θυγατρίαι, congenorous and cognate with our human souls, there is ἄει τουτο, nothing any where to be found at all like unto it. So that Plato, though he were also a star-worshipper and idolater, upon other grounds, yet in all probability would he not at all have approved of Plotinus his ὑποστασῶν, ὅν ἦν ἡ παροικία, our souls being of the same species with that third hypostasis of the divine triads; but rather have said, in the language of the Psalmist, It is he that hath made us, and not we our selves; we are his people, and the sheep of his pasture.

Notwithstanding all which, a Christin Platonist, or Platonick Christian, would, in all probability, apologize for Plato himself, and the ancient and most genuine Platonists and Pythagoreans, after this manner. First, that since they had no scriptures, councils, nor creeds, to direct their steps in the darkness of this mystery, and to confine their language to a regular uniformity; but theologized all freely and boldly, and without any scrupulosity, every one according to his own private apprehensions; it is no wonder at all.
all, if they did not only speak, many times undividedly, and inconsistently with their own principles, but also plainly wander out of the right path. And that it ought much rather to be wondered at, that living so long before Christianity, as some of them did, they should in so abstruse a point, and dark a mystery, make so near an approach to the Christian truth afterwards revealed, than that they should anywhere stumble or fall short of the accuracy thereof: they not only extending the true and real Deity to three hypostases, but also calling the second of them, \( \lambda \delta \rho \nu, \) reason or word too, (as well as \( \nu \epsilon \iota \iota \), mind or intellect,) and likewise the Son of the first hypostasis, the Father; and affirming him to be the \( \delta \mu \rho \mu \nu \gamma \nu \delta \) and \( \alpha \iota \nu \varepsilon \), the artificer and cause of the whole world, and lastly describing him, as the scripture doth, to be the image, the figure and character, and the splendour or brightness of the first. This, I say, our Christian Platonist supposes to be much more wonderful, that this so great and so abstruse a mystery, of three eternal hypostases in the Deity, should thus by Pagan philosophers, so long before Christianity, have been afferted, as the principal and original of the whole world; it being more indeed than was acknowledged by the Nicene fathers themselves; they then not so much as determining, that the Holy Ghost was an hypostasis, much less that he was God.

But particularly as to their gradual subordination of the second hypostasis to the first, and of the third to the first and second; our Platonick Christian, doubtless, would therefore plead them the more excusable, because the generality of Christian doctors, for the first three hundred years after the Apostles times, plainly afferted the same; as Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Tatianus, Ireneus, the author of the Recognitions, Tertullian, Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, Gregorius Thaumaturgus, Dionysius of Alexandria, {La\'ciantius}, and many others. All whose testimonies because it would be too tedious to set down, we shall content our selves only with one of the last mentioned:

"Et Pater & Filius Deus est; sed ille quasi exuberans fons, hic tanquam desinens inquit." 

ex eo rivos: Ille tanquam sol, hic tanquam radius à sole porrexit. Both the Father and the Son is God; but he as it were an exuberant fountain, this as a stream derived from him: be like to the sun, this like to a ray extended from the sun. And though it be true that Athenaeus, writing against the Arians, does appeal to the tradition of the ancient church, and amongst others cites Origen's testimony too; yet was this only for the eternity and divinity of the Son of God, but not at all for such an absolute co-equality of him with the Father, as would exclude all dependence, subordination and inferiority; those ancients so unanimously agreeing therein, that they are by Petavius therefore taxed for Platonism, and having by that means corrupted the purity of the Christian faith; in this article of the Trinity. Which how it can be reconciled with those other opinions of ecclesiastick tradition, being a rule of faith, and the impossibility of the visible church's erring in any fundamental point, cannot easily be understood. However, this general tradition or consent of the Christian church, for three hundred years togeth...
gether after the Apostles times, though it cannot justify the Platonists, in any thing discrepant from the scripture, yet may it in some measure double
lels plead their excuse, who had no scripture-revelation at all, to guide them
herein: and so at least make their error more tolerable or pardonable.

Moreover, the Platonick Christian would further apologize for these Pagan Platonists after this manner: That their intention in thus subordinating the hypostases of their trinity was plainly no other, than to exclude thereby a plurality of co-ordinate and independent gods, which they supposd an
abolute co-equality of them would infer. And that they made only so
much subordination of them, as was both necessary to this purpose, and una
voidable; the juncture of them being in their opinion so close, that there
was, μήδεν μεταξόν, nothing intermedium, or that could possibely be thrust in
between them. But now again, on the other hand, whereas the only ground
of the co-equality of the persons in the Holy Trinity is, because it cannot
well be conceived, how they should otherwise all be God; since the essence
of the Godhead, being abolute perfection, can admit of no degrees; these
Platonists do on the contrary contend, that notwithstanding that depend
ence and subordination, which they commonly suppose in these hypostases,
there is none of them, for all that, to be accounted creatures, but that
the general essence of the Godhead, or the uncreated nature, truly and pro
perly belongeth to them all: according to that of Porphyrius before cited,
ἄρδι τοῖς ὑποστάσεσι τοῦ κατα τούτου ὄντος, the essence of the Godhead pro
ceedeth to three hypostases. Now these Platonists conceive, that the essence of
the Godhead, as common to all the three hypostases of their trinity, con
sisteth (besides perfect intellectuality) in these following things: First, in
being eternal, which, as we have already shewed, was Plato's distinctive
character betwixt God and the creature. That whatsoever was eternal, is
therefore uncreated; and whatsoever was not eternal, is a creature. He by
eternity meaning, the having not only no beginning, but also a permanent
duration. Again, in having not a contingent but necessary existence, and
therefore being absolutely undestroyable; which perhaps is included also in
the former. Lastly, in being not particular but universal, ὅσα ἡ ἡμῖν, one
and all things, or that which comprehends the whole; which is all one as
to say, in being infinite and omnipotent, and the creator of the whole
world. Now, say these Platonists, if any thing more were to be added to
the general essence of the Godhead besides this, then must it be self-exis
tence, or to be underived from any other, and the first original, principle,
and cause of all; but if this be made so essential to the Godhead, or un
created nature, as that whatsoever is not thus originally of it self, is there
fore ipso facto to be detrued and thrust down into the rank of creatures;
then must both the second and third hypostases, as well in the Christian as
the Platonick Trinity, upon this supposision, needs be creatures, and not God;
the second deriving its whole being and godship from the first; and the
third, both from the first and second; and so neither first nor second being
the cause of all things. But it is unquestionable to these Platonists, that
whatsoever is eternal, necessarily existent, infinite, and omnipotent, and the
creator
creator of all things, ought therefore to be religiously worshipped and adored as God, by all created beings. Wherefore this essence of the Godhead, that belongeth alike to all the three hypostases, being, as all other essences, perfectly indivisible, it might be well affirmed, according to Platonick grounds, that all the three divine hypostases (though having some subordination in them) yet in this sense are co-equal, they being all truly and alike God or uncreated. And the Platonists thus differing betwixt θεῖον and ὑπόστασις, the essence of the Godhead, and the distinct hypostases or personali-
ties thereof, and making the first of them to be common, general and un-
iversal, are not without the consent and approbation of the orthodox fa-
thers herein; they determining likewise, that in the Deity, essence or sub-
stance differs from hypostasis, as τὸ καὶ θεῖον from τὸ μὴ θεῖον, that which
is common and general, differs from that which is singular and individual.
Thus, besides many others, St. Cyril, ἦν ἐξ ἐξελείπον τὸ γενός, ἢ ἐξ
τὸ ἁγιόν, ταύτω ἢ ἐξ ἐξελείπον τῷ ὑπόστασιν ἐξελείπον. The essence or substance of the
Deity differs from the hypostasis, after the same manner as a genus or spe-
cies differs from an individuum. So that, as well according to these fa-
thers as the Platonists, that essence or substance of the Godhead, which
all the three persons agree in, is not singular, but generic or universal; they both supposing each of the persons also to have their own numerical
essence. Wherefore, according to this distinction, betwixt the essence or sub-
stance of the Godhead, and the particular hypostases, (approved by the ortho-
dox fathers) neither Plato, nor any intelligent Platonist, would scruple to sub-
scribe that form of the Nicene council, that the Son or Word, is ὑπόστασις,
co-equal, or con-substantial, and co-equal with the Father. And we think
it will be proved afterwards, that this was the very meaning of the Nicene
council itself, that the Son was therefore co-equal or con-substantial with the
Father, meerly because he was God, and not a creature.

Besides which, the genuine Platonists would doubtless acknowledge also:
all the three hypostases of their trinity to be homo-ousian, co-equal or
con-substantial, yet in a further sense than this; namely, as being all of them
one Θεῖον or divinity. For thus, besides that passage of Porphyrius before
cited, may these words of St. Cyril be understood concerning them; μήζη
τῷ Θείῳ ὑποστάσεως τῷ Θείῳ τῷ Θείῳ πρεσβύτερος Ειρήνος. That, according to them,
the essence of God extended to three hypostases, or comprehended three hyp-
ostases in it: that is, not only so as that each of these three is God; but
also that they are not so many separate and divided Gods, but all of them
together one God or Divinity. For though the Platonists, as Pagans, being not
so scrupulous in their language as we Christians are, do often call them three
Gods, and a first, second, and third God; yet notwithstanding, as philosophers,
did they declare them to be one Θεῖον or Divinity; and that, as it seems, upon these
several accounts following. First, because they are indivisibly conjoined together,
as the splendour is indivisible from the sun. And then, because they are mutual-
ly inexistant in each other, the first being in the second, and both first and second,
in

This seems to be a mistake for Theodoret, Dialog. I. de Trinitate, p. 408. Tom. V. Oper.
in whom we find these very words, Dialog. 1. Ed. Aubert.

advoc. Harof. Tom. II. Oper. p. 297. Tho’ the same thing is laid in other words in St. Cyril,

2 Contra Julian. lib. VIII. p. 279.
in the third. And lastly, because the entireness of the whole divinity is made up of all these three together, which have all \( \mu \nu \theta \nu \delta \varepsilon \gamma \alpha \nu \varepsilon \mu \omega \kappa \eta \), one and the same energy or action ad extra. And therefore, as the centre, radius, distance, and moveable circumference, may be all said to be coessential to a sphere; and the root, stock, and branches, co-essential to an entire tree: so, but in much a more perfect sense, are the Platonick Tagathon, Nous and \( \Psi \chi \beta \), coessential to that in \( \tau \gamma \varphi \omega \iota \) \( \delta \iota \iota \iota \iota \), that divinity in the whole universe. Neither was Athanasius a stranger to this notion of the word \( \delta \mu \rho \alpha \omega \nu \iota \) also, he affirming \( \tau \alpha \nu \kappa \omega \lambda \alpha \mu \alpha \nu \delta \) \( \psi \alpha \iota \mu \lambda \sigma \nu \sigma \iota \) \( \kappa \alpha \iota \lambda \iota \iota \) \( \varphi \omega \iota \iota \iota \iota \), \( \theta \alpha \kappa \iota \theta \alpha \iota \sigma \theta \iota \iota \iota \) \( \theta \alpha \kappa \iota \theta \alpha \iota \sigma \theta \iota \iota \iota \), That the Branches are co-essential with, and indivisible from the vine; and illustrating the Trinity by that similitude. Neither must it be thought, that the whole Trinity is one, after the very same manner that each single person thereof is in it self one, for then should there be a Trinity also in each person. Nor that it is so called undivided, as if three were not three in it: (which were to make the mystery contemptible:) but because all the three hypostases, or persons, are indivisibly and inseparably united to each other, as the sun and the splendour, and really but one God. Wherefore, though there be some subordination of hypostases, or persons, in Plato's trinity, (as it is commonly represented) yet this is only \( \text{ad intra} \), within the Deity itself, in their relation to one another, and as compared amongst themselves: but \( \text{ad extra} \), outwardly, and to us, are they all one and the same God, concurring in all the same actions; and in that respect, without any inequality, because in identity there can be no inequality.

Furthermore, the Platonick Christian would, in favour of these Platonists, urge also, that, according to the principles of Christianity itself, there must of necessity be some dependence and subordination of the persons of the Trinity, in their relation to one another; a priority and posteriority, not only \( \tau \alpha \chi \iota \nu \), but also \( \delta \zeta \iota \mu \alpha \dot{\nu} \lambda \alpha \), of dignity as well as order, amongst them. First, because that which is originally of itself, and undervied from any other, must needs have some superiority and preheminence over that, which derives its whole being and godship from it, as the second doth from the first alone, and the third from the first with the second. Again, though all these three hypostases, or persons, be alike omnipotent \( \text{ad extra} \), or outwardly, yet \( \text{ad intra} \), inwardly, or \( \text{within the Deity} \) itself, are they not so; the Son being not able to beget the Father, nor the Holy Ghost to produce either Father or Son; and therefore neither of these two latter is absolutely the cause of all things, but only the first. And upon this account was that first of these three hypostases (who is the original fountain of all) by Macrobius \(^1\) styled, omnipotentissimus Deus, the most omnipotent God; he therein implying the second and third hypostases, Nous and \( \Psi \chi \beta \), to be omnipotent too, but not in a perfect equality with him, as within the Deity they are compared together; however, \( \text{ad extra} \), or outwardly, and to us, they being all one, are equally omnipotent. And Plotinus writeth,

