





R-B B1299.M6 1662

BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY

*The gift of*

the Cutter Fund















Mr. Smith  
From

R. J. MENEFEE.

all 8/91





A  
**COLLECTION**  
 Of Several  
**Philosophical Writings**  
 OF  
**Dr HENRY MORE**  
 Fellow of *Christ's Colledge in Cambridge.*

As Namely,

*Antidote against Atheism.*  
*Appendix to the said Antidote.*  
*Enthusiasmus Triumphatus.*  
 His *Letters to Des-Cartes, &c.*  
*Immortality of the Soul.*  
*Conjectura Cabbalistica.*

The second Edition more correct and much enlarged.

**Aristot. Ethic. lib. 10.**

Εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νῦν πρὸς τὸ ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τὸν βίον, θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον·  
 χρὴ δὲ καὶ τὸ ὀφθαλμοφανές ἀνθρώπου φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπου ὄντας, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται,  
 ἀπαθαναλίζειν, καὶ ἅπαντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον ἃς ἐν ἡμῖν.

**And again ch. 8. and 7.**

Ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅπῃ θεωρητικὴ πρὸς ὅσον ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐπὶ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ὅπῃ τὸν θεὸν  
 μάλιστα περιλήψαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαιμόνας εἶναι· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀνθρωπότης ὅσον, καὶ τὸ βιώσεσθαι  
 πρὸς, ἀλλ' ἡ θεῖον πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀρχαί.

**L O N D O N,**

Printed by *James Fleisher*, for *William Morden* Book-seller in *Cambridge*,

**M D C L X I I.**





# T H E

## P R E F A C E G E N E R A L.

1. The Authors Excuse for such Alterations as he has made in this Edition of his Books. 2. The general Scope of this whole Volume.
3. The excellency and necessity of Reason for the maintaining of the truth of Christian Religion. 4. His Apology for interweaving *Platonisme* and *Cartesianisme* so frequently into his Writings. 5. Certain Advertisements for the more profitably perusing his Books. 6. Divine Sagacity a Principle antecedaneous to successful Reason in Contemplations of the highest concernment. 7. The abovesaid Principle further illustrated and confirmed out of *Aristotle*. 8. The Authors Excuse for his omitting in his *Antidote*, to confute the *unconcluding* reasons some use for the proof of a God. 9. His Excuse for not adding a Treatise of *Superstition* to that of *Enthusiasme*. 10. That it can be no offence to the knowing and ingenuous, that men have a shyness and jealousy against such Truths as they have not been acquainted with.
11. Certain remarkable things concerning *Des-Cartes* and his Writings. 12. Certain considerations lay'd together which wholly prevent all imaginable Objections against the Extension of a Spirit.
13. The properties and Offices of the Spirit of Nature further cleared and confirmed. A Consecratory concerning the Conduct of Souls by the Spirit of Nature. 14. That the ancient *Judaical Cabbala* did consist of what we now call *Platonisme* and *Cartesianisme*, made farther probable from the Lineage of the *Pythagorick School*. 15. Particular considerations out of *Pherecydes*, *Parmenides* and *Aristotle*, that might move one to believe that the whole *Pythagorick Philosophy*, as well *Physical* as *Metaphysical*, was the ancient Wisdome of the Jews.
16. The unhappy disjunction of the *Physical* part of the *Cabbala* from the *Metaphysical* in *Leucippus*, *Democritus* and *Epicurus*; with the Authors serious endeavour of re-uniting them again. 17. That what he applies to the Text of *Moses* in his Philosophick *Cabbala*, he conceives is *rational*, and is assured that it *exquisitely fits* the Text, but deliberates further concerning the *Truth* thereof. 18. The Testimony of several holy Persons that did either plainly assert, or at least had no dislike of, the doctrine of the Souls Præexistence; *Clem. Alexand.* *Origenes Adamantius Clemens* his Scholar, *S. Basil* and *Gregorie Nazianzen*, *Synesius Bp of Cyrene*, *Arnobius*, *Prudentius*, *S. Augustine*, the Authour of the Book of *Wisdome*, & our blessed Saviour. 19. That there is not the least clashing of Præexistence with the Derivation of Original sin from *Adam*. 20. That Mathematical certitude in mere Philosophical Speculations needs oblige no mans conscience to make profession of

them against the good liking of his Superiours. 21. That if the Philosophy which he has applied to *Moses* his Text be true, it is a real *Restoration* of the *Mosaick Cabbala*.

# READER,

The Authors  
Excuse for such  
Alterations as  
he has made  
in this Edition  
of his Books.

I.



*H A T* these Writings which thou findest bound up in one volume may appear also to be held together in some common consideration, I thought it not amiss to speak something by way of General Preface to them all. And therefore if thy curiosity be forward to enquire what I have done in these new Editions of my Books, I am ready to inform thee, that I have taken the same liberty in this Intellectual or Theoretical Garden of my own planting that men usually take in their Natural ones: which is, To set, or pluck up, to transplant and inoculate, where and what they please. And therefore if I have rased out some things, (which yet are but very few) and transposed others, and interserted others, I hope I shall seem injurious to no man in ordering and cultivating this Philolophical Plantation of mine according to mine own humour and liking.

The general  
Scope of this  
whole Volume.

2. But these are smaller matters, and scarce any part of what I was a going to speak. The great Cement that holds these several Discourses together is one main Design, which they joyntly drive at, and which, I think, is confessedly generous and important, namely, The knowledge of God, and therein of true Happiness, so far as Reason can cut her way through those darkneses and difficulties she is incumbred with in this life. Which though they be many and great, yet I should belie the sense of my own success if I should pronounce them insuperable; as also, if I were deprived of that sense, should lose many pleasures and enjoyments of mind which I am now conscious to my self of. Amongst which there is none so considerable as that tacit reflexion within my self, what real service may redound to Religion from these my labours. For what greater satisfaction can there be to a rational Spirit then to find himself able to appeal to the strictest Rules of Reason and Philosophy, if those Doctrines of the Existence of God and the Immortality of the Soul be not true? And what greater Establishment to Religion then to discover these two grand Pillars thereof so firm and stable, even upon those very grounds that our own faculties do naturally assent to as true? Which cannot but conciliate much honour and reverence to the Priesthood, and stop the mouths of shallow and profane Wits, that are so prone to look upon every Priest as either a Fool or an Impostour.

The excellency  
and necessity of  
Reason for the  
mainraining of  
the truth of  
Christian Re-  
ligion.

3. Nor would I be thought to restrain the Reasonableness of our Religion to those two main points only, as if the rest were not so too. For I conceive Christian Religion rational throughout, and I think I have proved it to be so in my Mystery of Godliness. Which I must confess was the main, if not the only, scope of my so long and anxious search into Reason and Philosophy, and without which I had proved but a lazy and remiss enquirer into the nature of things. For to heap up a deal of Reading and Notions and Experiments without some such noble and important Design, had but been, as I phansied, to make my Mind or Memory a shop of small-wares. But having this so eminent a scope in my view, and taking up that generous resolution of

Marcus



Marcus Cicero, Rationem, quod ea me cunque ducet, sequar; *I make account I began then to adorn my Function, and amongst other Priestly Habiliments, in particular to put on the Λόγιον or Rationale, the Sacerdotal Breast-plate, which most justly challenges place in that region which is the seat of the Heart; the simplicity and sincerity of that part being the Root or Well-spring of the soundest and purest Reason. And truly I cannot well imagine what may be the moral account why Aaron's Robes should be such an express Representation of the Universe* (ἀπὸ κόσμου καὶ μίμημα τῷ κόσμῳ, as \* Philo calls it) *as in that every Priest should endeavour, according to his opportunity and capacity, to be also as much as he can a Rational man or Philosopher. (For which reason certainly Universities were first erected, and are still continued to this very day.) And Philo himself insinuates something to this purpose. Βάλετο γὰρ τὴν ἀρχιερέα εἰκόνα τῷ παντὸς ἔχον ἑμπερὴν, ἵνα ἐκ τῆς συνεχῆς δέας ἄξιον παρέχη τὸ ἴδιον βίον τῷ ὅλῳ φύσει. That the High Priest continually reflecting upon his attire, which represented the Universe, might be re-minded not to do or speak any thing contrary to the laws thereof, or repugnantly to the Rules of eternal Reason, which is that everlasting High Priest, as Philo \* elsewhere intimates. Δύο γὰρ, ὡς ἵσταν, ἱερά θεῶν ἐν μὴ ὁδε ὁ κόσμος, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἀρχιερέως ὁ πρωτόγονος αὐτῷ, ὁ θεὸς λόγος ἔπρον τῇ λογικῇ ψυχῇ, ἥς ἱερέως ὁ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἀνδρωπός. That there are two Temples of God: the one the Universe, in which the First-Born of God, the Divine Logos, or eternal Wisdom, is High Priest; the other the Rational Soul, whose Priest is the true man, that is to say the Intellect, (as Plotinus somewhere speaks) and which is the Image of the Divine Logos, as Clemens has expressed himself. Εἰκὼν μὴ γὰρ θεῶν λόγος θεῶν ἐ βασιλικός, ἀνδρωπός ἀπαθής, εἰκὼν δ' εἰκὼν ἀνδρώπινος νῦν. The Image of God is the Royal and Divine Logos, the impassible Man; but the Image of this Image is the humane Intellect.*

\* Philo de Monarch.

\* In his De Somniis.

Stromat. lib. 9.

*So that though the Divine Reason or Logos be that eternal High Priest which in time was to be incarnate, and of which Aaron in his Priestly Robes was but a Type and Figure; yet Man being an Image of him, and every Priest in a more special manner, he is to endeavour the adorning of himself with such accomplishments as are set out by these rich and precious Habiliments of Aaron; amongst which the Rationale had a chief place. For though it belong to that everlasting Logos alone to be the Maker of the world, and to fill out all parts thereof by his presence, and to be in a manner vitally clad therewith; yet through the Goodness of God it may fall to the share of every Christian Priest, to be invested as it were and adorned with the Knowledge of the Laws and Measures of the Creation, and to take notice of the Reasons of Nature of which the eternal Logos is the Maker and Governor. Which is very consonant to what Philo writes of the Figure of the Rationale or Sacerdotal Breast-plate, which he saith was square, ὅτι χρὴ καὶ τῇ φύσει λόγον καὶ τῷ ἀνδρώπῳ βεβηκέναι πάντα, καὶ κατὰ μέτρον ὁπῶν κεραδαίνεσθαι. Because the reason of Universal Nature and of Man ought to stand firm on all sides, and to be no where vacillant. Which things as they were figured in Aaron, and are fulfilled immensely in Christ, so are they also in their measure to be fulfilled in the Christian Priesthood. For if it were not lawful to offer up the blind or lame under the Law, sure the Priest ought*

to be neither under the Gospel, nor yet the People (so far as is possible) whom he presents to God.

To take away Reason therefore, under what Fanatick pretense soever, is to disrobe the Priest and despoil him of his Breast-plate, and, which is worst of all, to rob Christianity of that special Prerogative it has above all other Religions in the World, namely, That it dares appeal unto Reason. Which as many as understand the true Interest of our Religion will not fail to stick closely to, the contrary betraying it to the unjust suspicion of Falshood, and equallizing it to every vain Imposture. For take away Reason, and all Religions are alike true; as the Light being removed, all things are of one colour. Nay, which is worst of all, that Religion which is the truest will seem the falsest in this superinduced Darkness, it so strictly and positively declaring it self to be the only true. Which will not by any means be allowed, nor can any way be discovered in that Region of Midnight, which makes all things look alike.

His Apologie  
for interweaving  
Platonism  
and Cartesianism  
so frequently into his  
Writings.

4. Which serious and weighty considerations lying before me, urged me with all possible care and vigour to search to the very bottom of things, that my heart might not fail me in the day of Tryall. The result of which Investigation is much of it comprised in this present Volume. Wherein as I have gained no small satisfaction to my self in those grand points I have endeavoured to clear, so I am as desirous that nothing that occurs there may occasion the least dissatisfaction to others. And I think it will be impossible any thing should, if they will be but pleased to take notice of my Design, which is not to Theologize in Philosophy, but to draw an Exoterick Fence or exterior Fortification about Theologie; That making good those Out-works against all the assaults of the confident Atheist, and his Gigantick batteries raised against the belief of the existence of a God, and of a Reward in the World to come, I might teach him what a man of Vanity and temerity he is, in that he imagines it so feasible a thing, in his unskilful thoughts, to overrun the Holy City and Sanctuary, he being so easily beat off from the walls thereof. And this is the true and genuine meaning of my interweaving of Platonisme and Cartesianisme so frequently as I do into these writings, I making use of these Hypotheses as invincible Bulwarks against the most cunning and most mischievous efforts of Atheism. For I am certain that, taking the Suppositions which I have culled out of those two Philosophies for true, (and let our Adversaries prove them false if they can) there is not any Objection that Atheism can make against the above-named Doctrines, but I can return to it a full and irrefutable Answer.

Whence it is not hopeless, but that as we may put many to flight, so the rest may voluntarily surrender themselves as Prisoners, being carried captive by the power of Reason into a true belief of things for the main; and having all hopes of an After-Impunity intercepted by so clear a conviction of the Soul's Immortality, be engaged to turn real Christians in the plainer points thereof, and be willingly detained in the Outward Court, though by reason of the present Weakness of their sight they may not be as yet fit to enter into the more sacred smoke of the Temple. Wherefore I being so faithfully, and, as I conceive, so usefully taken up in managing these Out-works, as I may so call them, I shall not impute it, no not so much as to over-hasty zeal,  
but



but to mere mishap, if I be pelted behind my back by any shots of Obloquie from any unknown servant of the Sanctuary; and presume that if I receive any hurt, that their smart will be the greatest that did it, when they shall consider they have wounded a true and faithful friend, and even then when he was so busily and watchfully employ'd in facing the common Enemy.

5. If any expect or desire any general Instruction or Preparation for the more profitably perusing of these my Writings, I must profess that I can give none that is peculiar to them, but what will fit all Writings that are writ with Freedome and Reason. And this one Royal Rule I would recommend for all, Not to judge of the truth of any Proposition till we have a settled and determinate apprehension of the terms thereof. Which Law though it be so necessary and indispensible, yet there is none so frequently broken as it: the effect whereof is those many heaps of voluminous writings and inept Oppositions and Controversies that fill the World. Which were impossible to be, if men had not got an habit of fluttering mere words against one another, without taking notice of any determinate sense, and so did fight as it were with so many Hercules clubs made of Pastboard, which causes a great sound, but does no execution towards the ending of disputes. For as no man will ever be so extravagant as to affirm that a Triangle is a Quadrangle, or a Square a Circle, having the distinct Ideas of those Figures in his mind: so it would be as impossible for him to pronounce of any thing else falsely and absurdly, if he had as perfect and settled a Notion of the things concerning which he seems to pronounce. But this first and main Principle of wisdom being neglected, it is no wonder that men clash as ridiculously and causelessly as those two Country Clowns, who in their cups had like to have gone to blows, because the one professed himself a Lutheran, the other a Martinist.

Certain Advertisements for the more profitable perusing his Books.

I might adde also another Advertisement (which will contribute much towards a greater Compendiousness in Controversies) which I think I have hinted upon occasion elsewhere; namely, That what will prove any thing will prove nothing. Which if it were thoroughly taken notice of, would not only inable a man to defeat the seeming force of innumerable impertinent assaults, but also keep himself off, if he have any ingenuity in him, from assaulting, or rather disturbing or interrupting, the composure and silence of another mans mind, by the empty noise of such weak and groundless Arguments; I mean such as will infer or maintain Falshood as well as Truth. For all such Arguments ought to be exploded, especially in Philosophie. And I think if this kind of weapon were once out of fashion, contest would soon be at an end, and such a victory follow as all would be gainers by it.

6. But in the third and last place (and which, though it has some considerable influence every where, yet is more peculiarly requisite in perusing writings upon such Subjects as these I treat of) I should commend to them that would successfully philosophize, the belief and endeavour after a certain Principle more noble and inward than Reason it self, and without which Reason will fault, or at least reach but to mean and frivolous things. I have a sense of something in me while I thus speak, which I must confess is of so retruse a nature that I want a name for it, unless I should adventure to term it Divine Sagacity, which is the first Rise of successful Reason, especi-

Divine Sagacity a Principle antecedaneous to successful Reason in Contemplations of the highest concernment.



ally in matters of great comprehension and moment, and without which a man is as it were in a thick wood, and may make infinite promising attempts, but can find no Out-let into the open Champaign, where one may freely look about him every way ( the πεδιον τῆ ἀληθείας ) without the safe conduct of this good Genius.

All Pretenders to Philosophy will indeed be ready to magnifie Reason to the skies, to make it the light of Heaven and the very Oracle of God: but they do not consider that the Oracle of God is not to be heard but in his Holy Temple, that is to say, in a good and holy man, throughly sanctified in Spirit, Soul and body. For there is a sanctity even of Body and Complexion, which the sensually-minded do not so much as dream of. Aaron's Rationale, his Λόγον or Oracle of Reason, did it not include in it the Urim and Thummim, Purity and Integrity of the Will and Affections, as well as the Light of the Understanding? Was not that Breast-plate square, not only in reference to the firmness of Ratiocination, as Philo intimates, but also to denote the Evenness and Uprightness of his Spirit that will take upon him to pronounce great Truths, that he must be, as Aristotle somewhere speaks, ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ τιμωρὸς ὁ ἀνὴρ λόγος\* and that not only according to the measure of the City, but of the Sanctuary, not only to a Political degree of vertue, but Cathartical, or rather that which \* Plotinus places ἐν τῇ κακαδιότητι, and implies a Soul already purged?

\* Ennead. 1.  
lib. 2.

Let a man adorn himself as well as he can with the History of Universal Nature represented by the long Sacerdotal Robe, if this Breast-plate with the Urim and Thummim be wanting to him that thus far would act the Priest, he must of necessity fall so far short of approving himself a sound Philosopher, being at least unable to utter any Oracles himself, and but in a bad capacity of receiving them when they are uttered by another. For if this Divine Sagacity be wanting, by reason of the impurity of a mans Spirit, he can neither hit upon a right sent of things himself, nor easily take it, or rightly pursue it, when he is put upon it by another. Which odd Position of mine though it may make them fret and storm that have made the Contempt of Morality one part of their Philosophy, and may think themselves uncivilly dealt with to be pronounced incompetent Judges of such things as they took for granted to be within their own sphere; yet I could not conceal so concerning a Truth, especially it self being not at all unphilosophical.

The abovesaid  
Principle fur-  
ther illustrated  
and confirmed  
out of Aristot-  
le.  
De Subtil. ex-  
ercit. 307.  
sect. 25.

7. For is it not the saying of that so universally-applauded Aristotle, Κινεῖ γὰρ πῶς πάντα τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον, λόγος δὲ ἀρχὴ καὶ λόγος, ἀλλὰ πικρεῖτον; What Plato, nay what Chrysostome, what Augustine could have spoke more Heavenly language? Scaliger transported at the view of this Text breaks out into this Encomiastick Interrogation, Quid ais, divine vir? Estne in nobis aliquid divinum quod sit præstantius ipsâ ratione? An tibi quoque noti fuerunt ipsi radii Spiritûs Sancti? &c. And that we may not think that this τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον is any part of our selves, it appears both from what goes before and what follows after that it is the very Deity: For he having made this the Question, τίς ἡ τῆ κινήσεως ἀρχὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; What is the Beginning of motion in the Soul? the full Answer follows thus, Δηλον ὅτι ὡπερ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ θεός, καὶ πᾶν ἐκείνῳ. κινεῖ γὰρ πῶς πάντα τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον\* λόγος δὲ ἀρχὴ καὶ λόγος, ἀλλὰ πικρεῖτον. τί οὖν ἂν εἴη κρεῖττον καὶ ὁσιώμεν  
σπλὴν

Arist. Moral.  
Eudem. lib. 7.  
cap. 14.

πλὴν Θεός; It is evident, *saieth he*, that it is, as in the Universe, God himself, and all in him. For it is the same Numen in us that moves all things in some sort or other: And the Beginning of Reason is not Reason, but something which is better: but what can be better then Science but God? *The Argument of the chapter is a Question* ἀεὶ εὐτυχίας, of good success in affairs, *whether it be φύσει, νόῳ, ἢ ἐπιμελείᾳ πνι* that is to say, *whether it be by Nature, Reason, or by the Procuration of some good Genius, of some δαίμων ἀγαθὸς ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς*, they are Aristotle's own words; which I cite the rather, because it is the only place that I know wherein there is such express mention of Dæmons: Which yet he does not assert here neither; but upon occasion of this subject his mind swelling higher, rose at last to such a pitch as to utter this so much admired Aphorisme by Jul. Scaliger, namely, That there is something before and better then Reason, whence Reason it self has its rise.

Which though Aristotle mainly appropriates to external Affairs, I must (and may with equal right) transfer also to the Negotiations of the Mind and the success of pure Speculation: Where the ἡ δὲ διὰ δύσυχια, as he calls it, is more likely to be continued, and to prove constant, (by reason of the natural cohesion of Truth with an impolluted Soul) then it is in external transactions. This intellectual success therefore is from the Presence of God, who does (κινεῖν πῶς πάντα) move all things in some sort or other, but residing in the undefiled Spirit moves it in the most excellent manner, and endues it with that Divine Sagacity I spoke of, which is a more inward, compendious, and comprehensive Presentation of Truth, ever antecedent to that Reason which in Theories of greatest importance approves it self afterwards, upon the exactest examination, to be most solid and perfect every way, and is truly that wisdom which is peculiarly styled the Gift of God, and hardly competible to any but to persons of a pure and unspotted mind. Of so great concernment is it sincerely to endeavour to be holy and good.

8. This is all that I thought fit to preface in a more general way. I will briefly cast an eye also upon the several parts of this present Volume, if any thing haply occurs that will be requisite for me to either excuse, complete, or any way give light to. As it may be some may conceive it an Omission in my Antidote, in that I have not brought in and confuted the lubricous or unconvulsive Arguments which some use to prove the Existence of a Deity. But I think it may not unbecome one that is faithful to the Cause, not to be over-industrious in discovering the weakness of such Arguments as are meant for the engendring in mens minds the belief of that Truth which is of so necessary and vast importance for mankind to be persuaded of. For I charitably surmise that the first inventours of those reasons thought them conclusive, or else they would not have made use of them. Whence it will follow, that they may still have their force with those that are but of the same pitch with their first Proposers. And he that guesleth right and goes on his journey will as certainly come to the place he aims at, as he that perfectly knows the way. I must confess I have been more free in my censure of Des-Cartes his second and third Argument: but there is the less hurt done, they being not so popular; and besides, it was fit to shew my impartialness, because I have

The Authours  
Excuse for his  
omitting in his  
Antidote, to  
confute the un-  
concluding rea-  
sons some use  
for the proof  
of a God.

with



with that confidence avouched the solidity of the first. Which the more I considered the more firm I found, nor have to this day met with either man or book that could produce any thing material towards the Confutation of it.

His Excuse for  
not adding a  
Treatise of Su-  
perstition to  
that of Enthu-  
siasm.

9. What Defect any one may spy in my Treatise of Enthusiasm I cannot so easily presage, nor can secure my self from seeming deficient to him that more resentingly considers the usefulness of that Treatise, in that I have not added another of Superstition. But I have naturally and heedlessly hit upon that judicious advice of the Poet,

—————Et quæ

Desperas tractata nitescere posse relinque.

For I must confess I do not look upon that Subject as any thing polishable by my hand, it being an argument fitter for Rhetorick then Philosophy. Besides that I never found my mind low or abject enough to sink into any sense or conceit of that Dispensation, experimentally to find what is at the bottom thereof. I must ingenuously confess that I have a natural touch of Enthusiasme in my Complexion, but such as, I thank God, was ever governable enough, and I have found at length perfectly subduable. In virtue of which victory I know better what is in Enthusiasts then they themselves, and therefore was able to write what I have wrote with life and judgement, and shall, I hope, contribute not a little to the peace and quiet of this Kingdome thereby.

But having had such a notion of God from my very youth, as represented him to me as the most noble and excellent Being that can be, it could never enter into my minde that he was either irritable or propitiable by the omitting or performing of any mean and insignificant services, such as are neither perfective of humane nature, nor the genuine result of that perfection. And therefore I had an early belief that he served God best, that was least envious, worldly or sensual, that delighted most in the common good of the Universe, and had the strongest faith in the bounty and Mercy of God, of which his Son Jesus is the most palpable pledge that he could exhibit to the World. Which constant frame of Spirit made me wholly incapable of the least Tincture of Superstition. For it is the Ignorance of better things that causes those perplexities and consternations of minde about matters of less moment.

The End of Religion is humane Happiness and Perfection; and he that so serves God as phansying Him to want any thing of his, instead of honouring of him reproaches him. Wherefore Superstition is alwaies accompanied with Ignorance or Hypocrisie. The first, when not knowing what that good and acceptable will of God is, which is to become like unto him (Τιμω-  
μεν τὸ θεὸν ἀρετῇ ἐὰν τὰς θεῷ τὰς δυνάμεις ὁμοιωσῶμεν, as Pythagoras taught) they do express their zeal and devotion in such things as neither themselves nor any one else is better for. The second, when the same Trifles are offered up to God, not so much out of ignorance of what is better, as out of a kind of tacit fraud and cunning circumvention, as it were, of God, in making with him, or rather whether he will or no, such an unequal exchange. By which Delusions though they may for a while in some sort pacifie their false hearts and consciences, yet in the mean time they really do but provoke God by these sacrifices of Fools.

This is the summe of what I am able to conceive of this other Disease of Superstition,

Superstition, which is by mere collection of Reason, having had no experience therein for the quickening my style or enlarging my thoughts thereupon. But I think I may safely affirm as I have elsewhere, That it is Superstition (if it be not Vain-glory, Interest, or something worse) where men have an over-proportionated zeale for or against such things in Religion as God puts little or no price upon either their performance or omission. Which thing if it were seriously and conscienciously considered, would tend very much to the laying or preventing the usual blasters of Christendome. And there can be no better effect of writing a whole Volume. But I must confess that the success and growth of the Church is an Arcanum that lies more deep in Providence, and rather is a Mystery of life then of external Reason. Paul may plant and Apollos may water, but God gives the increase.

10. As for the Letters that follow in the next place, themselves speak the occasion of them. I have superadded that to V. C. as for other reasons, so chiefly for the begetting a better opinion in such as are not so well acquainted with Des-Cartes and his Writings. For it cannot be but that men of very excellent spirits may labour with prejudice against so worthy an Authour by misrepresentation of things. And I must confess that the very newness alone is occasion enough, even to those that are truly ingenuous, to make a stand; that which is strange having something of the face of what is hostile. Whence Hostis and Peregrinus had once the same signification, as Cicero observes. And it is a piece of Rudenesse and Unskilfulnesse in the nature of things and in the perfection of Divine Providence, (who has generally implanted a tenacious adhesion to what has accustomedly been received, that the mind of man might be the safer Receptacle when it lights upon what is best) to conceit that because a Truth is demonstratively evident in it self, that therefore its Opposite shall immediately surrender the Castle. Which consideration with the ingenuous cannot but secure the continuance of unfeigned civility and respect even to the jealous Suspecters or Opposers of new Truths, and make them look upon it as a piece of surprizing Ignorance or Inhumanity to be otherwise affected towards them.

11. What particularly to take notice of in that Letter occurs not to my mind, unless I should applaud the luckiness of my Conjecture concerning Des-Cartes his distorting the true and natural Idea of motion in reference to Galilæo's ill hap, who was so rudely handled for his Hypothesis of the Motion of the Earth by a Councel of Cardinals. To which that he had an eye is now very evident from several of his \* Letters to Marsennus, of which passages I had no knowledge till within these few days, and my Letter it self was writ before this second volume of Des-Cartes his came out. But in the mean time I cannot but observe the inconvenience this external force and fear does to the commonwealth of Learning, and how many innocent and well-deserving young Wits have been put upon the Rack, as well as Galilæo into prison. For his Imprisonment frightened Des-Cartes into such a distorted description of Motion, that no mans Reason could make good sense of it, nor Modesty permit him to phansy any thing Non-sense in so excellent an Authour.

My main design in my Letter was to clear Cartesius from that giddy and groundless suspicion of Atheism (which surely could not be taken up by any but the more course and vulgar Spirits) which I conceive I have done fully,  
and

That it can be no offence to the knowing and ingenuous, that men have a shyness and jealousy against such Truths as they have not been acquainted with.

Certain remarkable things concerning Des-Cartes and his Writings.

\* Lett. de Mr. Des-Cartes. Tom. 2. Lett. 75. 76, 80.



and to the effectual stopping of all such surmises for the future, even in the weakest and most scrupulous suspects of him. And yet I might have added more even out of his first Volume of Letters, namely, That he did not only believe the existence of God, but also his particular Providence, which he felt and acknowledged in that special impulse and success he had in his Philosophical Studies. Which I less wonder at, he beginning so piously in his youth, and exercising his first style upon that excellent Theme, The fear of the Lord is the beginning of Wisdom, as I was informed by letters from Mr Clerfelier at Paris, when he sent me a Catalogue of what Writings Cartesius had left behind him. The notice whereof did not a little please me, it being the very Text upon which my self first common-placed in our Colledge Chappel.

But that which enravishes me the most is, that we both setting out from the same Lists, though taking several wayes, the one travailing in the lower Rode of Democritisme, amidst the thick dust of Atoms and flying particles of Matter, the other tracing it over the high and airy Hills of Platonisme, in that more thin and subtil Region of Immateriality, meet together notwithstanding at last (and certainly not without a Providence) at the same Goale, namely at the Enterance of the holy Bible, dedicating our joynt labours to the use and glory of the Christian Church, laying at their feet the most true, as we conceive, and the most approvable Philosophical Interpretation of the three first Chapters of Genesis as ever was yet offered to the World since the loss of the ancient Judaical Cabbala. Which is not a mere strain of Rhetorick of mine, but a free acknowledgement, or rather serious boast, of Des-Cartes himself in a Letter to a certain friend, where he professes that he had found his own Philosophy even to admiration agreeable to the Text of Moses, above all other Interpretations whatsoever. Which I have abundantly made good in the Defense of my Philosophick Cabbala, and above what Des-Cartes could well perform, anless he had light on the same Key with my self.

12. Concerning my Immortality of the Soul, I shall take notice only of these two Dissatisfactions, which, because they seem main ones to some, though they never did so to me, I shall now bring into view. The first of which is this, That I have admitted a kind of Extension in the nature of a Spirit; the second, That I have not admitted perception in the Spirit of Nature. But as touching the first, I can justly apologize for my self, that Necessity has no Law, and that if they consider the demonstrable evidence of these two Conclusions, 1. That there is a substance immaterial really and specifically distinct from Body, 2. and, That there is no real Entity but what is in some sense extended, it will be impossible for them not to conclude as well as we, That a Spirit is in some sort extended also. Wherefore it is an unskilfully-framed complaint that cavils at the Inference without searching into the strength of the Premisses. I do therefore here appeal to any indifferent Reader, whether I have not Mathematically demonstrated the truth of the First both in my Antidote and my Treatise of the Soul's Immortality.

And shall now for his fuller satisfaction demonstrate the Second more punctually; namely, that neither the Soul nor any thing else can be Totum in

Lett. 114.

Lett. de Mr.  
Des-Cartes.  
Tom. 2. Lett. 24.

Certain considerations layd together which wholly prevent all imaginable Objections against the Extension of a Spirit.



in toto, and totum in qualibet parte, but that this Assertion (as I had once occasion to write to an ingenious friend of mine) is a mere chiming contradiction. Which I proved to him thus: namely, That Totum comprehends all that is of a thing both in a positive sense and (consequently) in a negative, that is to say, If all A be in B, there is nothing left to be in C distant from B. For it is as if one should say, there is nothing of A but what is concluded within B, and yet at the same moment not only something of A, but all A, should be in C also: which is impossible in any singular or individual Essence; and Universals are not Things, but Notions.

To which we may further add, that this Supposition makes that of which it is affirmed as small as the smallest thing conceivable. For if the Total be in every point, it is plain that the amplitude of this Total is no bigger then the point it is in. Which is intolerable applyed to the Deity, and ridiculous in every thing else.

Wherefore it being so Mathematically demonstrable that there is that which is properly called Spirit, and that no Being at all can be totally present in distant points or parts of Matter at once, it does unavoidably follow that a Spirit is in some sort extended.

But you will further urge; If Spirit be extended as well as Body, how shall we conceive Perception more competent to a Spirit then to a Body? To which briefly I answer, that I have already demonstrated that Perception is incompetent to Body, which I challenge any one to doe if he can concerning a Spirit: And demand further of them that phansy a Spirit totally present in every part of Matter, whether they can any better conceive thereby the immediate reason of the power of perception; and aske those that say it is neither as a Mathematical point, nor totally present, nor extended, whether they conceive it any thing more capable thereby of that vital Sympathy and Coactivity that transmits Objects in their exact circumstances to the common Percipient. I dare say, if they will speak what they find, they will not fail to return answer, That they are not at all advantaged for the conceiving of the immediate reason of either simple Perception, or of the above-said vital Sympathy, by any such suppositions.

And therefore in the third place I will take the boldness to advertise them, that the truth of my 9. Axiom, that declares That some powers and properties are immediate to a Subject, had already fully accomplished my Purpose. For there being other properties in Body that intercepted from it the capacity of perceiving, it was necessarily left to some Substance Incorporeal to be the immediate Subject of the power of Perception. For it must be the immediate power of some Subject or other, so far as our Understanding reaches, nor can we find out an adequate cause besides the Subject it self, according to which precisely any thing is perceptive. It is true that we are conscious to our selves that that Being that is perceptive must be very Unitive, and Reason does evidence to us that to be One more then Matter is one (which is one only by juxtaposition of parts) is a necessary requisite of that which is capable of the function of Common-Percipiency, and therefore precedes in nature. But that which is as much one as anything can be without a contradiction, that is to say, is so much one that it has immediately of its own nature vital Sympathy and coactivity of parts, as I may so  
b
speak,

Speak, and perfect Indiscerpibility, does not for all this immediately imply a power of perception residing therein. For I conceive every Spirit may be thus Unitive; but I am not assured that every Spirit has Perception, but rather on the contrary that some have not. Wherefore though every thing that is perceptive must be a Spirit, yet every Spirit need not be perceptive. Whence Perception must be an immediate power in that Rank of Spirits that are perceptive; and therefore it must be an argument of no small ἀπαιδουσία or Unskilfulness to ask or expect a reason why it is so.

Nor can we give any account of that vital Oneness in every Spirit consisting in Sympathy and Coactivity of parts, unless we should alledge that it is very fit, seeing the nature of a Spirit is opposite to that of Matter, that the first and most immediate consequences of their natures should be opposite also; and that therefore, it being here acknowledged that Matter is stupid, or destitute of vital Sympathy and Coactivity, Spirit must be vital, and endued with such like properties: or that, as Matter, which has not that Essential Unity consisting in Indiscerpibility of parts, is also devoid of this vital Oneness; so Spirit, which has this Essential Unity, should consequently be endued with the vital. But this is not altogether according to the severity of the manner of reasoning which I affect; though the argument be in no wise contemptible if we consider the immediate Opposition of the two species, and that it is but the first degree and most immediate emergency of Vitality which we contend for in the comparison.

But I did not care to stand upon such kind of ratiocinations, being well assured that I had already done my business in merely demonstrating that what I assert to belong to Spirit was incompetible to Matter or Body, and that therefore Spirit must be necessarily acknowledged both to be, and to be also the Subject of such powers and properties, namely, of vital Sympathy and Coactivity of parts, and, which is the flower of all, of the Faculty of Perception. And who can question but that they are rightly lodged?

For I think there is none but will acknowledge that there is generally in all men either a confused presage, or more determinate Notion, that that which has this power of Sympathy and Perception is the most subtil and unitive thing that is. Now I dare appeal to any one, if he can conceive any thing more subtil or more unitive than the Essential Notion of a Spirit, as it is immediately counterdistinct to Matter. For can there be any thing more one than what is utterly indiscerpible into parts? or more subtil than what is not only penetrative of Matter, but also of it self, or of things of its own kind? For Spirit will penetrate Spirit, though Matter cannot Matter. Wherefore there being no ἀντιρροπία in a Spirit neither to its own kind nor to any thing else, it is evident that it is the most subtil thing that is, and that therefore the communication of vital Impresses (and all impresses here are vital, though not all Perceptions, nor any of them Motions) is not made by the jogging or crouding of parts, but by Spiritual Sympathy, which is more loose and free from those restrictions that are in the Mechanical laws of Matter.

Of which the natural Consecutary is, That to resolve a Phenomenon into Sympathy, is not alwaies to take sanctuary in the Asylum of Fools. For it is the Result of very subtil and operose Demonstration to come to the certain knowledge of the existence of Spiritual Beings; which once granted, their  
nature



*nature is such that it is impossible but that any one should confess that they are the proper Subjects of Sympathy and Perception. And therefore to conclude that to be by Sympathy that we can demonstrate not to be by mere Mechanical Powers, is not to shelter a mans self in the common Refuge of Ignorance, but to tell the proximate and immediate cause of a Phænomenon, which is to philosophize to the height.*

*Briefly therefore to conclude : I having demonstrated with evidence no less then Mathematical, That there are Substances incorporeal, and that all Substance is in some sense extentional, because there is no Substance but is, or at least may be, essentially present to Matter ; it will necessarily follow from hence , That Incorporeal Substance is in some sort extended ; and consequently, that a Soul or Spirit is capable of no other Unity or Oneness then what consists in Indiscerpibility and in vital Coactivity and Sympathy of parts ; and that therefore, finally, the resolution of such Phænomena as we experience in our selves, or observe in other things, which exceed the mere Mechanical laws of Matter, into this Vital Oneness, which consists in Coactivity and Sympathy of parts, is no vain Tautologie, or the mere saying a thing is so because it is so, but a distinct Indication of the proper and immediate cause thereof. All which things lay'd together, and seriously considered, will easily prevent whatever Objections any one might otherwise imagine against the Extension of a Spirit.*

13. *The second Dissatisfaction is touching the Spirit of Nature, in that I have not allowed it the Power of Perception. That there is a Spirit of Nature, that is to say, a substance incorporeal that does interesse it self in the bringing about some more general Phænomena in the World, I think I have demonstrated so evidently that nothing can be more evident in Philosophy. Nor can a man doubt but that it is an Universal Principle, if he consider the nature of God and the Divine Fecundity, and the use of this Spirit wherever there is Matter manageable to some serviceable end for the good of the whole Creation ; besides those Testimonies of its Omnipresence, if I may say, it doing the same things at vast Distances. As for example, It remands down a stone toward the Center of the Earth as well when the Earth is in Aries as in Libra, keeps the Waters from swilking out of the Moon, curbs the matter of the Sun into roundness of figure, which would otherwise be oblong, restrains the crusty parts of a Star from flying apieces into the circumambient Æther, carries along those large Regions of looser Particles of the third Element, together with the Comets, in their peregrinations from Vortex to Vortex, every where directs the magnetick Atoms in their right Rode ; besides all the Plastick services it does both in Plants and Animals.*

The Properties and Offices of the Spirit of Nature further cleared and confirmed.

*This therefore being a mute copy of the eternal Word ( that is, of that Divine Wisedome that is entirely every where ) is in every part naturally appointed to doe all the best services that Matter is capable of, according to such or such modifications, and according to that Platform of which it is the Transcript, I mean according to the Comprehension and Purpose of those Idea's of things which are in the eternal Intellect of God. Whence it is plain, That there need be no other λόγοι σπέρματιχοι, or Seminal Forms, then this one, which virtually contains all every where, and is therefore rightly styled The Universal Spirit of Nature : As also, That this Spirit need not be per-*

Book 2. ch. 2.  
sect. 8.

\* see sect. 11.

A Confectary  
concerning the  
Conduct of  
Souls by the  
Spirit of Na-  
ture.

That the an-  
cient Judaical  
Cabbala did  
consist of what  
we now call  
Platonism and  
Cartesianism,  
made farther  
probable from  
the Lineage of  
the Pythagorick  
School.

ceptive it self, it being the natural Transcript of that which is knowing or perceptive, and is the lowest Substantial Activity from the all-wise God, containing in it certain general Modes and Laves of Nature for the good of the Universe. But the Eye of particular Providence is not therein. Else why does a tyle fall upon the head of him that passes by in the streets, goe he to either Play or Sermon? And how come those bungles in monstrous productions, or those inept and self-thwarting Attempts of this Spirit in certain experiments about the finding out a Vacuum? as I have particularly noted in my Antidote. Wherefore neither Omnipotency nor Omniscieny acts in such cases, but this imperceptive Spirit of Nature. Whose Imperceptiveness is no more Obstacle to her natural and plastical Operations, then the Soul's having no actual Idea of a thing aforehand is an hinderance of her occasional perceptions, as I have already intimated in my \* Preface to my Treatise of the Soul's Immortality.

Which things well considered and allow'd, that special Office of this Spirit of Nature in conducting of souls in their State of Silence, to actuate prepared Matter, and so to raise Animals into Life, will easily be conceived as becoming an employment as any of the rest, and not at all more difficult. For how much harder is it to apprehend that the Spirit of Nature may direct or carry down a silent Soul, then a dead stone, to their fit and natural abodes? For the liveless Spirit and the dead stone are alike easy to be taken hold upon, the Spirit of Nature penetrating them both alike; and body slipping up and down so easily in this Spirit of the World, as that it cannot be imagined that any Mechanical power, but that only which is truly called Sympathetical, must be the Tye where any hold is taken. Which Tye catches and lets goe, for the direction and transmission of things to their proper places in the several parts of the World for the good of the Whole, according to that Essential Law which is the Form and Being of this Spirit of Nature, the last Ideal or Omniiform Efflux from God. Nor is it, as I have already said, any thing more marvelous that a liveless soul should by this imperceptive Spirit of Nature be carried away and conducted to duly-prepared Matter, then that a dead Stone or the senseless Magnetick Particles should be guided thereby. For that whereby the Soul is caught so fast by its particular Body is not the perceptive part thereof, but the plastick or natural; else in a pet she might easily leave the body without either hanging, drowning or stabbing. Why then may not a Spirit, that has subtiler fingers then the finest Matter, I mean the Spirit of Nature, lay hold on that imperceptive part of the Soul, or on the Soul it self, in the state of Silence or Imperception, and by the sympathy and coactivity of its own Essence carry her away to such services as either her self had deserved or the Universe required? All which things though I will not assert as true, yet I dare pronounce them as intelligible as the Union of the Soul with the Body, which experience makes us understand whether we will or no.

14. As for my Conjectura Cabbalistica, I have no new thing to take notice of there, unless what I have added there of anew, which is the Appendix to the Defence of my Philosophick Cabbala. Wherein I think I have cleared that Cabbala of all imaginable Objections of any moment, and amongst other things have plainly proved that not only Platonism, but that which



which now deserves to be called Cartesianism, for Des-Cartes his so happily recovering of it again into view, was part of the ancient Judaical Cabbala, it being part of Pythagoras his Philosophy which he had (as is abundantly testified out of ancient Writers) from the Jews. I omitted to set down the succession of the Pythagorick School, which yet had not been impertinent to our scope; and therefore I will here make a supply out of Diogenes Laërtius, who reckons the Descent thus; Pherecydes, Pythagoras, Telauges, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno Eleates, Leucippus, Democritus, and then many others, amongst whom were Nausiphanes and Naucydes, and the last of all Epicurus.

This School was called the Italick School; the first of which succession, Pherecydes, is said to have got certain secret Writings from the Phoenicians or Hebrews, as I have already observed out of \* Hēsychius: nor need here repeat those ample Testimonies that prove that Pythagoras, the immediate successor of Pherecydes, had his Philosophy from the Jews: nor how that the Cabbala was kept entire in him and in some of his successors, that is to say, The Physical or Mechanical part was not dissevered from the Theological or Metaphysical, the body from the soul, as it seems to have happened in Leucippus and Democritus, and finally to have grown cadaverous and of an ill savour in Epicurus, and in as many as have insisted in his steps to this very day.

15. But in the mean time I cannot but note that this succession of that School is no small confirmation both that Pythagoras his Philosophy was the ancient Wisdom of the Jews, and especially that the Atomical or Mechanical Philosophy (such, in a manner, and so much as I have applied to Moses his Text) was also part of that Wisdom. It is needlesse here to repeat what I have already noted to make for the discovering that Pythagorisme had relation to the Text of Moses. But besides what I have observed from Pherecydes his mentioning of Ophioneus as the Ring-leader of the Apostate Spirits, the beginning of a Book of his, which Laërtius recites, methinks looks like a broken reflexion upon the Beginning of Genesis. Ζῶς μὲν καὶ χρόνος αἰεὶ καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστου τοῦ ἑτέρου ἦν ἀειδαὶ αὐτῶν Ζῶς γένεσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν. Of which the easy English is this, God and Time (I suppose he means Duration) and the Ground were eternally: But the Ground upon God's adorning it was called Earth. Which latter in all likelihood was a glance at the third day's work. But the former part, that affirms the Ground eternal, reflects upon the first. For this χωρὶς, which I have translated the Ground, is Hyle, which Plotinus calls ὑποβάσις and ἡ ἀρχαία φύσις, the Ground or Foundation, and the ancient Nature; Hyle or the Possibility of the external Creation being eternal, which notwithstanding is but a kind of Non-Entity, and yet the lowest Basis of Actual Being. According to which sense is Parmenides also to be understood (the fifth in this Italick succession) in his making the two first Principles Fire and Earth, as appears out of Aristotle. Δύο τὰς ἀρχὰς τίθει, θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν, οὗ πῦρ καὶ γῆν λέγων· τέτων δὲ τὸ μὴ κατὰ τὸ ὄν τὸ θερμὸν πάντα, δαίμων δὲ κατὰ τὸ μὴ ὄν. Where the learned Stagirite is utterly out in his glosse, as if Parmenides meant by his Fire and Earth nothing but heat and cold, and so made two Accidents the first principles of all things. But by the bye he has lent

\* Append. to the Defence of the Philosoph. Cabbala ch. 7. sect. 5.

Particular considerations out of Pherecydes, Parmenides and Aristotle, that might move one to believe that the whole Pythagorick Philosophy, as well Physical as Metaphysical, was the ancient Wisdom of the Jews.

Aristot. Metaphys. lib. 1. c. 5.

unto us very useful light, in that he witnesseth of Parmenides that he ranked the Earth in the order of Non-entities. For hereby it is manifest that he spoke Symbolically, and understood thereby the same that Pherecydes did by  $\chi\theta\omega\nu$ , the ancient Hyle. For who would say that this Physical Earth, which is the most gross and palpable Entity in the World, is in the Rank of Non-entities more then Fire or Aire or the like? But Aristotle (though he speak excellent things sometimes) does very often without any victory triumph and trample upon the opinions of the ancient Philosophers, by reason of his ignorance of what Clemens Alexandrinus so expressly instructs us in, "Οτι ὁ  $\pi\rho\acute{o}\tau\omicron\tau\omicron\varsigma$  παρ' αὐτοῖς τῆ φιλοσοφίας Ἑβραϊκὸς καὶ ἀνιγμωδὸς, That their manner of Philosophy was Mosaical and symbolical. And it being so evident that Earth signifies symbolically with Parmenides, there can be no question but Fire signifies so too, and that it is no other then  $\alpha\iota\theta\epsilon\rho$  or Οὐρανός, Æther, and answers in signification to Light or Heaven mentioned in the first Day's Creation. Which is Parmenides his Plastical or

Clem. Strom.  
lib. 1.

\* Diog. Laërt.  
in vita Par-  
menidii.

\* See Append.  
to the Defence  
of the Philoso-  
phick Cabbala,  
ch. 7. sect. 5.

\* See Append.  
to the Philos.  
Cabb. ch. 1.  
sect. 8.

\* Demiurgical Principle (which Fire cannot be) as the Earth the Material. Such Indications as these have I \* produced to prove that the Pythagorick Philosophy has reference to Moses his Text.

And that that Philosophy which Pythagoras had from the Jews was not merely Metaphysical, but also Physical or \* Mechanical, and of such a nature as the Cartesian, not only the Motion of the Earth, which is the famed opinion of Pythagoras, and which implies a Vortex about the Sun, but also the confessed Atomical Philosophy of Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus, who are of the Italick line, does more fully evince: Though what they speak of the Vortices are either corrupt notions of that School then decaying, or but brokenly and confusedly set down by the Historian. And yet something I have culled out in the life of Parmenides, that is so perfectly agreeable to the Cartesian Philosophy that nothing can be more, and is indeed the very heart and marrow of it, and in a manner comprehends or takes hold of all. Which is thus expressed by the Interpreter of Laërtius; \* Solem ipsum frigidum esse & calidum: which is a monstrous saying of Parmenides, unless the meaning be only this, Solem esse vel candentem vel extinctum, alluding to  $\text{שמש}$  and  $\text{כוכב}$ . Nor can that be true that goes immediately before, that men were generated out of the Sun, but as it is extinct and becomes an Earth or Planet. And Des-Cartes his Philosophy defines thus far, That this Earth out of which man at first was made is of such a nature as if it had been once a Sun, nor dare I define any further.

\* See Append.  
to the Philos.  
Cabb. ch. 7.  
sect. 5.

The unhappy  
disjunction of  
the Physical  
part of the Cab-  
bala from the  
Metaphysical in  
Leucippus, De-  
mocritus and  
Epicurus; with  
the Authors  
serious endea-  
vour of re-uni-  
ing them  
again.

16. It is therefore very evident to me that the ancient Pythagorick or Judaick Cabbala did consist of what we now call Platonisme and Cartesianisme, the latter being as it were the Body, the other the Soul of that Philosophy; the unhappy disjunction of which has been a great evil to both: the Metaphysicians growing vain in spinning out needless and useless subtilties and ridiculous falsities, concerning immaterial Beings, for want of some other easier Object to exercise their Reason upon; and the Atomical Philosophers becoming over-credulous of the powers of Matter, nay, I may say, too too impious and impudent in exploding the belief of Immaterial Beings, in contemning the Rules and Maximes of Vertue and Morality, and in shamelessly obtruding upon the World their Mechanical Surmises for necessary Demonstra-



*Demonstrations, when they were indeed down-right Falsities and Impossibilities. And therefore I do not a little please myself in that I have made some progress towards the resuscitating that ancient and venerable Wisdom again to life, and the bringing together, as it were, of the Soul and Body of Moses, fitly investing him or cloathing him with the Covering of his own most sacred Text.*

*Which though it seemed something an hardy Exploit, and not much unlike the raising from the dead the dislimb'd Hippolytus; yet the consideration of the fate of Æsculapius could not deterre me from so glorious an Enterprize; but my free professing it to have been rather a Design than an Atchievement gave me no small assurance, that I was safe enough sheltered from any Thunder-clap of either mis-directed Zeal or glowing Envy.*

17. But yet that I may not dissemble what cannot be conceal'd, that of Platonisme and Cartesianism which I have applied to Moses his Text, is in it self, as I conceive, very rational. And I must further adde, what I dare not conceal nor dissemble, it being for the Interest and safety of Religion for me openly and earnestly to profess it, namely, That what I have applied is exquisitely and unexceptionably fitted to the Text, from the beginning to the end, as I have made good in the Defence of that Cabbala, and in the Appendix thereto. Which is not a voluntary Boast of mine, but a serious profession of the truth, extorted from me out of the great sense I have of that service it does to the Dignity and Authority of the Church. For being perswaded in my own judgement that what I have applied is very consonant to the faculties of humane Understanding, and considering also how far that Philosophy has already got foot in Christendome, and how easily those victories are gained which prove the pleasure and satisfaction of the conquered (and such is Truth to the Soul of Man) as also how hugely disadvantageous it would be to Religion and Theologie to seem to be left so far behind, or to appear to be so opposite to that, which I foresaw might probably become the common Philosophy of the learned; therefore to prevent all contempt and cavil against the Sacredness of Christianity, as holding any thing against the solid truths of approved Reason and Philosophy, I thought it necessary, and an indispensable duty of that Faithfulness I owe to the Christian Church, publickly to declare, That, if any one presume that he has found such points of Cartesianisme or Platonisme as I have applied to the Mosaick letter to be really true upon through examination, I dare confidently pronounce to him, that if they be so, those truths were ever lodged in the Text of Moses, and that no Philosopher has any the least pretence to magnifie himself against Religion and the Church of God, wherein such rich Theories have been ever treasured up, though men have not had, for these many Ages, the leisure or opportunity of unlocking them till now. Which consideration, I think, is of main importance for the stopping the mouths of Atheistical Wits, and conciliating unspeakable Honour and Reverence to Religion and the Church in those who are knowing and ingenuous.

Thus much therefore I must and ought to avouch, That what I have applied is exquisitely fit and applicable to the Text of Moses, and I hope without the breach of Modesty may also adde that it is rational; but it must be the result of a longer deliberation with my self to avouch it is true. For

That what he applies to the Text of Moses in his Philosophick Cabbala, he conceives is rational, and is assured that it exquisitely fits the Text, but deliberates further concerning the Truth thereof.

*I must confess, though I find myself to have got a Key in my hand, whose structure and make is exquisitely fitted to every ward in the lock of this Mo-  
saick Treasury, and which turns easily, locks and unlocks, and I view  
within, as I conceive, inestimable riches of Knowledge: yet I dare not  
believe mine own eyes, nor conclude whether it be real Vision or a Dream,  
not knowing whether this be undoubtedly that ancient golden Key of the  
Cabbala, or one made of baser alloy. And truly a mans Jealousy may well  
be the more encreased, in that it opens immediately upon those two dazeling  
Paradoxes of the Motion of the Earth and the Præexistence of the Soul,  
which is enough to make the hardiest beholder to step back and to strike him  
into a sudden amazement, in which I confess I stand to this very day. At  
which Timidity of mine none can justly wonder that considers how shie the  
ancient Fathers were of the Globesity of the Earth and the Inhabitation  
thereof by the Antipodes: which was indeed the opinion of Pythagoras  
of old, but the certain knowledge of these later Ages.*

The Testimo-  
nie of several  
holy persons  
that did either  
plainly assert, or  
at least had no  
dislike of the  
doctrine of the  
Soul's Præexi-  
stence.

18. *Besides, I must ingenuously confess, I know nothing more nor better  
to be alledged for the Motion of the Earth and other principal points of  
Cartesianisme, then what I have comprised in my Letter to V. C. nor any  
thing more conclusive of the Præexistence of the Soul then what I have  
produced in my Treatise of her Immortality; which I brought into view  
(as also whatever else any one shall conceive in my Writings in any measure  
to deviate from the common Tract) to enlarge the Object of more accurate  
Judgements; which confers very much to a right decision of what is true.  
Nor did any thing offer it self to my mind that seemed worth the adding  
concerning that latter Subject of Præexistence, unless (besides my shewing  
that it was the opinion of all Philosophers that held the Soul immortal, and  
more particularly of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, Authours appointed us  
by the very Statutes of our University; which is enough to make the Opinion  
creditable) I had taken also notice how innocent and inoffensive that  
doctrine was in the more pure and intemperate Ages of the Church.*

Clemens Alex-  
andrinus.

*For I find Clemens Alexandrinus in several places describing it without  
the least intimation of any dislike thereof, as in the first of his Stromata's,  
where writing of the Barbarians (whose wisdom he seems to prefer before  
the Greeks, haply in favour to the Hebrews) he speaks thus, Ἀλλοι δὲ  
εἰσιν οἱ βάρβαροι διαφοροῦτως τιμήσαντες τὰς αὐτῶν νομοθέτας καὶ διδασκα-  
λούς, διὰς προσφύνας. ψυχὰς γὰρ ἀγαθοῖς, κατὰ Πλάτωνα, κατὰ λιπείας ἢ  
ὑπερβαίνον τίπον ὑπομείναντες εἰς τὴνδε τὴν παρὰρην, καὶ σῶμα ἀναλα-  
βέσας τῷ ὄν γενέσθαι κακῶν ἀπάντων μέλαρχεῖν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, καὶ δεμότας τῶ  
τῷ ἀνθρώπων γένει, αἱ νόμους πέθεσαν, καὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἐκήρυξαν. i. e. It is  
plain that the Barbarians did in a special manner honour their Law-givers  
and Instruētors, calling them Gods. For they conceive, with Plato, that  
certain good Souls leaving their celestial mansions did endure the come-  
ing into this Tartarus, and resūming bodies did partake of all the misfe-  
ries that attend Generation, as having committed to them the care of  
mankind, to whom they gave Laws and preached Philosophy. Which  
opinion he is so far from exploding, that he premises in general, before he  
falls into this Discourse of the Philosophy of the Nations, this admirable  
comparison: That as the parts of the Universe, though they disagree one  
from*



from another, yet have a peculiar consenancy and agreement to the whole World; ἔτις ἡ π βάρβαρος ἡ π Ἑλληνικὴ φιλοσοφία ἡ αἰδίων ἀλήθειαν παραγωγὸν πᾶς τῆς τῷ Λόγῳ τῷ ὄντος αἰεί θεολογίας πεποίηται. Ὁ δὲ πὰ διηρημένα σωθεῖς αὐδὺς καὶ ἐνοποιήσας πέλσον τὸν λόγον, ἀνδρώως οὗτος ὅτι καλὸς ἐστὶν ἡ ἀλήθειαν. So, saith he, the Barbarous and Greek Philosophy have made the eternal Truth a kind of discription of the Theologie of the Logos that abides for ever, into disperfed parts. But he that puts together what is thus disperfed and brings them under one perfect consideration, know assuredly that this man shall see to the bottom of Truth. Which I was the more willing to rehearse, I seeming to my self to have attempted some such performance as this in my fitting together the scattered Wisdome of the Ancients into one Mosaick Cabbala.

Again in the third Book, where he disputes against the Marcionites, he cites several sayings out of Plato, that either refer to or directly aver the Praexistence of the Soul. As that out of his Phædo, That it is ὁ δὲ ἀπορρήτους λεγόμενος λόγος, ὡς ἐν πνι φρεσὶ ἐσμεν οἱ ἀνθρώποι, That it is a Traditional Arcanum, that we men in this life are as it were kept in a prison. And he entitles also Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato at once to this sage saying, Θάνατος ἐστὶν ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ὀρέομεν, ὁκόσα δὲ ὀδόντες ὕπνῳ. But that is most fully to the purpose which he cites out of Philolaus the Pythagorean, Μαρίνῳ δὲ ὅτι καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ θεολόγοι τε ἔμνησται ὡς διὰ πᾶς τιμωρίας ἡ ψυχὰ πρὸ σώματος συνέζδου, καὶ κατὰ περὶ τοῦ σώματος τέτταρτα πένταπλοι. The ancient Divines and Prophets (he means, I suppose, especially those of the Jews,) witness that the Soul is joyn'd to this earthly body in a way of punishment, and that so far forth as she is in this body, she is, as it were, buried. Against which Platonical Opinions Clemens shews not the least disgust, but only blames Marcion for his abusing them to his absurd doctrine of the unlawfulness of Marriage, and complains that he did ungratefully and unskilfully take occasion from Plato of hatching his own strange and perverse Opinions.

And after in the same Book, though he do zealously oppose Julius Cassianus for speaking against those hidden parts of God's own making, in both Male and Female; yet when he mentions his holding the Praexistence of the Soul, Ἠγεί, saith he, ὁ γενναῖος ἔτι Πλάτωνικῶς περὶ, Δεῖαν ἔσαν ἡ ψυχὴν ἀνωθεν ἐπιθυμία διλωθεῖσαν δεῦρο ἡκὴν εἰς γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν. This \* noble Spirit, (saith he, meaning Cassianus) does something more expressly Platonize, in saying, That the Soul, a divine Essence and from above, by being effeminated, descends hither into generation and corruption. And again in the same page, when he has produced Cassianus his Opinion concerning the Coats of skins God is said to cloath our first Parents with after their fall, (χίτωνας δὲ δερμάτινους ἡγεί) ὁ Κασσιανὸς πρὸ σώματος he passes it over only with this dilatory Promise or Threatning (call it which you will) that he will shew that Cassianus was deceived, when he had prepared and perfected his Treatise of the Generation of man, but declines to pronounce it an error for the present; and if he ever wrote any such Treatise, it is manifest that he did not handle those skins so rudely but that they were transmitted entire to that excellent Disciple of his Origenes Adamantius, that Miracle of the Christian World, if that Description of his life and worth be

\* And it is no wonder Clemens speaks so well of Cassianus, himself seeming to assert the same Opinion in his Protrept. where speaking of Christ he saith, Ἡ δὲ αὐτοῦ εἰς ἐσθλὴν ἀνακαλείδης τὸς εἰς γῆν ἐρριμμένους.

Origenes Adamantius, Clemens his scholar.

true which we find in Eusebius. For certainly ( to say nothing of his stupendious parts and abilities, which his greatest Adversaries will not deny ) it will be very hard to example so sincere and zealous an adhesion to the cause of Christ, even to the contempt of death and desire of Martyrdome. Which was no inconsiderate excursion of a juvenile fervour in him, but a permanent faithfulness and fortitude of Spirit; it being usual with that holy man to assist and encourage all the Martyrs, as well those unknown to him as of his acquaintance, openly to accompanie them to their execution; friendly embracing them, and administering to them all the comfort he could, to his frequent hazard of being stoned by the incensed multitude.

It will seem a less matter to take notice of his assiduous reading and meditating on the holy Scripture day and night, and his wholly neglecting the World for the pleasure of divine contemplation and the service of the Church of Christ. his excessive Charity to the indigent, his frequent Fastings and lyings on the ground, his undergoing cold and nakedness, his going bare-foot on the hard stones, his abstinence from wine and singular Temperance in all the pleasures of Nature. Whose great example of an Ascetick life gain'd many disciples to the Church, and bred up and furnished out many undaunted Champions of the Christian Faith, who willingly laid down their lives for the love of the Lord Jesus. Such out of Origen's School were Plutarchus, the two Sereni, Heraclides, Heron, Rhais, and Basilides who receiv'd the Crown of Martyrdome through the intercession of that illustrious Virgin-Martyr Potamiana. What direfull calamities Origen himself also underwent in the Decian Persecution, what Fetters and Torments of Body, what castings into Prisons and Dungeons, what stretching and racking of limbs, what terrours of fire and burnings, are to be read in the records of the Ecclesiastick History.

These and such like Instances as these will make good the Integrity and Holiness of this Venerable Father. But I must confess I should be loath to be bound to answer for the truth of all those Opinions that are imputed to him. As, for his making the Sun, Moon and Starres living and intelligent creatures: which shews that he was a better Divine then Naturalist. His affirming that the power of God is finite, and that he made only so many things as did not imply a Contradiction to be managed by his Providence. Which Error ( if it was Origen's ) certainly was intended for an Apologie for God's not making the World infinite, and shews that the Reverend Father had a greater solicitude for the Sovereign goodness of God then for his Power. His making the punishment of the Devils and of the Damned not eternal: which yet Jacobus Merlinus quits him of by the Testimony of at least ten several Citations out of his Writings. His saying, That the bodies of men at the Resurrection will be raised in an Orbicular figure: which is expressly against what \* Methodius declares concerning Origen, namely, that his opinion was, That every one at the Resurrection should appear exactly in his own particular Form or shape, as is rightly observed in the Letter of Resolution, whoever was the Authour thereof; for I profess I know not who is, much less am I the Authour of it my self, as some have groundlessly imagined. His asserting \* That the Soul of our Saviour was the same that was in Adam: which yet is impossible for him ever to assert, he so

\* See Phot. Bibliothec. Excerpt. 234.

\* Phot. Bibliothec. Excerpt. 117.



so expressly declaring that the Soul of the Messias never sinned. And lastly, to omit several others, his transmitting the Souls of men into the bodies of brutes: which I question not, and could easily prove, to be falsely fathered as well upon Pythagoras as Origen. But some phansyful followers of both did affix these unhandsome and ridiculous Appendages, thinking every vain addition to be an improvement of those pure doctrines which were anciently delivered to the World. And such was Præexistence in the Church of the Jewes, where no such Fooleries were mixed with it. And if it had so continued amongst the Origenists, certainly it would never have fallen under publick censure: though I dare not lay the blame solely upon them, their malevolent Adversaries taking liberty enough to charge Origen with such things as had no ground at all of report. Such was that formal story of his casting incense on the Altar of an Idol, being put to his choice whether he would yield to that or to the abuse of his body by an Æthiopian. Which is nothing but a \* mere Romance built upon the greatness of Origen's name and Vertues. Whose repute though it may seem much blemished by that publick Censure in the fifth General Council; yet he that considers that the Particulars of his Condemnation were wholly removed out of the Records of that Council by the same Power that first occasion'd his censure, may easily find what will repair Origen's credit in a great measure without any detriment to the Authority of that grand Convention: For it was their Wrong, not their Fault, that they were misinformed.

\* See Epitom.  
Spondan. Ann.  
253. sect. 19.

S. Basil also and Gregorie Nazianzen, that they were no enemies to the opinion of the Soul's Præexistence, but rather favourers thereof, appears out of the great esteem they had of Origen, and particularly out of that Present that Nazianzen made unto Theodorus Tyaneus, of a Book of Excerptions out of Origen's Writings, compiled by himself and S. Basil, which is styled *Ὡς ὁ Ὀρίγηνς Φιλονομία*, wherein are several Passages that plainly imply or directly affirm the Præexistence of the Soul.

S. Basil and  
Gregorie Na-  
zianzen.

The next open Assertour of the Soul's Præexistence is Synesius Bishop of Cyrene, who in a Letter to his brother does seriously profess that he cannot accept of that honourable employment offered him, without the liberty of enjoying, nay I may say of professing, certain opinions of his, which had been a long time rooted in him upon duly-considered reasons, in the head of which he names this of the Præexistence of the Soul. \* *Ἀμείδι ἔ ψυχὴν ἐκ ἀζιῶσω ποτὲ σώματι ὅς ἐστι γὰρ ἡ νομίζεν*, In good earnest, saith he, I shall never consent that the Soul is of later existence then Body or Matter: and deales so apertly, that he gives directions to his brother to divulge the Letter to the Scholasticks, as he calls them, that so it might be communicated to that reverend Father that offered him the Employment. Which freedom notwithstanding in professing the Opinion was no barre to his Pre-ferment.

Synesius Bishop  
of Cyrene.

\* Epist. 105.

To these you may adde the authority also of two Latine Fathers, Arnobius and Prudentius. The former of whom writes thus expressly concerning this point, \* *Nonne Deo omnes debemus hoc ipsum primum quod sumus, quod esse homines dicimur, quod ab eo vel missi, vel lapsi cæcitate, hujus in corporis vinculis continemur?* The other thus, in his Hymnus in Exequiis Defunctorum,

Arnobius.

\* *Advers. gent.  
lib. 1.*

Prudentius.



Patet, ecce, fidelibus ampli  
Via lucida jam Paradisi:  
Licet & nemus illud adire  
Homini quod ademerat anguis.  
Illic, precor, optime Ductor,  
Famulam tibi præcipe mentem  
Genitali in sede sacrari,  
Quam liquerat exul & errans.

*Which last verse answers exactly to that expression of Synesius in his Hymns, where he calls his Soul  $\phi\upsilon\lambda\alpha\varsigma\ \alpha\lambda\eta\tau\eta\varsigma$ , for quitting Heaven and wandering into this lower World.*

S. Augustine.

\* Lib. 1.

\* Lib. 3.

S. Augustine also speaks very favourably of this opinion in his de \* Libero arbitrio, where he writes thus, Utrum ante consortium hujus corporis aliâ quâdam vitâ vixerit animus, magna quæstio est, magnum secretum. And then in \* another place of the same Treatise, speaking again of the Soul's præexistence, he tells us freely and ingenuously, Si de Deo aliud senserimus quàm est, intentio nostra non in beatitatem sed in vanitatem compellet. De creatura verò siquid aliter quàm sese habet senserimus, dummodo non id pro cognito perceptoque teneamus, nullum periculum. And in a third place, in his discussion of that Fourfold Quære, namely, Whether the Souls be propagated, created, sent from God out of some hidden Repository where they did præexist, or fell hither of their own accords, Aut nondum ista quæstio, saith he, à divinorum librorum Catholicis tractatoribus pro merito suæ obscuritatis & perplexitatis evolura arque illustrata est; aut, si jam factum est, nondum in manus nostras ejusmodi literæ pervenerunt. Whence, methinks, it is very plain that the primæval Ages of the Church had no ill conceit of the opinion of the Soul's Præexistence.

The Authour  
of the Book of  
Wisedome.  
Wisd. 8. 19.

Wisd. 18. 24.

\* Chap. 5. sect. 3.

Which may further be evinced by the Book of Wisedome, where the Præexistence of the Soul is as conspicuous as the Sun in the firmament, in these words; For I was a witty child and of a good spirit; yea rather being good I came into a body undefiled. Of which there can be no sense without the Soul's præexistence. And a further pledge of the certainty of this interpretation is that most rational conjecture of them that conclude Philo the Jew to be the Authour of this Book, with whom there is no opinion more familiar than that of Præexistence; besides other footsteps of his impression, as that especially concerning Aaron's robe, where he saith, That the whole World was in the long garment, and the Majesty of God upon the Diademe of his head. Which answers exquisitely to what I have produced out of him for the explaining those Sibylline verses I cite in my \* Appendix to the Defence of my Philosophick Cabbala. Wherefore the Church in those primitive times so well approving of this Book of Wisedome, it argues the inoffensiveness of that opinion so clearly discoverable therein.

Our blessed  
Saviour.  
John 9.

And lastly, from that question put to our Saviour himself by his disciples, (Master, who did sin, this man or his Parents, that he was born blind?) and his not at all chastizing them, nor shewing the least dislike of this supposition of Præexistence, vulgarly known then to the Jews, and plainly im-

plied

plied in the question; I say, a man may fetch a demonstration from hence, That there is no hurt in the Opinion, no poyson nor danger therein, else assuredly our Saviour, having so fit an opportunity, would not have omitted the discovery thereof.

19. And that there is not the least evil or slightest collision or clashing in this Hypothesis with the ordinary and literal sense of the Scripture and universally-acknowledged Canon of Faith, I am as certain as that the clear Aire will not exclude the light of the Sun, but both be comprised in the same space. That which it seems most repugnant to is the derivation of Original sin from Adam. But they that assert the Præexistence of the Soul do not understand the mystery aright, if they suppose not all Souls that come according to natural Order into these Terrestrial Tenements to be in the state of silence first. Which makes them in a manner as if they were not before, and the whole scene of things evidently to begin from Adam. Whose Soul God incorporating into such a Paradisiacall body as did naturally charm his mind into as full a possibility of not falling, as the usual orthodox Theologie supposes Adam to have been in, and designing the same advantage, if he had stood, to be derived upon his Posterity; it is plainly manifest from hence, that his fall was the cause of that which we now call Original sin, that is to say, of that over-proportionated Proneness and almost irresistible Proclivity to what is evil: So far is this Hypothesis of Præexistence from clashing with the derivation of Original sin from Adam.

That there is not the least clashing of Præexistence with the Derivation of Original sin from Adam.

Nay I will adde further, that what is said in Scripture of the first and second Adam cannot so well be understood as upon the Hypothesis of Præexistence, and of an antecedent lapse of Souls in another state. For I desire any one to consider without prejudice, what so good meaning there can be of those words of S. Paul, where he saies that Adam was the figure of him that was to come, that is to say, of Christ, as that the office of Adam was preludious to and Typicall of the office of Christ. Which would be very dilute, if it was only in this, that he was a publick person as he was, but had not in any sense incumbent upon him the care of the Redemption of the Sons of men. Wherefore the office of Adam was to transmit that wholesome and Paradisiacal complexion of body to his Seed, (in such sort as our ordinary Theologie determines thereof) and thereby to be, as it were, the Saviour and Redeemer of his posterity from the ill effects of that former lapse they had fallen into; whence he was exquisitely the figure of him that was to come. But this earthly Adam failing in his office, the Heavenly was surrogated in his roome, who is \* able to save to the utmost. Which Hypothesis in my mind makes S. Paul and this part of the Mystery of our Religion wonderfully easy and intelligible.

Rom. 5. 14.

\* Hebr. 7. 25.

That Mathematical certitude in mere Philosophical Speculations need oblige no mans conscience to make profession of them against the good liking of his Superiours.

These and such like things as these may be alledged in the behalf of that ancient point of Platonisme, The Præexistence of the Soul.

20. But for mine own part, though I were as certain of the truth of Platonisme and Cartesianisme in all those points of them which I have applied to the Text of Moses in my Philosophick Cabbala as I am of any Mathematical Demonstration; yet I do not find my self bound in conscience to profess my opinion therein any further then is with the good liking or permission of my



my Superiours. For though those Theories were so certain to me, yet I am as certain that Mathematical certitude it self is not absolute, and that God alone is infallible.

But that I may not seem injurious to my self, nor give scandal unto others by this so free profession, I am necessitated to adde, That the Conscience of every holy and sincere Christian is as strictly bound up in matters of Religion plainly and expressly determined by the infallible Oracles of God, as it is free in Philosophical Speculations: And that though, out of love to his own ease, or in a reverential regard to the Authority of the Church, which undoubtedly every ingenuous spirit is sensible of, he may have a great desire to say, profess and doe as they would have him; yet in cases of this kind, where any thing is expected contrary to the plain and express sense of those Divine Writings, he cannot but find himself streightned here, and will certainly be constrained τὰ τῷ θεῷ ἀποσβύτεια ποιῆσαι ἢ τὰ τοῦ ἄνθρωπου, (as the Lacedæmonians are said to have done, though upon a religious mistake:) or rather he will use that short, but weighty, apologie of the Apostle, Πειρασθεῖν δὲ εἰ θεῷ μάλλον ἢ ἀνθρώποις, That God is to be obeyed rather than men.

Herodot. lib. 5.  
n. 63.

Act. 5. 29.

Matt. 10. 33.

These are the Adamantine Laws and Tyes of Religion, against which no man can repine but he must repine against the Being of a God, or against his indispensable Right of being served in the first place, and of binding our consciences to believe and our tongues to profess what truths he has in a miraculous manner communicated to the World upon those Terms. He that denies me before men, him will I deny before my Father which is in Heaven. But in Philosophical Theories, such as the Præexistence of the Soul, the Motion of the Earth, and the like, where God has not required our profession, nor our Eternal Interest is concerned, nor that which dictates is infallible; though we should conceit to our selves a Mathematicall assurance of the Conclusions, yet I must profess, as I said before, that I do not see that any one is conscientiously bound to averre them against the Authority of the Church under which he lives, if they should at any time dislike them, but that he may with a safe conscience compromise with his Superiours, and use their language and phrases concerning such things. For if it was a Vertue in that holy and venerable Law-giver Moses, with such prudence and paternal sweetness to condescend to the Capacity of the Vulgar, as to describe the Creation of the World according to the Appearance of things to them; certainly it cannot be a Vice in us, in humble submission and reverence to the Governours of the Church, (let our private judgement be what it will) to receive their definitive modes and phrases of speech in those things where God has not tied us to the contrary.

That if the Philosophy which he has applied to Moses his Text be true, it is a real Restauration of the Mosaick Cabala.

21. But if Time, that brings on all great things pompously and by degrees, shall at last so universally discover that to be sound Philosophy which I have adventured to apply to the Mosaick Text, as that it will pass as currently and inoffensively as the doctrine of Antipodes does now, which once seemed so monstrous and extravagant to the Christian World; Approbation will hardly be able to keep a mean, but the Theoremes being allowed for true, will be also necessarily acknowledged most lovely and glorious;

---

*rious ; nor will there be then wanting , I hope , who on our behalf will appeal to the Jews whether it be not a real Restauration of the Mosaick Cabbala , and whether we so devoutly worship the incarnate Logos for nought , the blessing of sound Reason and a sagacious Spirit being so conspicuously found amongst the Christians, the affectionate Adorers of the Lord Jesus.*

---

A N

---





AN  
ANTIDOTE  
AGAINST  
ATHEISM:  
OR,

An Appeal to the Natural Faculties of  
the Mind of Man, Whether there  
be not a GOD.

---

By HENRY MORE, D.D.

---

The *third Edition* corrected and enlarged :

WITH

AN APPENDIX

thereunto annexed.

---

Trismegist.

Ἡ μεγάλη νόσος τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ ἀθεότης.

Aristot.

Οἱ ἀνθρώποι πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς πεφύκασι ἱκανῶς, καὶ πλεῖον  
τυγχάνουσι τῆς ἀληθείας.

---

L O N D O N,

Printed by *James Fleisher*, for *William Morden* Book-seller in *Cambridge*,

MDC LXII.



1880-1881

IN 24813 T

Examination of the ...

...

...

...

...

...

---

TO  
THE RIGHT HONORABLE,  
The Lady  
ANN E,  
Viscountess

CONWAY and KILULTA.

MADAM,

**T**HE high opinion, or rather certain knowledge,  
I have of your singular Wit and Vertues;  
has emboldened, or, to speak more properly,  
commanded me to make choice of none other then your self  
for a Patroness of this present Treatise. For besides  
that I doe your Ladiship that Right, as also this pre-  
sent Age and succeeding Posterity, as to be a witness  
to the World of such eminent Accomplishments and tran-  
scendent Worth; so I do not a little please my self, while  
I finde my self assured in my own conceit, that Cebes his  
mysterious and judicious Piece of Morality hung up in  
the Temple of Saturn, (which was done in way of Divine  
Honour to the Wisdome of the Deity) was not more safely  
and suteably placed, then this carefull Draught of Na-  
turall Theology or Metaphysicks, which I have  
dedicated to so Noble, so Wise and so Pious a Personage.  
And for my own part, it seems to me as reall a point of Re-  
ligious



---

## The Epistle Dedicatory.

---

religious Worship to honour the Vertuous, as to relieve the Necessitous, which Christianity terms no lesse then a Sacrifice. Nor is there any thing here of Hyperbolism or high-flown Language; it being agreed upon by all sides, by Prophets, Apostles, and ancient Philosophers, that holy and good Men are the Temples of the Living God. And verily the Residence of Divinity is so conspicuous in that Heroicall Pulchritude of your noble Person, that Plato, if he were alive again, might finde his timorous Supposition brought into absolute Act, and to the enravishment of his amazed Soul might behold Vertue become visible to his outward sight. And truly, Madame, I must confesse that so Divine a Constitution as this wants no Preservative, being both devoid and incapable of Infection; and that if the rest of the World had attain'd but to the least Degree of this sound Complexion and generous frame of Minde, nay if they were but brought to an æquilibrious Indifference, and, as they say, stood but Neutrals, that is, If as many as are supposed to have no love of God, nor any knowledge or experience of the Divine Life, did not out of a base ignorant fear irreconcilably hate him; assuredly this Antidote of mine would either prove needles and superfluous, or, if Occasion ever called for it, a most certain Cure. For this Truth of the Existence of God being as clearly demonstrable as any Theorem in Mathematicks, it would not fail of winning as firm and as universall Assent, did not the fear of a sad Afterclap pervert mens

Under-

---

## The Epistle Dedicatory.

---

*Understandings, and Prejudice and Interest pretend uncertainty and obscurity in so plain a matter. But considering the state of things as they are, I cannot but pronounce, that there is more necessity of this my Antidote than I could wish there were. But if there were less or none at all, yet the pleasure that may be reaped in perusal of this Treatise (even by such as by an holy Faith and divine Sense are ever held fast in a full assent to the Conclusion I drive at) will sufficiently compensate the pains in the penning thereof. For as the best Eyes, and most able to behold the pure Light, do not unwillingly turn their backs of the Sun, to view his refracted Beauty in the delightful colours of the Rainbow; so the perfectest Mindes and the most lively possesse of the Divine Image, cannot but take contentment and pleasure in observing the glorious Wisdom and Goodness of God, so fairly drawn out and skilfully variegated in the sundry Objects of externall Nature. Which delight though it redound to all, yet not so much to any as to those that are of a more Philosophicall and Contemplative Constitution; and therefore, Madam, most of all to Yourself, whose Genius I know to be so speculative, and Wit so penetrant, that in the knowledge of things as well Natural as Divine you have not onely out-gone all of your own Sex, but even of that other also, whose ages have not given them over-much the start of you. And assuredly your Ladships Wisdom and Judgment can never be highly enough commended, that makes the best use that may be of those ample*



---

## The Epistle Dedicatory.

---

Fortunes that Divine Providence has bestow'd upon you. For the best result of Riches, I mean in reference to our selves, is, that finding our selves already well provided for, we may be fully Masters of our own time : and the best improvement of this time is the Contemplation of God and Nature ; wherein if these present Labours of mine may prove so grateful unto you and serviceable as I have been bold to presage, next to the winning of Souls from Atheism, it is the sweetest fruit they can ever yield to

Your Ladiships humbly-devoted

Servant,

HENRY MORE.

---

The

## THE PREFACE.

1. *The Authour's Apologie for writing this Treatise, there being so many already on the same Subject.*
2. *That what he has wrote are the proper Emanations of his own Minde, and may have their peculiar serviceableness for men of the like Genius.*
3. *That he affects not Rhetorick, nor Philologie, nor the pompous numerosity of more popular Arguments, but solid and irresistible Reason in a perspicuous Method.*
4. *That he has undeniably demonstrated the Existence of God, this one Postulate being but admitted, That our Faculties are true.*
5. *His peculiar Management of the first Argument of Des-Cartes:*
6. *And the Reasons of his Rejection of the rest.*
7. *His caution and choiceness in the managing such Arguments as are fetch'd from the more general Phænomena of Nature:*
8. *As also in those from Animals.*
9. *His carefull choice in such Histories as tend to the proving of Spirits.*
10. *His assuredness of that kinde of Argument.*
11. *The reason of his declining the recital of the miraculous Stories of Holy Writ.*
12. *His studied Condescension and compliance with the Atheist to win him from his Atheism.*

READER,

1. **B**Y what inducements I was drawn to publish this present Treatise, notwithstanding the Numerosity of the Writings of this kinde, I had rather leave to thine own quick-sightedness to spy out, then be put upon so much immodesty my self as to speak any thing that may seem to give it any precellency above what is already extant in the world about the same matter. Onely I may say thus much, that I did on purpose abstain from reading any Treatises concerning this Subject, that I might the more undisturbedly write the easie *Emanations* of mine own Mind, and not be carried off from what should naturally fall from my self, by prepossessing my thoughts by the inventions of others.