\(^1\) In Semnium Scipion. Lib. I. Cap. XVII. p. 87.
only imitating and partaking thereof. And accordingly hereunto would the Platonick Christian further pretend, that there are fundry places in the Scripture, which do not a little favour some subdivision and priority both of order and dignity, in the persons of the holy Trinity; of which none is more obvious, than that of our Saviour Christ, My Father is greater than I: which to understand of his humanity only, feemeth to be less reasonable, because this was no news at all, that the eternal God, the creator of the whole world, should be greater than a mortal man, born of a woman. And thus do divers of the orthodox fathers, as Athanasius himself, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen and St. Chrysostom, with several others of the Latins, interpret the same to have been spoken, not of the humanity, but the divinity of our Saviour Christ. Infomuch that Petavius himself, expounding De Trin. the Athanasian creed, writeth in this manner: Pater major Filio, rite & p. 863. catholice pronuntiatus est de plerisque veterum; & origine prior sine reprehensione dicit folet. The Father is, in a right catholic manner, affirmed, by most of the ancients, to be greater than the Son; and he is commonly said also, without reprehension, to be before him in respect of original. Whereupon he concludes the true meaning of that creed to be this, that no person in the Trinity is greater or less than other, in respect of the essence of the Godhead common to them all; Quia vero Deitas in nillo esse aut minor aut major potest; because the true Godhead can be nowhere greater or less: but that, notwithstanding, there may be some inequality in them, as they are hic Deus, and hac persona; this God, and that person. It is true indeed, that many of those ancient fathers do restrain and limit this inequality only to the relation of the persons one to another, as the Father's begetting, and the Son's being begotten by the Father, and the Holy Ghost proceeding from both; they seeming to affirm, that there is otherwise a perfect equality amongst them. Nevertheless several of them do extend this difference further also, as for example, St. Hilary, a zealous opposer of the Arians, he in his book of Synods writing thus: Sicuti unum dictum Deum, Christum autem Deum, ante seculum Filium Dei, obsecutum Patri in creatione omnium, non confessurus, anathema sit. And again, Non exaequam vel conformam Filium Patri, sed subjeciem intelligimus. And Athanasius himself, who is commonly accounted the very rule of orthodoxy in this point, when he doth so often resemble the Father to the ι光荣, or to the φως, the sun, or the original light, and the Son to the ἄνωτέρα, the splendor or brightness of it, (as likewise doth the Nicene council and the Scripture itself;) he seems hereby to imply some dependence of the second upon the first, and subordination to it; especially when he declareth, that the three persons of the Trinity are not to be looked upon as three principles, nor to be resembled to three suns, but to the sun, and its splendor, and its derivative light; ὥστε γὰρ τεις ἄρχοντες υἱός ἐστίν, ὡστε μηδὲ τινὶ τὸν θεόν ἐπιδίδομεν τῷ τιμώμα ἐότι τῷ θεῷ, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ τῷ τῇ ἄνωτέρα, ἡµῖν ἡµῖν ἡ ἀνωτέρα, κ. τ. λ. p. 467. For it appears from the similitude used by us, that we do not introduce three principles (as the Marcionists and Manicheans did) we not comparing the Trinity to three suns, but only to the sun and its splendor; so that we acknowledge only one principle.

As

As also where he approves of this of Dionysius of Alexandria, ὁ δὲ γε Θεὸς ἀναστήθη ἐν Γασία, ἦτα ἀναστήθη, ἦτα κόσμου στερεόν; ἦτα οὐκ εἶναι προκειμένοι ὁ σύνεται αὐτῷ ἄνθρωπον ἁπάντα, ἐπειδὴ ἄνθρωπον προκειμένοι ἄνθρωπον προκειμένοι. God is an eternal light, which never began, and shall never cease to be; wherefore there is an eternal splendor also co-existent with him, which had no beginning neither, but was always generated by him, beginning out before him. For if the Son of God be as the splendor of the sun ἀναστήθη, always generated, then must he needs have an essential dependence upon the Father, and subordination to him. And this same thing further appears from those other resemblances, which the same Dionysius maketh, of the Father and the Son, approved in like manner also by Athanasius, viz. to the fountain and the river; to the root and the branch; to the water and the vapour; for so it ought to be read, ὅπως, and not παραλληλομεν, as appeareth from his book of the Nicene synod, where he affirmeth the Son to have been begotten of the essence or substance of the Father, ὁς τῷ Φωτοῦ ἀναστήθη, ὁς θαλας ἀτμία, as the splendor of the light, and as the vapour of the water; adding, ὥσπερ τῷ ἀναστήθη, ὥσπερ ἡ ἀτμία, αὐτό τῷ ὑδάτι ἐν, ἡ αὐτοῦ ὁ ἐλεος, ὥσπερ τῷ ἀναστήθη, ἡ ἀτμία τὸ τοῦ παλαιοῦ ὑδάτι. For neither the splendor nor the vapour is the very sun, and the very water; nor yet is it alien from it, or a stranger to its nature; but they are both effusions from the essence or substance of them, as the Son is an effusion from the substance of the Father, yet so as he is no way diminished or lessened thereby. Now all these similitudes, of the fountain and the river, the root and the branch, the water and the vapour, (as well as that of the sun and the splendor) seem plainly to imply some dependence and subordination. And Dionysius doubtless intended them to that purpose, heasserting, as Phoebus informeth us, an inferiority of power and glory in the second, as likewife did Origen before him; both whole testimonies, notwithstanding, Athanasius maketh ufe of, without any cenfure or reprehension of them. Wherefore when Athanasius, and the other orthodox fathers, writing against Arius, do so frequently affert the equality of all the three Persons, this is to be understood in way of opposition to Arius only, who made the Son to be unequal to the Father, as ἀναστήθη, of a different essence from him, one being God and the other a creature; they affirming on the contrary, that he was equal to the Father, as ὁ μείζον, of the same essence with him; that is, as God, and not a creature. Notwithstanding which equality, there might be some subordination in them, as hic Deus and hic persona (to ufe Petauins his language) this God and that person.

And thus does there seem not to be so great a difference between the more genuine Platonists, and the ancient orthodox fathers, in their doctrine concerning the Trinity, as is by many conceived. However, our Platonick Christiant would further add, that there is no necessity at all from the principles of Platonism itself, why the Platonists should make any other or more subordination in their Trinity, than the most severely orthodox fathers themselves. For according to the common hypothesis of the Platonists, when the character of the first hypostasis is supposed by them, to be infinite goodness; of the second, infinite wisdom; and of the third, infinite active
active love and power, (these not as accidents and qualities, but as all substantial) it is more easy to conceive, that all these are really but one and the same God, than how there should be any considerable inferiority in them. But besides this, there is another Platonick hypothesis (which St. Augustine De Civ. D. hinteth from Porphyrius, though he professeth he did not well understand it) where the third hypothetis is made to be a certain middle betwixt the first and second. And this does Proclus also sometimes follow, calling the third to like manner, μετων διαμοι, a middle power, and φείσεν ὅμως, the relation of both the first and second to one another. Which agreeeth exactly with that apprehension of some Christians, that the third hypothetis is as it were the nexus betwixt the first and the second, and that love, whereby the Father and Son love each other. Now, according to this latter Platonick hypothesis, there would seem to be not so much a gradation or descent, as a kind of circulation in the Trinity. Upon all which considerations, the Platonick Christian will conclude, that though some junior Platonists have adulterated the notion of the Trinity, yet either there is no such great difference betwixt the genuine Platonick Trinity, rightly understood, and the Christian; or else, that as the same might be modelled and rectified, there need not to be.

But though the genuine Platonists do thus suppose the three hypothesies of their Trinity to be all of them, not only God, but also one God, or μία σώφρον, one entire Divinity; upon which latter account, the whole may be laid also by them, to have one singular or numerical essence: yet notwithstanding must it be acknowledged, that they no where suppose each of these three hypothesies to be numerically the very same, or to have no distinct singular essences of their own; this being, in their apprehensions, directly contradistious to their very hypothesis itself, and all one, as if they should affirm them, indeed not to be three hypothesies, but only one. Nevertheless, the Christian Platonist would here also apologize for them after this manner; that the ancient orthodox fathers of the Christian church were generally of no other persuasion than this, that that essence or substance of the Godhead, which all the three persons or hypothetis agree in, as each of them is God, was not one singular and individual, but only one common and universal essence or substance; that word substance being used by them as synonymous with essence, and applied to universals likewise, as it is by the Peripateticks, when they call a man, or animal in general, substansiam secundam, a second substance. Now this is evident from hence, because these orthodox fathers did commonly distinguish, in this controversy of the Trinity, betwixt Θεός and Τριάς, the essence or substance of the Godhead, and the hypothesies or persons themselves, after this manner; namely, that the hypothetis or person was singular and individual, but the essence or substance common and universal. Thus does Theodoret pronounce of these fathers in general, κατὰ τὸν τῶν πατέων διδασκαλίαν ἔτι ηἷς ἔδιδα διαφορὰν τὸ καινῳ ὑπὸ τὸ ίδιον, θεός τινὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντομοῦ, ταῦτα ἔχει: Ἡ ΟΥΣΙΑ τρίς ΘΗΝ ΤΙΠΟΣΤΑΣΙΝ. According to the doctrine of the fathers, as that which is common differs from that which is proper, and the genus from the species or individual, so
doth essence or substance, differ from hypostases; that is to say, that essence or substance of the Godhead, which is common to all the three hypostases, or whereby each of them is God, was concluded by the fathers, not to be one singular or individual, but one general or universal essence and substance; Theodoret, notwithstanding, there acknowledging, that no such distinction was observed by other Greek writers betwixt those two words ὀνήματι καὶ ὑποστάσει, essence or substance and hypostasis, as that the former of them should be restrained to univerals only, generical or specificales essences or substances; but that this was peculiar to the Christian fathers, in their doctrine concerning the Trinity. They in the mean time not denying, but that each hypostasis, person, or person, in the Trinity, might be said in another sense, and in way of opposition to Sabellius, to have its own singular, individual, or existent essence also; and that there are thus, τὸ ὀνήμα, three singular existent essences in the Deity, as well as τὸ ὑποστάσης, three hypostases; an hypostasis being nothing else to them, but an existent essence: however, for distinction's sake, they here thought fit thus to limit and appropriate the signification of these two words, that a singular and existent essence should not be called essence, but hypostasis; and by ὀνήμα, essence or substance, should be meant that general or universal nature of the Godhead only, which is common to all those three singular hypostases or persons, or in which they all agree. We might here heap up many more testimonies for a further confirmation of this; as that of St. Basil; ὅπως ἔχει λόγον τὸ κανόν πρὸς τὸ ὕποστασις, τῶν ἐν τῇ πρὸς τῷ ὑποστάσιμῳ. What common is to proper, the same is essence or substance (in the Trinity) to the hypostases. But we shall content ourselves only, with this full acknowledgment of D. Petavius; In hoc uno Graecorum praeritum omnium judicia concordant, ὀνήμα, id est, essentiam seu substantiam, aut naturam (quia τὸ ὑποστάσιμον) generale esse aliquid & commune, ac minimè definitum; ὑποστάσις vero proprium, singular, & circumscripsum, quod ex illo commun, & peculiaribus quasdam nostris ac proprietatibus veluti compositur. In this one thing do the judgments and opinions of all the Greeks especially agree, that Ufia, essence or substance, and nature, which they call Phylos (in the Trinity) is something general, common and undetermined; but hypostasis is that, which is proper, singular and circumscribed, and which is, as it were, compounded and made up of that common essence or substance, and certain peculiar notes and properties, or individuating circumstances.

But besides this, it is further certain, that not a few of those ancient fathers, who were therefore reputed orthodox, because they zealously opposed Arianism, did entertain this opinion also, that the three hypostases or persons of the Trinity, had not only one general and universal essence of the Godhead, belonging to them all, they being all God; but were also three individuals, under one and the same ultimate species, or specifick essence and substance of the Godhead; just as three individual men (Thomas, Peter, and John) under that ultimate species of man; or that specifick essence of humanity, which have only a numerical difference from one another. Wherefore an hypostasis, or person (in the Trinity) was accordingly thus
thus defined by some of these fathers (viz. Anastasius and Cyril) to be
\( \text{Essentia cum suis quibusdam proprietatibus ab iis, quae sunt ejusdem specie,}
\) numero differentes; an essence or substance, with its certain properties (or individuating circumstances) differing only numerically from those of the same species with it. This doctrine was plainly affirmed and indubitably pursued, (besides several others both of the Greeks and Latins) especially by Gregory Nyssen, Cyril of Alexandria, Maximus the Martyr, and Damasceus; whose words, because Petavius hath set them down at large, we shall not here insert. Now these were they, who principally insinuated upon the absolute co-equality and independent co-ordination of the three hypostases or persons in the Trinity, as compared with one another. Because, as three men, though one of them was a father, another a son, and the third a nephew, yet have no essential dependence one upon another, but are naturally co-equal and unsubsordinate, there being only a numerical difference betwixt them; so did they in like manner conclude, that the three hypostases, or persons of the Deity, (the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost) being likewise but three individuals, under the same ultimate species or specific essence of the Godhead, and differing only numerically from one another, were absolutely co-equal, unsubsordinate and independent: and this was that, which was commonly called by them their \( \text{όμοιότης, their co-essentiality or con-substantiality.} \)

Wherefore it is observable, that St. Cyril, one of these theologers, finds no other fault at all with the Platonick Trinity, but only this, that such an Homooiotes, such a co-essentiality or con-substantiality as this, was not acknowledged therein; \( \text{ιδιοτεις δ' ἐν πρώς} \) Cont. Jul. I. \( τοτε ματος ἴδιος, εἰ τῶν τῆς ομοιοτητῶν λόγων ἑρμηνευόμεν ἠθέλον ύποτάσσεται, p. 270. τοῖς τρισίν; ἧς ἡ μία νοστὸς τῆς Ἰεωνίς Φωσίς, τὸ τριάδος ἐκ ἐξουσί πρὸς ἰπτέτοτα φωσική, καὶ τὸ γε ἐν δεῖν ἀλλάξων ἐν μείον ὀρθωτη ὑποτάσει. There would have been nothing at all wanting to the Platonick trinity for an absolute agreement of it with the Chriftian, had they but accommodated the right notion of co-essentiality or con-substantiality to their three hypostases; so that there might have been but one specific essence of the Godhead, not further distinguishable by any natural diversity, but numerically only, and so no one hypostasis any way inferior or subordinate to another. That is, had these Platonists complied with that hypothesis of St. Cyril and others, that the three persons of the Trinity were but three independent and co-coordinate individuals, under the same ultimate species or specific essence of the Godhead, as Peter, Paul and John, under that species or common nature of humanity, and so taken in this co-essentiality or con-substantiality of theirs, then had they been completely orthodox. Though we have already shewed, that this Platonick Trinity was, in another sense, Homooiotes; and perhaps it will appear afterwards, that it was so also in the very sense of the Nicene fathers, and of Athanasius. Again, these theologers supposed the three persons of their Trinity to have really no other than a specific unity or indentity; and because it seems plainly to follow from hence, that therefore they must needs be as much three gods as three men are three men; these learned fathers endeavoured with their logick
to prove, that three men are but abusively and improperly so called three, they being really and truly but one, because there is but one and the same specifick essence or substance of human nature in them all; and seriously persuaded men to lay aside that kind of language. By which same logick of theirs, they might as well prove also, that all the men in the world are but one man, and that all Epicurus his gods were but one God neither. But not to urge here, that, according to this hypothesis, there cannot possibly be any reason given, why there should be so many as three such individuals in the species of God, which differ only numerically from one another, they being but the very same thing thrice repeated; and yet that there should be no more than three such neither, and not three hundred, or three thousand, or as many as there are individuals in the species of man; for they, not to urge this, it seems plain, that this Trinity is no other than a kind of Tritheism, and that of gods independent and co-ordinate too. And therefore some would think, that the ancient and genuine Platonick Trinity, taken with all its faults, is to be preferred before the Trinity of St. Cyril and St. Gregory Nyssen, and several other reputed orthodox fathers; and more agreeable to the principles both of Christianity and of reason. However, it is evident from hence, that these reputed orthodox fathers, who were not few, were far from thinking the three hypotheses of the Trinity to have the same singular existent essence, they supposing them to have no otherwise one and the same essence of the Godhead in them, nor to be one God, than three individual men have one common specifical essence of manhood in them, and are all one man. But as this Trinity came afterwards to be decried for tritheistic; so in the room thereof, started there up that other Trinity of persons numerically the same, or having all one and the same singular existent essence; a doctrine, which feemeth not to have been owned by any publick authority in the Christian Church, save that of the Lateran council only.