2. I have writ therefore after no Copy but the eternal Characters of the Minde of Man, and the known *Phænomena* of



Nature. And all men consulting with these that endeavour to write sense, though it be not done alike by all men, it could not happen but I should touch upon the same Heads that others have that have wrote before me : who though they may merit very high commendation for their learned achievements ; yet I hope my endeavours have been such, that though they care not to be corrivals or partners in their praise & credit, yet I do not distrust but they will doe their share towards that *publick good* that such performances usually pretend to aim at.

For that which did embolden me to publish this present Treatise was not, as I said before, because I flatter'd my self in a Conceit that it was gayer or more plausible then what is already in the hands of men ; but that it was of a different sort, and has its peculiar serviceableness and advantages apart and distinct from others ; whose proper preeminences it may aloof off admire, but dare not in any wise compare with. So that there is no Tautology committed in recommending what I have written to the publick view, nor any lessening the labours of others by thus offering the fruit of mine own. For considering there are such several complexions and tempers of men in the world, I do not distrust but that, as what others have done has been very acceptable and profitable to many, so this of mine may be well relish'd of some or other, and so seem not to have been writ in vain.

3. For though I cannot promise my Reader that I shall entertain him with so much winning *Rhetorick* and pleasant *Philology* as he may find elsewhere ; yet I hope he will acknowledge, if his mind be unprejudic'd, that he meets with sound and plain Reason, and an easie and clear *Method*.

And though I cannot furnish him with that copious variety of Arguments that others have done ; yet the frugal carefulness and saveness of choice that I have made in them may compensate their paucity.

For I appeal to any man, whether the proposal of such as will easily admit of evasions ( though they have this peculiar advantage, that they make for greater pomp, and at first sight seem more formidable for their multitude ) does not embolden  
the

the *Atheist*, and make him fancy, that because he can so easily turn the edge of these, the rest have no more solidity then the former; but that if he thought good and had leisure, he could with like facility enervate them all.

4. Wherefore I have endeavoured to insist upon such alone as are not only true in themselves, but are unavoidable to my Adversary, unless he will cast down his shield, forsake the free use of the natural Faculties of his Mind, and profess himself a mere puzzled *Sceptick*. But if he will with us but admit of this one *Postulate* or *Hypothesis*, *That our Faculties are true*; though I have spoke modestly in the Discourse it self, yet I think I may here, without vanity or boasting, freely profess, that I have no less then demonstrated *That there is a God*: and by how much more any man shall seriously endeavour to resist the strength of my Arguments, that by so much the more strong he shall find them; (as he that presses his weak finger against a wall of Marble) and that they can appear slight to none but those that carelessly and slightly consider them. For I borrowed them not from Books, but fetch'd them from the very nature of the thing it self, and indeleble *Ideas* of the Soul of Man.

5. And I found, that keeping myself within so narrow a compass as not to affect any Reasonings but such as had very clear affinity and close connexion with the Subject in hand, I naturally hit upon whatever was material to my purpose; and so contenting my self with my own, received nothing from the great store and riches of others. And what I might easily remember of others, I could not let pass, if in my own judgement it was obnoxious to evasion. For I intended not to impose upon the *Atheist*, but really to convince him. And therefore *Des-Cartes*, whose Mechanical wit I can never highly enough admire, might be no Master of *Metaphysics* to me. Whence it is that I make use but of his first Argument only, if I may not rather call it the School's, or mine own. For I think I have manag'd it in such sort, and every way so propt it and strengthened it, that I may challenge in it as much interest as any.

6. But



\* Per Realitatem objectivam *Idea* intelligo entitatem rei representatam per *Ideam* quatenus est in *Idea*. Nam quaecunque percipimus tanquam in *Ideis* objectis, ea sunt in ipsis *Ideis* objectivè. Cartes. Resp. ad Object. 2. Metaphys. De fin. 3.

6. But as for his following Reasons, that suppose the \* *Objective Reality* of the *Idea* of God does exceed the efficiency of the Mind of man, and that the Mind of man, were it not from another, would have conferr'd all that perfection upon it self that it has the *Idea* of, and, lastly, that it having no power to conserve it self, and the present and future time having no dependence one of another, that it is continually reproduc'd, that is, conserv'd, by some higher Cause, which must be God; these grounds, I say, being so easily evaded by the Atheist, I durst not trust to them, unless I had the Author's wit to defend them, who was handsomly able to make good any thing. But they seem to me to be liable to such evasions as I can give no stop to.

For the Mind of man, as the Atheist will readily reply, may be able of her self to frame such an actual *Idea* of God as is there disputed of, which *Idea* will be but the present modification of her, as other Notions are, and an effect of her essence and power, and that power a radical property of her essence. So that there is no excess of an Effect above the efficiency of the Cause, though we look no further then the Mind it self; for she frames this Notion of God as naturally and as much without the help of an higher Cause, as she does any thing else whatsoever.

And as for the Mind's contributing those perfections on her self she has an *Idea* of; if she had been of her self, the *Atheist* will say, it implies a contradiction, and supposes that a thing before it exists may consult about the advantages of its own existence. But if the Mind be of it self, it is what it findes it self to be, and can be no otherwise.

And therefore, lastly, if the Mind finde it self to exist, it can no more destroy it self then produce it self; nor needs any thing to continue its Being, provided that there be nothing in Nature that can act against it and destroy it; for whatever is, continues so to be, unless there be some Cause to change it.

7. So likewise from those Arguments I fetch'd from *external Nature*, as well as in these from the innate properties of the

the Mind of Man, my carefull choice made very large defalcations; insisting rather upon such things as might be otherwise, and yet are far better as they are, then upon such as were necessary, and could not be otherwise. As for example, When I consider'd the distance of the Sun, I did not conceive that his not being plac'd so low as the Moon, or so high as the fixed Stars, was any great argument of Providence, because it might be reply'd, that it was necessary it should be betwixt those two distances, else the Earth had not been habitable, and so mankind might have waited for a Being, till the agitation of the Matter had wrought things into a more tolerable fitness or posture for their production.

Nor simply is the annual Motion of the Sun, or rather of the Earth, any argument of Divine Providence, but as necessary as a piece of wood's being carried down the stream, or straws about a whirl-pool. But the Laws of her Motion are such that they very manifestly convince us of a Providence; and therefore I was fain to let go the former, and insist more largely upon the latter.

Nor thought I it fit to Rhetoricate in proposing the great variety of things, and precellency of one above another; but to press close upon the design and subordination of one thing to another; shewing that, whereas the rude motions of the Matter (a thousand to one) might have cast it otherwise, yet the productions of things are such as our own Reason cannot but approve to be best, or as we our selves would have design'd them.

8. And so in the consideration of *Animals*, I do not so much urge my Reasons from their diversity and subsistence, (though the framing of *Matter* into the bare subsistence of an Animal is an Effect of no less Cause then what has some skill and counsel;) but what I drive at is, the exquisite contrivance of their parts, and that their structure is far more perfect then will merely serve for their bare existence and continuance in the world: which is an undeniable Demonstration that they are the effects of Wisdome, not the results of Fortune or fermented Matter.

9. Lastly,



9. Lastly, when I descend to the History of things miraculous and above the ordinary course of Nature, for the proving that there are *Spirits*, that the Atheist thereby may the easier be induced to believe there is a *God*; I am so cautious and circumspect, that I make use of no Narrations that either the avarice of the *Priest*, or the credulity and fancifulness of the *Melancholist* may render suspected.

10. Nor could I abstain from that Subject, it being so pat and pertinent unto my purpose; though I am well aware how ridiculous a thing it seems to those I have to deal with. But their confident ignorance shall never dash me out of countenance with my well-grounded knowledge: for I have been no careless Inquirer into these things, and from my Childhood to this very day have had more Reasons to believe the Existence of God and a Divine Providence, then is reasonable for me to make particular profession of.

11. In this History of things Miraculous or Supernatural, I might have recited those notable Prodigies that happened after the Birth, in the Life, and at the Death of *Christ*: as the Star that led the Wise men to the young Infant; Voices from Heaven testifying *Christ* to be the Son of God; and, lastly, that miraculous Eclipse of the Sun, made, not by interposition of the Moon (for she was then opposite to him) but by the interposition or totall involution, if you will, of those scummy spots that ever more or less are spread upon his face, but now overflowed him with such thickness, and so universally, that day-light was suddenly intercepted from the astonished eyes of the Inhabitants of the Earth. To which direful Symptomes though the Sun hath been in some measure at several times obnoxious, yet that those latent Causes should so suddenly step out and surprise him, and so enormously at the Passion of the *Messias*, he whose Mind is not more prodigiously darkned then the Sun was then Eclips'd, cannot but at first sight acknowledge it a special designment of Providence.

But I did not insist upon any Sacred History, partly, because it is so well and so ordinarily known, that it seemed less

less needful; but mainly, because I know the *Atheist* will boggle more at whatever is fetch'd from establish'd Religion, and flie away from it, like a wild Colt in a Pasture at the sight of a bridle or an halter, snuffing up the aire, and smelling a plot afar off, as he foolishly fancies.

12. But that he might not be shie of me, I have conform'd my self as near his own *Garb* as I might, without partaking of his folly or wickedness; and have appear'd in the plain shape of a mere *Naturalist* my self, that I might, if it were possible, win him off from down-right Atheisme.

For he that will lend his hand to help another fallen into a ditch, must himself, though not fall, yet stoop and incline his body; and he that converses with a Barbarian, must discourse to him in his own language: so he that would gain upon the more weak and sunk minds of sensual mortals, is to accommodate himself to their capacity, who, like the *Bat* and *Owle*, can see no where so well as in the shady glimmerings of their own Twilight.





A N


# A N T I D O T E

A G A I N S T

# A T H E I S M.

## CHAP. I.

1. *That the Pronenesse of these Ages of the World to winde themselves from under the awe of Superstition makes the attempt seasonable of endeavouring to steer them off from Atheisme.* 2. *That they that adhere to Religion in a mere superstitious and accustomary way, if that tye once fail, easily turn Atheists.* 3. *The usefulness of this present Treatise even to them that are seriously Religious.*

1.  HE grand Truth which we are now to be employed about and to prove, is, *That there is a God*: And I made choice of this Subject as very seasonable for the Times we are in, and are coming on, wherein Divine Providence more universally loosening the minds of men from the awe and tyranny of mere accustomary Superstition, and permitting a freer perusal of matters of Religion then in former Ages, the Tempter would take advantage, where he may, to carry men captive out of one dark prison into another, out of *Superstition* into *Atheism* it self.

2. Which is a thing feasible enough for him to bring about in such men as have adhered to Religion in a mere externall way, either for fashion sake, or in a blinde obedience to the Authority of a Church. For when this externall frame of Godliness shall break about their ears, they being really at the bottome devoid of the true fear and love of God, and destitute of a more free and unprejudic'd use of their Faculties, by reason of the sinfulness and corruption of their natures, it will be an easy thing to allure them to an assent to that which seems so much for their present Interest; and so being imboldened by the tottering and falling of what they took for the chief Structure of Religion before, they will gladly in their conceit cast down also the very Object of that Religious Worship after it, and conclude that there is as well no God as no Religion; that is, they have a mind there should be none, that they may be free from all



wrangings of Conscience, trouble of correcting their Lives, and fear of being accountable before that great Tribunall.

3. Wherefore for the reclaiming of these, if it were possible, at least for the succouring and extricating of those in whom a greater measure of the love of God doth dwell, (who may probably by some darkening cloud of Melancholy, or some more then ordinary importunity of the Tempter, be dissettled and intangled in their thoughts concerning this weighty matter) I held it fit to bestow mine endeavours upon this so useful and seasonable an enterprize, as to demonstrate *That there is a God.*

## C H A P. II.

1. *That there is nothing so demonstrable, that the Mind of man can rationally conclude that it is impossible to be otherwise.*
2. *That the Soul of man may give full Assent to that which notwithstanding may possibly be otherwise, made good by severall Examples.*
3. *A like Example of Dissent.*
4. *The Reasons why he has so sedulously made good this point.*
5. *That the Atheist has no advantage from the Authour's free confession, that his Arguments are not so convictive but that they leave a possibility of the thing being otherwise.*

1. **B**UT when I speak of demonstrating there is a God, I would not be suspected of so much vanity and ostentation, as to be thought I mean to bring no Arguments but such as are so convictive, that a mans Understanding shall be forced to confesse that it is impossible to be otherwise then I have concluded. For, for mine own part, I am prone to believe that there is nothing at all to be so demonstrated. For it is possible that *Mathematical evidence* it self may be but a constant undiscoverable Delusion, which our nature is necessarily and perpetually obnoxious unto, and that either fatall or fortuitously there has been in the world time out of minde such a Being as we call *Man*, whose essentiall Property it is to be then most of all mistaken, when he conceives a thing most evidently true. And why may not this be as well as any thing else, if you will have all things fatall or casuall without a God? For there can be no curb to this wilde conceit, but by the supposing that we our selves exist from some higher Principle that is absolutely *Good and Wise*, which is all one as to acknowledge *That there is a God.*

2. Wherefore when I say that I will demonstrate *That there is a God*, I do not promise that I will alwayes produce such Arguments, that the Reader shall acknowledge so strong, as he shall be forced to confesse that it is utterly impossible that it should be otherwise: but they shall be such as shall deserve *full assent*, and win *full assent* from any unprejudic'd mind.

For I conceive that we may give *full assent* to that which notwithstanding may possibly be otherwise: which I shall illustrate by severall Examples. Suppose two men got to the top of mount *Athos*, and there viewing

viewing a Stone in the form of an *Altar* with *Ashes* on it, and the *footsteps* of men on those ashes, or some *words*, if you will, as *Optimo Maximo*, or *αὐτῷ μεγίστῳ θεῷ*, or the like, written or scralled out upon the ashes; and one of them should cry out, Assuredly here have been some men here that have done this: but the other more nice then wise should reply, Nay, it may possibly be otherwise; for this stone may have naturally grown into this very shape, and the seeming ashes may be no ashes, that is, no remainders of any fewell burnt there, but some unexplicable and imperceptible motions of the Aire, or other particles of this fluid Matter that is active every where, have wrought some parts of the Matter into the form and nature of ashes, and have fridg'd and play'd about so, that they have also figured those intelligible Characters in the same. But would not any body deem it a piece of weaknesse no less then dotage for the other man one whit to recede from his former apprehension, but as fully as ever to agree with what he pronounced first, notwithstanding this bare possibility of being otherwise?

So of *Anchors* that have been digged up, either in plain fields or mountainous places, as also the *Roman Urnes* with ashes and inscriptions, as *Severianus*, *Ful. Linus*, and the like, or *Roman Coins* with the *effigies* and *names* of the *Cesars* on them, or that which is more ordinary, the *Sculls* of men in every Church-yard, with the right figure, and all those necessary perforations for the passing of the vessels, besides those conspicuous hollows for the eyes and rowes of teeth, the *Os Styloides*, *Ethoicides*, and what not? if a man will say of them, that the Motion of the particles of the Matter, or some hidden Spermatick power has gendered these both *Anchors*, *Urnes*, *Coins*, and *Sculls* in the ground, he doth but pronounce that which humane Reason must admit as possible: Nor can any man ever so demonstrate that those *Coins*, *Anchors* and *Urnes* were once the Artifice of men, or that this or that *Scull* was once a part of a living man, that he shall force an acknowledgment that it is impossible that it should be otherwise. But yet I do not think that any man, without doing manifest violence to his Faculties, can at all suspend his assent, but freely and fully agree that this or that *Scull* was once part of a living man, and that these *Anchors*, *Urnes* and *Coins*, were certainly once made by humane artifice, notwithstanding the possibility of being otherwise.

3. And what I have said of *Assent* is also true in *Dissent*. For the Mind of man, not craz'd nor prejudic'd, will fully and unreconcilably disagree, by its own naturall sagacity, where notwithstanding the thing that it doth thus resolvedly and undoubtingly reject, no wit of man can prove impossible to be true. As if we should make such a Fiction as this; that *Archimedes* with the same individuall body that he had when the Soldiers slew him, is now safely intent upon his Geometricall Figures under ground, at the Center of the Earth, farre from the noise and din of this world, that might disturb his Meditations, or distract him in his curious delineations he makes with his Rod upon the dust; which no man living can prove impossible: Yet if any man does not as unreconcilably dissent from such a Fable as this as from any Falshood imaginable, assuredly that man is next door to madness or dotage, or does enormous violence to the free use of his Faculties.



Wherefore it is manifest that there may be a very firm and unwavering *Assent* or *Dissent*, whenas yet the thing we thus assent to may be possibly otherwise, or that which we thus dissent from cannot be proved impossible to be true.

4. Which point I have thus long and thus variously sported my self in, for making the better impression upon my Reader, it being of no small use and consequence, as well for the advertising of him that the Arguments which I shall produce, though I do not bestow that ostentative term of *Demonstration* upon them, yet they may be as effectual for winning a firm and unshaken assent as if they were in the strictest notion such; as also to re-mind him, that if they be so strong, and so patly fitted and sutable with the Faculties of mans Mind, that he has nothing to reply, but only that for all this it may possibly be otherwise, that he should give a free and full *Assent* to the Conclusion: and if he do not, that he is to suspect himself rather of some distemper, prejudice, or weakness, then the Arguments of want of strength.

5. But if the *Atheist* shall contrariwise pervert my candour and fair dealing, and phansie that he has got some advantage upon my free confession, that the Arguments that I shall use are not so convictive but that they leave a possibility of the thing being otherwise; let him but compute his supposed gains, by adding the limitation of this possibility, (*viz.* that it is no more possible, then that the clearest *Mathematicall evidence* may be false, (which is impossible, if our Faculties be true) or in the second place, then that the *Roman Urnes* and *Coins* above mentioned may prove to be the works of Nature, not the Artifice of man; which our Faculties admit to be so little probable, that it is impossible for them not fully to assent to the contrary: ) and when he has cast up his account, it will be evident that it can be nothing but his grosse ignorance in this kinde of Arithmetick that shall embolden him to write himself down gainer, and not me.

### CH A P. III.

1. *That we are first to have a settled notion What God is, before we goe about to demonstrate That he is.* 2. *The Definition of God.* 3. *That there is an Idea of a Being absolutely perfect in our Minde, whether the Atheist will allow it to be the Idea of God or not.* 4. *That it is no prejudice to the Naturality of this Idea, that it may be framed from some occasions from without.*

1. **A**Nd now having premised thus much, I shall come on nearer to my present designe. In prosecution whereof it will be requisite for me, first to define *What God is*, before I proceed to demonstration *That he is*. For it is obvious for Man's Reason to finde Arguments for the impossibility, possibility, probability, or necessity of the Existence of a thing, from the explication of the Essence thereof.

And

And now I am come hither, I demand of any *Atheist* that denies there is a God, or of any that doubts whether there be one or no, what *Idea* or *Notion* they frame of that they deny or doubt of. If they will prove nice and squeamish, and profess they can frame no *Notion* of any such thing, I would gladly ask them, why they will then deny or doubt of they know not what. For it is necessary that he that would rationally doubt or deny a thing, should have some settled *Notion* of the thing he doubts of or denies. But if they profess that this is the very ground of their denying or doubting whether there be a God, because they can frame no *Notion* of him; I shall forthwith take away that Allegation, by offering them such a *Notion* as is as proper to God, as any *Notion* is proper to any thing else in the world.

2. I define God therefore thus, *An Essence or Being fully and absolutely Perfect*. I say, *fully and absolutely Perfect*, in counterdistinction to such *Perfection* as is not *full* and *absolute*, but the *Perfection* of this or that *Species* or *Kind* of *finite Beings*, suppose of a Lion, Horse, or Tree. But to be *fully and absolutely Perfect* is to be at least as *Perfect* as the apprehension of a man can conceive without a contradiction: for what is inconceivable or contradictory, is nothing at all to us, who are not now to wag one Atome beyond our Faculties; but what I have propounded is so far from being beyond our Faculties, that I dare appeal to any *Atheist*, that hath yet any command of Sense and Reason left in him, if it be not very easy and intelligible at the first sight, and that if there be a God, he is to be deemed of us such as this *Idea* or *Notion* sets forth.

3. But if he will suddenly deny that this is the proper *Notion* of God, let him enjoy his own humour; this yet remains undeniable, That there is in man an *Idea* of a *Being absolutely and fully Perfect*, which we frame out by attributing all conceivable *Perfection* to it whatsoever that implies no contradiction. And *this Notion* is naturall and essentiall to the Soul of man, & cannot be washt out, nor conveigh'd away by any force or trick of wit whatsoever, so long as the Mind of man is not craz'd, but hath the ordinary use of her own Faculties.

4. Nor will that prove any thing to the purpose, whenas it shall be alleg'd that *this Notion* is not so connatural and essentiall to the Soul, because she framed it from some occasions from without. For all those undeniable Conclusions in Geometry which might be help'd and occasioned from something without, are so natural notwithstanding and Essentiall to the Soul, that you may as soon unsoul the Soul as divide her from perpetual assent to those Mathematical Truths, supposing no distemper nor violence offered to her Faculties. As for example, she cannot but acknowledge in her self the *several distinct Ideas* of the *five regular Bodies*, as also, that it is impossible that there should be any more then five. And this *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Perfect* is as distinct and indeleble an *Idea* in the Soul, as the *Idea* of the *five Regular Bodies*, or any other *Idea* whatsoever.

It remains therefore undeniable, that there is an inseparable *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Perfect* ever residing, though not alwayes acting, in the Soul of man;



## CHAP. IV.

1. *What Notions are more particularly comprised in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect.* 2. *That the difficulty of framing the conception of a thing ought to be no Argument against the Existence thereof; the nature of corporeall Matter being so perplex'd and intricate, which yet all men acknowledge to exist.* 3. *That the Idea of a Spirit is as easy a Notion as of any other Substance whatsoever. What powers and properties are contained in the Notion of a Spirit.* 4. *That Eternity and Infinity, if God were not, would be cast upon something else; so that Atheism cannot free the Mind from such Intricacies.* 5. *Goodness, Knowledge and Power, Notions of highest Perfection, and therefore necessarily included in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect.* 6. *As also Necessity, it sounding greater Perfection then Contingency.*

1. **B**UT now to lay out more particularly the *Perfections* comprehended in this Notion of a Being absolutely and fully Perfect, I think I may securely nominate these; *Self-subsistency, Immateriality, Infinity as well of Duration as Essence, Immensity of Goodness, Omniscience, Omnipotency, and Necessity of Existence.* Let this therefore be the Description of a Being absolutely Perfect, That it is a Spirit, Eternall, Infinite in Essence and Goodness, Omniscient, Omnipotent, and of it self necessarily existent. All which Attributes being Attributes of the highest Perfection that falls under the apprehension of man, and having no discoverable imperfection interwoven with them, must of necessity be attributed to that which we conceive absolutely and fully Perfect. And if any one will say that this is but to dress up a Notion out of my own fancy, which I would afterwards slyly insinuate to be the Notion of a God; I answer, that no man can discourse and reason of any thing without recourse to settled Notions deciphered in his own Mind: and that such an Exception as this implies the most contradictory Absurdities imaginable, to wit, as if a man should reason from something that never entered into his Mind, or that is utterly out of the ken of his own Faculties. But such groundless allegations as these discover nothing but an unwillingness to find themselves able to entertain any conception of God, and a heavy propension to sink down into an utter oblivion of him, and to become as stupid and senseless in Divine things as the very Beasts.

2. But others, it may be, will not look on this Notion as contemptible for the easy composure thereof out of familiar conceptions which the Mind of man ordinarily figures it self into, but reject it rather out of some unintelligible hard terms in it, such as *Spirit, Eternall, and Infinite*; for they do profess they can frame no Notion of *Spirit*, and that any thing should be *Eternall* or *Infinite* they do not know how to set their mind in a posture to apprehend, and therefore some would have no such thing as a *Spirit* in the world.

But if the difficulty of framing a conception of a thing must take away the

the Existence of the thing it self, there will be no such thing as a *Body* left in the world, and then will all be *Spirit*, or nothing. For who can frame so safe a notion of a *Body*, as to free himself from the intanglements that the *Extension* thereof will bring along with it? For this *extended Matter* consists of either indivisible points, or of particles divisible *in infinitum*. Take which of these two you will, (and you can find no third) you will be wound into the most notorious Absurdities that may be. For if you say it consists of points, from this position I can necessarily demonstrate, that every *Spear* or *Spire- Steeple*, or what long body you will, is as thick as it is long; that the tallest *Cedar* is not so high as the lowest *Mushrome*; and that the *Moon* and the *Earth* are so near one another, that the thickness of your hand will not goe betwixt; that *Rounds* and *Squares* are all one Figure; that *Even* and *Odde Numbers* are Equall one with another; and that the clearest *Day* is as dark as the blackest *Night*. And if you make choice of the other Member of the *Disjunction*, your Fancy will be little better at ease; for nothing can be divisible into parts it has not: therefore if a *Body* be divisible into infinite parts, it has infinite extended parts: and if it has an infinite number of extended parts, it cannot be but a hard mysterie to the Imagination of Man, that infinite extended parts should not amount to one whole infinite Extension. And thus a *grain of Mustard-seed* would be as well infinitely extended as the whole Matter of the Universe, and a thousandth part of that grain as well as the grain it self. Which things are more unconceivable then any thing in the Notion of a *Spirit*. Therefore we are not scornfully and contemptuously to reject any Notion, for seeming at first to be clouded and obscured with some difficulties and intricacies of conception; sith that of whose being we seem most assured, is the most intangled and perplex'd in the conceiving, of any thing that can be propounded to the apprehension of a Man. But here you will reply, that our *Senses* are struck by so manifest impressions from the *Matter*, that though the *nature* of it be difficult to conceive, yet the *Existence* is palpable to us by what it acts upon us. Why then, all that I desire is this, that when you shall be re-minded of some *Actions* and *Operations* that arrive to the notice of your Sense or Understanding, which, unless we do violence to our Faculties, we can never attribute to *Matter* or *Body*, that then you would not be so nice and averse from the admitting of such a Substance as is called a *Spirit*, though you fancy some difficulty in the conceiving thereof.

3. But for mine own part, I think the *nature* of a *Spirit* is as conceivable and easy to be defined as the nature of any thing else. For as for the very *Essence* or bare *Substance* of any thing whatsoever, he is a very Novice in speculation that does not acknowledge that utterly unknowable; but for the *Essentiall* and *Inseparable Properties*, they are as intelligible and explicable in a *Spirit* as in any other Subject whatever. As for example, I conceive the intire *Idea* of a *Spirit* in generall, or at least of all finite created and subordinate *Spirits*, to consist of these several powers or properties, viz. *Self-penetration*, *Self-motion*, *Self-contraction* and *Dilatation*, and *Indivisibility*; and these are those that I reckon more absolute: I will adde also what has relation to another, and that is the power of

*Penetra-*



*Penetrating, Moving, and Altering the Matter.* These *Properties* and *Powers* put together make up the *Notion* and *Idea* of a *Spirit*, whereby it is plainly distinguished from a *Body*, whose parts cannot *penetrate* one another, is not *Self-moveable*, nor can *contract* nor *dilate* it self, is *divisible* and *separable* one part from another; but the parts of a *Spirit* can be no more separated, though they be dilated, then you can cut off the *Rays* of the *Sun* by a pair of Scissors made of pellucid Crystall. And this will serve for the settling of the *Notion* of a *Spirit*; the proof of its *Existence* belongs not unto this place. And out of this Description it is plain that a *Spirit* is a notion of more *Perfection* then a *Body*, and therefore the more fit to be an *Attribute* of what is *absolutely Perfect* then a *Body* is.

4. But now for the other two hard terms of *Eternall* and *Infinite*, if any one would excuse himself from assenting to the *Notion* of a *God* by reason of the *Incomprehensibleness* of those *Attributes*, let him consider, that he shall whether he will or no be forced to acknowledge something *Eternall*, either *God* or the *World*, and the *Intricacy* is alike in either. And though he would shuffle off the trouble of apprehending an *Infinite Deity*, yet he will never extricate himself out of the intanglements of an *Infinite Space*; which *Notion* will stick as closely to his Soul as her power of *Imagination*.

5. Now that *Goodnesse, Knowledge* and *Power*, which are the three following *Attributes*, are *Attributes of Perfection*, if a man consult his own *Faculties*, it will be undoubtedly concluded; and I know nothing else he can consult with. At least this will be returned as infallibly true, That a *Being absolutely Perfect* has these, or what supereminently contains these. And that *Knowledge* or something like it is in *God*, is manifest, because without *Animadversion* in some sense or other it is impossible to be *Happy*. But that a *Being* should be *absolutely Perfect*, and yet not *Happy*, is as impossible. But *Knowledge* without *Goodness* is but dry Subtilty or mischievous Craft; and *Goodness* with *Knowledge* devoid of *Power* is but lame and ineffectuall. Wherefore whatever is *absolutely Perfect*, is *Infinitely both Good, Wise and Powerfull*.

6. And lastly, it is more *Perfection* that all this be *Stable, Immutable* and *Necessary*, then *Contingent* or but *Possible*. Therefore the *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Perfect* represents to our mindes, That that of which it is the *Idea* is *necessarily to exist*: and that which of its own nature doth *necessarily exist*, must never fail to be. And whether the *Atheist* will call this *absolute Perfect Being* *God* or not, it is all one; I list not to contend about words. But I think any man else at the first sight will say that we have found out the true *Idea* of *God*.

## CHAP. V.

1. *What has occasioned sundry men to conceit that the Soul is Abrafā Tabula.* 2. *That the Mind of Man is not Abrafā Tabula, but has actuall Knowledge of her own, and in what sense she has so.* 3. *A further illustration of the truth thereof.*

1. **A**ND now we have found out this *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Perfect*, that the use which we shall hereafter make of it may take the better effect, it will not be amisse, by way of further preparation, briefly to touch upon that notable point in Philosophy, *Whether the Soul of man be Abrafā Tabula, a Table-book in which nothing is writ; or Whether she have some Innate Notions and Ideas in her self.* For so it is, that she having taken first occasion of thinking from externall Objects, it hath so imposed upon some mens judgements, that they have conceited that the Soul has no Knowledge nor Notion, but what is in a *Passive* way impressed or delineated upon her from the Objects of *Sense*; they not warily enough distinguishing betwixt extrinsecall Occasions, and the adequate or principal Causes of things.

2. But the Mind of Man more free, and better exercised in the close observations of its own operations and nature, cannot but discover that there is an active and *actuall Knowledge* in a man, of which these outward Objects are rather the re-minders then the first begetters or implanters. And when I say *actuall Knowledge*, I do not mean that there is a certain number of *Ideas* flaring and shining to the *Animadversive Faculty*, like so many *Torches* or *Starres* in the *Firmament* to our outward Sight, or that there are any *Figures* that take their distinct places, and are legibly writ there like the *Red letters* or *Astronomical Characters* in an *Almanack*: but I understand thereby an active sagacity in the Soul, or quick recollection, as it were, whereby some small businesse being hinted unto her, she runs out presently into a more clear and larger conception.

3. And I cannot better describe her condition then thus: Suppose a skillfull *Musician* fallen asleep in the field upon the grasse, during which time he shall not so much as dream any thing concerning his Musicall faculty, so that in one sense there is no *actuall Skill* or Notion, nor representation of any thing musicall in him; but his friend sitting by him, that cannot sing at all himself, jogs him and awakes him, and desires him to sing this or the other Song, telling him two or three words of the beginning of the Song, whereupon he presently takes it out of his mouth, and sings the whole Song upon so slight and slender intimation: So the *Mind* of Man being jogg'd and awakened by the impulses of outward Objects, is stirred up into a more full and clear conception of what was but imperfectly hinted to her from externall occasions; and this Faculty I venture to call *actuall Knowledge*, in such a sense as the sleeping Musician's skill might be called *actuall Skill* when he thought nothing of it.



## C H A P. VI.

1. *Sundry Instances arguing actual Knowledge in the Soul: as that she has a more accurate Idea of a Circle and Triangle then Matter can exhibite to her: 2. And that upon one single consideration she assures her self of the Universal Affection of a Triangle. 3. The same argued from the nature of Mathematical and Logical Notions, which come not in by the Senses, as being no Physical affections of the Matter; 4. Because they are produced without any Physical motion upon the Matter; 5. And that contrary kinds may be intirely in one and the same part of Matter at once. 6. That there are certain sure Complex Notions of the Mind for which she was not beholden to Sense.*

1. **A**ND that this is the condition of the Soul is discoverable by sundry observations. As for example, Exhibite to the Soul through the outward Senses the figure of a *Circle*; she acknowledgeth presently this to be one kind of *Figure*, and can adde forthwith, that if it be perfect, all the lines from some one point of it drawn to the *Perimeter* must be exactly *Equal*. In like manner shew her a *Triangle*; she will straightway pronounce, that if that be the right figure it makes toward, the *Angles* must be closed in indivisible *points*. But this accuracy either in the *Circle* or the *Triangle* cannot be set out in any material Subject: therefore it remains that she hath a more full and exquisite knowledge of things in her self then the *Matter* can lay open before her.

2. Let us cast in a third Instance: Let some body now demonstrate this *Triangle* described in the *Matter* to have its three *Angles* equal to two right ones; Why yes, saith the Soul, this is true, and not only in this particular *Triangle*, but in all plain *Triangles* that can possibly be describ'd in the *Matter*. And thus, you see, the Soul sings out the whole Song upon the first hint, as knowing it very well before.

3. Besides this, there are a multitude of *Relative Notions* or *Ideas* in the Mind of Man, as well *Mathematical* as *Logical*, which if we prove cannot be the Impresses of any material Object from without, it will necessarily follow that they are from the Soul her self within, and are the natural furniture of humane Understanding. Such as are these, *Cause*, *Effect*, *Whole* and *Part*, *Like* and *Unlike*, and the rest. So *Equality* and *Inequality*, λόγος and ἀναλογία, *Proportion* and *Analogy*, *Symmetry* and *Asymmetry*, and such like: all which *Relative Ideas* I shall easily prove to be no material Impresses from without upon the Soul, but her own active conception proceeding from her self whilest she takes notice of *external Objects*. For that these *Ideas* can make no Impresses upon the outward Senses is plain from hence, because they are no *sensible* nor *Physical affections* of the *Matter*. And how can that that is no *Physical affection* of the *Matter*, affect our corporeal Organs of *Sense*?

But now that these *Relative Ideas*, whether *Logical* or *Mathematical*, be no *Physical affections* of the *Matter*, is manifest from these two Arguments,

ments. First, They may be produced when there has been no *Physical Motion* nor alteration in the Subject to which they belong, nay, indeed, when there hath been nothing at all done to the Subject to which they do accrue. As for example, suppose one side of a Room whitened, the other not touch'd or meddled with, this other has thus become unlike, and hath the Notion of *Dissemble* necessarily belonging to it, although there has nothing at all been done thereunto. So suppose two Pounds of *Lead*, which therefore are two *Equal* Pieces of that Metall; cut away half from one of them, the other Pound, nothing at all being done unto it, has lost its Notion of *Equal*, and hath acquired a new one of *Double* unto the other. Nor is it to any purpose to answer, That though there was nothing done to this Pound of *Lead*, yet there was to the other, for that does not at all enervate the Reason, but shews that the Notion of *Sub-double*, which accrued to that *Lead* which had half cut away, is but our *Mode* of conceiving, as well as the other, and not any *Physical affection* that strikes the corporeal Organs of the *Body*, as *Hot* and *Cold*, *Hard* and *Soft*, *White* and *Black*, and the like do. Wherefore the *Ideas* of *Equal* and *Unequal*, *Double* and *Sub-double*, *Like* and *Unlike*, with the rest, are no external Impresses upon the Senses, but the Souls own active manner of conceiving those things which are discovered by the outward Senses.

5. The Second Argument is, That one and the same part of the *Matter* is capable at one and the same time wholly and entirely of two contrary *Ideas* of this kind. As for example, any piece of *Matter* that is a *Middle proportional* betwixt two other pieces is *Double*, suppose, and *Sub-double*, or *Triple* and *Sub-triple*, at once. Which is a manifest sign that these *Ideas* are no *affections* of the *Matter*, and therefore do not affect our Senses; else they would affect the Senses of *Beasts*, and they might also grow good Geometricians and Arithmeticians. And they not affecting our Senses, it is plain that we have some *Ideas* that we are not beholding to our Senses for, but are the mere exertions of the Mind occasionally awakened by the Appulses of the outward Objects; which the outward Senses do no more teach us, then he that awakened the *Musician* to sing taught him his skill.

6. And now in the third and last place it is manifest, besides these single *Ideas* I have proved to be in the Mind, that there are also severall complex *Notions* in the same, such as are these, *The Whole is bigger then the Part*; *If you take Equall from equall, the Remainders are Equall*; *Every Number is either Even or Odde*; which are true to the Soul at the very first proposal, as any one that is in his wits does plainly perceive.



## CHAP. VII.

1. *The Mind of Man being not unfurnish'd of Innate Truth, that we are with confidence to attend to her naturall and unprejudic'd Dictates and Suggestions.* 2. *That some Notions and Truths are at least naturally and unavoidably assented unto by the Soul, whether she have of her self Actual Knowledge in her or not.* 3. *And that the Definition of a Being absolutely Perfect is such.* 4. *And that this absolutely Perfect Being is God, the Creator and Contriver of all things.* 5. *The certainty and settledness of this Idea.*

1. **A**ND now we see so evidently the Soul is not unfurnished for the dictating of Truth unto us, I demand of any man, why under a pretence that she having nothing of her own, but may be moulded into an assent to any thing, or that she does arbitrarily and fortuitously compose the severall Impresses she receives from without, he will be still so squeamish or timorous as to be afraid to close with his own Faculties, and receive the Naturall Emanations of his own Mind, as faithfull Guides.

2. But if this seem, though it be not, too subtile which I contend for, viz. That the Soul hath *actuell Knowledge in her self* in that sense which I have explained; yet surely this at least will be confess'd to be true, That the nature of the Soul is such, that she will certainly and fully assent to some Conclusions, however she came to the knowledge of them, unlesse she doe manifest violence to her own Faculties. Which Truths must therefore be concluded not fortuitous or arbitrary, but Natural to the Soul: such as I have already named, as, that *Every finite number is either even or odde; If you adde equal to equal, the wholes are equal*: and such as are not so simple as these, but yet stick as close to the Soul once apprehended, as, that *The three Angles in a Triangle are equal to two right ones; That there are just five regular Bodies, neither more nor less*, and the like, which we will pronounce necessarily true according to the light of Nature.

3. Wherefore now to re-assume what we have for a while laid aside, the *Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect* above proposed; it being in such sort set forth that a man cannot rid his Minde of it, but he must needs acknowledge it to be indeed the *Idea of such a Being*, it will follow, that it is no *arbitrariou*s nor *fortuitous* conceipt, but *necessary*, and therefore *natural* to the Soul at least, if not ever actually there.

Wherefore it is manifest, that we consulting with our own Natural light concerning the Notion of a *Being absolutely Perfect*, that this Oracle tells us, That it is *A Spiritual substance, Eternal, Infinite in Essence and Goodness, Omnipotent, Omniscient, and of it self necessarily existent*.

For this Answer is such, that if we understand the sense thereof, we cannot tell how to deny it, and therefore it is true according to the light of Nature.

4. But it is manifest that that which is *Self-subsistent, infinitely Good, Omniscient*

*Omniscient* and *Omnipotent*, is the Root and Original of all things. For *Omnipotency* signifies a power that can effect any thing that implies no contradiction to be effected; and *Creation* implies no contradiction: therefore this *perfect Being* can create all things. But if it found the *Matter* or other Substances existing aforehand of themselves, this *Omnipotency* and power of *Creation* will be in vain, nay, indeed, a full *Omnipotency* will not be in this absolute *Omnipotent*; which the free and unprejudic'd Faculties of the Minde of man do not admit of; but look upon as a Contradiction. Therefore the natural notion of a *Being absolutely Perfect*, implies that the same *Being* is *Lord and Maker of all things*. And according to Natural Light, that which is thus, is to be adored and worshipped of all that has the knowledge of it, with all humility and thankfulness: and what is this but to be acknowledged to be *God*?

5. Wherefore I conceive I have sufficiently demonstrated that the *Notion* or *Idea* of *God* is as *Natural*, *necessary* and *essential* to the Soul of Man, as any other *Notion* or *Idea* whatsoever, and is no more *arbitrarious* or *fictitious* then the *Notion* of a *Cube* or *Tetraedrum*, or any other of the *Regular Bodies* in Geometry: which are not devised at our own pleasure (for such *Figments* and *Chimaras* are infinite,) but for these it is demonstrable that there can be no more then Five of them; which shews that their *Notion* is necessary, not an *arbitrarious* complement of what we please.

And thus having fully made good the *Notion* of *God*, *What he is*, I proceed now to the next Point, which is to prove *That he is*.

## CHAP. VIII.

1. That the very *Idea* of *God* implies his necessary Existence.
2. That his Existence is not hypothetically necessary, but absolutely, with the occasion noted of that slippery Evasion.
3. That to acknowledge *God* a *Being* necessarily Existent according to the true *Notion* of him, and yet to say he may not Exist, is a plain contradiction.
4. That Necessity is a Logical term, and implies an indissoluble connexion betwixt Subject and Predicate, whence again this *Axiome* is necessarily and eternally true, *God* doth exist.
5. A further Demonstration of his Existence from the incompetibility of Contingency or Impossibility to his Nature or *Idea*.
6. That necessary Self-existence belongs either to *God*, or to *Matter*, or to both.
7. The great Incongruities that follow the admission of the Self-existency of *Matter*.
8. An Answer to an Evasion.
9. That a number of Self-essentiated Deities plainly takes away the Being of the true *God*.
10. The onely undeniable Demonstration of the Unity of the God-head.
11. The absurdness in admitting actual Self-existence in the *Matter*, and denying it in *God*.
12. That this absurdity cannot be excused from the sensibleness of *Matter*, sith the *Atheist* himself is forced to admit such things as fall not under Sense.
13. That it is as foolish a thing



thing to reject the Being of God because he does not immediately fall under the Senses, as it were to reject the Being of Matter because it is so incomprehensible to the Phansy. 14. The factious Humoursomeness of the Atheist in siding with some Faculties of the Soul, and rejecting the rest, though equally competent judges.

1. **A**ND now verily casting my eyes upon the true *Idea* of God which we have found out, I seem to my self to have struck further into this business then I was aware of. For if this *Idea* or *Notion* of God be true, as I have undeniably proved, it is also undeniably true That he doth exist: For this *Idea* of God being no arbitrary Figment taken up at pleasure, but the necessary and natural Emanation of the Minde of Man, if it signifies to us that the Notion and Nature of God implies in it *necessary Existence*, as we have shewn it does, unless we will wink against our own natural Light, we are without any further Scruple to acknowledge *That God does exist*.

2. Nor is it sufficient ground to diffide to the strength of this Argument, because our Phansy can shuffle in this Abater, *viz.* That indeed this *Idea* of God, supposing God did exist, shews us that his Existence is necessary, but it does not shew us that he doth necessarily exist. For he that answers thus, does not observe out of what prejudice he is enabled to make this Answer, which is this: He being accustomed to fancy the Nature or Notion of every thing else without *Existence*, and so ever easily separating *Essence* and *Existence* in them, here unawares he takes the same liberty, and divides *Existence* from that *Essence* to which *Existence* it self is essential. And that's the witty Fallacy his unwariness has intangled him in.

3. Again, when as we contend that the true *Idea* of God represents him as a *Being necessarily existent*, and therefore that he does exist; and you to avoid the edge of the Argument reply, If he did at all exist; by this answer you involve your self in a manifest Contradiction. For first, you say with us, That the Nature of God is such, that in its very Notion it implies its *Necessary Existence*; and then again you unsay it, by intimating that notwithstanding this true *Idea* and *Notion*, God may not exist; and so acknowledge that what is *absolutely necessary* according to the free Emanation of our Faculties, yet may be otherwise: Which is a palpable Contradiction as much as respects us and our Faculties, and we have nothing more inward and immediate then these to steer our selves by.

4. And to make this yet plainer at least, if not stronger; when we say that the *Existence* of God is *Necessary*, we are to take notice that *Necessity* is a *Logical Term*, and signifies so firm a Connexion betwixt the *Subject* and *Predicate* (as they call them) that it is impossible that they should be dislevered, or should not hold together; and therefore if they be affirm'd one of the other, that they make *Axioma Necessarium*, an Axiome that is Necessary, or eternally true. Wherefore there being a *Necessary Connexion* betwixt God and *Existence*, this Axiome, *God does Exist*, is an Axiome Necessarily and Eternally true. Which we shall yet more clearly under-

understand, if we compare *Necessity* and *Contingency* together. For as *Contingency* signifies not onely the *Manner of Existence* in that which is *Contingent* according to its *Idea*, but does intimate also a *Possibility* of *Actual Existence*; so (to make up the true and easie Analogy) *Necessity* does not onely signify the *Manner of Existence* in that which is *Necessary*, but also that it does *actually Exist*, and *could never possibly do otherwise*. For ἀναγκάων ἐστὶν and ἀδυνάτων μὴ ἐστὶν, *Necessity* of being and *Impossibility* of Not being, are all one with *Aristotle* and the rest of the *Logicians*. But the *Atheist* and the *Enthusiast* are usually such profess'd Enemies against *Logick*; the one merely out of Dotage upon outward gross Sense, the other in a dear regard to his stiffe and untamed Phansy, that shop of Mysteries and fine things.

5. Thirdly, we may further adde, That whereas we must needs attribute to the *Idea* of God either *Contingency*, *Impossibility*, or *Necessity* of *Actual Existence*, (some one of these belonging to every *Idea* imaginable) and that *Contingency* is incompetent to an *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Perfect*, much more *Impossibility*, the *Idea* of God being compiled of no Notions but such as are *possible* according to the Light of Nature, to which we now appeal; it remains therefore that *Necessity* of *Actual Existence* be unavoidably cast upon the *Idea* of God, and that therefore God does *actually Exist*.

6. But fourthly and lastly, If this seem more subtle, though it be no lesse true for it, I shall now propound that which is so palpable, that it is impossible for any one that has the use of his wits for to deny it. I say therefore, that either *God*, or this *corporeall* and *sensible World* must of it self *necessarily exist*. Or thus, Either *God*, or *Matter*, or *both*, do of themselves *necessarily exist*: If *both*, we have what we would drive at, the *Existency* of God.

7. But yet to acknowledge the *necessary Existence* of the *Matter* of it self, is not so congruous and suteable to the Light of Nature. For if any thing can exist *independently* of God, all things may: so that not onely the *Omnipotency* of God might be in vain, but beside, there would be a letting in from hence of all confusion and disorder imaginable; nay, of some grand Devil of equal Power and of as large Command as God himself; or, if you will, of six thousand Millions of such monstrous Gigantick Spirits, fraught with various and mischievous Passions, as well as armed with immense power, who in anger or humour appearing in huge shapes, might take the Planets up in their prodigious Clutches, and pelt one another with them as Boyes are wont to doe with snow-balls. And that this has not yet happened, will be resolved onely into this, that the humour has not yet taken them: but the frame of Nature and the generation of things would be still liable to this ruine and disorder. So dangerous a thing it is to slight the natural *dependencies* and *correspondencies* of our *Innate Ideas* and *Conceptions*.

8. Nor is there any Refuge in such a Reply as this, That the full and perfect Infinitude of the Power of God is able easily to overmaster these six thousand Millions of Monsters, and to stay their hands. For I say that six or fewer may equalize the Infinite Power of God. For if any thing



may be *Self-essentiated* besides God, why may not a *Spirit* of just six times less power than God *exist of it self*? and then six such will equalize him, a seventh will over-power him.

9. But such a rabble of *Self-essentiated* and *divided* Deities does not onely hazzard the pulling the world in pieces, but plainly takes away the Existence of the true God. For if there be any *Power* or *Perfection* whatsoever which has its original from any other than God, it manifestly demonstrates that God is not God, that is, is not a *Being absolutely and fully Perfect*, because we see some Power in the world that is not his, that is, that is not from him. But what is fully and wholly from him is very truly and properly his, as the *thought* of my minde is rather my mind's than my thought's.

10. And this is the onely way that I know to demonstrate that it is impossible that there should be any more than *One* true God in the world: For if we did admit another beside him, this other must be also *Self-originated*; and so neither of them would be God. For the *Idea* of God swallows up into it self all *Power* and *Perfection* conceivable, and therefore necessarily implies that whatever hath any Being derives it from him.

11. But if you say the *Matter* does only exist, and not *God*, then this *Matter* does *necessarily exist of it self*, and so we give that Attribute unto the *Matter* which our Natural Light taught us to be contain'd in the Essential conception of no other thing besides *God*. Wherefore to deny that of *God* which is so *necessarily* comprehended in the true *Idea* of him, and to acknowledge it in that in whose *Idea* it is not at all contain'd, (for *necessary Existence* is not contain'd in the *Idea* of any thing but of a *Being absolutely Perfect*) is to pronounce contrary to our Natural Light, and to doe manifest violence to our Faculties.

12. Nor can this be excused by saying that the Corporeal *Matter* is palpable and *sensible* unto us, but *God* is not, and therefore we pronounce confidently that it is, though *God* be not; and also that it is *necessary* of it self, sith that which is without the help of another, must necessarily be, and eternally.

For I demand of you then, sith you professe your selves to believe nothing but *Sense*, how could *Sense* ever help you to that Truth you acknowledged last, *viz. That that which exists without the help of another is necessary and eternall*? For *Necessity* and *Eternity* are no *sensible* Qualities, and therefore are not the Objects of any *Sense*; and I have already very plentifully proved, that there is other Knowledge and perception in the Soul besides that of *Sense*. Wherefore it is very unreasonable, whenas we have other Faculties of Knowledge besides the *Senses*, that we should consult with the *Senses* alone about matters of Knowledge, and exclude those Faculties that penetrate beyond *Sense*. A thing that the profess'd *Atheists* themselves will not doe when they are in the humor of Philosophising; for their Principle of *Atomes* is a business that does not fall under *Sense*, as *Lucretius* at large confesses.

13. But now seeing it is so manifest that the Soul of man has other *Cognitive* Faculties besides that of *Sense*, (which I have clearly above demonstrated)

monstrated) it is as incongruous to deny there is a *God*, because *God* is not an Object fitted to the *Senses*, as it were to deny there is *Matter* or a *Body*, because that *Body* or *Matter*, in the imaginative Notion thereof, lies so unevenly and troublefomly in our *Phanſy* and *Reason*.

In the contemplation whereof our Understanding discovereth ſuch contradictory incoherencies, that were it not that the *Notion* is ſuſtain'd by the confident dictates of *Sense*, *Reason* appealing to thoſe more cras Re-  
presentations of *Phanſy*, would by her ſhrewd *Dilemmas* be able to argue it quite out of the world. But our *Reason* being well aware that corporeall *Matter* is the proper Object of the *Sensitive* Faculty, ſhe gives full belief to the information of *Sense* in her own ſphear, ſlighting the puzzling objections of perplexed *Phanſy*, and freely admits the exiſtence of *Matter*, notwithstanding the intanglements of *Imagination*; as ſhe does alſo the exiſtence of *God*, from the contemplation of his *Idea* in our Soul, notwithstanding the ſilence of the *Senses* therein.

14. For indeed it were an unexcusable piece of folly and madneſſe in a man, whenas he has *Cognitive* Faculties reaching to the knowledge of *God*, and has a certain and unalterable *Idea* of *God* in his Soul, which he can by no device wipe out, as well as he has the knowledge of *Sense* that reaches to the diſcovery of the *Matter*; to give neceſſary *Self-exiſtence* to the *Matter*, no Faculty at all informing him ſo; and to take neceſſary *Exiſtence* from *God*, though the natural Notion of *God* in the Soul inform him to the contrary; and onely upon this pretence, becauſe *God* does not immediately fall under the Knowledge of the *Senses*: thus partially ſiding with one kinde of Faculty onely of the Soul, and proſcribing all the reſt. Which is as humourſomely and fooliſhly done, as if a man ſhould make a faction amongſt the *Senses* themſelves, and reſolve to believe nothing to be but what he could ſee with his *Eyes*, and ſo confidently pronounce that there is no ſuch thing as the Element of *Aire*, nor *Winds*, nor *Muſick*, nor *Thunder*. And the reaſon, forſooth, muſt be, becauſe he can ſee none of theſe things with his *Eyes*, and that's the ſole *Sense* that he intends to believe.



## C H A P. I X.

1. *The Existence of God argued from the Finall cause of the implantation of the Idea of God in the Soul.* 2. *An Evasion of the Argument, by supposing all things to be such as they are, by Chance.* 3. *That the Evasion is either impossible, or but barely possible, and therefore of no weight.* 4. *That we are not to attend to what is simply possible, but to what our Natural Faculties determine.* 5. *He urges therefore again the Final cause of the indeleble Idea or Image of God in the Soul, illustrating the force thereof from a Similitude.* 6. *That supposing God did exist, he would have dealt no otherwise with us for the making himself known unto us then we are de facto dealt with; which therefore again argues that He doth exist.*

1. **A**ND hitherto I have argued from the naturall *Notion* or *Idea* of God as it respects that, of which it is the *Idea* or *Notion*. I shall now try what advantage may be made of it from the respect it bears unto our *Souls*, the *Subject* thereof, wherein it does reside.

I demand therefore, who put this Indeleble Character of God upon our Souls? why, and to what purpose is it there?

2. Nor do not think to shuffle me off by saying, We must take things as we finde them, and not inquire of the finall Cause of any thing: for things are necessarily as they are of themselves, whose guidance and contrivance is from no Principle of Wisdome or Counsel, but every Substance is now and ever was of what nature and capacity it is found, having its Originall from none other then it self; and all those changes and varieties we see in the World are but the result of an Eternal Scuffle of coordinate Causes, bearing up as well as they can, to continue themselves in the present state they ever are; and acting and being acted upon by others, these varieties of things appear in the world, but every particular Substance with the Essential Properties thereof is self-originated, and independent of any other.

3. For to this I answer, That the very best that can be made of all this is but thus much, That it is merely and barely *possible*, nay, if we consult our own Faculties, and the *Idea* of God, utterly impossible: but admit it possible; this bare *possibility* is so lax, so weak and so undeterminate a consideration, that it ought to have no power to move the Mind this way or that way that has any tolerable use of her own Reason, more then the faint breathings of the loose Air have to shake a Mountain of brasse. For if bare *possibility* may at all intangle our assent or dissent in things, we cannot fully misbelieve the absurdest Fable in *Aesop* or *Ovid*, or the most ridiculous Figments that can be imagin'd; as suppose that *Ears of Corn in the field hear the whistling of the wind and chirping of the Birds: that the stones in the street are grinded with pain when the Carts goe over them: that the Heliotrope eyes the Sun, and really sees him, as well as turns round about with him: that the Pulp of the Wall-nut, as bearing the signature of the Brain, is indued with Imagination and Reason.* I say,

no man can fully mis-believe any of these fooleries, if bare *Possibility* may have the least power of turning the Scales this way or that way. For none of these, nor a thousand more such like as these, imply a perfect and palpable Contradiction, and therefore will put in for their right of being deemed *possible*.

4. But we are not to attend to what is simply *possible*, but to what our *Natural Faculties* do direct and determine us to. As for example, Suppose the question were, *Whether the Stones in the street have sense or no*; we are not to leave the point as indifferent, or that may be held either way, because it is *possible*, and implies no palpable Contradiction, that they may have *sense*, and that a *painfull* sense too: but we are to consult with our *Naturall Faculties*, and see whither they propend; and they do plainly determinate the controversy, by telling us that what has *sense* and is capable of *pain* ought to have also *progressive Motion*, to be able to avoid what is hurtfull and painfull, and we see it is so in all Beings that have any considerable share of *Sense*. And *Aristotle*, who was no doter on a *Deity*, yet frequently does assume this Principle, Ἡ φύσις ἐδὲν μάταιον ποιεῖ, That *Nature does nothing in vain*. Which is either an acknowledgment of a *God*, or an appeal to our own *Rationall Faculties*; and I am indifferent which, for I have what I would out of either; for if we appeal to the naturall suggestions of our own Faculties, they will assuredly tell us There is a *God*.

5. I therefore again demand, and I desire to be answered without prejudice, or any restraint laid upon our Natural Faculties, To what purpose is this Indeleble *Image* or *Idea* of *God* in us, if there be no such thing as *God* existent in the world? or who seal'd so deep an impresson of that Character upon our Minds?

If we were travelling in a desolate *Wilderneß*, where we could discover neither Man nor House, and should meet with *Herds of Cattel* or *Flocks of Sheep* upon whose bodies there were branded certain *Marks* or *Letters*, we should without any hesitancy conclude that these have all been under the hand of some man or other that has set his name upon them. And verily when we see writ in our Souls in such legible Characters the *Name*, or rather the *Nature* and *Idea*, of *God*, why should we be so slow and backward from making the like reasonable inference? Assuredly, he whose *Character* is signed upon our Souls has been here, and has thus marked us, that we and all may know to whom we belong, That *it is he that has made us, and not we our selves; that we are his people, and the sheep of his Pasture*. And it is evidently plain from the *Idea* of *God*, which includes *Omnipotency* in it, that we can be made from none other then he; as I have \* before demonstrated. And therefore there was no better way then by sealing us with this *Image* to make us acknowledge our selves to be his, and to doe that Worship and Adoration to him that is due to our mighty *Maker* and *Creator*, that is, to our *God*.

Wherefore things complying thus naturally and easily together, according to the free Suggestions of our *Naturall Faculties*, it is as perverse and forced a businesse to suspend assent, as to doubt whether those *Roman Urnes* and *Coins* I spoke of, digg'd out of the Earth, be the works of Nature, or the Artifice of Men.

6. But

\* See the foregoing Chap. Sect. 7, 8, 9.



6. But if we cannot yet for all this give free assent to this Position, *That God does Exist*, let us at least have the Patience a while to suppose it. I demand therefore, supposing God did *Exist*, What can the Mind of Man imagine that this God should doe better or more effectually for the making himself known to such a Creature as Man, indued with such and such Faculties, then we finde really already done? For God being a *Spirit* and *Infinite*, cannot ever make himself known Necessarily & Adequately by any appearance to our outward *Senses*. For if he should manifest himself in any outward figures or shapes, portending either love or wrath, terror or protection, our Faculties could not assure us that this were *God*, but some particular *Genius*, good or bad: and besides, such dazling and affrightfull externall forces are neither becoming the Divine Nature, nor futeable with the Condition of the Soul of Man, whose *better Faculties* and more free God meddles with, does not force nor amaze us by a more course and oppressing power upon our weak and brutish *Senses*. What remains therefore but that he should manifest himself to our *Inward Man*? And what way imaginable is more fit then the indeleble Impression of the *Idea* of himself, which is ( not Divine life and sense, for that's an higher prize laid up for them that can win it, but ) a naturall representation of the Godhead, and a Notion of his *Essence*, whereby the Soul of Man could no otherwise conceive of him then as an *Eternall Spirit*, *Infinite in Goodnesse*, *Omnipotent*, *Omniscient*, and *Necessarily of himself Existent*? But this, as I have fully proved, we finde *de facto* done in us. Wherefore we being every way dealt with as if there were a God *Existing*, and no *Faculty* discovering any thing to the contrary, what should hinder us from the concluding that he does really *Exist*?

## C H A P. X.

1. *Several other Affections or Properties in the Soul of Man that argue the Being of God.* 2. *As Natural Conscience.* 3. *A pious Hope or Confidence of success in affairs upon dealing righteously with the World.* 4. *An Answer to an Objection, That some men are quite devoid of these Divine senses.* 5. *That the Universality of Religious Worship argues the Knowledge of the Existence of God to be from the Light of Nature.* 6. *An Answer to an Objection, viz. That this general acknowledgment of a God amongst the Nations may be but an Universal Tradition.* 7. *Another Objection answered, viz. That what is universally received by all Nations may notwithstanding be false.* 8. *An Objection taken from the general falseness and perverseness of the Religions of the Nations. The first Answer thereto by way of Apologie.* 9. *The second Answer, supposing the Religions of the Nations as depraved as you please.* 10. *A further Objection from the long continuance of those false Religions, and the hopelesness of ever getting out of them, with a brief Answer thereto.*

1. **H**itherto we have argued for the Existency of the Godhead from the natural *Idea* of God, inseparably and immutably residing in the Soul of Man. There are also other Arguments may be drawn from what

what we may observe to stick very close to mans Nature; and such is *Natural remorse of Conscience*, and a fear and disturbance from the committing of such things as notwithstanding are not punishable by men; as also a *Natural hope* of being prosperous and successfull in doing those things which are conceived by us to be good and righteous; and lastly, *Religious Veneration*, or *Divine worship*: all which are fruits unforcedly and easily growing out of the Nature of man; and if we rightly know the meaning of them, they all intimate *That there is a God*.

2. And first, of *Natural Conscience* it is plain, that it is a Fear and Confusion of Minde arising from the presage of some mischief that may befall a man beside the ordinary course of Nature, or the usuall occurrences of affairs, because he has done thus or thus. Not that what is supernatural or absolutely extraordinary must needs fall upon him, but that at least the ordinary calamities and misfortunes which are in the world will be directed and levelled at him some time or other, because he hath done this or that Evil against his *Conscience*. And men do naturally in some heavy *Adversity*, mighty *Tempest* on the Sea, or dreadful *Thunder* on the Land (though these be but from Natural Causes) reflect upon themselves and their actions, and so are invaded with fear, or are unterrified, accordingly as they condemn or acquit themselves in their own *Consciences*. And from this supposal is that magnificent Expression of the *Poet* concerning the Just man,

*Nec fulminantis magna Fovis manus,*

That he is not afraid of the darting down of *Thunder* and *Lightning* from Heaven. But this *Fear*, that one should be struck rather then the rest; or at this time rather then another time, because a man has done thus or thus, is a natural acknowledgement that these things are guided and directed from some discerning Principle, which is all one as to confess *That there is a God*. Nor is it material that some alledge, that *Mariners* curse and swear the lowdest when the Storm is the greatest; for it is because the usualness of such dangers hath made them lose the sense of the danger, not the sense of a *God*.

3. It is also very natural for a man that follows honestly the dictates of his own *Conscience*, to be full of *good Hopes*, and much at ease, and secure that all things at home and abroad will go successfully with him, though his actions or sincere motions of his Minde act nothing upon Nature or the course of the world to change them any way: wherefore it implies that there is a *Superintendent Principle* over Nature and the material frame of the world, that looks to it so, that nothing shall come to pass but what is consistent with the good and welfare of honest and conscientious men. And if it does not happen to them according to their expectations in this world, it does naturally bring in a belief of a world to come.

4. Nor does it at all enervate the strength of this Argument, that some men have lost the sense and difference betwixt *Good* and *Evil*, if there be any so fully degenerate; but let us suppose it, this is a monster, and, I suspect, of his own making. But this is no more prejudice to what I aim at, who argue from the *Natural constitution* of a Man the *Existency* of



of a God, then if, because *Democritus* put out his Eyes, some are born blind, others drink out their Eyes and cannot see, that therefore you should conclude that there is neither *Light* nor *Colours*: for if there were, then every one would see them; but *Democritus* and some others do not see them. But the reason is plain, there hath been force done to their *Natural Faculties*, and they have put out their Sight.

Wherefore I conclude from *natural Conscience* in a man, that puts him upon *Hope* and *Fear* of *Good* and *Evil* from what he does or omits, though those actions and omissions doe nothing to the change of the course of Nature or the affairs of the world, that there is an *Intelligent Principle* over universall Nature that takes notice of the Actions of men, that is, that *there is a God*; for else this *Natural Faculty* would be false and vain.

5. Now for *Adoration* or *Religious Worship*, it is as universall as mankind, there being no Nation under the cope of Heaven that does not doe Divine worship to something or other, and in it to God, as they conceive; wherefore according to the ordinary *natural light* that is in all men, there is a God.

6. Nor can the force of this Argument be avoided, by saying it is but an universall *Tradition* that has been time out of minde spread among the Nations of the world: For if it were so (which yet cannot at all be proved) in that it is universally received, it is manifest that it is according to the *light of Nature* to acknowledge there is a God; for that which all men admit as true, though upon the proposall of another, is undoubtedly to be termed true according to the *light of Nature*. As many hundreds of *Geometrical Demonstrations*, that were first the inventions of some one man, have passed undeniable through all Ages and places for true according to the *light of Nature*, with them that were but Learners, not Inventors of them. And it is sufficient to make a thing true according to the *light of Nature*, that no man upon a perception of what is propounded and the Reasons of it (if it be not clear at the first sight, and need Reasons to back it) will ever stick to acknowledge it for a Truth. And therefore if there were any Nations that were destitute of the knowledge of a God, as they may be, it is likely, of the Rudiments of *Geometry*; so long as they will admit of the knowledge of one as well as of the other, upon due and fit proposall, the acknowledgement of a God is as well to be said to be according to the *light of Nature*, as the knowledge of *Geometry* which they thus receive.

7. But if it be here objected, That a thing may be universally received of all Nations, and yet be so farre from being true according to the *light of Nature*, that it is not true at all, as for example, that the *Sun* moves about the *Earth*, and that the *Earth* stands still as the fixed *Center* of the world, which the best of Astronomers & the profoundest of Philosophers pronounce to be false; I answer, that in some sense it does stand still, if you understand by *motion* the translation of a Body out of the vicinity of other Bodies. But suppose it did not stand still, this comes not home to our Case; for this is but the just victory of *Reason* over the generall prejudice of *Sense*; and every one will acknowledge that *Reason* may correct  
the

the Impresses of *Sense*, otherwise we should, with \**Epicurus* and *Lucretius*, admit the Sun and Moon to be no wider then a Sieve, and the bodies of the Stars to be no bigger then the ordinary flame of a Candle. Therefore you see here is a clashing of the Faculties one against another, and the stronger carries it. But there is no Faculty that can be pretended to clash with the judgment of Reason and naturall Sagacity, that so easily either concludes or presages that there is a God: wherefore that may well goe for a Truth according to the *light of Nature* that is universally receiv'd of men, be it by what Faculty it will they receive it, no other Faculty appearing that can evidence to the contrary. And such is the *universal acknowledgement* that *there is a God*.

\* See *Lucret. de Natura Rerū*, li. 5. and *Diog. Laert. l'iti Epicur.*

8. Nor is it much more material to reply, That though there be indeed a *Religious Worship* exercised in all Nations upon the face of the Earth, yet they worship many of them but *stocks and stones*, or some particular piece of Nature, the *Sun, Moon, or Stars*. For I answer that, first, it is very hard to prove that they worship any Image or Statue without reference to some Spirit at least, if not to the Omnipotent God. So that we shall hence at least win thus much, That there are in the Universe some more subtile and Immaterial Substances that take notice of the affairs of men; and this is as ill to a slow Atheist as to believe that *there is a God*.

And for that *Adoration* some of them doe to the *Sun and Moon*, I cannot believe they doe it to them under the notion of mere *Inanimate Bodies*, but they take them to be the habitation of some *Intellectual Beings*, as the verse does plainly intimate to us,

Ἡελίος δ' ὅς πάντ' ἐφορᾷ καὶ πάντ' ἐπαυέει,

*The Sun that hears and sees all things*: and this is very near the true Notion of a God.

9. But be this *universal Religious Worship* what it will, as absurd as you please to fancy it, yet it will not fail to reach very far for the proving of a *Deity*. For there are no *natural Faculties* in things that have not their Object in the world; as there is *meat* as well as *months*, *sounds* as well as *hearing*, *colours* as well as *sight*, *dangers* as well as *fear*, and the like. So there ought in like manner to be a *God* as well as a *natural propensity* in men to *Religious Worship*, *God* alone being the proper Object thereof.

Nor does it abate the strength of the Argument, that this so deeply-radicated Property of *Religion* in man that cannot be lost, does so ineptly and ridiculously display it self in Mankind.

For as the plying of a *Dog's* feet in his sleep, as if there were some game before him, and the butting of a young *Lamb* before he has yet either horns or enemies to encounter, would not be in nature, were there not such a thing as a *Hare* to be coursed, or an *horned Enemy* to be encountred with horns: so there would not be so *universal* an exercise of *Religious Worship* in the world, though it be done never so ineptly and foolishly, were there not really a due Object of this *Worship*, and a capacity in Man for the right performance thereof; which could not be unless there were a *God*.



But the truth is, Man's Soul, in this drunken drowzy condition she is in, has fallen asleep in the Body, and like one in a dream talks to the bed-posts, embraces her pillow instead of her friend, falls down before Statues in stead of adoring the Eternal and Invisible God, prays to stocks and stones in stead of speaking to him that by his Word created all things.

10. I but you will reply, that a young *Lamb* has at length both his weapon and *Enemy* to encounter, and the dreaming *Dog* did once and may again pursue some real game; and so he that talks in his sleep did once confer with men awake, and may doe so once again: but whole Nations for many successions of Ages have been very stupid Idolaters, and do so continue to this day. But I answer, that this rather informs us of another great Mystery, then at all enervates the present Argument, or obscures the grand Truth we strive for. For this does plainly insinuate thus much, That Mankind is in a laps'd condition, like one fallen down in the fit of an *Epilepsie*, whose limbs by force of the convulsion are moved very incompesedly and illfavour'dly; but we know that he that does for the present move the members of his body so rudely and fortuitously, did before command the use of his Muscles in a decent exercise of his progressive faculty, and that when the fit is over he will doe so again.

This therefore rather implies that these poor barbarous Souls had once the true knowledge of *God* and of his *Worship*, and by some hidden Providence may be recover'd into it again, then that this propension to *Religious Worship*, that so conspicuously appears in them, should be utterly in vain: as it would be both in them and in all men else, if there were no *God*.

## CHAP. XI.

1. *A concerning Enquiry touching the Essence of the Soul of Man.* 2. *That the Soul is not a mere Modification of the Body, the Body being incapable of such Operations as are usually attributed to the Soul, as Spontaneous Motion, Animadversion, Memory, Reason.* 3. *That the Spirits are incapable of Memory, and consequently of Reason, Animadversion, and of Moving of the Body.* 4. *That the Brain cannot be the Principle of spontaneous Motion, having neither Muscles nor Sense.* 5. *That Phantasy, Reason and Animadversion is seated neither in any Pore, nor any particular part of the Brain, nor is all the Brain figured into this or that Conception, nor every Particle thereof.* 6. *That the Figuration of one part of the Brain is not reflected to the rest, demonstrated from the Site of things.* 7. *That the Brain has no Sense, further demonstrated from Anatomical Experiments.* 8. *How ridiculously the Operations of the Soul are attributed to the Conarion.* 9. *The Conclusion, That the Impetus of Spontaneous Motion is neither from the Animal Spirits nor the Brain.* 10. *That the Soul is not any Corporeal Substance distinct from the Animal*

*mal Spirits and the Body; 11. And therefore is a Substance Incorporeal. 12. The discovery of the Essence of the Soul, of what great usefulness for the easier conceiving the nature of God. 13. And how there may be an Eternal Mind that has both Understanding and power of Moving the Matter of the Universe.*

1. **WE** have done with all those more obvious Faculties in the Soul of Man that naturally tend to the discovery of the Existence of a God. Let us briefly, before we loose from our selves and lanch out into the vast Ocean of the Externall *Phænomena* of Nature, consider the Essence of the *Soul* her self, what it is, whether a mere *Modification* of the *Body*, or *Substance distinct* therefrom; and then whether *Corporeal* or *Incorporeal*. For upon the clearing of this point we may haply be convinced that there is a *Spiritual* Substance really distinct from the *Matter*; which who so does acknowledge, will be easilier induced to believe there is a God.

2. First therefore, if we say that the *Soul* is a mere *Modification* of the *Body*, the *Soul* then is but one universal Faculty of the *Body*, or a many Faculties put together, and those Operations which are usually attributed unto the *Soul*, must of necessity be attributed unto the *Body*. I demand therefore, to what in the *Body* will you attribute *Spontaneous Motion*? I understand thereby, A power in our selves of moving or holding still most of the parts of our *Body*, as our hand, suppose, or little finger. If you will say that it is nothing but the *immission* of the *Spirits* into such and such Muscles, I would gladly know what does *immit* these *Spirits*, and *direct* them so curiously. Is it *themselves*, or the *Brain*, or that particular piece of the *Brain* they call the *Conarion* or *Pine-kernel*? Whatever it be, that which does thus *immit* them and *direct* them must have *Animadversion*, and the same that has *Animadversion* has *Memory* also and *Reason*. Now I would know whether the *Spirits themselves* be capable of *Animadversion*, *Memory* and *Reason*; for it indeed seems altogether impossible. For these *Animal Spirits* are nothing else but matter very thin and liquid, whose nature consists in this, that all the particles of it be in Motion, and being loose from one another, fridge and play up and down according to the measure and manner of agitation in them.

3. I therefore now demand, which of the particles in these so many loosely moving one from another has *Animadversion* in it? If you say that they all put together have, I appeal to him that thus answers, how unlikely it is that that should have *Animadversion* that is so utterly incapable of *Memory*, and consequently of *Reason*. For it is as impossible to conceive *Memory* competible to such a Subject, as it is how to write Characters in the water or in the wind.

4. If you say the *Brain* *immits* and *directs* these *Spirits*, how can that so freely and spontaneously move it self or another that has no *Muscles*? Besides, *Anatomists* tell us, that though the *Brain* be the instrument of sense, yet it has no sense at all of it self; how then can that that has no sense direct thus spontaneously and arbitrarily the *Animal Spirits* into any part of the *Body*? an act that plainly requires determinate sense and



perception. But let the *Anatomists* conclude what they will, I think I shall little less then demonstrate that *the Brains have no sense*. For the same thing in us that has *Sense* has likewise *Animadversion*; and that which has *Animadversion* in us, has also a Faculty of *free* and *arbitrarious Phansy* and of *Reason*.

5. Let us now consider the nature of the *Brain*, and see how com- petible those Operations and Powers are to such a Subject. Verily if we take a right view of this laxe pithe or marrow in man's head, neither our *Sense* nor *Understanding* can discover any thing more in this Substance that can pretend to such noble Operations as *free Imagination* and the sagacious collections of *Reason*, then we can discern in a Cake of Sewet or a Bowl of Curds. For this loose Pulp that is thus wrapt up within our *Cranium* is but a spongy and porous Body, and pervious not only to the Animal Spirits, but also to more grosse juice and Liquor; else it could not well be nourished, at least it could not be so soft and moistened by Drunkenness and excess, as to make the *Understanding* inept and sottish in its Operations.

Wherefore I now demand, in this soft substance which we call the *Brain*, whose *softness* implies that it is in some measure *liquid*, and *liquidity* implies a severall *Motion* of loosned parts, in what part or parcel thereof does *Phansy*, *Reason* and *Animadversion* lye? In this laxe consistence that lies like a Net all on heaps in the water, I demand in what knot, loop or interval thereof does this Faculty of *free Phansy* and *active Reason* reside? I believe you will be asham'd to assign me any one in particular.

And if you will say in *all together*, you must say that the whole *Brain* is figured into this or that representation, which would cancell *Memory*, and take away all capacity of there being any distinct Notes and places for the severall *Species* of things there represented.

But if you will say there is in *every Part* of the *Brain* this power of *Animadversion* and *Phansy*, you are to remember that the *Brain* is in some measure a *liquid Body*, and we must enquire how these loose parts understand one anothers severall *Animadversions* and *Notions*: And if they could (which is yet very inconceivable) yet if they could from hence doe any thing toward the *Inimission* and *Direction* of the *Animal Spirits* into this or that part of the body, we must consider that they must doe it (upon the knowing one anothers minds,) as it were by a joynt contention of strength; as when many men at once, the word being given, lift or tug together for the moving of some so massie a body that the single strength of one could not deal with. But this is to make the *several particles* of the *Brain* so many *individual persons*; a fitter object for Laughter then the least measure of Belief.

6. Besides, how come these *many Animadversions* to seem *but one* to us, our Mind being these, as is supposed? Or rather why, if the figuration of one part of the *Brain* be communicated to all the rest, does not the same Object seem situated both behinde us and before us, above and beneath, on the right hand and on the left, and every way as the Impress of the Object is reflected against all the parts of the *Brains*? But there ap-  
 pearing

pearing to us *but one Animadversion*, as *but one site of things*, it is a sufficient Argument that there is *but one*; or if there be *many*, that they are not mutually communicated from the parts one to another, and that therefore there can be no such joynt endeavour toward one designe: whence it is manifest that the *Brains* cannot *immit* nor *direct* these *Animal Spirits* into what part of the Body they please.

7. Moreover, that the *Brain has no Sense*, and therefore cannot impress spontaneously any motion on the *Animal Spirits*, it is no slight Argument, in that some being dissected have been found *without Brains*; and *Fontanus* tells us of a Boy at *Amsterdam* that had nothing but limpid water in his head in stead of *Brains*; and the *Brains* generally are easily dissolvable into a *watery* consistence; which agrees with what I intimated before. Now I appeal to any free Judge, how likely these *liquid* particles are to approve themselves of that nature and power as to be able, by erecting and knitting themselves together for a moment of time, to bear themselves so as with one joynt contention of strength to cause an arbitrary ablegation of the *Spirits* into this or that determinate part of the Body. But the absurdity of this I have sufficiently insinuated already.

Lastly, the *Nerves*, I mean the marrow of them, which is of the self-same substance with the *Brain*, have *no Sense*, as is demonstrable from a *Catalepsis* or *Catochus*. But I will not accumulate Arguments in a matter so palpable.

8. As for that little sprunt piece of the *Brain* which they call the *Conarion*, that this should be the very substance whose natural faculty it is to move it self, and by its motions and nods to determinate the course of the *Spirits* into this or that part of the Body, seems to me no less foolish and fabulous then the story of him that could change the wind as he pleased, by setting his cap on this or that side of his head.

If you heard but the magnificent stories that are told of this little lurking Mushrome, how it does not onely hear and see, but imagines, reasons, commands the whole fabrick of the body more dexterously then an *Indian* boy does an *Elephant*, what an acute *Logician*, subtle *Geometrician*, prudent *Statesman*, skilfull *Physician*, and profound *Philosopher* he is, and then afterward by dissection you discover this worker of Miracles to be nothing but a poor silly contemptible Knob or Protuberancy, consisting of a thin Membrane containing a little pulposus Matter, much of the same nature with the rest of the Brain;

*Spectatum admissi risum teneatis amici?*

would you not sooner laugh at it then go about to confute it? And truly I may the better laugh at it now, having already confuted it in what I have afore argued concerning the rest of the *Brain*.

9. I shall therefore make bold to conclude, that the impress of *Spontaneous Motion* is neither from the *Animal Spirits* nor from the *Brain*, and therefore that those Operations that are usually attributed unto the *Soul* are really incompatible to any part of the *Body*; and therefore that the *Soul* is not a mere *Modification* of the *Body*, but a *Substance distinct* therefrom.

10. Now we are to enquire whether this *Substance distinct* from what



ordinarily we call the *Body*, be also it self a *Corporeal Substance*, or whether it be *Incorporeal*. If you say that it is a *Corporeal Substance*, you can understand no other then *Matter* more subtile and tenuious then the *Animal Spirits* themselves, mingled with them and dispersed through the vessels and porosities of the *Body*; for there can be no Penetration of Dimensions. But I need no new Arguments to confute this fond conceit, for what I said of the *Animal Spirits* before, is applicable with all ease and fitness to this present case. And let it be sufficient that I advertise you so much, and so be excused from the repeating of the same things over again.

11. It remains therefore that we conclude, That that which impresses *Spontaneous Motion* upon the *Body*, or more immediately upon the *Animal Spirits*, that which *imagines, remembers and reasons*, is an *Immaterial Substance distinct from the Body*, which uses the *Animal Spirits* and the *Brains* for instruments in such and such Operations. And thus we have found a *Spirit* in a proper Notion and signification that has apparently these Faculties in it, it can both *understand*, and *move Corporeal Matter*.

12. And now the prize that we have wonne will prove for our design of very great Consequence: For it is obvious here to observe, that the Soul of man is as it were ἀγάλμα Θεῶ, a *compendious Statue of the Deity*; her substance is a *solid Effigies of God*. And therefore as with ease we consider the Substance and Motion of the vast *Heavens* on a little *Sphere* or *Globe*, so we may with like facility contemplate the nature of the *Almighty* in this little *meddal of God*, the Soul of Man, enlarging to infinity what we observe in our selves when we transerre it unto God; as we do imagine those *Circles* which we view on the *Globe* to be vastly bigger while we fancy them as described in the *Heavens*.


13. Wherefore we being assured of this, That there is a *Spiritual Substance* in our selves in which both these Properties do reside, viz. of *Understanding*, and of *moving Corporeall Matter*; let us but enlarge our minds so as to conceive as well as we can of a *Spiritual Substance* that is able to *move and actuate all Matter* whatsoever never so farre extended, and after what way and manner soever it please, and that it has not the *Knowledge* only of this or that *particular thing*, but a distinct and plenary *Cognoscence of all things*; and we have indeed a very competent apprehension of the Nature of the *Eternall and Invisible God*, who, like the Soul of Man, does not indeed fall under *Sense*, but does every where operate so, that his presence is easily to be gathered from what is discovered by our outward Senses.