And that no such thing was ever entertained by the Nicene fathers and those first opposers of Arianism, might be rendered probable in the first place from the free confession and acknowledgment of D. Petavius, (a person well acquainted with ecclesiastick antiquity;) and for this reason, especially, because many are much led by such new names and authorities; In eo principium vim collocasse patres, ut aequalis patri naturalis essentiae, filium esse defendent I, citra expressam SINGULARITATIS mentionem, liceat ex eo coniicere. Etenim Niceni ipsi presbiteris, quibus nemo melius Arianum scit, arcana cognovit, nemo, qua re opprimenda maxime forset, acerum dijudicare potuit, nihil in professionibus sua formulâ specierunt aliquid, nisi ut aequalitatem illam essentiae, dignitatis, aternitatis affirmerent. Ita est, hoc esse vox ipsa, quae arx quaedam fuit catholicum dogmatis. Hec enim aequalitatem patris essentiae, quam SINGULARITATEM significat, ut capite quinto docuit. Deinde caterna ejusdem modi sunt in illo decreto, et; etc. The chief force, which the ancient fathers opposed against the Arian heretics, was in asserting only the equality of the Son with the Father, as to nature or essence, without any express mention of the SINGULARITY of the same. For those

* The fourth general Lateran Council held in 1215, under Pope Innocent III.
those Nicene bishops themselves, who did understand best of any the secrets of the Arian faction, and which way it should especially be oppugned, aimed at nothing else in their confession of faith, but only to establish that equality of essence, dignity and eternity between them. This does the word Homousius itself declare, it signifying rather equality, than SINGULARITY of essence, as we have before shewed. And the like do those other passages in the same decree; as, That there was no time when the Son was not; and, That he was not made of nothing, nor of a different hypostasis, or essence. Thus does Petavius clearly confess, that this same singularity of numerical essence was not affected by the Nicene council, nor the most ancient fathers, but only an equality or sameness of generical essence; or else that the Father and Son agreed only in one common essence or substance of the Godhead, that is, the eternal and uncreated nature.

But the truth of this will more fully appear from these following particulars: Firfi, Because these orthodox Anti-arian fathers did all of them zealously condemn Sabellianism, the doctrine whereof is no other than this, that there was but one hypostasis, or singular individual essence, of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and consequently that they were indeed but three several names, or notions, or modes, of one and the self-same thing. From whence such absurdities as these would follow, that the Father's begetting the Son was nothing but one name, notion, or mode of the Deity's begetting another; or else the same Deity, under one notion, begetting itself under another notion. And when again the Son, or Word, and not the Father, is said to have been incarnated, and to have suffered death for us upon the cross, that it was nothing but a mere logical notion or mode of the Deity, that was incarnate and suffered, or else the whole Deity under one particular notion or mode only. But should it be averred notwithstanding, that this trinity, which we now speak of, was not a trinity of mere names and notions, as that of the Sabellians, but of distinct hypostases or persons; then must it needs follow (since every singular essence is an hypostasis, according to the sense of the ancient fathers) that there was not a trinity only, but a quaternity of hypostases, in the Deity. Which is a thing, that none of those fathers ever dream'd of.

Again, the word Homousius, as was before intimated by Petavius, was never used by Greek writers otherwise than to signify the agreement of things, numerically differing from one another in some common nature or universal essence, or their having a generical unity or identity, of which fundry instances might be given. Nor indeed is it likely, that the Greek tongue should have any name for that, which neither is a thing in nature, nor falls under human conception, viz. several things having one and the same singular essence. And accordingly St. Basil interprets the force of this word thus, ἡ διὰ τὴν ταυτότητά της ὑποστάσεως ἡ γὰρ αὐτῷ τι ἐγείρα τινά ὕποπτον, ἀλλ' ἴσην ἴσων. That is plainly takes away the sameness of hypostasis, that is, of singular numerical essence (this being that, which the ancient fathers meant).
by the word hypothesis:) for the same thing is not homousios, co-essential or con-substantial with itself, but always one thing with another. Wherefore as τὸ ὁμοῦσιν and συνεχεῖσθαι are used by Plotinus as synonymous, in these words concerning the soul, Θεὼν μὲν ἴδια συνεχεῖσθαι γὰρ τὸ ὁμοῦσιν, that it is full of divine things, by reason of its being conguate or congenerous, and homousios with them; so doth Athanasius in like manner use them, when he affirmeth, τὸ κύριον ἐστὶν ὁμοῦσιν ἐκ συνεχείας ἡς ἡ σωματικὴ, That the branches are homousious [co-essential or con-substantial] and congenerous with the vine, or with the root thereof. Besides which, the same father uses ὁμοῦσις, and οὐμοῦσις, and οὐμοῦσις, indifferently for ὁμοῦσις, in sundry places; none of which words can be thought to signify an identity of singular essence, but only of generical or specific. And thus was the word Homousios plainly used by the council of Chalcedon 1, they affirming, that our Saviour Christ was ὁμοῦσις τῷ πα-τεὶ κατὰ τὴν ἔνσωσιν, ὁμοῦσις ἡ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαγγέλου, co-essential or con-substantial with the Father, as to his divinity; but co-essential or con-substantial with us men, as to his humanity. Where it cannot reasonably be suspected, that one and the same word should be taken in two different senses in the same sentence, so as in the first place to signify a numerical identity, but in the second, a generical or specific only. But lastly, which is yet more, Athanasius himself speaketh in like manner of our Saviour Christ's being homousios with us men; τὸ μὲν ὁμοῦσις ἵνα ἐν τῷ θεῷ γίνῃς, γάρ τὸν αὐτοῦ θεόν ἐν τῷ θεῷ γίνῃς, ἵνα κατὰ τὸν ὄνομα ἀλληλεπιβιβάζεται ἡ σωματική. If the Son be co-essential or con-substantial (of the same essence or substance) with us men, he having the very same nature with us, then let him be in this respect a stranger to the essence or substance of the Father, even as the vine is to the essence of the bushanaman. And again, a little after, in the same epistle, ἦν πάντων καὶ οὐκ ἔχει τοῦ λόγου ἵνα τοῦ τῶν πατρὸς υἱόν γίναι τὸν ἀνθρώπων. Or did Dionysius, think you, when be affirmed the Word not to be proper to the essence of the Father, suppose him therefore to be co-essential or con-substantial with us men? From which it is unquestionably evident, that Athanasius did not, by the word homousios, understand that which hath the same singular and numerical essence with another, but the same common generical or specific only; and consequently, that he conceived the Son to be co-essential or con-substantial with the Father after that manner.

Furthermore, the true meaning of the Nicene fathers may more fully and thoroughly be perceived, by considering what that doctrine of Arius was, which they opposed and condemned. Now Arius maintained, the Son or Word to be Φύσις, a creature, made in time, and mutable or defeasible; and for that reason, as Athanasius tells us, ἑτερόσως and ἀλληλεπιβιβάζεται, of a different essence or substance from the Father, (that which is created being supposed to differ essentially or substantially from that which is uncreated.) Wherefore the Nicene fathers, in way of opposition to this doctrine of Arius, determined, that the Son or Word was not thus ἑτερόσως, nor

nor ἀλληλομονή, but ὁμοόσιον τῷ Παρθ, co-essential or consubstantial with the Father; that is, not a creature, but God; or agreeing with the Father in that common nature or essence of the Godhead. So that this is that ὀνόμα, essence or substance of the ancient fathers, which is said to be the same in all the three hypostases of the Trinity, as they are called God; not a singular existent essence, but the common, general, or universal essence of the Godhead, or of the uncreated nature, called by St. Hilary, Natura una, non unitate personæ, sed generis; one nature, not by unity of person, but of kind. Which unity of the common or general essence of the Godhead is the same thing also with that equality, which some of the ancient fathers so much insist upon against Arius; namely, an equality of nature, as the Son and Father are both of them alike God, that essence of the Godhead (which is common to all the three persons) being, as all other essences, supposed to be indivisible. From which equality itself also does it appear, that they acknowledged no identity of singular essence, it being absurd to say, that one and the self-same thing is equal to itself. And with this equality of essence did some of these orthodox fathers themselves imply, that a certain inequality of the hypostases or persons also, in their mutual relation to one another, might be consistent. As for example, St. Austin writing thus against the Arians; Patris, ergo & Fili, & Spiritus Sancti, etiam disparum cognitum potestatem, naturam saeclum confecintur eodem: Though they conceive the power of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be unequal, yet let them, for all that, confess their nature at least to be equal.

And St. Basil likewise; Though the Son be in order second to the Father, 3. Cont. Eu-because produced by him, and in dignity also, (so far as the Father is the cause and principle of his being) yet is he not, for all that, second in nature, because there is one divinity in them both. And that this was indeed the meaning, both of the Nicene fathers, and of Athanasius, in their Homoeoieos, their co-essentiality or consubstantiality, and co-equality of the Son with the Father, namely, their having both the same common essence of the Godhead; or that the Son was no creature, as Arius contended, but truly God or uncreated likewise, will appear undeniably from many passages in Athanasius, of which we shall here mention only some few. In his epistle concerning the Nicene council, he tells us, how the Eusebian faction subscribed the form of that council, though afterward they recanted it, πάντων τοῦ ὑποτηθείσων ὑπέρφευξαν ὡς οἱ μείζον Εὐσέβιον τέτων τοῖς ῥήμασιν οις αὐτικοίς ὑπὸ άυτῶν λέγω δι’ τὸ ἐκ τῆς υἱότης, ὡς τῷ ὁμοούσιον, ὡς οτι μέντε κλίσιμα ὡς ποίμα, μένο τὸν γενετέον ἐνῷ ὁ τῷ Θεῷ ὤστ’ ἀλλὰ γενετέον ὡς τῆς τοῦ παλέος ὑψίς ὁ λόγος. All the rest subscribing, the Eusebian faction themselves subscribed also to these very words, which they now find fault with; I mean, of the essence or substance, and co-essential or consubstantial, and that the Son is no creature or satellite, or any of the things made, but the genuine off-spring of the essence or substance of the Father. Afterwards he declareth, how the Nicene council at first intended to have made use only of scripture words and phrases, against the Arians; τῷ συνόδῳ βελονόσα τῇ μέν τοῦ Λευκωνίου τῆς αὐτοθείας λείπεις αὐθείαν τῷ Θεῷ τ. 267. ἐν τῷ γεγονόν ὁμοολογήμας φωνής γέφυρας, ὡς οτι τοῦ ἄγιον ἤρθεν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὡς λόγος ἔστιν ὡς σεφία, ἀλλ’ οἱ κλίσιμα ὑπὲρ ποίμα, ὡς δι’ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, πατρὶς, I. 111.
πατρὸς γένους. As that Christ was the Son of God, and not from nothing, but from God, the word and wisdom of God, and consequently, no creature or thing made. But when they perceived, that the Enthusiast faction would evade all those expressions by equivocation, εἰς τὴν κύριον αὐτοῦ κυριακότης άποκείμενον αύτῳ τὸ Θεόν ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, they conceived, if they had not the essence of God in him, they might be said to be from God, so as to be accounted coessential or confusional with the Father, contrary to the Nicene Fathers, who maintained, that the Son was a creature, or thing made, and mutable, and that he was not before he was made; which is to be affirmed, contrariety of the synod, but whatsoever divers from Arian, must needs confess to these forms of the synod. In this same epistle, to cite but one passage more out of it, χαλκοίς, σιλβάνας καὶ χρυσούς, &c. ἐπετρεπτόν καὶ ἐπετρεπτὰ ἀλλάξαντες εἰ μὴ ἐν καὶ ἐν οὐκ ἐνέκα, εἰ καὶ οὐκ ὑπό τῷ θεῷ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ οὕτως, καὶ μὴ ὑμῶν, οἱ τῶν ἐν θεῷ καὶ τῶν ἐν θεῷ οἷον ἐν θεῷ, καὶ τῶν ἐν θεῷ ἀνθρώπον, εἰς τινὰς οἰκοδομίας καὶ τοιαύτας εὐκαθιστώς. The synod perceiving this, rightly declared, that the Son was homousious with the Father, both to cut off the subterfuges of heretics, and to show him to be different from the creatures. For after they had decreed this, they added immediately, Τίνος δὲν λέγοντων ἔχων, that the Son of God was from things that are not, or made, or mutable, or a creature, or of another substance or essence, all such does the holy and catholic church anathematize. Whereby they made it evident, that these words, Of the Father, and coessential or confusional with the Father, were opposed to the impiety of those expressions of the Arians, that the Son was a creature, or thing made, and mutable, and that he was not before he was made, which is to affirm, contrary to the synod, but whatsoever divers from Arian, must needs confess to those forms of the synod. Wherefore it is unquestionably evident, that when the ancient orthodox fathers of the Christian church maintained, against Arian, the Son to be homousious, coessential or confusional with the Father, though that word be thus interpreted, Of the same essence or substance, yet they universally understood thereby, not a farnosel of singular and numerical, but of common or universal essence only; that is, the general or specific essence of the Godhead; that the Son was no creature, but truly and properly God. But if it were needful, there might be yet more testimonies cited out of Athanasius to this purpose. As from his epistle De Synodis.
Synodis Arimini & Seleuciae, where he writeth thus, concerning the differenc betwixt those two words; 'Oμοιότης, of like substance, and 'Oμοσιον, of the same substance,' O διαλεγει σ' χ' χριστιανικα δι' την ρηματικην λειτουργιαν την ομοιοτηταν, αλλα δι' αυταν ανθρωπου ομοσιον λεγεται εις κατα την ρηματικαν--- τη γαρ αυτη 'Ομοφυλει εστιν το παλαιον ανθρωπου και εις Ανθρωπου λεγεται αλλα Ετεροφυλει 'Ομοσιον και εις τον τον ομοσιον.--- For even yourselves know, that similitude is not predicated of essences or substances, but of figures and qualities only. But of essences or substances, identity or sameness is affirmed, and not similitude. For a man is not said to be like to a man, in respect of the essence or substance of humanity, but only as to figure or form; they being said, as to their essence, to be congeneric, of the same nature or kind with one another. Nor is a man properly said to be unlike to a dog, but of a different nature or kind from him. Wherefore that, which is congeneric, of the same nature, kind, or species, is also Homousion, co-essential or consubstantial (of the same essence or substance) and that, which is of a different nature, kind or species, is Heterousion, (of a different essence or substance.) Again, Athanasius, in that fragment of his against the hypocri- lity of Meletius, &c. concerning consubstantiality, writeth in this manner: 'Ο τουχου αναμνησει το εις τον ισομοσιου τον πατα, λεγον δε ομοσιον, αναφερει το εις Θεον' οιασις δε και εις την ομοσιον τον δε ομοσιον; For he interprets of the same nature, kind, or species, and of the same essence or substance, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, as God, the Father, and the Holy Ghost, of which he saith, 'Ελληνων ης εις εικονικην το ομοσιον ρημα το εις 'Ελληνων ης εις εικονικην ρημα το εις την αυτην φυσιν παρακατασκευασται, &c. He that denies the Son to be Homousion, consubstantial with the Father, affirming him only to be like to him, denies him to be God. In like manner, he, who retaining the word Homousion or consubstantial, interprets it notwithstanding only of similitude or likeness in substance, affirmtb the Son to be of another different substance from the Father, and therefore not God; but like to God only. Neither doth such a one rightly understand those words. Of the substance of the Father, he not thinking the Son to be so consubstantial, or of the essence and substance of the Father, as one man is consubstantial, or of the essence or substance of another who begat him. For be who affirmeth, that the Son is not so of God, as a man is of a man, according to essence or substance; but that he is like him only, as a statue is like a man, or as a man may be like to God, it is manifest, that such a one, though he use the word Homousion, yet be doth not really mean it. For he will not understand it, according to the customary signification thereof, for that, which both one and the same essence or substance; this word being used by Greeks and Pagans in no other sense, than to signify that, which both the same nature; as we ought to believe concerning the Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Where we see plainly, that though the word Homousion be interpreted, That