A N  
A N T I D O T E  
A G A I N S T  
A T H E I S M.

B O O K II.

CHAP. I.

1. *That the more general Phænomena of External Nature argue the Being of a God. 2. That if Matter be self-moved, it cannot work it self into these Phænomena. 3. Much less if it rest of it self. 4. That though it were partly self-moving, partly self-resting, yet it could not produce either Sun or Stars of that figure they are. 5. That the Laws of the Motion of the Earth are not casual or fortuitous. 6. That there is a Divine Providence that does at least approve, if not direct, all the Motions of the Matter; with a Reason why she permits the Effects of the mere Mechanical motion of the Matter to goe as far as they can.*

1.  HE last thing I insisted upon was the Specifick nature of the *Soul* of Man, how it is an *Immaterial* Substance indued with these two eminent Properties, of *Understanding*, and Power of *moving Corporal Matter*. Which truth I cleared, to the intent that when we shall discover such motions and contrivances in the largely-extended Matter of the World as imply *Wisdom* and *Providence*, we may the easilier come off to the acknowledgment of that Eternal Spiritual Essence that has fram'd Heaven and Earth, and is the Author and maker of all visible and invisible Beings.

Wherefore we being now so well furnish'd for the voiage, I would have my *Atheist* to take Shipping with me, and loosing from this particular Speculation of our own inward Nature, to lanch out into that vast Ocean, as I said, of the External *Phænomena* of *Universal Nature*, or walk



with me a while on the wide Theatre of this *Outward World*, and diligently to attend to those many and most manifest marks and signs that I shall point him to in this outward frame of things, that naturally signify unto us *That there is a God*.

And now, first, to begin with what is most general, I say that the *Phænomena* of *Day and Night*, *Winter and Summer*, *Spring-time and Harvest*, that the manner of *rising and setting* of the *Sun, Moon and Stars*, that all these are signs and tokens unto us that there is a *God*, that is, that things are so framed, that they naturally imply a Principle of *Wisdom and Counsel* in the *Author* of them. And if there be such an *Author* of external Nature, there is a *God*.

2. But here it will be reply'd, that mere *Motion* of the *Universal Matter* will at last necessarily grinde it self into those more rude and general Delineations of Nature that are observed in the Circuits of the *Sun, Moon and Stars*, and the general consequences of them. But if the Mind of man grow so bold as to conceit any such thing, let him examine his Faculties what they naturally conceive of the *Motion* of *Matter*. And verily the great Master of this Mechanical *Hypothesis* does not suppose or admit of any *Specificall difference* in this *Universal Matter*, out of which this outward frame of the World should arise. Neither do I think that any man else will easily imagine but that all the *Matter* of the World is of *one kind* for its very Substance or *Essence*.

Now therefore I demand concerning this *universal uniform Matter*, whether naturally *Motion* or *Rest* belongs unto it. If *Motion*, it being acknowledg'd *uniform*, it must be alike moved in *every part* or *particle* imaginable of it. For this *Motion* being naturall and essentiall to the *Matter*, is alike every where in it, and therefore has loosened every *Atome* of it to the utmost capacity; so that every particle is alike, and moved alike. And therefore there being no prevalency at all in any one *Atome* above another in bignesse or Motion, it is manifest that this *universal Matter*, to whom *Motion* is so essentiall and intrinsecall, will be ineffectuall for the producing of any *variety of appearances* in Nature, and so no *Suns*, nor *Stars*, nor *Earths*, nor *Vortices* can ever arise out of this infinitely-thin and still *Matter*, which must thus eternally remain unperceptible to any of our Senses, were our Senses ten thousand millions of times more subtile then they are: Indeed there could not be any such thing as either Man or Sense in the world. But we see this *Matter* shews it self to us in abundance of *varieties of appearance*; therefore there must be another Principle besides the *Matter*, to order the *Motion* of it so as may make these *varieties* to appear: And what will that prove but a *God*?

3. But if you'll say that *Motion* is not of the nature of *Matter* (as indeed it is very hard to conceive it, the *Matter* supposed homogeneous) but that it is inert and stupid of it self; then it must be moved from some other, and thus of necessity we shall be cast upon a *God*, or at least a *Spiritual Substance* actuating the *Matter*; which the Atheists are as much afraid of, as children are of *Spirits*, or themselves of a *God*.

4. But men that are much degenerate know not the natural Emanations of their own Minds, but think of all things confusedly, and therefore,

fore, it may be, will not stick to affirm, that either the parts of the Matter are *Specifically different*, or though they be not, yet some are *Moveable* of themselves, others inclinable to *Rest*, and were ever so; for it happened so to be, though there be no reason for it in the thing it self: which is to wound our Faculties with so wide a gap, that after this they will let in any thing, and take away all pretence to any principles of Knowledge.

But to scuffle & combat with them in their own dark Caverns, let the *Universal Matter* be a heterogeneal *Chaos* of confusion, variously moved and as it happens; I say, there is no likelihood that this mad *Motion* would ever amount to so wise a Contrivance as is discernable even in the general Delineations of Nature: nay, it will not amount to a Natural appearance of what we see, and what is conceived most easy thus to come to pass, to wit, a round *Sun*, *Moon*, and *Earth*. For it is shrewdly to be suspected, if there were no *Superintendent* over the Motions of those *Æthereall Whirle-pools*, which the *French* Philosophy supposes, that the form of the *Sun* and the rest of the *Stars* would be *oblong*, not *round*, because the *Matter* recedes all along the *Axis* of a *Vortex*, as well as from the *Centre*; and therefore naturally the Space that is left for the finest and subtilest Element of all, of which the *Sun* and *Stars* are to consist, will be *long*, not *round*. Wherefore this *round* Figure we see them in must proceed from some higher Principle than the mere Agitation of the *Matter*: but whether simply *Spermatical*, or *Sensitive* also and *Intellectual*, I'll leave to the disquisition of others, who are more at leisure to meddle with such curiosities.

5. The Business that lies me in hand to make good is this, That taking that for granted which these great Naturalists would have allowed, to wit, *That the Earth moves about the Sun*; I say, the Laws of its *Motion* are such, that if they had been imposed on her by humane reason and counsel, they would have been no other then they are. So that appealing to our own Faculties, we are to confess that the *motion* of the *Sun* and *Stars*, or of the *Earth*, as our Naturalists would have it, is from a *knowing Principle*, or at least hath passed the Approbation and Allowance of such a Principle.

For as *Art* takes what *Nature* will afford for her purpose, and makes up the rest her self: so the *Eternal Mind* (that put the *Universal Matter* upon Motion, as I conceive most reasonable, or if the *Matter* be confusedly mov'd of its self, as the Atheist wilfully contends) this *Eternal Mind*, I say, takes the easie and natural results of this general Impress of *Motion*, where they are for his purpose; where they are not, he rectifies and compleats them.

6. And verily it is far more sutable to Reason, that God making the *Matter* of that nature, that it can by mere *Motion* produce something, that it should goe on so far as that single advantage could naturally carry it; that so the Wit of man, whom God hath made to contemplate the *Phænomena* of Nature, may have a more fit object to exercise it self upon. For thus is the Understanding of Man very highly gratifi'd, when the works of God and their manner of production are made intelligible unto him by a natural deduction of one thing from another; which would  
not



not have been, if God had on purpose avoided what the *Matter* upon *Motion* naturally afforded, and cancelled the Laws thereof in every thing. Besides, to have altered or added any thing further, where there was no need, had been to *multiply Entities* to no purpose.

Thus it is therefore with Divine Providence, what that one single Impression of *Motion* upon the *Universal Matter* will afford that is usefull and good, it doth allow and take in; what it might have miscarried in or could not amount to, it directs or supplies. As in little pieces of wood naturally bow'd like a Man's Elbow, the Carver doth not unbow it, but carves an hand at the one end of it, and shapes it into the compleat figure of a Man's Arm.

That therefore that I contend for is this, That be the *Matter moved* how it will, the *Appearances of things* are such as do manifestly intimate that they are either appointed all of them, or at least approved, by an *Universal Principle of Wisdom and Counsel*.

## C H A P. II.

1. *The perpetual Parallelisme of the Axis of the Earth a manifest argument of Divine Providence.* 2. *The great Inconveniencies, if the posture of this parallel Axis were Perpendicular to the Plane of the Ecliptick:* 3. *Or Co-incident with the said Plane.* 4. *The excellent advantages of that Inclining posture it hath, and what a manifest Demonstration it is of Providence.* 5. *The same Argument urged from the Ptolemaical Hypothesis.* 6. *A further consideration of the Axis of the Earth, and of the Moon's crossing the Equinoctial Line.* 7. *A Demonstration from the Phænomenon of Gravity, that there is a Principle distinct from Matter.* 8. *That neither the Aire, nor any more subtile Matter in the Aire, have any Knowledge or free Agency in them.* 9. *A notable Demonstration from the Sucker of the Aire-Pump's drawing up so great a weight, that there is a Substance distinct from Matter in the World.* 10. *That this Phænomenon cannot be salv'd by the Elastick power of the Aire, demonstrated from the Phænomenon it self.* 11. *An Evasion produced and answered.* 12. *Another Evasion anticipated.* 13. *That this peremptory force of Nature against the first Lawes of Mechanical motion and against that of Gravity, is a palpable pledge, that where things fall out fitly, there is the same Immaterial Guide, though there be not the same sensibility of force on the Matter.* 14. *The ridiculous Sophistry of the Atheist, arguing from some petty effects of the mere Motion of Matter that there is no higher Principle, plainly discovered and justly derided.* 15. *Providence concluded from the Lawes of Day and Night, Winter and Summer, &c.*

1. **N**OW therefore to admit the *Motion of the Earth*, and to talk with the Naturalists in their own Dialect, I demand, Whether it be better to have the *Axis* of the Earth *steady*, and *perpetually parallel* with its

its self; or to have it *carelessly tumble* this way and that way as it happens, or at least very variously and intricately. And you cannot but answer me, That it is better to have it *steady* and *parallel*; for in this lies the necessary Foundation of the Art of *Navigation* and *Dialling*. For that *steady* stream of Particles which is supposed to keep the *Axis* of the Earth *parallel* to it self, affords the Mariner both his *Cynosura* and his *Compass*; the *Load-stone* and the *Load-star* depend both on this; and *Dialling* could not be at all without it. But both of these *Arts* are pleasant, and the one especially of mighty importance to mankind: For thus there is an orderly measuring of *Time* for our affairs at home, and an opportunity of traffick abroad with the most remote Nations of the world, and so there is a mutual supply of the several commodities of all Countreys, besides the enlarging of our Understanding by so ample Experience we get of both men and things. Wherefore if we were rationally to consult, Whether the *Axis* of the Earth is to be held *steady* and *parallel* to it self, or to be left at *random*; we would conclude, That it ought to be *steady*. And so we find it *de facto*, though the Earth move floating in the liquid Heavens. So that appealing to our own Faculties, we are to affirm, That the constant direction of the *Axis* of the Earth was established by a Principle of *Wisdom* and *Counsel*, or at least approved of it.

2. Again, there being several Postures of this *steady* direction of the *Axis* of the Earth, *viz.* either *Perpendicular* to a Plane going through the Centre of the Sun, or *Co-incident*, or *Inclining*; I demand, which of all these Reason and Knowledge would make choice of. Not of a *Perpendicular* posture: for both the pleasant variety and great conveniency of *Summer* and *Winter*, *Spring-time* and *Harvest*, would be lost; and for want of accession of the Sun, these parts of the Earth that bring forth fruit now and are habitable, would be in an incapacity of ever bringing forth any, and consequently could entertain no Inhabitants; and those parts that the full heat of the Sun could reach, he plying them alwaies alike, without any annual recession or intermission, would at last grow tired and exhausted. And besides, consulting with our own Faculties we observe, that an orderly *vicissitude* of things is most pleasant unto us, and doth much more gratifie the *Contemplative* property in Man.

3. And now in the second place, nor would Reason make choice of a *Co-incident* position of the *Axis* of the Earth. For if the *Axis* thus lay in a Plane that goes through the Centre of the Sun, the *Ecliptick* would, like a *Colure* or one of the *Meridians*, pass through the *Poles* of the Earth, which would put the Inhabitants of the world into a pitiful condition: For they that scape best in the *Temperate Zone*, would be accloy'd with very tedious long nights, no less then fourty daies long; and they that now have their night never above four and twenty hours, as *Friseland*, *Iseland*, the further parts of *Russia* and *Norway*, would be deprived of the Sun above a hundred and thirty daies together; our selves in *England*, and the rest of the same *Clime*, would be closed up in darkness no less then an hundred or eighty continual daies, and so proportionably of the rest both in and out of the *Temperate Zones*. And as for *Summer* and  
*Winter*,



Winter, though those *vicissitudes* would be, yet it could not but cause very raging Diseases to have the Sun stay so long describing his little Circles near the Poles, and lying so hot upon the Inhabitants that had been in so long extremity of Darknes and Cold before.

4. It remains therefore that the posture of the *Axis* of the Earth be *Inclining*, not *Co-incident*, nor *Perpendicular* to the forenamed Plane. And verily it is not onely *Inclining*, but in so fit proportion, that there can be no fitter excogitated to make it to the utmost capacity as well pleasant as habitable. For though the course of the Sun be curbed within the compass of the *Tropicks*, and so makes those parts very hot; yet the constant gales of wind from the East (to say nothing of the nature and fit length of their nights) make the *Torrid Zone* not onely habitable, but pleasant.

Now this best posture which our Reason would make choice of, we see really establish'd in Nature; and therefore, if we be not perverse and wilfull, we are to infer, that it was establish'd by a *Principle* that hath in it *Knowledge* and *Counsel*, not from a blind fortuitous jumbling of the parts of the *Matter* one against another, especially having found before in our selves a *Knowing Spiritual Substance*, that is also able to *move* and *alter* the *Matter*. Wherefore, I say, we should more naturally conclude, That there is some such *Universal Knowing Principle*, that hath power to *move* & *direct* the *Matter* of the Universe; then to fancy that a confused juggling of the Parts thereof should contrive themselves into such a condition, as if they had in them *Reason* and *Counsel*, and could *direct* themselves. But this *directing* Principle, what could it be but *God*?

5. But to speak the same thing more briefly, and yet more intelligibly, to those that are onely acquainted with the *Ptolemaical Hypothesis*: I say, that being it might have hapned, that the annual course of the *Sun* should have been through the *Poles* of the world, and that the *Axis* of the Heavens might have been very troublesomely and disorderly moveable, from whence all those inconveniencies would arise which I have before mentioned, and yet they are not, but are so ordered as our own Reason must approve of as best; it is natural for a man to conceive, that they are really ordered by a *Principle* of *Reason* and *Counsel*, that is, that they are made by an All-wise and All-powerful *God*.

6. I will onely adde one or two observables more, concerning the *Axis* of the *Earth* and the course of the *Moon*, and so I will pass to other things.

It cannot but be acknowledged, that if the *Axis* of the Earth were *perpendicular* to the Plane of the Sun's *Ecliptick*, that her *Motion* would be more easie & natural; and yet, for the conveniencies afore-mentioned, we see it is made to stand in an *inclining* posture: So in all likelihood it would be more easie and natural for that Hand-maid of the Earth, the *Moon*, to finish her monethly courses in the *Aequinoctial Line*; but we see, like the *Sun*, she crosses it, and expatiates some degrees further than the *Sun* himself, that her exalted light might be more comfortable to those that live very much North, in their long nights.

Wherefore I conclude, That though it were possible that the confused

fused agitation of the parts of the *Matter* might make a round hard heap like the *Earth*, and more thin and liquid bodies like the *Aether* and *Sun*, and that the *Earth* may swim in this liquid *Aether*, like a roasted Apple in a great bowl of Wine, and be carried about like straws or grafs cast upon a Whirlpool; yet that its *Motion* and *Posture* would be so directed and attemper'd, as we our selves that have Reason upon due consideration would have it to be, and yet not to be from that which is *Knowing*, and in some sense *Reasonable*, is to our Faculties, if they discern any thing at all, as absonous and absurd as any thing can be. For when it had been easier to have been otherwise, why should it be thus, if some *Superintendent Cause* did not oversee and direct the *Motions* of the *Matter*, allowing nothing therein but what our Reason will confesse to be to very good purpose?

7. And that the foregoing *Phænomena* are not by chance or luck, but directed and effected by the abovesaid Superintendency, will be more evincingly confirmed, if we adde the consideration of two other *Phænomena* in Nature, which are very plain and simple, but even violently cross to the mere *Mechanical* powers of *Matter*. The one is that of *Gravity*, or the Descent of heavy bodies toward the Earth; the other what they ordinarily call *Fuga Vacui*: wherein I shall bring such an Instance out of that noble and ingenious Gentleman's Experiments of his *Aire-pump*, as will plainly demonstrate there must be some *Immaterial* Being that exercises its *directive* Activity on the *Matter* of the World. But first I shall recurre, and give a touch upon the nature of *Gravity*.

That, upon supposition the Earth runs round in four and twenty hours, it will violently fling off such things as lye upon it, (unless there be some other Substance distinct from *Matter* that resists the *Mechanical* powers thereof,) I have clearly and copiously demonstrated in my *Treatise of the Immortality of the Soul*. And if we consider more particularly what a strong tug a massie Bullet, suppose of lead or brass, must needs give (according to that prime *Mechanical* law of Motion persisting in a right Line) to recede from the superficies of the Earth, the Bullet being in so swift a motion as would dispatch some fifteen miles in one minute of an hour; it must needs appear that a wonderfull power is required to curb it, regulate it, or remand it back to the Earth, and keep it there notwithstanding the strong reluctancy of that first *Mechanical* Law of *Matter* that would urge it to recede. Whereby is manifested not onely the marvellous power of *Unity* and *Indiscerpibility* in the *Spirit of Nature*, but that there is a peremptory, and even forcible, execution of an *All-comprehensive and Eternal Counsel* for the ordering and the guiding of the Motion of the *Matter* in the Universe to what is for the best. And this *Phænomenon* of *Gravity* is of so good and necessary consequence, that there could be neither Earth nor Inhabitants without it, in this state that things are.

For the *Aire*, whether a man will be so delirous as to phancy it all endued with *perception* and *liberty of will* to resist as it pleases, or to be interspersed with some *subtler* *Matter* so qualified, which they must ridiculously make either a disjoyned or else spongy and perforated Deity; all



the resistance that this laxe and disunited Element could make, call it Natural or Divine, (for words have no force) could no more keep down the above-said Bullet from receding from the Earth, then an army of the smallest Flyes stop a Cannon-bullet flying in the Aire, let them resist it as stoutly as they can. So plain a Demonstration is this *Phænomenon* of Gravity, that there is a *Spirit of Nature*<sup>a</sup> which is the Vicarious power of God upon the *Motion* of the *Matter* of the Universe.

8. And that neither the *Aire* it self has any such *Power, Knowledge* and *liberty of will*, nor that there are any such *Divine* particles interspersed in the *Aire* that have, in my opinion is plainly manifest from the second & thirty second Experiments of the abovenamed Treatise of that Learned \* Gentleman. For whereas in the first of those Experiments, the Brass Key or Stopple of the Cover of the Receiver, after the Receiver is emptied well of Aire, is with much difficulty lifted up; and in the other, if you apply a tapering Valve of brass to the lower branch of the Stop-cock of the Receiver well emptied of Aire, as before, and turn the Key of the Stop-cock, the external Aire beating like a forcible stream upon the Valve to get in there, will suddenly both shut the Valve, and keep it shut so strongly, that it will bear up with it a ten-pound weight (which are evident arguments of an earnest endeavour in Nature to fill the Receiver again with Aire, as it was naturally before, though this motion whereby it attempts so strongly to get in, does more accurately exclude it out:) it is apparent from hence that neither the *Aire* it self, nor any more *subtile* and *Divine* Matter (which is more throngly congregated together in the Receiver upon the pumping out of the Aire) has any *freedom of will*, or any *knowledge* or *perception* to doe any thing, they being so puzzled and acting so fondly and preposterously in their endeavours to replenish the Receiver again with Aire.

For if the external *Aire* and that *subtiler* Matter in the Receiver had been *knowing* and *free* Agents, there would have been that Correspondence betwixt them, that the Exterior *Aire* would have suspended or withdrawn its pressure without, and the *subtile* and *Divine* Matter within would have directed its motion against the Stopple and Valve to let in the Aire, according to the intention of Nature. Or if nothing but that *subtile* body be *free* and *knowing*, that alone by mutual Correspondence (that in the Aire without bearing off the pressure of the outward Aire against the Receiver, & that part within bearing against the Valve or Stopple) would let in the Aire, according to the earnest and serious purpose of Nature. But their acting being so clear contrary to the End designed, and their attempts so inept, (whenas yet the thing were easily done; if there were *Knowledge* and *free Agency* in either the *Aire* or any other more *subtile* Matter) it is a Demonstration that the *Impetus* of *Motion* in all *Matter* is blinde and necessary, and that there is no *Matter* at all that is *free* and *knowing*, but moves and acts of it self (if undirected by some other Immaterial Principle) according to the mere *Mechanical* laws of *Motion*.

9. According to which that notable \* *Phænomenon*, which now at last I come to, cannot be brought to pass, namely, That the Sucker of the  
*Aire-*

\* The Honou-  
rable Robert  
Boyle Esq. his  
Treatise entit-  
uled *New Ex-  
periments Phys-  
ico-Mechanical  
touching the  
Aire.*

<sup>a</sup> See Mr. Boyle's  
*New Experi-  
ments Physico-  
Mechanical,*  
Exper. 23.

*Aire-pump*, the Cylinder being well emptied of Aire, should draw up above an hundred pound weight, moving up as it were of its own accord. For, as the ingenious Experimenter has observed in his third Experiment, this forcible endeavour of the subingression of the Aire is not from the pressure of the ambient Aire as strengthened by the accession of the Aire sucked out, because then he that manages the Pump would find the resistance of the Aire increased as the Sucker is drawn down lower, which yet is not observed. To which we may adde in reason, that the Aire being nothing but a thin body or *Congeries* of small particles in perpetual motion, what is pumped out will naturally spread out into such distances as it may move more freely in, that is, into those spaces where the Aire is more thin; so that, as it were in a moment, all the Aire becomes of one and the same consistency. And therefore any new pressure (upon the account of the Aire nearest to the Pump becoming more thick) cannot come into compute in this case.

10. The most plausible *Mechanical* Solution therefore that can be given of this *Phænomenon* is that *Hypothesis* which the excellent Authour himself has made use of, and which will agree universally to the Aire though in its own natural temper: namely, that there is an *Elastick* power in the *Aire*, whether you explain it the *Cartesian* way, by the playing and whirling of every particle thereof, whereby they attempt to possess a larger space; or whether there be such a compression of the particles as there is in the hairs of a lock of wooll, which will expand it self upon the receding of what bore too strongly against it.

But let this *Elastical* power consist in this or in what else it will, though the Solution look at first sight very hopefull and promising, yet I must confess (but with submission to better judgments) that the Effect that is attributed to the *Hypothesis* in this Experiment, seems to me a Demonstration against the *Hypothesis* it self. For this *Elastical* power, according to the Experiment, has no less force of pressure then an hundred pound weight or more: which pressure (as in all flexible bodies that have a *Spring-power* in them) is perpetual and every where in the Aire, if it be there at all. And therefore any Cylinder of Aire in the same height from the ground, and of the same diameter with that of the Sucker of the Pump, will press as forcibly as an hundred pound weight.

Now suppose a Lump of Butter in a pair of wooden scales having the same diameter with the Sucker of the *Aire-pump*: it is manifest that this Butter will be pressed with the force of the pressure of two hundred pound weight, a Cylinder of Aire from beneath and another from above pressing with the force of an hundred pound weight apiece. This would necessarily follow if there were this *Elastick* power in the Aire. But the Butter is not pressed at all, as appears in that no serose humour is squeezed out of it; nor is it at all flatted or spread out by any such compression, although it have the force of two hundred pound weight pressing it, according to this *Hypothesis* of the *Elastick* power of the Aire.

11. Nor can I excogitate any Evasion against this Demonstration, unless it be that the *Spring of the Aire* pressing against the sides of the Butter as well as the bottom and top, keeps it from flatting. But it is



easily answered, That yet it cannot keep it from squeezing on all sides, and pressing out the milky and serose humour in the Butter, if there were any such pressure, as is supposed. To which you may further adde, That the Lump of Butter being reduced to the figure, suppose, of a round Trencher, whose edge should fall short of the *Area* of the two sides an hundred or two hundred times, and then placed betwixt two thin light Trenchers broad enough for the purpose, and hung free in the Aire with strings, as in a Scale, so that the force of pressure from above and beneath shall exceed that against the round edge of the Butter an hundred or two hundred times; yet the Butter will not for all this be pressed closer by the *Spring of the Aire*, nor have any more effect upon it then it had before: when notwithstanding it is so soft and yielding, that a very small force of our hands will press it betwixt the two Trenchers.

12. Which yet is not; because our strength is superadded to the force of the *Spring of the Aire*: For the excess of the force of the *Spring of the Aire* against the sides of the Trenchers above that which is against the round edge of the Butter, is far greater then the addition of the force of our pressing hand added to the force of the *Aire-spring* against the sides of the Trencher, and yet there was no new effect.

And moreover where this *Aire-spring* does not reach, namely, within the sides of a paille filled with water, in which you may put a lump of Butter, the Butter will there as easily yield to the pressure of your hand as in the Aire it self. So that it is irrefragably evident, that there is no such *Spring of the Aire* as some learned men have supposed, much less so strong as to master an hundred pound weight, as it is conceived to doe in this notable Experiment of the *Aire-pump*.

13. But as the *Phænomenon* of Gravity is quite cross and contrary to the very first *Mechanick laws of Motion*, which yet is an Universal law of Terrestrial bodies, put upon them by that which is not onely not Terrestrial, but *Immaterial*: so likewise this ascending of the Sucker of the *Aire-pump* with above an hundred pound weight at it, is as cross and violent a breach of that Universal Law of Gravity, and so forcible, that it is apparent, that there is a *Principle* transcending the nature and power of *Matter* that does *umpire* and *rule* all, that *directs* the *Motion* of every part and parcell of *Matter* backwards and forwards and contrary waies, in pursuance of such *General* designs as are best for the Whole. And no less good then the *living* and *breathing* of Animals is aimed at in this so industriously and peremptorily keeping the parts of the *Aire* together, as is well observed by this vertuous and judicious Authour, upon his 41 Experiment.

Wherefore it being so manifest, that there is a *Principle* in the World that does tug so stoutly and resolutely against the *Mechanick* laws of *Matter*, and that so forcibly resists or nulls one common Law of Nature for the more seasonable exercise of another; this, I say, is a very sure pledge to us, that when things are fitly done, though not with this seeming violence and peremptoriness, yet they are the Effects of the same *Immaterial* Principle, (call it the *Spirit of Nature* or what you will) which is the Vicarious Power of God upon this great *Automaton*, the World.

14. But

14. But because so many *Bullets* joggled together in a mans hat will settle to such a determinate figure, or because the *Frost* and the *Wind* will draw upon doors and glafs-windows pretty uncouth streaks like feathers, and other fooleries, which are to no use or purpose, to infer thence, that *all the Contrivances* that are in *Nature*, even the *Frame* of the *bodies* both of *Men* and *Beasts*, are from no other Principle but the jumbling together of the *Matter*, and so because that this doth naturally effect *something*, that it is the Cause of *all things*, seems to me to be a reasoning in the same *Mood* and *Figure* with that wise Market-mans, who going down a hill, and carrying his *Cheeses* under his arms, one of them falling and trundling down the hill very fast, let the other goe after it, appointing them all to meet him at his house at *Gotham*, not doubting but they beginning so hopefully, would be able to make good the whole journey: or like another of the same Town, who perceiving that his *Iron Trevet* he had bought had three feet, and could stand, expected also that it should walk too, and save him the labour of the carriage. So our profound *Atheists* and *Epicureans*, according to the same pitch of Wisdom, do not stick to infer, because this confused *Motion* of the parts of the *Matter* may amount to a rude delineation of *hard* and *soft*, *rigid* and *fluid*, and the like, that therefore it will goe on further, and reach to the disposing of the *Matter* in such order as doth naturally imply a *Principle* that some way or other contains in it exact *Wisdom* and *Counsel*. A Position more befitting the Wise-men above mentioned, then any one that hath the least command of his natural Wit and Faculties.

15. Wherefore we having sufficiently detected the ridiculous folly of this present Sophism, let us, attending heedfully to the natural Emanations of unprejudic'd Reason, conclude, That *the Rising and Setting of the lights of Heaven*, *the vicissitude of Day and Night*, *Winter and Summer*, being so ordered and guided as if they had been settled by exquisite consultation and by clearest knowledge; that therefore that which did thus ordain them is a *Knowing Principle*, able to *move*, *alter* and *guide* the *Matter* according to his own will and pleasure; that is to say, *That there is a God*.

And verily I do not at all doubt but that I shall evidently trace the visible foot-steps of this *Divine Counsel* and *Providence*, even in all things discoverable in the world. But I will pass through them as lightly and briefly as I can.

## CHAP. III.

1. That there is nothing in Nature but what passes the approbation of a Knowing Principle.
2. The great Usefulness of Hills and Mountains.
3. The Condition of Man in order and respect to the rest of the Creation.
4. The designed Usefulness of Quarries of Stone, Timber-Wood, Metalls and Minerals.
5. How upon these depend the glory and magnificence



both of Peace and Warre : 6. As also the defense of Men against Beasts.

1. LET us therefore swiftly course over the *Valleys* and *Mountains*, sound the depth of the *Sea*, range the *Woods* and *Forrests*, dig into the *Entrails* of the *Earth*, and let the *Atheist* tell me which of all these places are silent, and say nothing of a *God*. Those that are most dumb will at least compromise with the rest, that all things are by the *guidance* and *determination*, (let the *Matter* move as it will) or at least by the *allowance* and *approbation*, of a *Knowing Principle*. As a *Mason* that makes a wall, sometimes meets with a *stone* that wants no cutting, and so only approving of it, he places it in his work : and a *piece of Timber* may happen to be crack'd in the very place where the *Carpenter* would cleave it, and he need not close it first, that he may cleave it asunder afterwards. Wherefore if the mere *Motion* of the *Matter* can doe any rude general thing of good consequence, let it stand as allowable : But we shall find out also those things which do so manifestly favour of *Design* and *Counsel*, that we cannot naturally withhold our assent, but must say *There is a God*.

2. And now let us betake our selves to the search, and see if all things be not so as our Reason would desire them. And to begin at the Top first, even those rudely-scattered *Mountains*, that seem but so many Wens and unnatural Protuberancies upon the face of the Earth, if you consider but of what consequence they are, thus reconciled you may deem them ornaments as well as useful.

For these are Nature's *Stillatories*, in whose hollow Caverns the ascending vapours are congealed to that universal *Aqua vitæ*, that good *fresh-water*, the liquor of life, that sustains all the living Creatures in the world, being carried along in all parts of the Earth in the winding Channels of *Brooks* and *Rivers*. Geography would make it good by a large induction. I will onely instance in three or four ; *Ana* and *Tagus* run from *Sierra Molina* in *Spain*, *Rhenus*, *Padus* and *Rhodanus* from the *Alps*, *Tanais* from the *Riphean*, *Garumna* from the *Pyrenean Mountains*, *Achelous* from *Pindus*, *Hebrus* from *Rhodope*, *Tigris* from *Niphates*, *Orontes* from *Libanus*, and *Euphrates* from the Mountains of *Armenia*, and so in the rest. But I will not insist upon this ; I will now betake my self to what doth more forcibly declare an *Eye of Providence* directing and determining, as well as approving of, the results of the supposed agitation of the parts of the *Matter*.

3. And that you may the better feel the strength of my Argument, let us first briefly consider the Nature of Man, what Faculties he hath, and in what order he is in respect of the rest of the Creatures. And, indeed, though his Body be but weak and disarmed, yet his inward abilities of *Reason* and Artificial contrivance is admirable. He is much given to *Contemplation*, and the viewing of this Theatre of the world, to traffick and commerce with foreign Nations, to the building of Houses and Ships, to the making curious instruments of Silver, Brass or Steel, and the like : in a word, he is the flower and chief of all the products of Nature  
upon

upon this Globe of the Earth. Now if I can shew, that there are designs laid even in the lowest and vilest products of Nature that respect Man the highest of all, you cannot deny but that there is an *Eye of Providence* that respecteth all things, and passeth very swiftly from the Top to the Bottom, disposing all things wisely.

4. I therefore now demand, Man being of this nature that he is, whether these noble Faculties of his would not be lost and frustrate, were there not Materials to exercise them on. And in the second place, I desire to know, whether the rude confused *Agitation* of the *particles* of the *Matter* do certainly produce any such Materials fit for Man to exercise his skill on, or no: that is to say, whether there were any Necessity that could infallibly produce *Quarries of Stone* in the Earth, which are the chief Materials of all the Magnificent Structures of building in the world; and the same of *Iron and Steel*, without which there had been no use of these Stones; and then of *Sea-Coal* and other necessary *Fuel*, fit for the working or melting of these Metalls; and also of *Timber-Trees*, for all might have been as well brush-wood and shrubs, and then assuredly there had been no such convenient *Shipping*, whatever had become of other buildings: and so of the *Load-stone*, that great help to Navigation, whether it might not have lain so low in the Earth as never to have been reached by the industry of Man; and the same may be said also of other *Stones* and *Metalls*, that they being heaviest, might have lain lowest. Assuredly the *agitated Matter*, unless there were some special over-powering guidance over it, might as well have over-slipt these necessary useful things as hit upon them: But if there had not been such a Creature as *Man*, these very things themselves had been useless, for none of the *brute Beasts* make use of such commodities. Wherefore unless a man will doe enormous violence to his Faculties, he must conclude, that there is a contrivance of *Providence* and *Counsel* in all those things, which reacheth from the beginning to the end, and orders all things sweetly: and that *Providence* foreseeing what a kind of Creature she would make *Man*, provided him with materials from whence he might be able to adorn his present Age, and furnish History with the Records of egregious exploits both of Art and Valour.

5. But without the provision of the forenamed Materials, the Glory and Pomp both of *War* and *Peace* had been lost. For men in stead of those magnificent Buildings which are seen in the world, could have had no better kind of dwellings then a bigger sort of Bee-hives or Birds-nests, made of contemptible sticks, and straws, and durty mortar. And in stead of the usual pomp and bravery of *War*, wherein is heard the solemn sound of the hoarse Trumpet, the couragious beating of the Drum, the neighing and prancing of the Horses, clattering of Armour, and the terrible thunder of Cannons; to say nothing of the glittering of the Sword and Spear, the waving and fluttering of displayed Colours, the gallantry of Charges upon their well-managed Steeds, and the like: I say, had it not been for the forenamed provision of *Iron, Steel* and *Brass*, and such like necessary Materials, in stead of all this glory and solemnity there had been nothing but howlings and shoutings of poor naked men, belabouring



one another with snag'd sticks, or dully falling together by the ears at Fifti-cuffs.

6. Besides this, Beasts being naturally *armed*, and men naturally *unarmed* with any thing save their *Reason*, and *Reason* being ineffectual having no materials to work upon; it is plain, that that which made *Men*, *Beasts* and *Metalls*, knew what it did, and did not forget it self in leaving Man destitute of natural Armature, having provided Materials, and giving him wit and abilities to arm himself, and so to be able to make his party good against the most fierce and stoutest of all living Creatures whatsoever; nay indeed, left him unarmed on purpose, that he might arm himself, and exercise his natural wit and industry.

#### C H A P. I V.

1. *Distinction of Land and Sea not without a Providence.* 2. *As also the Consistence of the Sea-Water that it can bear Ships.* 3. *The great convenience and pleasure of Navigation.* 4. *The admirable train of fit Provisions in Nature for the gratifying the Wit of man in so concerning a Curiosity.*

1. **H**AVING thus passed over the *Hills*, and through the *Woods* & hollow *Entrails* of the *Earth*, let us now view the wide *Sea* also, and see whether that do not inform us that there is a *God*; that is, whether things be not there in such sort as a rational Principle would either order or approve, whenas yet notwithstanding they might have been otherwise. And now we are come to view those *Campos natantes*, as *Lucretius* calls them, that vast Champain of Water, the *Ocean*; I demand first, Whether it might not have been *wider* then it is, even so large as to overspread the face of the whole *Earth*, and so to have taken away the habitation of *Men* and *Beasts*. For the wet particles might have easily ever mingled with the dry, and so all had either been *Sea* or *Quag-mire*.

2. And then again, though this distinction of *Land* and *Sea* be made, Whether this watry Element might not have fallen out to be of so *thin* a consistency as that it would not bear *Shipping*; for it is so far from impossibility, as there be *de facto* in Nature such waters, as the River *Silas*, for example, in *India*. And the waters of *Borysthenes* are so *thin* and light, that they are said to swim upon the top of the Stream of the River *Hypanis*. And we know there is some kind of wood so heavy that it will sink in any ordinary kind of water.

I appeal therefore to any mans Reason, whether it be not better that there should be a distinction of *Land* and *Sea*, then that all should be mire or water; and whether it be not better that the *Timber-trees* afford wood so light that it swim on the water, or the water be so heavy that it will bear up the wood, then the contrary. That therefore which might have been otherwise, and yet is settled according to our own hearts wish, who  
are

are knowing and rational Creatures, ought to be deemed by us as established by *Counsel* and *Reason*.

3. And the closer we look into the business, we shall discern more evident foot-steps of *Providence* in it : For the two main properties of Man being *Contemplation*, and *Sociableness* or love of *Converse*, there could nothing so highly gratifie his nature as power of *Navigation*, whereby he riding on the back of the waves of the *Sea*, views the wonders of the *Deep*, and by reason of the glibness of that Element, is able in a competent time to prove the truth of those sagacious suggestions of his own Mind ; that is, whether the *Earth* be every way round, and whether there be any *Antipodes*, and the like ; and by cutting the *Equinoctial line*, decides that controverſie of the habitableness of the *Torrid Zone*, or rather wipes out that blot that lay upon Divine Providence, as if so great a share of the world had been lost by reason of unfitness for Habitation.

Besides, the falling upon *strange Coasts*, and *discovering* men of so great a diversity of manners from our selves, cannot but be a thing of infinite pleasure and advantage, to the enlargement of our thoughts from what we observe in their Conversation, Parts and Policy. Adde unto this the sundry *Rarities of Nature*, and *Commodities* proper to several Countreys, which they that stay at home enjoy by the Travels of those that goe abroad, and they that travel grow rich for their adventure.

4. Now therefore *Navigation* being of so great consequence to the delight and convenience of humane life, and there being both wit and courage in man to attempt the *Seas*, were he but fitted with right Materials and other advantages requisite: when we see there is so pat a provision made for him to this purpose in large *Timber*, for the building of his *Ship* ; in a *thick Sea-water*, sufficient to bear the *Ship's* burthen ; in the *Magnet* or *Load-stone*, for his *Compass* ; in the steady and parallel *direction of the Axis* of the *Earth*, for his *Cynosura* ; and then observing his natural wit and courage to make use of them, and how that ingenite desire of knowledge and converse, and of the improving of his own parts and happiness, stir him up to so notable a design ; we cannot but conclude from such a train of Causes so fitly and congruously complying together, That it was really the counsel of an *Universal* and *Eternal Mind*, that hath the overseeing and guidance of the whole frame of Nature, that laid together these Causes so carefully and wisely ; that is, we cannot but conclude *That there is a God*.

And if we have got so fast foot-hold already in this Truth by the consideration of such *Phænomena* in the world that seem more rude and general, what will the contemplation of the more particular and more polished pieces of Nature afford in *Vegetables*, *Animals*, and the *Body of Man* ?



## CHAP. V.

1. *That the Form and Beauty, Seed and Signature of Plants are Arguments of a Providence.* 2. *That though the mere motion of the Matter might produce certain Meteors, as Haile, Snow, Ice, &c. yet it will not follow that the same is the adequate cause of Animals and Plants.* 3. *That it were no great botch nor gap in Nature, if some more rude Phænomena were acknowledged the Results of the mere Mechanical Motion of Matter.* 4. *That the Forme and Beauty of Flowers and Plants are from an higher Principle.* 5. *That there is such a thing as Beauty, and that it is the Object of our Intellectual Faculties.* 6. *From whence it follows, that the beautiful Formes and Figures of Plants and Animals are from an Intellectual Principle.*

1. **H**itherto we have onely considered the more rude and careless strokes and delineaments of Divine Providence in the world, set out in those more large Phenomena of Day and Night, Winter and Summer, Land and Sea, Rivers, Mountains, Metalls, and the like; we now come to a closer view of God and Nature in Vegetables, Animals, and Man.

And first of Vegetables, where I shall touch only these four heads, their Form and Beauty, their Seed, their Signatures, and their great Use as well for Medicine as Sustenance. And that we may the better understand the advantage we have in this closer Contemplation of the works of Nature, we are in the first place to take notice of the condition of that Substance which we call Matter, how fluid and slippery and undeterminate it is of it self; or if it be hard, how unfit it is to be chang'd into any thing else. And therefore all things rot into a moisture before any thing can be generated of them, as we soften the wax before we set on the Seal.

2. Now therefore, unless we will be so foolish, as, because the uniform motion of the Aire, or some more subtile corporeal Element, may so equally compress or bear against the parts of a little vaporous moisture, as to form it into round drops (as some say it doth in the Dew and other Experiments) and therefore because this more rude and general Motion can doe something, conclude that it does all things; we must in all Reason confesse that there is an *Eternal Mind*, in virtue whereof the Matter is thus usefully formed and changed.

But mere rude and undirected Motion, because naturally it will have some kind of Results, that therefore it will reach to such as plainly imply a wise contrivance of Counsel, is so ridiculous a Sophism, as I have already intimated, that it is more fit to impose upon the inconsiderate Souls of Fools and Children, then upon men of mature Reason and well exercis'd in Philosophy. Admit that Rain and Snow and Wind and Hail and Ice, and such like Meteors, may be the products of Heat and Cold, or of the Motion and Rest of certain small particles of the Matter; yet that the  
useful

useful and beautiful contrivance of the *branches, flowers and fruits of Plants* should be so too ( to say nothing yet of the *bodies of Birds, Fishes, Beasts and Men* ) is as ridiculous and supine a Collection, as to infer that, because mere *Heat and Cold* does *soften and harden Wax*, and puts it into some shape or other, that therefore this mere *Heat and Cold*, or *Motion and Rest*, without any Art and direction, made the *Silver Seal* too, and graven upon it so curiously some *Coat of Arms*, or the shape of some *Birds or Beasts*, as an *Eagle*, a *Lion*, and the like. Nay, indeed, this inference is more tolerable far then the other, these effects of *Art* being more easie and less noble then those others of *Nature*.

3. Nor is it any botch or gap at all in the works of Nature, that some particular *Phænomena* be but the easie results of that *general Motion* communicated unto the *Matter* from God, others the effects of more curious *contrivance*, or of the *divine Art or Reason* (for such are the *λόγοι σπερματικοί*, the \* *Rationes Seminales*) incorporated in the *Matter*, especially the *Matter* it self being in some sort vital; else it would not continue the *Motion* that it is put upon, when it is occasionally this or the other way moved: and besides, the Nature of God being the most perfect fulness of Life that is possibly conceivable, it is very congruous that this outmost and remotest shadow of himself be some way, though but obscurely, vital. Wherefore things falling off by degrees from the highest Perfection, it will be no uneven or unproportionable step, if descending from the Top of this outward Creation, *Man*, in whom there is a principle of more fine and reflexive Reason, which hangs on, though not in that manner, in the more perfect kind of Brutes, as Sense also, loth to be curb'd within too narrow compass, lays hold upon some kinds of *Plants*, as in those sundry sorts of *Zoophyta*, ( but in the rest there are no further foot-steps discovered of an *Animadversive* form abiding in them, though there be the effects of an *Inadvertent* form ( *λόγοι ἐνυλκοί* ) of materiated or incorporated Art or Seminal Reason: ) I say, it is no uneven jot, to pass from the more faint and obscure examples of *Spermatical* life to the more considerable effects of *general Motion* in *Minerals*, *Metalls*, and sundry *Meteors*, whose easie and rude shapes may have no need of any Principle of Life, or *Spermatical* form distinct from the *Rest* or *Motion* of the particles of the *Matter*.

4. But there is that Curiosity of *Form* and *Beauty* in the more noble kind of *Plants*, bearing such a suitableness and harmony with the more refined sense and sagacity of the Soul of Man, that he cannot chuse ( his Intellectual Touch being so sweetly gratifi'd by what it deprehends in such like Objects ) but acknowledge that some hidden Cause, much akin to his own nature, that is *Intellectual*, is the contriver and perfecter of these so pleasant spectacles in the world.

5. Nor is it at all to the purpose to object, that this business of *Beauty* and *Comeliness* of *proportion* is but a conceit, because some men acknowledge no such thing, and all things are alike handsome to them, who yet notwithstanding have the use of their *Eyes* as well as other folks. For, I say, this rather makes for what we aime at, that *Pulchritude* is conveyed indeed by the outward *Senses* unto the Soul, but a more *Intel-*  
*lectual*

\* Concerning these *Rationes Seminales*, whether they be distinct, or one Common Spirit of Nature, see Book. 3. c. 12, and 13. in the Discourse Of the Immortality of the Soul.



*lectual* Faculty is that which relishes it; as a *Geometrical Scheme* is let in by the *Eyes*, but the *Demonstration* is discern'd by *Reason*. And therefore it is more rational to affirm, that some *Intellectual Principle* was the Author of this *Pulchritude* of things, then that they should be thus fashion'd without the help of that Principle. And to say that there is no such thing as *Pulchritude*, because some mens Souls are so dull and stupid that they relish all Objects alike in that respect; is as absurd and groundless, as to conclude there is no such thing as *Reason* and *Demonstration*, because a natural Fool cannot reach unto it. But that there is such a thing as *Beauty*, and that it is acknowledged by the whole generations of men to be in *Trees*, *Flowers* and *Fruits*, the adorning and beautifying of *Buildings* in all Ages is an ample and undeniable Testimony. For what is more ordinary with them then the taking in *Flowers* and *Fruitage* for the garnishing of their work? Besides, I appeal to any man that is not sunk into so forlorn a pitch of Degeneracy, that he is as stupid to these things as the basest of Beasts, whether, for example, a rightly-cut *Tetrahedrum*, *Cube* or *Icosaedrum* have no more *pulchritude* in them, then any rude *broken stone* lying in the field or high-ways; or to name other *solid Figures*, which though they be not Regular, properly so called, yet have a settled *Idea* and Nature, as a *Cone*, *Sphear* or *Cylinder*, whether the sight of these do not gratifie the minds of men more, and pretend to more elegancy of shape, then those rude cuttings or chippings of *freestone* that fall from the Mason's hands, and serve for nothing but to fill up the middle of the Wall, and so to be hid from the Eyes of Man for their ugliness. And it is observable, that if Nature shape any thing near this *Geometrical* accuracy, that we take notice of it with much content and pleasure: as if it be but exactly *round* (as there are abundance of such stones found betwixt two hills in *Cuba*, an Island of *America*) or *ordinately Quinquangular*, or have the *sides* but *Parallel*, though the *Angles* be unequal, as is seen in some little stones, and in a kind of *Alabaster* found here in *England*; these stones, I say, gratifie our sight, as having a nearer cognation with the Soul of Man, that is Rational and Intellectual, and therefore is well pleased when it meets with any outward Object that fits and agrees with those congenite *Ideas* her own nature is furnished with. For *Symmetry*, *Equality* and *Correspondency of parts*, is the discernment of *Reason*, not the Object of *Sense*, as I have heretofore proved.

6. Now therefore it being evident that there is such a thing as *Beauty*, *Symmetry* and *Comelineß of Proportion* (to say nothing of the delightful mixture of *Colours*) & that this is the proper Object of the *Understanding* and *Reason*, (for these things be not taken notice of by the *Beasts*) I think I may safely infer, That whatever is the first and principal Cause of changing the fluid and undetermined *Matter* into shapes so comely and symmetrical, as we see in *Flowers* and *Trees*, is an *Understanding Principle*, and knows both the nature of man, and of those Objects he offers to his sight in this outward and visible world. For these things cannot come by chance, or by a multifarious attempt of the parts of the *Matter* upon themselves; for then it were likely that the *Species* of things (though some might hit right, yet most) would be maim'd and ridiculous;

lous; but now there is not any ineptitude in any thing, which is a sign that the fluidness of the *Matter* is guided and determined by the overpowering counsel of an *Eternal Mind*, that is, of a God.

If it were not needful, I might now instance in sundry kinds of *Flowers*, *Herbs* and *Trees*: but these Objects being so obvious, and every mans phantasy being branched with the remembrance of *Roses*, *Marigolds*, *Gilly-flowers*, *Pionyes*, *Tulips*, *Pansies*, *Primroses*, the leaves and clusters of the *Vine*, and a thousand such like, of all which they cannot but confess, that there is in them *beauty* and *symmetry* and grateful *proportion*; I hold it superfluous to weary you with any longer Induction, but shall pass on to the three Considerations behind, of their *Seed*, *Signatures* and *Usefulness*, and shall pass through them very briefly, the Observables being very ordinary and easily intelligible.

## CHAP. VI.

1. Providence argued from the Seeds of Plants. 2. An Objection answered concerning stinking Weeds and poisonous Plants. 3. The Signature of Plants an argument of Providence. 4. Certain Instances of Signatures. 5. An Answer to an Objection concerning such Signatures in Plants as cannot referre to Medicine.

I Say therefore, in that every *Plant* has its *Seed*, it is an evident sign of Divine Providence. For it being no necessary Result of the *Motion* of the *Matter*, as the whole contrivance of the *Plant* indeed is not, and it being of so great consequence that they have *Seed* for the continuance and propagation of their own *Species*, and for the gratifying of mans Art also, industry and necessities (for much of Husbandry and Gardening lies in this) it cannot but be an Act of *Counsel* to furnish the several kinds of *Plants* with their *Seeds*, especially the Earth being of such a nature, that though at first for a while it might bring forth all manner of *Plants*, (as some will have it also to have brought forth all kinds of *Animals*) yet at last it would grow so sluggish, that without the advantage of those small compendious Principles of generation, the grains of *Seed*, it would yield no such births; no more then a Pump grown dry will yield any water, unless you pour a little water into it first, and then for one Basin-ful you may fetch up so many Soe-fuls.

2. Nor is it material to object, That stinking *Weeds* and *poisonous Plants* bear *Seed* too, as well as the most *pleasant* and most *useful*: For even those stinking *Weeds* and *poisonous Plants* have their use. For first, the Industry of Man is exercised by them to weed them out where they are hurtful. Which reason if it seem slight, let us but consider, that if humane Industry had nothing to conflict and struggle with, the fire of mans Spirit would be half extinguish'd in the flesh; and then we shall acknowledge that that which I have alledged is not so contemptible nor invalid.



But secondly, who knows but it is so with poisonous *Plants* as vulgarly is phansied concerning *Toads* and other poisonous *Serpents*, that they lick the venome from off the Earth: so poisonous *Plants* may well draw to them all the malign juice and nourishment, that the other may be more pure and defæcate; as there are Receptacles in the Body of Man and Emunctories to drain them of superfluous Choler, Melancholy, and the like.

But lastly, it is very well known by them that know any thing in Nature and Physick, that those *Herbs* that the rude and ignorant would call *Weeds* are the Materials of very sovereign Medicines; that *Aconitum hyemale* or *Winter-wolfs-bane*, that otherwise is rank poison, is reported to prevail mightily against the bitings of *Vipers* and *Scorpions*, which *Crollius* assenteth unto; and that that Plant that bears *death* in the very name of it, *Solanum lethiferum*, prevents death by procuring sleep, if it be rightly apply'd in a *Feaver*. Nor are those things to be deemed unprofitable whose use we know not yet; for all is not to be known at once, that succeeding Ages may ever have something left to gratifie themselves in their own discoveries.

3. We come now to the *Signatures* of *Plants*, which seem no less Argument that the highest Original of the works of Nature is some *Understanding Principle*, then that so careful provision of their *Seed*. Nay, indeed, this respects us more properly and adequately then the other, and is a certain Key to enter Man into the knowledge and use of the *Treasures* of Nature. I demand therefore, whether it be not a very easie and genuine inference, from the observing that several *Herbs* are marked with some *mark* or *sign* that intimates their virtue, what they are good for, and there being such a creature as Man in the world that can read and understand these *signs* and *characters*; hence to collect that the Authour both of Man and them knew the nature of them both: For it is like the *Inscriptions* upon Apothecaries Boxes, that the Master of the Shop sets on that the Apprentice may read them; nay, it is better, for here is in *Herbs* inscribed the very *nature* and *use* of them, not the mere *name*. Nor is there any necessity that all should be thus signed, though some be; for the rarity of it is the delight: for otherwise it had been dull and cloying, too much harping upon the same string. And besides, Divine Providence would onely initiate and enter mankind into the useful knowledge of her *Treasures*, leaving the rest to imploy our industry, that we might not live like idle Loyterers and Truants: For the Theatre of the world is an exercise of Mans wit, not a lazy *Polyanthea*, or book of Common-places. And therefore all things are in some measure obscure and intricate, that the sedulity of that divine Spark, the Soul of Man, may have matter of conquest and triumph, when he has done bravely by a superadvenient assistance of his God.

4. But that there be some *Plants* that bear a very evident *Signature* of their *nature* and *use*, I shall fully make good by these following instances.

*Capillus Veneris*, *Polytrichon* or *Maiden-hair*, the lye in which it is sodden or infus'd is good to wash the head, and make the Hair grow in those places that are more thin and bare.

And

And the decoction of *Quinces*, which are a downy and hairy fruit, is accounted good for the fetching again Hair that has fallen by the French Pox.

The leaf of *Balm*, and of *Alleluia* or *Wood-Sorrel*, as also the Roots of *Anthora*, represent the Heart in figure, and are *Cardiacal*.

*Wall-nuts* bear the whole *signature* of the Head. The outward green *Cortex* answers to the *Pericranium*, and a salt made of it is singularly good for wounds in that part; as the kernel is good for the Brains, which it resembles.

*Umbilicus Veneris* is powerful to provoke Lust, as *Dioscorides* affirms. As also your several sorts of *Satyrians*, which have the evident resemblance of the genital parts upon them; \* *Aron* especially, and all your *Orchisses*, that they have given names unto from some beasts or other, as *Cynosorchis*, *Orchis Myodes*, *Tragorchis*, and the like. The last whereof, notorious also for its goatish smell, and tufts not unlike the beard of that lecherous Animal, is of all the rest the most powerful Incentive to Lust.

\* Sunt qui putant verum *Paracelsi* *Satyrium* esse *Aron*.  
Croll. de Signaturis rerum internis.

The leaves of *Hypericon* are very thick prick'd, or pink'd with little holes, and it is a singular good wound-herb, as useful also for de-obstru-cting the pores of the body.

*Scorpioides*, *Echium*, or *Scorpion-grass*, is like the crooked tail of a Scorpion, and *Ophioglossum*, or *Adders-tongue*, has a very plain and perfect resemblance of the tongue of a Serpent, as also *Ophioscorodon* of the intire head and upper parts of the body; and these are all held very good against Poison, and the biting of Serpents. And generally all such *Plants* as are speckled with spots like the skins of *Vipers* or other venomous creatures, are known to be good against the stings or bitings of them, and are powerful Antidotes against Poison.

Thus did Divine Providence by natural *Hieroglyphicks* read short Physick-Lectures to the rude wit of man, that being a little entred and engaged, he might by his own industry and endeavours search out the rest himself; it being very reasonable that other Herbs that had not such *Signatures* might be very good for Medicinal uses, as well as they that had.

5. But if any here object, that some Herbs have the resemblance of such things as cannot in any likelihood refer to Physick, as *Geranium*, *Cruciata*, *Bursa Pastoris*, the *Bee-Flower*, *Fly-Orchis*, and the like; I say, they answer themselves in the very proposal of their Objection: for this is a sign that they were intended onely for ludicrous ornaments of Nature, like the flourishes about a great Letter, that signifie nothing, but are made onely to delight the Eye. And 'tis so far from being any inconvenience to our first Progenitors, if this intimation of *Signatures* did fail, that it cast them with more courage upon attempting the virtue of those that had no such *Signatures* at all; it being obvious for them to reason thus, Why may not those Herbs have Medicinal virtue in them that have no *Signatures*, as well as they that have *Signatures* have no virtue answerable to the *signs* they bear? which was a further confirmation to them of the former Conclusion; and still a greater provocation of their in-



dustry, if they at any time light upon *Signatures* of a contrary effect.

And it was sufficient that those that were of so present and great consequence as to be Antidotes against Poison, ( that so quickly would have dispatch'd poor rude and naked Antiquity, ) or to help on the small beginnings of the world, by quickning and actuating their phlegmatick Natures to more frequent and effectual Venery ( for their long lives shew they were not very fiery ) I say, it was sufficient that Herbs of this kind were both so obvious and so legibly *sign'd* with *Characters* that so plainly bewray'd their usefull virtues, as is manifest in your *Satyrions*, *Ophioglossum*, and the like. But I have dwelt too long upon this Theory; wee'l betake our selves to what follows, and what is more unexceptionably stringent and forcing.

## C H A P. VII.

1. *That the Usefulness of Plants argues a Providence, particularly those that afford Timber.*
2. *As also such Herbs and Plants as serve for Physick for Men and Beasts.*
3. *Of Plants fit for Food.*
4. *Of the Colour of Grass and Herbs, and of the Fruits of Trees.*
5. *The notable provisions in Nature for Husbandry and Tillage, with the universal Usefulness of Hemp and Flaxe.*
6. *The marvellous Usefulness of the Indian Nut-Tree.*

1. **W**E are at length come to the fourth and last consideration of *Plants*, viz. their *Use* and *Profitableness*. We shall say nothing now of those greater *Trees* that are fit for *Timber*, and are the requisite Materials for the *building* of Ships and magnificent Houses, to adorn the Earth, and make the life of Man more splendid and delectable; as also for the erecting of those *holy Structures* consecrated to Divine Worship. Amongst which we are not to forget that famous Edifice, that glorious Temple at *Jerusalem*, consecrated to the great God of Heaven and Earth: As indeed it was most fit that He whose Guidance and Providence permitted not the strength of the Earth to spend it self in base gravel and pebbles in stead of Quarries of Stone, nor in briars and brushwood in stead of Pines, Cedars and Oaks, that He should at some time or other have the most stately magnificent *Temples* erected to Him that the wit and industry of Man and the best of those Materials could afford; it being the most suitable acknowledgement of thanks for that piece of Providence that can be invented. And it is the very consideration that moved that pious King *David* to design the building of a Temple to the God of *Israel*: See now, says he, *I dwell in a house of Cedar, but the Ark of God dwelleth within Curtains*. But, as I said, I will adde nothing concerning these things, being contented with what I have glanced upon heretofore.

2. We will now briefly take notice of the *Profitableness* of Plants for  
*Physick*

*Physick* and *Food*, and then pass on to the consideration of *Animals*. And as for their *Medicinal* uses, the large *Herbals* that are every where to be had are so ample Testimonies thereof, that I have said enough in but reminding you of them. That which is most observable here is this, that brute *Beasts* have some share in their virtue as well as *Men*. For the *Toad* being overcharged with the poison of the *Spider*, as is ordinarily believed, hath recourse to the *Plantane leaf*: the *Weasel*, when she is to encounter the *Serpent*, arms her self with eating of *Rue*: the *Dog*, when he is sick at the stomach, knows his cure, falls to his *Grass*, vomits, and is well: the *Swallows* make use of *Celandine*, the *Linnet* of *Euphrasia*, for the repairing of their *sight*: and the *Ass*, when he is oppress'd with Melancholy, eats of the herb *Asplenium* or *Miltwaste*, and so eases himself of the swelling of the *Spleen*. And *Virgil* reports of the *Dictamnus Cretense* or *Cretian Dittany*, that the wild *Goats* eat it when they are shot with darts or arrows; for that Herb has the virtue to work them out of their body, and to heal up the wound.

———*non illa feris incognita Capris*  
*Gramina, cum tergo volucres hæsere sagittæ.*

Which things I conceive no obscure indigitation of *Providence*: For they doing that by Instinct and Nature which men, who have free Reason, cannot but acknowledge to be very pertinent and fitting; nay, such that the skilfullest Physician will approve and allow; and these Creatures having no such reason and skill themselves as to turn Physicians; it must needs be concluded, that they are inabled to doe these things by virtue of that *Principle* that contrived them, and made them of that nature they are, and that that *Principle* therefore must have *Skill* and *Knowledge*, that is, that it must be *God*.

3. We come now to the consideration of *Plants* as they afford *Food* both to *Man* and *Beasts*. And here we may observe, That as there was a general provision of *Water*, by setting the Mountains and Hills abroad, from whence through the Spring-heads and continued Rivulets drawn together (that caused afterwards greater Rivers with the long winding distributions of them) all the Creatures of the Earth quench their thirst: so *Divine Providence* has spread her *Table* every where, not with a juiceless green Carpet, but with succulent *Herbage* and nourishing *Grass*, upon which most of the *Beasts* of the field do feed; and they that feed not on it, feed on those that eat it, and so the generations of them all are continued.

4. But this seeming rather *necessary* then *of choice*, I will not insist upon it. For I grant that *Counsel* most properly is there imply'd, where we discern a variety and possibility of being otherwise, and yet the *Best* is made choice of. Therefore I will onely intimate thus much, That though it were necessary that some such thing as *Grass* should be, if there were such and such creatures in the world; yet it was not at all necessary that *Grass* and *Herbs* should have that *Colour* which they have; for they might have been *red* or *white*, or some such *Colour* which would have been very offensive and hurtful to our sight. But I will not insist upon



these things; let us now consider the *Fruits of Trees*, where I think it will appear very manifestly, that there was one and the same Author both of Man and them, and that assuredly he knew what he did when he made them. For could *Apples*, and *Oranges*, and *Grapes*, and *Apricocks*, and such like fruit, be intended for *Beasts* that hold their heads downward, and can scarce look up at them, much less know how to reach them? When we feed our *Dogs*, we set the dish or trencher on the ground, not on the Table. But you'll say, That at last these fruits will fall down, and then the *Beasts* may come at them. But one thing is, there are not many that desire them, and so they would rot upon the ground before they be spent, or be squander'd away in a moment of time, as it might easily fare with the most precious of Plants, the *Vine*. But *Man*, who knows the worth of the *Grape*, knows to preserve it a long season ( for it is both *eaten* and *drunk* some years after the vintage ) as he does also gather the rest of the Fruits of the Earth, and layes up both for himself and his Cattel. Wherefore it is plainly discoverable, that *Man's* coming into the world is not a thing of *Chance* or *Necessity*, but a *Design*, as the bringing of worthy Guests to a well-furnish'd Table.

5. And what I have intimated concerning the *Vine*, is as eminently, if not more eminently, observable in the ordinary kinds of *Grain*, as *Wheat* and *Barly*, and the like, which also, like the *Vine*, are made either *Edible* or *Potable* by *Man's* Art and Industry. But that's not the thing that I care so much to observe. That which I drive at now is this; That *Bread-corn*, that brings so considerable increase by *Tillage* and *Husbandry*, would scarce be at all without it; for that which grows wildly of it self is worth nothing: but it being so wholesom and strengthening a food, that it should yield so plentiful increase, and that this should not be without humane Art and Industry, does plainly insinuate that there is a *Divine Providence* that intended to exercise the wit of *Man* in *Husbandry* and *Tillage*. Which we may the more firmly assure our selves of, if we adde unto this the careful provision of *Instruments* so exactly fitted out for this imployment; viz. the laborious *Oxe*, and the stout, but easily manageable, *Horse*; *Iron* for the plough-share, and *Roaps* for the horse-gears to pull by. And it is very seasonable to take notice of this last, it belonging to this consideration of the *Profitableness of Plants*. And I appeal to any body that will but take the pains a while to consider of what great use and consequence *Cordage* is in the affairs of Men, whether it was not a palpable Act of Providence to send out such Plants out of the Earth which would afford it. For we can discover no necessity in Nature that there must needs be such Plants as *Hemp* and *Flax*. Wherefore if we will but follow the easie suggestions of free Reason, we must cast it upon *Providence*, which has provided Mankind of such a Commodity, that no less affairs depend upon then all the *Tackling* of Ships, their *Sails* and *Cable-roaps*, and what not? and so consequently all forein *Traffick*, and then the transportation of wood and stone, and other necessary materials for building, or the carriage of them by land in Wains and Carts, besides the ordinary use of *Pulleys* or other *Engines* for the lifting up of heavy weights, which the strength of *Man* without these helps would not easily master;

master; besides what I hinted before concerning the use of *Cordage* in *Husbandry*, in plowing and carrying home the fruits of the Earth. The *Uses* indeed of the fore-named *Plants* are so universal, and take place so in every affair of Man, that if it were lawful to be a little merry in so serious a matter, a man might not unfittingly apply that verse of the Poet to this so general a commodity,

*Omnia sunt homini tenui pendentia filo;*

that all the businesses of Men do very much depend upon these little long fleaks or threads of *Hemp* and *Flax*. Or if you will say, that there may some scrambling shift be made without them in long chains of Iron, or sails of Woollen, and the like; yet we seeing our selves provided for infinitely better, are in all reason to judge it to proceed from no worse a Principle than *Divine Providence*.

6. I might now reach out to *Exotick Plants*, such as the *Cinnamon-tree*, the *Balsame-tree*, the Tree that bears the *Nutmeg* invelliped with the *Mace*, as also the famous *Indian Nut-tree*, which at once almost affords all the Necessaries of life. For if they cut but the twigs at Evening, there is a plentiful and pleasant Juice comes out, which they receive into Bottles, and drink instead of *Wine*, and out of which they extract such an *Aqua vita* as is very soveraign against all manner of sicknesses. The Branches and Boughs they make their *Houses* of; and the Body of the Tree, being very spongy within, though hard without, they easily contrive into the frame and use of their *Canoes* or *Boats*. The Kernel of the Nut serves them for *Bread* and *Meat*, and the Shells for *Cups* to drink in; and indeed they are not mere empty *Cups*, for there is found a delicious cooling Milk in them. Besides, there is a kind of *Hemp* that incloses the Nut, of which they make *Roaps* and *Cables*, and of the finest of it *Sails* for their ships: and the Leaves are so hard and sharp-pointed, that they easily make *Needles* or *Bodkins* of them, for stitching their Sails, and for other necessary purposes. And that *Providence* may shew her self *benign* as well as *wise*, this so notable a Plant is not restrain'd to one Coast of the world, as suppose the *East-Indies*, but is found also in some parts of *Africa*, and in all the Islands of the *West-Indies*, as *Hispaniola*, *Cuba*, as also upon the Continent of *Carthagera* in *Panama*, *Norembega*, and several other parts of the New-found world.

But I thought fit not to insist upon these things, but to contain my self within the compass of such Objects as are familiarly and ordinarily before our eyes, that we may the better take occasion from thence to return thanks to him who is the bountiful Authour of all the supports of life.



## C H A P. VIII.

1. *The designed Usefulness of Animals for Man, as in particular of the Dog and the Sheep.* 2. *As also of the Oxe and other Animals.* 3. *Of Mans subduing the Creatures to himself.* 4. *Of those that are as yet untamed.* 5. *The excellent Usefulness of the Horse.* 6. *The Usefulness of some Animals that are Enemies to such Animals as are hateful or noisome to Man.*

1. **WE** are now come to take a view of the nature of *Animals*: In the contemplation whereof we shall use much-what the same Method we did in that of *Plants*, for we shall consider in them also their *Beauty*, their *Birth*, their *Make* and *Fabrick* of body, and *Usefulness* to Mankind. And to dispatch this last first; It is wonderful easie and natural to conceive, that as almost all are made in some sort or other for humane uses, so some so notoriously and evidently, that without main violence done to our Faculties we can in no wise deny it. As to instance in those things that are most obvious and familiar; When we see in the solitary fields a *Shepherd*, his *Flock* and his *Dog*, how well they are fitted together; when we knock at a Farmer's door, and the first that answers shall be his vigilant *Mastiff*, whom from his use and office he ordinarily names *Keeper*; (and I remember, *Theophrastus* in his character *Περὶ ἀρεσκίας*, tells us, that his Master when he has let the stranger in, *ἐπὶ λαβόμενος τὸ ῥύγχος*, taking his *Dog* by the snout, will relate long stories of his usefulness and his services he does to the house and them in it; *Οὗτος φυλάσσει τὸ χωρίον καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ τὰς ἐνδον*, *This is he that keeps the yard, the house and them within*) lastly, when we view in the open Champain a brace of swift *Grey-hounds* coursing a good stout and well-breathed *Hare*, or a pack of well-tuned *Hounds* and *Huntsmen* on their horse-backs with pleasure and alacrity pursuing their game, or hear them winding their Horns near a wood side, so that the whole wood rings with the Echo of that Musick and chearful yelping of the eager *Dogs*; to say nothing of *Duck-hunting*, of *Fox-hunting*, of *Otter-hunting*, and a hundred more such like sports and pastimes, that are all performed by this one kind of *Animal*: I say, when we consider this so multifarious congruity and fitness of things in reference to our selves, how can we withhold from inferring, That that which made both *Dogs* and *Ducks* and *Hares* and *Sheep*, made them with a reference to us, and knew what it did when it made them? And though it be possible to be otherwise, yet it is highly improbable that the flesh of *Sheep* should not be designed for food for men; and that *Dogs*, that are such a familiar and domestick Creature to Man, amongst other pretty feats that they doe for him, should not be intended to supply the place of a Servitour too, and to take away the bones and scraps, that nothing might be lost. And unless we should expect that Nature should make *Jerkins* and *Stockens* grow out of the ground, what could she doe better then afford us so fit materials for *Cloathing* as the  
Wool

*Wool* of the Sheep, there being in Man Wit and Art to make use of it: To say nothing of the *Silk-worm*, that seems to come into the world for no other purpose then to furnish man with more costly cloathing, and to spin away her very entrails to make him fine without.

2. Again, When we view those large Bodies of *Oxen*, what can we better conceit them to be, then so many living and walking powdring-Tubs, and that they have *animam pro Sale*, as *Philo* speaks of Fishes, that their life is but for Salt, to keep them sweet till we shall have need to eat them? Besides, their *Hides* afford us *Leather* for *Shoes* and *Boots*, as the *Skins* of other Beasts also serve for other uses. And indeed Man seems to be brought into the world on purpose that the rest of the Creation might be improved to the utmost usefulness and advantage: For were it not better that the *Hides* of Beasts and their *Flesh* should be made so considerable use of as to feed and cloath Men, then that they should rot and stink upon the ground, and fall short of so noble an improvement as to be matter for the exercise of the Wit of Man, and to afford him the necessary conveniences of life? For if Man did not make use of them, they would either dye of Age, or be torn apieces by more cruel Masters. Wherefore we plainly see that it is an Act of *Reason* and *Counsel* to have made Man, that he might be a Lord over the rest of the Creation, and keep good quarter among them.

3. And being furnish'd with fit Materials to make himself Weapons, as well as with natural Wit and Valour, he did bid battel to the very fiercest of them, and either chased them away into solitudes and desarts, or else brought them under his subjection, and gave laws unto them; under which they live more peaceably and are better provided for (or at least might be, if Men were good) then they could be when they were left to the mercy of the *Lion*, *Bear* or *Tiger*. And what if he do occasionally and orderly kill some of them for food? their dispatch is quick, and so less dolorous then the paw of the Bear, or the teeth of the Lion, or tedious Melancholy and sadness of old Age, which would first torture them, and then kill them, and let them rot upon the ground stinking and useless.

Besides, all the wit and Philosophy in the world can never demonstrate, that the killing and slaughtering of a Beast is any more then the striking of a Bush where a Bird's Nest is, where you fray away the Bird, and then seize upon the empty Nest. So that if we could pierce to the utmost *Catastrophe* of things, all might prove but a *Tragick-Comedy*.

4. But as for those *Rebels* that have fled into the *Mountains* and *Desarts*, they are to us a very pleasant subject of Natural History; besides, we serve our selves of them as much as is to our purpose: and they are not onely for Ornaments of the Universe, but a continual Exercise of Mans Wit and Valour when he pleases to encounter. But to expect and wish that there were nothing but such dull *tame* things in the world that will neither bite nor scratch, is as groundless and childish as to wish there were no *Choler* in the body, nor *Fire* in the universal compass of Nature.

5. I cannot insist upon the whole result of this war, nor must forget how that generous Animal the *Horse* had at last the wit to yield himself up, to his own great advantage and ours. And verily he is so fitly made for



for us, that we might justly claim a peculiar right in him above all other Creatures. When we observe his patient service he does us at the *Plough*, *Cart*, or under the *Pack-saddle*, his *speed* upon the high-way in matters of importance, his *docibleness* and desire of *glory* and *praise*, and consequently his notable achievements in *War*, where he will snap the *Spears* apieces with his teeth, and pull his *Riders Enemy* out of the *Saddle*; and then that he might be able to perform all this labour with more ease, that his *Hoofs* are made so fit for the Art of the *Smith* and that round armature of *Iron* he puts upon them; it is a very hard thing not to acknowledge, that this so congruous contrivance of things was really from a *Principle of Wisdom and Counsel*.

6. There is also another consideration of *Animals* and their *Usefulness*, in removing those Evils we are pester'd with by reason of the abundance of some other *hurtful Animals*, such as are *Mice* and *Rats*, and the like; and to this end the *Cat* is very serviceable. And there is in the *West-Indies* a *Beast* in the form of a *Bear*, which *Cardan* calls *Ursus Formicarius*, whose very business it is to eat up all the *Ants*, which some parts of that Quarter of the World are sometimes excessively plagued withall.

We might adde also sundry Examples of living creatures that not only bear a singular good affection to Mankind, but are also fierce Enemies to those that are very hurtful and cruel to Man: and such are the *Lizard*, an Enemy to the *Serpent*; the *Dolphin*, to the *Crocodile*; the *Horse*, to the *Bear*; the *Elephant*, to the *Dragon*, &c. But I list not to insist upon these things.

## CHAP. IX.

1. *The Beauty of several brute Animals.* 2. *The goodly Stateliness of the Horse.* 3. *That the Beauty of Animals argues their Creation from an Intellectual Principle.* 4. *The difference of Sexes a Demonstration of Providence.* 5. *That this difference is not by Chance.* 6. *An Objection answered concerning the Eele.* 7. *Another answered, taken from the consideration of the same careful provision of difference of Sexes in viler Animals.* 8. *Of Fishes and Birds being Oviparous.* 9. *Of Birds building their Nests and hatching their Eggs.* 10. *An Objection answered concerning the Ostrich.* 11. *That the Homogeneity of that Crystalline liquor which is the immediate Matter of the generation of Animals implies a Substance Immaterial or Incorporeal in Animals thus generated.* 12. *An Answer to an Elusion of the foregoing Argument.*

I Return now to what I propos'd first, the *Beauty* of living Creatures: which though the course-spirited *Atheist* will not take notice of, as relishing nothing but what is subservient to his Tyranny or Lust; yet I think it undeniable but that there is comely *Symmetry* and *Beautifulness* in sundry living Creatures, a tolerable useful *Proportion* of parts

parts in all. For neither are all men and women exquisitely handsome, indeed very few, that they that are may raise the greater admiration in the minds of men, and quicken their natural abilities to brave adventures either of Valour or Poetry: But as for the brute Creatures, though some of them be of an *hateful* aspect, as the *Toad*, the *Swine*, and the *Rat*; yet these are but like *Discords* in Musick, to make the succeeding chord goe off more pleasantly; as indeed most of those momentany Inconveniences that the life of Man ever and anon meets withall, they do put but a greater edge and vigour upon his Enjoyments.

2. But it is not hard to find very many Creatures that are either καλὰ χρήματα, or ἀσπεῖα, as the Philosopher distinguishes, that are either very goodly things and *beautiful*, or at least *elegant* and *pretty*; as most of your *Birds* are. But for *Stateliness* & *Majestie*, what is comparable to a *Horse*? whether you look upon him single, with his Mane and his Tail waving in the wind, and hear him coursing and neighing in the pastures; or whether you see him with some gallant *Heros* on his back, performing gracefully his usefull postures, and practising his exploits of *War*; who can withhold from concluding that a *Providence* brought these two together, that are fitted so well to each other, that they seem but one compleat Spectacle of Nature? which imposed upon the rude people near *Thessaly*, and gave the occasion of the fabulous *Centaurs*, as if they had been one living Creature made up of *Horse* and *Man*.

3. That which I drive at is this, There being that *Goodliness* in the bodies of *Animals*, as in the *Ox*, *Grey-hound* and *Stag*; or that *Majestie* and *Stateliness*, as in the *Lion*, the *Horse*, the *Eagle* and *Cock*; or that grave *Awfulness*, as in your best breed of *Mastiffs*; or *Elegancy* and *Prettiness*, as in your lesser *Dogs*, and most sorts of *Birds*; all which are several Modes of *Beauty*, and *Beauty* being an intellectual Object, as *Symmetry* and *Proportion* is (which I proved sufficiently in what I spake concerning the *Beauty* of *Plants*;) That which naturally follows from all this is, That the *Author* or *Original* of these Creatures which are deemed *beautiful*, must himself be *Intellectual*, he having contrived so grateful Objects to the Mind or Intellect of Man.

4. After their *Beauty*, let us touch upon their *Birth* or *manner* of *Propagation*. And here I appeal to any man, whether the contrivance of *Male* and *Female* in living Creatures be not a genuine Effect of *Wisdom* and *Counsel*; for it is notoriously obvious that these are made one for the other, and both for the continuation of the *Species*. For though we should admit, with *Cardan* and other Naturalists, That the *Earth* at first brought forth all manner of *Animals* as well as *Plants*, and that they might be fastned by the Navel to their common Mother the *Earth*, as they are now to the *Female* in the Womb; yet we see she is grown steril and barren, and her births of *Animals* are now very inconsiderable. Wherefore what can it be but a *Providence*, that whiles she did bear she sent out *Male* and *Female*, that when her own Prolifick virtue was wasted, yet she might be a dry-Nurse, or an officious Grand-mother, to thousands of generations? And I say it is *Providence*, not *Chance*, nor *Necessity*; for what is there imaginable in the parts of the *Matter*, that they



they should necessarily fall into the structure of so much as an *Animal*, much less into so careful a provision of *difference of Sexes* for their continual propagation?

5. Nor was it the frequent attempts of the *moved Matter* that first light on *Animals*, which perpetually were suddenly extinct for want of the difference of *Sexes*, but afterward by *chance* differenced their *Sexes* also, from whence their kinds have continued. For what is perpetual is not by *chance*; and the Births that now are by putrefaction, shew that it is perpetual; for the Earth still constantly brings forth *Male* and *Female*.

6. Nor is it any thing to the purpose to reply (if you will make so large a skip as to cast your self from the land into the water to dive for Objections) that the *Eele*, according to *Plinie* and *Aristotle*, though it be ζῷον ἑναιμρον, an *Animal so perfect as to have blood in it*, yet that it has no distinction of *Sexe*: For if it have not, there is good reason for it, that creature arising out of such kind of *Matter* as will never fail generation; for there will be such like Mud as will serve this end so long as there be Rivers, and longer too, and Rivers will not fail so long as there is a Sea. Wherefore this rather makes for discriminative Providence, that knew afore the nature and course of all things, and made therefore her contrivances accordingly, doing nothing superfluously or in vain.

7. But in other *Generations* that are more hazardous, though they be sometimes by putrefaction, yet she makes them *Male* and *Female*; as 'tis plain in *Frogs* and *Mice*. Nor are we to be scandalized at it, that there is such careful provision made for such contemptible *Vermine* as we conceive them: for this onely comes out of *pride* and *ignorance*, or a haughty presumption, that because we are encouraged to believe that in some sense all things are made for Man, therefore they are not made at all for themselves. But he that pronounces thus is ignorant of the nature of God, and the knowledge of things. For if a good man be merciful to his beast; then surely a good God is bountiful and benign, and takes pleasure that all his Creatures enjoy themselves that have life and sense, and are capable of any enjoyment. So that the swarms of little *Vermine*, and of *Flyes*, and innumerable such like diminutive Creatures, we should rather congratulate their coming into Being, then murmur sullenly and scornfully against their Existence; for they find nourishment in the world, which would be lost if they were not, and are again convenient nourishment themselves to others that prey upon them.

But besides, *Life* being individuated into such infinite numbers that have their distinct sense and pleasure, and are sufficiently fitted with contentments: those little Souls are in a manner as much considerable for the taking off or carrying away to themselves the overflowing benignity of the first Original of all things, as the *Ox*, the *Elephant*, or *Whale*. For it is *sense*, not *bulk*, that makes things capable of enjoyments.

Wherefore it was fit that there should be a safe provision made for the propagation and continuance of all the *kinds* of living Creatures, not onely of those that are *good*, but of those also that we rashly and inconsiderately call *evil*: For they are at least good to enjoy themselves, and to partake of the bounty of their Creator. But if they grow noisome and trouble-

See Plin. Natural. Histor. lib. 10. cap. 68. and Aristot. Histor. Animal. lib. 6. cap. 14, and 16. Also lib. 4. cap. 11. and lib. 9. cap. 30.

troublesom to us, we have both power and right to curb them : For there is no question but we are more worth then they, or any of the brute Creatures.