1 P. 928. Tom. I. Oper. 2 Tom. I. Oper. p. 572.
That which hath one and the same essence or substance, yet is this underflood of the same common nature, and as one man is of the same essence or substance with another. We might here also add to this the concurrent testimonies of the other orthodox fathers; but, to avoid tediousness, we shall omit them, and only insert some passages out of St. 

For he, in his first book, contra Maxim. chap. the 15th*, wrote thus, Duo veri homines, est nullus corum filius est alterius, unus tamen est ejusdem, et ejusdem substantiae. Homo autem alterius hominis verus filius nullus modo potest nisi ejusdem cum patre esset substantiae, etiam si non sit per omnia similis patri. Quocirca veri Dei filius, et unus cum patre substantiae est, quia verus filius est; et per omnia est patri similis, quia est Dei filius. Two true men, though neither of them be son to the other, yet are they both of one and the same substance. But a man, who is the true son of another man, can by no means be of a different substance from his father, although he be not in all respects like unto him. Wherefore the true Son of God is both of one substance with the Father, because he is a true Son, and he is also in all respects like to him, because he is the Son of God. Where Christ, or the Son of God, is said to be no otherwise of one substance with God the Father, than here amongst men the son is of the same substance with his father, or any one man with another. Again, the same St. 

To the same purpose is that in his Second Book, ch. 6. Diversa sunt substantia Dei Patris, & Homo Meus & non tamen diversa substantia Dei Patris & Deus Filius; filius non est diversa substantia, Homo Mater & Homo Filius, & Homo. Filius.
same substance with the Father; for whatever substance is not God, is creature; and whatever is not creature, is God. And therefore if the Son be not of the same substance with the Father, he must needs be a made and created substance, and not truly God.

Lastly, That the ancient orthodox fathers, who used the word Homoousios against Arius, intended not therein to affect the Son to have one and the same singular or individual essence with the Father, appeareth plainly from their disclaiming and disowning those two words, Ταυτοοὐφίον and Μονοοὐφίον. Concerning the former of which, Epiphanius thus; Ἐπιφανεὶς δὲ λέγομεν Ταυτοοὐφίον, ίνα μὴ ἡ λέξις ποιῶν τινι λεγομένην, Σαβέλλιον ἀπικαθῆ. Ταυτάς δὲ λέγομεν τῇ Σειτηλίᾳ, καὶ τῇ Κανσίᾳ, καὶ τῇ δυνάμει. We affirm not the Son to be Tautooulion, (one and the same substance with the Father) lest this should be taken in way of compliance with Sabellius; neither do we affect him to be the same in Godhead, and in essence, and in power. Where it is plain, that when Epiphanius affirmed the Son to be the same with the Father in Godhead and essence, he understood this only of a general or specific, and not of a singular or individual sameness; namely, that the Son is no creature, but God also, as the Father is; and this he intimates to be the true and genuine sense of the word Homoousios; he therefore rejecting that other word Tautooulion, because it would be liable to misinterpretation, and to be taken, in the Sabellian sense, for that, which hath one and the same singular and individual essence, which the word Homoousios could not be obnoxious to. And as concerning that other word Monoooufios, Athanasius himself, in his Exposition of Faith, thus expressly condemns it, αἱ γὰρ οὐσίαις Ἐφεσίων, ὡς οἱ Σαβελλινοὶ Μονοοὐφίον καὶ οὐχ Θαυτοοὐφίον. We do not think the Son to be really one and the same with the Father, as the Sabellians do, and to be Monoooufios, and not Homoousios; they thereby destroying the very being of the Son. Whereof, essence or substance, in that fictitious word Monoooufios, is taken for singular or existent essence, the whole Deity being thus said, by Sabellians, to have only one singular essence or hypostasis in it: whereas in the word Homoousios is understood a common or universal, general or specific essence, the Son being thus said to agree with the Father in the common essence of the Godhead, as not being a creature. Wherefore Athanasius here disclaimeth a Monoooufian trinity, as Epiphanius did before a Tautooulion; both of them a trinity of mere names and notions, or inadequate conceptions of one and the same singular essence or hypostasis; they alike distinguishing them from the Homoousian trinity, as a trinity of real hypostases or persons, that have severally their own singular essence, but agree in one common and universal essence of the Godhead, they being none of them creatures, but all uncreated, or creators. From whence it is plain, that the ancient orthodox fathers affcrted no such thing as one and the same singular or numerical essence, of the several persons of the trinity; this, according to them, being not a real trinity, but a trinity of mere names, notions, and inadequate conceptions only, which is thus disclaimed and declared against by Athanasius 1; Τριάς δὲ ἐστιν οὐχ ἐν οὐσίαις, καὶ Φανής, καὶ Πάνης, καὶ Θαυτοῦς Τριάς, Τὸ θεὸν ἐστιν 

trinity of mere names and words only, but of hypostases, truly and really existing. But the Homoo- 

thesis, or co-essentiality of the three persons in the trinity, does imply them to be all God, yet does it not follow from thence of necessity that they are therefore one God. What then? Shall we conclude, that Athanasius himself also entertained that opinion before mentioned and exploded, of the three persons in the trinity being but three individuals under the same species (as Peter, Paul, and Timothy) and having no other natural unity or identity, than specific only? Indeed some have confidently fastened this upon Athanasius, because, in those Dialogues of the Trinity, published amongst his works, and there entitled to him, the same is grozilly owned, and in defence thereof this absurd paradox maintained, that Peter, Paul, and Timothy, though they be three hypostases, yet are not to be accounted three men, but only then when they differ from one another, or disagree in will or opinion. But it is certain, from several passages in those dialogues themselves, that they could not be written by Athanasius; and there hath been also another father found for them, to wit, Maximus the martyr. Notwithstanding which, thus much must not be denied by us, that Athanasius, in those others his reputedly genuine writings, does sometime approach


Whether Co-essentiality alone  Book I.
approach so near hereunto, that he lays no small stress upon this homoeostases, this coessentiality and common nature of the Godhead, to all the three persons, in order to their being one God. For thus, in that book entitled, Concerning the common essence of the three persons, and the chapter inquired, "Nor in their essences, that there are not three Gods, doth Athanasius lay his foundation here. When to that question proposed, How it can be said, that the Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, and yet that there are not three Gods? the first reply which he makes is this, 'Yet, xaiVoi the τῆς Φύσεως, κινεῖ καὶ κύμα τῆς φύσεως απ' τιν ἄλλης φύσεως, οὐδὲ ὁ θεὸς τα ἰες πλῆθιν αὐρημένα ἀπ' ἀλλής φύσεως, οὐδὲ ὁ θεὸς τα ἰες πλῆθιν αὐρημένα τῇ ὑποχρεωσει, ἡ νὶ αὐρημένα καὶ τῇ διαλαλοῦσαι τῷ κόσμῳ, ὡς εἰν αὐρημένα διαλαλοῦσαι: Where there is a communion of nature, there is also one common name of dignity bestowed. And thus doth God himself call things, divided into multitudes from one common nature, by one singular name. For both when he is angry with men, doth he call all those, who are the objects of his anger, by the name of one man; and when he is reconciled to the world, he be reconciled thereto as to one man. The first instances, which he gives hercelf, are in Gen. the 6th, the 3d and 7th verses; My spirit shall not always strive with men, and I will destroy man whom I have created. Upon which, Athanasius makes this reflection; κατοί νῦν ἡ εἰκὼν, ἀλλὰ μορφᾶς ἀπενεργοῦσα ἅλλα τῇ διάφορα τῆς φύσεως, τῷ πάλιν αὐρημένα ἐκ ἑκάστου ἀὐρημένα διὰ τῷ κατοί τῆς φύσεως. Though there was not then only one man, but infinite myriads of men, nevertheless by the name of one nature, doth the Scripture call all those men, one man, by reason of their community of essence or substance. Again, he commenteth in like manner upon that other Scripture passage, P. 213, 214. Isaiah xv. 1. The horse and his rider both be thrown into the sea: "Ὅσοι εἶναι Φαραώ κατὰ τὴν Ἑλάσασαν, πήθουσας μετὰ μηρῶν αματῶν ἐν τῇ Ἑλάσασα, καὶ θάπτουσαν αὐρημένους οἱ βοώδεις μετὰ ἑκάστου, καὶ θάπτουσαν ὁ δὲ Μωσῆς εἰεῖς, ὅτι πάντων τοῖς βοώδεσιν μία ἐν τῇ Φύσει, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἤπατων γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἄνθρωπων λόγων, ἐπειδὴ μετὰ ἀναλησίως ἐπέβαλεν τῇ Ἑλάσασαν τῇ πλῆθος τῶν ἄνθρωπων ἐκάστου οἱ αὐρημέναι, καὶ τῇ πλῆθος τῶν ἤπατων ἐκάστου ἐπέβαλεν τῇ πλῆθος ἑκάστου. When Pharaoh went out to the Red-sea, and fell, with infinite chariots in the sea; and there were many men, that were drowned together with him, and many horses: yet Moses knowing, that there was but one common nature of all those, that were drowned, speaketh thus both of men and horses; The Lord hath thrown both the horses and the rider into the sea: being called such a multitude of men but one singular man, and such a multitude of horses but one horse. Whereupon Athanasius thus concludes; P. 214. οὖν, ἐν τοῖς αὐρημέναις, ὡσαν συνεχείως τὰς τῆς φύσεως; ὡσαν διαφορας τὰς τῆς μορφῆς καὶ εὐκαρπίας καὶ βασιλείας, η γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ ἑκάστη ἑαυτῆς, ἡ μορφῆς, ἡ ἑκάστης, καὶ ἐνδεξαιμότης διὰ τῶν κατοί τῆς φύσεως πάντων ἐνδεξαμένως εἰς αὐρημέναις ἐκάστους, οὗτος ἰσα πᾶς, ἑναὶ τῶν ἄνθρωπων, ὅτι καὶ βασιλεῖς, ἐνδεξαμένως τῆς ἐπιφάνειας, Ἔκα τῆς Θεοῦ. If therefore amongst men, where the things of nature are confounded, and where there are differences of form, power and will (all men not having the same disposition of mind, nor form, nor strength) as also different languages, (from whence men are called by the poets Meropes) nevertheless, by reason of the community of nature, the whole world is called one man; might not that Trin-
Co-Essentiality necessary