8. But to return to the present point in hand ; There are also other manifest footsteps of *Providence* which the *Generation* of living Creatures will discover to us ; as for Example, the manner of Procreation of *Fishes* and *Birds*. For there being that notable difference in Animals, that some of them are *Oviparous*, others *Viviparous* ; that the τὰ γενέσθαι (as *Philo* comprehends them by that general term ) that *Fishes* and *Birds* should be *Oviparous*, is a plain sign of *Counsel* and *Providence*. For though it will be granted that their *Species* might continue and subsist though they had been *Viviparous* ; yet it would have brought their Individuals to very small numbers.

For as for *Fishes*, since *Grass* and *Herbs* are no fruit of the Sea, it was necessary that they should feed one upon another, and therefore that they should multiply in very great plenty ; which they could not have done any thing near to that fulness they now do, if they had been *Viviparous*, as four-footed Beasts are : But being now *Oviparous*, and the lesser kinds of them so many at first, and sending forth such infinite numbers of Spawn, their generations are neither extinct nor scantied, but are as plentiful as any Creatures on the Land.

And the reason why *Birds* are *Oviparous* and lay Eggs, but do not bring forth their yong alive, is, because there might be more plenty of them also, and that neither the Birds of prey, the Serpent nor the Fowler, should streighten their generations too much. For if they had been *Viviparous*, the burthen of their womb, if they had brought forth any competent number at a time, had been so big and heavy, that their wings would have failed them, and so every body would have had the wit to catch the Old one. Or if they brought but one or two at a time, they would have been troubled all the year long with feeding their young, or bearing them in their womb : besides there had been a necessity of too frequent Venery, which had been very prejudicial to their dry carcases. It was very reasonable therefore that *Birds* should propagate by laying of Eggs.

9. But this is not all the advantage we shall make of this Consideration. I demand further, What is it that makes the *Bird* to prepare her Nest with that Artifice, to sit upon her Eggs when she has laid them, and to distinguish betwixt these and her useles Excrement ? Did she learn it of her Mother before her ? or rather does she not doe she knows not what, but yet what ought to be done by the appointment of the most exquisite Knowledge that is ? Wherefore something else has knowledge for her, which is the Maker and Contriver of all things, the Omniscient and Omnipotent God.

And though you may reply, that the *Hatching* of their Eggs is necessary, else their generations would cease ; yet I answer, that all the Circumstances and Curiosities of *Brooding* them are not necessary : for they might have made shift on the ground in the Grass, and not made themselves such curious and safe Nests in Bushes and Trees. Besides, if all



things were left to *Chance*, it is far easier to conceive that there should have been no such things as *Birds*, then that the *blind Matter* should ever have stumbled on such lucky *Instincts* as they that seem but barely necessary.

10. But you'll object, that the *Ostrich* lays Eggs and hatches them not, so that these things are rather by *Chance* than *Providence*. But this rather argues a more exquisite discerning *Providence*, then is any Argument against it. For the heat of the ground (like those *Ovens* in *Egypt* *Diodorus* speaks of) whereon she lays them, proves effectual for the production of her young. So Nature ties not the Female to this tedious service where it is needless and useleſs; as in *Fishes* also, who when they have spawn'd, are discharg'd of any further trouble: which is a most manifest discovery of a very curious and watchfull *Eye of Providence*, which suffers nothing to be done ineptly and in vain.

11. I will only make one advantage more of this Speculation of the *Birth of Animals*, and then pass on to what remains. It is observed by those that are more attentive watchers of the works of Nature, that the *fœtus* is framed out of some *homogeneous liquor* or moisture, in which there is no variety of parts of Matter to be contrived into bones and flesh: but as in an *EGG* for Example, about the third day the Hen has fate on it, in that part where Nature begins to set upon her work of efformation, all is turned into a Crystalline *liquid* substance about her; as also several *Insects* are bred of little drops of *dew*; so in all *Generations* besides it is supposed by them, that Nature does as it were wipe clean the Table-book first, and then pourtray upon it what she pleaseth. And if this be her course, to corrupt the subject Matter into as perfect Privation of Form as she may, that is, to make it as *homogeneous* as she can, but *liquid* and pliable to her Art and Skill; it is to me very highly probable, if not necessary, that there should be something besides this *fluid Matter* that must change it, alter and guide it into that wise contrivance of parts that afterwards we find it. For how should the parts of this *liquid Matter* ever come into this exquisite Fabrick of themselves? And this may convince any *Atheist*, that there is a *Substance besides corporeal Matter*; which he is as loath to admit of as that there is a *God*.

For there being nothing else in Nature but *Substantia* or *Modus*, this power of contriving the *liquid Matter* into such order and shape as it is being incompetent to the *liquid Matter* it self, it must be the *Modus* of some other Substance latent in the *fluid Matter*, and really distinguishable from it; which is either the *Soul*, or some seminal Form or *Archeus*, as the *Chymist* calls it; and they are all alike indifferent to me at this time, I aiming here onely at a *Substance besides the Matter*, that thence the *Atheist* may be the more easily brought off to the acknowledgement of the Existence of a *God*.

12. Nor can the force of this Argument be eluded, by saying the *Matter* is touched and infected by the *life* of the Female whiles she bore the *Egg*, or that her *Phanſie* gets down into her womb.

For what *life* or *phanſie* has the *Earth*, which, as they say, gendred at first all *Animals*, some still? and what similitude is there betwixt a *Bee* and

and an *Ox*, or a *Wasp* and an *Horse*, that those *Insects* should arise out of the putrefi'd bodies of these Creatures? It is but some rude and general congruity of vital preparation that sets this *Archeus* on work rather than another: As mere *Choler* engages the Phansie to dream of firing of Guns and fighting of Armies; *Sanguine* figures the Imagination into the representation of fair Women and beautiful Children; *Phlegm* transforms her into Water and Fishes; and the shadowy *Melancholy* intangles her in colluctation with old Hags and Hobgoblins, and frights her with dead mens faces in the dark. But I have dwelt on this Subject longer then I intended.

## CHAP. X.

1. *That the Fabrick of the Bodies of Animals argues a Deity: as namely the number and situation of their Eyes and Ears;*
2. *As also of their Legs.*
3. *The Armature of Beasts, and their Use thereof.*
4. *Of the general structure of Birds and Fishes.*
5. *The admirable Fabrick of the Mole.*
6. *Cardan's rapture upon the consideration thereof.*
7. *Of the Hare and Grey-hound.*
8. *Of the structure of the body of the Camel.*

**I** Come now to the last consideration of *Animals*, the outward *Shape and Fabrick of their Bodies*; which when I have shew'd you that they might have been otherwise, and yet are made according to the most exquisite pitch of *Reason* that the wit of Man can conceive of, it will naturally follow that they were really made by *Wisdom and Providence*, and consequently *That there is a God*. And I demand first in general, concerning all those Creatures that have *Eyes and Ears*, whether they might not have had only *one Eye and one Eare* apiece; and to make the supposition more tolerable, had the *Eye* on the one side the head, and the *Eare* on the other; or the *Eare* on the Crown of the head, and the *Eye* in the Forehead: for they might have lived and subsisted though they had been no better provided for then thus. But it is evident that their having *two Eyes and two Ears*, so placed as they are, is more safe, more sightly, and more useful. Therefore that being made so constantly choice of which our own *Reason* deemeth best, we are to infer, that that choice proceeded from *Reason and Counsel*.

2. Again, I desire to know why there be no *three-footed Beasts*, (when I speak thus, I do not mean *Monsters*, but a constant *Species* or kind of Animals) for such a Creature as that would make a limping shift to live as well as they that have *four*. Or why have not some Beasts more then four feet, suppose *six*, and the two middlemost shorter then the rest, hanging like the two legs of a Man a horse-back by the horse-sides? For it is no harder a thing for Nature to make such frames of Bodies then others that are more elegant and useful. But the works of Nature being neither usefess nor inept, she must either be wise her self, or be guided by some



higher Principle of *Knowledge*: As that Man that does nothing foolishly all the days of his life, is either wise himself, or consults with them that are so.

3. And then again for the *Armature* of Beasts, who taught them the use of their *Weapons*? The *Lion* will not kick with his Feet, but he will strike such a stroke with his *Tail*, that he will break the back of his Encounterer with it. The *Horse* will not use his Tail, unless against the busie flies, but kicks with his Feet with that force, that he lays his Enemy on the ground. The *Bull* and *Ram* know the use of their *Horns* as well as the *Horse* of his *Hoofs*. So the *Bee* and *Serpent* know their *Stings*, and the *Bear* the use of his *Paw*. Which things they know merely by natural instinct, as the Male knows the use of the Female. For they gather not this skill by observation and experience, but the frame of their nature carries them to it; as it is manifest in young *Lambs* that will butt before they have Horns. Therefore it is some higher *Providence* that has made them of this nature they are. And this is evident also in *Birds* that will flutter with their wings when there is but a little Down upon them, and they as yet utterly unuseful for flying.

4. And now I have fallen upon the mention of this kind of Creature, let me make my advantage of that general structure observable in them: The form of their *Heads* being narrow and sharp, that they may the better cut the Aire in their swift flight; and the spreading of their *Tails* parallel to the *Horizon*, for the better bearing up their Body; for they might have been perpendicular, as the Tails of *Fishes* in the water. Nor is it any thing that the *Owl* has so broad a face, for her flight was not to be so swift nor so frequent.

And as for *Fishes*, to say nothing how handsomly their *Gills* supply the place of *Lungs*, and are replenish'd with the like plenty of *Veins* and *Arteries*, that their blood may be cool'd by the *Water*, as it is in the *Lungs* of other Animals by the *Aire*, we will take notice of more easie and vulgar considerations. The bladder of wind found in their Bodies, who can say it is convey'd thither by chance, but that it is contriv'd for their more easie swimming? as also the manner of their *Fins*, which consist of a number of gristly bones long and slender like pins and needles, and a kind of a skin betwixt, which is for the more exactness, and makes them thin and flat like *Oars*. Which perfect artifice and accuracy might have been omitted, and yet they have made a shift to move up & down in the water.

But I have fallen upon a Subject that is infinite and inexhaustible; therefore, that I be not too tedious, I will confine my self to some few Observations in ordinary *Beasts* and *Birds*, (that which is most known and obvious being most of all to our purpose) and then I shall come to the contemplation of *Man*.

5. And indeed what is more obvious and ordinary then a *Mole*? and yet what more palpable Argument of *Providence* then she? The members of her body are so exactly fitted to her nature and manner of life. For her dwelling being under ground, where nothing is to be seen, Nature has so obscurely fitted her with *Eyes*, that Naturalists can scarce agree whether she have any *Sight* at all or no. But for amends, what she is

is capable of for her defence and warning of danger, she has very eminently conferr'd upon her; for she is exceeding quick of *hearing*. And then her *short Tail* and *short Legs*, but broad *Fore-feet* armed with *sharp Claws*, we see by the event to what purpose they are, she so swiftly working her self under ground, and making her way so fast in the Earth, as they that behold it cannot but admire it. Her *Legs* therefore are short, that she need dig no more then will serve the mere thickness of her Body; and her *Fore-feet* are broad, that she may scoup away much Earth at a time; and little or no *Tail* she has, because she courses it not on the ground, like the *Rat* or *Mouse*, of whose kindred she is, but lives under the *Earth*, and is fain to dig her self a dwelling there: And she making her way through so thick an Element, which will not yield easily, as the *Aire* or the *Water*, it had been dangerous to have drawn so long a train behind her; for her Enemy might fall upon her Reer, and fetch her out before she had compleated, or had got full possession of her works.

6. *Cardan* is so much taken with this Contemplation, that though I find him often staggering, yet here he does very fully and firmly profess that the contrivance of all things is from *Wisdom* and *Counsel*: his words are so generous and significant, that I hold them worth the transcribing. *Palam est igitur, Naturam in cunctis sollicitam mirum in modum fuisse, nec obiter, sed ex sententia omnia praevidisse; hominésque, quibus hoc beneficium Deus largitus est, ut Causam rerum primam inveniant, participes esse illius primæ Naturæ; neque alterius esse generis Naturam quæ hac constituit, ab illorum mente qui causam eorum cur ita facta sint plene assequi potuerunt.* Thus forcibly has the due contemplation of *Nature* carried him beyond Nature and himself, and made him write like a Man rap'd into a Divine Ecstasie.

7. But there are as manifest foot-steps of *Divine Providence* in other Creatures as in the *Mole*: as for Example, the *Hare*, whose temper and frame of body are plainly fitted on purpose for her condition.

For why is she made so full of *Fear* and *Vigilancy*, ever rearing up and listning whiles she is feeding? and why is she so exceeding swift of foot, and has her *Eyes* so prominent, and placed so that she can see better behind her then before? but that her flight is her onely safety; and it was needful for her perpetually to eye her pursuing enemy, against whom she durst never stand at the Bay, having nothing but her long soft limber *Ears* to defend her. Wherefore he that made the *Hare*, made the *Dog* also, and guarded her with these Properties from her eager foe, that she might not be too easie a booty for him, and so never be able to save her self, or afford the Spectator any considerable pastime. And that the *Hare* might not alwaies get away from the *Grey-hound*, see how exquisitely his shape is fitted for the Course: For the narrowness and slenderness of his parts are made for speed; and that seeming impertinent long *Appendix* of his body, his *Tail*, is made for more nimble turning.

8. There are other *Animals* also whose particular fabrick of Body does manifestly appear the Effect of *Providence* and *Counsel*, though Naturalists cannot agree whether it be in the behalf of the *Beast* thus framed,



or of *Man*. And such is that Creature which, though it be Exotick, yet is ordinarily known by the name of a *Camel*: For why are those *bunches* on his back, but that they may be in stead of a *Pack-saddle* to receive the burthen? and why has he four *knees*, and his *hinder Legs bending inwards*, as also a *Protuberancy* under his *Breast* to lean on, but that, being a tall Creature, he might with ease *kneel* down, and so might the more gainly be loaden?

But *Cardan* will by no means have this the design of Nature, but that this frame of the *Camel's* body is thus made for his own convenience: For he being a Creature that lives and seeks his food in waste and dry Defarts, those *Bunches* he would have *Receptacles* of redundant *Moisture*, from whence the rest of his body is to be supply'd in a hard and tedious time of drought; and that his *Legs* being very long, he ought to have *Knees* behind and a *knob* beneath, to rest his weary limbs in the wilderness, by sitting or kneeling in that posture he does; for he could not so conveniently lie along, as the *Horse*, or *Ass*, or other Creatures. But I should not determine this to either alone, but take in both Causes, and acknowledge therein a richer design of *Providence*, that by this Frame and Artifice has gratifi'd both the *Camel* and his *Master*.

## C H A P. XI.

1. *Some general Observables concerning Birds.* 2. *Of the Cock.* 3. *Of the Turkey-Cock.* 4. *Of the Swan, Hern, and other Water-fowl.* 5. *Of the γαμψώνυχια and πτερυγόποδα, and of the peculiarity of Sight in Birds of prey.* 6. *The Description of the Bird of Paradise according to Cardan.* 7. *The suffrages of Scaliger, Hernandes and Nierembergius.* 8. *Aldrovandus his Objections against her feeding on the dew onely, with what they might probably answer thereto.* 9. *His Objections against her manner of Incubiture, with the like Answer.* 10. *What Properties they are all five agreed on.* 11. *In what Pighafetta and Clusius dissent from them all, with the Author's conditional inclination to their judgment.* 12. *The main Remarkables in the story of the Bird of Paradise.* 13. *A supply from ordinary and known Examples as convictive or more convictive of a discerning Providence.*

I. **W**E pass on now to the consideration of *Fowls* or *Birds*. Where omitting the more general Properties, of having two Ventricle, and picking up stones to convey them into their second Ventricle, the Gizzard, (which provision and instinct is a supply for the want of teeth;) as also their having no Paps as *Beasts* have, their young ones being nourished so long in the Shell, that they are presently fit to be fed by the mouthes of the old ones, and unfit to suck by reason of the shape and hardness of their Bills: (which Observations plainly signify that Nature does nothing ineptly and foolishly, and that therefore there is a Providence)

*Providence*) I shall content my self in taking notice onely of the outward frame of some few *kinds* of this Creature that familiarly come into our sight, such as the *Cock*, the *Duck*, the *Swan*, and the like.

2. I demand therefore concerning the *Cock*, why he has *Spurs* at all; or having them, how they come to be so fittingly placed. For he might have had none, or so misplaced that they had been utterly useles, and so his courage and pleasure in fighting had been to no purpose. Nor are his *Comb* and his *Wattles* in vain, for they are an *Ornament* becoming his Martial Spirit; yea an *Armature* too, for the tugging of those often excuses the more usefull parts of his Head from harm. Thus fittingly does Nature gratifie all Creatures with accommodations sutable to their temper, and nothing is in vain.

3. Nor are we to cavil at the red pugger'd attire of the *Turkey*, and the long *Excrefcency* that hangs down over his Bill, when he swells with pride and anger: for it may be a Receptacle for his heated blood, that has such free recourse to his Head; or he may please himself in it, as the rude *Indians*, whose Jewels hang dangling at their Noses. And if the Bird be pleasur'd, we are not to be displeased, being always mindful that Creatures are made to enjoy themselves as well as to serve us; and it is a gross piece of Ignorance and Rusticity to think otherwise.

4. Now for *Swans* & *Ducks*, and such like *Birds* of the *Water*, it is obvious to take notice how well they are fitted for that manner of life. For those that swim, their *Feet* are framed for it like a pair of *Oars*, their *Claws* being connected with a pretty broad Membrane; and their *Necks* are long, that they may dive deep enough into the water. As also the *Neck* of the *Hern*, and such like Fowl who live of *Fishes*, and are fain to frequent their Element, who walk on long stilts also like the people that dwell in the *Marshes*; but their *Claws* have no such Membranes, for they had been but a hindrance to those kind of Birds that onely wade in the water, and do not swim.

*Aristotle* is witty, in comparing the \* *long necks* of these *Water-fowls* to an *Angle-Rod*, and their *long Bills* to the *Line* and *Hook*. And adds also another observable concerning their *long Legs*, that their *Tails* are therefore the shorter: though I do not much admire his reason, who makes them so for want of matter that was spent upon the *Legs*. But the reason is, because they are Birds less volacious; and besides, the posture of their *long Legs* cast backwards while they fly, supplies the office of a larger ὀρροπύγων, and so they are helps to their flying, whenas otherwise they would be a trouble and hindrance. Wherefore, as I said, their *Tails* are so short, not because the Matter was spent upon their *Legs*, but because their *Legs* supply the office of the *Tail*, according to that excellent Aphorism of \* *Aristotle*, ἔτε περιέρχον ἔδεν ἔτε μάττω ἢ φύτις ποιεῖ, *Nature does nothing vainly and superfluously*.

Which is the reason *Fishes* have no *Legs*, though they have *Fins*; and that the *Torpedo* has no *Fins* at the *sides* of his round body, but onely at the *sides* of his *Tail*, the breadth and flatness of his body serving him in stead of fore-fins to swim with. But this speculation of the *Water-fowls* has engaged me amongst the *Fishes* further then I intended.

\* Καὶ γίνεται τοῖς ποῖσις ὁ μὲν ἀνχλῶ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀλιδωτικὸς καὶ λαμψ, τὸ δὲ ῥύγχος δὲ ὀρμὰ καὶ τὸ ἀγκυσεῖν.  
Arist. de part. Animal. lib. 4. cap. 12.

\* Cap. 13. ejusd. lib.



5. I shall return, and make a short stay with the *Birds*; those *Martial* ones, I mean, and *Birds of Prey*. In which the Philosopher has observed *shortness of Neck* as fittest for *strength*; and that none of the γαμψώνυχα, or *Birds with crooked claws*, have long Necks, or plain and straight Beaks, but crooked; and that all carnivorous Birds that are forced to hunt for their prey, are such. Ταμψόν ὃ τὸ ὠμφάρον· χρήσιμον δὲ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον. τὼ δὲ πρὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἀπὸ ζώων πορίζεσθαι. And therefore their crooked Talons are fit to hold fast the live prey that otherwise would wriggle from them, and their crooked Beaks to tear their tough flesh, (as it were with a sharp hook) that with a plain Beak would not so easily be riven in pieces. But the Bills of *Geese* and *Ducks* are quite of another form, but fit for rooting in the ground or mud, or shearing of herbs and grass, and such easie manner of feeding.

That also is ingeniously observed of *Aristotle* concerning the γαμψώνυχα, that their *Bodies* are but small in comparison of their *Wings*, their greatest succour lying in them if they were assaulted: But that more heavy Birds are otherwise provided for defence, namely either by *Spurs* that grow on their Legs, or by the strength and sharpness of some single cley in their Foot; as I have observed in the *Cassowary* or *Emeu*. But he gives it for a Maxime, That the same Birds are never γαμψώνυχα and πτερυγοφόρα, never have crooked claws and spurs together. For the Armature of *Spurs* is fit onely for such Birds as fight on the ground; but the crook-claw'd Birds are scarce well provided to tread upon it. And therefore none of the heavy-bodied Fowl have crooked Talons.

But the greatest observable in Nature concerning these *Birds of Prey* is the strangeness of their *Sight*. For by a peculiar frame of their *Eye* they are inabled to spy their booty from aloft in the Aire, and see best at that distance, scarce see at all near at hand. So they are both the *Archer* and *Shaft*; taking aim afar off, and then shooting themselves directly upon the desired Mark, they seize upon the prey having hit it. The works of *Providence* are infinite: I will close all with the description of that strange *Bird of Paradise*, for the strangeness has made it notorious.

6. There is a *Bird* that falls down out of the Aire dead, and is found sometimes in the *Molucco Islands*, that has no Feet at all. The bigness of her Body and Bill, as likewise the form of them, is much-what as a *Swallow's*; but the spreading out of her *Wings* and *Tail* has no less compass then an *Eagle's*. She lives and breeds in the Aire, comes not near the Earth but for her burial; for the largeness and lightness of her *Wings* and *Tail* sustain her without lassitude. And the laying of her Eggs and brooding of her young is upon the back of the Male, which is made hollow, as also the breast of the Female, for the more easie incubation. Also two strings like two *Shoe-makers* ends come from the hinder parts of the Male, wherewith it is conceived that he is fastned closer to the Female while she hatches her Egges on the hollow of his back. The dew of Heaven is appointed her for food, her Region being too far removed from the approach of Flies and such like Insects.

This is the entire story and Philosophy of this miraculous *Bird* in *Cardan*, who professes himself to have seen it no less then thrice, and to have

have describ'd it accordingly. The Contrivances whereof, if the Matter were certainly true, are as evident Arguments of a Divine Providence, as that *Copper-Ring*, with the Greek \* Inscription upon it, was an undeniable monument of the Artifice and finger of man.

7. But that the reproach of over-much credulity may not lye upon *Cardan* alone, *Scaliger*, who lay at catch with him to take him tripping wherever he could, cavils not with any thing in the whole Narration but the *bigness* of the *Wings* and *littleness* of the *Body*; which he undertakes to correct from one of his own which was sent him by *Orvesanus* from *Java*. Nay he confirms what his Antagonist has wrote, partly by History, and partly by Reason; affirming that himself in his own Garden found two little birds with membranaceous wings utterly devoid of Legs, their form was near to that of a Bat's. Nor is he deterr'd from the belief of the perpetual flying of the *Manucodiata*, by the gaping of the feathers of her wings, (which seem thereby less fit to sustain her body) but further makes the narration probable by what he has observed in Kites hovering in the Aire, as he saith, for a whole hour together without any flapping of their wings or changing place. And he has found also how she may sleep in the Aire from the Example of *Fishes*, which he has seen sleeping in the water without sinking themselves to the bottome, and without changing place, but lying stock still, *pinnulis tantum nescio quid motiuncula meditates*, onely wagging a little their fins, as heedlessly and unconcernedly as Horses while they are asleep wag their ears, to displace the flies that sit upon them. Wherefore *Scaliger* admitting that the *Manucodiata* is perpetually on the wing in the Aire, he must of necessity admit also that manner of Incubation that *Cardan* describes; else how could their generations continue?

*Franciscus Hernandez* affirms the same with *Cardan* expressly in every thing: as also \* *Eusebius Nierembergius*, who is so taken with the story of this Bird, that he could not abstain from celebrating her miraculous properties in a short but elegant copie of Verses; and does after, though confidently opposed, assert the main matter again in Prose.

8. Such are the Suffrages of *Cardan*, *Scaliger*, *Hernandes*, and *Nierembergius*. But *Aldrovandus* rejects that Fable of her feeding on the dew of Heaven, and of her Incubiture on the back of the Male, with much scorn and indignation. And as for the former, his reasons are no waies contemptible, he alledging that Dew is near the Earth, and not at all times of the year, nor unless in clear daies, and that only in the Morning, and that the perpetual flying of the Bird must needs exhaust her spirits; lastly, that Dew is a body not perfectly-enough mixt, or heterogeneal enough for food, nor the hard Bill of the Bird made for such easy uses as sipping this soft moisture.

To which I know not what *Cardan* and the rest would answer, unless this, That they mean by Dew the more unctuous moisture of the Aire, which as it may not be alike every where, so these Birds may be fitted with a natural sagacity to finde it out where it is: That there is Dew in this sense day and night (as well as in the morning) and in all seasons of the year; and therefore a constant supply of moisture and spirits to their

\* The Inscription runs thus;  
Εἰμὶ ζῆναι-  
ῶντος πύτη  
λίμνη παρ' ὁ-  
ρωτοῦ δ' ἄν-  
τιδὸς διὰ τὸ  
κοσμοῦσθαι  
δυσίκευ β. τὰς  
χεῖρας, ἐν τῇ  
ἐ. ἡμέρᾳ τῇ  
Ὀκτωβρίῳ.

a. σ. λ.  
This Pike was taken about Hailprun, the Imperial City of *Suecia*, in the year 1497. *Gesner*.

Jul. Scalig. de  
Subtil. exercit.  
228. §. 2. &  
229. §. 2.

Cardan. de  
Subtil. l. 10.

\* Nieremberg.  
Hist. Natur.  
lib. 10. cap. 13.



their perpetual flying, which they more copiously imbibe by reason of their exercise: That the thicker parts of this moisture stick and convert into Flesh, and that the lightness of their feathers is so great, that their pains in sustaining themselves are not overmuch: That what is homogeneal & simple to our sight, is fit enough to be the rudiments of *Generation* (all Animals being generated of a kind of clear Crystalline liquour) and that therefore it may be also of *Nutrition*: That *Orpine* and *Sea-House-leek* are nourished and grow being hung in the Aire, and that *Duck-weed* has its root no deeper then near the upper parts of the Water: and lastly, That the Bills of these Birds are for their better flying, by cutting the way, and for better ornament; for the rectifying also and composing of their feathers, while they swim in the Aire with as much ease as Swans do in the Rivers.

9. To his great impatency against *their manner of Incubation* they would haply return this Answer; That the way is not ridiculous, but, it may be, rather necessary, from what *Aldrovandus* himself not onely acknowledges, but contends for, namely, that they *have no Feet at all*. For hence it is manifest that they cannot light on the ground, nor any where rest on their bellies and be able to get on wing again; because they cannot creep out of holes of rocks, as *Swifts* and such like short-footed Birds can, they having no Feet at all to creep with. Besides, as *Aristotle* well argues concerning the long Legs of certain *Water-Fowl*, that they were made so long because they were to wade in the water and catch Fish, adding that excellent Aphorism, *Τὰ γὰρ ὄργανα πρὸς τὸ ἔργον ἢ φύσις ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' ὃ τὸ ἔργον πρὸς τὰ ὄργανα* so may we rationally conclude, will they say, that as the long Legs of these *Water-fowl* imply a design of their haunting the Water, so want of *Legs* in these *Manucodiata's* argue they are never to come down to the Earth, because they can neither stand there, nor goe, nor get off again. And if they never come on the Earth or any other resting-place, where can their Eggs be lay'd or hatched but on the back of the Male?

De part. Ani-  
mal. lib. 4 c. 12.

Besides that *Cardan* pleases himself with that *Antiphonie* in Nature, that as the *Ostrich* being a Bird, yet never flies in the Aire; so this *Bird of Paradise* should alwayes be in the Aire, and never rest upon the Earth. And as for *Aldrovandus* his presumption from the five several *Manucodiata's* that he had seen, and in which he could observe no such figuration of parts as imply'd a fitness for such a manner of *Incubation*, *Cardan* will answer, my self has seen three and *Scaliger* one, who both agree against you.

10. However, you see that both *Cardan*, *Aldrovandus* and the rest do joyntly agree in allowing the *Manucodiata* no feet, as also in furnishing her with two strings hanging at the hinder parts of her body; which *Aldrovandus* will have to be in the Female as well as the Male, though *Cardan's* experience reached not so farre.

11. But *Pighafetta* and *Clusius* will easily end this grand controversy betwixt *Cardan* and *Aldrovandus*, if it be true which they report, and if they speak of the same kind of Birds of Paradise. For they both affirm that they have Feet a palme long, and that with all confidence imaginable.

But

But *Nierembergius* on the contrary affirms, that one that was an eye-witness, and that had taken up one of these Birds newly dead; told him that it had no Feet all. *Johnston* also gives his suffrage with *Nierembergius* in this, though with *Aldrovandus* he rejects the manner of their Incubation.

But unless they can raise themselves from the ground by the stiffness of some of the feathers of their Wings, or rather by virtue of those nervous strings which they may have a power to stiffen when they are alive, by transfusing spirits into them, and make them serve as well in stead of Legs to raise them from the ground, as to hang upon the boughs of Trees by, (a slight thing being able to raise or hold up their light feathery bodies in the Aire, as a small twig will us in the Water;) I should rather incline to the testimony of *Pighafetta* and *Clusius* then to the judgment of the rest, and believe those Mariners that told him, that the Legs are pulled off by them that take them, and exenterate them and drie them in the Sun, for either their private use or sale.

Which Conclusion would the best salve the credit of *Aristotle* who long since has so peremptorily pronounced, Ὅτι πᾶν ὄν ζῷον ἢ ἐν ὕδατι ἢ ἐν ἀέρι, ὡς περὶ ψαλιν, μόνον ζῇν ἔχουσιν, *That there is not any Bird that onely flies, as the Fish onely swims.*

*Histor. Animal. l. 1. c. 1.*

12. But thus our *Bird of Paradise* is quite flown and vanished into a Figment or Fable. But if any one will condole the loss of so convincing an Argument for a *Providence* that fits one thing to another, I must take the freedom to tell him, that unless he be a greater admirer of Novelty then a searcher into the indissoluble consequences of things, I shall supply his Meditations with what of this nature is as strongly conclusive, and re-mind him that it will be his own reproach if he cannot spy as clear an inference from an ordinary Truth, as from either an Uncertainty or a Fiction. And in this regard the bringing this doubtful narration into play may not justly seem to no purpose, it carrying so serious and castigatory a piece of pleasantry with it.

The *Manucodiata's* living on the Dew is no part of the Convictiveness of a *Providence* in this story: But the being so excellently-well provided of Wings and Feathers, *tantâ levitatis supellectile exornata*, (as *Nierembergius* speaks) being so well furnished with all the advantages for lightness, that it seems harder for her to sink down (as he conceits) then to be born up in the Aire; that a Bird thus fitted for that Region should have no Legs to stand on the Earth, this would be a considerable indication of a discriminative Providence that on purpose avoids all uselessness and superfluities.

The other Remarkable, and it is a notorious one, is the Cavity on the back of the Male and in the breast of the Female, for Incubation.

And the third and last, the use of those strings, as *Cardan* supposes, for the better keeping them together in this Incubiture.

If these considerations of this strange Story strike so strongly upon thee as to convince thee of a *Providence*, think it humour and not judgment, if what I put in lieu of them, and is but ordinary, have not the same force with thee.



13. For is not the *Fishe's wanting Feet*, (as we observed before) the being sufficiently supply'd with *Fins* in so *thick* an Element as the *Water*, as great an Argument for a *Providence*, as so light a Bird's wanting Feet in that *thinner* Element of the *Aire*, the extreme lightness of her furniture being approporionated to the *thinness* of that Element? And is not the same Providence seen, and that as conspicuously, in allotting but very short Legs to those Birds that are called *Apodes* (both in *Plinie* and *Aristotle*,) upon whom she has bestow'd such large and strong Wings, and a power of flying so long and swift, as in giving no Legs at all to the *Manucodiata*, who has still a greater power of Wing and lightness of body?

And as for the Cavities on the back of the Male and in the breast of the Female, is that design of Nature any more certain and plain then in the Genital parts of Male and Female in all kind of Animals? What greater Argument of *Counsel* and Purpose of fitting one thing for another can there be then that? And if we should make a more inward search into the contrivances of these parts in an ordinary *Hen*, and consider how or by what force an *Egge* of so great growth and bigness is transmitted from the *Ovarium* through the *Infundibulum* into the *processus* of the *uterus*, (the Membranes being so thin and the passage so very small to see to) the *Principle* of that Motion cannot be thought less then *Divine*. And if you would compare the *protuberant* Paps or Teats in the females of Beasts with that *Cavity* in the Breast of the *she-Manucodiata*, whether of them think you is the plainer pledge of a knowing and designing Providence?

And lastly, for the Strings that are conceived to hold together the Male and Female in their Incubiture, what a toy is it, if compared with those invisible links and ties that engage ordinary Birds to sit upon their Eggs, they having no visible allurements to such a tedious service?

## CHAP. XII.

1. That there is not an ampler Testimony of Providence then the structure of mans Body.
2. The safeness of the fabrick of the Eyes.
3. Their exquisite fittedness to their use.
4. The superadded advantage of Muscles to the Eye.
5. The admirable contrivance of Muscles in the whole Body.
6. The fabrick of the Heart and of the Veins.
7. Of the Teeth and of the Joynts, of the Arms and Legs.
8. Of the hinder parts of the Body, and Head, Vertebrae, Nails, Bones, &c.
9. That there is proportionably the same evidence of Providence in the Anatomie of all Bodies as in that of Man.
10. The sottishness of them that are not convinced from these Considerations.
11. Of the Passions in Man, and particularly that of Devotion.
12. Of the Passions of Animals, and their Usefulness to themselves;
13. As also to Man. The ridiculous Antipathie of the Ape to the Snail.
14. How inept and frustraneous a Passion Religion would be in Man, if there were neither God nor Spirit in the

*the World.* 15. *The outrageous Mistake of Nature in implanting this Property of Religion in Man, if there be no God.* 16. *The necessary cause of Disorder in Man's nature.* 17. *The exquisite fitness that there should be such a Creature as Man upon Earth.* 18. *That the whole Creation and the several parts thereof are an undeniable Demonstration that there is a God:*

1. **B**UT we needed not to have rambled so far out into the works of Nature, to seek out Arguments to prove a *God*, we being so plentifully furnish'd with that at home which we took the pains to seek for abroad. For there can be no more ample testimony of a *God* and *Providence* then the *frame and structure of our own Bodies*. The admirable *Artifice* whereof *Galen*, though a mere Naturalist, was so taken with, that he could not but adjudge the honour of a *Hymn* to the wise Creator of it. The contrivance of *the whole* and *every particular* is so evident an argument of exquisite skill in the Maker, that if I should pursue all that suits to my purpose it would amount to an intire Volume. I shall therefore onely hint at some few things, leaving the rest to be supply'd by *Anatomists*. And I think there is no man that has any skill in that Art, but will confess, the more diligently and accurately the *Frame of our Body* is examined, it is found the more exquisitely conformable to our Reason, Judgement and Desire. So that supposing the same matter that our Bodies are made of, if it had been in our own power to have made our selves, we should have fram'd our selves no otherwise then we are.

2. To instance in some particular. As in our *Eyes*, the *number*, the *situation*, the *fabrick* of them is such that we can excogitate nothing to be added thereto, or to be altered, either for their *Beauty*, *Safety* or *Usefulness*. But as for their *Beauty*, I will leave it rather to the delicate wit and pen of Poets and amorous persons, then venture upon so tender and nice a Subject with my severer style: I will onely note how *safely* they are *guarded*, and *fitly framed* out for the *use* they are intended. The *Brow* and the *Nose* saves them from harder strokes: but such a curious part as the *Eye* being necessarily liable to mischief from smaller matters, the *sweat* of the Forehead is fenced off by those two wreaths of hair which we call the *Eye-brows*; and the *Eye-lids* are fortifi'd with little stiff *bristles*, as with *Palisadoes*, against the assault of Flies and Gnats, and such like bold *Animalcula*. Besides, the *upper-lid* presently claps down, and is as good a fence as a *Portcullis* against the importunity of the Enemy: which is done also every night, whether there be any present assault or no; as if Nature kept garrison in this *Acropolis* of Man's body, the *Head*, and look'd that such laws should be duly observ'd as were most for his safety.

3. And now for the *Use* of the *Eye*, which is *Sight*, it is evident that this Organ is so exquisitely framed for that purpose, that not the least curiosity can be added. For, first, the *Humour* and *Tunicles* are purely *Transparent*, to let in *Light* and *Colours* unfoul'd and unsophisticated by any inward tincture. And then again, the parts of the *Eye* are made *Convex*, that there might be a direction of many rayes coming from one



point of the Object unto one point answerable in the bottom of the *Eye*; to which purpose the *CrySTALLINE Humour* is of great moment, and without which the sight would be very obscure and weak. Thirdly, the *Tunica Uvea* has a *Musculous power*, and can dilate and contract that round hole in it which is called the *Pupil* of the *Eye*, for the better moderating the transmission of light. Fourthly, the inside of the *Uvea* is *black'd* like the walls of a Tennis-court, that the rayes falling upon the *Retina*, may not, by being rebounded thence upon the *Uvea*, be returned from the *Uvea* upon the *Retina* again; for such a repercussion would make the sight more confus'd. Fifthly, the *Tunica Arachnoïdes*, which envelops the *CrySTALLINE Humour*, by virtue of its *Processus Ciliares* can thrust forward or draw back that precious useful part of the *Eye*, as the nearness or distance of the Object shall require. Sixthly & lastly, the *Tunica Retina* is *white*, for the better and more true reception of the *species* of things, (as they ordinarily call them) as a white Paper is fittest to receive those Images in a dark room. If the wit of Man had been to contrive this *Organ* for himself, what could he have possibly excogitated more accurate? Therefore to think that *mere Motion of the Matter*, or any other blind Cause, could have hit so punctually, (for Creatures might have subsisted without this accurate provision) is to be either mad or sottish.

4. And the *Eye* is already so *perfect*, that I believe the Reason of Man would have easily rested here, and admir'd at its own contrivance: for he being able to *move* his whole *Head* upward and downward and on every side, might have unawares thought himself sufficiently well provided for. But Nature has added *Muscles* also to the *Eyes*, that no Perfection might be wanting: For we have oft occasion to *move our Eyes* our *Head* being *unmoved*, as in reading and viewing more particularly any Object set before us: and that this may be done with more ease and accuracy, she has furnish'd that *Organ* with no less than six several *Muscles*.

5. And indeed this framing of *Muscles* not only in the *Eye*, but in the *whole Body*, is admirable. For is it not a wonder that even all our flesh should be so handsomely contriv'd into distinct pieces, whose Rise and Insertions should be with such advantage, that they do serve with such ease to move some part of the Body or other; and that the parts of our Body are not moved only so conveniently as will serve us to walk and subsist by, but that they are able to move every way imaginable that will advantage us? For we can fling our *Legs* and *Arms* upwards and downwards, backwards, forwards and round, as they that spin, or would spread a Mole-hill with their feet. To say nothing of *Respiration*, the constriction of the *Diaphragme* for the keeping down the *Guts*, and so enlarging the *Thorax*, that the *Lungs* may have play, and the assistance of the inward *Intercostal Muscles* in deep Suspirations, when we take more large gulps of Aire to cool our heart overcharged with Love or Sorrow: nor of the curious fabrick of the *Larynx*, so well fitted with Muscles for the modulation of the *Voice*, tunable *Speech*, and delicious *Singing*: nor, lastly, of Nature's so industriously perforating the *Tendons* of the second Joynts both of Fingers and Toes, and her so careful transmitting of the *Tendons* of the third Joynts through them.

6. You

6. You may adde to these the notable contrivance of the *Heart*; its two *Ventricles* and its many *Valvula*, so fram'd and situated as is most fit for the reception and transmission of the *Blood*, which comes about through the *Heart*, and is sent thence away warm to comfort and cherish the rest of the Body: For which purpose also the *Valvula* in the *Veins* are made, that the *Blood* may the more easily ascend upwards.

7. But I will rather insist upon such things as are easie and intelligible even to Idiots, who if they can but tell the *Joynts* of their *Hands* or know the use of their *Teeth*, they may easily discover it was *Counsel*, not *Chance*, that created them. For why have we *three Joynts* in our *Legs* and *Arms*, as also in our *Fingers*, but that it was much better then having but *two*, or *four*? And why are our *fore-teeth sharp* like chiefels to cut, but our *inward-teeth broad* to grind, but that this is more exquisite then having them *all sharp* or *all broad*, or the *fore-teeth broad* and the *other sharp*? But we might have made a hard shift to have lived though in that worser condition. Again, why are the *Teeth* so luckily placed, or rather why are there not *Teeth* in *other bones* as well as in the *jaw-bones*? for they might have been as capable as these. But the reason is, Nothing is done foolishly nor in vain; that is, there is a *Divine Providence* that orders all things. Again, to say nothing of the inward curiosity of the *Eare*, why is that outward frame of it, but that it is certainly known that it is for the bettering of our *Hearing*?

8. I might adde to these, that Nature has made the *hindmost parts* of our body which we sit upon most *fleshy*, as providing for our Ease, and making us a natural Cushion, as well as for instruments of Motion for our *Thighs* and *Legs*. She has made the *hinder part* of the *Head* more strong, as being otherwise unfenced against falls and other casualties. She has made the *Back-bone* of several *Vertebrae*, as being more fit to bend, more tough, and less in danger of breaking, then if they were all one intire bone without those gristly *Junctures*. She has strengthened our *Fingers* and *Toes* with *Nails*, whereas she might have sent out that substance at the end of the first and second joynt; which had not been so handsome nor useful, nay rather somewhat troublesome and hurtful. And lastly; she has made all the *Bones* devoid of *sense*, because they were to bear the weight of themselves and of the whole Body. And therefore if they had had *sense*, our life had been painful continually and dolorous.

9. And what she has done for *us*, she has done proportionably in the contrivance of all *other Creatures*; so that it is manifest that a *Divine Providence* strikes through all things.

10. And therefore things being contrived with such exquisite *Curiosity* as if the most watchful *Wisdom* imaginable did attend them, to say they are thus framed without the assistance of some *Principle* that has *Wisdom* in it, and that they come to pass from *Chance* or some other blind unknowing Original, is sullenly and humorously to assert a thing because we will assert it, and under pretence of avoiding Superstition, to fall into that which is the onely thing that makes Superstition it-self hateful or ridiculous, that is, a wilful and groundless adhering to conceits without any support of Reason.



11. And now I have considered the fitness of the parts of Mans Body for the good of the whole, let me but consider briefly the fitness of the *Passions* of his *Mind*, whether *proper*, or *common* to him with the rest of Animals, as also the fitness of the *whole Man* as he is *part of the Universe*, and then I shall conclude.

And it is manifest that *Anger* does so actuate the Spirits and heighten the Courage of men and beasts, that it makes them with more ease break through the difficulties they encounter. *Fear* also is for the avoiding of danger, and *Hope* is a pleasant premeditation of enjoyment, as when a Dog expects till his Master has done picking of the bone. But there is neither *Hope*, nor *Fear*, nor *Hate*, nor any peculiar Passion or Instinct in *Brutes*, that is in vain: why should we then think that Nature should miscarry more in *us* than in any other Creature, or should be so careful in the Fabrick of our *Body*, and yet so forgetful or unlucky in the framing of the Faculties of our *Souls*; that that *Fear* that is so peculiarly natural to us, *viz. the Fear of a Deity*, should be in vain, and that pleasant *Hope* and Heavenly Joys of the Mind which man is naturally capable of, with the earnest direction of his Spirit towards God, should have no real Object in the world; and so *Religious affection* which Nature has so plainly implanted in the Soul of Man should be to no use, but either to make him ridiculous or miserable? Whenas we find no *Passion* or *Affection* in *Brutes*, either common or peculiar, but what is for their good and welfare.

12. For it is not for nothing that the *Hare* is so *fearful* of the *Dog*, and the *Sheep* of the *Wolf*: and if there be either *Fear* or *Enmity* in some Creatures for which we cannot easily discern any reason in respect of themselves, yet we may well allow of it as reasonable in regard of us, and to be to good purpose. But I think it is manifest that *Sympathy* and *Antipathy*, *Love* and *Enmity*, *Aversion*, *Fear*, and the like, are notable whetters and quickners of the Spirit of Life in all Animals; and that their being obnoxious to Dangers and Encounters does more closely knit together the vital Powers, and makes them more sensibly relish their present Safety; and they are more pleased with an Escape than if they had never met with any Danger. Their greedy assaults also one upon another while there is *hope* of Victory highly gratifies them both: and if one be conquer'd and slain, the Conqueror enjoys a fresh improvement of the pleasure of life, the Triumph over his Enemy. Which things seem to me to be contriv'd even in the behalf of these Creatures themselves, that their vital heat and moisture may not always onely simmer in one sluggish tenour, but sometimes boil up higher and seethe over, the fire of Life being more then ordinarily kindled upon some emergent occasion.

13. But it is without Controversie that these peculiar *Passions* of Animals many of them are *useful* to Men, (as that of the *Lizard's* enmity against the *Serpent*,) all of them highly gratifie his Contemplative faculty, some seem on purpose contriv'd to make his Worship merry: For what could Nature intend else in that *Antipathy* betwixt the *Ape* and *Snail*, that that Beast that seems so boldly to claim kindred of Man from the resemblance of his outward shape, should have so little Wit or Cou-  
rage

rage as to run away from a *Snail*, and very ruefully and frightfully to look back, as being afraid she would follow him, as *Erasmus* more largely and pleasantly tells the whole Story :

14. But that Nature should implant in Man such a *strong propension to Religion*, which is the *Reverence of a Deity*, there being neither *God* nor *Angel* nor *Spirit* in the world, is such a Slur committed by her, as there can be in no wise excogitated any Excuse. For if there were a higher *Species* of things to laugh at us as we do at the *Ape*, it might seem more tolerable. But there can be no end, neither ludicrous nor serious, of this *Religious property* in Man, unless there be something of an higher Nature then himself in the world. Wherefore *Religion* being convenient to no other *Species* of things besides Man, it ought to be convenient at least for himself : But supposing there were no *God*, there can be nothing worse for Man then *Religion*.

15. For whether we look at the *External Effects* thereof, such as are bloody *Massacres*, the *disturbance* and *subversion* of *Commonwealths*, *Kingdoms* and *Empires*, most savage *Tortures* of particular persons, the *extirpating* and *dispossession* of whole *Nations*, as it hath hapned in *America*, where the remorseless *Spaniards*, in pretence of being educated in a better *Religion* then the *Americans*, vilified the poor *Natives* so much, that they made nothing of knocking them on the head merely to feed their dogs with them ; with many such unheard of Cruelties : Or whether we consider the great affliction that that severe Governess of the life of Man brings upon those *Souls* she seises on, by affrighting *horrors of Conscience*, by puzzling and *befooing* them in the free use of their *Reason*, and putting a bar to more large searches into the pleasing *knowledge of Nature*, by anxious *cares* and disquieting *fears* concerning their *state* in the *Life to come*, by *curbing* them in their natural and kindly *enjoyments* of the *Life present*, and making *bitter* all the *pleasures* and contentments of it by some *checks* of *Conscience* and suspicions that they doe something now that they may rue eternally hereafter ; besides those inefable *Agonies* of Mind that they undergoe that are more generously *Religious*, and contend after the participation of the Divine Nature, they being willing, though with unspeakable pain, to be torn from themselves to become one with that Universal Spirit that ought to have the guidance of all things, and by an unsatiable desire after that just and decorous temper of Mind (whereby all Arrogancy should utterly cease in us, and that which is due to God, that is, all that we have or can doe, should be lively and sensibly attributed to him, and we fully and heartily acknowledge our selves to be nothing, that is, be as little elated, or no more relish the glory and praise of Men, then if we had done nothing or were not at all in being) do plunge themselves into such *damps* and *deadness of Spirit*, that to be buried quick were less torture by far then such dark *privations* of all the *joys* of *life*, then such sad and heart-sinking *Mortifications* : I say, whether we consider these *inward pangs* of the Soul, or the *external outrages* caused by *Religion* (and *Religious* pretence will animate men to the committing such violences as bare Reason and the single Passions of the Mind unback'd with the fury of Superstition

See also John-  
ston. *Histor.*  
*Natur. de*  
*Quadruped.*  
*lib. 3. titul. 2.*  
*cap. 2.*



perstition will never venture upon) it is manifest that if there were no God, no Spirit, no Life to come, it were far better that there were no such Religious propensions in Mankind as we see universally there are.

For the fear of the Civil Magistrate, the convenience of mutual aide and support, and the natural scourge and plague of Diseases would contain men in such bounds of Justice, Humanity and Temperance, as would make them more clearly and undisturbedly happy, then they are now capable of being from any advantage Religion does to either publick State or private person, supposing *there were no God*.

Wherefore this Religious Affection which Nature has implanted and as strongly rooted in Man as the fear of Death or the love of Women, would be the most enormous slip or bungle she could commit; so that she would so shamefully fail in the last Act, in this contrivance of the nature of Man, that in stead of a *Plaudite* she would deserve to be hissed off the Stage.

16. But she having done all things else so wisely, let us rather suspect our own Ignorance then reproach her, and expect that which is allowed in well-approved Comedies, *Σεὸς ἀπὸ μυχῶν* for nothing can unloose this knot but a *Deity*. And then we acknowledging Man to dwell as it were in the borders of the Spiritual and Material world (for he is *utrinque mundi nexus*, as Scaliger truly calls him) we shall not wonder that there is such tugging and pulling this way and that way, upward and downward, and such broken disorder of things; those that dwell in the confines of two Kingdoms being most subject to disquiet and confusion. And hitherto of the Passions of the Mind of Man, as well those that tie him down to the Body, as those that lift him up towards God. Now briefly of the whole Man as he is part of the Universe.

17. It is true, if we had not been here in the world, we could not then have missed our selves: but now we find our selves in being and able to examine the reasonableness of things, we cannot but conclude that our Creation was an Act of very exquisite Reason and Counsel. For there being so many notable Objects in the world to entertain such Faculties as Reason and inquisitive Admiration, there ought to be such a member of this visible Creation as Man, that those things might not be in vain: And if Man were out of the world, who were then left to view the face of Heaven, to wonder at the transcurfion of Comets, to calculate Tables for the Motions of the Planets and Fix'd Stars, and to take their Heights and Distances with Mathematical Instruments; to invent convenient Cycles for the computation of time, and consider the several forms of Years; to take notice of the Directions, Stations and Repedations of those Erratick Lights, and from thence most convincingly to inform himself of that pleasant and true Paradox of the Annual Motion of the Earth; to view the Asperities of the Moon through a Dioptrick-glass, and venture at the Proportion of her Hills by their shadows; to behold the beauty of the Rain-bow, the Halo, Parelit and other Meteors; to search out the causes of the Flux and Reflux of the Sea, and the hidden virtue of the Magnet; to inquire into the usefulness of Plants, and to observe the variety of the Wisdom of the first Cause in framing their bodies, and giving sundry observable

servable instincts to *Fishes, Birds and Beasts*? And lastly, as there are particular *Priests* amongst Men, so the whole *Species* of *Mankind* being indued with *Reason* and a power of finding out God, there is yet one singular End more discoverable of his Creation, *viz.* that he may be a *Priest* in this magnificent *Temple* of the *Universe*, and send up Prayers and Praises to the great Creator of all things in behalf of the rest of the Creatures. Thus we see all filled up and fitted without any defect or useless superfluity.

18. Wherefore the *whole Creation* in general and *every part* thereof being so ordered as if the *most exquisite Reason* and *Knowledge* had contrived them, it is as natural to conclude that all this is the work of a *Wise God*, as at the first sight to acknowledge that those inscribed *Urns* and *Coins* digg'd out of the Earth were not the Products of *unknowing* Nature, but the Artifice of Man.




A N  
A N T I D O T E  
A G A I N S T  
A T H E I S M.

B O O K III.

CHAP. I.

1. *That, good men not always faring best in this world, the great examples of Divine Vengeance upon wicked and blasphemous Persons are not so convincing to the obstinate Atheist.* 2. *The irreligious Feers and Sacrileges of Dionysius of Syracuse.* 3. *The occasion of the Atheists incredulity in things supernatural or miraculous.* 4. *That there have been true Miracles in the world as well as false.* 5. *And what are the best and safest ways to distinguish them, that we may not be impos'd upon by History.*

1.  hitherto I have insisted upon such Arguments for the proving of the *Existence of God* as were taken from the ordinary and known *Phænomena of Nature*; for such is the History of *Plants, Animals and Man*. I shall come now to such *Effects* discovered in the World as are not deemed *Natural*, but *Extraordinary and Miraculous*. I do not mean unexpected discoveries of Murthers, a conspicuous Vengeance upon proud and blasphemous Persons, such as *Nicator, Antiochus, Herod*, and the like, of which all Histories, as well Sacred as Profane, are very full, and all which tend to the impressing of this divine Precept in the Poet upon the minds of Men,

*Discite Justitiam moniti & non temnere Divos.*

For though these Examples cannot but move indifferent men to an acknowledgment of *Divine Providence*, and a *Superior Power* above & different from the *Matter*; yet I having now to doe with the obstinate & refractory *Atheist*, who, though an obdurate contemner of the *Deity*, finding himself

himself to be safe and well at ease, will shuffle all these things off, by asking such a Question as *he* did to whom the Priest of *Neptune* shewed the many *Donaria* hung up in his Temple by his *Votaries* saved from ship-wreck, and therefore vaunted much of the Power of that God of the Sea; But *what is become of all those*, said he, *that notwithstanding their Vows have been lost?* so I say, the *Atheist* to evade the force of this Argument will whisper within himself, *But how many proud blasphemous Atheistical men, like my self, have escaped, and those that have been accounted good have died untimely deaths?*

Such as *Æsop* and *Socrates*, the *Prophets*, *Apostles* and *Martyrs*, with fundry other wise and good men in all Ages and Places, who yet being not so well aware of the ill condition and restiness of this wicked World, of which they have truly profest themselves no Citizens, but Strangers, have suffered the greatest mischiefs that can happen to humane Nature, by their innocent meaning and intermeddling in *aliena Republica*: It having usually been more safe, craftily and cautiously to undermine the Honour of God, then plainly and honestly to seek the good and welfare of Men.

2. Nay, outrageous affronts done on purpose to *Religion*, will the *Atheist* further reply, have not onely past applauded by the World, but unpunish'd by Divine Justice: As is notorious in that Sacrilegious Wit, *Dionysius* of *Syracuse*, who spoiling *Jupiter Olympius* of his costly Robe very stiff and ponderous with Gold, added this Apologetical jeer to his Sacrilege, That this golden Vestment was too heavy for the Summer, and too cold for the Winter, but one of wool would fit both Seasons.

So at *Epidaurus* he commanded the golden Beard of *Æsculapius* to be cut off and carried away, alleging, that it was very unfit that the Son should wear a Beard, whenas his Father *Apollo* wore none.

That also was not inferiour to any of his Sacrilegious jests, when taking away the golden Cups and Crowns held forth by the hands of the Images of the Gods, he excused himself, saying, that he received but what they of their own accord gave him; adding, that it were a very gross piece of foolishness, whenas we pray to the Gods for all good things, not to take them when they so freely offer them with their own hands.

These and other such like irreligious Pranks did this *Dionysius* play, who notwithstanding fared no worse then the most demure and innocent, dying no other death then what usually other Mortals do: as if in those Ages there had been as great a lack of *Wit* as there was here in *England* once of *Latin*, and that he escaped a more severe Sentence by the benefit of his Clergy. But others think that he was pay'd home and punish'd in his Son that succeeded him. But that, will the *Atheist* reply, is but to whip the absent; as *Aristotle* wittily said to him that told him that such an one did unmercifully traduce him behind his back.

Wherefore I hold it more convenient to omit such Arguments as may intangle us in such endless Altercations, and to bring onely those that cannot be resolved into any *Natural causes*, or be phansied to come by *Chance*, but are so *Miraculous*, that they do imply the presence of some free subtille understanding Essence distinct from the brute *Matter* and ordinary power of Nature.

3. And



3. And these *Miraculous* effects, as there is nothing more cogent if they could be believed, so there is nothing more hard to the *Atheist* to believe than they are. For *Religionists* having for pious purposes, as they pretend, forged so many false Miracles to gull and spoil the credulous people; they have thereby with the *Atheist* taken away all belief of those which are true. And the childish and superstitious fear of *Spirits* in *Melancholick* persons, who create strange Monsters to themselves and terrible Apparitions in the dark, hath also helped them with a further evasion, to impute all *Spectres* and strange Apparitions to mere *Melancholy* and disturbed *Phantasie*.

4. But that there should be so *universal a fame and fear* of that which never was, nor is, nor can be ever in the world, is to me the greatest *Miracle* of all.

For if there had not been at some time or other *true Miracles* (as indeed there ought to be, if the Faculties of Man, who so easily listens to and allows of such things, be not in vain) it is very improbable that Priests and cunning Deluders of the people would have ever been able so easily to impose upon them by their *false*. As the *Alchymist* would never goe about to sophisticate *Metalls*, and then put them off for *true Gold* and *Silver*, but that it is acknowledged that there is such a thing as *true Gold* and *Silver* in the world. In like manner therefore as there is an endeavour of deluding the people with *false Miracles*, so it is a sign there have been and may be those that are *true*.

5. But you'll say there is a *Touchstone* whereby we may discern the truth of *Metalls*, but that there is nothing whereby we may discover the truth of *Miracles* recorded every where in History. But I answer, There is, and it is this.

First, if what is recorded was avouched by such persons who had *no end nor interest* in avouching such things.

Secondly, if there were many *Eye-witnesses* of the same Matter.

Thirdly and lastly, if these things which are so strange and miraculous leave any sensible *effect* behind them.

Though I will not acknowledge that all those Stories are *false* that want these conditions, yet I dare affirm that it is mere humour and fullness in a man to reject the *truth* of those that have them; for it is to believe nothing but what he seeth himself: From whence it will follow, that he is to read nothing of History, for there is neither pleasure nor any usefulness of it, if it deserve no belief.

## CHAP. II.

1. *The Moving of a Sieve by a Charm.* Coskinomancy. 2. *A Magical Cure of an Horse.* 3. *The Charming of Serpents.* 4. *A strange Example of one Death-strucken as he walked the Streets.* 5. *A Story of a sudden Wind that had like to have thrown down the Gallows at the hanging of two Witches.*

1. **A**ND now that I have premised thus much, I will briefly recite some few of those many *Miraculous* passages we meet with in Writers; beginning first with the *bare* and *simple Effects* of *Spirits*, as I will aforehand adventure to pronounce them, and then afterwards we shall come to the *Apparitions* of *Spirits* themselves.

And of those *bare Effects* we will not care to name what may seem slightest first. \* *Bodin* relates how himself and several others at *Paris* saw a young man with a *Charm* in *French* move a *Sieve* up and down. And that ordinary way of Divination which they call *Coskinomancy*, or finding who stole or spoiled this or that thing by the *Sieve* and *Shears*, \* *Pictorius Vigillanus* professeth he made use of thrice, and it was with success.

\* *Mag. Damonoman. lib. 2. c. 1.*

\* *De speciebus Magia Cere-monialis, c. 21.*

2. A friend of mine told me this Story concerning *Charms*: That himself had an *Horse* which, if he had stood sound, had been of a good value. His Servants carried him to several Farriers; but none of them had the skill to cure him. At last, unknown to their Master, they led him to a Farrier that had, it should seem, some tricks more then ordinary, and dealt in *Charms* or *Spells*, and such like Ceremonies: in virtue of these he made the Horse sound. The Owner of him after he had observ'd how well his Horse was, asked his Servants how they got him cured: whence understanding the whole matter, and observing also that there was an *S. branded* on his buttock, which he conceited stood for *Satan*, chid his Servants very roughly, as having done that which was unwarrantable and impious. Upon this profession of his dislike of the fact, the Horse forthwith fell as ill as ever he was, insomuch that for his unserviceableness he was fain to be turned up loose in the pasture. But a kinsman of the Owners coming to his house, and after chancing to see the Horse in the Grounds, took the advantage of a low price for so fair a Gelding, and bought him. The Horse had no sooner changed his Master, but presently changed his plight of body also, and became as sound as ever.

3. *Charming* also of *Serpents* is above the power of Nature. And \* *Wierus* tells us this Story of a *Charmer* at *Saltzburg*, That when in the sight of the people he had *charmed* all the *Serpents* into a ditch and killed them, at last there came one huge one far bigger then the rest, that leapt upon him, and winded about his waste like a girdle, and pulled him into the ditch, and so killed the *Charmer* himself in the conclusion.

\* *De Praestig. Damon. lib. 2. cap. 4.*

4. That also I will adventure to refer to the *Effects* of *Spirits* which I heard lately from one M<sup>rs</sup> *Dark* of *Westminster* concerning her own

Husband,



*Husband*, who being in the flower of his Age, well in health and very chearful, going out of his house in the morning with an intent to return to Dinner, was, as he walked the streets, sensibly struck upon the thigh by an invisible hand, (for he could see no man near him to strike him.) He returned home indeed about dinner-time, but could eat nothing, only he complain'd of the sad Accident that befell him, and grew forthwith so mortally sick, that he died within three daies. After he was dead, there was found upon the place where he was struck the perfect figure of a mans hand, the four fingers, palm and thumb, black and sunk into the flesh, as if one should clap his hand upon a lump of dow.

And hitherto there is nothing related which will not abide the exactest trial, and be cleared from all suspicion of either *Fraud* or *Melancholy*. But I shall propound things more strange, and yet as free from that suspicion as the former.

5. And to say nothing of *Winds sold* to Merchants by *Laplanders*, and the danger of loosing the *Third knot* (which was very frequent, as \* *Olaus* affirms, before those parts of the world were converted to *Christianity*) I shall content my self for the present with a true Story which I heard from an eye-witness concerning these preternatural Winds. At *Cambridge*, in the reign of Queen *Elizabeth*, there were two Witches to be executed, the *Mother* and *Daughter*. The *Mother*, when she was called upon to repent and forsake the *Devil*, said, there was no reason for that, for he had been faithfull to her these threescore years, and she would be so to him so long as she lived; and thus she died in this obstinacy. But she hanging thus upon the Gallows, her *Daughter* being of a contrary minde, renounced the *Devil*, was very earnest in prayer and penitence; which, by the effect, the people conceived the *Devil* to take very haينously. For there came such a sudden blast of wind (whenas all was calm before) that it drave the *Mother's* body against the Ladder so violently, that it had like to have overturn'd it, and shook the Gallows with such force, that they were fain to hold the posts for fear of all being flung down to the ground.

\* De Gentibus  
Septentrional.  
lib. 3. sub tit.  
De Magis &  
Maleficis Fin-  
norum.

## CHAP. III.

1. *That Winds and Tempests are raised upon mere Ceremonies or forms of words.* 2. *The unreasonableness of Wierus his doubting of the Devils power over the Meteors of the Aire.* 3. *Examples of that power in Rain and Thunder.* 4. *Margaret Warine discharged upon an Oake at a Thunder-Clap.* 5. *Amantius and Rotarius cast headlong out of a cloud upon an house-top.* 6. *The Witch of Constance seen by the Shepherds to ride through the Aire.* 7. *That he might adde several other Instances from Eye-witnesses, of the strange Effects of invisible Damons.* 8. *His compendious Rehearsal of the most remarkable exploits of the Devil of Malcon in lieu thereof.* 9. *The Reasons of giving himself the trouble of this Rehearsal.*

1. **W**ierus, that industrious Advocate of Witches, recites several Ceremonies that they use for the raising of Tempests, and doth acknowledge that Tempests do follow the performance of those Ceremonies, but that they had come to pass nevertheless without them: which the Devil foreseeing, excites the deluded Women to use those Magick Rites, that they may be the better perswaded of his power. But whether there be any causal connexion betwixt those Ceremonies and the ensuing Tempests, I will not curiously decide. But that the connexion of them is supernatural, is plain at first sight. \* For what is casting of Flint-Stones behind their backs toward the West, or flinging a little Sand in the Aire, or striking a River with a Broom, and so sprinkling the Wet of it toward Heaven, the stirring of Urine or Water with their finger in a Hole in the ground, or boiling of Hogs Bristles in a Pot? What are these fooleries available of themselves to gather Clouds and cover the Aire with Darknes, and then to make the ground smoak with peals of Hail and Rain, and to make the Air terrible with frequent Lightnings and Thunder? Certainly nothing at all. Therefore the ensuing of these Tempests after such like Ceremonies must be either from the prevision of the Devil (as Wierus would have it) who set the Witches on work, or else from the power of the Devil which he hath in his Kingdom of the Aire.

2. And it seems strange to me that Wierus should doubt this power, when he gives him a greater; for what is the transporting of Vapours or driving them together, to the carrying of Men and Cattel in the Aire; (of which he is a confident Asserter) unless it require larger Devils or greater numbers? And that there are sufficient numbers of such Spirits will seem to any body as credible as that there are any at all. But now for the truth of this, that certain Words or Ceremonies do seem at least to cause an alteration in the Aire, and to raise Tempests, Remigius writes that he had it witnessed to him by the free confession of near two hundred men that he examined: Where he adds a Story or two, in which there being neither Fraud nor Melancholy to be suspected, I think them worth the mentioning.

\* Wierus de  
Præstig. Da-  
mon. l. 3. c. 16.

De Præstig.  
Damon. l. 3.  
c. 12. l. 4. c. 19.  
See Bodin.  
Mag. Damon.  
l. 2. c. 4.



3. The one is of a *Witch*, who, to satisfy the curiosity of them that had power to punish her, was set free that she might give a proof of that power she professed she had to raise *Tempests*. She therefore being let goe, presently betakes her self to a place thick set with Trees, scrapes a *Hole* with her hands, fills it with *Urine*, and stirs it about so long, that she caused at last a thick dark *Cloud* charged with *Thunder* and *Lightning*, to the terror and affrightment of the beholders. But she bade them be of good courage, for she would command the *Cloud* to discharge upon what place they would appoint her; which she made good in the sight of the Spectators.

The other Story is of a young *Girl*, who, to pleasure her Father complaining of a drought, by the guidance and help of that ill Master her Mother had devoted and consecrated her unto, rais'd a *Cloud*, and water'd her Father's ground onely, all the rest continuing dry as before.

4. Let us adde to these that of *Cuinus* and *Margaret Warine*. While this *Cuinus* was busie at his Hay-making, there arose suddenly great *Thunder* and *Lightning*, which made him run homeward and forsake his work, for he saw six *Oaks* hard by him overturned from the very *Roots*, and a seventh also shatter'd and torn apieces: he was fain to lose his hat, and leave his fork or rake for haste; which was not so fast, but another crack overtakes him and rattles about his ears: upon which *Thunder-clap* he presently espied this *Margaret Warine*, a reputed *Witch*, upon the top of an *Oak*, whom he began to chide. She desired his secrecy, and she would promise that never any injury or harm should come to him from her at any time.

This *Cuinus* deposed upon Oath before the Magistrate, and *Margaret Warine* acknowledged the truth of it, without any force done unto her, several times before her death, and at her death. *Remigius* conceives she was discharged upon the top of the *Oak* at that last *Thunder-clap*, and there hung amongst the boughs; which he is induced to believe from two Stories he tells afterwards.

5. The one is of a *Tempest* of *Thunder* and *Lightning*, that the Herdsmen tending their Cattel on the brow of the Hill *Alman* in the field of *Guicuria* were frighted with, who running into the Woods for shelter, suddenly saw two countrey men on the top of the Trees which were next them, so dirty, and in such a pickle, and so out of breath, as if they had been dragg'd up and down through thorns and miry places; but when they had well eyed them, they were gone in a moment out of their sight they knew not how nor whither. These herdsmen talked of the business, but the certainty of it came out not long after. For the free confessions of those two men they then saw, being so exactly agreeing with what the Herdsmen had related, made the whole matter clear and undoubted.

The other Story is of the same persons, known afterward by their names, viz. *Amantius* and his partner *Rotarius*, who having coursed it aloft again in the Aire, and being cast headlong out of a *Cloud* upon an house, the later of them, being but a Novice and unexperienced in those supernatural exploits, was much astonish'd and afraid at the strangeness of the matter; but *Amantius* being used to those feats from his youth,

his Parents having devoted him from his childhood to the *Devil*, made but a sport of it, and laughing at his friend called him Fool for his fear, and bade him be of good courage; for their Master, in whose power they were, would safely carry them through greater dangers than those. And no sooner had he said these words, but a *whirlwind* took them and set them both safe upon the ground: but the house they were carried from so shook, as if it would have been overturn'd from the very foundations. This both those men, examin'd apart, confessed in the same words, not varying their story at all; whose confessions exactly agreed in all circumstances with what was observed by the Countrey people concerning the time and the manner of the *Tempest* and shaking of the house.

6. I will onely adde one Relation more of this nature, and that is of a Witch of *Constance*, who being vex'd that all her Neighbors in the Village where she lived were invited to the Wedding, and so were drinking and dancing and making merry, and she solitary and neglected, got the *Devil* to transport her through the Aire, in the midst of day, to a Hill hard by the Village: where she *digging a hole and putting Urine into it*, rais'd a greast *Tempest* of *Hail*, and directed it so that it fell onely upon the Village, and pelted them that were dancing with that violence, that they were forc'd to leave off their sport. When she had done her exploit, she returned to the Village, and being spied, was suspected to have raised the *Tempest*; which the Shepherds in the field that saw her riding in the Aire knew well before, who bringing in their witnesses against her, she confess'd the fact.

See Bodin.  
*Mag. Dæmono-*  
*man. l. 2. c. 8.*

7. We might abound in instances of this kind (I mean, supernatural effects unattended with miraculous Apparitions) if I would bring in all that I have my self been informed of by either Eye-witnesses themselves, or by such as have had the narrations immediately from them. As for example, Bricks being carried round about a room without any visible hand; Multitudes of Stones flung down at a certain time of the day from the roof of an house for many moneths together, to the amazement of the whole Country; Pots carried off from the fire and set on again, no body meddling with thẽ; The violent flapping of a Chest-cover, no hand touching it; The carrying up linens, that have been a bleaching, so high into the Aire, that Table-cloths and Sheets looked but like Napkins, and this when there was no wind, but all calme and clear; Glass-windows struck with that violence as if all had been broken to shivers, the glasse jingling all over the Floor, and this for some quarter of an hour together, when yet all has been found whole in the Morning; \* Boxes carefully locked unlocking themselves, and flinging the Flax out of them; Bread tumbling off from a Fourm of its own accord; Womens pattens rising up from the floor, and whirling against people; The breaking of a Combe into two pieces of it self in the window, the pieces also flying in mens faces; The rising up of a Knife also from the same place, being carried with its haft forwards; Stones likewise flung about the house, but not hurting any mans person; with several other things, which would be too voluminous to repeat with their due circumstances; and the less needful,

\* These following passages, with some others, being carefully enquired into by a learned and judicious person, but very incredulous, did to convince him of Witches & Spirits, that he could not abstain from acknowledging: it to a friend of his under his own hand.



there being already published to our hands such Narrations as will store us with Examples enough of this kind.

8. Amongst which that Relation of M<sup>r</sup> *Francis Perreand*, concerning an unclean Spirit that haunted his house at *Mascon* in *Burgundy*, both for the variety of matter and the Authentickness of the Story, is of prime use. For though this *Dæmon* never appear'd visible to the eye, yet his presence was palpably deprehensible by many freaks and pranks that he play'd. As in drawing the Curtains at Midnight, and plucking off the blankets; In his holding of the doors, and in rolling of billets; In his knocking and flinging things against the Wainscot; In his whistling such tunes as they teach Birds, and in his singing prophane and bawdy Songs; In his repeating aloud the Lords Prayer and the Creed; In his imitating the voices and dialects of several persons, as also the crying of Huntsmen, the croaking of Frogs, and the speeches of Jugglers and Mountebanks; His scoffing and jeering and uttering merry conceits, as that of *Pays de Vaux*, where he said they made goodly Carbonado's of Witches, and thereupon laughed very loud; His bringing commendations from remote friends, and his telling stories of fightings and murders; His discovering of things done in private to the Actors of them; His exprobrating to a grave Divine the singing of a bawdy song in a Tavern;

His tossing of a roll of cloth of fifty ells; His disordering of skeans of yarn, and pulling men at their work by their coats backward; His flinging the hat of one at his face while he was asleep in his house, and snatching a candlestick out of a maid's hand; His entangling and tying things in such knots as it was impossible for any one to untye them, and yet himself untying them in a moment; His tumbling the bed as soon as it has been made into the midst of the floor, and taking down books from their shelves in the study; His making a noise like a volley of shot, and imitating the sound of Hemp-dressers four beating together; His making musick of two little bells he found amongst rusty iron in the house, which he used not onely there but in several other places, whose sound they could hear pass by them in the Aire, though they could see nothing; His hiding of a Goldsmiths Jewels and tools for a while, and then dropping them out of the Aire on the table; His flinging of stones about the house, but without hurt, as in the former Narration; His often beating a new Maid in her bed, and pouring water on her head till he had forced her away; And lastly, his pulling a certain Lawyer by the arm into the midst of the room, and there whirling him about on the tiptoe, and then flinging him on the ground.

This is a short *Epitome* of the most remarkable exploits of that invincible Devil of *Mascon*. For, as I remember, he was not so much as once seen in any shape all this time; unless it was he that *Lullier* and *Repay* met at a corner of the street in the habit of a Countrey-woman spinning by Moon-shine, who upon their nearer approach vanished from their sight.

9. I have given my self the trouble of transcribing these particulars, partly because they conduce so much to the discovery of the nature of these kind of Spirits (these Effects making it suspicable that he did not much miss the mark that ventur'd to style them *Homines Aëreos*) and partly

partly for the both copiousness and futableness of the Story to the present Theme ; but lastly and chiefly, for the unexceptionable truth and Authentickness of the Narration : the observation of these strange passages being made not by \* one solitary person, but by many together ; nor by a person of suspected integrity, but of singular gravity and exemplarity of life ; nor carelessly or credulously, but cautiously and diligently, by searching every corner of the house, and setting bolts and barricadoes to all the doors and windows thereof, stopping the very Cat-holes of the doors, and leaving nothing that might give way to suspicion of Imposture ; a candle also burning every night all the night long, the places also from whence the voice came in the *day-time* being searched and the things therein by *divers* persons ; from whence when one *Siméon Meissonier* had amongst other things brought away a bottle, the Devil fell a laughing, that he should think him such a fool as to goe into it, as being liable thereby to be stopped up therein by his finger ; and lastly, the Experience made not once or twice, but in a manner every day for a quarter of a year together.

\* Nor writ by one pen. For *Marcelin*, a Preacher then at *Mascon*, wrote the same story ; and *Torinus*, a frequent eye-witness of the pranks of this *Demon*, left a Relation written and signed with his own hand, which *Perreand* kept by him.

To the truth of the miraculousness of the Narration the silence of the Dog gives also further suffrage, he being otherwise very watchfull and ready to bark at the least noise, and yet never barking at the loud speaking and hideous noises of the *Demon* : Which the prophane Goblin himself took notice of, roguishly avouching that it was because he had made the sign of the Cross on his head ; for he was then on a merry pin and full of jeering.

To all which you may further adde the Authority of the Reverend and Learned M<sup>r</sup> *P. Du Moulin*, Father to the now D<sup>r</sup> *Du Moulin*, and the smart judicious reasoning of his accomplish'd Son, in his Preface to M<sup>r</sup> *Perreand*'s Relation, namely, *That this familiar Conversation of the Devil was not in a corner or in a Desert (where the Melancholy of Witches is supposed to make them fancy they converse with him) but in the midst of a great City, in an house where there was daily a great resort to hear him speak, and where men of contrary Religions met together, whose proneness to cast a disgrace upon the dissenting parties did occasion the narrow examining and full confirming the truth thereof, both by the Magistrate and by the Diocesan of the place.*

And lastly, that nothing may be wanting to convince the incredulous, we adjoyn the Testimony of that excellently-learned and noble Gentleman M<sup>r</sup> *R. Boyle*, who conversed with M<sup>r</sup> *Perreand* himself at *Geneva*, where he received from him as a present a Copie of his Book before it was printed, and where he had the opportunity to enquire both after the Writer and several passages of his Book ; and was so well satisfied, that he professes that all his settled indisposedness to believe strange things was overcome by this special Conviction.



## CHAP. IV.

1. *The Supernatural Effects observed in the bewitched Children of Mr Throgmorton and Mrs Muschamp.* 2. *The general Remarkables in them both.* 3. *The possession of the Religious Virgins of Werts, Hessimont, &c.* 4. *The story of that famous Abbateß Magdalena Crucia, her useleß and ludicrous Miracles.* 5. *That she was a Sorcereß, and was thirty years married to the Devil.* 6. *That her story is neither any Figment of Priests, nor delusion of Melancholy.*

1. **WE** will now pass to those *supernatural Effects* which are observed in *Persons* that are *bewitch'd* or *possess'd*. And such are, *Foretelling things to come*; *telling what such and such persons speak or doe* as exactly as if they were by them, when the party *possess'd* is at one end of the Town and sitting in a house within doors, and those parties that act and confer together are without at the other end of the Town; to be able to *see some and not others*; to play at Cards with one certain person, and not to discern any body else at the table besides him; to act, and talk, and goe up and down, and tell what will become of things, and what happens in those *fitts* of *possession*, and then, so soon as the possessed or bewitched party is out of them, for him to *remember nothing* at all, but to enquire concerning the welfare of those whose faces he seemed to look upon but just before, when he was in his *fitts*. All which can be no symptoms nor signs of any thing else but the *Devil* got into the body of a man, and holding all the Operations of his Soul, and then acting and speaking and sporting as he pleases in the miserable Tenement he hath crouded himself into, making use of the Organs of the Body at his own pleasure, for the performing of such pranks and feats as are far above the capacity, strength or agility of the party thus *bewitched* or *possessed*.

All these things are fully made good by long and tedious observations recorded in *The discovery of the Witches of Warbois in Huntingtonshire, Anno 1594.* the memory whereof is still kept fresh by an Anniversary Sermon preach'd at *Huntington* by some of the Fellows of *Queen's College* in *Cambridge*.

There is also lately come forth a Narration how one Mrs *Muschamp's* Children were handled in *Cumberland*, which is very like this of Mr *Throckmorton's* Children of *Warbois*.

2. That which is generally observed in them both is this, That in their *fitts* they are as if they had no Soul at all in their Bodies, and that whatsoever operations of Sense, Reason or Motion there seems to be in them, it is not any thing at all to them, but is wholly that Stranger's that hath got into them. For so soon as their *fitts* are over, they are as if they had been in so profound a sleep that they did not so much as dream, and so remember nothing at all of what they either said or did, or where they had been; as is manifest by an infinite number of Examples in the fore-named relations.

3. Of the truth of which passages here at home we being very well ascertain'd, we may with the more confidence venture upon what is recorded concerning others abroad. As for example, The possession of the *Religious Virgins* in the Monastery of *Werts*, others in *Hessimont*, others also not far from *Xantes*, and in other places, where there were Eye-witnesses enough to take notice how strangely they were handled, being flung up from the ground higher then a mans head, and falling down again without harm; swarming upon Trees as nimbly as Cats, and hanging upon the boughs; having their flesh torn off from their bodies without any visible hand or instrument; and many other mad pranks, which is not so fit to name, but they that have a minde may read at large in *Wierus*.

See Wierus, de  
Præstig. Da-  
mon. l. 4. c. 10.

4. I would pass now to other *Effects* of *Witchcraft*, as the conveying of *Knives*, *Balls of hair* and *Nails* into the bodies of them that are bewitched; but that the mention of these *Nuns* puts me in mind of that famous story in *Wierus* of *Magdalena Crucia*, first a *Nun*, and then an *Abbatesse* of a Nunnery in *Corduba* in *Spain*. Those things which were miraculous in her were these; That she could tell almost at any distance how the affairs of the world went, what consultations or transactions there were in all the Nations of Christendome, from whence she got to her self the reputation of a very *Holywoman* and a great *Propheteß*. But other things came to pass by her, or for her sake, no less strange and miraculous; as that at the celebrating of the holy *Eucharist* the Priest should always want one of his round *Wafers*, which was secretly conveyed to *Magdalen* by the administration of Angels, as was supposed, and she receiving of it into her mouth ate it in the view of the people, to their great astonishment and high reverence of the *Saint*. At the elevation of the Host *Magdalen* being near at hand, but yet a wall betwixt, that the wall was conceived to open, and to exhibite *Magdalen* to the view of them in the Chappel, and that thus she partaked of the consecrated bread. When this *Abbatesse* came into the Chappel her self upon some special day, that she would set off the solemnity of the day by some notable and conspicuous Miracle: for she would sometimes be lifted up above the ground three or four cubits high; other sometimes bearing the Image of Christ in her arms, weeping favourly, she would make her hair to increase to that length and largeness that it would come to her heels, and cover her all over and the Image of Christ in her armes, which anon notwithstanding would shrink up again to its usual size; with a many such specious, though unprofitable, Miracles.

De Præstigiis  
Damon. l. 6. c. 6.

5. But you'll say that the Narration of these things is not *true*, but they are *feigned* for the advantage of the *Roman Religion*, and so it was profitable for the Church to forge them and record them to posterity. A man that is unwilling to admit of any thing *supernatural* would please himself with this general shuffle and put-off. But when we come to the *Catastrophe* of the Story, he will finde it quite otherwise: for this *Saint* at last began to be suspected for a *Sorcereß*, as it is thought, and she being conscious, did of her own accord, to save her self, make confession of her wickedness to the Visitors of the Order, as they are called, *viz.* That for



thirty years she had been married to the *Devil* in the shape of an *Aethiopian*; that another *Devil*, servant to this, when his Master was at dalliance with her in her Cell, supplied her place amongst the *Nuns* at their publick Devotions; that by virtue of this Contract she made with this *Spirit* she had done all those Miracles she did. Upon this confession she was committed, and while she was in durance, yet she appear'd in her devout postures praying in the Chappel as before at their set hours of Prayer: which being told to the Visitors by the *Nuns*, there was a strict watch over her that she should not stir out. Nevertheless she appeared in the Chappel as before, though she were really in the Prison.

6. Now what credit or advantage there can be to the *Roman Religion* by this Story, let any man judge. Wherefore it is no Figment of the Priests or Religious persons, nor Melancholy, nor any such matter (for how could so many spectators at once be deluded by Melancholy?) but it ought to be deem'd a reall *Truth*: And this *Magdalena Crucia* appearing in two several places at once, it is manifest that there is such a thing as *Apparitions of Spirits*. But I must abstain as yet from touching that argument, I having not dispatch'd what I propounded concerning the vomiting up of *Nails*, the conveying of *Knives* and *pieces of Wood* into the Bodies of men, and the like. Which things are so palpable and uncapable of delusion, that I think it worth the while to insist a little upon them.

## C H A P. V.

1. *Knives, Wood, Pieces of Iron, Balls of Haire in the body of Ulricus Neufesser.* 2. *The vomiting of Cloth stuck with Pins, Nails and Needles, as also Glas, Iron and Haire, by Wierus his Patients, and by a friend of Cardan's.* 3. *Wierus his Story of the thirty possessed Children of Amsterdam.* 4. *The Convictiveness of these Narrations.* 5. *Objections against their Convictiveness answered.* 6. *Of a Maid Daemoniack speaking Greek; and of the miraculous binding of anothers hands by an invisible power.*

1. **I** Will begin with that memorable true Story that *Langius* tells of one *Ulricus Neufesser*, who being grievously tormented with a pain in his side, suddenly felt under his skin, which yet was whole, an iron *Nail* as he thought. And so it prov'd when the Chirurgeon had cut it out: But nevertheless his great torments continued, which enraged him so that he cut his own Throat. The third day, when he was carried out to be buried, *Eucharicus Rosenbader* and *Johannes ab Ettenstet*, a great company of people standing about them, dissected the Corps, and ripping up the Ventricle, found a round piece of Wood of a good length; four *Knives*, some even and sharp, others indented like a Saw, with other two rough pieces of Iron a span long. There was also a ball of Hair. This hapned at *Fugenstal*, 1539.

2. *Wierus*

2. *Wierus* tells also of one that was possessed, of which himself was an Eye-witness, that vomited up *pieces of Cloth* with *Pins* stuck in them, *Nails*, *Needles*, and such like stuff: which he contends doth not come from the stomach, but by a prestigious sleight of the *Dévil* is onely ingested into the mouth.

*De Praestig. Dæmon. l. 4. c. 2, 3.*

*Cardan* relates the like of a good simple Countrey-fellow and a friend of his, that had been a long time troubled with vomiting up *Glass*, *Iron*, *Nails* and *Hair*, and that at that time he told *Cardan* of it, he was not so perfectly restored but that something yet crash'd in his belly, as if there were a *Bag of Glass* in it.

*De Varietate Rerum, lib. 15. cap. 80.*

I might adde seasonably hereunto what is so credibly reported of *M<sup>s</sup> Muschamp's* Child, that it was seen to vomit up pieces of *Wood* with *Pins* stuck in it.

3. But I will conclude all with that Story of about thirty Children that were so strangely handled at *Amsterdam*, 1566. of the truth whereof *Wierus* professeth himself very well assured. They were tortured very much, and cast violently upon the ground; but when they arose out of their fitt, knew nothing, but thought they had been onely asleep. For the remedying of this mischief they got the help of *Physicians*, *Wizards* and *Exorcists*, but without success. Onely while the *Exorcists* were reading, the Children vomited up *Needles*, *Thimbles*, shreds of *Cloth*, pieces of *Pots*, *Glasse*, *Hair*, and other things of the like nature.

*Wierus de Praestig. Dæmon. l. 4. c. 8.*

4. Now the advantage I would make of these Relations is this, That these Effects extraordinary and supernatural being so palpable and permanent, they are not at all liable to such Subterfuges as *Atheists* usually betake themselves to, as of *Melancholy* and disturbance of *Phansie* in those that profess they see such strange things, or any *Fraud* or *Imposture* in those that act.

5. All that can with any shew of Reason be alledged is this, That such parties in their fits of Distraction may devour such things as they vomit up, or at least put them into their mouths. But they that are by might easily see that, distracted people doing things carelessly and openly. And these things happen to those that are thus handled against their wills: and as they are not discovered to doe any such things of themselves, so neither do they confess afterwards that they did it, when they are come to their right senses; and ordinarily it is found out that some Woman or other by *Sorcery* or *Witchcraft* was the Author of it.

Besides, it is evident that there can be no mistake at all in some of these passages: For how can an iron *Nail* get betwixt the skin and the flesh, the skin not at all ripped or touch'd? or how is it possible for any body to swallow down *Knives* and *pieces of Iron* a span long? which besides that Story of *Ulricus Neufesser*, is made good in another of a young Wenck, who when she had made clean a pair of shoes with a *Knife*, which she put in her bosom, she after seeking for it, it could not be found any where, till at length it began to discover it self in a swelling on her left side, and at last was pulled out thence by a Chirurgion. You may read the whole Relation in *Wierus*. It was done at *Levensteet* in the Dukedome of *Brunswick*, 1562. An old Woman had come to the house

*De Praestig. Dæmon. lib. 4. cap. 13.*



house in the morning, and a strange *black Dog* was found under the table.

See Bodin.  
Mag. Damono-  
man. l. 2. c. 3.

6. There are also other miraculous & supernatural Effects, as in that Maid of *Saxonia's* speaking of *Greek*; and in another, whom *Calius Rhodiginus* profess he saw, that spoke from betwixt her Legs; a third at *Paris*, whom Dr. *Picard* and other Divines would have dispossess, whom one *Hollerius* a Physician deriding, as if it had been nothing but *Melancholy* in the Woman and *Ignorance* in those Divines, was after convinc'd of the contrary, when he saw her standing betwixt two other women, and crying out of a sudden, discerning her hands to be so fast bound that there was no loosing of them without cutting the string. There was not the appearance of any thing to any body but to the *possessed* onely, who said she saw then a white cloud come near her when she was bound.

## CH A P. VI.

1. *The Apparition Eckerken.* 2. *The Story of the pyed Piper.* 3. *A Triton or Sea-God seen on the banks of Rubicon.* 4. *Of the Imps of Witches, and whether those old women be guilty of so much dotage as the Atheist fancies them.* 5. *That such things pass betwixt them and their Imps as are impossible to be imputed to Melancholy.* 6. *The examination of John Winnick of Molesworth.* 7. *The reason of Sealing Covenants with the Devil.*

Wierus de  
Praestig. Da-  
mon. l. 6. c. 15.

1. **B**UT it is now high time to clear up this more dim and cloudy discovery of *Spirits* into more distinct and articulate *Apparitions*, according as I did at first propound. And these I shall cast into two ranks: such as appear near to us on the *Ground*, or such as are seen afar off, above in the *Aire*. And here again to begin with small things first. Near *Elton*, a Village half a mile distant from *Embrica* in the Dukedom of *Cleve*, there was a thing had its haunt, they called it *Eckerken*; there appeared never more then the shape of an *Hand*, but it would beat Travellers, pull them off from their horses, and overturn carriages. This could be no *Phansie*, there following so real *Effects*.

De Praestig.  
Damon. l. 1.  
cap. 16.

2. The Story of the *pyed Piper*, that first by his Pipe gathered together all the *Rats* and *Mice*, and drown'd them in the River; and afterward, being defrauded of his reward, which the Town promis'd him if he could deliver them from the plague of those *Vermine*, took his opportunity, and by the same Pipe made the *Children* of the Town follow him, and leading them into a Hill that opened, buried them there all alive; hath so evident proof of it in the town of *Hammel* where it was done, that it ought not at all to be discredited. For the fact is very religiously kept amongst their ancient Records, painted out also in their Church-windows, and is an *Epoche* joyned with the year of our Lord in their Bills and Indentures and other Law-Instruments.

3. That

3. That also seems to me beyond all exception and evasion which *Suetonius* relates of a *Spectrum* appearing on the banks of the River *Rubicon*; which was thus. *Julius Caesar* having marched with his Army to this River, which divides *Gallia citerior* from *Italy*, and being very doubtful with himself whether he should pass over into *Italy* or not, there was seen on the River side a Man of a prodigious stature and form, playing on a Reed. The strangeness of his person as well as the pleasantness of his Musick had drawn several of the Shepherds unto him, as also many of the Souldiers, amongst whom were some Trumpeters; which this *Triton* (as *Melanchthon* ventures to call him) or *Sea-god* well observing, nimbly snatches away one of the Trumpets out of their hands, leaps forthwith into the River, and sounding a March with that strength and violence that he seem'd to rend the Heavens, and made the aire ring again with the mighty forcibleness of the Blast, in this manner he passed over to the other side of the River: whereupon *Caesar* taking the *Omen*, leaves off all further dispute with himself, carries over his Army, enters *Italy*, secure of success from so manifest tokens of the favour of the Gods.

4. To confirm this truth of *Apparitions*, if we would but admit the free confessions of *Witches* concerning their *Imps*, whom they so frequently see and converse withall, know them by their names, and doe obeisance to them, the point would be put quite out of all doubt, and their proofs would be so many that no volume would be large enough to contain them. But forsooth these must be all *Melancholy old women* that dote and bring themselves into danger by their own *Phantasies* and *Conceits*. But that they do not dote I am better assured of, then of their not doting that say they do. For, to satisfy my own curiosity, I have examined several of them, and they have discours'd as cunningly as any of their quality and education. But by what I have read and observ'd, I discern they serve a very perfidious Master, who plays wrecks many times on purpose to betray them. But that is onely by the bye.

5. I demand concerning these *Witches* who confess their contract and frequent converse with the *Devil*, some with him in one shape, others in another, whether mere *Melancholy* and *Imagination* can put *Powders*, *Rods*, *Oyniments*, and such like things into their hands, and tell them the use of them; can impress *Marks* upon their bodies, so deep as to take away all sense in that place; can put *Silver* and *Gold* into their hands, which afterwards commonly proves but either *Counters*, *Leaves*, or *Shells*, or some such like useles matter. These *real Effects* cannot be by mere *Melancholy*. For if a man receive any thing into his hand, be it what it will be, there was some body that gave it him. And therefore the *Witch* receiving some reall thing from this or that other shape that appeared unto her, it is an evident sign that it was an external thing that she saw, not a mere figuration of her *Melancholy Phansie*. There are innumerable Examples of this kind; but the thing is so trivial and ordinary, that it wants no Instances. I will onely set down one, wherein there is the apparition of three Spirits.

6. *John Winnick* of *Molsworth* in *Huntington-shire* being examined April 11<sup>th</sup> 1646. confessed as follows. "Having lost his purse with  
" seven



“ seven shillings in it, for which he suspected one in the family where he  
 “ lived, he saith that on a Friday, while he was making hay-bottles in  
 “ the barn, and swore and curs’d and rag’d, and wish’d to himself that  
 “ some *wise* body would help him to his purse and money again, there  
 “ appear’d unto him a *Spirit* in the shape of a *Bear*, but not so big as a  
 “ *Coney*, who promis’d, upon condition that he would fall down and  
 “ worship him, he would help him to his purse. He assented to it; and  
 “ the *Spirit* told him, to morrow about this time he should find his purse  
 “ upon the floor where he made bottles, and that he would then come  
 “ himself also; which was done accordingly: and thus at the time ap-  
 “ pointed recovering his purse, he fell down upon his knees to the *Spirit*,  
 “ and said, *My Lord and God, I thank you.* This *Spirit* brought then with  
 “ him two other, in the shape the one of a white *Cat*, the other of a *Co-*  
 “ *ney*, which at the command of the *Bear-Spirit* he worshipped also. The  
 “ *Bear-Spirit* told him he must have his Soul when he died, that he must  
 “ suck of his body, that he must have some of his Blood to seal the Co-  
 “ venant. To all which he agreed; and so the *Bear-Spirit* leaping up to  
 “ his shoulder, prick’d him on the head, and thence took blood. After  
 “ that they all three vanished, but ever since came to him once every  
 “ twenty four hours, and suck’d on his body, where the *Marks* are found.  
 “ And that they had continually done thus for this twenty nine years to-  
 “ gether. That all these things should be a mere *dream* is a conceit more  
 flight and foolish than any dream possibly can be. For that receiving of  
 his purse was a palpable and sensible pledge of the truth of all the rest.  
 And it is incredible that such a *series* of circumstances, back’d with twenty  
 nine years experience of being suck’d and visited daily, sometimes in  
 the day-time, most commonly by night, by the same three *Familiars*,  
 should be nothing but the hanging together of so many *Melancholy Con-*  
*ceits* and *Phansies*.

7. Nor doth the *sealing* of *Covenants* and *writing* with *Blood* make  
 such Stories as these more to be suspected: for it is not at all unreasona-  
 ble that such Ceremonies should pass betwixt a *Spirit* and a *Man*, when  
 the like palpable Rites are used for the more firmly tying of Man to God.  
 For whatsoever is crass and external leaves stronger Impress upon the  
*Phansie*, and the remembrance of it strikes the Mind with more efficacy.  
 So that assuredly the *Devil* hath the greater hanck upon the Soul of a  
*Witch* or *Wizard* that hath been perswaded to compleat their *Contract*  
 with him in such a gross sensible way, and keeps them more fast from re-  
 volting from him, then if they had onely contracted in bare words.

## CHAP. VII.

1. *The Story of Anne Bodenham, a Witch who suffered at Salisbury, Anno 1653. The Author's punctual Information concerning her.* 2. *The manner and circumstances of her first Conjuring up the Devil.* 3. *An Objection answered concerning the truth thereof.* 4. *The Objection more fully answered by a second Conjuraton.* 5. *An Objection answer'd concerning this second Conjuraton, and still further cleared by the circumstances of a third.* 6. *The Witches fourth and last Conjuraton, at which Anne Styles made a Contract with the Devil.* 7. *That these transactions could be no Dreams nor Fancies of Anne Styles, nor she knowingly forsworn in her avouching them upon Oath.* 8. *Which is further proved by the impartialness of her Confession.* 9, 10. *By her Contract with the Devil, evidenced from the real effects thereof.* 11. *And by her behaviour at the Assizes when she gave evidence.* 12. *An answer to certain Objections.* 13. *Sundry Indications that Anne Bodenham was a Witch.* 14. *The Summary Conclusion, That the above-related Conjuratons are no Fictions of Anne Styles, but real Transactions by Anne Bodenham.*

1. **T**O that of *John Winnick*, it will not be amiss to adde a more late and more notable Narration concerning one *Anne Bodenham*, a Witch, who lived in *Fisherton-Anger*, adjacent to the City of new *Sarum* in the County of *Wilts*, who was arraigned and executed at *Salisbury* 1653. He that has a minde to read the Story more at large, may consult *Edmond Bower*, who was an eye-witness and eare-witness of several passages. But I shall onely set down here what is most material to our present purpose, partly out of him, and partly from others who were then at the Assizes, and had also private Conference with the Witch, and spoke also with the Maid that gave evidence against her.

This *Anne Bodenham*, it seems, concealed not her skill in foretelling things to come, and helping men to their stolen goods, and other such like feats, that the more notable sort of Wizards and Witches are said to pretend to and to practise.

2. Amongst others that resorted to her, there was one *Anne Styles*, servant to *Rich. Goddard Esq;* of the *Clofe* in new *Sarum*, sent by Mr. *Mason* this *Goddard's* Son in Law (he having a design to commence a Law Suit against his Father), to learn of the Witch what would be the event of the Suit. Who being asked by the Maid, who had three shillings to give her for her pains, she took her staff, and there drew it about the house, making a kinde of a Circle; and then took a book, and carrying it over the Circle with her hands, and taking a green glass, did lay it upon the book, and placed in the Circle an earthen Pan of Coals, wherein she threw something, which burning caused a very noisome stink, and told the Maid, she should not be afraid of what she should then see, for now they would come: (they are the words she used) and so calling *Belzebub*, *Tormentor*, *Satan* and *Lucifer* appear; there suddenly arose a



very high wind, which made the house shake, and presently the back-door of the house flying open, there came five Spirits, as the Maid supposed, in the likeness of ragged Boyes, some bigger then others, and ran about the house, where she had drawn the staff; and the Witch threw down upon the ground crums of bread, which the Spirits picked up, and leapt over the Pan of coals oftentimes, which she set in the midst of the Circle, and a Dog and a Cat of the Witches danced with them: and after some time the Witch looked again in her book, and threw some great white seeds upon the ground, which the said Spirits picked up; and so in a short time the wind was laid, and the Witch going forth at her back-door the Spirits vanished. After which the Witch told the Maid, that Mr. Mason should demand fifteen hundred pound, and one hundred and fifty pound per annum, of Mr. Goddard; and if he denied it, he should prosecute the Law against him, and be gone from his Father, and then he should gain it: with which message the Maid returned and acquainted Mr. Mason.

3. But it may be it will be objected, That these were some poor ragged Boyes that conspired there with *Anne Bodenham* to get money upon pretence of Conjuring and foretelling future events, whereas it was indeed nothing else but a cheat within the power of an ordinary knavish wit. But the loudness of the wind, and the forcible shaking of the house upon those Magical Words and Ceremonies, may easily answer, or rather quite blow away, such frivolous Evasions.

4. But if the Objector will yet persist in his opinion, let him read the circumstances of the second Conjuration of this Witches. For the same Maid being sent again to her from the same party, to enquire in what part of the house the Poison was that should be given her Mistress, Hereupon she took her stick as before, and making therewith a Circle, the wind rose forthwith: then taking a besom, she swept over the Circle, and made another; and looking in her book and glass as formerly, and using some words softly to her self, she stood in the Circle and said, Belzebub, Tormentor, Lucifer and Satan appear. There appeared first a Spirit in the shape of a little Boy, as she conceived, which then turned into another shape something like a Snake, and then into the shape of a shagged Dog with great eyes, which went about in the Circle; and in the Circle she set an earthen Pan of Coals, wherein she threw something which burned and stank, and then the Spirit vanished. After which the Witch took her book and glass again, and shewed the Maid in the glass Mrs Sarah Goddard's Chamber, the colour of the Curtains, and the bed turned up the wrong way, and under that part of the bed where the Bolster lay she shewed the poison in a white paper. The Maid afterward returned home, and acquainted Mrs Roswell with what the Witch had shewed her in a glass, that the poison lay under Mrs Sarah's Bed, and also spoke to her that they might go together and take it away.

The transformation of a Boy into a Snake; and of that Snake into a shagged Dog with staring eyes, is a feat far above all humane art or wit whatsoever.

5. Nor can it be imagined that *Melancholy* had so disturbed the mind of the Maid, that she told her own dreams or fancies for external sensible transactions. For she was employed by others in a real Negotiation betwixt

twixt them and the Witch, and ever brought back her answers to them, receiving also things from her, by the help of those ragged Boyes she raised up; as appears in a third Conjuraton of hers, when the Maid was another time sent to procure some exemplary punishment upon Mr Goddard's two Daughters, who yet were unjustly, as it seems, aspersed with the suspicion of endeavouring to poison their Mother-in-law. *The Witch receiving the Wenches errand, made a Circle as formerly, and set her Pan of Coals therein, and burnt somewhat that stank extremely, and took her book and glass as before is related; and said, Belzebub, Tormentor, Lucifer and Satan appear. And then appeared five Spirits, as she conceived, in the shapes of little ragged Boyes, which the Witch commanded to appear, and goe along with the Maid to a Meadow at Wilton, which the VVitch shewed in a glass, and there to gather Vervine and Dill. And forthwith the ragged Boyes ran away before the Maid, and she followed them to the said Meadow: and when they came thither, the ragged Boyes looked about for the Herbs, and removed the Snow in two or three places before they could finde any, and at last they found some, and brought it away with them; and then the Maid and the Boyes returned again to the VVitch, and found her in the Circle, paring her Nails: and then she took the said Herbs, and dried the same, and made Powder of some, and dried the Leaves of other, and threw bread to the Boyes, and they eat and danced as formerly; and then the VVitch reading in a book they vanished away. And the VVitch gave the Maid in one paper the Powder, in another the Leaves, and in the third the paring of the Nails, all which the Maid was to give her Mistris. The Powder was to put in the young Gentlemomens, Mrs Sarah and Mrs Anne Goddard's, drink or broth, to rot their guts in their bellies; the Leaves to rub about the brims of the Pot, to make their teeth fall out of their heads; and the paring of the Nails to make them drunk and mad. And when the Maid came home and delivered it to her Mistris, and told her the effects of the Powder and the other things, her Mistris laughed and said, That is a very brave thing indeed. But yet she had the discretion not to make use of it.*

6. This Powder was shewn at the Assizes (so that it could be no Fancy or Dream) together with a piece of Money that she received of the Spirits, which one of them first bit and gave it the Witch, and then the Witch gave it to the Maid. The hole also in her finger was then shown, out of which blood was squeezed to subscribe a Covenant with the Devil, as you may see in the fourth and last bout of Conjuring the Witch performed in the Maid's presence. For she being advised by Mr. Goddard's household to goe to London, she went to the Witches first before she quit the Countrey; who being made acquainted with her journey, asked her whether she would goe to London High or Low? To which she replied, What do you mean by that? She answered, If you will goe on High, you shall be carried to London in the Aire, and be there in two hours; but if you goe a Low, you shall be taken at Sutton Towns end and before, unless you have help. But before she departed, the Witch earnestly desired the Maid to live with her, and told her if she would doe so, she would teach her to doe as she did, and that she should never be taken. Then the Maid asked her what she could doe. She answered, You shall know presently; and forthwith she



appeared in the shape of a great black Cat, and lay along by the Chimney : at which the Maid being very much affrighted, she came into her own shape again, and told her, I see you are afraid, and I see you are willing to be gone ; and told her, if she was, she should say so, and not speak against her Conscience : and the Maid replied, she was willing to goe, and not to dwell with the VVitch. Then the Witch said, she must seal unto her body and blood not to discover her : which she promising to doe, she forthwith made a Circle as formerly she had done, and looking in her book, called, Belzebub, Tormentor, Lucifer and Satan appear. Then appeared two Spirits in the likeness of great Boyes, with long shagged black hair, and stood by her looking over her shoulder ; and the Witch took the Maid's forefinger of her right hand in her hand, and pricked it with a pin, and squeezed out the blood, and put it into a Pen, and put the Pen in the Maid's hand, and held her hand to write in a great book ; and one of the Spirits lay'd his hand or Claw upon the VVitches whilest the Maid wrote : and when she had done writing, whilest their hands were together, the Witch said Amen, and made the Maid say Amen, and the Spirits said Amen, Amen : and the Spirit's hand did feel cold to the Maid as it touched her hand, when the Witches hand and hers were together writing. And then the Spirit gave a piece of silver (which he first bit) to the Witch, who gave it to the Maid ; and also stuck two Pins in the Maids head-cloths, and bid her keep them, and bid her be gone ; and said also, I will vex the Gentlewoman well enough, as I did the man in Clarrington Park, which I made walk about with a bundle of Pales on his back all night in a pond of water, and he could not lay them down till the next morning.

7. All these things the Maid deposed upon Oath ; and I think it now beyond all controversie evident, that unless she did knowingly forswear her self, that they are certainly true : for they cannot be imputed to any Dreamings, Phanfy, nor Melancholy. Now that the Maid did not forswear her self, or invent these Narrations she swore to, many Arguments offer themselves for eviſtion.

As first, That it is altogether unlikely that a sorry Wench, that could neither write nor read, should be able to excogitate such Magical Forms and Ceremonies, with all the circumstances of the effects of them, and declare them so punctually, had she not indeed seen them done before her eyes.

Secondly, If she had been so cunning at inventing Lies, she could not but have had so much wit as to frame them better for her own advantage, and for theirs by whom she was employed ; or told so much onely of the truth as would have been no prejudice to her self, nor any else to have it revealed.

8. For in brief, the case stood thus ; Her Mistris either had, or feigned her self to have, a suspicion that her two Daughters in law, Mistris Sarah and Mistris Anne Goddard, complotted to poison her. Hereupon this Maid Anne Styles was sent to the Witch, upon pretence to know when this poisoning would be, and how to prevent it ; and at the second time she consulted her, the Witch sent her to the Apothecaries to buy her some white Arsenick, and bring her it, which she taking told her

her she would burn it, and so prevent the poisoning of her Mistress. The buying of this Arsenick was the great occasion of the Maid's flying. For it coming to the knowledge of the two Sisters how they were suspected to endeavour the poisoning of their Mother, and that they had bought an ounce and half of Arsenick lately at the Apothecaries, they, to clear themselves from this suspicion, made diligent enquiry at all the Apothecaries shops throughout *Sarum*, and at last found where the poison was bought. Hereupon the Maid was desired by her Mistress to goe away and shift for her self, to avoid that trouble and disgrace that might come upon them, if she should stay and be examined before some Justice. While she was upon her journey, Mr *Chandler*, Son-in-law to Mr *Goddard*, hearing how his Mother-in-law was in danger of being poisoned, and that a Servant of hers that had bought the poison was fled, he forthwith with another man made after her, overtook her near *Sutton*, had her there into an Inne, where she confessed what has been above related. Which Confession, I say, cannot be any Figment or forged tale, but certain truth, it making nothing for the parties advantage, or theirs that imployed her, but rather against them, and mainly against her self; whenas if she had onely confessed the buying of the Arsenick with the purpose of preventing her Mistresses being poisoned, by the help and skill of the Witch or Wise-woman, it might have gone for a tolerable piece of folly, could not seem so criminal and execrable as these other acts do. Nothing therefore but a guilty Conscience and the power of truth did extort from her this impartial Confession, which thus every way touches her friends, her self, and the Witch.

9. Thirdly, That her compact with the Devil was no Fable but a sure truth (and if that be true, there is no reason to doubt of the rest) was abundantly evidenced by the reall effects of it. For after she had delivered the piece of Money above-mentioned and the two pins to Mr *Chandler*, she said she should be troubled for not keeping these things secret. For the Devil told her, so long as she kept them secret, she should never be troubled; but now, she said, having revealed them, she feared she should be troubled. And that those grievous troubles and agonies she was after found in were not mere freaks of her own disturbed Phanasy, but the Tyranny of *Satan*, will appear from several Circumstances.

For at her recovery from the first fitt she fell into, (which was in *Stockbridge*) both Mr *Chandler* and *William Atwood*, the man that went with him, saw a black shade come from her, whereupon presently she came to her self.

Again, she was so strong in her fitts, that six men or more could not hold her; and once as they were holding her, she was caught up from them so high, that her feet touched their breasts, when she was in the Prison at *Sarum*. As also at another time about midnight, she being miserably tormented, and crying out, *The Devil will carry me away*, she was pulled from them that held her, and cast from the low bed where she lay to the top of an high bed, with her Clothes torn off her back, and a piece of her skin torn away. *The Candle in the room standing on the Table*



was thrown down and put out : at which time there being a little Boy that was almost asleep, but with this noise affrighted, he had no power with the rest to goe out of the room, but stayed there, and saw a Spirit in the likeness of a great black man with no head in the room, scuffling with the Maid, who took her and set her into a Chair, and told her that she must goe with him, he was come for her Soul, she had given it to him. But the Maid answered, that her Soul was none of her own to give ; and he had already got her blood, but as for her Soul he should never have it : and after a while tumbling and throwing about of the Maid, he vanished away.

And that that which the Boy heard and saw was no fancy of his own, but a reall object of his Senses, the Witches condition in another Chamber at the same time does not obscurely argue. For she was then seen with her clothes off, in her fetters, running about like mad ; and being asked why she ran about the room, she replied, She could not keep her bed, but was pulled out by violence ; and being asked the reason why, she replied, Pray you what is the matter in your Chamber ? Nothing, said they, but a Childe is not well. To which she answered, Do not you lie to me, for I know what is the matter as well as your selves.

10. But to return to the Maid, from whom we may draw further Arguments relating also to the Witch. As that, when the Maid had not for many dayes and nights together taken any rest, and being then under most grievous huriyings and tortures of the body, the Witch being brought into the room where she lay, the design unknown to her, and the time of her entring, yet so soon as the Witch had set one foot into the room, she gave a most hideous glance with her eyes, and shut them presently after, falling asleep in a moment, and slept about three hours so fast, that when they would have wakened her they could not by any art or violence whatever, as by stopping her breath, putting things up her nostrils, holding her upright, striking of her, and the like. The Witch also declared her unwillingness that she should be wakened, crying out, *O pray you by no means awake the Maid, for if she should awake I should be torn in pieces, and the Devil would fetch me away bodily.* And a further evidence that this sleep of the Maid did some way depend upon the Witch is, that so soon as the Witch had gone from under the roof where she was, the Maid wakened of her self ; and so soon as the Maid awakened, and was at ease (the Devil, as she said, having gone out of her stomach, but doing her no violence, onely making her body tremble a little,) the Witch began to roar and cry out, *The Devil will tear me in pieces.* These things you may read more fully and particularly in the Narration of *Edmond Bower*, who was an eye-witness of them. But what I have transcribed from thence I think is sufficient to convince any indifferent man, that what befell the Maid after her revealing those secrets she was intrusted with, was not counterfeited, but reall, nay, I may safely say, Supernatural.

11. Fourthly and lastly, her behaviour at the Assizes, when she gave evidence against the Witch, was so earnest and serious, with that strength of mind and free and confident appeals to the Witch her self, that, as I was informed of those that were Spectators of that Transacti-

on,

on, it had been argument enough to the unprejudiced, that she swore nothing but what she was assured was true. And those floods of tears and her bitter weepings after Sentence was passed on the Witch, and her bewailing of her own wickedness and madness, and professing her willingness notwithstanding, if it might be done without sin, that the Witch might be reprieved, may further wash away all suspicion of either Fraud or Malice.

12. Nor can the Witches denying (even to her dying day) what the Maid swore to, enervate her testimony. For the Maid tells the whole truth as it was, even to the hazard of her own life; which the Witch indeed denies, but for the saving of hers. And it is no wonder that one that would bid a pox on the Hangman when he desired her to forgive him at her death, should lye and impudently deny any thing to save her own life.

But you'll object, that this reputed Witch may indeed be wicked enough, and willing enough to do any thing; but the power of her wickedness not reaching to such performances as the Maid witnessed against her, we may well believe her rather than the Maid. The sense of which Objection, if I understand it, can be nothing but this; that either this *Anne Bodenham* was no Witch, or else the things charged upon her were absolutely impossible. The meaning of the latter whereof assuredly is, that it is impossible any one should be a *Witch*, there being no such things as *Spirits* to be conjured up by them. Which is unskilfully to let goe the Premisses as finding them too strong, and to quarrel with the Conclusion.

13. But if the sense be (admitting there are *Witches*) that she was none; I think it may be evidently evinced that she was, from what she undoubtedly both did and spake. As for example, from her shewing of the Maid in a Glass the shapes of sundry persons, and their actions and postures, in several rooms in her Masters house, whither when she had returned from the Witch, she told them punctually what they had been doing in her absence; which made *Elisabeth Roswell*, one of the Family, profess, that she thought *M<sup>rs</sup> Bodenham* was either a Witch or a woman of God. Besides, what hapned to her in reference to the fits of the Maid, which has been already insisted upon, are shrewd suspicions of her being a Witch. As also what she boasted of to *M<sup>r</sup> Tucker's* Clerk concerning a purse that hung about her neck in a green string, that she could do many feats with it; and that if he would give her half a dozen of Ale, she would make a Toad spring out of it. Her confession to *M<sup>r</sup> Langley of Sarum*, that she lived with *D<sup>r</sup> Lamb*, and learn'd the art of raising Spirits from him, which she also confessed to *Edmond Bower*; to whom also she acknowledged her skill of curing diseases by *Charms* and *Spells*, that she could discover stolen goods, and shew any one the thief in a Glass: and being asked by him for the *Red Book* half wrote over with blood, being a *Catalogue* of those that had sealed to the Devil, she denied not the knowledge of the book, but said it was with one in *Hampshire*. She also professed that she used many good Prayers, and said the Creed backwards and forwards, and that she prayed to the Planet *Jupiter* for the curing of Diseases.



She also acknowledged she had a Book whereby she raised *Spirits*, calling it a *Book of Charms*, and said it was worth thousands of other books; and that there was a particular *Charm* in it for the finding of a Treasure hid by the old Earl of *Pembroke* in the North part of *Wilton* Garden.

To another party, being asked by him whether there were any *Spirits*, she made this reply, That she was sure there were; and confirmed it to him by several passages of late, and particularly by that of one forced to *walk about all night with a bundle of Pales on his back in a pond of water*, which is mentioned at the end of the fourth Conjuraton above recited. She did also highly magnifie her own art to him, venturing at *Astrological* terms and phrases, and did much scorn and blame the ignorance of the people; averring to him with all earnestness and confidence that there was no hurt in these *Spirits*, but that they would doe a man all good offices, attending upon him and guarding him from evil all his life long.

But certainly her *ragged Boyes* were no such, who discharged the Maid from keeping the Commandments of God, and told her they would teach her a better way; as she also confessed to the same party.

Adde unto all this, that this *Anne Bodenham* was searched both at the Gaol and before the Judges at the Assizes, and there was found on her shoulder a certain mark or teat about the length and bigness of the nipple of a womans breast, and hollow and soft as a nipple, with an hole on the top of it.

14. Wherefore to conclude, there being found upon her, there being done and spoken by her such things as do evidently indigitate that she is a Witch, and has the power of raising Spirits, and she being accused by one of raising them up, who in no likelihood could excogitate any such either Magical Forms, Effects or Circumstances, as are above recited, and who tells her story so indifferently, that it touches her self near as much as the Witch, and upon her revealing of the villany was so handled that it was plainly above any natural distemper imaginable; it cannot, I say, but gain full assent of any man, whom prejudice and obstinacy has not utterly blinded, that what the Maid confessed concerning her self and the Witch is most certainly true.

## CHAP. VIII.

1. Two memorable Stories, with the credibility of them. 2. The first of a Shoemaker of Breslaw, who cut his own throat. 3. His appearing after death in his usual habit, and his vexatious haunting the whole Town. 4. That he being dug up after he had been eight moneths buried, his body was found intire and fresh, and his joynts limber and flexible. 5. That upon the burning thereof the Apparition ceased. 6. Which also hapned in a Maid of his, when she had vexed and disturbed people for a whole moneth together. 7. That the Relator of the Story lived in the Town at what time these things fell out.

1. **I** Have insisted so long upon the foregoing Narration, partly because it is very fresh, so that any man may satisfy himself concerning the truth thereof that has any doubt of such things; and partly because it is so notorious, that it is hardly to be parallel'd by any we meet with in Writers, considering all circumstances. And yet if they were as new, I know not but those Relations of *Martinus Weinrichius*, a *Silesian* Physician and Philosopher, which by way of Preface are prefixt to *Picus Mirandula* his *Strix* or *De ludificatione Daemonum*, may seem as convincing as that.

The Stories are two and very memorable, and the more credible, because the things hapned in the age of the Narrator, some few years before he wrote them, and in his own Countrey; and he doth avouch them with all imaginable confidence to be most certainly true. The former of them is this.

2. A certain Shoemaker in one of the chief Towns of *Silesia*, in the year 1591. *Septemb. 20.* on a Friday betimes in the morning, in the further parts of his house, where there was adjoyning a little Garden, cut his own throat with his Shoemakers knife. The Family, to cover the foulness of the fact, and that no disgrace might come upon his widow, gave out that he died of an Apoplexie, declined all visits of friends and neighbours, in the mean time got him washed and laid linens so handsomely about him, that even they that saw him afterwards, as the Parson and some others, had not the least suspicion but that he did dye of that disease; and so he had honest Burial, with a funeral Sermon and other circumstances becoming one of his rank and reputation. Six weeks had not past but so strong a rumour broke out that he died not of any disease, but had laid violent hands upon himself, that the Magistracy of the place could not but bring all those that had seen the corps to a strict examination. They shuffled off the matter as well as they could at first, with many fair Apologies in the behalf of the deceased, to remove all suspicion of so hainous an act: but it being pressed more home to their Conscience, at last they confessed he died a violent death, but desired their favor and clemency to his widow and children, who were in no fault; adding also, that it was uncertain but that he might be slain by some external mishap,  
or



or if by himself, in some irresistible fit of phrensie or madness.

Hereupon the Councel deliberate what is to be done. Which the Widow hearing, and fearing they might be determining something that would be harsh, and to the discredit of her Husband and her self, being also animated thereto by some busie-bodies, makes a great complaint against those that raised these reports of her Husband, and resolved to follow the Law upon them, earnestly contending that there was no reason upon mere rumours and idle defamations of malevolent people, that her Husband's body should be digged up or dealt with as if he had been either *Magician* or *Self-murtherer*. Which boldness and pertinacity of the woman, though after the confession of the fact, did in some measure work upon the Councel, and put them to a stand.

3. But while these things are in agitation, to the astonishment of the Inhabitants of the place, there appears a *Spectrum* in the exact shape and habit of the deceased, and that not onely in the night, but at mid-day. Those that were asleep it terrified with horrible visions; those that were waking it would strike, pull, or press, lying heavy upon them like an *Ephialtes*: so that there were perpetuall complaints every morning of their last nights rest through the whole Town. But the more freaks this *Spectrum* play'd, the more diligent were the friends of the deceased to suppress the rumours of them, or at least to hinder the effects of those rumours; and therefore made their addressses to the President, complaining how unjust a thing it was, that so much should be given to idle reports and blind suspicions, and therefore beseech'd him that he would hinder the Councel from digging up the corps of the deceased, and from all ignominious usage of him: adding also, that they intended to appeal to the Emperour's Court, that their Wisdoms might rather decide the Controversie, then that the cause should be here determined from the light conjectures of malicious men.

But while by this means the business was still protracted, there were such stirs and tumults all over the Town that they are hardly to be described. For no sooner did the Sun hide his head but this *Spectrum* would be sure to appear, so that every body was fain to look about him and stand upon his guard, which was a sore trouble to those whom the labours of the day made more sensible of the want of rest in the night. For this terrible *Apparition* would sometimes stand by their bed-sides, sometimes cast it self upon the midst of their beds, would lie close to them, would miserably suffocate them, and would so strike them and pinch them, that not onely blew marks, but plain impressions of his fingers would be upon sundry parts of their bodies in the morning. Nay, such was the violence and impetuousness of this Ghost, that when men forsook their beds and kept their dining-rooms, with Candles lighted, and many of them in company together, the better to secure themselves from fear and disturbance; yet he would then appear to them, and have a bout with some of them notwithstanding all this provision against it. In brief, he was so troublesome, that the people were ready to forsake their houses and seek other dwellings, and the Magistrate so awakened at the perpetual complaints of them, that at last they resolved, the President agreeing thereto, to dig up the Body.

4. He

4. He had lain in the ground near eight moneths, *viz.* from *Sept.* 22. 1591. to *April* 18. 1592. When he was digged up, which was in the presence of the Magistracy of the Town, his body was found entire, not at all putrid, no ill smell about him, saving the mustiness of the grave-Clothes, his joynts limber and flexible, as in those that are alive, his skin only flaccid, but a more fresh grown in the room of it, the wound of his throat gaping, but no gear nor corruption in it; there was also observed a Magical mark in the great toe of his right foot, *viz.* an Excreescency in the form of a Rose. His body was kept out of earth from *April* 18. to the 24. at what time many both of the same Town and others came daily to view him. These unquiet stirs did not cease for all this, which they after attempted to appease by burying the corps under the Gallows, but in vain; for they were as much as ever, if not more, he now not sparing his own Family: insomuch that his Widow at last went her self to the Magistrate, and told them that she should be no longer against it, if they thought fit to fall upon some course of more strict proceedings touching her Husband.

5. Wherefore the seventh of *May* he was again digged up, and it was observable that he was grown more sensibly fleshy since his last interment. To be short, they cut off the Head, Arms and Legs of the corps, and opening his Back took out his Heart, which was as fresh and intire as in a Calf new kill'd. These, together with his Body, they put on a pile of wood, and burnt them to Ashes, which they carefully sweeping together and putting into a Sack (that none might get them for wicked uses) poured them into the River, after which the *Spectrum* was never seen more.

6. As it also happened in his Maid that dyed after him, who appeared within eight daies after her death to her fellow-servant, and lay so heavy upon her that she brought upon her a great swelling of her eyes. She so grievously handled a Child in the cradle, that if the Nurse had not come in to his help, he had been quite spoiled; but she crossing her self and calling upon the name of *Jesus*, the Spectre vanished. The next night she appeared in the shape of an *Hen*, which when one of the Maids of the house took to be so indeed and followed her, the Hen grew into an immense bigness, and presently caught the Maid by the throat and made it swell, so that she could neither well eat nor drink of a good while after.

She continu'd these stirs for a whole moneth, flapping some so smartly that the strokes were heard of them that stood by, pulling the bed also from under others, and appearing sometimes in one shape, sometimes in another, as of a Woman, of a Dog, of a Cat, and of a Goat. But at last her body being digged up and burnt, the Apparition was never seen more.

7. These things were done at *Breslaw* in *Silesia* where this *Weinrichius* then lived, which makes the Narration more considerable. This concealing the name of the parties, I conceive, was in way of civility to his deceased Towns-man, his Towns-mans Widow, and their Family.



## CHAP. IX.

1. *The second Story of one Cuntius, whose first Pen-man not onely dwelt in the Town, but was a sad sufferer in the Tragedie.* 2. *The quality of Cuntius, his fatal blow by his Horse, and his desperate affliction of Mind.* 3. *Prodigies attending his death.* 4. *A Spiritus Incubus in the shape of him, with other disorders.* 5. *More hideous disorders, as also his appearing to a Gossip of his in behalf of his Child.* 6. *Several sad effects of his appearing upon several persons.* 7. *His miserable usage of the Parson of the Parish and his Family, who is the Pen-man of the Story.* 8. *A brief Rehearsal of many other mad Pranks of this Spectre.* 9. *A remarkable passage touching his Grave-stone.* 10. *The florid plight of Cuntius after he had been buried near half a year, his grasping of a Staff, and the motion of his Eyes and of his Blood.* 11. *The prodigious Weight of his body.* 12. *As also the Incombustibleness thereof.* 13. *How hard set the Atheist will be for a subterfuge against this Story.*

1. **T**HE other Story he sets down he is not the first Pen-man of (though the things were done in his time, and, as I conceive, some while after what has been above related; as a passage in the Narration seems to intimate) but he transcribed it from one that not only dwelt in the place, but was often infested with the noisom occurrences of that troublesom Ghost that did so much mischief to the place where he dwelt. The Relation is somewhat large, I shall bring it into as narrow compass as I can.

2. *Johannes Cuntius, a Citizen of Pentsch in Silesia, near sixty years of age, and one of the Aldermen of the Town, very fair in his carriage, and unblamable, to mens thinking, in the whole course of his life, having been sent for to the Maior's house (as being a very understanding man and dexterous at the dispatch of busineses) to end some controversies concerning certain Wagoners, and a Merchant of Pannonia having made an end of those affairs, is invited by the Maior to Supper: he gets leave first to goe home to order some busineses, leaving this sentence behind him, It's good to be merry while we may, for mischiefs grow up fast enough daily.*

This *Cuntius* kept five lusty Geldings in his Stable, one whereof he commanded to be brought out, and his shoe being loose, had him tied to the next post: his Master with a Servant busied themselves to take up his leg to look on his hoof, the Horse being mad and metalsom struck them both down; but *Cuntius* received the greatest share of the blow: one that stood next by helpt them both up again, *Cuntius* no sooner was up and came to himself, but cry'd out, *Wo is me, how do I burn and am all on a fire!* Which he often repeated. But the parts he complained of most, the women being put out of the room, when they were searched, no appearance of any stroke or hurt was found upon them. To be short, he fell downright

downright sick and grievously afflicted in Mind, loudly complaining, that his Sins were such that they were utterly unpardonable, and that the least part of them were bigger then all the Sins of the world besides; but would have no Divine come to him, nor did particularly confess them to any. Several rumours indeed there were that once he sold one of his Sons, but when and to whom it was uncertain, and that he had made a Contract with the Devil, and the like. But it was observed and known for certain, that he had grown beyond all expectation rich, and that four daies before this mischance he being witness to a Child, said, that that was the last he should be ever witness to.

3. The night he died his eldest Son watched with him. He gave up the Ghost about the third hour of the night, at what time a black Cat opening the casement with her nails (for it was shut) ran to his bed, and did so violently scratch his face and the bolster, as if she endeavoured by force to remove him out of the place where he lay. But the Cat afterwards suddenly was gone, and she was no sooner gone, but he breathed his last. A fair tale was made to the Pastor of the Parish, and the Magistracy of the Town allowing it, he was buried on the right side of the Altar, his Friends paying well for it. No sooner *Cuntius* was dead but a great Tempest arose, which raged most at his very Funeral, there being such impetuous Storms of Wind with Snow, that it made mens bodies quake and their teeth chatter in their heads. But so soon as he was interred, of a sudden all was calm.

4. He had not been dead a day or two, but several rumours were spread in the town of a *Spiritus incubus* or *Ephialtes*, in the shape of *Cuntius*, that would have forced a Woman. This hapned before he was buried. After his Burial the same *Spectre* awakened one that was sleeping in his dining-room, saying, *I can scarce withhold myself from beating thee to death.* The voice was the voice of *Cuntius*. The watchmen of the Town also affirmed that they heard every night great stirs in *Cuntius* his House, the fallings and throwings of things about, and that they did see the gates stand wide open betimes in the mornings, though they were never so diligently shut o're night; that his Horses were very unquiet in the Stable, as if they kicked and bit one another; besides unusual barkings and howlings of Dogs all over the Town. But these were but preludious suspicions to further evidence, which I will run over as briefly as I may.

5. A Maid-servant of one of the Citizens of *Pentsch* (while these Tragedies and stirs were so frequent in the Town) heard, together with some others lying in their beds, the noise and tramlings of one riding about the House, who at last ran against the walls with that violence that the whole House shook again as if it would fall, and the windows were all fill'd with flashings of light. The Master of the house being informed of it, went out of doors in the morning to see what the matter was; and he beheld in the Snow the impressions of strange feet, such as were like neither Horses, nor Cows, nor Hogs, nor any Creature that he knew.

Another time, about eleven of the clock in the night, *Cuntius* appears to one of his Friends that was a witness to a Childe of his, speaks unto

L

him,



him, and bids him be of good courage, for he came onely to communicate unto him a matter of great importance. *I have left behind me*, said he, *my youngest son James, to whom you are God-father. Now there is at my eldest son Steven's, a Citizen of Jegerdorf, a certain Chest wherein I have put four hundred and fifteen Florens: This I tell you, that your God-son may not be defrauded of any of them, and it is your duty to look after it, which if you neglect, woe be to you.* Having said this, the *Speetre* departed, and went up into the upper rooms of the House, where he walked so stoutly that all rattled again, and the roof swagged with his heavy stampings. This, *Cuntius* his Friend rold to the Parson of the Parish a day or two after for a certain truth.

6. But there are also other several notorious passages of this *Cuntius*. As his often speaking to the Maid that lay with her Mistriss, his Widow, to give him place, for it was his right; and if she would not give it him, he would writhe her neck behind her.

His galloping up and down like a wanton horse in the Court of his House. His being divers times seen to ride, not onely in the streets, but along the valleys of the field and on the Mountains, with so strong a trot that he made the very ground flash with fire under him.

His bruising of the body of a Child of a certain Smiths, and making his very bones so soft, that you might wrap the corps on heaps like a glove.

His miserably tugging all night with a Jew that had taken up his *Inne* in the Town, and tossing him up and down in the lodging where he lay.

His dreadful accosting of a Wagoner, an old acquaintance of his, while he was busie in the stable, vomiting out fire against him to terrifie him, and biting of him so cruelly by the foot that he made him lame.

7. What follows, as I above intimated, concerns the Relator himself, who was the Parson of the Parish, whom this Fury so squeezed and pressed when he was asleep, that wakening he found himself utterly spent and his strength quite gone, but could not imagine the reason. But while he lay musing with himself what the matter might be, this *Speetre* returns again to him, and holding him all over so fast that he could not wag a finger, rowled him in his bed backwards and forwards a good many times together. The same hapned also to his Wife another time, whom *Cuntius*, coming through the casement in the shape of a little Dwarf and running to her bed side, so wrung and pulled as if he would have torn her throat out, had not her two Daughters come in to help her.

He pressed the lips together of one of this *Theologer's* Sons so, that they could scarce get them asunder.

His House was so generally disturbed with this unruly Ghost, that the Servants were fain to keep together anights in one room, lying upon straw and watching the approaches of this troublesome Fiend. But a Maid of the house, being more courageous then the rest, would needs one night goe to bed, and forsake her company. Whereupon *Cuntius* finding her

her alone, presently assaults her, pulls away the bedding, and would have carried her away with him; but she hardly escaping fled to the rest of the Family, where she espied him standing by the candle, and straightway after vanishing.

Another time he came into her Masters Chamber, making a noise like a Hog that eat grains, smacking and grunting very sonorously. They could not chase him away by speaking to him; but ever as they lighted a Candle he would vanish.

On another time about Evening, when this *Theologer* was sitting with his Wife and Children about him, exercising himself in Musick, according to his usual manner, a most grievous stink arose suddenly, which by degrees spread it self to every corner of the room. Hereupon he commends himself and his family to God by prayer. The smell nevertheless encreased, and became above all measure pestilently noisom, insomuch that he was forced to goe up to his chamber. He and his Wife had not been in bed a quarter of an hour, but they find the same stink in the bed-chamber; of which while they are complaining one to another, out steps the *Spectre* from the wall, and creeping to his bed-side breathes upon him an exceeding cold breath of so intolerable stinking and malignant a sent, as is beyond all imagination and expression. Hereupon the *Theologer*, good soul, grew very ill, and was fain to keep his bed, his face, belly and guts swelling, as if he had been poisoned; whence he was also troubled with a difficulty of breathing, and with a putrid inflammation of his eyes, so that he could not well use them of a long time after.

8. But taking leave of the sick Divine, if we should goe back and recount what we have omitted, it would exceed the number of what we have already recounted. As for example, The trembling and sweating of *Cuntius* his Gelding, from which he was not free night nor day: The burning blew of the Candles at the approaches of *Cuntius* his Ghost: His drinking up the milk in the milk-bowls, his flinging dung into them, or turning the milk into blood: His pulling up posts deep set in the ground, and so heavy that two lusty Porters could not deal with them: His discoursing with several men he met concerning the affairs of the Wagoners: His strangling of old men: His holding fast the Cradles of Children, or taking them out of them: His frequent endeavouring to force women: His defiling the water in the Font, and fouling the Cloth on the Altar on that side that did hang towards his grave with dirty bloody spots: His catching up Dogs in the streets, and knocking their brains against the ground: His sucking dry the Cows, and tying their tails like the tail of an Horse: His devouring of Poultry, and his flinging of Goats bound into the Racks: His tying of an Horse to an empty Oat-tub in the Stable to clatter up and down with it, and the hinder foot of another to his own head-stall: His looking out of the window of a low Tower, and then suddenly changing himself into the form of a long staff: His chiding of a Matron for suffering her servant to wash dishes on a Thursday, at what time he laid his hand upon her, and she said it felt more cold then ice: His pelting one of the women that washed his corps, so forcibly, that the prints of the Clods he flung were to be seen upon the



wall : His attempting to ravish another , who excusing her self, and saying, *My Cuntius, thou seest how old, wrinckled and deformed I am, and how unfit for those kinds of sports,* he suddenly set up a loud laughter and vanished.

9. But we must not insist upon these things ; onely we will adde one passage more that is not a little remarkable. His grave-stone was turned of one side, shelving, and there were several holes in the earth, about the bigness of mouse-holes, that went down to his very Coffin, which however they were filled up with earth and all made plain over night, yet they would be sure to be laid open the next morning.

It would be a tedious business to recite all these things at large, and prosecute the Story in all its particular Circumstances. To conclude therefore, their calamity was such from the frequent occurrences of this restless Fury, that there was none but either pitied them or despised them ; none would lodge in their Town, trading was decayed, and the Citizens impoverished by the continual stirs and tumults of this unquiet Ghost.

10. And though the *Atheist* may perhaps laugh at them as men undone by their own Melancholy and vain imaginations, or by the wag-gery of some ill neighbours ; yet if he seriously consider what has been already related, there are many passages that are by no means to be resolved into any such Principles : but what I shall now declare, will make it altogether unlikely that any of them are.

To be short therefore, finding no rest nor being able to excogitate any better remedy, they dig up *Cuntius* his body, with several others buried both before and after him. But those both after and before were so putrefied and rotten, their Skulls broken, and the Sutures of them gaping, that they were not to be known by their shape at all, having become in a manner but a rude mass of earth and dirt ; but it was quite otherwise in *Cuntius* : His Skin was tender and florid, his Joynts not at all stiff, but limber and moveable, and a staff being put into his Hand, he grasped it with his fingers very fast ; his Eyes also of themselves would be one time open and another time shut ; they opened a vein in his Leg, and the blood sprang out as fresh as in the living ; his Nose was entire and full, not sharp, as in those that are gastly sick or quite dead : and yet *Cuntius* his body had lien in the grave from *Feb. 8.* to *July 20.* which is almost half a year.

11. It was easily discernible where the fault lay. However, nothing was done rashly, but Judges being constituted, Sentence was pronounced upon *Cuntius* his Carcase, which ( being animated thereto from success in the like case some few years before in this very Province of *Silesia*, I suppose he means at *Breslaw* where the Shoemakers body was burnt) they adjudged to the fire.

Wherefore there were Masons provided to make a hole in the wall near the Altar to get his body through, which being pulled at with a rope, it was so exceeding heavy that the rope brake, and they could scarce stir him. But when they had pull'd him through, and gotten him on a Cart without, which *Cuntius* his Horse that struck him ( which was a  
lusty-

lustly-bodied Jade) was to draw ; yet it put him to it so, that he was ready to fall down ever and anon , and was quite out of breath with striving to draw so intolerable a load, who notwithstanding could run away with two men in the same Cart presently after, their weight was so inconsiderable to his strength.

12. His body, when it was brought to the fire, proved as unwilling to be burnt as before to be drawn, so that the Executioner was fain with hooks to pull him out, and cut him into pieces to make him burn. Which while he did, the blood was found so pure and spiritous, that it spurted into his face as he cut him ; but at last, not without the expence of two hundred and sixteen great billets, all was turned into ashes. Which they carefully sweeping up together, as in the foregoing Story, and casting them into the River, the *Spectre* never more appeared.

13. I must confess I am so slow-witted my self, that I cannot so much as imagine what the *Atheist* will excogitate for a subterfuge or hiding-place from so plain and evident Convictions.

Hitherto of Witches and other devoted Vassals of *Satan* in several ; we shall now consider their Assemblies and Conventicles, and urge further proofs of *Spirits* and *Apparitions* from thence.

## CHAP. X.

1. *The Nocturnal Conventicles of Witches ; two examples thereof out of Paulus Grillandus.* 2. *Of the Witch of Lochiæ, with a reflexion on the unexceptionableness of these Instances for the proof of Spirits.* 3. *The piping of John of Hembach to a Conventicle of Witches.* 4. *The dancing of Men, Women and cloven-footed Satyrs at Mid-day.* 5. *John Michael's dumb Musick on his crooked staff from the bough of an Oak at that Antick dancing.* 6. *The Impresse of a Circle with cloven feet in it on the ground where they danced.*

1. **P**aulus Grillandus reports of one not farre from Rome, who at the perswasion of his Wife anointing himself, as she had done before him, was carried away in the aire to a great Assembly of Wizards and Witches, where they were feasting under a Nut-tree. But this stranger not relishing his chear without Salt, at last the Salt coming, and he blessing of God for it, at that Name the whole Assembly disappeared, and he poor man was left alone naked an hundred miles off from home ; whither when he had got he accused his Wife : she confess'd the fact, discovering also her companions, who were therefore burnt with her.

The same Author writes also of a young Girl thirteen years old in the Dukedome of Spalatto, who being brought into the like company, and admiring the strangeness of the thing, and crying out, *Blessed God, what's here to doe !* made the whole Assembly vanish, was left her self in



the field alone, and wandering up and down was found by a countreyman, to whom she told the whole matter.

Bodin. Mag.  
Demon. lib. 2.  
cap. 4.

2. So the Husband of the Witch of *Lochia*, whom she brought into the like Assembly, by saying, *O my God, where are we?* made all to vanish, and found himself naked alone in the field fifteen dayes journey from home.

Several other Narrations to this purpose *Bodinus* sets down, which these sensible effects of being so far distant from home, and being found naked in the fields, shew to be no freaks of *Melancholy*, but certain truth. But that the *Devil* in these junquetings appears to the Guests in the form of a *Satyr*, *black Goat*, or else sometimes in the shape of an ill-favoured *black man*, is the ordinary Confession of *Witches*, by this way discovered and convicted.

3. I will onely adde a Story or two out of *Remigius* concerning these kindes of *Conventicles*, and then I will proceed to some other proofs.

See Remig. Da-  
monolatr. l. 1.  
cap. 14.

*John* of *Hembach* was carried by his Mother being a Witch to one of these Meetings, and because he had learn'd to play on the *Pipe*, was commanded by her to exercise his faculty, and to get up into a Tree, that they might the better hear his Musick. Which he doing, and looking upon the Dancers, how uncouth and ridiculous they were in their motions and gestures, being struck with admiration at the novelty of the matter, suddenly burst out into these words, *Good God, what a mad company have we here!* Which was no sooner said, but down came *John*, *Pipe* and all, and hurt his shoulder with the tumbling cast; who when he called to the company to help him, found himself alone, for they had all vanished. *John* of *Hembach* told what had hapned, but people knew not what to make of it, till some of that mad Crew that danc'd to his *Pipe* were apprehended upon other suspicions, as *Catharina Prævetia*, *Kelvers Orilla*, and others, who made good every whit what *John* had before told (though they knew nothing of what he told before) adding also more particularly that the place where he pip'd to them was *Maybuch*.

Demonolatr.  
l. 1. c. 14.

4. The other memorable Story that I shall relate out of *Remigius* is this. One *Nicolea Langbernhard*, while she was going towards *Assennunturia* along a hedge side, spied in the next field (it was about Noon-time of day) a company of men and women dancing in a ring; and the posture of their bodies being uncouth and unusual, made her view them more attentively, whereby she discerned some of them to have cloven feet like *Oxen* or *Goats* (it should seem they were *Spirits* in the shape of lusty *Satyrs*: ) she being astonish'd with fear cries out, *Jesus, help me, and send me well home.* She had no sooner said so, but they all vanished saving onely one *Peter Grossetter*, whom a little after she saw snatch'd up into the aire, and to let fall his *Maulkin* (a stick that they make clean *Ovens* withall) and her self was also driven so forcibly with the wind, that it made her almost lose her breath. She was fain to keep her bed three dayes after.

5. This *Peter* (though at first he would have followed the Law on *Nicolea* for slandering him, yet) afterward freely confess'd and discovered others of his companions, as *Barbelia* the wife of *Joannes Latomus*, &

*Mayetta*

*Mayetta* the wife of *Laurentius*, who confessed she danced with those cloven-footed Creatures at what time *Peter* was amongst them. And for further evidence of the business, *John Michael*, Herdsman, did confess, that while they thus danced, he plaid upon his *Crooked staff*, and struck upon it with his fingers as if it had been a Pipe, sitting upon an high bough of an Oak; and that so soon as *Nicolea* called upon the Name of *Jesus*, he tumbled down headlong to the ground, but was presently catch'd up again with a whirlwind, and carried to *Weiller Meadows*, where he had left his Herds a little before.

6. Adde unto all this, that there was found in the place where they danced a round *Circle*, wherein there was the manifest marks of the treading of cloven feet, which was seen from the day after *Nicolea* had discovered the business, till the next Winter that the Plough cut them out. These things hapned in the year 1590.

## CHAP. XI.

1. Of Fairy-Circles. 2. Questions propounded concerning Witches leaving their bodies, as also concerning their Transformation into bestial shapes. 3. That the Reasons of Wierus and Remigius against reall Transformation are but weak. 4. The Probabilities for, and the Manner of, reall Transformation. 5. An argumentation for their being out of their bodies in their Ecstasies. 6. That the Soul's leaving the Body thus is not Death, nor her return any proper Miracle. 7. That it is in some cases most easie and natural to acknowledge they do leave their bodies, with an instance out of Wierus that suits to that purpose. 8. The Author's Scepticism in the point, with a favourable interpretation of the proper extravagances of Temper in Bodinus and Des-Cartes.

1. **I**T might be here very seasonable, upon the foregoing Story, to enquire into the nature of those large *dark Rings* in the grass which they call *Fairy-Circles*, whether they be the *Rendezvous* of Witches, or the dancing-places of those little Puppet-Spirits which they call *Elves* or *Fairies*. But these curiosities I leave to more busie wits. I am onely intent now upon my serious purpose of proving there are *Spirits*; which I think I have made a pretty good progress in already, and have produced such Narrations as cannot but gain credit with such as are not perversly and wilfully incredulous.

2. There is another more profitable Question started, if it could be decided, concerning these *Night-revellings* of Witches, Whether they be not sometimes there, their Bodies lying at home; as sundry Relations seem to favour that opinion: \* *Bodinus* is for it, \* *Remigius* is against it.

\* *Magor. Dæmonom. lib. 2. cap. 5.*

\* *Remig. Dæmonolatr. lib. 1. cap. 14.*

It is the same Question, Whether when Witches or Wizards profess they will tell what is done within so many miles compass, and afterwards, to give a proof of their skill, first anoint their Bodies, and then fall down



dead in a manner, and so lie a competent time senseless, whether, I say, their Souls goe out of their Bodies, or all be but represented to their Imagination.

Bodin. *Magor. Damon*, lib. 2. cap. 6.

We may adde a third, which may haply better fetch off the other two; and that is concerning your *Λυγισμοί* (which the *German*s call *Werewolff*, the French *Loups garous*) *Men* transformed into *Wolves*: and there is much what the same reason of other *Transformations*. I shall not trouble you with any *Histories* of them, though I might produce many. But as well those that hold it is but a delusion of the *Devil*, & mere *Tragedies* in *Dreams*, as they that say they are real transactions, do acknowledge, that those parties that have confessed themselves thus transformed have been *weary* and *fore* with running, have been *wounded*, and the like. *Bodinus* here also is deserted of *Remigius*, who is of the same minde with *Wierus*, that sly, smooth Physician, and faithful Patron of *Witches*, who will be sure to load the *Devil* as much as he can, his shoulders being more able to bear it, and so to ease the *Haggs*.

Remig. *Demonolatr.* l. 2. c. 5.

3. But for mine own part, though I will not undertake to decide the Controversie; yet I think it not amiss to declare that *Bodinus* may very well make good his own, notwithstanding any thing those do alledge to the contrary. For that which \* *Wierus* and \* *Remigius* seem so much to stand upon, that it is too great a power for the *Devil*, and too great indignity to *Man*, that he should be able thus to *transform* him, are, in my minde, but slight *Rhetorickations*, no sound *Arguments*.

\* *De Praestig. Damon*, lib. 3. c. 10. l. 1. c. 24. l. 2. c. 8. l. 4. c. 20. \* *Remig. Demonolatr.* l. 2. cap. 5.

For what is that *outward mis-shapement* of *Body* to the *inward deformity* of their *Souls*, which he helps on so notoriously? And they having given themselves over to him so wholly, why may he not use them thus *here*, when they shall be worse used by him *hereafter*? And for the changing of the *species* of things, if that were a power too big to be granted the *Devil*, yet it is no more done *here*, when he thus *transforms* a *Man* into a *Wolf*, then when he transforms *himself* into the shape of a *Man*. For this *Wolf* is still a *Man*, and that *Man* is still a *Devil*. For it is so as the Poet sayes it was in *Ulysses* his *Companions* which *Circe* turned into *Hoggs*, They had the *Head*, the *Voice*, the *Body* and *Bristles* of *Hogs*;

— Αὐτὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἔμπεδός, ὡς τὸ πάροις,  
but their Understanding was unchanged, they had the Mind and Memory of a *Man* as before. As *Petrus Bourgotus* professeth, that when his companion *Michael Verdung* had anointed his body and transform'd him into a *Wolf*, when he look'd upon his hairy Feet, he was at first afraid of himself.

4. Now therefore it being plain that nothing material is alledged to the contrary, and that *Men* confess they are turn'd into *Wolves*, and acknowledge the salvage cruelties they then committed upon *Children*, *Women* and *Sheep*, that they finde themselves exceeding *weary*, and sometimes *wounded*; it is more natural to conclude they were *really* thus *transformed*, then that it was a mere delusion of *Phansy*.

For I conceive the *Devil* gets into their *Body*, and by his subtiler substance, more operative and searching then any fire or putrefying liquor, melts

melts the yielding *Compages* of the Body to such a consistency, and so much of it as is fit for his purpose, and makes it pliable to his Imagination; and then it is as easie for him to work it into what *shape* he pleaseth, as it is to work the Aire into such forms and figures as he ordinarily doth. Nor is it any more difficulty for him to mollifie what is hard, then it is to harden what is so soft and fluid as the Aire.

5. And he that hath this power, we can never stick to give him that which is lesser, *viz.* to instruct men how they shall for a time *forsake their Bodies*, and come in again. For can it be a hard thing for him that can thus melt and take a-pieces the particles of the Body, to have the skill and power to loosen the Soul, a Substance really distinct from the Body and separable from it; which at last is done by the easie course of Nature, at that final dissolution of Soul and Body which we call *Death*? But no course of Nature ever transforms the Body of Man into the shape of a Wolf; so that this is more hard and exorbitant from the order of Nature then the other.

6. I but, you'll say, the greatness and incredibleness of the Miracle is this, That there should be an actual *separation* of *Soul* and *Body*, and yet no *Death*. But this is not at all strange, if we consider that *Death* is properly a disjunction of the Soul from the Body by reason of the *Body's unfitness* any longer to entertain the Soul, which may be caused by extremity of *Diseases*, outward *Violence* or *Age*; and if the Devil could restore such Bodies as these to Life, it were a *Miracle* indeed. But this is not such a *Miracle*, nor is the Body properly *dead*, though the Soul be out of it. For the *life* of the Body is nothing else but that *fitness* to be actuated by the Soul. The conservation whereof is help'd, as I conceive, by the *anointing* of the Body before the *Ecstasie*; which ointment filling the pores, keeps out the cold, and keeps in the heat and spirits, that the frame and temper of the Body may continue in fit case to entertain the Soul again at her return. So the vital steams of the carcase being not yet spent, the pristine operations of Life are presently again kindled; as a Candle new blown out, and as yet reeking, suddenly catches fire from the flame of another, though at some distance, the light gliding down along the smoke.

7. Wherefore there being nothing in the nature of the thing that should make us incredulous, these *Sorceresses* so confidently pronouncing that they are *out of their Bodies* at such times, and see and doe such and such things, meet one another, bring messages, discover secrets and the like, it is more natural and easie to conclude they be *really out of their Bodies* then *in* them. Which we should the more easily be induced to believe, if we could give credit to that Narration *Wierus* tells of a Souldier, out of whose mouth whilest he was asleep a thing in the shape of a Weasel came, which nudling along in the grass, and at last coming to a brook side, very busily attempting to get over, but not being able, some one of the standers by that saw it made a bridge for it of his sword, which it passed over by, and coming back made use of the same passage, and then entred into the Souldiers mouth again; many looking on. When he awaked, he told how he dream'd he had gone over an iron bridge, and  
other



\* De Praestig.  
Damon. lib. 1.  
cap. 14.

other particulars answerable to what the Spectators had seen aforehand. \* *Wierus* acknowledgeth the truth of the Relation, but will by all means have it to be the *Devil*; not the *Soul* of the Man; which he doth in a tender regard to the Witches, that from such a truth as this they might not be made so obnoxious to suspicion that their *Ecstasies* are not mere *Dreams* and *Delusions* of the Devil, but are accompanied with *reall effects*.

8. I will not take upon me to decide so nice a Controverſie, onely I will make bold to intermeddle thus far, as to pronounce *Bodinus* his opinion not at all unworthy of a rational and ſagacious man: and that though, by his being much addicted to ſuch like ſpeculations, he might attribute ſome natural effects to the miniſtery of *Spirits*, when there was no need ſo to doe; yet his Judgement in other things of this kinde is no more to be ſlighted for that, then *Carteſius*, that ſtupendious Mechanical Wit, is to be diſallowed in thoſe excellent inventions of the cauſes of thoſe more general *Phænomena* of Nature, becauſe by his ſucceſs in thoſe he was imboldened to enlarge his Principles too far, and to aſſert that *Animals* themſelves were mere *Machinas*: like *Ariſtoxenus* the Muſician, that made the *Soul* nothing elſe but an *Harmony*; of whom *Tully* pleaſantly obſerves, *Quòd non receſſit ab arte ſua*.

Every *Genius* and *Temper*, as the ſundry ſorts of Beaſts and living Creatures, have their proper excrement: and it is the part of a wiſe man to take notice of it, and to chuſe what is profitable, as well as to abandon what is uſeleſs and excrementitious.

## CHAP. XII.

1. *The Coldneſs of thoſe Bodies that Spirits appear in, witneſſed by the experience of Cardan and Bourgotus.* 2. *The natural reaſon of this Coldneſs.* 3. *That the Devil does really lie with Witches.* 4. *That the very Subſtance of Spirits is not Fire.* 5. *The Spectre at Ephesus.* 6. *Spirits skirmiſhing on the ground.* 7, 8. *Field-fights and Sea-fights ſeen in the Aire.*

1. **B**UT to return into the way, I might adde other Stories of your *Dæmones Metallici*, your *Guardian Genii*, ſuch as that of *Socrates*, and that other of which *Bodinus* tells an ample Relation, which he received from him who had the ſociety and aſſiſtance of ſuch an *Angel* or *Genius*, which for my own part I give as much credit to as to any Story in *Livy* or *Plutarch*; your *Lares familiares*, as alſo thoſe that haunt and vex Families, appearing to many, and leaving very ſenſible effects of their appearings. But I will not ſo far tire either my ſelf or my Reader. I will onely name one or two more, rather then recite them. As that of *Facius Cardanus*, who relates, as you may ſee in \* *Cardan*, how a *Spirit* that familiarly was ſeen in the houſe of a friend of his, one night laid his hand upon

\* See Cardan  
De rerum va-  
rietas, lib. 16.  
cap. 93.

upon his brow, which felt intolerably cold. And so \* *Petrus Bourgotus* confessed, that when the *Devil* gave him his hand to kiss, it felt cold. And many more examples there be to this purpose.

\* Wier. De præ-  
stig. Dæmon.  
lib. 6. c. 13.

2. And indeed it stands to very good reason that the *Bodies* of *Devils*, being nothing but *coagulated Aire*, should be cold, as well as *coagulated Water*, which is *Snow* or *Ice*; and that it should have a more keen and piercing cold, it consisting of more subtile particles then those of *Water*, and therefore more fit to insinuate, and more accurately and stingingly to affect and touch the nerves.

3. Wherefore *Witches* confessing so frequently as they do, that the *Devil* lies with them, and withall complaining of his tedious and offensive coldness, it is a shrewd presumption that he doth lie with them indeed, and that it is not a mere *Dream*, as their friend *Wierus* would have it.

4. Hence we may also discover the folly of that opinion that makes the very Essence of *Spirits* to be *Fire*: for how unfit that would be to *coagulate* the *Aire* is plain at first sight. It would rather melt and dissolve these consistences, then constringe them and freeze them in a manner. But it is rather manifest that the Essence of *Spirits* is a substance specifically distinct from all corporeal matter whatsoever. But my intent is not to Philosophize concerning the nature of *Spirits*, but onely to prove their Existence.

5. Which the *Spectre* at *Ephesus* may be a further argument of. For that old man which *Apollonius* told the *Ephesians* was the walking plague of the City, when they stoned him and uncovered the heap, appear'd in the shape of an huge black *Dog* as big as the biggest *Lion*. This could be no imposture of *Melancholy*, nor *Fraud* of any *Priest*. And the learned *Grotius*, a man far from all *Levity* and vain *Credulity*, is so secure of the truth of *Tyaneus* his *Miracles*, that he does not stick to term him impudent that has the face to deny them.

6. Our *English Chronicles* also tell us of *Apparitions*, armed men, foot and horse, fighting upon the ground in the North part of *England* and in *Ireland* for many Evenings together, seen by many hundreds of men at once, and that the grass was troden down in the places where they were seen to fight their *Battails*: which agreeth with *Nicolaus Langbernhard* her Relation of the cloven-footed *Dancers*, that left the print of their hoofs in the ring they trod down for a long time after.

See Mystery of  
Godliness,  
Book 6. ch. 2.  
sect. 5.

7. But this skirmishing upon the *Earth* puts me in mind of the last part of this argument, and bids me look up into the *Aire*. Where, omitting all other *Prodigies*, I shall onely take notice of what is most notorious, and of which there can by no means be given any other account then that it is the effect of *Spirits*. And this is the Appearance of armed men fighting and encountring one another in the *Sky*. There are so many examples of these *Prodigies* in *Historians*, that it were superfluous to instance in any. That before the great slaughter of no less then fourscore thousand made by *Antiochus* in *Jerusalem*, recorded in the second of *Maccabees* chap. 5. is famous. The *Historian* there writes, "That through all the City for the space almost of fourty daies there were seen *Horsemen* running in the *Aire* in cloth of Gold, and arm'd with *Lances*, like a band

"of



“ of Souldiers, and *Troops* of Horsemen in array *encountering* and running  
 “ one against another, with shaking of shields and multitudes of pikes,  
 “ and drawing of swords, and casting of darts, and glittering of golden  
 “ ornaments, and harness of all sorts. And *Josephus* writes also concerning the like Prodigies that hapned before the destruction of the City by *Titus*, prefacing first, that they were incredible, were it not that they were recorded by those that were Eye-witnesses of them.

8. The like *Apparitions* were seen before the Civil wars of *Marius* and *Sylla*. And *Melanchthon* affirms that a world of such Prodigies were seen all over *Germany* from 1524 to 1548. *Snellius* amongst other places doth particularize in *Amortsfort*, where these *fightings* were seen not much higher then the house tops; as also in *Amsterdam*, where there was a *Sea-fight* appearing in the *Aire* for an hour or two together, many thousands of men looking on. And to say nothing of what hath been seen in *England* not long agoe, there is lately a punctual narration of such a *Sea-fight* seen by certain *Hollanders*, and sent over hither into *England*; but a *Lion* appearing alone at the end of that *Apparition*, though it may be true for ought I know, yet it makes it obnoxious to *Suspicion* and evasion, and so unprofitable for my purpose. But the *Phanomena* of this kind, whose reports cannot be suspected to be in subserviency to any Politick design, ought in reason to be held true, when there have been many profest Eye-witnesses of them. And they being resolvable into no *natural* causes, it is evident that we must acknowledge *supernatural* ones, such as *Spirits*, *Intelligences* or *Angels*, term them what you please.

### C H A P. XIII.

1. *The main reason why good Spirits so seldome consociate with men.*
2. *What manner of Magick Bodinus his friend used to procure the more sensible assistance of a good Genius.*
3. *The manner of this Genius his sensible Converse.*
4. *The Religiousness of the Party, and the Character of his Temper.*
5. *His escapes from danger by advertisements of the good Genius.*
6. *The Genius his averseness from Vocall conversation with him.*
7. *His usefull Assistance by other Signs.*
8. *The manner of his appearing to him awake, and once in a Slumber.*

1. **I** Had here ended all my Stories, were I not tempted by that remarkable one in \* *Bodinus* to out-run my method. I but named it in the foregoing Chapter; I shall tell it now more at large. I am the more willingly drawn to relate it, such examples of the consociation of good *Spirits* being very scarce in History. The main reason whereof, as I conceive, is, because so very few men are heartily and sincerely good. The Narration is more considerable, in that he that writes it had it from the mans own mouth whom it concerns, and is as follows.

\* *Mag. Demon.*  
*lib. 1. cap. 2.*

2. This Party, a holy and pious man, as it should seem, and an acquaintance of *Bodinus's*, freely told him how that he had a certain *Spirit* that did perpetually accompany him, which he was then first aware of when he had attain'd to about thirty seven years of age, but conceived that the said *Spirit* had been present with him all his life-time, as he gathered from certain Monitory *Dreams* and *Visions*, whereby he was fore-warn'd as well of several Dangers as Vices. That this *Spirit* discovered himself to him after he had for a whole year together earnestly pray'd to God to send a *good Angel* to him, to be the Guide and Governor of his life and actions; adding also, that before and after Prayer he used to spend two or three hours in meditation and reading the Scriptures, diligently enquiring with himself what *Religion*, amongst those many that are controverted in the world, might be best, beseeching God that he would be pleased to direct him to it; and that he did not allow of their way, that at all adventures pray to God to confirm them in that opinion they have already preconceived, be it right or wrong. That while he was thus busie with himself in matters of Religion, that he lighted on a passage in *Philo Judæus* in his Book *De Sacrificiis*, where he writes, that a *good and holy Man can offer no greater nor more acceptable Sacrifice to God then the Oblation of himself*; and therefore following *Philo's* counsel, that he offered his *Soul* to God. And that after that, amongst many other divine *Dreams* and *Visions*, he once in his sleep seemed to hear the voice of God saying to him, *I will save thy Soul, I am he that before appeared unto thee*. Afterwards that the *Spirit* every day would knock at the door about three or four a clock in the morning, though he rising and opening the door could see no body; but that the *Spirit* persisted in this course, and unless he did rise, would thus rouse him up.

3. This trouble and boisterousness made him begin to conceit that it was some *evil Spirit* that thus haunted him, and therefore he daily pray'd earnestly unto God that he would be pleased to send a *good Angel* to him; and often also sung Psalms, having most of them by heart.

Wherefore the *Spirit* afterward knocked more gently at the door, and one day discovered himself to him waking, which was the first time that he was assured by his senses that it was he; for he often touched and stirred a Drinking-glass that stood in his chamber, which did not a little amaze him.

Two days after, when he entertain'd at Supper a certain friend of his, *Secretary* to the *King*, that this friend of his was much abash'd while he heard the *Spirit thumping* on the bench hard by him, and was stricken with fear; but he bade him be of good courage, there was no hurt towards; and the better to assure him of it, told him the truth of the whole matter.

Wherefore from that time, saith *Bodinus*, he did affirm that this *Spirit* was always with him, and by some sensible signe did ever advertise him of things; as by striking his *right Ear*, if he did any thing amiss; if otherwise, his *left*. If any body came to *circumvent* him, that his *right*



*Ear* was struck, but his *left Ear* if a *good man* and to *good ends* accosted him. If he was about to eat or drink any thing that would hurt him, or intended or purposed with himself to doe any thing that would prove ill, that he was inhibited by a *signe*; and if he delayed to follow his business, that he was quickned by a *signe* given him.

When he began to praise God in Psalms and to declare his marvelous Acts, that he was presently raised and strengthened with a spiritual and supernatural power.

4. That he daily begg'd of God that he would teach him his Will, his Law and his Truth; and that he set one day of the week apart for reading the Scripture and Meditation, with singing of Psalms, and that he did not stir out of his house all that day: but that in his ordinary conversation he was sufficiently merry and of a chearful minde, and he cited that saying for it, *Vidi facies Sanctorum latas.* But in his conversing with others, if he had talked vainly and indiscreetly, or had some days together neglected his *Devotions*, that he was forthwith admonished thereof by a *Dream*. That he was also admonished to rise betimes in the morning, and that about four of the clock a voice would come to him while he was asleep, saying, *Who gets up first to pray?*

5. He told *Bodinus* also how he was often admonish'd to give *Alms*, and that the more *Charity* he bestow'd the more *prosperous* he was. And that on a time when his enemies sought after his life, and knew that he was to goe by water, that his Father in a *Dream* brought two *Horses* to him, the one *white*, the other *bay*; and that therefore he bid his servant hire him two horses, and though he told him nothing of the colours, that yet he brought him a *white* one and a *bay* one.

That in all difficulties, journeyings and what other enterprises soever, he used to ask counsel of God; and that one night, when he had begged his blessing, while he slept he saw a *Vision* wherein his Father seemed to blese him.

At another time, when he was in very great *Danger*, and was newly gone to bed, he said that the *Spirit* would not let him alone till he had raised him again; wherefore he watched and pray'd all that night. The day after he escaped the hands of his Persecutors in a wonderful manner; which being done, in his next sleep he heard a *voice* saying, Now sing, *Qui sedet in latibulo Altissimi.*

6. A great many other passages this Party told *Bodinus*, so many, indeed, that he thought it an endless labour to recite them all. But what remains of those he has recited, I will not stick to take the pains of transcribing them.

*Bodinus* asked him why he would not *speak to the Spirit* for the gaining of the more plain and familiar converse with it. He answered that he once attempted it, but the *Spirit* instantly struck the door with that vehemency, as if he had knock'd upon it with a hammer: whereby he gathered his dislike of the matter.