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uity of persons, where there is an undivided dignity, one kingdom, one power, one will, and one energy, be much rather called one God? But though it be true, that Athanasius in this place (if at least this were a genuine foetus of Athanasius) may justly be thought to attribute too much to this κοινόν τῆς Φύσεως καὶ ζωῆς, a common nature, essence, or substance, of all the three persons, as to the making of them to be truly and properly one God; and that those Scripture-paflages are but weakly urged to this purpose: yet it is plain, that he did not acquiesce in this only, but addeth other things to it also, as their having not only one will, but also one energy or action, of which more afterwards. Moreover, Athanasius elsewhere plainly imploïth, that this common essence or nature of the Godhead is not sufficient alone to make all the three hypostases one God. As in his fourth oration against the Arians, where he tells us, that his Trinity of divine hypostases cannot therefore be accounted three gods nor three principles, because they are not resembled by him to three original suns, but only to the sun, and its splendour, and the light from both. Now, three suns, according to the language of Athanasius, have κοινόν τῆς Φύσεως καὶ ζωῆς, a common nature, essence, and substance, and therefore are coessential or confusantial; and since they cannot be accounted one sun, it is manifest, that, according to Athanasius, this specific identity or unity, is not sufficient to make the three divine hypostases one God. Again, the same Athanasius, in his Exposition of Faith, writeth thus; οὐκετί τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις μεταφοράς καὶ τις ἰσχύς, ἀλλὰ συμμαχώμεθα ἐν ἰδιότητι καὶ λογίαςα, ηνα μὴ πολυθεῖαν ἐστι τῷ θεῷ Φερούμενον. Neither do we acknowledge three hypostases, divided or separate by themselves (as is to be seen corporeally in men) that we may not comply with the pagan polytheism. From whence it is evident, that neither three separate men, though coessential to Athanasius, were accounted by him to be one man, nor yet the community of the specific nature and essence of the Godhead can alone, by itself, exclude polytheism from the Trinity. Wherefore, the true reason, why Athanasius laid so great a stress upon this Homooysotes, or co-essentiality of the Trinity, in order to the unity of the Godhead in them, was not because this alone was sufficient to make them one God, but because they could not be so without it. This Athanasius often urges against the Arians, as in his fourth oration, where he tells them, πολλὲς ἐν εἰσάγων [οὐ] διὰ τὸ ἐπεξείδιε αὐτῶν. That they must needs introduce a plurality of gods, because of the heterogeneity of their trinity. And again afterwards determining, that there is ἐν θεῷ τῆς Θεότητος, one species of the Godhead, in Father, Son, and Spirit, he adds: ὅταν ὡς ἐνα ἰδιαὶ τῆς τριάδος ὑπολογίζουμεν εἶναι τὸν Θεόν ἐν πάλλ μαλλιν εὐστείτερον λέγουμεν τῆς πολυιδιάς τῶν αἰτετικῶν Θεῶν, ἐστι τὸ μίαν ἐν τριάδι θεότητα Φερομένην ἐν γὰρ μὴ εὐτὺς ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀριθμῷ πολίμα ἐν πλίμα ἑστὶν οὐ λόγου ——ἀπάγκη λέγειν αὐτῶς οὐ Δυναμικά, ἦν μὲν κίνημα, τὸν δὲ ἑπετοῦ κίνημα. And thus do we acknowledge one only God in the Trinity; and maintain it more religiously, than those heretics do, who introduce a multiform Deity, consisting of divers species; we supposing only one universal Godhead in the whole. For if it be not thus, but the Son be a creature, made out of nothing, however called God by these Arians, then

2 P. 463.
then must he and his father of necessity be two gods; one of them a creator, the other a creature. In like manner, in his book of the Nicene council, he p. 275. affirmeth, concerning the Arians, that it is said to them in the psalms: 'like him there must be a creator, not a creature.' In like manner, in his book of the Nicene council, he p. 275. affirmeth, concerning the Arians, that it is said to them in the psalms: 'like him there must be a creator, not a creature.' Whereas the right orthodox Trinity, on the contrary, is elsewhere thus described by him; *Tρις τούν αγίαν η τηλείαν έστιν, εν Ερ. ad Soter.*

The holy and perfect Trinity theologized in the Father, Son, and Spirit, both nothing alien, foreign, or extraneous intermingled with it; nor is it compounded of heterogeneous things, the creator and creature joined together. And whereas the Arians interpreted that of our Saviour Christ, *I and my father are one,* only in respect of consent or agreement of will, *Athanafius* shewing the insufficiency hereof, concluded thus, *Ανάγκη λοιπόν καθά τόν Ούρανον κεινόν καθά τόν θεόν καθά παλιόν οίνωλα,* Whereupon besides this consent of will, there must of necessity be another unity of essence or substance also, acknowledged in the Father and the Son. Where by unity of essence or substance, that *Athanafius* did not mean a unity of singular and individual, but of general or universal essence only, appears plainly from these following words: *τά μεν γὰρ νεκτά καί συμφωνίαν έχουσα έπες τού πατέρα, αλλ' έν κυρίω η μελετία ταύτην έχον, οσπέρ ο μή Φιλίας εκθέλεται, ομοίως έν έκτον ένότητι καί το γένους ταύτας.*

For those things, which are made or created, though they may have an agreement of will with their Creator, yet have they this by participation only, and in a way of motion; as he, who retaining not the same, was cast out of heaven. But the Son, being begetten from the essence or substance of the Father, is essentially or substantially one with him. So that the opposition here is betwixt unity of consent with God in created beings, which are mutable, and unity of essence in that, which is uncreated, and immutably of the same will with the father. There are also many other places in *Athanafius,* which though some may understand of the unity of singular essence, yet were they not so by him intended, but either of generic or specific essence only, or else in such other sense as shall be afterwards declared. As for example, in his fourth oration, *τοῦ μίαν τού εὐάθλην φρονομένην, We acknowledge only one God.*

bead in the Trinity; where the following words plainly imply this to be understood, in part at least, of one common or general essence of the Godhead, *εί γὰρ μὴ οὕτως έχει, αλλ' έξ οὗ οὕτως ποίμα γένοιτο έπει δούλοις, &c.* Because if it be not so, but the Word be a creature, made out of nothing, he is either not truly God, or if be be called by that name, then must they be two gods, one a creator, the other a creature. Again, when in the same book it is said,

*ἐν είσοδὸ ούς καί ο πατής τήν ιδιότητι μακαριότητι τῆς Φύσεως, μία τῷ ταυτότητι τῆς μίας θεότητος.* That the Son and the Father are one thing in the propriety of nature, and in the sameness of one Godhead; it is evident from the context, that this is not to be understood of a sameness of singular essence, but partly of a common and general one, and partly of such another sameness or unity, as will be hereafter expressed. Lastly, when the three hypostases are somewhere said

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1 Vide Quæstion. VI. p. 442. Tom. II. Opera. Athanaf.
by him to be μία oίCω, one essence or substance, this is not to be understood neither in that place, as if they had all three the same singular essence, but in some of those other sentences before mentioned.

But though Athanasius no where declare the three hypostases of the Trinity to have only one and the same singular essence, but, on the contrary, denies them to be monooousian; and though he lay a great stress upon their idem nature, their specific or generic unity, and coessentiality, in order to their being one God, for as much as without this they could not be God at all; yet doth he not rely wholly upon this, as alone sufficient to that purpose, but addeth certain other considerations thereunto, to make it out, in manner as followeth. First, that this trinity is not a Trinity of principles, but that there is only one principle or fountain of the Godhead in it, from which the other are derived. Thus doth he write in his fifth oration, ἡ αἰχμή γὰρ τοῦ τόιτο εἰς Ἰησοῦν, There is but one principle, and accordly but one God. Again, in his book against the Sabellanists, εἰς εἰς δός ὁ εἰς, ὅτι μηδὲ δύο πατήρες, μηδὲ ἐπερχόμενος τοῦ γενεσίους ἡ γενενομοσος, οἱ μὴ γὰρ αἰχμές εἰσάγων δύο, δύο κηρύκτης Ὀδος, αὐτὴ Μαρκιανὸς ἡ δουλεία. There are not two gods, both because there are not two fathers, and because that, which is begotten, is not of a different essence from that which begat. For he that introduceth two principles, preacheth two gods, which was the impiety of Marcion. Accordingly, the same Athanasius declareth, ἢ τὸν Συν. Μηδόν υἱὸν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀθέτη, ἂς ἀνεῖγεν ἢ πατρὸς εἰς τοῦ γόος, That the essence or De Sel. I. 920. substance of the Father is the principle, and root and fountain of the Son.

And in like manner doth he approve of this doctrine of Dincyfius, ὅτε πατὴρ τοῦ αἵματος ἀνέγομεν εἰς ὁ Σως, πάντως δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ περιεχόμενος ὁ ὸσ. That God (the father) is the first fountain of all good things, but the Son a river poured out from him. To the same purpose is it also, when he compar eth the Father and the Son to the water and the vapour arising from it; to the light and the splendor; to the prototype and the image. And he concludes the unity of the Godhead from hence, in this manner: De Syn. Nic., ἢ τὸν Μηδόν τριάδα εἰς ὅνα ὄστη ἢ καρπὸν τινα, τὸν Ἰησοῦ τὸν ὄλον τοῦ παν-

In the next place therefore, Athanasius further addeth, that these three divine hypostases are not μεταφανείαν and καταλείψεων, separate and disjointed beings.

³ Pag. 905.
beings, but ἀδιαίρετος, indivisibly united to one another. Thus in his fifth oration ; πατρίς καὶ υἱός καὶ θεὸς; τῷ Ἁγίῳ, καὶ τῷ ἁχορίστῳ, ἀμφίστῳ, καὶ ἀδιαίρετῳ ἄχορίστῳ εἰς τὸν λόγον ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς. The father and the son are both one thing in the Godhead, and in that the Word, being begotten from him, is indivisibly and inseparably conjoined with him. Where, when he affirmeth the Father and the Son to be one in the Godhead, it is plain, that he doth not mean them to have one and the same singular essence, but only generical and universal; because in the following words he supposeth them to be two, but indivisibly and inseparably united together. Again, in his book De Sent. Dionys. ἡ τοῦ ἀπαγόρως ὁ ὡς, ὡς ἂν τὸ ἀπαγόρως ἀπὸ τὸ φῶς. The Son is indivisibly from the Father, as the splendor is from the light. And afterwards in the same book he insinuateth further upon this point, according to the sense of Dionysius, after this manner: ὅ δέ ἱδὼν ἢ ἀδιαίρετός τιν, τοῦ πατρός ἡς τοῦ ἡμῶν ἡ συνομοσύνη, ὡς ἡν τὸ λόγος πρὸς τὸν ὄν καὶ ἡ ἡρεμία πρὸς τον πνεύματος, ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ πνεύματος μερίσατο καὶ τινάξατο διελέει, ἡ τοῦ ἀπαγόρως ἐκαθιελίων ἀπὸ τοῦ φωτοῦ. Dionysius teacheth, that the Son is cognate with the Father, and indivisibly from him, as reason is from the mind, and the river from the fountain. Who is there therefore, that would go about to alienate reason from the mind, and so separate the river from the fountain, making up a wall between them? or to cut off the splendor from the light? Thus also in his epistle to Serapion, that the Holy Ghost is not a creature, ὃ διελέευσε τοῦ προτοῦ κατοι καὶ τὸ ἀπαγόρως καὶ τὸ φῶς, ὃ τὸν σωματικὸν τὸ σώματος ἡ μη εἰπάσασα, πως ἢ τοι. Let these men first divide the splendor from the light, or wisdom from him that is wise; or else let them wonder no more, how these things can be. Elsewhere Athanasius calls the whole Trinity, τριάδα ἀδιαίρεττόν καὶ οὐκομίαν πρὸς τὸν, a Trinity undivided and united to itself. Which Athanasian indivisibility of the Trinity is not so to be understood, as if three were not three in it; but first of all, that neither of these could be without the other, as the original light or sun could not be without the splendor, nor the splendor without the original light, and neither one nor the other of them without a diffused derivative light. Wherefore God the Father being an eternal sun, must needs have also an eternal splendor, and an eternal light. And secondly, that these are so nearly and intimately conjoined together, that there is a kind of συνῆχες, continuity, between them; which yet is not to be understood in the way of corporeal things, but so as is agreeable to the nature of things incorporeal.

Thirdly, Athanasius ascendeth yet higher, affirming the hypostases of the Trinity not only to be indivisibly conjoined with one another, but also to have a mutual inexistence in each other, which later Greek fathers have called ἐς τὴν ἀξιωσίαν, their circuminfection. To this purpose does he cite the words of Dionysius, ἀπορρίμα γὰρ τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ καθίσκους διὰ τοῦ καθίσκους λόγον, καὶ οὕτως ἐντὸς ἐντὸς ἐν καθίσκους. ἐς τὸν καθίσκους, καὶ ἡ εἰσὶν οἷς ἤλθεν ὄντος ὑπὸ τοῦ καθίσκους καὶ ὁ λόγος. [Tom. I. O. Tom. I. O. 265. Sentent. Dion. Sentent. Dion. 3 See Petav. Lib. IV. de Trinitate, Cap. XVI. p. 263. Tom. II. Dogmat. theolog. 1 P. 529. 2 P. 566. 3 See Petav. Lib. IV. de Trinitate, Cap. XVI. p. 263. Tom. II. Dogmat. theolog.]
For reason is the efflux of the mind, which in men is derived from the heart into the tongue, where it is become another reason or word, differing from that in the heart; and yet do these both mutually exist in each other, they belonging to one another; and so though being two, are one thing. Thus are the Father and the Son one thing, they being said to exist in each other. And Athanasius further illustrates this also by certain similitudes; as that again of the original light and the splendor, he affirming φως είναι ἐν τῷ ἀκανθόμενῳ, καὶ ἀκανθόμενον εἰς τὸν ιθής. That the original light is in the splendor, and again the splendor in the sun; and also that of the prototype and the image, or the king and his picture; which he thus insinueth upon, ἐν τῇ εἴσοδῷ τοῦ βασιλέως τὸ εἶδος ἦν μορφή εἰς, καὶ ἐν τῷ εἰσέχουν τῇ εἴσοδῳ εἶναι. In the picture is contained the form and figure of the king, and in the king the form and figure of the picture. And therefore if any one, when he had seen the picture, should afterward desire to see the king, the picture would be a proficient to bespeak him after this manner; ἐν λαβω καὶ ὁ βασιλεύς ἐν ἑσύμου, ἐν γὰρ ἐν ἑκείνῳ εἰμὶ, καθ' οὗ ἐν ἑµοί καὶ ὁ ἐκεῖνος ἐν ἑµοί, τοτε ἐν ἑκείνῳ ἑλπίζει, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἐν ἑκείνῳ. For the figure, εἰς ὁ γὰρ προσκυνεῖ τον εἰσόδον, ἐν αὐτῇ προσκυνεῖ τοῦ βασιλέως. I and the king am one, I am in him, and he is in me; and what you take notice of in me, the same may you observe in him also; and what you see in him, you may see likewise in me: He therefore, that worshippeth the image, therein worshippeth the king, the image being nothing but the form of the king. Elsewhere, in the fourth oration, he thus insinueth upon this particular; ἐν γὰρ ὁ ἄγγελος ἐν τῷ πατρὶ, ὑπερὶν οἰκετείναι εἰς τὸν Κυρίον, τούτῳ τῷ πατρὶ προσκέπτεται εἰς τὴν καρδίαν. And the Son is in the Father, as may be conceived from hence; because the whole being of the Son is proper to the essence of the Father, he being derived from it, as the splendor from the light, and the river from the fountain: so that be, who sees the Son, sees that which is the Father's own and proper. Again, the Father is in the Son, because that which is the Father's own and proper, that is the Son; accordingly as the sun is also in the splendor, the mind in reason, and the fountain in the river. What cavils the Arians had against this doctrine, Athanasius also informs us; ἐκεῖνος διακυβέρνει τὸ ύπό τοῦ Κυρίου λέγεται, ἢ εἴναι τῷ πατρὶ, καὶ τῷ πατρὶ ἐν ἑµοί· λέγεται, ἡ δὲ τῇ κατακλίσει, πῶς ἔσται ὁ θεός ἐν τῷ θεός, καθαρὸς ἐν τῷ κηρίῳ χριστίων. Here the Arians begin to quarrel with that of our Lord, I am in the Father, and the Father in me; objecting, How is it possible, that both the former should be in the latter, and the latter in the former? or how can the Father, being greater, be received in the Son, who is less? And yet what wonder is it, if the Son should be in the Father; since it is written of us men also, That in him we live, and move, and have our being? In way of reply whereunto, Athanasius first observes, that the ground of this Arian cavillation was the grossness of their apprehensions, and that they did το ἀνάμαλα συμμαχίας ἐκλαμβάνων, conceive of incorporeal things after a corporeal manner. And then does he add,
Lastly, the same Athanasius, in sundry places, still further supposes those three divine hypostases to make up one entire divinity, after the same manner as the fountain and the stream make up one entire river; or the root, and the stock, and the branches, one entire tree. And in this sense also, is the whole Trinity said by him to be μία Θεότης, and μία Φύσις, and μία Ὑπόστασις, one divinity, and one nature, and one essence, and one God. And accordingly the word Homoousios seems here to be taken by Athanasius, in a further sense, besides that before mentioned; not only for things agreeing in one common and general essence, as three individual men are coessential with one another; but also for such as concurrently together make up one entire thing, and are therefore jointly essentia] thereunto. For when he affirmeth, τὸ φυτὸν ἔστιν ἡ ὑπόστασις, and τὸ κλῆμα ὡμοφύλος τῆς ὕποστασις, That the tree is congruous or homogenum with the root, and the branches coessential with the vine; his meaning is, that the root, fock, and branches, are not only of one kind, but all together make up the entire essence of one plant or tree. In like manner, those three hypostases, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are not only congruous and coessential, as having all the essence of the Godhead alike in them, but also as concurrently making up one entire Divinity. Accordingly whereunto, Athanasius further concludes, that these three divine hypostases have not a consent of will only, but essentia] and the self-same will, and that they do also jointly produce ad extra, μίαν ὑπόστασιν, one and the self-same energy, operation, or action; nothing
The Reasons for this Platonick Book I.

nothing being peculiar to the Son as such, but only the economy of the incarnation: 

nothing, and the Father by the Word, in the Holy Ghost, doth all things. And this is the unity of the holy Trinity conserved, and one God preached in the church: namely, such as is above all, and by or through all, and in all. Above all, as the Father, the principle, and fountain; through all, by the Word; and in all, by the Holy Spirit. And elsewhere he writeth often to the same purpose. Thus have we given a true and full account, how, according to Athanasius, the three divine hypostases, though not Monousious, but Homoousious only, are really but one God or Divinity. In all which doctrine of his there is nothing but what a true and genuine Platonist would readily subscribe to. From whence it may be concluded, that the right Platonick trinity differs not so much from the doctrine of the ancient church, as some late writers have supposed.

Hitherto hath the Platonick Christian endeavoured partly to rectify and reform the true and genuine Platonick trinity, and partly to reconcile it with the doctrine of the ancient church. Nevertheless, to prevent all mistakes, we shall here declare, that whereas ever this most genuine Platonick trinity may be found to differ, not only from the Scripture itself, (which yet notwithstanding is the sole rule of faith) but also from the form of the Nicene and Constantinopolitane councils; and further from the doctrine of Athanasius too, in his genuine writings, (whether it be in their inequality, or in any thing else) it is there utterly disclaimed and rejected by us. For as for that creed, commonly called Athanasian, which was written a long time after by some other hand; since at first it derived all its authority, either from the name of Athanasius, to whom it was entitled, or else because it was supposed to be an epitome and abridgement of his doctrine; this (as we conceive) is therefore to be interpreted according to the tenor of that doctrine, contained in the genuine writings of Athanasius. Of whom we can think no otherwise, than as a person highly instrumental and serviceable to divine providence, for the preserving of the Christian church from lapsing, by Arianism, into a kind of paganick and idolatrous Christianity; in religiously worshipping of thole, which themselves concluded to be creatures; and by means of whom especially, the doctrine of the Trinity, (which before fluctuated in some loose uncertainty) came to be more punctually stated and settled.

Now the reason, why we introduced the Platonick Christian here thus apologizing, was first; because we conceived it not to be the interest of Christianity, that the ancient Platonick trinity should be made more discrepant from the Christian, than indeed it is. And secondly, because, as we
have already proved, the ancient and genuine Platonick trinity was doubtless Anti-Arian, or else the Arian trinity Anti-Platonick; the second and third hypothesis, in the Platonick trinity, being both eternal, infinite, and immutable. And as for those Platonick Dei'or, or gradations, so much spoken of, these (by St. Cyril's leave) were of a different kind from the Arian, there being not the inequality of creatures in them to the Creator. Wherefore Socrates, the ecclesiastick historian, not without cause wonders, how those two prebysters Georgius and Timotheus should adhere to the Arian faction, since they were accounted such great readers of Plato and [P. 343]

**Origen;** Τοιαύτα τοι μεν ἐντευκτην, πως ἦσαν οἱ ἀδέλφις, τῷ Ἀρεικίνῳ Ἐπισκόπειᾳ παρεμείναν, ὡς μὲν Πλάτωνα, οἱ μὲν ἡμῖν χεῖρας, εἶχαν, ὡς τῷ Ὑβρισθῳ αὐτοπεταῖν, νῦν γὰρ Πλάτων τῷ Ἑλείτον καὶ τῷ Ἐρυτον αἰτίον, όσον αὐτοῦ σώματι εἰσίν, οὕτως ὑπάρχει, εἰκὸνι τόπον καὶ Ὀριγίνης εὐτυχίας παραλαμβάνει τοῦ γονὸς τοῦ πατέρας. It seems to me wonderful, how these two persons should persist in the Arian persuasion, one of them having always Plato in his hands, and the other continually breathing Origen. Since Plato nowhere affirmeth his first and second cause (as he was wont to call them) to have had any beginning of their existence; and Origen everywhere confesseth the Son to be coeternal with the Father.

Besides which, another reason for this apology of the Christian Platonists was, because as the Platonick Pagans after Christianity did approve of the Christian doctrine concerning the Logos, as that which was exactly agreeable with their own; so did the generality of the Christian fathers, before and after the Nicene council, represent the genuine Platonick trinity as really the same thing with the Christian, or as approaching so near to it, that they differed chiefly in circumstances, or the manner of expression. The former of these is evident from that famous passage of Amelius contemporary with Plotinus, recorded by Eusebius, St. Cyril, and Theodoret; Καὶ ἐτὸς ἄρα ἢ δο θὸ Λόγος, καθι' ὅσο καὶ νείκι, τὰ γυμναὶ εἰς χεῖρας, ὡς ὅσο δο Ἑκατευτον Pr. E. ν. 11. αἰώνιας, ἦν τῇ ΔΌντι τοῦ Βιοκέρατον στοιχεῖον καὶ τῷ ὑπὲρ ἄρχει τᾶς τοῖς ἀρχής καθενῶτα, c. 9. [Cap. XIX. P. 540.] προς τὸν Θεον εἰσί, καθι' Θεον εἰσί, ὥσο δο πάλιν ἄπλος γεννηθήσεται καὶ τὸ γενομένον ζωὴν καὶ ψυχήν καὶ ὑπὲρ παραμυθον' καὶ εἰς τὰ σώματα πιστεύει οὐ καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἐκ τῆς ζωῆς καθεκολεόμενον, καὶ θεολογίαν, µετα' ὅσο τῷ πνευματικῷ οἰκειοστὸν τῆς ζωῆς τῶν μεταμετομενων ἀνάλογος καὶ αναλογίαν πάλιν ἀποικιάζει, καὶ Θεον εἰσίν, ὅσον πέφυλ' τὰς τὰ σώματα καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατακθεῖναι. And this was the Logos or Word, by whom existing from eternity, according to Heraclitus, all things were made, and whom that Barbarian also placeth in the rank and dignity of a principle, affirming him to have been with God, and to be God; and that all things were made by him, and that whatsoever was made, was life and being in him. As also that he descended into a body, and being clothed in flesh, appeared as a man, though not without demonstration of the divinity of his nature. But that afterwards being loosed or separated from the same, he was deified, and became God again, such as he was before he came down into a mortal body. In which words, Amelius speaks favourably also of the incarnation of that eternal Logos. And the same is further manifested from what St. Austin writeth concerning a Platonist in his time, Ini. l. 10. c. 29. tium sancti evangelist, cui nomen est secundum Johannem, quidam Platonicius, [P. 202] Tom. VII. hunc à sancto fene Simpliciano, qui postea Mediolanensi ecclesiæ presidit episcop.]

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1 Adverf. Julian. Lib. VIII. p. 270. & Lib. I. p. 34.
The Father's Sense, of the Book I.

...and Seneck. To Book Jujlin testimonies £57 quibus, /&c. Apol. Pag. Strom. Po'tKrTl r'.

L. 6. c. Celf. [P. 280.]


The folopus, solebanus audire, aureis literis conferribendum, & per omnes ecclesias in locis eminentissimis proponendum esse dicebat. We have often heard from that holy man Simplicianus, afterward bishop of Milan, that a certain Platonist affirmed, the beginning of St. John's gospel desired to be writ in letters of gold, and to be set up in all the most eminent places throughout the Christian churches. And the latter will sufficiently appear from these following testimonies: Justin Martyr, in his apology affirmeth of Plato, δινων χάρις το παρά Θεο λόγος ἤδησα την δι τρίτην το λεγόμενον ἐφιδεξει καὶ ὑμνήματι, &c. That he gave the second place to the Word of God; and the third to that spirit, which is said to have moved upon the waters. Clemens Alexandrinus speaking of that passage in Plato's second epistle to Dionysius, concerning the first, second, and third, writeth thus: maks ἐγὼ ἡγομαι, ἔν των ἀρίθμων τοῦ μιᾶς μονάδος, τριῶν μέν, ἄρα εἴπασκι το τό θεόν πνεύμα τούτοις ἐν διεύθεσιν, ἐν τέσσαρες ἐργοις κατὰ ἕκαστον το τάξις. I understand this no otherwise, than that the Holy Trinity is signified thereby, the third being the Holy Ghost, and the second the Son, by whom all things were made, according to the will of the Father. Origen also affirmeth the Son of God to have been plainly spoken of by Plato, in his epistle to Hermias and Coriscus, ἐν πάντι ἑπαξελλόμενον εἰς τὸν Θεόν, εἰς τὸν πατέρα τοῦ Πλάτωνος παρατιθημένον, ἐκεῖ, γιὰ, ὅπου τό πατέρα τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγον, τοῦ πατέρα Πλάτωνος λεγόμενον ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ Θεοματίᾳ καὶ Κορισκοῦ ἐπισκόπησέν Κελλίου, ὃς προετοίμασε ἔργον ἃς θέλει. We have often heard of the Father of this prince and cause. And again, elsewhere in the same book, he writeth to the same purpose, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐικολήθη τὸ παρά Πλάτωνος εἰς ταῖς ἑπαξελλωσίας λεγόμενον, ἐν τῇ τοῖς αναθεωρήματι ἑρμηνεῖται, περὶ τοῦ ἐπισκόπου τῶν νεωτέρων τῶν πατέρων ὁ Πλάτων ἐργάσει καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἑπεδέχθη καὶ Κορισκοῦ ἐπισκόπησε τὸν Πλάτωνος, ὃς πολλάκις ἑσώμεν, αδιακρίσθη, παραδέχθηκε, ὃς οἱ καὶ οἱ δικαιοὺς τοῦ πατέρα, ἓν ὃς ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁ δὲ προτέρους ἐν πάσιν τοῖς πατριώτητι ἑσὼν αὐτὸν. Neither would Celsus (here speaking of Christians making Christ the Son of God) take any notice of that passage in Plato's epistle before mentioned, concerning the framer and governour of the whole world, as being the Son of God; lest he should be compelled by the authority of Plato, whom he so often magnified, to agree with this doctrine of ours, that the Demiurgus of the whole world is the Son of God; but the first and supreme Deity, his Father. Moreover, St. Cyprian, or whoever were the author of the book inscribed de Spiritu Sancto, affirmeth the Platonists first and universal Pyche, to be the same with the Holy Ghost in the Christian theology, in these words: Hujus sempiterna virtus & divinitas, cum in propria natura, ab inquisitoribus mundi antiquis philosophis propriè investigari non possit; subtilissimis te tenitui conditiorum compositionem mundi, & diffinis elementorum affectibus, praebet omnibus animam adiuvse dexterum; quibus, secundum genus & ordinem singularum, vitam praebet & motum, & intransgressibles signet metas, & stabilitatem assignet; & universum bene vitam, bonum motum, bene rerum essentiam,