7. But though the *Spirit* would not talk with him, yet he could make use of his judgement in the reading of books and moderating his studies. For if he took an ill book into his hands and fell a reading, the

the *Spirit* would strike it, that he might lay it down; and would also sundry times, be the books what they would, *hinder* him from *reading* and *writing* overmuch, that his mind might rest, and silently meditate with it self. He added also, that very often while he was *awake*, a small, subtile, inarticulate *sound* would come unto his Ears.

8. *Bodinus* further enquiring whether he ever did see the *Shape* and *Form* of the *Spirit*, he told him that while he was awake he never saw any thing but a certain *light* very *bright* and *clear* and of a *round* *Compass* and *Figure*; but that once being in great jeopardy of his life, and having heartily pray'd to God that he would be pleased to provide for his safety, about break of day, amidst his slumberings and wakings, he espy'd on his bed where he lay a *young Boy* clad in a *white Garment*, *tintured* somewhat with a touch of *purple*, and of a *visage* admirably lovely and beautiful to behold. This he confidently affirmed to *Bodinus* for a certain truth.

## CHAP. XIV.

1. *Certain Enquiries upon the preceding Narration; as, What these Guardian Genii may be.* 2. *Whether one or more of them be allotted to every man, or to some none.* 3. *What may be the reason of Spirits so seldom appearing;* 4. *And whether they have any settled shape or no.* 5. *What their manner is of assisting men in either Devotion or Prophecy.* 6. *Whether every mans complexion is capable of the Society of a good Genius.* 7. *And lastly, Whether it be lawful to pray to God to send such a Genius or Angel to one, or no.* 8. *What the most effectual and divinest Magick.*

1. **I**T is beside my present scope, as I have already professed, to enter into any more particular and more curious Disquisitions concerning the nature of *Spirits*, my aime being now onely to demonstrate their *Existence* by those strange *Effects* recorded every where in *History*. But this last Narration is so extraordinarily remarkable, that it were a piece of disrespect done to it, to dismiss it without *some Enquiries* at least into such *Problems* as it naturally affords to our consideration; though it may well seem plainly beyond the power of humane Wit or laws of Modesty to determine any thing therein.

In the first place therefore, it cannot but amuse a mans mind to think what these officious *Spirits* should be that so willingly sometimes offer themselves to consociate with a man: Whether they may be *Angels* incapable of incorporation into humane Bodies, which vulgarly is conceived: Or whether the *Souls of the deceased*, they having more affinity with mortality and humane frailty then the other, and so more sensible of our necessities and infirmities, having once felt them themselves; a reason alledged for the Incarnation of *Christ* by the Author to the He-



*brews*: which opinion has no worse favourers then *Plutarch*, *Maximus Tyrius*, and other *Platonists*: Or lastly, whether there may not be of both sorts. For separate Souls being *ἰατρῆτοι*, in a condition not unlike the *Angels themselves*, it is easie to conceive that they may very well undergoe the like offices.

2. Secondly, we are invited to enquire, Whether every man have his *Guardian Genius* or no. That *Witches* have many, such as they are, their own Confessions testifie. The *Pythagoreans* were of opinion that every man has two *Genii*, a good one and a bad one. Which *Mahomet* has taken into his Religion, adding also, that they sit on mens shoulders with table-books in their hands, and that the one writes down all the good, the other all the evil a man does. But such expressions as those I look upon as symbolical rather than natural. And I think it more reasonable that a man changing the frame of his mind, changes his *Genius* withall: or rather, unless a man be very sincere and single-hearted, that he is left to common Providence; as well as if he be not desperately wicked or deplorably miserable, scarce any particular evil Spirit interposes or offers himself a perpetual Assistant in his affairs and fortunes. But extreme Poverty, irksome old Age, want of Friends, the Contempt, Injury and Hard-heartedness of evil Neighbours, working upon a Soul low sunk into the Body, and wholly devoid of the Divine life, does sometimes kindle so sharp, so eager, and so piercing a desire of Satisfaction and Revenge, that the shrieks of men while they are a murdering, the howling of a Wolf in the fields in the night, or the squeaking and roaring of tortured Beasts, do not so certainly call to them those of their own kind, as this powerful Magick of a pensive and complaining Soul in the bitterness of its affliction attracts the aid of these over-officious Spirits. So that it is most probable that they that are the forwardest to hang Witches are the first that made them, and have no more goodness nor true piety then these they so willingly prosecute, but are as wicked as they, though with better luck or more discretion, offending no further then the Law will permit them; and therefore they securely starve the poor helpless man, though with a great deal of clamour of Justice they will revenge the death of their Hog or Cow.

3. Thirdly, it were worth our disquisition, Why Spirits so seldom now-a-daies appear, especially those that are good; whether it be not the wickedness of the present Age, as I have already hinted; or the general prejudice men have against all Spirits that appear, that they must be straightways Devils; or the frailty of humane nature, that is not usually able to bear the appearance of a Spirit, no more then other Animals are; for into what agonies Horses and Dogs are cast upon their approach, is in every ones mouth, and is a good circumstance to distinguish a real Apparition from our own Imaginations: or lastly, whether it be the condition of Spirits themselves, who, it may be, without some violence done to their own nature cannot become visible; it being haply as troublesome a thing to them to keep themselves in one steady visible consistence in the aire, as it is for men that dive, to hold their breath in the water.

4. Fourthly,

Fourthly, it may deserve our search, Whether Spirits have any settled *form* or *shape*. *Angels* are commonly pictured like good plump cherry-cheek'd Lads. Which is no wonder, the boldness of the same *Artists* not sticking to picture God Almighty in the shape of an old man. In both it is as it pleases the *Painter*. But this story seems rather to favour their opinion that say that *Angels* and separate *Souls* have no settled *form* but what they please to give themselves upon occasion, by the power of their own Phansy. *Ficinus*, as I remember, somewhere calls them *Aereal Stars*. And the good *Genii* seem to me to be as the benign Eyes of God running to and fro in the world, with love and pity beholding the innocent endeavours of harmless and single-hearted men, ever ready to doe them good and to help them.

What I conceive of separate Souls and Spirits, I cannot better express then I have already in my *Poem* of the *Præexistence of the Soul*; which therefore will not be altogether impertinent to repeat in this place.

*Like to a light fast lock'd in lantern dark,  
Whereby by Night our wary steps we guide  
In slabby streets, and dirty Chanels mark;  
Some weaker rays from the black top doe glide,  
And flusher streams perhaps through th'horny side:  
But when we've past the peril of the way,  
Arriv'd at home, and laid that case aside,  
The naked light how clearly doth it ray,  
And spread its joyful beams as bright as Summers day!*

*Even so the Soul in this contracted state,  
Confin'd to these streight Instruments of Sense,  
More dull and narrowly doth operate;  
At this hole hears, the Sight must ray from thence,  
Here tastes, there smells: But when she's gone from hence,  
Like naked lamp she is one shining sphere,  
And round about has perfect cognoscence  
Whate're in her Horizon doth appear;  
She is one Orb of Sense, all Eye, all airy Ear.*

And what I speak there of the condition of the Soul out of the Body, I think is easily applicable to other *Genii* or Spirits.

5. The fifth Enquiry may be, How these good *Genii* become serviceable to men for either heightning their *Devotions*, or inabling them to *Prophecy*; whether it can be by any other way then by descending into their Bodies, and possessing the Heart and Brain. For the *Euchites*, who affected the gift of *Prophecy* by familiarity with evil Spirits, did utterly obliterate in their Souls the *πατερὰ σύμβολα*, the Principles of Goodness and Honesty (as you may see in *Psellus* *πρὶ ἐνεργείας δαυμόνων*) that the evil Spirits might come into their Bodies, whom those sparks of Vertue, as they said, would driveaway, but those be-



ing extinguisht they could come in and possess them, and inable them to *Prophecy*. And that the Imps of Witches do sometimes enter their own Bodies as well as theirs to whom they send them, is plain in the story of the Witches of *Warbois*. It is also the opinion of *Trismegist*, that these Spirits get into the Veins and Arteries both of men and beasts.

Wherefore concerning the *Dreams* and *Visions* of this holy man that so freely imparted himself to *Bodinus*, it may be conceived reasonable that the *good Genius* insinuated himself into his very Body, as well as the *bad* into the bodies of the wicked; and that residing in his *Brain* and *figuring* of it, by thinking of this or that Object, as we our selves *figure* it when we think, the external Senses being laid asleep, those *figurations* would easily be represented to the *Common sense*; and that *Memory* recovering them when he awaked, they could not but seem to him as other *Dreams* did, saving that they were better, they ever signifying something of importance unto him.

But those Raptures of *Devotion* by day might be by the Spirit's kindling a purer kinde of Love-flame in his *Heart*, as well as by fortifying and raising his *Imagination*. And how far a man shall be carried beyond himself by this redoubled Soul in him, none, I think, can well conceive, unless they had the experience of it.

6. And if this be their manner of communion, it may well be enquired into, in the sixth place, Whether *all men* be capable of consociation with these *good Genii*. *Cardan* somewhere intimates that their approaches are deprehenfible by certain *sweet smells* they cast. From whence it may seem not improbable, that those Bodies that smell *sweet* themselves, where the Minde does not *stink* with *Pride* and *Hypocrisie*, have some natural advantage for the gaining their society. But if there be any peculiar *complexion* or *natural condition* required, it will prove less hopeful for every one to obtain their acquaintance. Yet *Regeneration* come to its due pitch, though it cannot be without much pain and anguish, may well rectifie all uncleanness of nature; so that no singularly-good and sincere man can reasonably despair of their familiarity. For he that is so highly in favour with the *Prince*, it is no wonder he is taken notice of by his *Courtiers*.

7. But the last and most considerable question is, Whether it be lawful to *pray* to God for such a *good Genius* or *Angel*. For the Example in the foregoing Story seems a sufficient warrant. But I conceive Faith and Desire ought to be full-sail to make such Voiages prosperous, and our end and purpose pure and sincere. But if Pride, Conceitedness, or Affectation of some peculiar privilege above other Mortals, spur a man up to so bold an Enterprize, his Devotions will no more move either *God* or the *good Genii*, then the whining voice of a Counterfeit will stir the affection of the discreetly Charitable. Nay, this high Presumption may invite some real *Fiends* to put a worse jest upon him then was put upon that tattered Rogue *Guzman* by those *Mock-Spirits*, for his so impudently pretending Kindred, and so boldly intruding himself into the knowledge and acquaintance of the Gentry and Nobility of *Genoa*.

8. But

8. But the *safest Magick* is the sincere consecrating a mans Soul to God, and the aspiring to nothing but so profound a pitch of *Humility*, as not to be conscious to our selves of being at all touched with the praise and applause of men; and to such a free and universal sense of *Charity*, as to be delighted with the welfare of another as much as our own. They that solely have their eye upon these, will finde coming in whatever their heart can desire. But they that put forth their hand to catch at high things, as they fancy, and neglect these, prove at last but a Plague to themselves and a Laughing-stock to the world.

These are the several Speculations that the foregoing Narration would naturally beget in the minds of the curious. But methinks I hear the *Atheist* replying to all this, That I have run a long division upon uncertain grounds, and asking me, not without some scorn and anger, whether I believe that multifarious Fable I have rehearsed out of *Bodinus*, and so much descanted upon. To which I answer, That I will not take my oath that the most likely passage in all *Plutarch's Lives* or *Livie's History* is assuredly true. But however that I am not ashamed to profess, that I am as well assured in my own judgement of the *Existence* of *Spirits*, as that I have met with men in *Westminster-Hall*, or seen beasts in *Smithfield*.

## CHAP. XV.

1. *The Structure of Mans body, and Apparitions, the most convictive Arguments against the Atheist.* 2. *His first Evasion of the former of them, pretending it never was but there were men and women and other Species in the World.* 3. *The Author's answer to this pretension. First, That every man was mortall, and therefore was either created or rose out of the Earth.* 4. *Secondly, That even in infinite succession there is something First ordine Naturæ, and that these First were either created or rose out of the Earth.* 5. *Thirdly, That if there were alwaies men in the world, and every man born of a woman, some was both Father and Son, Man and Babe at once.* 6. *That it is contrary to the Laws of mere blind Matter, that man in his adult perfections should exist therefrom at once.* 7. *The Atheist's second Evasion, That the Species of things arose from the multifarious attempts of the motion of the Matter; with a threefold Answer thereto.* 8. *An Evasion of the last Answer, touching the perpetual exactness in the fabrick of all living Species; with a threefold Answer also to that Evasion.* 9. *The further serviceableness of this Answer for the quite taking away the first Evasion of the Atheist.*

1. **T**HUS have we gone through the many and manifold Effects represented to our Senses on this wide Theatre of the World; the faintest and obscurest whereof are Arguments full enough to prove the Ex-



*istence of a Deity.* But some being more palpable than other some, and more accommodate to awaken the dull and slow belief of the *Atheist* into the acknowledgement of a *God*, it will not be amiss to take notice of what *Evasions* he attempts to make for the extricating himself out of those that he fancies the most sensibly to entangle him, and the most strongly to hinder his escape.

And such are especially these two last I insisted upon, *The curious frame of Mans Body*, and *Apparitions*.

2. And the force of the former some endeavour to evade thus ;  
 “ That there hath ever been Man and Woman and other *Species* in the  
 “ world, and so it is no wonder that like should propagate its like, and  
 “ therefore that there is no want of any other invisible or material cause  
 “ but the *Species* of things themselves : and so these admirable contrivances in Nature must imply no divine *Wisdom* nor *Counsel*, nor any such  
 “ thing.

3. But here I demand, whether there were ever any *Man* that was not *mortal*, and whether there be any *mortal* that had not a *beginning* ; and if he had, it must be either by *Generation*, or *Creation*. If by *Creation*, there is a *God* : If by equivocal *Generation*, as rising out of *Earth*, our Argument will hold good still notwithstanding this Evasion. But if you'll say there was never any man in the world but was born of a *Woman*, this must amount but to thus much, that there hath been an *infinite* number of *successions* of births. If there be meant by it any thing more then thus, it will not prove sense.

4. For though our Phantasie cannot run through an *infinite series* of *Effects*, yet our Reason is assured there is no *Effect* without a *Cause*, and be the Progress of *Causes* and *Effects* as *infinite* as it will, at last we resolve it naturally into some *First* : and he that denies this, seems to me wilfully to wink against the light of Nature, and doe violence to the Faculties of his Mind. And therefore of necessity there must be at least one *first Man* and *Woman* which are *first ordine Nature*, though *infinity* of time, reckoning from the present, causeth a confusion and obscurity in our apprehensions. And these which are thus *first in order* of *Nature* or *Causality*, must also exist first before there can be any other Men or Women in the World. And therefore concerning these *first*, it being manifest that they were born of no Parents, it follows they were *Created* or rose out of the *Earth*, and so the *Evasion* will be frustrated.

5. Besides, if you affirm that there was *never* any *Man* in the world but who was born of a *Woman*, and so grew to Mans estate by degrees, it will fall to some mans share to be a *Babe* and a *Man* at once, or to be both *Father* and *Child*. For so soon as Mankind was, ( let it be from Eternity, and beyond Eternity is nothing ) those that then existed were begot of *some body*, and there was *nothing* before them to beget them, therefore they begot *themselves*.

6. But that they should at once then have been *perfect men*, their substances being of alterable and passive matter, that is wrought diversly and by degrees into the frame it hath, according to the perpetual testimony of Nature, is as rash as if they should say that *Boots* and *Shoes* and

and *Stockins*, and *Pyes* and *Peels* and *Ovens*, have been together with all *Eternity*: whenas it is manifest there ought to be an orderly intervall of time before these things can be, wherein must precede the killing of Oxen and slaying of them, as also of Sheep, tanning, spinning, cutting, and many more such like circumstances. So that it is enormously ridiculous to say that *Mankind* might have been at once from all *Eternity*, unless the *Omnipotency* of a God, who can doe whatever we can imagine and more, should by his irresistible *Fiat* cause such a thing in a moment so soon as himself was, which was ever, and he was never to seek for either power or skill.

But that the fluid and blind *Matter* of it self should have been thus raised up from all *Eternity* into such compleat *Species* of things, is very groundless and irrational. I say, that there ever should be such a thing as this in the world, a *man* at once existing of himself in this corporeal frame that we see, who notwithstanding did afterwards dye like other mortals, is a Fable above all Poetical Figments whatsoever, and more incredible then the fondest Legend that any Religion ever offered to the *Atheists* belief.

7. Others therefore deserting this way of *Evasion* betake themselves to another, which, though it seem more plausible at first view, is fully as frivolous. They say, “ That all the *Species* of things, *Man* himself not excepted, came first out of the Earth by the omnifarious attempt of the particles of the *Matter* upon one another, which at last light on so lucky a construction and fabrick of the Bodies of Creatures as we see; and that having an infinite series of time to try all tricks in, they would of necessity at last come to this they are.

But I answer, that these particles might commit infinite *Tautologies* in their strokes and motions, and that therefore there was no such necessity at all of falling into those forms and shapes that appear in the world.

Again, there is that excellent contrivance in the *Body*, suppose, of a *Man*, as I have heretofore instanced, that it cannot but be the effect of very accurate *Knowledge* and *Counsel*.

And lastly, this concurrence of *Atoms*, they being left without a guide, it is a miracle above all apprehension, that they should produce no inept *Species* of things, such as should of their own nature have but three Legs, and one Eye, or but one Eare, rows of Teeth along the *Vertebrae* of their Backs, and the like, as I have above intimated; these *Ineptitudes* being more easie to hit upon then such accurate and irreprehensible frames of Creatures.

8. But to elude the force of this Argument against the fortuitous concurrence of *Atoms*, they'l excogitate this mad evasion; “ That Nature did indeed at first bring forth such ill-favoured and ill-appointed *Monsters*, as well as those that are of a more exquisite frame; but those that were more perfect fell upon those other and kill'd them and devoured them, they being not so well provided of either limbs or senses as the other, and so were never able to hop fast enough from them, or maturely to discover the approaching dangers that ever & anon were coming upon them. But this unjust and audacious calumny  
cast



cast upon God and Nature will be easily discover'd and convicted of falshood, if we do but consider,

First, that *Trees, Herbs and Flowers*, that do not stir from their places, or exercise such fierce cruelty one upon another, are all in their several kinds *handsome and elegant*, and have no *ineptitude or defect* in them.

Secondly, that all Creatures born of *putrefaction*, as *Mice and Frogs* and the like, as those many hundreds of *Insects*, as *Grashoppers, Flies, Spiders* and such other, that these also have a most *accurate contrivance of parts*, and that there is nothing fram'd rashly or ineptly in any of them.

Lastly, in more perfect Creatures, as in the *Scotch Barnacles*, which *Historians* write of; of which if there be any doubt, yet *Gerard* relates that of his own knowledge, (which is as admirable, and as much to our purpose) there is a kinde of *Fowl* which in *Lancashire* are called *Tree-Geese*; they are bred out of rotten pieces of broken Ships and trunks of Trees cast upon a little Island in *Lancashire* they call the *pile of Foulders*: the same Authour saith he hath found the like also in other parts of this Kingdom. Those *Fowls* in all respects, though bred thus of *putrefaction* (and that they are thus bred is undeniably true, as any man, if he please, may satisfy himself by consulting *Gerard*, the very last page of his History of Plants) are of as an exact *Fabrick of Body*, and as fitly contriv'd for the functions of such a kind of living Creature, as any of those that are produced by *propagation*. Nay, these kind of *Fowls* themselves do also propagate, which has imposed so upon the foolishness of some, that they have denied that other way of their generation; whenas the being generated one way does not exclude the other, as is seen in *Frogs and Mice*.

Wherefore those productions out of the *Earth* and of *Putrefaction* being thus perfect and accurate in all points as well as others, it is a manifest discovery that Nature did never frame any *Species* of things ineptly and foolishly, and that therefore she was ever guided by *Counsel and Providence*, that is, That *Nature* her self is the effect of an all-knowing God.

9. Nor doth this consideration only take away this present *Evasion*, but doth more palpably and intelligibly enervate the former. For what boots it them to flie unto an infinite propagation of *Individualls* in the same eternal *Species*, as they imagine, that they might be able alwayes to assign a Cause answerable to the Effect; whenas there are such Effects as these, and Products of Putrefaction, where *Wisdom and Counsel* are as truly conspicuous as in others? For thus are they nevertheless necessarily illaqueated in that inconvenience which they thought to have escaped by so quaint a subtilty.

## CHAP. XVI.

1. *The Atheists Evasions against Apparitions: as first, That they are mere Imaginations. 2. Then, That though they be Realities without, yet they are caused by the force of Imagination; with the confutation of these Conceits. 3. Their fond conceit, That the Skirmishings in the Aire are from the exuvius Effluxes of things; with a confutation thereof. 4. A copious confutation of their last subterfuge, (viz. That those Fightings are the Reflexions of Battels on the Earth) from the distance, and debility of Reflexion; 5. From the rude Politure of the Clouds; 6. From their inability of reflecting so much as the image of the starrs; which yet were a thing far easier; First, by reason of the undiminisshableness of their magnitude. 7. Then from the purity of their light. 8. Thirdly, from the posture of our Eye in the shade of the Earth. 9. Lastly, from their dispersedness, ready from every part to be reflected if the Clouds had any such Reflexivity in them. 10. That if they have any such Reflexivity as to represent battels so exceeding distant, it is by some supernatural Artifice. 11. That this Artifice has its limited laws. 12. Whence at least some of these Aereal battels cannot be Reflexions from the Earth. 13. Machiavel's opinion concerning these Fightings in the Aire. 14. Nothing so demonstrable in Philosophy as the being of a God. 15. That Pedantick affectation of Atheisme whence it probably arose. 16. The true causes of being really prone to Atheisme. 17. That men ought not to oppose their mere complexional humours against the Principles of Reason, and Testimonies of Nature and History. His Apology for being so copious in the reciting of Stories of Spirits.*

1. **N**OW for their *Evasions* whereby they would elude the force of that Argument for *Spirits* which is drawn from *Apparitions*, they are so weak and silly, that a man may be almost sure they were convinced in their judgement of the truth of such like Stories, else it had been better flatly to have denied them, then to feign such idle and vain Reasons of them.

For first, they say they are nothing but *Imaginations*, and that there is nothing *reall without us* in such *Apparitions*.

2. But being beaten off from this slight account, for that many see the same thing at once, then they fly to so miraculous a power of *Phansy*, as if it were able to change the Air into a real shape and form, so that others may behold it as well as he that fram'd it by the power of his *Phansy*.

Now I demand of any man, whether this be not a harder Mystery and more unconceiveable then all the *Magical Metamorphoses* of Devils or Witches. For it is far easier to conceive that some *knowing thing* in the Air should thus transform the Air into this or that shape, being in that part of the Air it doth thus transform, then that the *Imagination* of



of man, which is but a Modification of his own Minde, should be able at a distance to change it into such like *Appearances*. But suppose it could, can it *animate* the *Aire* that it doth thus metamorphize, and make it *speak*, and *answer* to questions, and *put things* into mens hands, and the like? O the credulity of besotted *Atheism*! How intoxicated and infatuated are they in their conceits, being given up to sensuality, and having lost the free use of the natural Faculties of their Minde!

But shall this force of *Imagination* reach as high as the *Clouds* also, and make Men *fight* pitched Battels in the *Aire*, running and charging one against the other?

In his 51. Dial.  
de Apparitionibus.

3. Here the same bold pretender to Wit and Philosophy, \* *Cesar Vanninus* (who cunningly and juggingly endeavours to infuse the poison of *Atheism* into the minde of his Reader on every occasion) hath recourse to those old cast rags of *Epicurus* his School, the *Exuvius Effluxes* of things, and attempts to salve these *Phænomena* thus; That the *vapours* of *Mens bodies*, and it seems of *Horses* too, are carried up into the *Aire*, and fall into a certain proportionable posture of parts, and so imitate the figures of them aloft among the *Clouds*.

But I demand how the *vapours* of the *horses* finde the *vapours* of their *Riders*: and when and how long are they coming together? and whether they appear not before there be any Armies in the field to send up such *vapours*: and whether *harnesse* and *weapons* send up *vapours* too, as *Swords*, *Pikes* and *Shields*: and how they come to light so happily into the hands of those Aerial men of war, especially the *vapours* of *Metalls* (if they have any) being heavier in all likelihood then the reek of *Animals* and *Men*: and lastly, how they come to *discharge* at one another and to *fight*, there being neither life nor soul in them: and whether *Sounds* also have their *Exuvia* that are reserved till these solemnities; for at *Alborough* in *Suffolk* 1642. were heard in the *Aire* very loud beatings of *Drums*, shooting of *Muskets* and *Ordnance*; as also in other such like *Prodigies* there hath been heard the sounding of *Trumpets*, as *Snellius* writes. And \* *Pliny* also makes mention of the sounding of *Trumpets* and *clashing* of *Armour* heard out of the heavens about the *Cimbrick Wars*, and often before. But here at *Alborough* all was concluded with a melodious noise of *Musical Instruments*.

\* Hist. Natural.  
lib. 2. cap. 57.

The *Exuvia* of *Fiddles* it seems fly up into the *Aire* too; or were those *Musical Accents* frozen there for a time, and at the heat and firing of the *Cannons*, the *Aire* relenting and thawing, became so harmoniously vocal? With what vain conceits are men intoxicated that wilfully wink against the light of Nature, and are estranged from the true knowledge and acknowledgment of a God!

Dialog. 51.

4. But there is another *Evasion* which the same sedulous Insinuator of *Atheism* would make use of in case this should not hold, which seems more sober, but no less false: and that is this; That these *fightings* and *skirmishings* in the *Aire* are only the *reflexion* of some real battel on the Earth. But this in Nature is plainly impossible. For of necessity these Armies thus fighting, being at such a *distance* from the *Spectators* that the fame of the battel never arrives to their ears, their eyes can never behold it

it by any *reflexion* from the Clouds. For besides that *reflexion* makes the images more *dim* then *direct* sight, such a *distance* from the Army to the clouds, and then from the clouds to our eye, will lessen the *species* so exceedingly that they will not at all be *visible*.

5. Or if we could imagine that there might be sometimes such an advantage in the figure of these Clouds as might in some sort remedy this *lessening* of the *species*, yet their surfaces are so exceeding *rudely polish'd*, and *reflexion* ( which, as I said, is ever *dim* enough of it self, ) is here so extraordinarily *imperfect*, that they can never be able, according to the course of Nature, to return the *species* of Terrestriall Objects back again to our sight, it being so evident that they are unfit for what is of far lesse difficulty. For we never finde them able to reflect the image of a *Star*, whenas not onely glasse, but every troubled pool or dirty plash of water in the high-way does usually doe it.

6. But that it is far easier for a *Star* then for any of *these Objects* here upon Earth to be *reflected* to our Eyes by those rude naturall Looking-glasses placed among the Clouds, sundry reasons will sufficiently inform us.

For first, The Stars do not abate at all of their *usuall magnitude* in which they ordinarily appear to us by this reflexion, the difference of many hundreds of Leagues making no difference of magnitude in them; for indeed the distance of the *Diameter* of the *Orbite* of the Earth makes none, as must be acknowledged by all those that admit of the *annual motion* thereof. But a very few miles do exceedingly diminish the usual bigness of the *species* of an Horse or Man, even to that littleness that they grow invisible. What then will become of his *sword, shield* or *spear*? And in these cases we now speak of, how great a journey the *species* have from the Earth to the Cloud that reflects them, I have intimated before.

7. Secondly, it is manifest that a Star hath the preeminence above these *Terrestrial Objects*, in that it is as *pure* a light as the Sun, though not so *big*, but they but *opaque* coloured bodies; and that therefore there is no comparison betwixt the vigour and strength of the *species* of a Star and of them.

8. Thirdly, in the *Night-time* the Eye being placed in the shadow of the Earth, those *reflexions* of a Star will be yet more easily visible; whenas the great light of the Sun by Day must needs much debilitate these reflected Images of the Objects upon the Earth, his beams striking our Eyes with so strong vibrations.

9. Fourthly and lastly, there being Stars all over the Firmament so as there is, it should seem a hundred times more easie for natural Causes to hit upon a *Paraster* or *Parastron* ( for let Analogie embolden me so to call these seldome or never seen *Phænomena*, the image of a single Star or whole Constellation reflected from the Clouds ) then upon a *Parelios* or *Paraselene*. But now the story of these is more then an hundred times more frequent then that of the *Paraster*. For it is so seldome discovered; that it is doubted whether it be or no, or rather acknowledged not to be; of which there can be no reason, but that the *clouds* are so *ill polished* that they



they are not able to reflect so considerable a light as a Star. From whence, I think, we may safely gather, that it is therefore impossible that they should reflect so debile *Species* as the colours and shapes of Beasts and Men, and that so accurately as that we may see their swords, helmets, shields, spears, and the like.

10. Wherefore it is plain that these *Apparitions* on high in the Aire are no reflexions of any Objects upon Earth; or, if it were imaginable that they were, that some *supernatural cause* must assist to conglaciate and polish the surfaces of the clouds to such an extraordinary accuracy of figure and smoothness as will suffice for such prodigious reflexions.

And that these *Spirits* that rule in the Aire may not act upon the materials there as well as *Men* here upon the Earth work upon the parts thereof, as also upon the neighbouring Elements so far as they can reach, shaping, perfecting and directing things according to their own purpose and pleasure, I know no reason at all in Nature or Philosophy for any man to deny. For that the help of some officious *Genii* is imploied in such like Prodigies as these, the seasonableness of their appearance seems no contemptible argument, they being, according to the observation of Historians, the \* *Forerunners of Commotions and Troubles* in all Kingdomes and Commonwealths.

\* The same which *Vaninius* himself acknowledges in his Dialogues, Dialog. 51.

11. Yet nevertheless as good Artificers as I here suppose, they working upon Nature must be bounded by the Laws of Nature: and *reflexion* will have its limits as well as *refraction*, whether for conveyance of *species*, or kindling of heat; the laws and bounds whereof that discerning Wit *Cartesius* being well aware of, doth generously and judiciously pronounce, *That a burning-Glass, the distance of whose focus from the Glass doth not bear a less proportion to the Diameter thereof then the distance of the Earth from the Sun to the Diameter of the Sun, will burn no more vehemently then the direct rays of the Sun will do without it, though in other respects this Glass were as exactly shaped and curiously polished as could be expected from the hand of an Angel.*

12. Wherefore suppose the surface of the clouds polished never so well and fitted for reflexion, it is still evident that some of these *Apparitions* cannot be such as are mere reflexions of Armies skirmishing on the ground. For those that are observed to fight determinately over such or such a City, if they be but the mere reflexions of fights, of necessity they must be from some Armies not far off: and if so, they could not but be discovered, at least by speedy report. Whence it is manifest, that such Skirmishings in the clouds are reall Encounters there, not the Images or Reflexions of Battels on the Ground. And considering that there have been such reall Prodigies of fightings on the ground it self by these Aereal Coursers, as I have \* above intimated, it is but reasonable to conceive, that the generality of the rest of these prodigious Skirmishings, though not determinate to this or that City, are really in the clouds or skye, not a shadow or reflexion of Battels upon the Earth.

\* See chap. 12. sect. 6.

But that these Fightings have been seen over such and such Cities, were easie to make good out of History: I shall onely instance in *Snellius* his report of *Amortsfort*, that such Skirmishings were seen there, and that  
nigh

nigh over the very tops of their houses. The like *Machiavell* reports concerning *Aretium*, and acknowledges that such kinde of Prodigies are very frequent in History, as also certain forerunners of the Troubles and Disturbances of that State and Countrey wherein they appear.

13. His own words are so free and ingenuous, and his judgment so considerable, (though he will not pretend to Philosophy) touching the reason of these strange sights, that I think it worth the while to transcribe them. \* *Hujusmodi rerum causas ab iis explicari posse credo qui rerum naturalium ac supranaturalium cognitione insignes sunt, à qua me alienum esse fateor: nisi forte cum philosophis quibusdam pronunciandum censeamus, acrem plenum spiritibus & Intelligentiis esse, quæ res futuras prævidentes, & casibus humanis condolentes, eas hominibus per hujusmodi signa prænuncient, ut se adversus eas tempestivius preparare & communire queant. Utut se res habeat, Experienciâ certè compertum habemus talia signa sequi solere magnos aliquos motus.*

\* Disput. de Republica lib. x. cap. 56.

14. I have now compleated this present Treatise against *Atheism* in all the Three parts thereof: upon which while I cast mine eye, and view that clear and irrefutable evidence of the Cause I have undertaken, the *external Appearances* of things in the world so faithfully seconding the undeniable dictates of the *innate Principles* of our own Minds, I cannot but with confidence aver, That there is not any one notion in all Philosophy more certain and demonstrable then *That there is a God*.

And verily I think I have ransacked all the corners of every kinde of Philosophy that can pretend to bear any stroke in this Controversie with that diligence, that I may safely pronounce, that it is mere brutish *Ignorance* or *Impudence*, no *Skill in Nature* or the *Knowledge* of things, that can encourage any man to profess *Atheism*, or to embrace it at the proposal of those that make profession of it.

15. But so I conceive it is, that at first some famously-learned men being not so indiscreetly zealous and superstitious as others, have been mistaken by *Ideots* and traduced for *Atheists*; and then ever after some one vain-glorious Fool or other hath affected, with what safety he could, to seem *Atheistical*, that he might thereby, forsooth, be reputed the more learned, or the profounder *Naturalist*.

16. But I dare assure any man, that if he do but search into the bottom of this enormous *disease of the Soul*, as *Trismegist* truly calls it, he will find nothing to be the cause thereof but either *vanity* of mind, or brutish *sensuality* and an untamed desire of satisfying a mans own will in every thing, an *obnoxious* Conscience, and a base *Fear* of divine Vengeance, *ignorance* of the scantness and insufficiency of second causes, a jumbled *feculency* and *incomposedness* of the spirits by reason of perpetual intemperance and luxury, or else a dark bedeadening *Melancholy* that so starves and kills the apprehension of the Soul, in divine matters especially, that it makes a man as inept for such Contemplations as if his head was filled with cold Earth or dry Grave-moulds.

17. And to such flow Constitutions as these, I shall not wonder if, as the *first Part* of my Discourse must seem marvellous subtile, so the *last* appear ridiculously incredible. But they are to remember, that I do not



here appeal to the *Complexional* humors or peculiar Relishes of men that arise out of the temper of the *Body*, but to the known and unalterable *Ideas* of the *Mind*, to the *Phænomena* of *Nature* and Records of *History*. Upon the last whereof if I have something more fully insisted, it is not to be imputed to any vain credulity of mine, or that I take a pleasure in telling strange stories, but that I thought fit to fortifie and strengthen the faith of others as much as I could; being well assured that a contemptuous misbelief of such like Narrations concerning *Spirits*, and an endeavour of making them all ridiculous and incredible, is a dangerous Prelude to *Atheism* it self, or else a more close and crafty profession and insinuation of it. For assuredly that Saying is not more true in Politicks, *No Bishop, no King*; then this is in Metaphysicks, *No Spirit, no God*.

---

A N

---

A N  
A P P E N D I X  
To the foregoing  
A N T I D O T E  
A G A I N S T  
A T H E I S M:

Wherein is contained  
An Answer to certain Objections made  
against several Passages thereof.

By H E N R Y M O R E, D.D.  
Fellow of Christ's College in Cambridge.

Aristot.  
Πρὸς τὸ ἔξω λόγον αἰεὶ ὅτιν ἐστὶν εἰσησσαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἔσω λόγον οὐκ αἰετῶς.

L O N D O N,  
Printed by James Fleisher, for William Morden Book-seller in Cambridge,  
M D C L X I I.



APPENDIX

OF THE

AMERICAN

AND

THE

OF THE

OF THE

OF THE

OF THE

OF THE

OF THE

OF THE

OF THE

OF THE

OF THE

OF THE


OF THE

OF THE

AN  
 APPENDIX  
 To the Foregoing  
 ANTIDOTE  
 AGAINST  
 ATHEISM.

CHAP. I.

1. *The Author's reason of adding this Appendix to his Antidote.* 2. *An Enumeration of the chief Objections made against the First Book thereof.*

1.  *Unsuspected Innocency* and misdoubted *Truth* can win no greater credit then by strictest examination: For the world is thereby *more fully* ascertain'd of the *unblameableness* of the one and of the *solidity* of the other, then it can be possibly without so publick a Trial. Wherefore that so great an advantage may not be wanting to that weighty Cause we have in hand, I was not contented onely to set down such *Reasons* for the *Existence of God* which in my own judgement I conceiv'd to be irresistably firm; but that the firmness of them may appear more conspicuous to all men, I have brought into view the chiefest and most material *Objections* I could meet with, whether raised by those that of themselves have excepted against any Argument I have made use of, or by such as have been invited more curiously to search and discover, where they could, any weakness or inconsequency in any Argumentation throughout the whole Treatise. And the chiefest *Exceptions* and *Objections* against the First Book are these:

2. First, That the Ground of our Demonstration of the *Existence of God* from his *Idea* is, That there are *Innate Ideas* in the Mind of Man; which, say they, is false.

Secondly, That there is no such *Idea* of God at all as we have describ'd;



neither *Innate* nor *Acquisitious* or *Transcriptitious* ; because it involves in it the Notion of a *Spirit*, which again consists of such particular Notions as are utterly unconceivable.

Thirdly, That *Existence* is no Term of *Perfection*, and therefore is not so inseparably involved in the Notion of a *Being absolutely Perfect*, or of *God*.

Fourthly, That though *Necessary Existence* be included in the *Idea* of *God*, yet our inferring from thence that he does *exist*, is but a Sophism ; because a *Being absolutely Evil*, as well as *absolutely Perfect*, includes *necessary Existence* in the *Idea* thereof.

Fifthly, That if there be any *necessary Existent*, it is plain that it is *Matter*, which we unadvisedly call *Space*, which we cannot imagine but did ever and will ever *necessarily exist*.

Sixthly, That *God* did not put this *Idea* of himself into the Mind of *Man*, but the subtler sort of *Politicians*, that have alwaies used Religion as a mere Engine of State.

Seventhly, That *Fear* and *Hopes* of *Natural Conscience* are nothing indeed but these *Passions* rais'd upon a belief of a *God* which men have had by Tradition or Education.

Lastly, That these Arguments whereby we prove the *Incorporeity* of the Soul of *Man*, will also conclude the *Incorporeity* of the Soul of a *Beast*, and that therefore they are Sophistical.

To these I shall answer in order with as little Pomp and Luxuriancy of words, and as much Plainness and Perspicuity, as I may, in so subtile and difficult a matter.

## CHAP. II.

1. That the force of his Argument for the Existence of *God* from his *Idea*, does not lye in this, that there are *Innate Ideas* in the Mind of man.
2. That the force of arguing from the *Idea* of a thing, be it innate or not innate, is the same, proved by several instances.
3. The reason why he contends for *Innate Ideas*.
4. The seeming accuracy of a *Triangle* to outward sense no disproof but that the exact *Idea* thereof is from the Soul her self.
5. That it doth not follow that, if there be *Innate Ideas*, a *Blind man* may discourse of Colours.
6. That *Brutes* have not the Knowledge of any Logical or Mathematical Notions.
7. Why *Zeno's Ass* goes in a right line to the bottle of Hay.
8. That those actions and motions in things that are according to Reason and Mathematicks, do not prove any Logical or Mathematical Notions in the things thus acting or moving.

1. THAT some have excepted against our Demonstration of the Existence of *God* from his *Idea*, in that they have conceived that it is founded upon this Principle, That there are *Innate Ideas* in the Soul of *Man*; I can impute the mistake not so much to Ignorance as Inadvertency. For no mans parts can be so weak, but that if he attend to what

we have written, he must plainly see that the stress of our Argument is not laid upon this Notion of *Innate Ideas*, but upon that confessed Truth, That there are some things so plain, that however the Soul came to the knowledge of them, she cannot but assent to them, and acknowledge them to be undeniably true.

2. Now the *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Perfect* being such, that it must needs be acknowledged according to the light of Nature to be indeed the true *Idea* of such a Being, call it *Innate* or not, it is all one, the Demonstration will as inevitably follow as if it were acknowledged an *Innate Idea*; as we shall more plainly discern if we instance in other *Ideas*; as for example, in the *Idea* of a *Triangle*, of a *regular Geometrical body*, and of a *round Solid*. For the nature of these *Ideas* is such, that the Mind of man cannot possibly deny but that they are such and such distinct *Ideas*, and that such and such affections belong unto them. As for example, That every *Triangle* is either *Isopleuron*, *Isosceles*, or *Scalenum*; so that there are just *Three kinds* of them in reference to their sides, and no more: That there are *Five regular Bodies* in Geometry, neither more nor less, viz. the *Cube*, the *Tetraedrum*, the *Octaedrum*, the *Dodecaedrum* and the *Eicosaedrum*: That there is one onely kind of *round Solid*, viz. the *Sphere* or *Globe*. And so contemplating the *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Perfect* (be the *Idea* innate or not innate, it is all one) we cannot but conclude that there can be *but one onely* such in number; and that *That one* also cannot fail to be, as we have demonstrated at large.

3. But however, though we need no such Principle for the carrying on of our Demonstration as this of *Innate Ideas*, yet because I thought it true, and of concernment to animate the Reader to attend the *Notions* of his own Mind, and relish the excellency of that Judge we are to appeal to, I held it not unfit to insist something upon it: And I am ready now to make it good, that this Principle is true, notwithstanding any thing that I find alledged against it.

4. For what I contend for in the sixth Chapter of this first Book, That the exact *Idea* of a *Circle* or a *Triangle* is rather hinted to us from those describ'd in *Matter* then taught us by them, is still true notwithstanding that Objection, that they seem exact to our *outward Senses* carelessly perusing them, though they be not so. For we plainly afterward correct our selves, not onely by occasion of the *figure*, which we may ever discern imperfect, but by our *Innate knowledge*, which tells us that the *outward Senses* cannot see an exact *Triangle*, because that an Indivisible point, in which the Angles are to be terminated, is to the *outward Sense* utterly invisible.

Besides, it is to be considered, that though we should admit that a *Triangle* could be so drawn that to our *outward Sense*, look on it as narrowly as we could, even through Microscopes, it would ever seem exact; yet they that never saw or took notice of any such accurate delineation, do of themselves upon the intimation of ruder draughts frame to themselves the exact *Idea* of a *Triangle*, which they having not learned from any outward Object, must needs be the inward representation of their own Minds.

5. But



5. But now for other Objections, That a *Blind* man would be able to discourse of *Colours*, if there were any *Innate Ideas* in his Soul; I say, it does not at all follow; because these *Ideas* that I contend to be in the Soul, are not *Sensible*, but *Intellectual*, such as are those many *Logical*, *Metaphysical*, *Mathematical*, and some *Moral* Notions. All which we imploy as our own *Modes* of considering sensible Objects, but are not the sensible Objects themselves, of which we have no *Idea*, but onely a capacity, by reason of the Organs of our Body, to be affected by them. The reason therefore of a *blind* man's inability of discoursing of *Colours*, is onely that he has no *Substratum* or *Phantasm* of the Subject of the discourse, upon which he would use these *innate* Modes or frame of Notions that are naturally in his Mind, and which he can make use of in the speculation of sundry other sensible Objects.

See Book I.  
ch. 6. sect. 3.

6. And whereas it is further objected, That these *Logical* and *Mathematical* Notions came in also at the *Senses*, because *Brutes* have the knowledge of them, upon whom we will not bestow so rich an inward furniture as these *Innate Ideas*; I answer, that *Brutes* have not the knowledge of any such *Notion*, but what they act is from a mere *Concatenation* of *sensible Phantasms* representing things *grateful* or *ungrateful* to the *Sense*: as to instance in those particulars that are objected, That a *Dog* will bark at one noise, suppose the knocking at the door, and not at another, as the falling of a stool or of a dish from off a shelf; that he will follow one sent, as that of the Hare, and neglect another, and the like; these are all done, not that he has any *Notion* of *Effect* and *Cause*, but by mere *Concatenation* of *Phantasms* representing things as *gratefull* or *ungratefull*, or neither *gratefull* nor *ungratefull* to his *Sense*, in which case he is not mov'd at all. And if a *Dog* chop at the bigger morsel, it is not that he considers the *notion* of *inequality*; but because that sensible Object does more powerfully move his appetite. So if he take one single side of a *Triangle* to come to the corner of it, where a piece of bread may be placed, it is not because he considers that a *straight line* is the shortest betwixt the same terms, but he sensibly feels that going directly to it he shall be sooner at it then if he went about: as *Zeno* instances well in an *Ass* at one corner of a Pasture & the fodder in the other, that he would goe directly to that corner the fodder lay in; which as he thought was a marvellous witty jeer to *Euclide* his *Demonstration*, that *any two sides of a Triangle are bigger then the third*, as being so plain a Truth that no *Ass* could miss of it.

7. But by the favour of so *Critical* a Philosopher, we may very well suspect that neither *Dog* nor *Ass*, that makes toward any Object, goes directly in a straight line to it because he considers that a crooked one is further about, but because the visual line guides him straight to the Object he looks at, in which he goes as naturally, without any reflexion upon *Mathematical* notions, as a stone cast out of a sling of it self endeavours to steer its course with a Motion rectilinear: which having not so much as *Sense*, we can in no wise suspect to be capable of the rudest Notion in *Geometry*.

8. Wherefore it is a mere fallacy, to argue that *Brutes*, because they doe such things as are Reasonable or Mathematical, therefore they doe them

them from *Notions* of *Logick* or *Mathematicks*; whenas in creatures inanimate that can think of nothing, we may read the footsteps of *Reason* and *Geometry* in their *Motions* and *Figurations*; as in the drops of *Rain* that fall downwards in the form of *Hailstones*; and in the beauty and symmetry of the leaves and flowers of *Herbs* and *Plants*: Which *Objects* while we contemplate, we apply to them the *Innate modes* of our own *Mind*, which she uses in the speculation even of those things that themselves are *dead* and *thoughtless*.

## CHAP. III.

1. *That considering the lapse of Man's Soul into Matter, it is no wonder she is so much puzzled in speculating things Immaterial.*
2. *That all Extension does not imply Physical Divisibility or Separability of Parts.*
3. *That the Emanation of the Secondary substance from the Centrall in a Spirit, is not properly Creation.*
4. *How it comes to pass that the Soul cannot withdraw her self from pain by her Self-contracting faculty.*
5. *That the Soul's extension does not imply as many Wills and Understandings as imaginable Parts, by reason of the special Unity and Indivisibility of her substance.*
6. *Several Instances of the puzzledness of Phansy in the firm conclusions of Sense, and of Reason.*
7. *The unconceivableness of the manner of that strong union some parts of the Matter have one with another.*
8. *What is meant by Hylopathy, and how a Spirit, though not impenetrable, may be the Impellent of Matter.*
9. *That the unexplicableness of a Spirit's moving Matter is no greater argument against the truth thereof, then the unconceivableness of that line that is produced by the Motion of a Globe on a Plane is an argument against the Mobility thereof.*
10. *That the strength of this last Answer consists in the Assurance that there are such Phænomena in the World as utterly exceed the Powers of mere Matter; of which several Examples are hinted out of the foregoing Treatise.*

1. **T**HAT the *Souls* of *Men*, the lowest dregs of all the *Intellectual Orders*, should be plung'd and puzzled in the more close and accurate Speculation of things *Spiritual* and *Intellectual*, is but reasonable; especially considering that even *Matter* it self, in which they tumble and wallow, which they feel with their hands and usurp with all their *Senses*; if they once offer to contemplate it in an *Intellectual* and *Rational* manner; their *Phansies* are so clouded in this dark state of incarceration in these earthly *Bodies*, that the *Notion* thereof seems unimaginable and contradictory; \* as I have largely enough already insisted upon.

But that the *Notion* of a *Spirit*, which seems so to obscure the clearness of the *Idea* of *God*, is no such inconsistent and unconceivable *Notion* as some would have it, I hope I shall sufficiently evince by answering the shrewdest *Objections* that I think can be made against it.

\* *Antidote,*  
Book 1. ch. 4.  
sect. 2.



2. Whereas therefore we have defined a *Spirit* (I mean chiefly a created one) as well from those more *absolute powers* of *Self-contraction* and *dilatation*, as also from those *relative faculties* of *Penetrating, moving and altering of the Matter*; we will now set down the Objections made against them both.

And against the first it is objected, That it is impossible for the Mind of Man to imagine any Substance having a power of *Self-dilatation* and *Contraction* to be *unextended*, and that *Extension* cannot be imagined without *diversity of parts*, nor *diversity of parts* without a *possibility of division* or separation of them; because *diversity of parts* in any Substance supposes *diversity of substances*, and *diversity of substances* supposes *independency of one another*: from whence it will follow that *Indivisibility* is incompatible to a *Spirit*, which notwithstanding we have added in the Definition thereof.

I confess the Objection is very ingenious and set on home; but withall conceive that the difficulty is easily taken off, if we acknowledge some such thing to be in the nature of a *Spirit* as has been by thousands acknowledged in the nature of *Intentional Species*. We will therefore represent the property of a *Spirit* in this *Symbol* or *Hieroglyphick*.

Suppose a *Point of light* from which rays out a *luminous Orb* according to the known principles of *Opticks*: This *Orb of light* does very much resemble the nature of a *Spirit*, which is diffus'd and extended, and yet *indivisible*. For we'll suppose in this *Spirit* the Center of life to be indivisible, and yet to diffuse it self by a kind of *circumscrib'd Omnipresency*, as the *Point of light* is discernible in every point of the *Luminous Sphere*. And yet supposing that Central lucid Point *indivisible*, there is nothing divisible in all that Sphere of light. For it is ridiculous to think by any Engine or Art whatsoever to separate the luminous rays from the shining Center, and keep them apart by themselves; as any man will acknowledge that does but carefully consider the nature of the thing we speak of.

Now there is no difficulty to imagine such an *Orb* as this a *Substance* as well as a *Quality*. And indeed this *Sphere of light* it self, it not inhering in any Subject in the space it occupies, looks far more like a Substance than any Accident. And what we fancie unadvisedly to befall *Light* and *Colours*, that any point of them will thus ray orbicularly, is more rationally to be admitted in *Spiritual* substances, whose central essence spreads out into a *Secondary* substance, as the luminous rays are conceiv'd to shoot out from a lucid Point. From whence we are enabled to return an Answer to the greatest difficulty in the foregoing Objection, *viz.* That the conceived parts in a *Spirit* have an inseparable dependence upon the central Essence thereof, from which they flow, and in which they are radically contained; and therefore though there be an *Extension* of this whole substantial power, yet one part is not separable or discernible from another, but the intire Substance, as well *Secondary* as *Primary* or *Central*, is *indivisible*.

3. But let us again cast our eye upon this *lucid Point* and radiant *Orb* we have made use of; It is manifest that those rays that are hindred from shooting

shooting out so far as they would, need not loose their virtue or Being, but only be reflected back toward the shining Center; and the obstacle being removed, they may shoot out to their full length again: so that there is no generation of a new ray, but an emission of what was actually before. Whereby we are well furnish'd with an Answer to a further Objection, that would insinuate that this Emanation or Efflux of the *Secondary Substance* from the *Central* is *Creation* properly so called, which is deemed incompetent to any creature.

But we answer, that both the *Central* and *Secondary Substance* of a *Spirit* were created at once by God; and that these free active *Spirits* have only a power in them of contracting their vital rays and dilating of them, not of annihilating or creating of them: For we also added in the Definition of a *Spirit*, *Self-penetration*, or the running of one part into another, if we may call them *parts*. And this Answer I hold so satisfactory, that I think it needless to alledge the opinion of *Durandus*; who contends that *Creation* is not incompetent unto a creature, provided that it be acknowledged to be done by virtue of donation from the first Creator, and in an inevitable observance to his Laws. We might also further scruple whether any *Emanation* may be properly call'd *Creation*; but enough has been already said to satisfy this Objection.

4. But we are further yet urged concerning this *Self-contraction* and *dilatation*; for it is demanded why the *Soul* of Man, which we acknowledge a *Spirit*, does not contract it self or withdraw it self from those parts which are pained, or why she does not dilate her self beyond the bounds of the *Body*. To which is answered, That the *Plantal faculty* of the *Soul*; whereby she is unitable to this terrestrial *Body*, is not arbitrary, but fatal or natural; which union cannot be dissolved unless the bond of Life be loosened, and that *vital congruity* (which is in the *Body*, and does necessarily hold the *Soul* there) be either for a time hindred or utterly destroy'd.

5. The last Objection against the *Self-extension* of a *Spirit* is, That there will be as many *Wills* and *Understandings* as *Parts*. But I have, in that *Symbolical* representation I have made use of, so represented the *Extension* of a *Spirit*, that it is also acknowledged *Indivisible*; whereby the Objection is no sooner propounded then answered, that engine lying in readiness to receive all such assaults.

6. Now for the Objections made against the *Relative faculties* of a *Spirit*, to wit, *The power of penetrating, moving and altering the Matter*; there is mainly this one, That *Matter* cannot be altered but by *Motion*, nor *Motion* be communicated but by *Impulse*, nor *Impulse* without *Impenetrability* in the *Impulsor*, and that therefore how a *Spirit* should move *Matter* which does penetrate it, is not to be imagined.

But I answer, first, what our *Imagination* is baffled in, either our outward *Senses* or inward *Reason* often prove to be true. As for example, our *Reason* attending to the nature of an exact *Globe* and *Plane*, will undoubtedly pronounce that they will touch in a *point*, and that they may be moved one upon another: But our *Imagination* cannot but make this exception, That the *Globe* thus drawn upon the *Plane* describes a *line*

O

which

See my *Immortality of the Soul*, Book 2. chap. 11. sect. 10. also Book 3. chap. 2. sect. 3. 4.

See also this *Append. chap. 10. sect. 9, 10.*



Book 1. chap. 4.  
sect. 2.

which must necessarily consist of *points*, point perpetually following point in the whole description; which how monstrous it is to be admitted, I have already intimated in the foregoing Discourse.

So likewise the *Angle of Contact* included betwixt the *Periphery* and a *Perpendicular* falling on the end of the *Diameter* of a *Circle*, Geometricians demonstrate by *Reason* to be less than any *acute Angle* whatsoever, insomuch that a *line* cannot fall betwixt the *Periphery* and the *Perpendicular*: whence the *Phansy* cannot but imagine this *Angle* to be indivisible; which is a perfect contradiction, and against the definition of an *Angle*, which is not the *coincidence* but the *inclination* of two lines. Besides, a lesser *Circle* inscrib'd in a greater, so that it touches in one point, through which let there be drawn the common *Diameter* of them both, and then let fall a *Perpendicular* on that end of the *Diameter* where the *Circles* touch; it will be evident that one *Angle of Contact* is bigger than the other, when yet they are both indivisible, as was acknowledged by our *Imagination* before: So that one and the same *Angle* will be both divisible and indivisible, which is again a plain contradiction.

And as *Imagination* is puzzled in things we are sure of by *Reason*, so is it also in things we are certain of by *Sense*; for who can imagine how it comes about that we see our image behind the Looking-glass? for it is more easie to fancy that we should deprehend our faces either in the very surface of the glass, or else in the place where they are: For if the reflected rayes might serve the turn, then we should finde the distance of our image no greater than that of the glass; but if we be affected also by the direct rayes, methinks we should be led by them to the first place whence they came, and finde our faces in that reall situation they are.

7. But to instance in things that will come more near to our purpose. We see in some kindes of Matter almost an invincible union of parts, as in *Steel*, *Adamant*, and the like; what is it that holds them so fast together? If you'll say, some inward Substantial form; we have what we look'd for, a Substance distinct from the Matter. If you say it is the quality of Hardness in the Matter that makes it thus hard; that is no more than to say, it is so because it is so. If you say it is a more perfect rest of parts one by another then there is in other Matter; if that be true, it is yet a thing utterly unimaginable: as for example, That upon Matter exactly plain, more plain and solid then a Table of Marble, if a man laid a little *Cube* upon it of like plainness and solidity, that this *Cube* by mere immediate touching of the Table should have as firm union therewith as the parts of the *Cube* have one with another, is a thing that the *Phansy* of man cannot tell how to admit. For suppose at first you drew along this *Cube* on the Table, as it would easily goe, both surfaces being so exactly smooth, and that then you left drawing of it; that these two smooth bodies should presently stick so fast together that a Hammer and a Chieffill would scarce sever them, is a thing utterly unimaginable.

Wherefore the union betwixt the Parts of the Matter being so strong, and yet so unimaginable how it comes to pass to be so, why should we not admit as strong or stronger union betwixt a *Spirit* and a *Body*, though our *Phansy* suggest it will pass through, as well as it does that smooth bodies

will

will ever lie loose, unless there be some cement to hold them together: And this *union* once admitted, *Motion*, *Activity* and *Agitation* being so easie and prone a conception of the property of a *Spirit*, it will as easly and naturally follow that it does *move* or *agitate the Matter* it is thus *united* to.

8. But again to answer more closely, I say, this present Objection is nothing else but a Sophism of the *Phansy*, conceiving a *Spirit* as a *Body* going through some pervious hole or passage too wide and patent for it, in which therefore it cannot stick or be firmly settled in it. To which *Imagination* we will oppose, that though *Spirits* do penetrate *Bodies*, yet they are not such thin and lank things that they must of necessity run through them, or be unable to take hold of them, or be united with them, but that they may fill up the capacity of a *Body* penetrable by *Spirits*: which *penetrability* of a *Body* or *Matter* when it is satiated or fill'd, that *Spirit* that thus fills it is more strongly riveted in, or united with the *Body* or *Matter*, then one part of the *Matter* can be with another.

And therefore we will acknowledge one speciall faculty of a *Spirit*, which after *penetration* it doth either naturally or arbitrarily exert, which is this, to fill the *Receptivity* or *Capacity* of a *Body* or *Matter* so far forth as it is capable or receptive of a *Soul* or *Spirit*.

And this affection of a *Spirit* we will make bold to call, for more compendiousness, by one Greek term *ὑλοπάθεια* which, that there may be no suspicion of any fraud or affected foolery in words, we will as plainly as we can define thus, *A power in a Spirit of offering so near to a corporeal emanation from the Center of life, that it will so perfectly fill the receptivity of Matter into which it has penetrated; that it is very difficult or impossible for any other Spirit to possess the same; and therefore of becoming hereby so firmly and closely united to a Body, as both to actuate and to be acted upon, to affect and be affected thereby.*

And now let us appeal to *Imagination* her self; if *Matter* does not fit as close, nay closer, to a *Spirit* then any one part of *Matter* can do to another: For here *union* pervades through all, but there conjunction is onely in a common Superficies, as is usually fancied and acknowledged. And this *Hylopathia* which we thus suppose in a finite *Spirit* or *Soul*, I further adde, may well answer in Analogy to that power of creating *Matter* which is necessarily included in the *Idea* of *God*.

9. But lastly, if the manner how a *Spirit* acts upon a *Body*, or is affected by a *Body*, seems so intricate that it must be given up for inexplicable; yet as the mobility of an exact *Globe* upon a *Plane* is admitted as an evident and undeniable property thereof by our *Understanding*, though we cannot *imagine* how it always touching in a *point* should by its motion describe a continued *line*, ( and the like may be urged from the other following instances of Intricacy and perplexedness: ) so supposing such manifest operations in Nature, that *Reason* can demonstrate not to be from the *Matter* it self, we must acknowledge there is some other Substance besides the *Matter* that acts in it and upon it, which is *Spiritual*, though we know not how *Motion* can be communicated to *Matter* from a *Spirit*.



10. And the strength of this our third and last Answer consists in this, that there are indeed several such operations apparently transcending the power of *Matter*, of which we will onely here briefly repeat the heads, having more fully discoursed of them in the foregoing Treatise.

And first, I instance in what is more general, and acknowledged by *Des-Cartes* himself, who yet has entituled the Laws of *Matter* to the highest Effects that ever any Man could rationally do : and 'tis this, That that *Matter* out of which all things are, is of it self *uniform* and of one kinde. From whence I infer, that of it self therefore it *all* either *rests* or *moves*. If it *all rests*, there is something besides *Matter* that *moves* it, which necessarily is a *Spirit* : If it *all move*, there could not be possibly the coalition of any thing, but every imaginable particle would be actually loose from another. Wherefore there is required a Substance besides *Matter* that must binde what we finde fix'd and bound.

The second Instance is in that admirable *Wisdom* discoverable in all the works of Nature, which I have largely insisted on in my Second Book, which do manifestly evince that all things are contriv'd by a *wise* Principle : But who but a fool will say that the *Matter* is *wise*, and yet notwithstanding out of the putrefied parts even of the Earth it self, as also out of the drops of dew, rotten pieces of wood, and such like geer, the bodies of Animals do arise so artificially and exquisitely well framed, that the Reason of Man cannot contemplate them but with the greatest pleasure and admiration ?

Thirdly, Those many and undeniable Stories of *Apparitions* do clearly evince, that an Understanding lodges in sundry *Aiery* bodies, when it is utterly impossible that *Aire* should be so arbitrarily changed into shapes, and yet held together as an actuated vehicle of life, if there were not something besides the *Aire* it self that did thus possess it and moderate it, and could dilate, contract, and guide it as it pleased ; otherwise it would be no better figured nor more steddily kept together then the fume of Tobacco or the reek of Chimneys.

Fourthly and lastly, It is manifest that that which in us *understands*, *remembers* and *perceives*, is that which *moves* our bodies, and that those *Cognitive* Faculties can be no operation of the bare *Matter*. From whence it is evident that there is in our *Bodies* an *Intellectual* Spirit that *moves* them as it pleases ; as I have largely enough prov'd in the last Chapter of the First Book of my *Antidote*, and shall yet further confirm when we come to the Objections made against it.

## CHAP. IV.

1. *That Existence is a Perfection, verified from vulgar Instances.* 2. *Further proved from Metaphysical Principles.* 3. *An Appeal to ordinary Reason.* 4. *That at least Necessary Existence is a Perfection, if bare Existence be not.* 5. *An Illustration of that last Conclusion.*

1. **T**O avoid the Necessity and Evidence of our Demonstration of the *Existence of God* drawn from the inseparable connexion of the Notion thereof with his *Idea* (we urging *That necessary Existence must needs be included in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect*) there are some that stick not to affirm that *Existence* is no Term of intrinsecal *Perfection* to any thing. For, say they, imagine two pieces of Gold equal in weight, purity and all other respects, but onely duration or necessity of *Existence*; we cannot justly, without being humourfome or phansiful, attribute preeminence to one more then to the other. To which I answer, That as two pieces of Gold are better then one, so one piece of Gold that will last twice as long as another is twice as good as the other, or at least much better then the other; which I think is so evident that it wants no further proof.

But further, that we may not onely apply our selves to answer Objections, but absolutely to ratifie the present Truth; *That Existence is a Perfection*: First, it is palpably plain, according to that sensible Aphorism of Solomon, *Better is a living Dog then a dead Lion*.

2. But then again to argue more generally, The *Metaphysicians*, as it is very well known, look upon *Existence* as the formal and actual part of a Being; and Form or Act is acknowledged the more noble and perfect Principle in every Essence; and therefore if they can be distinguished in God, is so there also: if they cannot, then it is thereby confest, that we cannot think of the *Idea* of God but it immediately informs us that he doth *Exist*. And I recommend it to the inquiry of the Hebrew *Criticks*, whether יהוה, from whence is יהוה, does not rather signifie *Existence* then *Essence*.

3. Thirdly, let the *Metaphysicians* conclude what they please, it is evident to ordinary Reason, that if there be one conception better then another, that implies no imperfection in it, it must be cast upon what is most perfect: But *Existence* is better then non-existence, and implies no imperfection in it; therefore it must be cast upon an *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Perfect*.

4. But fourthly and lastly, Though it were possible to cavil at the single Notion of *Existence*, that it neither argued *Perfection* nor *Imperfection*, nor belong'd to either; yet there can be no shew of exception against the highest and most perfect manner of existing, but that that is naturally and undeniably included in the *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Perfect*; and that therefore we do but rightfully contend that *necessary Existence* is inseparably contained in the *notion of God*.



5. For as for example, while it is confest that *Matter* is finite and cannot be otherwise, for a *Body* to be *figured* implies neither Perfection nor Imperfection, but is a natural and necessary affection thereof; yet to be *ordinately figured*, is an undoubted *Perfection* of a *Body*: so in like manner, though it were confessed that mere *Existence* is neither Perfection nor Imperfection, yet so noble a Mode thereof as necessarily to *Exist*, must without all tergiversation be acknowledged a notion of *Perfection*, and therefore to accrew naturally to the *Idea* of a Being absolutely perfect.

## CHAP. V.

1. *That there is a vast difference betwixt arguing from forced Figments or fancies and from the natural Ideas of our own Minds.* 2. *That the Idea of a Being absolutely Evil does not imply necessary Existence, whether it signifie a Being absolutely Imperfect,* 3. *Or absolutely Wicked,* 4. *Or absolutely Miserable,* 5. *Or absolutely Mischievous.* 6. *That if by a Being absolutely Mischievous were meant onely the Infinite power of doing hurt, this is God, whose absolute Goodness prevents the execution thereof.* 7. *That the right Method of using our Reason is to proceed from what is plain and unsuspected to what is more obscure and suspicable.* 8. *That according to this Method, being assured first of the Existence of a Being absolutely Perfect from his Idea, we are therewithall inabled to return answer, that Impossibility of Existence belongs to a Being either absolutely Miserable or absolutely Mischievous.* 9. *That the Phænomena of the World further prove the impossibility of the Existence of a Being absolutely Mischievous.* 10. *And that the Counsels and Works of God are not to be measured by the vain Opinions of Men.*

1. **A**S for those that admit *necessary Existence* to be included in the *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Perfect*, but would shew that our Inference from thence, viz. *That this perfect Being doth Exist*, is false and sophistical, because *necessary Existence* is contained in the *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Evil*, which notwithstanding we will not admit to *Exist* (for, say they, that which is *absolutely Evil* is immutably and ever unavoidably such, and cannot but be so, and therefore it cannot but Exist, and ever has Existed:) To these we answer, That we shall easily discover the grand difference betwixt such arbitrary and forced Figments and fancies as these, and the naturall and consistent *Ideas* of our own Mind, if we look more carefully and curiously into the Nature of what these Objectors have ventured to utter, and sift out what either themselves mean, or what must necessarily be understood by this *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Evil*; which they have thus forged.

2. By the *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Evil* must be meant either the *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Imperfect*, or *absolutely Wicked*, or *absolutely Miserable*, or *absolutely Mischievous*.

Now the *Idea* of what is *absolutely Imperfect* removes from it what-  
ever

ever sounds *Perfection*; as if all Perfection were 1000, then this *Idea* removes from this *absolute imperfect* every unite of these 1000, allowing not so much as an unite or fraction of an unite, no not the possibility of them, to what is thus *absolutely imperfect*. So that what is *absolutely imperfect* is impossible to *Exist*. But *necessary Existence* is a Term of *Perfection*, as was plainly demonstrated before.

3. The *Idea* of a Being *absolutely Wicked* removes from it all manner of Goodness, Equity, Decorum, Righteousness; and implies a firm and immutable aversion of the Will from all these, and a settled and unchangeable purpose of doing things wickedly: but intimates nothing either of the *Necessity* or *Contingency* of the *Existence* of the Substance of this Being; that being neither here nor there to the moral deformity thereof, as is evidently plain at first sight.

4. The *Idea* of a Being *absolutely Miserable* is the *Idea* of a Being that sustains the fullest and compleatest torments that are conceivable; and this must be in a knowing, passive, and reflexive Subject. Now, I say, this torture arising partly from the sense of present smart, and partly out of reflexion of what it has suffered, and a full belief that it shall suffer thus eternally; this *miserable Being*, though but a Creature, is as perfectly tormented as it could possibly be if it necessarily existed of it self. For if it were always, though but contingently and dependently of another, the torture is equally perfect; and therefore *necessary Existence* is not included in the *Idea* thereof.

Again, the Objector is to prove that a Being wholly Immaterial can suffer any torture: which till he do, it seeming more reasonable that it cannot, I shall flatly deny that it can; and therefore do assert, that a torturable Being is a Spirit incorporate; and affirm also, as a thing most rational, that this Spirit, if very great pain was upon it, such as that it were better for him not to be at all than to be in it, that anguish by continuance would be so increased, (pain infinitely overpowering the vital vigour, and overpoising the contents of life and sense) that it would die to the Body in which it is thus tormented. But if it be not in so ill a plight as to change its state of conjunction, but that the torture proves tolerable; then *necessary Existence* would not be its misery, but some part of happiness: so that there can be no such thing as a Being *absolutely Miserable* in the world. For *Misery* rack'd up to the highest would make the thing cease to be. As a man cannot say an *absolute big Triangle*; for a Circle will be always bigger: or rather no Figure can be *absolutely big*, because the nature of it is to be limited.

Thirdly, The *Idea* of a Being *absolutely Perfect* is compos'd of *Notions* of the same denomination, all of them of themselves sounding absolute Perfection; but the *Idea* of a Being *absolutely Miserable* is not compiled of *Notions* that sound absolute Misery of themselves. For what Misery, but rather good, is there in *necessary Existence*? Wherefore if we should contend that an inference from the *Idea* of a thing to its *necessary Existence* is onely warrantable there where the *Idea* consists of *Notions* of one denomination, the Objector is to take off the distinction.

Or, to speak more plainly, *Absolutely necessary Existence* and *Self-existence*



*existence* is one and the same Notion: But *Self-existence* is the most high and perfect mode of *Existence* that is conceivable, and therefore proper to what is most *absolutely Perfect*. Wherefore to transplant *Self-existence* to so pitiful an *Idea* as the *Idea* of a Being *absolutely Miserable*; is as absonous and prodigious as to clap the head of a Lion to the body of a Snail. Nay, indeed, it seems more contradictory, that being but the misplacing of Body and Figure, but this the implantation of an inward Property into a wrong Subject; nay infinitely contrary properties in the same Subject.

5. Fourthly and lastly, As for a Being *absolutely Mischievous*, it seems indeed to include *necessary* and unavoidable *Existence* as well as *Omnipotency* and *Omniscieny*, or else this *Sovereign Mischief* is not so full and absolute as our apprehension can conceive. These added to a peremptory and immutable desire or will of doing all mischief possible for Mischief sake, do fully complete the Notion of this *absolute Mischievous Being*.

But how spurious and unnatural this *Idea* is, is evident in that it does again forcedly tie together Notions of a quite contrary nature, the greatest Imperfection with the highest Perfections, joyning the incommunicable Attributes of God with that which is haply worse then we can demonstrate to be in any Devil; nay such as seem a contradiction in any Subject whatsoever.

Wherefore, as I intimated before, if any man pretend our Argument to be a Sophism, and in imitating it would discover the fallacy in some other Matter, he is exactly to observe the Laws thereof in his imitation, and constitute an *Idea* of Notions that agree with the same Title, as they exquisitely do in the *Idea* of a Being *absolutely Perfect*; for there is no notion there but what sounds highest *Perfection*.

But in this *Idea* of a Being *absolutely Mischievous* there is nothing that of its own nature signifies mischief, but that wicked and malicious desire of doing mischief merely for mischiefs sake. Which is a degree of Imperfection sunk into the borders of Inconsistency and Contradiction. But yet to be able accurately to destroy all good whatsoever, implies again an *Omnipotency* in Power, and an *Omniscieny*. But what is omnipotently and absolutely mischievous, must also destroy it self; as an infinitely big Triangle implies no Triangle at all. So that this *Idea* is not free from the intanglement of multifarious Contradictions in the conception thereof.

6. But if by a Being *absolutely Mischievous* were meant, a Being that has the power and skill of doing all mischief imaginable, and indeed far above all the Imagination and Conceit of man, and that so effectually and universally that nothing possibly can prevent him; this is indeed the Eternal God, who is necessarily of himself, and prevents all things, and can be limited in his actions by none but by himself: but he being that absolute and immutable *Good*, and full and pure *Perfection*, he cannot but include in his *Idea* that precious Attribute of *Benignity*; and therefore acting according to his entire Nature, he is not onely *Good* himself, but, by the prerogative of his own Being, keeps out such *mischievous Sovereignities*

*veraignies* as have been here pleaded for, from ever having any Existence in the world.

7. Wherefore to bring our Answer to a head, I say, we are to use that natural method in this Speculation that men that know the use of their Faculties observe in all others, *viz.* to assent to what is most simple, easie and plain first, and of which there can be no doubt but that the Notion is congruous and consistent; and such is the *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Perfect*, no arbitrary or fortuitous figment, or forced compilement of Notions that jarre one with another, or may be justly suspected, if not demonstrated, to be incoherent and repugnant; such as for example would be a *walking Tree*, or an *intelligent Stone*, or the like: but such as wherein the Notions naturally and necessarily come together to compleat the conception of some one single Title, as being homogeneal and essential thereunto.

8. And then what I contend for is this, That attending to this Natural *Idea* of God, or a *Being absolutely Perfect*, we unavoidably discover the necessity of *actual Existence*, as inseparable from him, it being necessarily included in this *Idea* of *absolute Perfection*: which is still more undeniably set on in the last push of my Argument, where I urge that either *Impossibility*, *Contingency*, or *Necessity of actual Existence* must needs belong to a *Being absolutely Perfect*; but not *Impossibility* nor *Contingency*, therefore *Necessity of actual Existence*.

And therefore being so well secured of this Truth, I require the Objector to bring up his Argument to this last and clearest frame, and let him also urge that either *Impossibility*, *Contingency*, or *Necessity of actual Existence*, belongs either to a *Being absolutely Miserable* or *absolutely Mischievous*; and I shall confidently answer, *Impossibility of Existence*, and give him a further Reason, besides what I intimated before of the incongruity of the Notions themselves, that it is also repugnant with the *Existence* of God, whom, without any rub or scruple, attending to the natural and undistorted suggestions of our own Faculties, we have already demonstrated to *exist*.

9. And still to make our Answer more certain concerning a *Being absolutely Mischievous*, it is most evident He is not, and therefore sith he must be of himself if he be at all, it is impossible he should be: And that he is not, is plain, because things would then be infinitely worse then they are, or not at all; whenas I dare say they are now as well as it is fit or possible for them to be, if we had but the wisdom to conceive or comprehend the whole counsel and purpose of *Providence*, and knew clearly and particularly what is past and what is to come.

10. But if we take up, out of our own blindness or rashness, Principles concerning the *Providence* of God that are inconsistent with his *Idea* (such as the *Ptolemaical* Systeme of the Heavens, which (as some say) *Alphonse* looked upon (though others tell the story of the misplacement of certain Mountains on the Earth) as so perplex'd a Bungle, that transported with zeal against that fond Hypothesis, he did scoffingly and audaciously profess, that if he had stood by whilst God made the World, he could have directed the Frame of it better) we shall indeed then have occasion to quarrell,



quarrell, but not with either the *Counsels* or *Works* of God, but rather with the *Opinions* of ignorant and mistaken men.

## CHAP. VI.

1. *That the sense of his Argument from the Idea of God in the first posture, is not simply That the Idea is true, and if God were, his Existence were necessary; but That this Idea being true does exhibit to our Minde an absolute necessary Existence as belonging to Him.* 2. *That the Idea of the God of the Manichees does not include in it necessary existence.* 3. *That to say that necessary Existence included in the Idea of a Being absolutely perfect is but conditional, is a Contradiction.* 4. *The second posture of his Argument made good, and that by virtue of the form thereof the Existence of the Manichean God is not concludible.* 5. *The invincible Evidence of the third posture of his Argument in the judgement of his Antagonist himself.* 6. *That the force of his Argument in the fourth and last posture is not, That we conceive the Idea of Matter without necessary Existence; but that, look as near as we can, we finde no necessary existence included therein, as we do in the Idea of God.* 7. *That the Faculties of our Minde, to which he perpetually appeals, are to be supposed, not proved to be true.*

1. **A**ND now having thus clearly satisfied the Objection taken from the *Idea of a Being absolutely Evil*, it will be easie to turn back the edge of any Argument of the like nature, be it never so skilfully & cunningly directed against us. As that which I had from an ingenious hand, which because it seems very witty to me as well as invincible to the Objector, I shall propound it in his own words; the tenour whereof runs thus:

*If a man may have a true Idea or Notion of that which is not, yea and of that which is not and yet would necessarily be if it were, then your Argument for the Existence of God, from necessary Existence being comprehended in his Idea or Notion, is unconcluding. How you can deny this Argument, I cannot possibly conceive, the substance of your first Argument from the Idea of God being contained therein in the first posture of it.*

*But a man may have a true Notion of that which is not, yea and of that which is not and yet would necessarily be if it were; as for instance, of the Evil God of the Manichees.*

But I answer briefly to the Proposition thus, That it does not reach our Case: because we argue God does exist, not because the *Idea* of him is true, and if he did exist he would necessarily exist; for *conditional* necessary Existence, as being less perfect than *absolute* necessary Existence, cannot belong to a *Being* absolutely Perfect: but because this true *Idea*, without any *If* or *And*, does suggest to our Natural Faculties, That *necessary Existence* being involved in his *Idea* alone, the like not happening in any other *Idea* beside, without any more a-do, he doth of himself absolutely and really exist.

To the Assumption I answer, That the *Manichees* God, if he could exist at all, would so do necessarily; and my reason is, because God would never create so foul a Monster.

2. But if you still urge that the *Idea* of this *Evil God* of the *Manichees* includes *necessary Existence* in it, it being the Notion of a God, and yet he is not existent; and that therefore the true God cannot be proved to exist, because *necessary Existence* is involved in his *Idea*: I further answer, That the Notion of the *Manichees* God does not naturally include *necessary Existence* in it, because it is not the Notion of a Being *absolutely Perfect*; and that the Notion of an *Evil God* is a mere forced or fortuitous Figment, and no better sense then a *Wooden God*, whose *Idea* implies not *necessary Existence*, but an impossibility thereof.

3. But the Objector proceeds, and we must attend his motions; onely before he comes to the second posture of our Argument, he takes notice of my charging of all those with self-contradiction that acknowledge that *necessary Existence* is contained in the *Idea* of God, or a Being *absolutely Perfect*, and that thereby is signified that *necessary Existence* belongs unto him, and yet unsay it again, by adding, *If he do at all exist*. But I answer, my charge is true: For to say, *necessary Existence* belongs to a Being, which we notwithstanding profess may not be for all that, is to admit a contradiction; for thus the same thing by our Faculties is acknowledged both *necessary* and *contingent*, that is, that it cannot but be, and yet that it may not be; which if it be not a Contradiction in this case, I know not what is: for no less then *absolutely necessary Existence* must be comprized in the *Idea* of a Being *absolutely perfect*.

*Antidote, Book  
1. chap. 8. sect. 3.*

4. But the Argument will still appear more plain in the second posture. For if there be any fraud or fallacy, it lies in this term, *Necessary*, which I have truly explain'd (and it is not denied) to signifie nothing else but an inseparable connexion betwixt the *Subject* and the *Pradicate*. Wherefore *Existence* having an inseparable connexion with God, it must needs follow that this Axiom, *God does Exist*, is eternally and immutably true. But here to reply, *If he did exist*, is to insinuate that for all this he may not exist, which is to say, that what is immutably true is not immutably true; which is a palpable contradiction.

*Antidote, Book  
1. chap. 8. sect. 4.*

But the Objector here flies for aid to the God of the *Manichees*, desiring me to put the *Manichean* God in stead of the God whose *Existence* I would prove, whereby I may discern my own Sophisme. Well, if it be not Idolatry, let us place him there; but how shrimpish he is and unfit to fill this place, you may understand out of what I said before, That the *Manichean* God does no more imply in the Notion thereof *necessary Existence* then a *Wooden God* does, nay it rather implyes *impossibility of Existence*. For the Notion of God is the same, that is, of a Being *absolutely Perfect*, which must involve in it the most absolute *Goodnesse* that may be. Now bring the *Manichean* God into sight, and let us view his inscription: He is an *evil absolutely good*; which, as I said before, is far worse sense in my conceit then a *Wooden God*, and therefore *Impossibility*, and not *Necessity of Existence*, is contained in his *Idea*.

5. The third posture of my Argument is formidable even to the Ob-  
jector

*Antidote, Book  
1. ch. 8. sect. 5.*



jector himself: for whereas I urge, That either *Impossibility*, *Contingency*, or *Necessity of Actual Existence* belongs to a *Being absolutely Perfect*, he confesses here, that the *Manichean God* will succour him no longer; but as a man left in distress he complains, that it is an hard case, that we must be put to prove the *Existence* of God impossible, or else we must be forced to admit that he is. But afterwards being better advised, he takes notice that if he be not, it is impossible for him to be; and therefore, say I, it is but just that we expect of him that will deny that he is, to prove his *Being* impossible, especially the force of our Argument so necessarily casting him upon it. But in my conceit he had better save his pains; then venture upon so frustraneous an undertaking: for he may remember that the *Idea* of this *Being absolutely Perfect* is so fram'd, that in the judgement of any man that has the use of his Faculties, there is no inconsistency nor impossibility therein, nor the least shadow for suspicion or shyness. And besides, since impossibility of existing is the most imperfect *ἁπλοῦς* that any Being can bear to Existence, it must needs be an outrageous incongruity to attribute it to a *Being absolutely Perfect*, it so naturally and undeniably belonging to a *Being absolutely Imperfect*, as hath been noted before.

chap. 5. sect. 2.

Wherefore if either the doubting or obdurate Atheist will say the Existence of God is impossible, that will not argue any weakness or vanity in my Argument, but rash boldness and blind impudency in him that shall return so irrational an Answer.

*Antidote*, Book  
I. chap. 8. sect.  
6, 7, 8, 9, 10,  
11.