* The following are not Origen's words, passage of Plato cited by Origen.

but Dr. Cutworth's, who thus explains the
Genuine Platonick Trinity. 623

In the next place Ensebius Cæsari—Fr. Ex. I. 11. castra gives a full and clear testimony of the concordance and agreement of the Platonick, at least as to the main, with the Christian trinity, which he will have to have been the Cabala of the ancient Hebrews, thus: τὸν παρ’ Εσχάτων λαοίν μετὰ τοῦ πέρ θεος καὶ τὴν θεόν, ἐν τριάν ταύτα τῶν Αριστοτελίων ὑποτείμων τῆς τριστού, ὥσ ἄν τῇ τρίτῃ δομῆς πάσην ὑπερεξενίαν ὑπετιέων θεοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς διά την Ἰον ὑπερον ἡσύχων, τρίτου ἐκ ἀπὸ τὸ πρῶτον Αριτ. Σχι καὶ οἱ Πλάτων ταύτα τινα τοῦ θεοῦ ἑαυτή ὑποτείμων, &c. The oracles of the Hebrews, placing the Holy Ghost, after the Father and the Son, in the third rank, and acknowledging a holy and blessed Trinity after this manner, so as that this third power does also transcend all created nature, and is the first of those intellectual substances, which proceed from the Son, and the third from the first cause: see how Plato enigmatically declareth the same things in his epistle to Dionysius, in these words, &c. These things the interpreters of Plato refer to a first God, and to a second cause, and to a third the soul of the world, which they call also the third God. And the divine Scriptures in like manner rank the holy Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in the place or degree of a principle. But it is most observable what Athanasius affirmeth of the Platonists; that though they derived the second hypostasis of their Trinity from the first, and the third from the second, yet they supposed both their second and third hypostases to be uncreated; and therefore does he fend the Arians to school thither, who, because there is but one Αριτουσιδ, one self-originated Being, would unskilfully conclude, that the Word or Son of God must therefore needs be a creature. Thus in his book concerning the decrees of the Nicene council: ἐκχειρισμον παρ’ Ἕλληνων λαποῦ τὸν λέγετ ἡ Αριστοτέλεις ἡμας προφέταις ἡ τῶν ὑπάρξεως ἐν τοῖς γεννηθην και τοίς κληρονομοις συναρβαμεθὰ; τὸν τὸ Ἰήσου; ἦ ς ὑπατα τῆς γέννησε ψηφιόν εἰ μὲν ἐν ὑδατοις τῆς ὑψώθης οὐκομόν, ἐδει μαθητα ἑαυτοπαζ καὶ τῶν ἑαυτοπαζ δικασθῶν εἰς τὸν Ἰησους καὶ τὸν Να ὑπήρχεν καὶ τὸν γέννησε τοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς, εἰς ἐφεδρακτόν ὦμος καὶ εὐτεί αἰνετε ἐν αἰνετα ἐκ τῶν ἔθως ἐναυτως τὸν ἐν ἐλεατίας τῷ πρώτον ἐ καὶ ταύτα περικυκῆ, ἦ ς ἦ ς ιτες τῶν λέγεν, ο ἡ μόνη λέγεν περὶ ἐν ἐν ἐνείναι. The Arians borrowing the word Agenetos from the Pagen, (who acknowledge only one Jach) make that a pretence to rank the Word or Son of God, who is the creator of all, amongst creatures or things made. Whereas they ought to have learned the right signification of that word Agenetos from those very Platonists, who gave it them. Who, though acknowledging their second hypostasis of Nous or Intellcl, to be derived from the first called Tagathon, and their third hypostasis or Pluche from the second; nevertheless doubt not to affirm them both to be Ageneta or uncreated, knowing well, that hereby they detract nothing from the majesty of the first, from whom these two are derived. Wherefore, the Arians either ought to speak as the Platonists do, or else to say nothing at all concerning these things, which they are ignorant of. In which words of Athanasius, there is a plain distinction made betwixt Αγενετος and ὑπάρξη, that is, unbegotten and uncreated, and the second person of the Trinity, the Son or Word of God, though acknowledged by him,
not to be Ἀβγανή, unbegotten, (he being begotten of the Father, who is the only Ἀγενετός) yet is here said to be Ἀβγανή, uncreated; he declaring the Platonists thus to have affirmed the second and third hypostases of their trinity, not to be creatures, but uncreated. Which signal testimony of Athanasius, concerning the Platonick trinity, is a great vindication of the fame. We might here further add St. Aulbin's confession also, that God the Father, and God the Son, were by the Platonists acknowledged in like manner, as by the Chriftians; though concerning the Holy Ghost, he observes some difference between Plotinus and Porphyrius, in that the former did postponere animae naturam paterno intelleflui, the latter, interponere; Plotinus did postpone his Psyche, or soul, after the paternal Intellefl; but Porphyrius interposed it between the Father and the Son, as a middle between both. It was before observed, that St. Cyril of Alexandria affirmeth nothing to be wanting to the Platonick trinity, but only that Hoæousiotes of his and some other fathers in that age, that they should not only all be God, or uncreated, but also three coequal individuals, under the same ultimate species, as three individual men; he conceiving that gradual subordination, that is in the Platonick trinity, to be a certain tang of Arianifm. Nevertheless, he thus concludes 1, πεφυγω ὑπὸ ἡρμόνει οὐκοπότας το λοιπος, That Plato notwithstanding was not altogether ignorant of the truth, but that he had the knowledge of the only begotten Son of God, as likewise of the Holy Ghost, called by him Psyche; and that he would have every way expressed himself rightly, had he not been afraid of Anitus and Melitus, and that poison, which Socrates drunk. Now, whether this were a fault or no in the Platonists, that they did not suppose their hypostases to be three individuals under the same ultimate species, we leave to others to judge. We might here add the testimony of Chalcidius, because he is unquestionably concluded to have been a Chriftian; though his language indeed be too much paganical, when he calls the three divine hypostases, a chief, a second, and a third God: Ἡ χριστιανικὴ ὄνομα ὁ τριάδος τούτων, τὸν Πατέρα, τὸν Υἱόν, τὸν Σορον. His subjection are rationes animas, legi obsequentes, ministras verò potestates, &c. Ergo summus Deus jubet, secundus ordinat, tertius intimat. Animo verò legem agunt. This thing is to be conceived after this manner; that the first original of things is the supreme and ineffable Deum; after his providence, a second God, the establisher of the law of life both eternal and temporary; and the third (which is also a substance, and called a second Mind or Intellefl) is a certain keeper of this eternal law. Under these three are rational souls, subject to that law, together with the ministerial powers, &c. So that the sovereign or supreme God commands, the second orders, and the third executes. But souls are subject to the law. Where Chalcidius, though seeming indeed rather more a Platonist than a Chriftian, yet acknowledges no such beings as Henades and Noes; but only three divine hypostases, and under them rational souls. But we shall conclude with the testimony

testimony of Theodoret in his book De Principio 

altered by Junior Platonists.

Wherefore, we cannot but take notice here of a wonderful providence of Almighty God, that this doctrine of a trinity of divine hypostases should find such admittance and entertainment in the Pagan world, and be received by the wise of all their philosophers, before the times of Christianity; thereby to prepare a more easy way for the reception of Christianity amongst the learned Pagans. Which that it proved successful accordingly, is undeniably evident from the monuments of antiquity. And the junior Platonists, who were most opposite and adverse to Christianity, became at length so sensible hereof, that besides their other adulterations of the Trinity before mentioned, for the countenancing of their polytheism and idolatry, they did in all probability, for this very reason, quite innovate, change and pervert the whole Cabala, and no longer acknowledge a trinity, but either a quaternity, or a quinary, or more of divine hypostases; they first of all contending, that before the Trinity, there was another supreme and highest hypostasis, not to be reckoned with the others, but standing alone by himself. And we conceive the first innovator in this kind to have been Jamblichus, who in his Egyptian Mysteries, where he seems to make the Egyptian theology to agree with his own hypothesis, writeth in this manner: ἔτοι τῶν ὅλος ὅλων, ἐκ τῶν ὅλων ἄρχων, ἐγὼ θεός τὸς πρῶτος, ἐγὼ τὰ πάντα διὸν ἡ ἥσσιμος ἡ καθιστή τῆς εἰσνέντοις μένων ἢ ἂν ὅποιο ἄνωτε ἐπιπλήσηται, ὡτο οὖν τοῖς παραθετείμην ἀκολουθήσαι τοὺς ἁρμάτους τοῖς ἀρχούσι καὶ μονοπάτοροι θεοὺς τὸν ὅλος ἄγαθον ἡ μεγίστον ἄρα τοῦ πρῶτον καὶ τῶν πάντων, καὶ παραθετείς τοῖς πάντως ἄρχων ἔστι οὗτος τοῦκαν, οἱ αὐτάρκης θεός, ἀκατωπορήτης, διὸ καὶ αὐτόπατος καὶ αὐτάρκης ἀρχὴν ἀρχήν τοῦ ὅλου καὶ τοῦς θεοὺς μονάς εἰς τὸ εἰς τοῦ παραθετείς ἄρχη τῆς οὐσίας. Before these things, which truly are, and the principles of all, there is one God supericur to the first God and king, immoveable, and always remaining in the solitude of his own unity, there being nothing intelligible, nor any thing else mingled with him; but being the paradigm of that God truly good, which is self-begotten and his own parent. For this is greater, and before him, and the fountain of all things, the foundation of all the first intelligible ideas. Wherefore, from this one did that self-sufficient God, who is Autopator, or his own parent, cause himself to shine forth; for this

L. 112

2 Tom. II. Oper. p. 496. 2 Stella. VIII. Cap. II. p. 158.
Proclus's Monad before the Trinity. Book I.

is also a principle, and the God of gods, a monad from the first one, before all essence. Where, so far as we can understand, Jambliсicus's meaning is, that there is a simple unity in order of nature, before that Tagathon, or monad, which is the first of the three divine hypostases. And this doctrine was afterward taken up by Proclus, he declaring it in this manner; πανταχι o Platon άτο τα πλήθα ῆπι τοις ιδαίοις ανατελείν είκοσι μικροι ζη το Πλάτωνος κατά τον τοις παραμάτοις τάξιν προ τα πλήθα ταί ιν αι ινι, κα τος θεια ταξις ανδ μονάδες αρχίζοντας δει μεν γάρ η τριάδος πεύχει μονάδος τοις πνευματικοις θείοις, άλλα προ της τριαδος ή μονας ή μη μιν οι θεια τριαδος και της θεοις της τριαδος τοις προ η τριαδος τε τοις εν θεοις γορ τοις θεοις τοις πληθις αρχίζοντας εκ άριστο και τριαδος αρχίζοντας αεί τοις ουρανοις αρχίζοντας, αλλα αν μονάδος Plato every where extends from multitude to unity, from thence also the order of the many proceeds; but before Plato, and according to the natural order of things, one is before multitude, and every divine order begins from a monad. Wherefore, though the divine number proceed in a trinity, yet before this trinity must there be a monad. Let there be three demiurgical hypostases; nevertheless, before these must there be one, because none of the divine orders begins from multitude. We conclude, that the demiurgical number does not begin from a trinity, but from a monad, standing alone by itself before that trinity. Here Proclus, though endeavouring to gain some countenance for this doctrine out of Plato, yet, as fearing lest that should fail him, does he fly to the order of nature, and from thence would infer, that before the trinity of demiurgical hypostases, there must be a single monad or henad, standing alone by itself, as the head thereof. And St. Cyril of Alexandria, who was junior to Jambliсicus, but senior to Proclus, seems to take notice of this innovation in the Platonick theology, as a thing then newly crept up, and after the time of Porphyry: αλλ' ον γα προσιρρηματικ' η' ριο το ουλλαγοντα, Φασκοικης μη δει τ' Ταγαθον ζυν- αριθμει τοις άπ' αυτην ειχερησαι γαρ από χωροις κοινωνις δικ το εικαν απλαν παλιν κα ακιδων τως συμβασεις Άπο απ τη Νεατον (αρχη γαρ άτο) της τριαδος μιαν σωθησει τοις, but those before mentioned contradicted this doctrine (of Porphyrius and the ancient Platonists), affirming, that the Tagathon ought not to be connumerated or reckoned together with those which proceed from it, but to be exempted from all communion, because it is altogether simple, and incapable of any commixture or confociation with any other. Wherefore these begin their trinity with Nous or Intellel, making that the first. The only difference here is, that Jambliсicus seems to make the first hypostasis of the trinity after a monad to be Tagathon, but St. Cyril, Nous. However, they both meant the same thing, as also did Proclus after them. Wherefore, it is evident, that when, from the time of the Nicene council and Athanasius, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity came to be punctually stated and settled, and much to be infested upon by Christians, Jambliсicus and other Platonists, who were great antagonists of the same, perceiving what advantage the Christians had from the Platonick Trinity, then first of all innovated this doctrine, introducing a quaternity of divine hypostases, instead of a trinity, the first of them being not coordinate with the other three, nor confociated or reckoned with them; but all of them, though subordinate, yet universal, and such as comprehend the whole; that
that is, infinite and omnipotent; and therefore none of them creatures. For it is certain, that before this time, or the age that Jamblichus lived in, there was no such thing at all dreamed of by any Platonist, as an unity before and above the trinity, and so a quaternity of divine hypostases; Platonus positively determining, that there could neither be more nor fewer than three; and Proclus himself acknowledging the ancient tradition, or Cabala, to have run only of three gods; and Numenius, who was senior to them both, writing thus of Socrates, \textit{T}ē\textit{cē} Ἴως ἔσω, Π. Ε.; ταῖς μὲν ἰσχαιμάτες, that he also (before Plato) asserted three gods; that is, three divine hypostases, and no more, as principles; wherein following the Pythagoreans.

Moreover, the same Proclus, besides his Henades and Noes before mentioned, added certain other phantastic trinities of his own also; as this, for example, of the first essence, the first life, and the first intellect, (to omit others;) whereby that ancient Cabala and \textit{ἡ τεράτων Ἱστορία, theology of divine tradition, of three archical hypostases, and no more, was disquieted, perverted, and adulterated.