6. But the Objector has arrived now to the fourth and last posture of our Argumentation, of which he conceives this is the utmost summe, That either there is a *God*, or *Matter* is of it self; but *Matter* is not of it self, because *necessary Existence* is not included in the *Idea* thereof. Against which he alledges, that as thousands have the *Idea* of a *Triangle*, and yet have not any knowledge of that property of having the three Angles equal to two right ones; so a man may have the *Idea* of *Matter*, and yet know nothing of the necessity of its Existence, though it have that property in it.

But I answer, This does not reach the force of our Argument; for look as curiously and skilfully as you will into the *Idea* of *Matter*, and you can discover no such property as *necessity of Existence* therein. And then again, the weight of my reasoning lieth mainly in this, That necessity of *Self-existence* being so plainly and unavoidably discoverable in the *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Perfect*, but not at all discernible in the *Idea* of *Matter*; that we doe manifest violence to our Faculties while we acknowledge *Self-existence* in *Matter*, no Faculty informing us so, and deny it in God, the *Idea* of God so conspicuously informing us that *necessary Self-existence* belongs unto him. So that all that I contend for is this, That he that denies a God, runs counter to the light of his Natural Faculties, to which I perpetually appeal.

7. But if you will still say, It may be our Faculties are false; I say so too, that it might be so if there were no God by whom we were made; for then we were such as we finde our selves, and could seek no further, nor assure our selves but that we might be of that nature, as to be then mistaken

mistaken most when we think we are most sure, and have used the greatest caution and circumspection we could to avoid error. But it is sufficient for us that we ask no more than what is granted to them that pretend to the most undeniable Methods of Demonstration, and which *Geometry* her self cannot prove, but supposes; to wit, *That our Faculties are true.*

## CHAP. VII.

1. *That that necessity of Existence that seems to be included in the Idea of Space is but the same that offers it self to our Mind in that more full and perfect Idea of God.* 2. *That there is the same reason of Eternal Duration, whose immediate subject is God, not Matter.* 3. *That Space is but the possibility of Matter, measurable onely as so many several possible Species of things are numerable.* 4. *That Distance is no Physical affection of any thing, but onely Notional.* 5. *That Distance of Bodies is but privation of actual union, measurable by parts, as other Privations of qualities by degrees.* 6. *That if distant Space after the removal of Matter be any real thing, it is that necessary Being represented by the Idea of God.* 7. *That Self-Existence and Contingency are terms inconsistent with one another.*

1. **O**thers there are that seem to come nearer the mark, while they alledge against the fourth posture of our Argument that *necessary Existence* is plainly involved in the *Idea of Matter*. For, say they, a man cannot possibly but imagine a *Space* running out in *infinitum* every way, whether there be a God or no. And this *Space* being extended thus, and measurable by Yards, Poles, or the like, it must needs be something, in that it is thus extended and measurable; for Non-entity can have no affection or property. And if it be an Entity, what can it be but corporeal *Matter*?

But I answer, If there were no *Matter*, but the Immenity of the Divine Essence only, occupying all by his Ubiquity, that *the Replication*, as I may so speak, of his indivisible substance, whereby he presents himself intirely every where, would be the Subject of that Diffusion and Mensurability. And I adde further, That the perpetual obversation of this infinite Amplitude and Mensurability, which we cannot disimagine in our Phansie but will necessarily be, may be a more rude and obscure Notion offered to our Mind of that *necessary* and *self-existent* Essence which the *Idea of God* does with greater fulness and distinctness represent to us. For it is plain that not so much as our Imagination is engaged to an appropriation of this *Idea of Space* to corporeal *Matter*, in that it does not naturally conceive any impenetrability or tangibility in the Notion thereof; and therefore it may as well belong to a *Spirit* as a *Body*. Whence, as I said before, the *Idea of God* being such as it is, it will both justly and

*Antidotes Book*  
1. ch. 8. sect. 11.



necessarily cast this ruder notion of *Space* upon that Infinite and Eternal Spirit which is God.

2. Now there is the same reason for *Time* (by *Time* I mean *Duration*) as for *Space*. For we cannot imagine but that there has been such a continued *Duration* as could have no beginning nor interruption. And any one will say, it is non-sense that there should be such a necessary duration, when there is no real Essence that must of it self thus be always, and for ever so endure. What or who is it then that this eternal, uninterrupted and never-fading duration must belong to? No Philosopher can answer more appositely then the holy Psalmist, *From everlasting to everlasting thou art God*. Wherefore I say that those unavoidable imaginations of the necessity of an *Infinite Space*, as they call it, and *Eternal duration*, are no proofs of a *Self-existent Matter*, but rather obscure subindications of the *necessary Existence* of God.

3. There is also another way of answering this Objection, which is this; That this Imagination of *Space* is not the imagination of any real thing, but onely of the large and immense capacity of the potentiality of the *Matter*, which we cannot free our Mindes from, but must necessarily acknowledge, that there is indeed such a possibility of Matter to be measured upward, downward, every way *in infinitum*, whether this *corporeal Matter* were actually there or no; and that though this potentiality of *Matter* or *Space* be measurable by furlongs, miles, or the like, that it implies no more any real Essence or Being, then when a man recounts so many orders or kindes of the Possibilities of things, the compute or number of them will infer the reality of their Existence.

4. But if they urge us further, That there will be a real distance even in *Space* devoid of Matter; as if, for Example, Three Balls of brass or steel were put together in this empty *Space*, it is utterly unimaginable but that there should be a Triangular distance in the midst of them: it may be answered, That *Distance* is no real or *Physical* property of a thing, but onely *notional*; because more or less of it may accrue to a thing, whenas yet there has been nothing at all done to that to which it does accrue. As suppose one of these Balls mentioned were first an inch distant from another; this distance betwixt them may be made many miles, and yet one of them not so much as touch'd or stirr'd, though it become as much distant as the other.

5. But if they urge us still further, and contend, That this *distance* must be some *real* thing, because it keeps off those Balls so one from another, that supposing two of them two miles distant in empty *Space*, and one of them to lie in the mid-way, if that two miles distant would come to the other so soon as that but one mile distant, it must have double celerity of motion to perform its race: I answer briefly, that *Distance* is nothing else but the privation of actual union, and the greater *distance* the greater privation, and the greater privation the more to doe to regain the former positive condition; and that this privation of actual union is measur'd by *parts*, as other privations of qualities are by *degrees*; and that *parts* and *degrees*, and such like notions, are not *real* things themselves any where, but our mode of conceiving them, and therefore we can bestow

bestow them upon Non-entities as well as Entities, as I have discovered elsewhere more at large.

6. But if this will not satisfy, 'tis no detriment to our cause: For if after the removal of *corporeal Matter* out of the world, there will be still *Space* and *Distance* in which this very Matter, while it was there, was also conceived to lye, and this *distant Space* cannot but be something, and yet not corporeal, because neither impenetrable nor tangible; it must of necessity be a Substance Incorporeal necessarily and eternally existent of it self: which the clearer *Idea* of a *Being absolutely perfect* will more fully and punctually inform us to be the *Self-subsisting God*.

7. But that we may omit nothing that may seem at all worth the answering, There are that endeavour to decline the stroke of our Argument in the third and fourth posture thereof, by saying that *Contingency* is not incompatible to God or any thing else: for all things that exist in the world, happen so to do, though they might have done otherwise. But no man would answer thus, if he attended to what he answered, or to the light of his own Reason, that would instruct him better. For, for example, if *Matter* did *exist of it self*, it is evident that it does *necessarily* exist, and could not have done otherwise: for *Self-existence* prevents all impediments whatsoever, whereby a thing may seem to have been in danger possibly to have fallen short of actually existing.

And as for God, it is as evident, that it is either impossible for him to be, or else that he is of himself; and if of himself, his Existence is unpreventable and necessary; as any man must needs acknowledge that understands the terms he ventures to pronounce.

## CHAP. VIII.

1. *That the Idea of God is a natural and indeleble Notion in the Soul of Man.* 2. *That if there were some smal obscurity in the Notion, it hinders not but that it may be natural.* 3. *That the Politician's abuse of the notion of God and Religion argues them no more to be his Contrivance, then natural Affection, love of Honour and Liberty are; which he in like manner abuses.* 4. *A twofold Answer to an Objection touching God's implanting his Idea in us upon counsel or design.*

1. **T**HAT the *Idea* of a *Being absolutely Perfect* is a Notion natural to the Soul, and such as she cannot deny but it is exactly representative of such a Being, without any clashing of one part against another, all the *Attributes* thereof being homogeneal to the general Title of *Perfection* to which they belong, is a thing so plain, that I dare appeal to any man that has the use of his Faculties, whether it be not undoubtedly and immutably true.

Nor can what is objected make it at all suspected of falsity: for whereas it is supposed, that the *Atheist* will pretend that the thousandth



part of the world never had any such *Idea*; and that those that have had it, have blotted it out of their Souls; and those that have it most deeply imprinted upon them, are not so sure of it as two and two make four; I briefly answer, That all men ever had and have this *Idea* in their Souls, nor is it in their power to blot it out, no more then to blow out the Sun with a pair of bellows. Interest, diversion of their Minds to other matters, distemper of Body by Sensuality or Melancholy, may hinder the actual contemplation or discovery of this *Idea* in the Mind, but it cannot radically obliterate it.

2. For the last alledgement, That it is not so clear as two and two make four; suppose it were true, yet it does not invalid our position, That this Truth we contend for is natural and undeniable. For many Truths on this side of that easiness at least, if not clearness, cannot but be acknowledged naturally and undeniably true.

3. But now to come more near to the business, and that grand suspicion of *Atheists*, That this Notion of a God is onely a crafty Figment of *Politicians*, whereby they would contain the People in Obedience, and that it is they that by their cunning and power have impressed this Character upon the minds of men; I answer, That what is naturally in man already, they cannot put there. They may, I confess, make a *Political* use of it; as indeed it is not so true as dreadful and detestable, That mere States-men make no conscience of prostituting the most Sacred things that are to their own base trivial Designs. But to argue therefore that there is no such thing as *Religion*, or a *God*, because they do so abominably abuse the acknowledgement of them to *Political* purposes, is as irrationally inferred as if we should contend that there is not naturally any Self-love, love of Wife and Children, desire of Liberty, Riches or Honour, but what *Politicians* and States-men have conveyed into the hearts of men: because by applying themselves skilfully to these affections, they carry and winde about the People as they please; and by the inflaming of their spirits by their plausible Orations, hurry them many times into an hazzard of losing the very capacity of the injoyment of those hopes that they so fairly and fully spread out before them.

4. The most material Objection that I can conceive can be made against our second Argument from the *Idea* of God, as it is subjected in our Soul, is this, That this *Idea* is so plain and conspicuous a Truth, that it cannot but be in an *intellectual* Subject, and therefore we cannot well argue as we do in the ninth Chapter of our first Book, That this *Idea* in our Soul was put there that we might come to the knowledge of our Maker; for it is necessarily there, and what is necessary is not of counsel or purpose.

But to this I answer, first, That our Bodies might have been of such a frame that our Minds thereby had been ever hindered or diverted from attending this *Idea*, though it could not possibly but be there.

And in the second place, That it is not any inconvenience to us to acknowledge, that the *Idea* of God is such that no *intellectual* Being can be conceived without it, that is, can be imagined of an *intellectual* nature, and yet not necessarily acknowledge upon due proposal that this *Idea* is undeniably

undeniably true: for hereby it is more manifest how absurd and irrational they are that will pretend to Reason and Understanding, and yet excuse themselves from the acknowledging of so plain a Truth.

## CHAP. IX.

1. *That the natural frame of Conscience is such, that it suggests such Fears and Hopes that imply that there is a God.* 2. *That the ridiculousness of sundry Religions is not any proof that to be affected with Religion is no Innate faculty of the Soul of man.*

1. **T**HE strength of my Argument from *Natural Conscience* is this, That men naturally *fear* Misfortunes, and *hope* for Success, accordingly as they behave themselves. But I must confess that this proof or reason is the most lubricous and unmanageable of any that I have made use of, it being so plainly obnoxious to that cavil or evasion, That the *Fears* and *Hopes* of *Conscience* are not from any *natural* knowledge of God, but from the power of *Education*, which is another Nature.

Now there scarce being any Nation that hath not aw'd their Children by some rudiments or other of Religion, we are not able to give a sincere instance that will fitly set off the validity of our Argument, and we do not know how to help our selves but by a Supposition.

We will therefore suppose a man of an ordinary stamp ( for I do profess that some men are born so enormously deformed for their ingeny or inward nature, that a man can no more judge of what is the Intellectual or Moral property of a man by them, then what is the genuine shape of his body by a *Mole* or *Monster* ) not to have inculcated into him any Principles of Religion, or explicite or Catechistical doctrine of a God, but to be of such a temper only ( whether by Nature or Education, 'tis all one ) as to deem some things *fit* and *right* to be done, and others *unfit* and *unjust*. For what is *just* and *unjust*, *good* and *evil*, *amiable* and *execrable*, is more palpable and plain, according to the judgement of some, then the *Existence* of a Deity. I say, suppose such a man should commit some things that he held very hainous and abominable crimes, as *Murder of Father* or *Mother*, *Incest with his Sister*, *betraying of his truest Friends*, or the like, and should after not by the hand of the Magistrate be punished, ( he doing these things so cunningly that they escap'd his cognisance ) but should immediatly thereupon be continually *unfortunate*, his Barns and Stacks of Corn burnt by Lightning from heaven, his Cattel die in his grounds, himself afterward tormented with most noisome and grievous Diseases; all which notwithstanding befall many in the course of nature; I appeal to any one, whether he can think it at all probable but that this man will naturally and unavoidably be so touch'd in Conscience; as to suspect that these *Misfortunes* are fallen upon him as a *punishment* from some invisible Power or Divine hand that orders all things justly.

2. What is alledged against our Argument from the *Universality* of  
P 3 *Religious*



*Religious veneration*, viz. The manifold ridiculous Religions in the world; from whence it is inferred that the Mind of man has no Innate principle of *Religion* at all in it, it being mouldable into any shape or form of Worship that it pleases the Supreme Power in every Countrey to propose; I answer to this,

First, That if every Religionist would look upon extraneous Religions with the same venerable candor and awfull sobriety that he does upon his own, he might rather finde them worthy to be pitied for their falseness then laughed at for their ridiculousness. But it no more follows that all Religions are false because so many are, then that no Philosophick opinions are true because so many are false.

But, secondly, The multitude of *various* and, if you will, *fond* Religions in the world, into which the Nations of the earth are mouldable, the more ridiculous, the never the worse for our purpose, who contend that *Religion* is a *natural property* of man. For the necessity of its adherence to our nature is more manifestly evidenced thereby, who can no more be without *Religion* then *Matter* can be without *Figure*, though few parts of it have the happiness to be framed into what is *Regular* or *Ordinate*, or to have any beauty or proportion in their shape; and yet break the *Matter* as you will, it will be in some shape or other.

## CHAP. X.

1. *That though the Conarion might be the Seat of Common Sense, yet it cannot be the Common Percipient;* 2. *As being incapable of Sensation,* 3. *Of Memory,* 4. *Of Imagination,* 5. *Of Reason,* 6. *And of Spontaneous Motion.* 7. *That these Arguments do not equally prove an Incorporeal Substance in Brutes; nor, if they did, were their Souls straightway immortal.* 8. *That we cannot admit Perception in Matter as well as Divisibility, upon pretence the one is no more perplex'd then the other; because both Sense and Reason averres the one, but no Faculty gives witness to the other.* 9. *In what sense the Soul is both divisible and extended.* 10. *A Symbolical representation how she may receive multitudes of distinct figurations into one indivisible Principle of perception.* 11. *That the manifest incapacity in the Matter for the Functions of a Soul assures us of the Existence thereof, be we never so much puzzled in the speculation of her Essence.*

1. **WE** have in the last Chapter of our first Book largely and evidently enough demonstrated, *That neither the Animal Spirits the nor Brain are the first Principle of Spontaneous motion in us;* we touch'd also upon the *Conarion*: but because our Opposers will not be so slightly put off, we shall here more fully & particularly shew the impossibility of that part proving any such Principle of Motion, though I confess it bids very fair to be the Organical seat of *Common sense*, because it is so conveniently

niently placed near the *Center of the Brain*; and if the transmission of Motions which act upon the Organs had not some such one part to terminate in, it is conceiv'd by some (but I suspect more wittily then solidly) that these outward Organs of Sense being two, the Objects would seem two also; which is contrary to experience.

But though the *Conarion* may be the Organ of sundry perceptions from corporeal Objects, and the Tent or Pavilion wherein the Soul is chiefly seated; yet we utterly deny that without an *Immaterial* inhabitant this *arbitrarious Motion* which we are conscious to our selves of can at all be performed in us or by us: for if we attend to the condition of our own natures, we cannot but acknowledge that that which *moves* our Body thus *arbitrarily*, does not only *perceive* sensible Objects, but also *remembers*, has a power of *free Imagination* and of *Reason*.

2. And to begin with the first of these; I say that mere *Perception* of external Objects seems incompatible to the *Conarion*. For it being of like nature with the rest of the *Brain*, it is not only divisible, but in a sort actually divided one particle from another; else it could not be so soft as it is, though it be something harder then the rest of the *Brain*. Now I say, the Images of sensible Objects, they spreading to some space in the surface of the *Conarion* against which they hit, one part of the *Conarion* has the *perception*, suppose, of the *head* of a man, the other of a *leg*, the third of an *arm*, the fourth of his *breast*; and therefore though we should admit that every particle of such a space of the *Conarion* may perceive such a *part* of a man, yet there is nothing to perceive *the whole man*, unless you'll say they communicate their *perceptions* one to another. But this communication seems impossible; for if *Perception* be by impression from the external Object, no particle in the *Conarion* shall *perceive* any part of the Object but what it receives an impress from. But if you will yet say, that every part of the Object impresses upon every part of the *Conarion* wherein the Image is, it will be utterly impossible but that the whole Image will be confus'd, and the distinctness of *Colours* lost, especially in lesser Objects.

3. Now for the Faculty of *remembering of things*, that it cannot be in the *Conarion* we prove thus: For that *Memory*, which is the standing seal or impression of external Objects, is not there, is plain; for if it were, it would spoil the representation of things present, or rather after-Objects would be sure to deface all former impressions whatsoever. But if you'll say that *Memory* is in the *Brain*, but *Reminiscency* in the *Conarion*; I answer, That these Impresses or signatures made by outward Objects in the *Brain* must also of necessity be obliterated by superadvenient Impressions. For whether these Images or Impresses consist in a certain posture or motion of the *Plicatile Fibres* or subtile threads of which the *Brain* consists, it is evident that they cannot but be cancelled and obliterated by occasion of thousands of Objects that invade our Senses daily, which must needs displace them, or give them a new motion from what they had before.

But suppose *Memory* were thus seal'd upon the *Brain*, and transmitted its Image through the *Animal Spirits* in the ventricles, as an outward



Object does its *Species* through the Aire to the Eye; being that *perception* is by *impreſſion*, and that the *impreſſion* was loſt in the *Conarion*, though retain'd in the *Brain*, how can the *Conarion* ever ſay that it had any ſuch *impreſſion* before? for the *impreſſion* once wiped out, it is as if it never had any, and therefore can never *remember* that it had. Beſides, the *perception* of this image in the *Brain* is as incompetent to the *Conarion* as the *perception* of any external Object, upon which we have already inſiſted.

4. And thirdly, For the power of *free Imagination*, whereby the *Conarion* is ſuppoſed to excogitate the ſeveral forms or ſhapes of things which it never ſaw; I enquire, whether it be the thin Membrane, or the inward and ſomething ſoft and fuzzy Pulpe it contains, that raiſes and repreſents to it ſelf theſe arbitrary Figments and Chimeras; and then, what part or particle of either of them can perform theſe fine feats; and (what is moſt material) whether the repreſentations being corporeal, there be not a neceſſity of the *Conarion's* being ſo affected or impreſſed as in external corporeal Objects: and then I demand how this paſſive ſoft ſubſtance ſhould be able to impreſs or ſigne it ſelf, or how one part of this body ſhould be able to act upon another for this purpoſe; and there being a *memory* alſo of theſe figmental impreſſions, how they can be ſealed upon the Brain the ſeat of *Memory*. For admitting the *Conarion* to imitate the manner of impreſſion of outward Objects in inventing Images of her own, ſhe then impreſſing theſe Images upon the *Brain*, it will be like as if we ſhould make uſe of the impreſſion of a Seal upon ſome hard matter to ſeal ſome ſofter matter with; in which caſe the two impreſſions will be notoriously different, thoſe parts that give out in the one, in the other giving in.

5. Fourthly, As concerning *Reason*, beſides that it is manifeſt in the uſe thereof that we comprehend at once the Images or Phantaſms of not only different but contrary things in the very ſame part or particle of the *Conarion*, (for if they be in different parts, what ſhall judge of them both?) as when, for example, we conclude hot is not cold, or a crooked line is not a ſtraight line, which cannot be conceived without a confuſion of both impreſſions: there is alſo another conſideration of *Notions plainly immaterial*, which do not impreſs themſelves upon the *Conarion*, nor any part of the *Brain*, or on the outward Organs from ſenſible Objects, but are our own *innate conceptions* in the ſpeculation of things; and ſuch are ſundry *Logical, Metaphyſical* and *Mathematical* Notions, as I have elſewhere made good. Wherefore it ſeems altogether incredible that the *Conarion*, being ſo groſs and palpable a body as it is, ſhould have any *Notions* or *Conceptions* that are not corporeal and conveyed to it from material Objects from without.

6. But fifthly and laſtly, It is very hardly conceivable how the *Conarion*, if it were capable of Senſe and perception, ſhould, being thus but a mere pulpoſ protuberant knob, by its nods or jogs drive the *Animal ſpirits* ſo curiouſly, as not to miſs the key that leads to the motion of the leaſt joynt of our body, or to drive them in ſo forcibly and ſmartly, as to enable us to ſtrike ſo fierce ſtrokes as we ſee men do, eſpecially theſe

*Animal*

*Animal spirits* being so very thin and fluid, and the *Conarion* so broad and blunt: For the one gives us to conceive, That the *Spirits*, especially being so faintly struck as they are likely to be by the *Conarion*, and certainly sometimes are, will gently wheel about all over the ventricles of the *Brain*, and be determinated to no key thereof that leads to the *Muscle* of this or that particular joynt of the body; and the other, That if this impulse of the *Conarion* will forcibly enough drive forward the *Spirits* in the ventricles of the *Brain*, that that wind will fling open more doors than one, whenas yet we see we can with a very considerable force move a finger or a toe, the rest of our body remaining unmoved. We might adde also, That it is hard to conceive how this *Pineal Glandula* can move it self thus spontaneously without *Muscles* and *Spirits*, or some equivalent mechanical contrivance; and if it do, to what purpose is that great care in Nature of *Muscles* and *Animal spirits* in the frame of Animals? if it do not, we shall further inquire concerning the *Spring of Motion*, and demand what moves the *Animal Spirits* that must be imagined to move the *Conarion*. For in *Motion corporeal* it is an acknowledged Maxime, *Whatever is moved, is moved by another*. So demonstrable is it every way that the first principle of our *spontaneous motion* is not nor can be seated in any part of our *Body*, but in a Substance really distinct from it, which men ordinarily call the *Soul*.

7. Nor does that at all invalid the force of our Demonstration which some alledge, that our Arguments are Sophistical, because they as certainly conclude that there is an *Incorporeal* substance in *Beasts* as they do that there is one in *Men*.

For I answer, first, That they conclude absolutely concerning *Men*, that there is an *Incorporeal Soul* in them, because we are certain there be in them such Operations that evidently argue such a nature; but we are not so certain of what is in *Beasts*: and very knowing men, but of a more mechanical *Genius*, have at least doubted whether *Beasts* have any *Cognition* or no, though in the meantime they have professed themselves sure, that if they had, they could not but have also *Immaterial* Souls really distinct from their *Bodies*.

Secondly, Admit our Arguments proved that there were *Souls* in Brutes really distinct from their *Bodies*, is it any thing more then what all Philosophers and School-men, that have held *Substantial forms*, have either expressly or implicitly acknowledged to be true? But if they be *Incorporeal*, say they, they will be also *Immortal*, which is ridiculous. If they mean by *Immortal*, unperishable, as *Matter* is, why should they not be so as well as *Matter* it self; this active substance of the *Soul*, though but of a *Brute*, being a more noble Essence, and partaking more of its Makers perfection, then the dull and dissipable *Matter*? But if they mean by *Immortality*, a capacity of eternal life and bliss after the dissolution of their *Bodies*, that's a ridiculous consequence of their own, which we give the Authors of free leave to laugh at; it concerns not us nor our present Argument. For we conceive that the *Soul* of a *Brute* may be of that nature as to be vitally affected only in a Terrestrial Body, and that out of it it may have neither *sense* nor *perception* of any thing; so as to it self it utterly perishes.

8. That



8. That seems an Objection of more moment, Being there are *Properties* that cannot but be acknowledged to be in a *Body* or *Matter*, and yet such as imply strange repugnancies in the conception thereof, (as suppose that perplexed property of *Divisibility*, which must be into points or *in infinitum*, either of which confounds our Imagination to think of them) why we may not acknowledge that a *Body* may also have *Sense* and *Understanding*, though it seem never so contradictory in the more close consideration thereof. But I answer, This arguing is very Sophistical, because by the same reason we should admit that the Head of an *Onion* understands and perceives as well as the *Conarion* in a Man. For you can bring no greater Argument against it then that it is contradictory and repugnant that it should so be. But you'll reply, That we plainly see that some part of the Body of man must have *Sense* and *Understanding* in it, but we discern no such thing in an *Onion*. But I demand, By what Faculty do we discern this? If you answer, *Our own Sense* tells us so; I say, *our own Sense*, if we did not correct it, would confidently suggest to us that our *Finger feels* and our *Eye sees*; whenas 'tis plain they do not, for the very same thing that *feels* and *sees*, *moves* also our Body: but neither our *Eye* nor our *Finger move* the Body, and therefore they neither *feel* nor *see*.

And yet without our *Eye* we cannot *see* in this state of conjunction, as without the due frame and temper of our *Brain* we cannot well *understand*: but it no more follows from thence that the *Brain understands*, and not something distinct from it, then that the *Eye sees*. Wherefore it is apparent that there is no Faculty in us that can clearly inform us that any part of our Body is indued with *Sense* and *Understanding*.

From whence we see the great disparity betwixt admitting of *Divisibility* in *Matter* (though the Notion be never so perplex'd) and of *Sense* and *Understanding* in a *Body*, (which indeed brings on more perplexity then the other, if it be very accurately look'd into;) because we are fully ascertained by *Sense*, and I may say by *Reason* too, that *Matter is divisible*, but no Faculty at all can pretend to ascertain us that a *Body* is capable of either *Sense* or *Reason*.

9. But there seems to be a worser Objection then this still behinde, which is this: That though we have evidently proved the impossibility of there being either *Sense*, *Understanding* or *Spontaneous Motion* in *Matter* or a *Body*, yet we are never the nearer; for the like difficulties may be urged against there being any *Sense* or *Understanding* in a *Spirit*, sith a *Spirit* cannot but be *extended*, nor extended but *divisible*, nor divisible but *incapable of Sense* or *Understanding*, as we have argued before against *Matter*.

But to this I answer, If by *Extension* be meant a *Juxta-position of parts*, or placing of them one by another, as it is in *Matter*, I utterly deny that a *Spirit* is at all in this sense *extended*. But if you mean only a certain *Amplitude of presence*, that it can be at every part of so much *Matter* at once, I say it is *extended*; but that this kind of *Extension* does not imply any *divisibility* in the substance thus *extended*; for *Juxta-position of parts*, *Impenetrability* and *Divisibility* goe together, and therefore where  
the

the two former are wanting, *Extension* implies not the Third.

But when I speak of *Indivisibility*, that Imagination create not new troubles to her self, I mean not such an *Indivisibility* as is fancied in a Mathematical point; but as we conceive in a *Sphere of light* made from one lucid point or radiant Center. For that *Sphere* or *Orbe of light*, though it be in some sense *extended*, yet it is truly *indivisible*, supposing the Center such: For there is no means imaginable to disceip or separate any one ray of this *Orbe*, and keep it apart by it self disjoyned from the Center.

10. Now a little to invert the property of this *luminous Orbe* when we would apply it to a *Soul* or *Spirit*; As there can be no alteration in the radiant Center, but therewith it is necessarily in every part of the *Orbe*, as suppose it were redder, all would be redder, if dimmer, all dimmer, and the like: so there is also that unity and indivisibility of the exterior parts, if I may so call them, of a *Spirit* or *Soul* with their inmost Center, that if any of them be affected, the Center of life is also thereby necessarily affected; and these exterior parts of the *Soul* being affected by the parts of the Object with such circumstances as they are in, the inward Center receives all so circumstantiated, that it has necessarily the intire and unconfused images of things without, though they be contrived into so small a compasse, and are in the very center of this Spiritual Substance.

This *Symbolical* representation I used before, and I cannot excogitate any thing that will better set off the nature of a *Spirit*, wherein is implied a power of receiving multitudes of particular figurations into one indivisible Principle of Sense, where all are exactly united into one Subject, and yet distinctly represented; which cannot be performed by the *Conarion* it self, as I have demonstrated, and therefore it remains that it must refer to a *Soul*, whose chief seat may haply be there as to the act of perception.

11. But if any shall abuse our Courtesie of endeavouring to help his Imagination (or at least to gratifie it) in this *Symbolical* representation we have made, by conceiving of this *Center of the Soul* but as some dull divisible point in *Matter*, and of no greater efficacy, and of the vital or arbitrary *extension* of it, as grossely as if it would necessarily argue as real a *divisibility* and *seperability* of the parts as in a *Body*; to prevent all such cavils, we shall omit those spinosities of the *extension* or *indivisibility* of a *Soul* or *Spirit*, and conclude briefly thus:

That the manifold contradictions and repugnancies we finde in the nature of *Matter* to be able to either *think* or *spontaneously to move* it self, do well assure us that these operations belong not to it, but to some other Substance: wherefore we finding those operations in us, it is manifest that we have in us an *Immaterial Being* really distinct from the *Body*, which we ordinarily call a *Soul*. The speculation of whose bare *Essence* though it may well puzzle us, yet those *Properties* that we finde incompatible to a *Body*, do sufficiently inform us of the different nature of her; for it is plain she is a Substance indued with the power of *cogitation* (that is, of perceiving and thinking of Objects) as also of *penetrating* and *Spontaneously moving* of a *Body*: which *Properties* are as immediate to her



her as *impenetrability* and *seperability of parts* to the Matter; and we are not to demand the cause of the one no more then of the other.

## CHAP. XI.

1. That *Subtilty* is not inconsistent with the strongest Truth.
2. That the subordinate serviceableness of things in the world are in the things themselves, not merely in our Phansy.
3. That the difficulty of obtaining such serviceable commodities is rather an Argument for Providence then against it.
4. That Beauty is no necessary Result from the mere Motion of the Matter.
5. That it is an intellectual Object, not taken notice of by Brutes.
6. That the preying of Animals one upon another is very well consistent with the Goodness of the First Cause.
7. As also the Creation of offensive Animals, there being curbs and correctives to their increase.
8. That the immediate Matter of the Foetus is homogeneous.
9. That the notion of the Archei or Seminal forms is no such intricate Speculation.

1. **WE** have now gone through all the Objections against the First Book of our *Antidote*; whereat if the more coarsely complexioned, that they may still seem to have something further to object, shall scoffingly cavil, as if we had used over-much *subtilty* in the management of our Arguments, I can onely advertise them of this, That *Subtilty* is as consistent with Truth as the most grosse Theories; as is manifest in manifold *Mathematical* Speculations, then which there is nothing more certain nor undeniable to the Reason of Man. But that the coherence of Notions that are subtile in themselves should be as easily plain and conspicuous as the broad Objects of Sense, is a very incongruous conceit, and can be the expectation of none but those that are utterly unskillfull in the nature of such like contemplations.

But the defence of our Second Book will be not onely more short, but lesse obscure, our Arguments there for the most part being such that even the unlearned can judge of them, and few of them but so evidently convictive that there can be nothing materiall alledged against them. But such Objections as there are I shall briefly set down and answer.

2. And the first is made against our reasoning for *Providence* from the excellent *Usefulness* of Stones, Timber, Metalls, the Magnet, &c. For those long and subordinate concatenations of instrumental serviceableness of such things, say they, is but our fancy, no designe of any First Cause. And how easy a thing is it for the wit of Man to bring things together that are of a distant nature in themselves, and to imagine many Series of means and ends in matters that have do dependence one of another but what himself makes? But I answer, that the severall *Usefull dependences* of sundry matters of this kind we onely find them, not make them. For whether we think of it or no, it is for example manifest that *Fewell* is good to continue *Fire*, and *Fire* to melt *Metalls*, and *Metalls* to make *Instruments*,

*struments*, to build ships or houses, and so on. Wherefore it being true that there is such a *subordinate Usefulness* in the things themselves that are made to our hand, it is but reason in us to impute it to such a Cause as was aware of the *Usefulness* and *Serviceableness* of its own works.

3. Nor are we to cavil because these *Useful* things, such as *Stones*, *Metalls*, *Coals*, and the like, are to be had with so much labour, whenas men were better released from all such drudgery, that they may have the more time to contemplate the World, and seek after God, and exercise those better Faculties of the humane Nature: For we see plainly that the lapsed condition of Man is such, that *Idleness* is no spur to Vertue or Piety, but rather a Nurse to all beastliness and Sensuality. Besides that few mens Minds are of so *Speculative* a temper that they can with any great pleasure attend such meditations as will prove worth their leaving of a more Practicall and laborious life, which does not exclude men from being pious and honest, as certainly no Calling at all does. Wherefore that to the generality of men all *Useful* things come hardly, is indeed rather an Argument of *Providence*, and that that Cause that framed the Earth knew well aforehand what the disposition of the terrestriall Man would be.

4. The second Objection is against our Argument from the *Beauty* of *Plants*, which I contend to have its first original from an *Intellectual* Cause, *Beauty* it self being such an *Intellectual* Object. But to this are objected two things. First, that *Beauty* is a necessary result of the mere motion of the *Matter*. Secondly, that it is no *intellectual* Object, sith *Women* and *Children* seem to be more taken with it then *Men*, and *Brutes* as well as either.

The former they will prove thus; That *Colour*, which is one part of *Beauty*, is the result of mere *Matter*, is, say they, plain from the *Rain-bow*, which is assuredly such a mere natural result: And for *Symmetry*, which is the other part of *Beauty*, and in *Plants* consists in their *leaves* and *branches* parallely answering one another, as also the several parts of the same *leaf*; there is, say they, a kind of Natural necessity that there should be such an uniform correspondency as this in these *branches* and *leaves*, because the nourishment must follow the tract of the Vessels of the Seed, which being regular in their first conformation, the *branches* and *leaves* which sprout out must also be regular. Now this regular conformation of the Seed came from the uniform motion of particles in the *Mother-plant*; and lastly, the first *Mother-plant* of any kind from the regular motion of the *Matter*.

But I answer, That though the *Posture* as well as the *Colours* themselves of the *Rain-bow* be necessary results of the mere *Matter*, and are nothing but the Reflexion and Refraction of the light of the Sun in the round drops of a rorid cloud, as *Cartesius* has admirably demonstrated; and that there is nothing at all further required hereunto saving the position of our Eyes in a line drawn from the Sun, and continued to this rorid cloud spread out so that the coloured circle may have for its *Radius* either about forty two or fifty one degrees, for then this Effect will necessarily follow; and if this rorid cloud extend it self so far every way, that there



will be at fifty one degrees distance from the aforesaid line, as well as at forty two, this dewy temper of the Aire, there will necessarily appear *two Rain-bows* at once, as has been frequently seen; and so, I confess, some things being put, the *Colours of Flowers* will be a necessary result of the *Matter* in such a motion or posture: Yet for all this, the *variety* of the *placing* of these *Colours of Flowers* cannot but shew that it is a thing either *fortuitous* or *arbitrarious*; but being that they ever some way gratifie the beholder, it is a signe that it is not *fortuitous*, and therefore it must be *arbitrarious*, and from some Counsel that contriv'd them thus.

But that I insist upon most and contend to proceed from an *Intellectual* principle is their *Symmetry*, against which the Objection seems very invalid, the reason of it being thus, as you plainly see, That the regular Motion of the *Matter* made the *first Plant* of every kinde: for we demand, What regulated the Motion of it so as to guide it to form it self into such a state that at last it appears a very pleasant *Intellectual* spectacle, and exceeding hard (if not impossible) to be hit upon without some other Director distinct from the blinde *Matter*? As a man will easily believe, if he do not think so much upon the *Trunks* and *Branches* of *Trees* (whose shooting out of the ground, and then having arms again shooting out of the trunk and branching themselves into a many subdivisions, is not so difficult to conceive) as upon their *Blossoms*, *Fruits*, and *Leaves*. As in the *Leaf* of the *Oak* and of *Holly*, and abundance of leaves of *Herbs* & their *Flowers*, as in *Monks-hood*, *Snap-dragon*, sundry sorts of *Flie-flowers*, as the *Flie-flower* properly so called, the *Butterfly-Satyrion*, the *Gnat-Satyrion*, to which adde the *Wasp-Orchis*, the *Bee-flower*, and the like. The *Matter* could never have hit upon such hard and yet regular shapes, had it not been regulated by something besides it self; the concinnity of which figures gratifying us that are Rational, we ought in all reason to conclude that they came from a Principle *Intellectual*.

5. But it was objected in the second place, That *Beauty* is no *Intellectual* Object, because *Women* and *Children* are more taken with it then *Men*, and *Beasts* as well as either. To which I answer, That *Children* are not so much taken with the *Symmetry* as the *gayness* of colours in things that are counted beautiful, as *Larks* are mightily pleased at the shining of the *Glaß* the *Lark-catcher* exposes to their view. But if they can also discover a want of *Symmetry* and correspondency, as supposing a *Flower* which has some leaves crott off, that Spirit which is in them being *Intellectual*, it is not at all unreasonable it should exercise it self upon such easy Objects as these betimes. But that *They* or *Women* are taken more withoutward beauty then *Men*, is because *Men* imploy their *Intellectuals* about harder tasks, and so cannot minde these smaller matters. Otherwise there is no question but if they could be idle from other imployments, they would be as devout admirers of *beauty* as *Women* themselves, and be as well pleased with theirs, if they have any, as they themselves are with it.

But as for *Brutes*, I deny that they have any sense of so noble an Object

ject as *Beauty* is, or take any notice of the chief requisite in it, which is *Symmetrie* and concinnity of parts, or of any *order of colours*, but only of the *colours* themselves. And it is no wonder that as the sight of *red stockings* will inflame the Spirits of a *Turky-cock* with anger, as also the sight of the *blood of grapes* or *mulberries* provoke the *Elephant* to fight; so other fresh colours of sundry sorts may please and exhilarate the spirits of several Animals, as *Light* does of most. And therefore if the *Horse* prance and carry himself proudly when he has gay and glittering furniture, it is from no other reason then what we have already declared. And if a *Dog* bark at a ragged Beggar more then at a handsomly-clad Gentleman, it is to be inquired into, whether a Beggar's *Curre* will not bark more at a Gentleman then at a Beggar, the sense of *Beauty* neither pleasing nor provoking this Animal, but the unusualness of the Object, stirring up his choler. And that *Birds* prune their feathers, is not any delight in decency and comeliness, but to rid themselves of that more uncouth and harsh sense they feel in their skins by the incomposure of their ruffled plumes. So for the choice of their *Mates* in either *Birds* or *Beasts* for copulation, it is very hard to prove that they are guided so much by *sight* as *scent*; and then if by *sight*, whether it be not *colour* rather then exact *symmetry* of parts that moves them.

And lastly, if we should admit at any time that *Brutes* may be more pleased with a *beautiful* Object (taking *Beauty* in the entire Notion thereof) then with one less beautiful, it is but a confused delight, nor do they any more relish it as *Intellectual*, then *Children* (that are ordinarily well pleased to see *Geometrical* instruments that are made of Brass or Ivory or such like materials) do the exact cuttings and carvings of the characters and lines thereof as they are rational and Mathematical. And therefore we may very well conclude, that the *Beauty* of bodies is naturally intended no more for *Brutes* then such *Mathematical* instruments for *Children*: but all such Objects are directed to *Creatures Intellectual* from that Eternal *Intellectual Principle* that made them.

6. The third Objection is against Animals *preying* one upon another, and Man upon them all. For this, say they, is inconsistent with that *Eternal Goodness* that we profess to have created and ordered all things. To which I answer, That it is not at all inconsistent: For the nature of that *Absolute Universal and Eternal Goodness* is not to dote upon any one particular, as we do (whose complexions haply may make us more then ordinarily compassionate (though most men have too little of that natural Benignity) and whose short sight plungeth us too much into the sense of what is present) but taking a full and free view of the capacities of *Happiness* in such kinde of Creatures, contriv'd their condition to be such as was best for the generality of them, though the *necessity* and *impossibility of things* would be sure to load some particular Creatures with greater inconveniency then the rest.

And therefore that several kinds of terrestrial Creatures more exactly might be *happy* in their animal nature, this *Sovereign Goodness* was content to let it be so, that ever and anon something that by the Animal sense would be necessarily accounted Tragical and miserable should light upon



some few; the *Species* of things in the mean time being still copiously enough preserved, and marching on safely in this Theatre of the World in their several successions.

Now it is evident that the *main powers* of the *Animal life* are *natural craft, strength and activity of body*, and that any purchase by these is far more pleasant to a living Creature than what easily comes without them. Wherefore what can be more grateful to a terrestrial Animal, than to hunt his prey and to obtain it? But all kinds of Creatures are not capable of this special happiness. Some therefore are made to feed on the fruits of the Earth, that they may thus not only enjoy themselves, but occasionally afford game and food to other Creatures. In which notwithstanding the *Wisdom* of God as well as his *Goodness* is manifest, in that while they are thus a sport and prey to others, yet they are abundantly preserved in their several generations. But I have so fully and methodically treated of all such scruples against Providence in my *Enquiry into the Causes and Occasions of Atheism*, that we will content our selves with this short intimation of an Answer in this place.

Onely we will adde, That if the *Souls of Brutes* prove *immortal* (which the best of Philosophers have not been averse from) the Tragedy is still lesse horrid: but yet that ought not to animate us causlessly and petulantly to dislodge them, because we know not how long it will be till they have an opportunity to frame to themselves other *Bodies*; and the intervall of time betwixt is as to them a perfect death, wherein they have not the sense nor injoyment of any thing. And for my own part, I think that he that slights the life or welfare of a brute Creature, is naturally so *unjust*, that if outward Laws did not restrain him, he would be as cruel to Man.

7. The fourth Objection is against our Argument for *Divine Providence* drawn from the consideration of that happy *Mitigation* of the trouble and *offensiveness* of some Animals by others that bear an *enmity* to them, and feed upon them as their prey, as the *Cat* for example does on the *Mouſe*. Now, say they, it were a more exact sign of *Providence* if there were no such *offensive* Creatures in the world to trouble us, then to bring on the trouble by making these Animals, and then to take it off again by making others to correct the mischief that would follow.

But no man would argue thus if it were not that he had over-carelessly taken up this *false Principle*, *That the World was made for Man alone*, whenas assuredly the Blessed and Benigne Maker of all things intended that *other living Creatures* should enjoy themselves as well as *Men*, which they could not if they had no existence: Therefore *Providence* is more exact, in that she can thus spread out her *Goodness* further, even to the injoyments of the more inferiour ranks of Creatures, without any considerable inconvenience to the more noble and superior.

Besides, all these Creatures that are thus a *prey* to others are their sport and sustenance, and so pleasure others by their death, as well as enjoy themselves while they are yet in life and free from their enemy. To say nothing how they are both in some sort or other *useful* to man himself, and therefore sometimes would be missed if they were wanting.

8. The

8. The fifth and last Objection is against our concluding a *Substance distinct from Body*, from the *Homogeneity* of that immediate *Crystalline Matter* out of which the *Fætus* is efformed, suppose in an *Egge*, the same being also observable in other generations. To avoid the force of which Argument, it is denied that there is any such *Homogeneity* of parts, but that there are several *Heterogeneous* particles, though to us invisible, which being put upon Motion by the heat of the *Hen* or some equivalent warmth, like particles will be driven to their like, and so the *Chicken* will be efformed: But that to acknowledge any other *Archeus*, brings inextricable difficulties along with it. For where, say they, were all the *Archei* which shap'd the *Wassps* out of an Horse's Carcase? Are they parts of the Horse's Soul, or new intruding guests upon the old ones being ejected? If the former, then the Soul of an Horse is divisible, and consequently material, or, if you will, truly *Matter*: If the latter, where were those little Intruders before? Or be they so many sprigs or branches of the common Soul of the world? But, if so, why have they not one common sense of pain and pleasure amongst them all? But to all these I answer in order.

And to the first part of this Objection I say, That it cannot but be a very strong presumption, that Nature intends an utter *Homogeneity* of *Matter* before she fall upon her work of efformation; she so constantly bringing it to as perfect *Homogeneity* as we can possibly discern with our Senses. And there being no conceivable convenience at all in the *Heterogeneity* of parts, I think the conclusion is not rash, if we averre that the *immediate matter* of efformation of the *Fætus* is either accurately *Homogeneous*, or if there be any *Heterogeneity* of parts in it, that it is onely by accident; and that it makes no more to the first work of efformation or organization of the *Matter*, then those Atomes of dust that light on the limners colours make to the better drawing of the picture. For to say that those sundry sorts of particles put upon motion by external warmth do gather together by virtue of similitude one with another, is to avouch a thing without any ground at all, against all grounds of Reason.

For what can this *Similitude of Parts* consist in, if not either in the likeness of figure, or in the equality of agitation or magnitude? Now Bodies of the like figure being put upon motion, will not direct their courses one towards another any thing the more for being alike in shape. Indeed Bodies of like figure of equal agitation and magnitude in a confused agitation may very likely goe together, as we see done (where yet we cannot promise our selves so exact similitude of the particles in their figure) in the thinner Spirits of distilled liquors, that all mount upward; in the Tartarous parts of wine, that are driven outward to the sides of the vessel; in the feculency of urine, that sinks to the bottom of the glass; in the subsidency of this dreggish part of the world, the *Earth*, if it may so properly be said to subside and be at the bottom, as in the midst of the more refined and subtile Elements. And so in like manner the *Fermentation* of the matter which precedes the efformation of Creatures may haply arrive to some such rude effect as is seen in the forenamed instances: but it can never amount to such an artificial contrivance of Organs as are in living Creatures.



But if by *Likeness of Parts* they mean onely *fitnesse of Parts* for figure and *motion*, they both being so framed and moderated, that upon external warmth their agitation will necessarily cast them to lock one with another, and to be linked into this admirable and useful frame of the body of an Animal; that Artifice would be so particularly nice and curious, that it is utterly unconceivable but that it must imply either the attendance, or at least first contrivance, of a *Knowing Principle*, that put the *Matter* into so wonderful an order, as to be able by such precise laws of *Figure* and *Motion* to exhibite so noble Objects to our Sense and Understandings: And thus our Adversaries will gain nothing by this supposal.

But though this may seem barely possible, yet I conceive it is very improbable that such an infinite number of particles that must concur to make up a *Fetus*, should have such a particular figuring and law of Motion impress'd upon each of them, as to enable it to take its right station or posture in the structure of a living Creature. \* For methinks this is going about the bush, whenas the more compendious way would be to make some *Immaterial Substance*, such as are conceived to be the *Seminal Forms* of Plants and Animals, or the *Archei*, as others call them. For this *Form* or *Archeus* is a thing more simple and plain, and requires a more simple and plain qualification of the subject it works upon, to wit, that it be onely *homogeneal*, and ductile, or yielding to the tender assaults of that Substantial power of life that resides in it.

\* See my Treatise of the Immortality of the Soul, Book 3. ch. 12, and 13.

9. Nor is this opinion of the *Archei* or *Seminal Formes* intangled in any such difficulties, but may be easily answered.

For as for those many pretended intricacies in the instance of the efformation of *Wasps* out of the Carcase of a Horse, I say, the *Archei* that framed them are no parts of the Horse's Soul that is dead, but several distinct *Archei* that do as naturally joyn with the *Matter* of his body so putrefied and prepared, as the Crowes come to eat his flesh.

But you demand where these *Archei* were before. To which I answer, Can there want room for so small pieces of *Spirituality* in so vast a compass as the comprehension of the Universe? I shall rather reply, Where were they not? the *World of life* being excluded out of no place, and the sundry sorts of Souls being as plentiful and as obvious there, as those *Magnetick* particles are in this corporeal world; and you can scarce place your *Loadstone* and *Iron* any where, but you will finde their presence by the sensible effects of them: Or if you will have a grosser comparison, they are as cheap and common as dust flying in the Aire in a dry and windy Summer.

To the last puzzle propounded, whether these *Archei* be so many sprigs of the *common Soul of the world*, or particular subsistences of themselves; there is no great inconvenience in acknowledging that it may be either way. For it does not follow that if they be so many *branches* or distinct \* *rayes* of the great *Soul of the world*, that therefore they are that very Soul it self; and if they be not, they may have their pleasures and pains apart distinct from one another: And what is pleasure and pain to them, may haply be *neither* to their Original, moving her no more then the chirping of a Cricket does those that are attentive to a full

\* This is the usual phrase of the Ancients, but how farre justifiable, see *Immortal Book* 3. ch. 16. sect. 8.

Consort

Confort of loud Musick, or the biting of a Flea does a man tortured on a Rack.

But suppose we say, They are so many Substances as independent on the *Soul of the world* as the *Matter* it self is (though all depend on God) there is no difficulty at all nor inconvenience in that position; nor need we trouble our selves where they are, or what becomes of them then, either before they actuate this or that part of the *Matter*, or after they have done actuating the same, no more then of the parts of the *Matter* actuated by them. For as every particle of the *Matter* is safely kept within the compass of the corporeall world, whether it be acted upon by any *Soul* or *Archæus* or not; so every *Archæus* or *Soul* is as safe in the *World of life*, and as secure from being exterminated out of the comprehension of *Immaterial* Beings, whether it act upon any part of the material world or no. For *Substance*, be it of what nature it will, it cannot perish without a Miracle. And why God should annihilate that which in succession of Time may again have opportunity to act its part, and prove serviceable to the world, no man, I think, can excogitate any Reason.

## CHAP. XII.

1. *Objections against the Story of the Charmer of Saltzburg, 2. And of the bewitched Children at Amsterdam, with some others of that kinde;*
3. *As also against that of John of Hembach and John Michael Pipers to the Antick dancings of Devils. 4. Also against the disappearing of the Conventicle of Witches at the naming of God; 5. And against a certain passage of that Story of the Guardian Genius which Bodinus relates.*

1. **T**HE Passages excepted against in my Third Book are either *Historical* or *Philosophical*. The *Historical* are chiefly these: First; against the Narration concerning the Charmer of *Saltzburg* it is objected, That that *last & greatest Serpent* might not be the *Devil*, but a mere Serpent. To which I answer, That it is very probable that that *Serpent* (he reserving himself so for the *last*, and bringing so sad a fate upon the Charmer, as if he would either imitate a revenge of the death of so many of his own kinde, or spitefully flurre the glory and victory of their now almost triumphant enemy) had more in it then an ordinary natural *Serpent*; that is, that it was either the *Devil* so transformed, or a *Serpent* actuated and guided by him: which we shall the easilier believe, if we consider that the whole business of *Charming* is of no natural efficacy; but supernatural, if it take any effect at all.

2. The second Objection is against those Stories of several possessed parties that have seemed to have vomited strange stuff out of their stomachs, as if it might be done by some sleight and cunning, onely to get money. In answer whereto I must needs confess, that there are no real strange effects or events in the world but some or other, if it be possible,



either out of design of gain or in waggery, may attempt the imitating of them. But this fraud might easily be discovered by prudent spectators, such as I suppose those two Physicians were, *Cardan* and *Wierus*, who, if there had been nothing in the business but *the sleight of a Jugler*, could not have been deceived by that Imposture.

And as for the Children at *Amsterdam*, the spectacle was so miserable, and their torture by report so great, and then the parties so many, and all attempts of Art or Religion so frustraneous, that it seems very incredible that there should be either *fraud* or *foolery* in the matter. As for the *Maid of Saxony* her speaking *Greek*, it were a ridiculous thing indeed to look upon it as supernatural, unless it were known that no body taught her that language; and therefore in such cases the judgement and sagacity of the first Relators is to be supposed, as in that Story that *Fernelius* tells us of a *Demoniack* in his time that spake *Greek*, and discovered the secrets of the Physicians, deriding their ignorance, in that they had half kill'd a man by administering Physick upon a false supposal of a natural disease.

3. The third Objection is against the *Mirth* of some of the Stories recorded, as that of *John* of *Hembach* and *John Michael* the Pipers. But these Narrations are to seem never the more incredible for those passages of *mirth*, if we consider that those Apostate Spirits that have their haunts near this lower Aire and Earth, are variously laps'd into the enormous love and liking of the *Animal life*, having utterly forsaken the *Divine*; and that there are such Passions and Affections in them as are in wicked Men and Beasts; and that some of them especially bear the same Analogy to an unfallen Angel that an Ape or Monkey does to a sober man, so that all their pleasure is in unlucky ridiculous tricks; and that even those that are more ferocious, if they ever relaxate into *mirth*, that it is foolishly *antick* and *deformed*, as is manifest in all those stories of their dancings and nocturnal Revellings: for they bear a secret hatred to whatever is comely and decorous, and in a perpetual scorn to it distort all their actions to the contrary Mode, applauding themselves onely in an unlimited liberty, and of doing whatever either their fond or foul Imagination suggest to them; affecting nothing but the lust of their own wills, and a power to make themselves wondred at and terrible.

4. The fourth Objection is against those Passages of the Nocturnall Conventicles of Witches, *disappearing* at the *naming of God* or *Jesus*. For the Devils (say they) are not at all afraid of these *Names*, but can name them by way of scorn or abuse themselves, and apply them to their own persons. But the Exception is easily satisfied, if we do but distinguish betwixt the mindes of the speakers of these words. Therefore I say it does not follow, because they can stand the pronouncing of these words amongst themselves, that they can also when they are named with an honest heart and due devotion.

Besides, it is not irrational (though they could withstand the power of these *Names*, and the devotion of them that use them) that it may be an indispensable ceremony amongst them not to continue their Conventicles if any be near or present that make an open and serious profession

of

of the fear of God. And it is also evident how burthensome the presence of a truly religious person is to wicked men, especially at that time they have a mind more freely to indulge to their own wickedness.

5. The fifth and last Objection is against a Vision or Dream, wherein he that had for so many years the society of a *Guardian Genius* or *Good Angel*, seem'd to hear these words, *I will save thy Soul, I am he that before appeared unto thee*, as if this *Genius* or *Angel* had been himself the Eternal God. But this need breed no scruple. For first, there being no shape of any person represented to him in this Vision, it may goe onely for a Divine suggestion of the Spirit of God assuring him of his love and providence over him now, as heretofore he had done in like Visions or Dreams.

And then secondly, if we should admit that the *Angel* should speak so unto him, the *Angel* in this case is not properly said to speak as a *Person*, but as an *Instrument*, so as a mans *Tongue* speaks, whereas yet a mans *Soul* or himself more properly speaks then the *Tongue*. Wherefore if God take so full possession of all the powers and faculties of an *Angel*, that for a time he loses the sense of his own personality, and becomes a mere passive Instrument of the Deity, being as it were the *Eye* or *Mouth of God*; what in this case he speaks is to be understood of God, and not of himself.

Thus I have, I hope, satisfied the difficulties concerning all the *Historical* passages of this Third Book, that are still remaining in it. For I must confess that I have expunged some that seemed not so accurately agreeable with those laws I set my self, upon my closer view. Not that I know any thing of them whereby I can discover them to be false, but because wanting that conformity, they must be acknowledged by me not so convincingly true.

### CHAP. XIII.

1. That the Transformation of an humane body into another shape may be done without pain.
2. That there may be an actual separation of Soul and Body without Death properly so called.
3. That the Bodies of Spirits may be hot, or cold, or warm, and the manner how they become so.
4. In what sense we may acknowledge a First in an Infinite succession of generations.
5. That the story of Tree-Geese in Gerard is certainly true.
6. That God must be a Spirit properly so called.
7. That Spirits ordinarily so called are not Fire nor Aire, but Essences properly Spiritual, demonstrated from the solute Arenosity (as I may so speak) of Aire and Fire.
8. That this soluteness makes those Aereal Compages incapable of Personality, spontaneous Motion, and Sensation:
9. As also of transfiguring their vehicle into those complete shapes of Animals they appear in;
10. And of holding it together in winds and storms;
11. And lastly, of transporting Men and Cattell in the Aire.
12. That



12. *That if Spirits or Dæmons be nothing but mere complements of Aiery or Fiery Atoms, every Devil is many Millions of Devils.* 13. *The preeminence of Arguments fetched from the History of Spirits above those from the Operations of the Soul in the Body for the proving of a Substance Immaterial.*

1. **T**HE first *Philosophical* Objection is against the *Transformation* of an humane body into the shape suppose of a *Wolf* for any such like creature: For it is conceived that it cannot be done without a great deal of pain to the transformed, To which I answer, That though this *Transformation* be made in a very short time, yet it may be performed without any pain at all. For *that part in the Head* which is the seat of *Common sense* I conceive is very small (suppose it to be the *Conarion*, it is not very big :) wherefore the Devil getting into the Body of a man and possessing *that part* with the rest, can intercept or keep off all the transmissions of motion from other parts of the Body, that, let him doe what he will with them, the Party shall feel no pain at all; so that he may *soften* all the parts of the Body besides into what consistency he please, and work it into any form he can his own Vehicle of Aire, and the Party not be sensible thereof all the time. And there is the same reason of reducing the Body into its own shape again, which is as *painless* to the Party that suffers it. Nor is there any fear that the Body once loosned thus will ever after be in this loose melting condition; for it is acknowledged even by them that oppose *Bodinus*, whose cause I undertake, that a *Spirit* can as well *stop* and *fix* a Body as *move* it. Wherefore I say, when the Devil has *fixed* again the Body in its pristine shape, it will according to the undeniable laws of Nature remain in that state he left it, till something more powerful disettle and change it: and every Body is overpowered at last, and we must all yield to death.

2. The second Objection is against our acknowledging an *actual separation* of Soul and Body without death, death being properly, as we define it, a disjunction of the Soul from the Body by reason of the *Bodies unfitness* any longer to entertain the Soul, which may be caused by extremity of diseases, by outward violence or old age. Now, say they, What is *violence*, if this be not, for the Devil to take the Soul out of the Body? But the Answer is easie, That any separation by violence is not *death*, but such a violence in separation as makes the body *unfit* to entertain the Soul again; as it is in letting the blood run out by wounding the body, and in hindring the course of the spirits by strangling it, or drowning it, or the like. For to revive such a Body as this would be a miracle indeed, in such cases as these, *death* having seized upon the Body in a true and proper sense; and then none but God himself can thus kill and make alive.

3. The third Objection is against the notable *coldness* of the bodies of Devils. For at the great trial of Witches at *S. Edmonds-Bury Assises* in *August 1645*. I heard some of them openly confess at the Bar, sayes the Objector, that when the Devil lay with them, he was *warm*. To which I might answer, if I had a mind rather to shuffle then precisely to satisfy the

the exceptions made against what we have wrote, that it may be some warm yong man had got into the place of the cold Devil: for who knows what juggles there might be in these things?

But to answer more home to the purpose, I confess that the *Bodies* of *Devils* may be not only *warm*, but findgingly *hot*, as it was in him that took one of *Melanchthon's* relations by the hand, and so *scorched* her, that she bare the mark of it to her dying day. But the examples of *cold* are more frequent, as in that famous story of \* *Cuntius*, when he toucht the arm of a certain woman of *Pentsch* as she lay in her bed, he felt as *cold* as ice; and so did the Spirit's claw to \* *Anne Styles*: and many other stories there are of that nature. But I will not deny but their bodies may be also *warm*, else it is not intelligible how those two execrable *Magi* should reap such unexpressible pleasure, the one from his *Armellina*, the other from his *Florina*, as they profess themselves to have done, in a certain Dialogue of *Franciscus Picus* his, which he has entituled *Strix*, or *De Ludificatione Demonum*; and assures us in his Epistle before it, that it is a true history, and that he sets down but such things as he has either seen with his eyes, or else heard from the confession of Witches themselves.

\* *Antidote*,  
Book 3. ch. 9.  
sect. 8.  
\* Ch. 7. sect. 6.

The force therefore of the Objection is levelled against what we do not assert, that the Bodies of Devils are found *only cold*: But what we would intimate is only this, that their *Bodies* being nothing but *coagulated* or constringed *Aire*, when they put them in such a posture as to constringe their vehicles in a greater measure by far then agitate the single particles of it, that it will then seem not only *cold* as congealed water does, but more piercingly and stingingly cold, by reason of the subtilty of the parts.

But when they not only strongly *constringe* their vehicle in the whole, but also fiercely *agitate* the single particles thereof, their Body will become findgingly *hot*, and imitate in some measure heated brass or iron, wherein the particles keep close together, and yet every one is smartly moved in it self. As is plain to us if we spit upon those metalls so heated; for they will make the spittle hizzle and bubble, the particles of the metalls communicating their motion to the spittle that lies upon them; and will turn all liquor into vapours, as we ordinarily see in the burning of Vinegar and Rose-water in a chamber to perfume the room. For what is this perfuming but the setting of the Aqueous separable parts of the liquor on motion so strongly, as to the mounting of them into the Aire and dispersing of them into fume, by the fierce and strong agitation of the inseparable parts of the heated fire-shovel?

But lastly, If a Spirit use his *Agitative* power moderately and his *constrictive* forcibly enough to feel solid or palpable to that man or woman he has to deal withall, he may not only feel warm, but more pleasantly and gratefully warm then any earthly or fleshly body that is; for the subtilty of the *Matter* will more punctually hit, and more powerfully reach the Organs of Sense, and more exquisitely and enravishingly move the Nerves, then any terrestrial body can possibly. But in the mean time the *Spirit* himself is neither hot, nor warm, nor cold, nor any thing else that belongs to a Body, but a Substance specifically distinct from all corporeal



\* *Antidote*,  
Book 3. chap.  
12. sect. 2, 3, 4.

poreal Matter whatsoever, as I have \* already intimated in the place we now defend.

\* See *Antidote*,  
Book 3. chap.  
15. sect. 5.

4. The fourth Objection is against our asserting, That it is an incongruous and self-contradicting position to hold, \* That there never was any man but was born of a woman, though we should admit the *successions* of mankind *infinite*. For, say they, the contradiction is onely if you can finde out a *First*: But in *infinite succession* there can be no *First* in any sense at all; for if a *First*, then a *Second*, and so on to our own times, and thus the *Series* would be numerable, and consequently finite; which is a contradiction, for then the *succession* would be both *finite* and *infinite*.

But I answer, First, that I can demonstrate, That there is a *First* in *infinite succession* out of such principles as the *Atheist* does or is necessarily to grant, and that is, that *Matter* is *ab Aeterno*, and that some part thereof at least moved *ab Aeterno*. Now it is plain that this *Matter* that moved *ab Aeterno* either moved of it self, or was moved by another. If the latter, then we have a *First* in an *infinite succession* of motions: for that which moved this *Matter* moved *ab Aeterno*, is first in order of causality, as is undeniably plain to any one that understands sense.

But you'll say that this *Matter* that moved *ab Aeterno* was moved of *it self*. Be it so, yet no part of it can move in this full Ocean of *Matter* that is excluded out of no space, but it must hit some other part of *Matter* so soon as it moves, and that another, and so on. And thus there might be a *Succession* of Motions *ab Aeterno* or *infinite*, and yet a *first* in order of causality. For that primordial Motion of the *Matter* is plainly *first* and the cause of all the rest: And our Understanding can never be quiet till it has penetrated to some such *first* in the order of Causes.

And then Secondly, to that subtile Argumentation that would prove that this *infinite succession* would be both *finite* and *infinite*, I answer, That it is a mere Sophisme from the ambiguity of the term *first*, which signifies either Priority of *Succession* or Priority of *Causality*. In the first sense if we admit a *first*, the *succession* will be *finite* according to our own Faculties, for we cannot but run beyond, we finding the succession bounded in that *first*. But in the other sense, *first* sets no bounds to succession, but leaves it free and infinite.

Or we may answer thus, That beginning from this moment and going on to the *first* primordial Motion, and calling this present moment *first*, and the next before it the *second*, that it will amount to a number truly *infinite*, and that our Understanding can never goe through it: but, though God's Understanding can, that it does not follow that the number is therefore *finite*; for an *infinite mind* may well comprehend an *infinite number*. But for us whose capacities are *finite*, if we would venture to name a *first* in *infinite succession*, we should call it *πρώτον ἀπειροσύν*, the *first infiniteſimal*, and acknowledge our selves unable to go through, our Understandings being finite.

5. The fifth and last Objection is against that Story out of Gerard of the *Tree-geese* in the Island of the *Pile of Foulders*. For it is objected by one that inquired of some that lived near the place, that it was not confirmed to him, but that they told him only that at the time of the year it

was

was a notable place for birds nests, and that one can scarce walk in the Island but he will tread on a nest of Eggs. But to this may be answered, either that those parties that were consulted were men that looked not after such curiosities as these; or that the rotten pieces of ships or trunks of trees that were washed up thither by the Sea, have been a long time agoe washed away again, and so the examples of this rarity being not freshly renewed, that the memory of it may be lost with many of those Parts: For it is nigh threescore years since *Gerard* wrote, but while he was living, he offered to make his narration good by sufficient witnesses; and he professes he declares but what his eyes had seen and his hands had touched.

And he also adds a Story of another sort of *Tree-geese* which he gathered in their shells from an old rotten tree upon the shore of our *English* Coast betwixt *Dover* and *Rumney*: He brought a many of them with him to *London*, and opening the shells, which were something like *Muscles*, he found these Birds in several degrees of maturation; in some shapeless lumps only, in others the form of Birds, but bare, in others the same form and shape, and with down also upon them, their shells gaping, and they ready to fall out.

I might adde a third kind described to me by a Gentleman out of *Ireland*, which he has often observed upon those Coasts; but it is not material to insist upon the description thereof. All that I aim at is this, That this truth of *Birds being bred of putrefaction* is very certain, of which I am so well assured by this Gentleman's information as well as that narration of *Gerard*, that I must confess for my own part I cannot doubt of it at all. And it might countenance my credulity, if I could be here justly suspected of that fault, that the Objector himself upon further enquiry is at length fully satisfied concerning the same truth.

6. We have now answered all the Objections, as well *Philosophical* as *Historical*, made against those particular passages in my Third Book. There remains only one of a more universal nature, and indeed of such importance, that if I do not satisfy it, it does utterly subvert the main design of our whole Third Book against *Atheism*, wherein we would fetch off men to an easier belief of a God, from the History of *Spirits*. For admitting all those Stories to be true, yet, say they, it does not at all follow that there are *Spirits* in that sense that I define *Spirits*, and in such a notion as is understood in my explication of the *Idea* of God, viz. *That there should be an Immaterial or Incorporeal Substance that can penetrate and actuate the Matter*; for they themselves are but a thinner kind of *Body*, such as *Aire* or *Fire*, or some such like subtile Element, and not *pure Spirit* according to our Definition thereof.

If this were true, I must confess that our last Book against *Atheism* is of no efficacy at all, and can do nothing towards the end it was intended for. For if there be a *God*, of necessity he must be a *Spirit properly so called*; otherwise he cannot be *Infinite*. Nor can he be this *Universal Matter* in the world, though we suppose it *boundless*; because he could not then be *perfect*. But he must be an *Essence* of which this *Matter* depends, and in which he is, penetrating and possessing all things. Which any one will



easily believe, if he were assured that there are particular *Spirits* that penetrate and actuate this or that part of the *Matter*, which I contend that those Stories which I have related do evidently evince.

7. For I appeal to any one that knows what *Fire* and *Aire* is, whether they be not as truly a mere aggregation of loosned particles of the *Matter* as an *heap of sand*; only they are so little, that they are invisible and insensible in their distinct particularities, but as truly *disjoyned Atomes* (if I may so call what is still divisible) as the *grains of sand* we speak of.

8. Now this being supposed, which nothing but Ignorance can deny, we shall plainly discover that such things are done by *Spirits*, as we usually call them, as are altogether incompatible to any *compages* of these *small grains* or *Atomes* of *Matter* of which *Aire* and *Fire* do consist. For first, Either all these *Grains* or *Atomes* have *Sense*, *Imagination* and *Understanding* in them, or but some few, or but one only. If all or some few, it is plain that they are so many distinct intelligent Beings, and a distinct intelligent Being is a *Person*; so that this one person is many persons; which is plainly contradictory, at least foolishly ridiculous. But if the residence of *Sense*, *Imagination* and *Understanding* be plac'd in one, how is it possible that that one Atome should be able *spontaneously to move* all the rest? And the same reason would be if we should seat *Sense* and *Reason* in some few inward Atomes. For how could they bring away those behind them, or carry on those on the side of them, or drive them before them, so as that they would not divide and be left behind? And yet it is a shrewd presumption that the *Seat of Sense* is confined to some small compass in the *Vehicle of a Spirit*, it being so in the *Body of a Man*. For if it were not, but that every part of the *Vehicle* had *Sense* in it self, the external Object would seem in God knows how many places at once, and the Images of things would be either utterly confounded, or the Atomes, when they put themselves upon their march, would mistake their mark, and following directly their sense, would of necessity break one from another and destroy the whole.

9. Again, It is manifest that that which has the power of *Sensation* in a *Spirit* has also the power of *Memory*, else they could not *remember* the Objects of *Sense*, if it were not one and the same thing in them that had both *Sense* and *Memory*: and that which *remembers* does also *imagine*, and that which *imagines* by the power of imagination *transforms* the *Vehicle* into various shapes and figures, and holds it there in that shape so long as it thinks good.

Now I demand, how can this possibly be done by either one or a few Particles or Atomes residing in any part of the *Vehicle*? How can they either hold together the other, or lay hold upon them, to restrain them and constringe them into this or that form, suppose of a *Dog*, *Colt*, or *Man*? But to say that *Imagination* is in every part of the *Vehicle*, and to admit those particles to *imagine* that have not so much as *Sense* (as the farr greater part seem not to have from what even now was intimated) is altogether unreasonable.

10. Thirdly, That which *Lucretius* alledges against the *Immortality* of the Soul, supposing it such a congeries of little *Atomes* as here *Spirits* are

are supposed, is as strong an Argument against the Existence of such kinde of Spirits. For they would be *blown out* like a candle, or *torn* in pieces with the windes, and be *dissipated* like smoke or clouds.

11. Fourthly and lastly, The transportation of Cattel, and of Witches themselves to their Nocturnal Conventicles through the Aire, if *Spirits* or *Devils* be but a mere *congestion of subtile Atomes Aiery or Fiery*, without an inward *Immaterial* Principle that has a power to hold fast the particles together, is a thing altogether impossible. For it is evident that the weight of a *Man* or a *Beast* will sink through the *Aire*, and never rest till they reach the *Earth*; and so they would do through the Vehicle of a *Spirit*, that is as subtile, fluid and yielding as the *Aire* it self is, were there not an Internal essence and principle that was able to constringe and hold together this fluid body or Vehicle of the *Spirit*, and so make it to sustain the weight. For all Bodies hard or fluid are equally impenetrable; and therefore if any power should hold the Aire together so as to restrain it near within one compass or space, and yet not change the usual consistency of it, it would be as winde in a bladder; and a man might lie upon it as safely as upon a soft bed, and never fear sinking through.

But in this *loose composure of Atoms* which they say is all that is in a *Spirit* (though we should admit of that ridiculous supposition, that every *Atome* can *imagine* and apply it self to one joynt design of holding all close together) yet it is hard to conceive, that this actual division of the whole into so many subtile, exile, invisible particles does not so enfeeble the spontaneous offers towards the sustaining and carrying away of the burden, that their endeavours would ever prove frustraneous.

12. But I need not insist upon that which, it may be, may seem a point something more lubricous, whenas we have what is more palpably incongruous presenting it self to our view. For this *complement of Aiery or Fiery particles* being the only substance acknowledged in a *Spirit*, every *Atome* having *Imagination* and *Reason* in it to apply it self to one joynt design, they must be, as I have intimated heretofore, as properly so many *distinct persons* as the *grains of sand* are so many *distinct* individuals of Matter, and therefore every one Devil is indeed 5000 millions of Devils and more; a thing that a man would little dream of, or admit to be any more then a dream, if he thinks of it waking. But if such things as these will not be acknowledged as absurd, but shamelessly admitted and swallowed down for true; I must confess that there is no Demonstration against impudence and pertinacity, and that I am not able to prove to such that either Brutes have life, or that the moats that play in the beams of the Sun are devoid of *Sense* and *Reason*.

13. The substance of these Arguments, as the Reader may remember, I have made use of elsewhere for the proving of an *Incorporeal Principle* residing and acting in the *Body* of man; but the frame and management of them in this place is not a little different, and their force far more conspicuous and apparent, the fixt consistency and Mechanical fabrick of an humane Body being able to perform many things that the fluid and unorganized Vehicle of *Fire* and *Aire* cannot possibly doe, unless we admit an *immaterial* essence to be in it, and so throughly to possess



it all over, as to have the power to constringe it and transform it into those various shapes it does appear in. And therefore though our Argumentations for an *Immaterial Soul* in the *Body* of man be solid and irrefutable ; yet because the truth is more palpably and undeniably demonstrable in the Fiery or Aiery *Vehicles* of what we ordinarily call *Spirits*, I conceive that our Third Book against *Atheism* is very convenient, if not necessary, not at all needless nor unprofitable.

---

T H E

---

# THE CONTENTS OF

## The Antidote against ATHEISM.

### The PREFACE.

1. **T**HE Authour's Apologie for Writing this Treatise, there being so many already on the same Subject. fol. 1
2. That what he has wrote are the proper Emanations of his own Mind, and may have their peculiar serviceableness for men of the like Genius. *ibid.*
3. That he affects not Rhetorick, nor Philologie, nor the pompous numerosity of more popular Arguments, but solid and irresistible Reason in a perspicuous Method. 2
4. That he has undeniably demonstrated the Existence of God, this one Postulate being but admitted, That our Faculties are true. 3
5. His peculiar Management of the first Argument of Des-Cartes: *ibid.*
6. And the Reasons of his Rejection of the rest. 4
7. His caution and choiceness in the managing such Arguments as are fetch'd from the more general Phænomena of Nature: *ibid.*
8. As also in those from Animals. 5
9. His carefull choice in such Histories as tend to the proving of Spirits. 6
10. His assuredness of that kinde of Argument. *ibid.*
11. The reason of his declining the recital of the miraculous Stories of Holy Writ. *ibid.*
12. His studied Condescension and compliance with the Atheist to win him from his Atheism. 7

### BOOK I.

CHAP. I. 1. **T**HAT the Proneness of these Ages of the World to winde themselves from under the awe of Superstition makes the attempt seasonable of endeavouring to steer them off from Atheism. 2. That they that adhere to Religion in a mere superstitious and accustomed way, if that eye once fail, easily turn Atheists. 3. The usefulness of this present Treatise even to them that are seriously Religious. f. 9.