But besides this advantage from the ancient Pagan Platonists and Pythagoreans, admitting a trinity into their theology, in like manner as Christianity doth, (whereby Christianity was the more recommended to the philosophick Pagans) there is another advantage of the same extending even to this present time, probably not unintended also by divine providence; that whereas bold and conceited wits precipitantly condemning the doctrine of the trinity for nonsensical, absolute repugnancy to human faculties, and impossibility, have thereupon some of them quite shaken off Christianity, and all revealed religion, professing only theism; others have frustrated the design thereof, by paganizing it into creature-worship or idolatry; this ignorant and conceited confidence of both may be returned, and confuted from hence, because the most ingenious and acute of all the Pagan philosophers, the Platonists and Pythagoreans, who had no byas at all upon them, nor any scripture revelation, that might seem to impose upon their faculties, but followed the free sentiments and dictates of their own minds, did notwithstanding not only entertain this trinity of divine hypostases eternal and uncreated, but were also fond of the hypothesis, and made it a main fundamental of their theology.

It now appears from what we have declared, that as to the ancient and genuine Platonists and Pythagoreans, none of their trinity of gods, or divine hypostases, were independent, so neither were they \textit{γὺναικίδες, creature-gods}, but uncreated; they being all of them not only eternal, and necessarily existent, and immutable, but also universal, that is infinite and omnipotent; causes, principles, and creators of the whole world. From whence it follows, that these Platonists could not justly be taxed for idolatry, in giving religious worship to each hypostasis of this their trinity. And we have the rather insisted so long upon this Platonick trinity, because we shall make use of this doctrine afterwards, in our defence of Christianity, where we
Arians charged by the Fathers

Book I.

we are to show, that one grand design of Christianity being to abolish the Pagan idolatry, or creature-worship, itself cannot justly be charged with the same from that religious worship given to our Saviour Christ, and the Trinity, (the Son and Holy Ghost) they being none of them, according to the true and orthodox Christianity, creatures; however the Arian hypotbesis made them such. And this was indeed the grand reason, why the ancient fathers so zealously opposed Arianism, because that Christianity, which was intended by God Almighty for a means to extirpate Pagan idolatry, was thereby itself paganized and idolatriz'd, and made highly guilty of that very thing, which it so much condemned in the Pagans, that is, creature-worship. This might be proved by sundry testimonies of Albananus, Basil, Gregory Nyssen, Gregory Nazianzen, Epiphanius, Chrysostom, Hilary, Ambrose, Auxin, Faustinus, and Cyril of Alexandria; all of them charging the Arians as guilty of the very same idolatry with the Gentiles or Pagans, in giving religious worship even to the Word and Son of God himself, (and consequent to our Saviour Christ) as he was suppos'd by them to be but a creature. But we shall content ourselves here only to cite one remarkable passage out of Albananus, in his fourth oration against the Arians: did't ye or ye may suppose that the one and only creature, or the creator, besides the creator? For though the Pagans worship one uncreated and many created gods, but these Arians only one uncreated, and one created, to wit, the Son or Word of God; yet will not this make any real difference between them, because the Arians one created is one of those many Pagan gods; and those many gods of the Pagans or Gentiles, have the same nature with this one, they being alike creatures. Wherefore these wretched Arians are apostates from the truth of Christianity, they betraying Christ more than the Jews did, and wallowing or tumbling in the filth of Pagan idolatry; worshipping creatures, and different kinds of gods. Where, by the way, we may take notice, that when Albananus affirmeth of the Arians, what St. Paul doth of the Pagans, that they did Hypostases of this kind, only one uncreated, he seems to imply, that the Platonick trinity of
hypostases, affirmed by him to be all uncreated, were by them looked upon only as one entire divinity.

But the principal things, which we shall observe from this passage of Athanasius, and those many other places of the fathers, where they parallel the Arians with the Pagans, making the former guilty of the very same idolatry with the latter, even then, when they worshipped our Saviour Christ himself, or the Word and Son of God, as he was by them supposed to be nothing but a creature, are these following; first, that it is here plainly declared by them, that the generality of the Pagans did not worship a multitude of independent gods, but that only one of their gods was uncreated or self-existent, and all their other many gods looked upon by them as his creatures. This, as it is expressly affirmed by Athanasius here, that the Greeks or Pagans did ἵνα ἐγένετο καὶ πολὺς, ἵνα ἐλεύθερος, worship only one uncreated, and many created gods; so is it plainly implied by all those other forementioned fathers, who charge the Arians with the guilt of Pagan idolatry; because, had the Pagans worshipped many uncreated and independent gods, it would not therefore follow, that the Arians were idolaters, if the Pagans were. But that this was indeed the sense of the fathers, both before and after the Nicene council, concerning the Pagan polytheism and idolatry, that it consisted not in worshipping many uncreated and independent gods, but only one uncreated and many created, hath been already otherwise manifested; and it might be further confirmed by sundry testimonies of them; as this of St. Gregory Nazianzen in his 37th oration: 

\[\text{Τί δὲι ὡς καὶ παρ᾽ Ἐλληνι Φαίνει ἢν Μία Θεότης, ως οἱ τὰ πεπλευθέντα παρ᾽ ἱεράς Θεοτοκίας; What then would some say, is there not one divinity also among the Pagans, as they, who philosophize more fully and perfectly amongst them, do declare? And that full and remarkable one of Irenæus, where he plainly affirmeth of the Gentiles: 

\[\text{Ira creaturre po-L. 2. c. 9.}

[Grabius, p. 129 Ed. 
Maffueti.]

That they so served the creature, and those who are not gods, rather than the Creator; that notwithstanding they attributed the first place of the Deity to one certain supreme God, the maker of this universe. The second thing is, that Athanasius, and all those other orthodox fathers, who charged the Arians with Pagan idolatry, did thereby plainly imply, those not to be incapable of idolatry, who worshipped one sovereign Numen, or acknowledge one supreme Deity, the maker of the whole world; since not only the Arians unquestionably did so, but also, according to these fathers, the very Pagans themselves. The third thing is, that in the judgment of Athanasius, and all the orthodox Anti-Arian fathers, to give religious worship to any created being whatsoever, though inferior to that worship, which is given to the supreme God, and therefore according to the modern distinction, not ἐκλεῖς, but ἐκεῖς, is absolutely idolatry. Because it is certain, that the Arians gave much an inferior worship to Christ, the Son, or Word of God, whom they contended to be a mere creature, made in time, mutable and defectible, than they did to that eternal God, who was the Creator of him.
Orthodox Christians worshipped

Book I.

Now if the Arians, who zealously contended for the unity of the Godhead, were nevertheless, by the fathers, condemned as guilty of idolatry, for bestowing but an inferior kind of religious worship upon Christ, the Son or Word of God himself, as he was supposed by them to be a creature; then certainly cannot they be excused from that guilt, who bestowed religious worship upon these other creatures, angels and souls of men, though inferior to what they give to the supreme omnipotent God, the Creator of all. Because the Son or Word of God, however conceived by these Arians to be a creature, yet was looked upon by them as the first, the most glorious, and most excellent of all creatures, and that by which, as an instrument, all other creatures, as angels and souls, were made; and therefore, if it were idolatry in them, to give an inferior kind of religious worship to this Son and Word of God himself, according to their hypothesis, then it cannot possibly be accounted less, to bestow the same upon those other creatures, made by him, as angels and men deceased. Besides which, the Word and Son of God, however supposed by these Arians to be a creature, yet was not really such; and in Scripture unquestionably declared to be a true object of religious worship, (worship him all ye gods;) so that the Arians, though formally idolaters, according to their own false hypothesis, yet were not materially and really so: whereas these religious angels and saint-worshippers must be as well materially as formally such. And here it is observable, that these ancient fathers made no such distinction of religious worship, into Latria, as peculiar to the supreme God, it being that, whereby he is adored as self-existent and omnipotent, or the Creator of all; and Doula, such an inferior religious worship, as is communicable to creatures: but concluded of religious worship universally, and without distinction, that the due object of it all was the Creator only, and not any creature. Thus Athanasius plainly in his third oration, η γάρ ού τη δόξη υπείχων προσκυνεῖται, ἐδώ καὶ εἰκάσω τῶν υποδεικνύων, τῶν υπείχοντα προσκυνείται ἀλλ' οὐ ἢ ἤτως, κτίσματα γὰρ κτίσμα κερκοειδών, ἀλλὰ κτίσμα Θεόν. If the Son or Word of God were to be worshipped, (though a creature) because transcending us in glory and dignity, then ought every inferior being to worship what is superior to it: whereas the case is otherwise; for a creature doth not religiously worship a creature, but only God the Creator. Now they who distinguish religious worship, into Latria and Doula, must needs suppose the object of it in general to be that, which is superior to us, and not the Creator only; which is here contradicted by Athanasius. But because it was objected against these orthodox fathers by the Arians, that the humanity of our Saviour Christ, which is unquestionably a creature, did share in their religious worship also; it is worth the while to see what account Athanasius gives of this: η κτίσμα προσκυνεῖται μὲ γι' νοῦτον· Ἐθνικῶν γὰρ καὶ Ἀρειακῶν ἡ Τοιήσσα πλάνη ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ Κύριῳ τῆς κτίσεως παρκαζέον τῷ τῷ Σει λόγῳ προσκυνοῦμεν εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ σειξ αὐτῇ καθ' ἐκαθ':

mific εἰς τῶν κτισμάτων, ἀλλά τις γέρον σῶμα, ὡς ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον σῶμα, καὶ ιεύτῳ ἀσχολοῦσα ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου, προσκυνομεῖν, ἢ τὸν Λόγον προσκυνοῦσι Θεότητες, μακρεύοντες ἀυτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν σαρκῶν, ἀλλὰ εἰσύνετο, τὸ, ὁ Λόγος σὰρκεὶ ἑγέτη, τῶν καὶ εἰς σαρκὶ γενοῦμαι ἐγενόσκομαι Θεόν! We give no religious worship to any creature, far be it from us; for this is the error of the Pagans and of the Arians: but we worship the Word of God, the Lord of the creation incarnated. For though the flesh of Christ, considered alone by itself, were but a part of the creatures, nevertheless was it made the body of God. And we neither worship this body by itself alone, divided from the Word, nor yet intending to worship the Word, do we remove it at a great distance from this flesh; but knowing that of the Scripture, the Word was made flesh, we look upon this Word even in the flesh as God. And again to the same purpose, Και γνωσκείτωσαν ὅτι τὸν Κύριον εἰς σαρκὶ προσκυνοῦτες, p. 167: κάθεσα τε κτίσμα προσκυνομεῖν, ἄλλα τοὺς κτίσματι, ἐνικούμενον τὸ κτιστὸν σῶμα. Let these Arians know at length, that we who worship the Lord in flesh, worship no creature, but only the Creator cloathed with a creaturely body. And for the same cause was it, that Nērocrus afterwards, dividing the Word from the flesh, the divinity of Christ from the humanity, and not acknowledging such an hypostatical union betwixt them as he ought, but, nevertheless, religiously worshipping our Saviour Christ, was therefore branded by the Christian church with the name of Aἱρομολόγοι, a man-worshipper, or idolater. To conclude, they, who excuse themselves from being idolaters no otherwise, than because they do not give that very same religious worship to fants and angels, which is peculiar to God Almighty, and consists in honouring him as self-existent, and the Creator of all things, but acknowledge those others to be creatures; suppose that to be necessary to idolatry, which is absolutely impossible, viz. to acknowledge more omnipotents, as creators of all, than one, or to account creatures as such creators; as they imply all those to be uncausable of idolatry, who acknowledge one supreme God the Creator of the whole world; which is directly contradieitious to the doctrine of the ancient church.

Hitherto in way of answer to an atheistical objection against the naturality of the idea of a God, as including onelincs in it, from the Pagan polytheists, have we largely proved, that at least the civilized and intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged one sovereign Numen; and that their polytheism was partly but phantastical, nothing but the polyonymy of one supreme God, or the worshipping him under different names and notions, according to his several virtues and manifestations; and that though, besides this, they had another natural and real polytheism also; yet this was only of many inferior, or created gods, subordinate to one Supreme Νομέν, or uncreated.

Which, notwithstanding, is not so to be understood, as if we did confidently affirm that opinion of many independent deities never to have so much as entered into the mind of any mortal. For since human nature is so mutable and depravable, as that, notwithstanding the connate idea and proleptis of God in the minds of men, some unquestionably do degenerate and lapse into atheism; there can be no reason, why it should be thought absolutely impossible, for any ever to entertain that false conceit of more independent deities.
deities. But as for independent Gods invisible, we cannot trace the footsteps of such a polytheism as this anywhere, nor find any more than a ditheism, of a good and evil principle: only Philo and others seem to have conceived, that amongst the ancient Pagans, some were so grossly foolish, as to suppose a plurality of independent gods visible, and to take the sun, and moon, and all the stars for such. However, if there were any such, and these writers were not mistaken, as it frequently happened, it is certain, that they were but very few; because, amongst the most Barbarian Pagans at this day, there is hardly any nation to be found, without an acknowledgment of a sovereign Deity, as appears from all those discoveries, which have been made of them, since the improvement of navigation.

Wherefore, what hath been hitherto declared by us, might well be thought a sufficient answer to the aforementioned atheistical objection against the idea of God. Notwithstanding which, when we wrote the contents of this chapter, we intended a further account of the natural and real polytheism of the Pagans, and their multifarious idolatry, chiefly in order to the vindication of the truth of Christianity against Atheists; forasmuch as one grand design hereof was unquestionably to destroy the Pagan polytheism and idolatry, which consisted in worshiping the creature besides the Creator.

But we are very sensible, that we have been surprized in the length of this chapter, which is already swelled into a disproportionate bigness; by means whereof we cannot comprehend, within the compass of this volume, all that belongs to the remaining contents, together with such a full and copious confutation of the atheistical grounds, as was intended. Wherefore we shall here divide the chapter, and refer those remaining contents, together with a further confutation of atheism, if need be, for another volume, which God affording life, health, and leisure, we intend shall follow. Only subjoining, in the mean time, a short and compendious confutation of all the atheistical arguments proposed.