CHAP. II. 1. That there is nothing so demonstrable, that the Mind of man can rationally conclude that it is impossible to be otherwise. 2. That the Soul of man may give full Assent to that which notwithstanding may possibly be otherwise, made good by several Examples. 3. A like Example of Dissent. 4. The Reasons why he has so sedulously made good this point. 5. That the Atheist has no advantage from the Authour's free confession, that his Arguments are not so convictive but that they leave a possibility of the thing being otherwise. 10

CHAP. III. 1. That we are first to have a settled notion What God is, before we goe about to demonstrate That he is. 2. The Definition of God. 3. That there is an Idea of a Being absolutely perfect in our Mind, whether the Atheist will allow it to be the Idea of God or not. 4. That it is no prejudice to the Naturality of this Idea, that it may be



# The CONTENTS.

- framed from some occasions from without. 12
- CHAP. IV. 1. *What Notions are more particularly comprised in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect.* 2. *That the difficulty of framing the conception of a thing ought to be no Argument against the Existence thereof; the nature of corporeall Matter being so perplex'd and intricate, which yet all men acknowledge to exist.* 3. *That the Idea of a Spirit is as easy a Notion as of any other Substance whatsoever.* *What powers and properties are contained in the Notion of a Spirit.* 4. *That Eternity and Infinity, if God were not, would be cast upon something else; so that Atheism cannot free the Mind from such Intricacies.* 5. *Goodness, Knowledge and Power; Notions of highest Perfection, and therefore necessarily included in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect.* 6. *As also Necessity, it sounding greater Perfection then Contingency.* 14
- CHAP. V. 1. *What has occasioned sundry men to conceit that the Soul is Abrasa Tabula.* 2. *That the Mind of Man is not Abrasa Tabula, but has actual Knowledge of her own, and in what sense she has so.* 3. *A further illustration of the truth thereof.* 17
- CHAP. VI. 1. *Sundry Instances arguing actuall Knowledge in the Soul: as that she has a more accurate Idea of a Circle and Triangle then Matter can exhibite to her:* 2. *And that upon one single consideration she assures her self of the Universal Affection of a Triangle.* 3. *The same argued from the nature of Mathematical and Logical Notions, which come not in by the Senses, as being no Physical affections of the Matter;* 4. *Because they are produced without any Physical motion upon the Matter;* 5. *And that contrary kindes may be intirely in one and the same part of Matter at once.* 6. *That there are certain sure Complex Notions of the Mind for which she was not beholden to Sense.* 18
- CHAP. VII. 1. *The Mind of Man being not unfurnish'd of Innate Truth, that we are with confidence to attend to her naturall and unprejudic'd Dictates and Suggestions.* 2. *That some Notions and Truths are at least naturally and unavoidably assented unto by the Soul, whether she have of her self Actual Knowledge in her or not.* 3. *And that the Definition of a Being absolutely Perfect is such.* 4. *And that this absolutely Perfect Being is God, the Creator and Contriver of all things.* 5. *The certainty and settledness of this Idea.* 20
- CHAP. VIII. 1. *That the very Idea of God implies his necessary Existence.* 2. *That his Existence is not hypothetically necessary, but absolutely, with the occasion noted of that slippery Evasion.* 3. *That to acknowledge God a Being necessarily Existent according to the true Notion of him, and yet to say he may not Exist, is a plain contradiction.* 4. *That Necessity is a Logical term, and implies an indissoluble connexion betwixt Subject and Predicate, whence again this Axiome is necessarily and eternally true, God doth exist.* 5. *A further Demonstration of his Existence from the incompetibility of Contingency or Impossibility to his Nature or Idea.* 6. *That necessary Self-existence belongs either to God, or to Matter, or to both.* 7. *The great Incongruities that follow the admission of the Self-existency of Matter.* 8. *An Answer to an Evasion.* 9. *That a number of Self-essentiated Deities plainly takes away the Being of the true God.* 10. *The onely undeniable Demonstration of the Unity of the Godhead.* 11. *The absurdness in admitting actuall Self-existence in the Matter, and denying it in God.* 12. *That this absurdity cannot be excused from the sensibleness of Matter, sith the Atheist himself is forced to admit such things as fall not under Sense.* 13. *That it is as foolish a thing to reject the Being of God because he does not immediately fall under the Senses, as it were to reject the Being of Matter because it is so incomprehensible to the Phansy.* 14. *The factious*

## The CONTENTS.

*factious Humoursomeness of the Atheist in siding with some Faculties of the Soul, and rejecting the rest though equally competent judges.* 21

CHAP. IX. 1. *The Existence of God argued from the Finall cause of the implantation of the Idea of God in the Soul.* 2. *An Evasion of the Argument, by supposing all things to be such as they are, by Chance.* 3. *That the Evasion is either impossible, or but barely possible, and therefore of no weight.* 4. *That we are not to attend to what is simply possible, but to what our Natural Faculties determine.* 5. *He urges therefore again the Final cause of the indeleble Idea or Image of God in the Soul, illustrating the force thereof from a Similitude.* 6. *That supposing God did exist, he would have dealt no otherwise with us for the making himself known unto us then we are de facto dealt with; which therefore again argues that He doth exist.* 26

CHAP. X. 1. *Several other Affections or Properties in the Soul of Man that argue the Being of God.* 2. *As Natural Conscience.* 3. *A pious Hope or Confidence of success in affairs upon dealing righteously with the World.* 4. *An Answer to an Objection, That some men are quite devoid of these Divine senses.* 5. *That the Universality of Religious Worship argues the Knowledge of the Existence of God to be from the Light of Nature.* 6. *An Answer to an Objection, viz. That this general acknowledgment of a God amongst the Nations may be but an Universal Tradition.* 7. *Another Objection answered, viz. That what is universally received by all Nations may notwithstanding be false.* 8. *An Objection taken from the general falseness and perverseness of the Religions of the Nations. The first Answer thereto by way of Apologie.* 9. *The second Answer, supposing the Religions of the Nations as depraved as you please.* 10. *A further Objection from the long continuance of those false Religions, and the hopelessness of ever getting out of them, with a brief Answer thereto.* 28

CHAP. XI. 1. *A concerning Enquiry touching the Essence of the Soul of Man.* 2. *That the Soul is not a mere Modification of the Body, the Body being incapable of such Operations as are usually attributed to the Soul, as Spontaneous Motion, Animadversion, Memory, Reason.* 3. *That the Spirits are incapable of Memory, and consequently of Reason, Animadversion, and of Moving of the Body.* 4. *That the Brain cannot be the Principle of Spontaneous Motion, having neither Muscles nor Sense.* 5. *That Phantasy, Reason and Animadversion is seated neither in any Pore, nor any particular part of the Brain, nor is all the Brain figured into this or that Conception, nor every Particle thereof.* 6. *That the Figuration of one part of the Brain is not reflected to the rest, demonstrated from the Site of things.* 7. *That the Brain has no Sense, further demonstrated from Anatomical Experiments.* 8. *How ridiculously the Operations of the Soul are attributed to the Conarion.* 9. *The Conclusion, That the Impetus of Spontaneous Motion is neither from the Animal spirits nor the Brain.* 10. *That the Soul is not any Corporeal substance distinct from the Animal Spirits and the Body;* 11. *And therefore is a Substance Incorporeal.* 12. *The discovery of the Essence of the Soul, of what great usefulness for the easier conceiving the nature of God.* 13. *And how there may be an Eternal Mind that has both Understanding and power of Moving the Matter of the Universe.* 32

## Book II.

CHAP. I. 1. **T**HAT the more general Phænomena of External Nature argue the Being of a God. 2. *That if Matter be self-moved, it cannot work it self into these Phænomena.* 3. *Much less if it rest of it self.* 4. *That though it were partly self-moving, partly self-resting, yet it could not produce either Sun or Stars of that figure they are.* 5. *That*

R 4 the



# The C O N T E N T S.

the *Laws* of the *Motion* of the *Earth* are not casual or fortuitous. 6. That there is a *Divine Providence* that does at least approve, if not direct, all the *Motions* of the *Matter*; with a Reason why she permits the *Effects* of the mere *Mechanical motion* of the *Matter* to goe as far as they can. 37

CHAP. II. 1. The perpetual *Parallelism* of the *Axis* of the *Earth* a manifest argument of *Divine Providence*. 2. The great *Inconveniences*, if the posture of this parallel *Axis* were *Perpendicular* to the *Plane* of the *Ecliptick*: 3. Or *Co-incident* with the said *Plane*. 4. The excellent advantages of that *Inclining* posture it hath, and what a manifest *Demonstration* it is of *Providence*. 5. The same *Argument* urged from the *Ptolemaical Hypothesis*. 6. A further consideration of the *Axis* of the *Earth*, and of the *Moon's* crossing the *Equinoctial Line*. 7. A *Demonstration* from the *Phænomenon* of *Gravity*, that there is a *Principle* distinct from *Matter*. 8. That neither the *Aire*, nor any more subtle *Matter* in the *Aire*, have any *Knowledge* or free *Agency* in them. 9. A notable *Demonstration* from the *Sucker* of the *Aire-Pump's* drawing up so great a weight, that there is a *Substance* distinct from *Matter* in the *World*. 10. That this *Phænomenon* cannot be salv'd by the *Elastick* power of the *Aire*, demonstrated from the *Phænomenon* it self. 11. An *Evasion* produced and answered. 12. Another *Evasion* anticipated. 13. That this peremptory force of *Nature* against the first *Laws* of *Mechanical motion* and against that of *Gravity*, is a palpable pledge, that where things fall out fitly, there is the same *Immaterial Guide*, though there be not the same sensibility of force on the *Matter*. 14. The ridiculous *Sophistry* of the *Atheist*, arguing from some petty effects of the mere *Motion* of *Matter* that there is no higher *Principle*, plainly discovered and justly derided. 15. *Providence* concluded from the *Laws* of *Day* and *Night*, *Winter* and *Summer*, &c. 40

CHAP. III. 1. That there is nothing in *Nature* but what passes the approbation of a *Knowing Principle*. 2. The great *Usefulness* of *Hills* and *Mountains*. 3. The *Condition* of *Man* in order and respect to the rest of the *Creation*. 4. The designed *Usefulness* of *Quarries* of *Stone*, *Timber-Wood*, *Metalls* and *Mineralls*. 5. How upon these depend the glory and magnificence both of *Peace* and *Warre*: 6. As also the defence of *Men* against *Beasts*. 47

CHAP. IV. 1. *Distinction* of *Land* and *Sea* not without a *Providence*. 2. As also the *Consistence* of the *Sea-Water* that it can bear *Ships*. 3. The great convenience and pleasure of *Navigation*. 4. The admirable train of fit *Provisions* in *Nature* for the gratifying the *Wit* of man in so concerning a *Curiosity*. 50

CHAP. V. 1. That the *Form* and *Beauty*, *Seed* and *Signature* of *Plants* are Arguments of a *Providence*. 2. That though the mere motion of the *Matter* might produce certain *Meteors*, as *Haile*, *Snow*, *Ice*, &c. yet it will not follow that the same is the adequate cause of *Animals* and *Plants*. 3. That it were no great botch nor gap in *Nature*, if some more rude *Phænomena* were acknowledged the *Results* of the mere *Mechanical Motion* of *Matter*. 4. That the *Forme* and *Beauty* of *Flowers* and *Plants* are from an higher *Principle*. 5. That there is such a thing as *Beauty*, and that it is the Object of our *Intellectual Faculties*. 6. From whence it follows, that the beautiful *Forms* and *Figures* of *Plants* and *Animals* are from an *Intellectual Principle*. 52

CHAP. VI. 1. *Providence* argued from the *Seeds* of *Plants*. 2. An *Objection* answered concerning stinking *Weeds* and poisonous *Plants*. 3. The *Signature* of *Plants* an argument of *Providence*. 4. Certain *Instances* of *Signatures*. 5. An *Answer* to an *Objection* concerning such *Signatures* in *Plants* as cannot referre to *Medicine*. 55

# The CONTENTS.

CHAP. VII. 1. *That the Usefulness of Plants argues a Providence, particularly those that afford Timber.* 2. *As also such Herbs and Plants as serve for Physick for Men and Beasts.* 3. *Of Plants fit for Food.* 4. *Of the Colour of Grass and Herbs, and of the Fruits of Trees.* 5. *The notable provisions in Nature for Husbandry and Tillage, with the universal Usefulness of Hemp and Flaxe.* 6. *The marvellous Usefulness of the Indian Nut-Tree.* 58

CHAP. VIII. 1. *The designed Usefulness of Animals for Man, as in particular of the Dog and the Sheep.* 2. *As also of the Oxe and other Animals.* 3. *Of Mans subduing the Creatures to himself.* 4. *Of those that are as yet untamed.* 5. *The excellent Usefulness of the Horse.* 6. *The Usefulness of some Animals that are Enemies to such Animals as are hatefull or noisome to Man.* 62

CHAP. IX. 1. *The Beauty of several brute Animals.* 2. *The goodly Statefulness of the Horse.* 3. *That the Beauty of Animals argues their Creation from an Intellectual Principle.* 4. *The difference of Sexes a Demonstration of Providence.* 5. *That this difference is not by Chance.* 6. *An Objection answered concerning the Eele.* 7. *Another answered, taken from the consideration of the same careful provision of difference of Sexes in viler Animals.* 8. *Of Fishes and Birds being Oviparous.* 9. *Of Birds building their Nests and hatching their Eggs.* 10. *An Objection answered concerning the Ostrich.* 11. *That the Homogeneity of that Crystalline liquor which is the immediate Matter of the generation of Animals implies a Substance Immaterial or Incorporeal in Animals thus generated.* 12. *An Answer to an Elusion of the foregoing Argument.* 64

CHAP. X. 1. *That the Fabrick of the Bodies of Animals argues a Deity: as namely the number and situation of their Eyes and Ears;* 2. *As also of their Legs.* 3. *The Armature of*

*Beasts, and their Use thereof.* 4. *Of the general structure of Birds and Fishes.* 5. *The admirable Fabrick of the Mole.* 6. *Cardan's rapture upon the consideration thereof.* 7. *Of the Hare and Grey-hound.* 8. *Of the structure of the body of the Camel.* 69

CHAP. XI. 1. *Some general Observables concerning Birds.* 2. *Of the Cock.* 3. *Of the Turkey-Cock.* 4. *Of the Swan, Hern, and other Water-fowl.* 5. *Of the γαμψόνυχια and πλανήτορες, and of the peculiarity of Sight in Birds of prey.* 6. *The Description of the Bird of Paradise according to Cardan.* 7. *The suffrages of Scaliger, Hernandez and Nierembergius.* 8. *Aldrovandus his Objections against her feeding on the dew onely, with what they might probably answer thereto.* 9. *His Objections against her manner of Incubiture, with the like Answer.* 10. *What Properties they are all five agreed on.* 11. *In what Pighafetta and Clusius dissent from them all, with the Author's conditional inclination to their judgment.* 12. *The main Remarkables in the story of the Bird of Paradise.* 13. *A supply from ordinary & known Examples as convictive or more convictive of a discerning Providence.* 72

CHAP. XII. 1. *That there is not an ampler Testimony of Providence then the structure of mans Body.* 2. *The safeness of the fabrick of the Eyes.* 3. *Their exquisite fittedness to their use.* 4. *The superadded advantage of Muscles to the Eye.* 5. *The admirable contrivance of Muscles in the whole Body.* 6. *The fabrick of the Heart and of the Veins.* 7. *Of the Teeth and of the Joynts, of the Arms and Legs.* 8. *Of the hinder parts of the Body, and Head, Vertebrae, Nails, Bones, &c.* 9. *That there is proportionably the same evidence of Providence in the Anatomie of all Bodies as in that of Man.* 10. *The sottishness of them that are not convinced from these Considerations.* 11. *Of the Passions in Man, and particularly that of Devotion.* 12. *Of the Passions of Animals, and their Usefulness to themselves;*



# The CONTENTS.

*selves*; 13. *As also to Man. The ridiculous Antipathie of the Ape to the Snail.* 14. *How inept and frustraneous a Passion Religion would be in Man, if there were neither God nor Spirit in the World.* 15. *The outrageous Mistake of Nature in implanting this Property of Religion in Man, if there be no God.* 16. *The necessary cause of Disorder in Man's nature.* 17. *The exquisite fitness that there should be such a Creature as Man upon Earth.* 18. *That the whole Creation and the several parts thereof are an undeniable Demonstration that there is a God.* 78

## BOOK III.

CHAP. I. 1. **T**hat, good men not always faring best in this world, the great examples of Divine Vengeance upon wicked and blasphemous Persons are not so convincing to the obstinate Atheist. 2. *The irreligious Jeers and Sacrileges of Dionysius of Syracuse.* 3. *The occasion of the Atheists incredulity in things supernatural or miraculous.* 4. *That there have been true Miracles in the world as well as false.* 5. *And what are the best and safest ways to distinguish them, that we may not be impos'd upon by History.* 86

CHAP. II. 1. *The Moving of a Sieve by a Charm. Coskinomancy.* 2. *A Magical Cure of an Horse.* 3. *The Charming of Serpents.* 4. *A strange Example of one Death-strucken as he walked the Streets.* 5. *A Story of a sudden Wind that had like to have thrown down the Gallows at the hanging of two Witches.* 89

CHAP. III. 1. *That Winds and Tempests are raised upon mere Ceremonies or forms of Words.* 2. *The unreasonableness of Wierus his doubting of the Devils power over the Meteors of the Aire.* 3. *Examples of that power in Rain and Thunder.* 4. *Margaret Warine discharged upon an Oake at a*

*Thunder-Clap.* 5. *Amantius and Rotarius cast headlong out of a cloud upon an house-top.* 6. *The Witch of Constance seen by the Shepherds to ride through the Aire.* 7. *That he might adde several other Instances from Eye-witnesses, of the strange Effects of invisible Demons.* 8. *His compendious Reherſal of the most remarkable exploits of the Devil of Malcon in lieu thereof.* 9. *The Reasons of giving himself the trouble of this Reherſal.* 91

CHAP. IV. 1. *The Supernatural Effects observed in the bewitched Children of Mr. Throgmorton and Mrs. Mufchamp.* 2. *The general Remarkables in them both.* 3. *The possession of the Religious Virgins of Werts, Heflimont, &c.* 4. *The story of that famous Abbateſs Magdalena Crucia, her useleſs and ludicrous Miracles.* 5. *That she was a Sorceress, and was thirty years married to the Devil.* 6. *That her story is neither any Figment of Priests, nor deluſion of Melancholy.* 96

CHAP. V. 1. *Knives, Wood, Pieces of Iron, Balls of Haire in the body of Ulricus Neuseſſer.* 2. *The vomiting of Cloth stuck with Pins, Nails and Needles, as also Glass, Iron and Haire, by Wierus his Patients, and by a friend of Cardan's.* 3. *Wierus his Story of the thirty possessed Children of Amsterdam.* 4. *The Convictiveness of these Narrations.* 5. *Objections against their Convictiveness answered.* 6. *Of a Maid Damoniack speaking Greek; and of the miraculous binding of anothers hands by an invisible power.* 98

CHAP. VI. 1. *The Apparition Eckerken.* 2. *The Story of the pyed Piper.* 3. *A Triton or Sea-God seen on the banks of Rubicon.* 4. *Of the Imps of Witches, and whether those old Women be guilty of so much dosage as the Atheist fancies them.* 5. *That such things pass betwixt them and their Imps as are impossible to be imputed to Melancholy.* 6. *The examination of John Winnick of Molesworth.* 7. *The reason of Sealing Covenants with the Devil.* 100

# The CONTENTS.

CHAP. VII. 1. *The Story of Anne Bodenham, a Witch who suffered at Salisbury, Anno 1653. The Author's punctual Information concerning her.* 2. *The manner and circumstances of her first Conjuring up the Devil.* 3. *An Objection answered concerning the truth thereof.* 4. *The Objection more fully answered by a second Conjurat[i]on.* 5. *An Objection answer'd concerning this second Conjurat[i]on, and still further cleared by the circumstances of a third.* 6. *The Witches fourth and last Conjurat[i]on, at which Anne Styles made a Contract with the Devil.* 7. *That these transact[i]ons could be no Dreams nor Fancies of Anne Styles, nor she knowingly forsworn in her avouching them upon Oath.* 8. *Which is further proved by the impartialness of her Confession.* 9, 10. *By her Contract With the Devil, evidenced from the real effects thereof.* 11. *And by her behaviour at the Assizes when she gave evidence.* 12. *An answer to certain Objections.* 13. *Sundry Indications that Anne Bodenham was a Witch.* 14. *The Summary Conclusion, That the above-related Conjurat[i]ons are no Fictions of Anne Styles, but real Transact[i]ons by Anne Bodenham.*

103

CHAP. VIII. 1. *Two memorable Stories, with the credibility of them.* 2. *The first of a Shoemaker of Breslaw, who cut his own throat.* 3. *His appearing after death in his usual habit, and his vexat[i]ons haunting the whole Town.* 4. *That he being dug up after he had been eight moneths buried, his body was found intire and fresh, and his joynts limber and flexible.* 5. *That upon the burning thereof the Apparition ceased.* 6. *Which also hapned in a Maid of his, when she had vexed and disturbed people for a whole moneth together.* 7. *That the Relator of the Story lived in the Town at what time these things fell out.*

111

CHAP. IX. 1. *The second Story of one Cuntius, whose first Pen-man not onely dwelt in the Town, but was a sad sufferer in the Tragedie.* 2. *The quality*

*of Cuntius, his fatal blow by his Horse, and his desperate affliction of Mind.* 3. *Prodigies attending his death.* 4. *A Spiritus Incubus in the shape of him, with other disorders.* 5. *More hideous disorders, as also his appearing to a Gosp of his in behalf of his Child.* 6. *Several sad effects of his appearing upon several persons.* 7. *His miserable usage of the Parson of the Parish and his Family, who is the Pen-man of the Story.* 8. *A brief Rehear[sal] of many other mad Pranks of this Spectre.* 9. *A remarkable passage touching his Grave-stone.* 10. *The florid plight of Cuntius after he had been buried near half a year, his grasping of a Staff, and the motion of his Eyes and of his Blood.* 11. *The prodigious Weight of his body.* 12. *As also the Incombustibleness thereof.* 13. *How hard set the Atheist will be for a subterfuge against this Story.*

114

CHAP. X. 1. *The Nocturnal Conventicles of Witches, two examples thereof out of Paulus Grillandus.* 2. *Of the Witch of Lochiæ, with a reflexion on the unexceptionableness of these Instances for the proof of Spirits.* 3. *The piping of John of Hembach to a Conventicle of Witches.* 4. *The dancing of Men, Women and cloven-footed Satyrs at Mid-day.* 5. *John Michael's dumb Musick on his crooked staff from the bough of an Oak at that Antick dancing.* 6. *The Impresse of a Circle with cloven feet in it on the ground where they danced.*

119

CHAP. XI. 1. *Of Fairy-Circles.* 2. *Questions propounded concerning Witches leaving their bodies, as also concerning their Transformation into bestial shapes.* 3. *That the Reasons of Wierus and Remigius against reall Transformation are but weak.* 4. *The Probabilities for, and the Manner of, reall Transformation.* 5. *An argumentation for their being out of their bodies in their Ecstasies.* 6. *That the Soul's leaving the Body thus is not Death, nor her return any proper Miracle.* 7. *That it is in some cases most easie and natural to acknowledge they do leave their bodies, with an instance out of Wierus that*

that



# The CONTENTS.

that suits to that purpose. 8. *The Author's Scepticism in the point, with a favourable interpretation of the proper extravagances of Temper in Bodinus and Des-Cartes.* 121

CHAP. XII. 1. *The Coldness of those Bodies that Spirits appear in, Witnessed by the experience of Cardan and Bourgotus.* 2. *The natural reason of this Coldness.* 3. *That the Devil does really lie with Witches.* 4. *That the very Substance of Spirits is not Fire.* 5. *The Spectre at Ephesus.* 6. *Spirits skirmishing on the ground.* 7, 8. *Field-fights and Sea-fights seen in the Aire.* 124

CHAP. XIII. 1. *The main reason why good Spirits so seldom consociate with men.* 2. *What manner of Magick Bodinus his friend used to procure the more sensible assistance of a good Genius.* 3. *The manner of this Genius his sensible Converse.* 4. *The Religiosity of the Party, and the Character of his Temper.* 5. *His escapes from danger by advertisements of the good Genius.* 6. *The Genius his averfeness from Vocall conversation with him.* 7. *His usefull Assistance by other Signs.* 8. *The manner of his appearing to him awake, and once in a Slumber.* 126

CHAP. XIV. 1. *Certain Enquiries upon the preceding Narration; as, What these Guardian Genii may be.* 2. *Whether one or more of them be allotted to every man, or to some none.* 3. *What may be the reason of Spirits so seldom appearing;* 4. *And whether they have any settled shape or no.* 5. *What their manner is of assisting men in either Devotion or Prophecy.* 6. *Whether every mans complexion is capable of the Society of a good Genius.* 7. *And lastly, Whether it be lawful to pray to God to send such a Genius or Angel to one, or no.* 8. *What the most effectual and divinest Magick.* 129

CHAP. XV. 1. *The Structure of Mans body, and Apparitions, the most convictive Arguments against the Atheist.* 2. *His first Evasion of the former of*

*them, pretending it never was but there were men and women and other Species in the World.* 3. *The Author's answer to this pretension. First, That every man was mortall, and therefore was either created or rose out of the Earth.* 4. *Secondly, That even in infinite succession there is something First ordine Naturæ, and that these First were either created or rose out of the Earth.* 5. *Thirdly, That if there were always men in the world, and every man born of a woman, some was both Father and Son, Man and Babe at once.* 6. *That it is contrary to the Laws of mere blind Matter, that man in his adult perfections should exist therefrom at once.* 7. *The Atheist's second Evasion, That the Species of things arose from the multifarious attempts of the motion of the Matter; With a threefold Answer thereto.* 8. *An Evasion of the last Answer, touching the perpetual exactness in the fabrick of all living Species; With a threefold Answer also to that Evasion.* 9. *The further serviceableness of this Answer for the quite taking away the first Evasion of the Atheist.* ... 133

CHAP. XVI. 1. *The Atheists Evasions against Apparitions; as first, That they are mere Imaginations.* 2. *Then, That though they be Realities without, yet they are caused by the force of Imagination; With the confutation of these Conceits.* 3. *Their fond conceit, That the Skirmishings in the Aire are from the exuvians Effluxes of things; With a confutation thereof.* 4. *A copious confutation of their last subterfuge, (viz. That those Fightings are the Reflexions of Battels on the Earth) from the distance, and debility of Reflexion;* 5. *From the rude Politure of the Clouds;* 6. *From their inability of reflecting so much as the image of the starrs; which yet were a thing far easier; First, by reason of the undiminishableness of their magnitude.* 7. *Then from the purity of their light.* 8. *Thirdly, from the posture of our Eye in the shade of the Earth.* 9. *Lastly, from their dispersedness, ready from every part to be reflected if the Clouds*

## The CONTENTS.

Clouds had any such Reflexivity in them. 10. That if they have any such Reflexivity as to represent battels so exceeding distant, it is by some supernatural Artifice. 11. That this Artifice has its limited laws. 12. Whence at least some of these Aereal battels cannot be Reflexions from the Earth. 13. Machiavel's opinion concerning these Fightings in the Aire. 14. Nothing so demonstrable in Philosophy as

the being of a God. 15. That Pedantick affectation of Atheisme. Whence it probably arose. 16. The true causes of being really prone to Atheisme. 17. That men ought not to oppose their mere complexional humours against the Principles of Reason, and Testimonies of Nature and History His Apology for being so copious in the reciting of Stories of Spirits. 137

## The CONTENTS of the APPENDIX to The Antidote against Atheism.

CHAP. I. 1. **T**HE Author's reason of adding this Appendix to his Antidote. 2. An Enumeration of the chief Objections made against the First Book thereof. 145

CHAP. II. 1. That the force of his Argument for the Existence of God from his Idea, does not lye in this, that there are Innate Ideas in the Mind of man. 2. That the force of arguing from the Idea of a thing, be it innate or not innate, is the same, proved by several instances. 3. The reason why he contends for Innate Ideas. 4. The seeming accuracy of a Triangle to outward sense no disproof but that the exact Idea thereof is from the Soul her self. 5. That it doth not follow that, if there be Innate Ideas, a Blind man may discourse of Colours. 6. That Brutes have not the Knowledge of any Logical or Mathematical Notions. 7. Why Zeno's Ass goes in a right line to the bottle of Hay. 8. That those actions and motions in things that are according to Reason and Mathematicks, do not prove any Logical or Mathematical Notions in the things thus acting or moving. 146

CHAP. III. 1. That considering the lapse of Man's Soul into Matter, it is no wonder she is so much puzzled in speculating things Immaterial. 2. That all Extension does not imply Physical Di-

visibility or Separability of Parts. 3. That the Emanation of the Secondary substance from the Centrall in a Spirit is not properly Creation. 4. How it comes to pass that the Soul cannot withdraw her self from pain by her Self-contracting faculty. 5. That the Soul's extension does not imply as many Wills and Understandings as imaginable Parts, by reason of the special Unity and Indivisibility of her substance. 6. Several Instances of the puzzleness of Phansy in the firm conclusions of Sense, and of Reason. 7. The unconceivableness of the manner of that strong union some parts of the Matter have one with another. 8. What is meant by Hylopathy, and how a Spirit though not impenetrable, may be the Impellent of Matter. 9. That the unexplisableness of a Spirit's moving Matter is no greater argument against the truth thereof, then the unconceivableness of that line that is produced by the Motion of a Globe on a Plane is an argument against the Mobility thereof. 10. That the strength of this last Answer consists in the Assurance that there are such Phænomena in the World as utterly exceed the Powers of mere Matter; of which several Examples are hinted out of the foregoing Treatise. 149

CHAP. IV. 1. That Existence is a Perfection, verified from vulgar Instances. 2. Further proved from Metaphysical  
S Prin.



## The CONTENTS.

*Principles.* 3. *An Appeal to ordinary Reason.* 4. *That at least Necessary Existence is a Perfection, if bare Existence be not.* 5. *An Illustration of that last Conclusion.* 155

CHAP. V. I. *That there is a vast difference betwixt arguing from forced Figments or fancies, and from the natural Ideas of our own Minds.* 2. *That the Idea of a Being absolutely Evil does not imply necessary Existence, whether it signifie a Being absolutely Imperfect, 3. Or absolutely Wicked, 4. Or absolutely Miserable, 5. Or absolutely Mischievous.* 6. *That if by a Being absolutely Mischievous were meant onely the Infinite power of doing hurt, this is God, whose absolute Goodness prevents the execution thereof.* 7. *That the right Method of using our Reason is to proceed from what is plain and unsuspected to what is more obscure and suspicable.* 8. *That according to this Method, being assured first of the Existence of a Being absolutely Perfect from his Idea, we are therewithall inabled to return answer, that Impossibility of Existence belongs to a Being either absolutely Miserable or absolutely Mischievous.* 9. *That the Phænomena of the World further prove the impossibility of the Existence of a Being absolutely Mischievous.* 10. *And that the Counsels and Works of God are not to be measured by the vain Opinions of Men.* 156

CHAP. VI. I. *That the sense of his Argument from the Idea of God in the first posture, is not simply That the Idea is true, and if God were, his Existence were necessary; but, That this Idea being true does exhibite to our Minde an absolute necessary Existence as belonging to Him.* 2. *That the Idea of the God of the Manichees does not include in it necessary existence.* 3. *That to say that necessary Existence included in the Idea of a Being absolutely perfect is but conditional, is a Contradiction.* 4. *The second posture of his Argument made good, and that by virtue of the form thereof the Existence of the Manichean God is not concludible.* 5. *The*

*invincible Evidence of the third posture of his Argument in the judgement of his Antagonist himself.* 6. *That the force of his Argument in the fourth and last posture is not, That we conceive the Idea of Matter without necessary Existence; but that, look as near as we can, we finde no necessary existence included therein, as we do in the Idea of God.* 7. *That the Faculties of our Minde, to which he perpetually appeals, are to be supposed, not proved to be true.* 160

CHAP. VII. I. *That that necessity of Existence that seems to be included in the Idea of Space is but the same that offers it self to our Mind in that more full and perfect Idea of God.* 2. *That there is the same reason of Eternal Duration, whose immediate subject is God, not Matter.* 3. *That Space is but the possibility of Matter, measurable onely as so many several possible Species of things are numerable.* 4. *That Distance is no Physical affection of any thing, but onely Notional.* 5. *That Distance of Bodies is but privation of actual union, measurable by parts, as other Privations of qualities by degrees.* 6. *That if distant Space after the removal of Matter be any real thing, it is that necessary Being represented by the Idea of God.* 7. *That Self-Existence and Contingency are terms inconsistent with one another.* 163

CHAP. VIII. I. *That the Idea of God is a natural and indeleble Notion in the Soul of Man.* 2. *That if there were some small obscurity in the Notion, it hinders not but that it may be natural.* 3. *That the Politician's abuse of the notion of God and Religion argues them no more to be his Contrivance, then natural Affection, love of Honour and Liberty are; which he in like manner abuses.* 4. *A twofold Answer to an Objection touching God's implanting his Idea in us upon counsel or design.* 165

CHAP. IX. I. *That the natural frame of Conscience is such, that it suggests such Fears and Hopes that imply that there is*

## The CONTENTS.

is a God. 2. That the ridiculousness of sundry Religions is not any proof that to be affected with Religion is no Innate faculty of the Soul of man. 167

CHAP. X. 1. That though the Conarion might be the Seat of Common Sense, yet it cannot be the Common Percipient; 2. As being incapable of Sensation; 3. Of Memory, 4. Of Imagination, 5. Of Reason, 6. And of Spontaneous Motion. 7. That these Arguments do not equally prove an Incorporeal Substance in Brutes; nor, if they did, were their Souls straightway immortal. 8. That we cannot admit Perception in Matter as well as Divisibility, upon pretence the one is no more perplex'd than the other; because both Sense and Reason averres the one, but no Faculty gives Witness to the other. 9. In what sense the Soul is both divisible and extended. 10. A Symbolical representation how she may receive multitudes of distinct figurations into one indivisible Principle of perception. 11. That the manifest incapacity in the Matter for the Functions of a Soul assures us of the Existence thereof, be we never so much puzzled in the speculation of her Essence. 168

CHAP. XI. 1. That Subtily is not inconsistent with the strongest Truth. 2. That the subordinate serviceableness of things in the world is in the things themselves, not merely in our Phansy. 3. That the difficulty of obtaining such serviceable commodities is rather an Argument for Providence than against it. 4. That Beauty is no necessary Result from the mere Motion of the Matter. 5. That it is an intellectual Object, not taken notice of by Brutes. 6. That the preying of Animals one upon another is very well consistent with the Goodness of the First Cause. 7. As also the Creation of offensive Animals, there being curbs & correctives to their increase. 8. That the immediate Matter of the Fœtus is homogeneous. 9. That the notion of the Archei or Se-

minal forms is no such intricate Speculation. 174

CHAP. XII. 1. Objections against the Story of the Charmer of Saltzburg, 2. And of the bewitched Children at Amsterdam, with some others of that kinde; 3. As also against that of John of Hembach and John Michael Pipers to the Antick dancings of Devils. 4. Also against the disappearing of the Conventicle of Witches at the naming of God; 5. And against a certain passage of that Story of the Guardian Genius which Bodinus relates. 181

CHAP. XIII. 1. That the Transformation of an humane body into another shape may be done without pain. 2. That there may be an actual separation of Soul and Body without Death properly so called. 3. That the Bodies of Spirits may be hot, or cold, or warm, and the manner how they become so. 4. In what sense we may acknowledge a First in an Infinite succession of generations. 5. That the story of Tree-Geese in Gerard is certainly true. 6. That God must be a Spirit properly so called. 7. That Spirits ordinarily so called are not Fire nor Aire, but Essences properly Spiritual, demonstrated from the solute Arenosity (as I may so speak) of Aire and Fire. 8. That this soluteness makes those Aereal Compages incapable of Personality, spontaneous Motion, and Sensation: 9. As also of transfiguring their vehicle into those complete shapes of Animals they appear in; 10. And of holding it together in winds and storms; 11. And lastly, of transporting Men and Cattel in the Aire. 12. That if Spirits or Dæmons be nothing but mere complements of Aiery or Fiery Atoms, every Devil is many Millions of Devils. 13. The preeminence of Arguments fetched from the History of Spirits above those from the Operations of the Soul in the Body, for the proving of a Substance Immaterial. 183





*Enthusiasmus Triumphatus;*  
O R,  
A B R I E F D I S C O U R S E  
O F  
The Nature, Causes, Kinds, and Cure  
O F  
E N T H U S I A S M.

By H E N R Y M O R E, D.D.  
Fellow of Christ's College in Cambridge.

Πολλοὶ μὲν νερθευφόμενοι, παύει δέ τε Βάκχοι.



L O N D O N,  
Printed by James Fleisher, for William Morden Book-seller in Cambridge,  
M D C L X I I.





A B R I E F  
D I S C O U R S E  
O F  
The Nature , Causes , Kindes , and Cure  
O F  
E N T H U S I A S M.

S E C T I O N I.

*The great Affinity and Correspondency betwixt Enthusiasm  
and Atheism.*



*Theism* and *Enthusiasm*, though they seem so extremely opposite one to another, yet in many things they do very nearly agree. For, to say nothing of their joynt conspiracy against the true knowledge of God and Religion, they are commonly entertain'd, though successively, in the same Complexion. For that Temper that disposes a man to listen to the Magisterial Dictates of an over-bearing *Phansy*, more then to the calm and cautious insinuations of free *Reason*, is a subject that by turns does very easily lodge and give harbour to these mischievous Guests.

For as *Dreams* are the *Fancies* of those that sleep, so *Fancies* are but the *Dreams* of men awake. And these *Fancies* by day, as those *Dreams* by night, will vary and change with the weather and present temper of the Body: So those that have onely a fiery *Enthusiastick* acknowledgment of God; change of diet, feculent old age, or some present damps of *Melancholy*, will as confidently represent to their *Phansy* that there is no God, as ever it was represented that there is one. And then having lost the use of their more noble Faculties of *Reason* and *Understanding*, they must according to the course of Nature be as bold *Atheists* now, as they were before confident *Enthusiasts*.

Nor do these Two unruly Guests onely serve themselves by turns on the same party, but also send mutual supplies one to another, being lodg'd in several persons. For the *Atheist's* pretence to Wit and natural Reason (though the foulness of his Mind makes him fumble very dotingly in the



use thereof) makes the *Enthusiast* secure that *Reason* is no guide to God: And the *Enthusiast*'s boldly dictating the careless ravings of his own tumultuous *Phanſy* for undeniable Principles of Divine knowledge, confirms the *Atheist* that the whole business of Religion and Notion of a God is nothing but a troublesome fit of over-curious *Melancholy*.

Wherefore there being that *near alliance* and *mutuall correspondence* betwixt these two enormous distempers of the Mind, *Atheism* and *Enthusiasm*; I hold it very suitable and convenient, having treated of the former, to adde this brief Discourse of the *Nature*, *Causes*, *Kinds*, and *Cure* of this latter Disease.

---

## SECT. II.

*What Inspiration is, and what Enthusiasm.*

THE Etymologie and varietie of the significations of this word *Enthusiasm* I leave to *Criticks* and *Grammarians*; but what we mean by it here, you shall fully understand after we have defined what *Inspiration* is: For *Enthusiasm* is nothing else but a misconceit of being *inspired*. Now to be *inspired* is, *to be moved in an extraordinary manner by the power or Spirit of God to act, speak, or think what is holy, just and true*. From hence it will be easily understood what *Enthusiasm* is, viz. *A full, but false, persuasion in a man that he is inspired*.

---

## SECT. III.

*A search of the Causes of Enthusiasm in the Faculties of the Soul.*

WE shall now enquire into the *Causes* of this Distemper, how it comes to passe that a man should be thus befooled in his own conceit. And truly unless we should offer lesse satisfaction then the thing is capable of, we must not onely treat here of *Melancholy*, but of the *Faculties of the Soul* of man, whereby it may the better be understood how she may become obnoxious to such disturbances of *Melancholy*, in which she has quite lost her own Judgement and freedome, and can neither keep out nor distinguish betwixt her own Fancies and reall Truths.

---

## SECT. IV.

*The severall Degrees and Natures of her Faculties.*

WE are therefore to take notice of the severall *Degrees* and *Natures* of the *Faculties of the Soul*, the lowest whereof she exercises without so much as any *Perception* of what she does; and these Operations are  
fatall

fatal and naturall to her so long as she is in the *Body*; and a man differs in them little from a *Plant*, which therefore you may call the *Vegetative* or *Plantal* Faculties of the Soul.

The *lowest* of those Faculties of whose present operations we have any *Perception*, are the *Outward Senses*, which upon the pertingencie of the Object to the Sensitive Organ cannot fail to act, that is, the Soul cannot fail to be affected thereby, nor is it in her power to suspend her *Perception*, or at least very hardly in her power.

From whence it is plain that the Soul is of that nature, that she sometimes may awake fatally and necessarily into *Phantasmes* and *Perceptions* without any will or consent of her own.

Which is found true also in *Imagination*, though that Facultie be freer then the former. For what are *Dreams* but the Imaginations and Perceptions of one asleep? which notwithstanding steal upon the Soul, or rise out of her without any consent of hers; as is most manifest in such as torment us, and put us to extreme pain till we awake out of them.

And the like obreptions or unavoidable importunities of *Thoughts*, which offer or force themselves upon the *Mind*, may be observed even in the day-time, according to the nature or strength of the complexion of our Bodies; though how the Body doth engage the Mind in *Thoughts* or *Imaginations*, is most manifest in *Sleep*. For according as *Choler*, *Sanguine*, *Phlegme*, or *Melancholy* are predominant, will the Scene of our *Dreams* be, and that without any check or curb of dubitation concerning the truth and existence of the things that then appear.

Of which we can conceive no other reason then this, That the *Inmost seat of Sense* is very fully and vigourously affected, as it is by Objects in the day, of whose reall existence the ordinary assurance is, that they so strongly strike or affect our *Sensitive* Facultie; which resides not in the externall Organs, no more then the Artificer's skill in his instruments, but in some more inward Recesses of the Brain: and therefore the *true* and *real* seat of Sense being affected in our *sleep*, as well as when we are awake, 'tis the lesse marvel the Soul conceits her *dreams*, while she is a dreaming, to be no dreams, but reall transactions.

## S E C T. V.

*Why Dreams, till we awake, seem reall transactions.*

NOW that the Inward sense is so vigorously affected in these *Dreams* proceeds, as I conceive, from hence; Because the *Brains*, *Animal spirits*, or whatever the Soul works upon within in her Imaginative operations, are not considerably moved, altered or agitated from any external motion, but keep intirely and fully that figuration or modification which the Soul *necessarily* and *naturally* moulds them into in our *sleep*: so that the opinion of the truth of what is represented to us in our *Dreams* is from hence, that *Imagination* then (that is, the inward figuration of our *Brain* or *Spirits* into this or that representation) is far *stronger* then any motion or agitation from *without*, which to them that are awake dimmes



dimmes and obscures their inward Imagination, as the light of the Sun doth the light of a Candle in a room; and yet in this case also according to *Aristotle* Phanſy is ἀδυναμία τις αἰσθῆναι, a kind of sense, though weak.

But if it were so strong as to bear it self against all the occurſions and impulses of outward Objects, so as not to be broken, but to keep it self entire and in equall splendour and vigour with what is represented from without, and this not arbitrarily, but necessarily and unavoidably, as has been already intimated, the Party thus affected would not fail to take his own Imagination for a reall Object of Sense: as it fell out in one that *Cartesius* mentions, (and there are several other Examples of that kind) that had his arm cut off, who being hoodwinkt, complained of a pain in this and the other finger, when he had lost his whole arm.

And a further Instance may be in mad or Melancholy men, who have confidently affirmed that they have met with the Devil, or conversed with Angels, when it has been nothing but an encounter with their own fancie.

## SECT. VI.

*The enormous strength of Imagination the Cause of Enthusiasme.*

**V**Herefore it is the enormous strength of *Imagination* (which is yet the Soul's weaknesse or unwieldinesse, whereby she so farre sinks into Phantasmes that she cannot recover her self into the use of her more free Faculties of *Reason* and *Understanding*) that thus peremptorily engages a man to believe a lie.

And if it be so strong as to assure us of the presence of some externall Object which yet is not there, why may it not be as effectual in the begetting of the belief of some more internall apprehensions, such as have been reported of mad and fanaticall men, who have so firmly and immutably fancied themselves to be *God the Father*, the *Messias*, the *Holy Ghost*, the *Angel Gabriel*, the *last and chiefest Prophet* that God would send into the world, and the like?

For their conceptions are not so pure or immateriall, nor solid or rational, but that these words to them are alwaies accompanied with some strong Phantasme or full Imagination; the fulnesse and clearnesse whereof, as in the case immediately before named, does naturally bear down the Soul into a belief of the truth and existence of what she thus vigorously apprehends: and being so wholly and entirely immersed in this conceit, and so vehemently touched therewith, she has either not the patience to consider any thing alledged against it, or if she do consider and find her self intangled, she will look upon it as a piece of humane sophistry, and prefer her own infallibility or the infallibility of the Spirit before all carnal reasonings whatsoever; as those whose Phanſies are fortified by long use and education in any absurd point of a false Religion, though wise enough in other things, will firmly hold the Conclusion, notwithstanding the clearest Demonstration to the contrary.

Now what *Custom* and *Education* doth by degrees, distempered  
Phanſy

*Phanſy* may doe in a ſhorter time. But the caſe in both is much like that in *Dreams*, where that which is repreſented is neceſſarily taken for true, becauſe nothing ſtronger enervates the perception. For as the ligation of the outward Organs of Senſe keeps off ſuch fluctuations or undulations of motion from without as might break or obſcure theſe representations in ſleep; ſo prejudice and confidence in a conceit, when a man is awake, keeps his fond imagination vigorous and entire from all the aſſaults of Reaſon that would cauſe any dubitation.

Nor is it any more wonder that his Intellectuals ſhould be found in other things, though he be thus delirious in ſome one point, no more then that he that thinks he ſees the devil in a wood, ſhould not be at all miſtaken in the circumſtance of place, but ſee the very ſame path, flowers and graſſe that another in his wits ſees there as well as himſelf.

To be ſhort therefore, The Originall of ſuch peremptory deluſions as mankind are obnoxious to, is the enormous ſtrength and vigour of the *Imagination*; which Faculty though it be in ſome ſort in our power, as *Reſpiration* is, yet it will alſo work without our leave, as I have already demonſtrated: and hence men become mad and fanaticall whether they will or no.

## SECT. VII.

*Sundry natural and corporeal Cauſes that neceſſarily work on the Imagination.*

NOW what it is in us that thus captivates our *Imagination*, and carries it wide away out of the reach or hearing of that more free and ſuperiour Faculty of *Reaſon*, is hard particularly to define. But that there are ſundry *material* things that do moſt certainly change our Mind or *Phanſy*, experience doth ſufficiently witneſſe.

For our *Imagination* alters as our Blood and Spirits are altered, (as I have above intimated and inſtanced in our *Dreams*) and indeed very ſmall things will alter them even when we are awake; the mere change of Weather and various tempers of the Aire, a little reek or ſuffumigation, as in thoſe ſeeds *Pomponius Mela* mentions, which the *Thracians*, who knew not the uſe of wine, wont at their feaſts to caſt into the fire, whereby they were intoxicated into as high a meaſure of mirth as they that drink more freely of the blood of the grape: The virtue of which is ſo great, that, as *Joſephus* phrases it, it ſeems to create a new ſoul in him that drinks it, *Μεταποιεῖ δὲ καὶ πάλανον αὐτὰς ψυχὰς ἐν αὐταῖς ἡρώμενον*, *It transforms and regenerates the Soul into a new nature.*

*De ſtu Orbis*  
lib. 2. cap. 2.

*Antiquitat. Judaic.* lib. 11.  
cap. 4.

But it doth moſt certainly bring a new Scene of *Thoughts* very ordinarily into their Minds that have occaſion to meddle with it. Which made the *Persians* undertake no weighty matter nor ſtrike up a bargain of any great conſequence, but they would conſider of it firſt both welnigh fuddled and ſober. For if they liked it in all the representations that thoſe two contrary Tempers exhibited to their Minds, they thought themſelves



selves well assured that they might proceed safely and successfully therein.

And yet *Wine* doth not always so much change the Thoughts and alter our Temper as heighten it, insomuch that its effect proves sometime contrary onely by reason of the diversity of persons; some being weeping drunk, others laughing, some kind, others raging; as it happens also in those that are stung with the *Tarantula*, *Alii perpetuò rident, alii canunt, alii plorant, &c.* as \* *Sennertus* observes out of *Matthiolus*. But that which they both seem most to admire is, That the Phansie of the *Tarantulati* should be so mightily carried away with Musick; for they do not onely forget their pain, but dance incessantly. Of which *Epiphanius Ferdinandus* tells a very remarkable story of an old man ninety foure yeares of age, that could scarce creep with a staffe, who yet being bit by the *Tarantula*, presently upon the hearing of Musick leaped and skipped like a young kid.

\* *Medicia.*  
*Prætic. lib. 1.*  
*part. 2. cap. 17.*

A-kin to this is that kind of madnesse which they call *S. Vitus* his Dance, which disease *Sennertus* rightly affirms to proceed from a certain malignant humour gendred in the body of near cognation with this poison of the *Tarantula*; which will help us for the explicating of the *Causes* of stranger workings on the *Phansie* then has yet been mentioned; as for example, in the *λυκανθρωπία*, *γαλεανθρωπία*, and *κυνανθρωπία*, which are distempers of the Mind, whereby men imagine themselves to be *Wolves*, *Cats*, or *Doggs*.

## S E C T. VIII.

*The power of Meats to change the Imagination.*

\* In his *Institution. Medic.*  
*lib. 2. part. 3.*  
*sect. 2. cap. 4.*

**T**HERE are several relations in the forenamed \* Authour concerning the power that *Nourishment* has to work upon *Imagination*, and to change a mans disposition into the nature of that creature whose blood or milk doth nourish him.

A Wench at *Breslaw* being struck with an Epilepsie upon the seeing of a Malefactours head cut off by the Executioner, when several other remedies failed, was perswaded by some to drink the blood of a *Cat*; which being done, the wench not long after degenerates into the nature and property of that Animal, cries and jumps like a *Cat*, and hunts mice with like silence and watchfulnesse that they do, pursuing them as close as she could to their very holes. This Narration he transcribes out of *Weinrichius*.

And he has another short glance upon another in the same Writer, of one that being long fed with *Swine's* blood, took a special pleasure in wallowing and tumbling himself in the mire: as also of another Girle who, being nourished up with *Goat's* milk, would skip like a *Goat* and brouze on trees as *Goats* use to doe.

We might adde a fourth, of one who by eating the brains of a *Bear* became of a *Bear-like* disposition; but we will not insist upon smaller considerations.

S E C T.

## SECT. IX.

*Baptista Porta his Potion to work upon the Phanfy.*

**B***aptista Porta* drives on the matter much further, professing that he had acquaintance with one that could, when he pleased, so alter the *Imagination* of a man, as he would make him fancie himself to be this or that *Bird, Beast, or Fish*; and that in this madnesse the party thus deluded would move his body, as near as it was capable, so as *such Creatures* use to doe; and if they were vocall, imitate also their voice.

*Magia natural.  
lib.7. cap.2.*

This intoxicating *Potion* is made of the extract of certain herbs, as *Solanum manicum*, Mandrake, and others, together with the heart, brain, and some other parts of this or that Animal with whose image they would infect the Phanfy of the party. And he doth affirm of his own experience, that trying this feat upon some of his comerades when he was young, one that had gormundized much *beef*, upon the taking the potion, strongly imagined himself to be surrounded with *Bulls*, that would be ever and anon running upon him with their horns.

## SECT. X.

*The power of Diseases upon the Phanfy.*

**W**HAT happens here in these cases where we can trace the *Causes*, sometimes falls out where we cannot so plainly and directly find out the reason. For Physicians take notice of such kind of *Madnesses* as make men confidently conceit themselves to be *Dogs, Wolves, and Cats*, when they have neither eat the flesh nor drunk the blood of any *Cat, Dog, or Wolf*, nor taken any such artificial potion as we even now spake of to bring them into these diseases.

The causes of this cannot be better guessed at then has been by *Senner-tus* in that of *S. Vitus* his dance. For as there the Body is conceived to be infested by some malignant humour near a-kin to the poison of the *Tarantula*; so in these distempers we may well conclude that such fumes or vapours arise into the Brain from some foulness in the Body (though the particular causes we do not understand) as have a very near analogie to the noxious humours or exhalations that move up and down and mount up into the Imagination of those that have drunk the blood of *Cats*, or have been nourished with the milk of those Animals above named, or taken such intoxicating potions as *Baptista Porta* has described.



## SECT. XI.

*Of the power of Melancholy, and how it often sets on some one absurd conceit upon the Mind, the party in other things being sober.*

WE have given severall Instances of that mighty power there is in *naturall Causes* to work upon and unavoidably to change our *Imagination*. We will name something now more generall, whose nature notwithstanding is so various and *Vertumnus*-like, that it will supply the place of almost all particulars, and that is *Melancholy*; of which *Aristotle* gives witnesse, that according to the severall degrees and tempers thereof men vary wonderfully in their constitutions; it making some slow and sottish, others wild, ingenious and amorous, prone to wrath and lust, others it makes more eloquent and full of discourse, others it raises up even to madnesse and *Enthusiasme*: and he gives an example of one *Maracus* a Poet of *Syracuse*, who never versified so well as when he was in his distracted fits.

Aristot. Problem. sect. 30.

Sennert. Medicin. Practic. l. 1. part. 2. cap. 8.

But it is most observable in *Melancholy* when it reaches to a disease, that it sets on some one particular absurd imagination upon the Mind so fast, that all the evidence of Reason to the contrary cannot remove it, the parties thus affected in other things being as sober and rationally as other men. And this is so notorious and frequent, that *Aretæus*, *Sennertus* and other Physicians define *Melancholy* from this very Effect of it.

## SECT. XII.

*Several Examples of the foregoing Observation.*

A *Aristotle* affords us no Examples of this kind; others do. *Democritus junior*, as he is pleased to style himself, recites severall Stories out of Authours to this purpose. As out of *Laurentius* one concerning a French Poet, who using in a feaver *Unguentum populeum* to anoint his temples to conciliate sleep, took such a conceit against the smell of that ointment, that for many yeares after he imagined every one that came near him to sent of it; and therefore would let no man talk with him but aloof off, nor would he wear any new clothes, because he fancied they smelt of that ointment: but in all other things he was wise and discreet, and would talk as sensibly as other men.

Another he has of a Gentleman of *Limosin* (out of *Anthony Verduer*) who was perswaded he had but one leg, affrighted into that conceit by having that part struck by a wild Boar, otherwise a man well in his wits.

A third he hath out of *Platerus*, concerning a Countreyman of his, who by chance having fallen into a pit where Frogs and Frogs-spawn was, and having swallowed down a little of the water, was afterward so fully perswaded that there were young Frogs in his belly, that for many yeares following he could not rectifie his conceit. He betook himself to the study  
of

of Physick for seven yeares together to find a cure for his disease: He travelled also in *Italy*, *France* and *Germany*, to confer with Physicians about it, and meeting with *Platerus* consulted him with the rest. He fancied the crying of his guts to be the croaking of the Frogs; and when *Platerus* would have deceived him by putting live Frogs into his excrements that he might think he had voided them and was cured, his skill in Physick made that trick ineffectuall. For saving this one vain conceit, the man was, as he reports, a learned and prudent man.

We will adde onely a fourth out of *Laurentius*, which is of a Nobleman of his time, a man of reason and discretion in all other things, saving that he did conceit himself made of glasse; and though he loved to be visited by his friends, yet had a speciall care that they should not come too near him, for fear they should break him.

Not much unlike to this is that of a Baker of *Ferrara*, that thought he was compos'd of butter, and therefore would not sit in the Sun nor come near a fire, for fear he should be melted.

It would be an infinite task to set down all at large. *Sennertus* has given some hints of the variety of this distemper; remitting us to *Schenckius*, *Marcell. Donatus*, *Forestus* and others for more full Narrations. Some, saith he, are vexed and tormented with the fear of death, as thinking they have committed some crime they never did commit; some fancy they are eternally damned, nay they complain that they are already tormented with hell-fire; others take themselves to be a dying, others imagine themselves quite dead, and therefore will not eat; others fear that the heavens will fall upon them, others dare not clinch their hands for fear of bruising the world betwixt their fists; some fancy themselves Cocks, some Nightingales, some one Animal, some another; some entertain conference with God or his Angels, others conceit themselves bewitched, or that a black man or Devil perpetually accompanies them; some complain of their poverty, others fancie themselves persons of honour, Dukes, Princes, Kings, Popes, and what not? Much to this purpose may you see in *Sennertus*, and more in *Democritus junior*.

*Medicin. Practic. l. 1. part. 2. cap. 8.*

## S E C T. XIII.

*A seasonable application of the foregoing Examples for the weakning of the authority of bold Enthusiasts.*

**T**HAT which is most observable & most usefull for the present matter in hand is, That notwithstanding there is such an enormous lapse of the Phanasy and Judgement in some *one* thing, yet the party should be of a sound mind in *all other*, according to his naturall capacities and abilities; which all Physicians acknowledge to be true, and are ready to make good by innumerable Examples. Which I conceive to be of great moment more thoroughly to consider.

I do not mean *how* it may come to passe (for that we have already declared) but *what* excellent *use* it may be of for to prevent that easie



and ordinary Sophisme which imposes upon many, who, if an *Enthusiast* speak eloquently, and it may be *rationaly* and *piously* (you may be sure *zealously* and *fervently* enough, and with the greatest confidence can be imagined) are so credulous that, because of this visible dresse of such laudable accomplishments, they will believe him even in that which is not onely not probable, but vain and foolish, nay sometime very mischievous and impious to believe; as, That the party is immediately and extraordinarily *inspired of God*; That he is a *special Messenger* sent by him, the *last and best Prophet*, the *holy Ghost* come in the flesh, and such like stuff as this: which has been ever and anon set on foot in all ages by some *Enthusiast* or other.

Amongst whom I do not deny but there may be some who for the main practical light of Christianity might have their judgments as consistent, as those *Melancholists* above named had in the ordinary prudentiall affairs of the world: But as for this one particular of being *supernaturally inspired*, of being the *last Prophet*, the *last Trumpet*, the *Angel in the midst of Heaven with the Eternall Gospel in his hand*, the *holy Ghost incorporated*, *God come to judgement*, and the like, this certainly in them is as true, but farre worse, dotage, then to fancy a mans self either a *Cock* or *Bull*, when it is plain to the senses of all that he is a *Man*.

---

#### SECT. XIV.

*That the causality of Melancholy in this distemper of Enthusiasm is more easily traced then in other Extravagancies.*

**B**UT it being of so weighty a concernment, I shall not satisfie my self in this more generall account of *Enthusiasm*, that it may very well be resolved into that property of *Melancholy* whereby men become to be *delirious* in some one point, their judgement standing untouched in others. For I shall easily further demonstrate that the very nature of *Melancholy* is such, that it may more fairly and plausibly tempt a man into such conceits of *Inspiration* and supernaturall light from God, then it can possibly do into those more extravagant conceits of being *Glasse*, *Butter*, a *Bird*, a *Beast*, or any such thing.

---

#### SECT. XV.

*Melancholy a pertinacious and religious complexion.*

**F**OR besides that which is most generall of all, that *Melancholy* enclines a man very strongly and peremptorily to either believe or misbelieve a thing (as is plain in that passion of *Suspicion* and *Jealousie*, which upon little or no occasion will winne so full assent of the Mind, that it will engage a man to act as vigorously as if he were certain that his jealousies were true) it is very well known that this Complexion is the most *Religious*

*gious* complexion that is, and will be as naturally tampering with Divine matters (though in no better light then that of her own) as Apes and Monkeys will be imitating the actions and manners of Men.

Neither is there any true spiritual *Grace* from God but this mere natural constitution, according to the several tempers and workings of it, will not onely *resemble*, but sometimes seem to *outstrip*, by reason of the fury and excess of it, and that not onely in *Actions*, but very ordinarily in *Eloquence* and *Expressions*; as if here alone were to be had that lively sense and understanding of all holy things, or at least as if there were no other state to be parallel'd to it.

The event of which must be, if a very great measure of the true *Grace* of God does not intervene, that such a *Melancholist* as this must be very highly puffed up, and not onely fancy himself *inspired*, but believe himself such a special piece of *Light* and *Holiness* that God has sent into the world, that he will take upon him to *reform*, or rather *annull*, the very *Law* and *Religion* he is born under, and make himself not at all inferiour to either *Moses* or *Christ*, though he have neither any sound *Reason* nor visible *Miracle* to extort belief.

## S E C T. XVI.

*That men are prone to suspect some special presence of God or of a Supernatural power in whatever is Great or Vehement.*

**B**UT this is still too general, we shall yet more particularly point out the *Causes* of this Imposture. Things that are *great* or *vehement*, People are subject to suspect they rise from some *Supernatural* cause; insomuch that the Wind cannot be more then ordinarily high, but they are prone to imagine the Devil raised it, nor any sore Plague or Disease, but God in an extraordinary manner to be the Authour of it.

So rude Antiquity conceiv'd a kind of Divinity in almost any thing that was extraordinarily *great*. Whence some have worshipped very tall Trees, others large Rivers, some a great Stone or Rock, other some high and vast Mountains; whence the Greeks confound *great* and *holy* in that one word *ιερός*, that signifies both; and the Hebrews by the *Cedars of God*, the *mountains of God*, the *Spirit of God*, and the like, understand *high Cedars*, *great Mountains*, and a *mighty Spirit* or *Wind*. We may adde also what is more familiar, how old Women and Nurses use to tell little Children when they ask concerning the *Moon*, pointing at it with their fingers, that it is *God's Candle*, because it is so great a Light in the night. All which are arguments or intimations, that mans nature is very prone to suspect some special presence of God in any thing that is *great* or *vehement*.

Whence it is a strong temptation with a *Melancholist* when he feels a storm of devotion or zeal come upon him like a mighty wind, his heart being full of affection, his head pregnant with clear and sensible representations, and his mouth flowing and streaming with fit and



powerfull expressions, such as would astonish an ordinary Auditorie to hear, it is, I say, a shrewd temptation to him to think that it is the very *Spirit of God* that then moves supernaturally in him; whenas all that excesse of zeal and affection and fluency of words is most palpably to be resolved into the power of *Melancholy*, which is a kind of *naturall inebriation*.

And that there is nothing better then *Nature* in it, it is evident both from the experience of good and discreet men, who have found themselves strangely vary in their zeal, devotion and elocution, as *Melancholy* has been more or lesse predominant in them: and also from what all may observe in those that have been wicked, mad and blasphemous, and yet have surpassed in this mistaken gift of *Prayer*; as is notorious in *Hacket*, who was so besotted with a conceit of his own zeal and eloquence, that he fancied himself the *Holy Ghost*.

## SECT. XVII.

*The mistake of heated Melancholy for holy Zeal and the Spirit of God.*

AND when men talk so much of the *Spirit*, if they take notice what they ordinarily mean by it, it is nothing else but a strong and impetuous motion whereby they are zealously and fervently carried in matters of Religion: so that *Fervour*, *Zeal* and *Spirit*, is in effect all one. Now no Complexion is so hot as *Melancholy* when it is heated, being like boiling water, as *Aristotle* observes (Ἐὰν ἰκανῶς θερμανθῇ, ὥς τὸ ζέον, &c.) so that it transcends the flame of fire; or it is like heated stone or iron when they are red hot, for they are then more hot by far then a burning Coal. We shall omit here to play the Grammarian, and to take notice how well *Aristotle's* τὸ ζέον suites with the very word *zeale* of which we speak; but shall cast our eyes more carefully upon the things themselves, and parallel out of the same Philosopher what they call *Spirit*, to what he affirms to be contained in *Melancholy*. "Ὁ τε χυμὸς καὶ ἡ κεῖται τῆς μελαίνης χολῆς πνέουσα ἐστίν."

*Aristot. Problem. sect. 30.*

The *Spirit* then that wings the *Enthusiast* in such a wonderful manner, is nothing else but that *Flatulency* which is in the *Melancholy* complexion, and rises out of the *Hypochondriacal* humour upon some occasional heat, as *Winde* out of an *Æolipila* applied to the fire. Which fume mounting into the Head, being first actuated and spirited and somewhat refined by the warmth of the Heart, fills the Mind with variety of *Imaginations*, and so quickens and enlarges *Invention*, that it makes the *Enthusiast* to admiration *fluent* and *eloquent*, he being as it were drunk with new wine drawn from that Cellar of his own that lies in the lowest region of his Body, though he be not aware of it, but takes it to be pure *Nectar*, and those waters of life that spring from above. *Aristotle* makes a long Parallelism betwixt the nature and effects of *Wine* and *Melancholy*, to which both *Fernelius* and *Sennertus* do referre.

SECT.

## S E C T. XVIII.

*The Ebbs and Flowes of Melancholy a further Cause of Enthusiasm.*

**B**UT this is not all the advantage that *Melancholy* affords towards *Enthusiasme*, thus unexpectedly and suddenly to surprize the Mind with such vehement fits of *Zeal*, such streams and torrents of *Eloquence* in either exhorting others to piety, or in devotions towards God; but it addes a greater weight of belief that there is something Supernatural in the business, in that the same Complexion discovers it self to them that lie under it in such *contrary Effects*.

For as it is thus vehemently *hot*, so it is as stupidly *cold*; whence the Melancholist becomes faithlesse, hopelesse, heartlesse, and almost witlesse. Which *Ebbs* of his Constitution must needs make the *overflowing* of it seem more miraculous and supernatural. But those *cold* and abject fits of his make him also very sensibly and winningly *Rhetorical*, when he speaks of *disconsolation*, *desertion*, *humility*, *mortification*, and the like, as if he were truly and voluntarily carried through such things; whenas onely the fatal necessity of his Complexion has violently drag'd him through the mere shadows and resemblances of them.

But he finding himself afterwards beyond all hope or any sense or preface of any power in himself lifted aloft again, he does not doubt that any thing less was the cause of this unexpected joy and triumph then the immediate arme of God from heaven that has thus exalted him; when it is nothing indeed but a *Paroxysme of Melancholy*, which is like the breaking out of a flame after a long smoaking and reeking of new rubbish laid upon the fire. But because such returns as these come not at set times, nor make men sick, but rather delight them, they think there is something *divine* therein, and that it is not from *Natural* causes.

## S E C T. XIX.

*The notorious mockery of Melancholy in reference to Divine love.*

**T**HERE is also another notorious Mockery in this Complexion, *Nature* confidently avouching her self to be *God*, whom the Apostle calls *Love*, as if it were his very Essence; whenas indeed it is here nothing else but *Melancholy* that has put on the garments of an Angel of light.

There is nothing more true then that *Love* is the *fulfilling of the Law*, and the *highest Perfection* that is competible to the Soul of man; and that this also is so plain and unavoidable, that a man may be in a very high degree mad, and yet not fail to assent unto it. Nay, I dare say, *Melancholy* itself would be his monitour to re-mind him of it, if there were any possibility that he should forget so manifest and palpable a Truth.

For the sense of *Love* at large is eminently comprehended in the temper of the *Melancholist*, *Melancholy* and *Wine* being of so near a nature



Aristot. Problem. sect. 30.

one to the other. Ποιεῖ ὃ φιλητικὸς ὁ οἶνος, But Wine makes men amorous; which the Philosopher proves, in that a man in wine will kisse such persons as a sober man would scarce touch with a pair of tongs, by reason of their age and ugliness. And assuredly it was the fumes of *Melancholy* that infatuated the fancy of a late new-fangled *Religionist*, when he sat so kindly by a *Gipsie* under an hedge, and put his hand into her bosome in a fit of devotion, and vaunted afterwards of it as if it had been a very pious and meritorious action.

## S E C T. XX.

*That Melancholy partakes much of the Nature of Wine, and from what complexion Poets and Enthusiasts arise, and what the difference is betwixt them.*

Problem. sect. 30.

BUT now that *Melancholy* partakes much of the nature of *Wine*, he evinces from that it is so *spiritous*; and that it is so *spiritous*, from that it is so *spumeous*: and that *Melancholy* is *flatuous* or *spiritous*, he appeals to the Physicians, οἱ τὰ πνέματῶν παῖν καὶ ὑποχόνδρια μελαγχολικὰ φασιν εἶναι.

Wherefore the Philosopher assigns another companion to *Venus* besides the plump youth *Bacchus* which the Poets bestow upon her, who, though more seemingly sad, yet will prove as faithfull an attendant as that other, and this is *Melancholy*. Καὶ οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ οἱ πλείους λάγνοι ἐσιν, ὅ, τε καὶ ἀφροδισιασμὸς πνέματῶν.

Now besides this *Flatulencie* that solicits to lust, there may be such a due dash of *Sanguine* in the *Melancholy*, that the Complexion may prove stupendiously enravishing. For that more sluggish *Dulcor* of the blood will be sometime so quickned and actuated by the fierceness and sharpness of the *Melancholy* humour (as the fulsomness of Sugar is by the acrimony of Limons) that it will afford farre more sensible pleasure; and all the imaginations of *Love*, of what kind soever, will be farre more lively and vigorous, more piercing and rapturous, then they can be in pure *Sanguine* it self.

From this Complexion are *Poets*, and the more highly-pretending *Enthusiasts*: Betwixt whom this is the great difference, That a *Poet* is an *Enthusiast* in jest, and an *Enthusiast* is a *Poet* in good earnest; *Melancholy* prevailing so much with him, that he takes his no better then *Poeticall* fits and figments for divine Inspiration and reall Truth.

## SECT. XXI.

*That a certain Dosis of Sanguine mixt with Melancholy is the Spirit that usually inspires Enthusiasts, made good by a large Induction of Examples.*

BUT that it is a mere naturall *flatuous* and *spiritous* temper with a proportionable *Dosis* of *Sanguine* added to their *Melancholy*, not the pure *Spirit of God*, that thus inacts them, is plainly to be discovered not onely in their language, which is very sweet and melting, as if sugar-plums lay under their tongue, but from notorious circumstances of their lives. And in my apprehension it will be a sufficient pledge of this Truth, if we set before our eyes those that have the most highly pretended to the *Spirit*, and that have had the greatest power to delude the people.

For that that *Pride* and tumour of mind whereby they are so confidently carried out to profess, as well as to conceive, so highly of themselves, that no lesse Title must serve their turns then that of *God*, the *Holy Ghost* or *Paraclet*, the *Messias*, the last and chiefest *Prophet*, the *Judge* of the quick and the dead, and the like; that all this comes from *Melancholy* is manifest by a lower kind of working of that Complexion.

For to begin with the first of these Impostours, *Simon Magus*, who gave out that he was *God the Father*, he prov'd himself to be but a wretched lecherous man by that inseparable companion of his, *Helena*, whom he called *Selene*, and affirmed to be one of the *Divine powers*, when she was no better then a lewd Strumpet.

There was also one *Menander* a *Samaritan*, that vaunted himself to be the *Saviour of the world*, a maintainer of the same licentious and impure opinions with *Simon*.

*Montanus* professed himself to be the *Spirit of God*; but that it was the *Spirit of Melancholy* that besotted him, his two Drabs, *Prista* and *Maximilla*, evidently enough declare, who are said to leave their own husbands to follow him. We might adde a third, one *Quintilla*, a woman of no better fame, and an intimate acquaintance of the other two, from whence the *Montanists* were also called *Quintillians*.

*Manes* also held himself to be the true *Paraclet*, but left a Sect behind him indoctrinated in all licentious and filthy principles.

*Mahomet*, more successfull then any, the last and chiefest *Prophet* that ever came into the world, (if you will believe him) that he was *Melancholick* his *Epileptical* fits are one argument; and his permission of plurality of wives and concubines, his lascivious descriptions of the joyes of Heaven or Paradise, another.

But I must confesse I do much doubt whether he took himself to be a *Prophet* or no; for he seems to me rather a pleasant witty companion and shrewd *Politician*, then a mere *Enthusiast*; and so wise, as not to venture his credit or success upon mere conceits of his own, but he builds upon the weightiest principles of the Religion of Jews and Christians: such as, That *God is the Creatour and Governour of the world*, That there are  
Angells



*Angells and Spirits, That the Soul of man is Immortall, and That there is a Judgement and an everlasting Reward to come after the natural death of the Body.* So that indeed *Mahometism* seems but an abuse of certain Principles of the doctrine of *Moses* and *Christ* to a *Political* design, and therefore in it self far to be preferred before the vain and idle *Enthusiasms* of *David George*; who yet was so highly conceited of his own light, that he hoped to put *Mahomet's* nose out of joynt, giving out of himself that he was the *last and chiefest Prophet*, whenas left to the intoxication of his own *Melancholy* and *Sanguine*, he held neither *Heaven* nor *Hell*, neither *Reward* nor *Punishment* after this life, neither *Devil* nor *Angel*, nor the *Immortality of the Soul*; but though born a *Christian*, yet he did *Mahometize* in this, that he also did *indulge plurality of wives*.

It should seem that so dark and fulsome a dash of Blood there was mixed with his *Melancholy*, that though the one made him a pretended *Prophet*, yet the other would not suffer him to entertain the least preface of any thing beyond this mortal life.

He also that is said to insist in his steps, and talks so magnificently of himself, as if he was come to judge both the quick and the dead, by an injudicious distorting and forcing of such plain substantial passages of Scripture as assure us of the Existence of Angels and Spirits and of a Life to come, bears his condemnation in himself, and proclaims to all the world that he is rather a *Priest of Venus*, or a mere *Sydereal* Preacher out of the sweetness and powerfulness of his own natural Complexion, then a *true Prophet of God*, or a friend of the mystical Bride-groom *Christ Jesus*; to whose very person, as to her Lord and Sovereigne, the Church his Spouse doth owe all reverential love and honour.

But such bloated and high-swoln *Enthusiasts*, that are so big in the conceit of their own inward worth, have little either sense or belief of this duty, but fancy themselves either *equal* or *superiour* to *Christ*; whom notwithstanding God has declared *Supreme Head* over Men and Angels. And yet they would dethrone him, and set up themselves, though they can shew no Title but an unsound kind of popular Eloquence, a Rhapsodie of slight and soft words, rowling and streaming Tautologies, which if they at any time bear any true sense with them, it is but what every ordinary *Christian* knew before; but what they oft insinuate by the bye, is abominably false, as sure as Christianity it self is true.

Yet such fopperies as these seem fine things to the heedless and puffanimous: but surely *Christ* will raise *such a discerning spirit* in his Church, that by Evidence and conviction of Reason, not by Force or external power, such *Mock-prophets* and false *Messiaes* as these will be discountenanced and hissed off of the stage; nor will there be a man that knows himself to be a *Christian* that will receive them.

See my Explanation of The Mystery of Godliness, Book 5. ch. 8. also Book 6. chap. 17.

SECT. XXII.

*More examples to the same purpose.*

WE have, I think, by a sufficient Induction discovered the *Condition* and *Causes* of this mysterious mockery of *Enthusiastical Love* in the highest workings of it, and shewn how it is but in effect a *Natural Complexion*, as very often *Religious Zeal* in general is discovered to be: As is also observable from the tumultuous *Anabaptists* in *Germany*; for amongst other things that they contended for, this was not the least, to wit, a *freedom to have many Wives*. So that it should seem that for the most part this *Religious heat* in men, as it arises merely from Nature, is like *Aurum fulminans*, which though it flie upward somewhat, the greatest force when it is fired is found to goe downward.

This made that religious Sect of the *Beguardi* conceit that it was a sin to kiss a woman, but none at all to lie with her. The same furnish'd *Carpocrates* and *Apelles*, two busie Sectaries in their time, the one with his *Marcellina*, the other with his *Philumena*, to spend their lust upon.

SECT. XXIII.

*of Enthusiastical Foy.*

BUT enough of this. Nearest to this *Enthusiastical* affection of *Love* is that of *Foy* and *Triumph* of Spirit, that *Enthusiasts* are several times actuated withall to their own great admiration. But we have already intimated the near affinity betwixt *Melancholy* and *Wine*; which *cheers the heart of God and Man*, as is said in the Parable. And assuredly *Melancholy*, that lies at first smothering in the Heart and Blood, when *Heat* has overcome it (it consisting of such solid particles, which then are put upon motion and agitation) is more strong and vigorous then any thing else that moves in the Blood and Spirits, and comes very near to the nature of the highest *Cordials* that are. Which *Aristotle* also witnesses, asserting that *Melancholy* while it is cold causes *sadness* and despondency of minde, but once heated, ἐνσώφει καὶ τὰς μετ' αὐτῆς οὐδυνίας, *Ecstasies* and *Raptures* with triumphant joy and singing.

*Problem.  
sect. 30.*

SECT. XXIV.

*of the mystical Allegories of Enthusiasts.*

THERE are *Three delusions* yet behinde, which, because they come into my memory, I will not omit to speak of, viz. *Mystical Interpretations of Scripture*, *Quakings*, and *Visions*; all which are easily relolved into



into *Effects of Melancholy*. For as for the first, we have already shewn that *Melancholy*, as well as *Wine*, makes a man *Rhetorical* or *Poetical*, and that *Genius* how fanciful it is, and full of Allusions and Metaphors and fine resemblances, every one knows. And what greater matter is there in applying *Moral* and *Spiritual* meanings to the *History of the Bible*, then to the *History of Nature*? and there is no *Rhetorician* nor *Poet* but does that perpetually. Or how much easier is it to make a Story to set out a *Moral* meaning, then to apply a *Moral* sense to such Stories as are already a foot? And for the former, *Æsop* was old excellent at it without any suspicion of *Inspiration*; and the latter *Sir Francis Bacon* has admirably well performed in his *Sapientia Veterum*, without any such peculiar or extraordinary illapses of a divine Spirit into him, a business, I dare say, he never dreamt of, and any man that understands him will willingly be his Compurgatour.

## SECT. XXV.

of Quaking, and of the Quakers.

AND for *Quaking*, which deluded souls take to be an infallible sign they are inactuated by the Spirit of God, that it may be onely an Effect of their *Melancholy* is apparent. For none have so high *Passions* as *Melancholists*; and that *Fear*, *Love* or *Veneration* in the height will cause great *Trembling*, cannot be denied; and to these *Passions* none are any thing nigh so obnoxious as those of the *Melancholy Complexion*, because of the deepness of their resentments and apprehensions.

That *Fear* causes *Trembling* there is nothing more obvious: and it is as true of *Love*, which the *Comedian* has judiciously noted in that passage where *Phadria* upon the sight of his *Thais*, speaking to *Parmeno*, *Totus tremo*, saies he, *horreôque postquam aspexi hanc*.

And for *Veneration*, which consists in a manner of these two mixt together, it is a *Passion* that *Melancholy* men are soundly plunged in whether they will or no; when they are to make their addreses to any person of honour or worth, or to goe about some solemn or weighty performance in publick, they will quake and tremble like an *Aspin-leaf*; some have been struck silent, others have fallen down to the ground.

And that *Phansy* in other cases will work upon the *Spirits*, and cause a tumultuous and disorderly commotion in them, or so suffocate the *Heart* that motion will be in a manner quite extinct, & the party fall down dead, are things so familiarly known, that it is enough onely to mention them.

Wherefore it is no wonder, the *Enthusiast* fancying these natural Paroxysms with which he is surpris'd to be extraordinary Visits of the Deity, and Illapses of the holy Ghost into his Soul, which he cannot but then receive with the highest *Veneration* imaginable, it is no wonder, I say, that *Fear* and *Foy* and *Love* should make such a confusion in his *Spirits*, as to put him into a fit of *trembling* and *quaking*. In which case the Fervour of his *Spirits* and Heat of *Imagination* may be wrought up

to that pitch that it may amount to a perfect *Epilepsie*; as it often happens in that Sect they call *Quakers*, who undoubtedly are the most *Melancholy Sect* that ever was yet in the world.

SECT. XXVI.

*That Melancholy disposes to Apoplexies and Epilepsies.*

AND that *Melancholy* it self disposes a man to *Apoplexies* and *Epilepsies*, is acknowledged both by Philosophers and Physicians. For what is *Narcotical* and deadens the motion of the Spirits, if it be highly such, proves also *Apoplectical*. Besides, grosse Vapours stopping the *Arteria Carotides* and *Plexus Choroïdes*, and so hindring the recourse and supply of Spirits, may doe the same. Some would illustrate the matter from the fumes of Char-coale, that has often made men fall down dead. But take any or all of these, *Melancholy* is as like to afford such noxious vapours as any other Temper whatsoever. And that an *Epilepsie* may arise from such like Causes, these two diseases being so near a-kin, as *Galen* writes, is very reasonable; and that the morbidick matter is *μυδροματινή τις βία ὡς περ ἄνρα*, as his Master *Pelops* expresses it, it is evident from the suddain and easy discussion of the fit.

Sennert. Institution. Medic. lib. 2. part. 3. sect. 2. cap 6.

SECT. XXVII.

*Of the nature of Enthusiastick Revelations and Visions.*

BUT in both these there being a ligation of the outward senses, whatever is then represented to the Mind is of the nature of a *Dream*. But these fits being not so ordinary as our naturall sleep, these *Dreams* the precipitant and unskillfull are forward to conceit to be Representations extraordinary and supernatural, which they call *Revelations* or *Visions*; of which there can be no certainty at all, no more then of a *Dream*.

SECT. XXVIII.

*of Ecstasie; the nature and causes thereof.*

THE mention of *Dreams* puts me in mind of another *Melancholy* Symptome, which Physicians call *Ecstasie*, which is nothing else but *Somnus præter naturam profundus*: the Causes whereof are none other then those of natural Sleep, but more intense and excessive; the Effect is the deliration of the party after he awakes, for he takes his *Dreams* for true Histories and real Transactions.

The reason whereof, I conceive, is the extraordinary clearness and



fulness of the representations in his sleep, arising from a more perfect privation of all communion with this outward world; and so there being no interfearings or cross-strokes of motion from his body so deeply overwhelmed and bedeaded with sleep, what the *Imagination* then puts forth of her self is as clear as broad day, and the *perception* of the Soul is at least as strong and vigorous as it is at any time in beholding things awake, and therefore *Memory* as throughly sealed therewith as from the sense of any external Object.

The vigour and clearness of these *Visions* differs from those in ordinary sleep, as much as the liveliness of the images let in artificially into a dark room accurately darkened differs from those in one carelessly made dark, some chinks or crevices letting in light where they should not.

But strength of perception is no sure ground of truth: And such *Visions* as these, let them be never so clear, yet they are still in the nature of *Dreams*. And he that regardeth *Dreams*, is like him that catcheth at a shadow, or followeth after the wind, as *Siracides* speaks.

## SECT. XXIX.

*Whether it be in mans power to cast himself into an Enthusiastick Apoplexie, Epilepsie or Ecstasie.*

**W**Hether it be in any mans power to fall into these *Epilepsies*, *Apoplexies*, or *Ecstasies* when he pleases, is neither an useleſs nor a desperate question: For we may find a probable solution from what has been already intimated.

For the *Enthusiast* in one of his *Melancholy* intoxications (which he may accelerate by solemn silence and intense and earnest meditation) finding himself therein so much beyond himself, may conceit it a sensible presence of God, and a supernatural manifestation of the Divinity, which must needs raise that passion of *Veneration* and most powerful Devotion, which consists of *Love*, *Fear* and *Foy*: Which single Passions have been able to kill men or cast them into a trance. How can they then (if they be well followed by imagination and desire in the *Enthusiast* of a nearer union with this inward Light) fail to cast him into *Tremblings*, *Convulsions*, *Apoplexies*, *Ecstasies*, and what not? *Melancholy* being so easily changeable into these Symptomes? And it is very probable that this may be the condition of some of those they call *Quakers*.

But for S<sup>r</sup>. *Auslin's* African Presbyter (who was named *Resitutus*) who by a lamenting voice or mournful tone would be cast into such an *Ecstasie*, he is found alone in that, and is hardly imitable, it arising from some proper and peculiar constitution of his own.

That *Cardan* and *Facius* his Father could cast themselves when they would into an *Ecstasie*, I can as easily believe as that the *Laplanders* could, and do in my own judgement refer them both to one cause, which *Sennertus* notes that *Cardan* somewhere does intimate concerning his Father, that he had *δαίμωνα πάρεδρον* which I conceive also to be the case of the  
worse

In his Institut.  
 Medicin. lib. 2.  
 part 3. sect 2.  
 cap 4. See also  
 Bodin's Magor.  
 Demon. lib. 2.  
 cap. 5.

worser sort of *Quakers*. But this kind of *Enthusiasm* I do not so much aim at as that which is *Natural*.

As for those *Visions* that *Enthusiasts* see waking, we have already referred their Causes to that strength of *Imagination* in a Melancholy Spirit.

SECT. XXX.

*Of Enthusiastick Prophecy.*

AND for that *Fervour of mind* whereby they are carried out so confidently to foretell things to come, that there is nothing *Supernatural* in it may be evidenced, in that either some probable grounds, that ordinary prudence may discover, might move them to think this or that, (the vehemency of their own *Melancholy* adding that confidence to their presage as if God himself had set it upon their Spirit ; ) or else in that they most frequently presage false, and therefore when they foretell true, it is justly imputed to chance. As a man that dreams a nights, it is a hard case if in so many years dreams he light not on some *εὐδυνεργία*, as they are called, such as are plainly and directly true, *καθότι οἱ πολλοὶ βάλλοντες ἐπιτυχάνουσιν πολλάκις*, as they that shoot oft, may sometimes hit the mark, ( as *Plutarch* speaks ; ) but 'tis more by luck then good skill.

SECT. XXXI.

*Of the Presage of a mans own heart from a Supernatural impulse sensible to himself, but unexplicable to others, where it may take place, and that it is not properly Enthusiasm.*

AND yet notwithstanding I humbly conceive, and I hope may doe so without any suspicion of the least tincture of *Fanaticism*, that there may be such a presage in the spirit of a man that is to act in things of very high concernment to \* himself, and much more if to the publick, as may be a sure guide to him, especially if he continue constantly sincere, just and pious. For it is not at all improbable but such as act in very publick affairs, in which Providence has a more special hand, that these \* Agents driving on her design may have a more special assistance and animation from her : Of which as others have not the sense, so neither can they imagine the manner of it. And this is the case, I think, wherein that of *Siracides* may be verified, *That a mans own heart will tell him more then seven watchmen on an high Tower*. But this is *Enthusiasm* in the better sense, and therefore not so proper for our Discourse, who speak not of that which is true, but of that which is a mistake: the Causes whereof we having so fully laid down, we will now consider the *Kinds* of it, but briefly and onely so far forth as suits with our present purpose and design.

\* See *Des-Cartes* Letter to the Princess *Elizabeth*, ou il est parlé du *Genie de Socrate*.  
\* *Prov.* 16. 10.  
\* 21. 1.

*Eccclus.* 37. 14.



Wherefore setting aside all accuracie, we shall content our selves to distribute it, from the condition of the Persons in which it resides, into *Political* and *Philosophical*. For *Enthusiasm* most-what works according to the *natural Genius* of the party it doth surprise.

## S E C T. XXXII.

*Several Examples of Political Enthusiasm.*

**W**herefore those whose Temper carries them most to *Political* affairs, who love rule and honour, and have a strong sense of Civil rights, *Melancholy* heating them makes them sometimes fancy themselves great Princes (at least by divine assignment) and Deliverers of the people sent from God; such as were in likelihood the false *Messiaes* that deceived the people of the Jews, as *Theudas* and that *Egyptian Impostor*, also *Barchocab*, *Jonathas*, *Dositheus*, and several others, who, it's likely, it being the common fame amongst the Jews that the *Messias* the Deliverer was about that time to come, according to the heat and forwardness of their own *Melancholy*, conceited themselves to be him. Which is the easier to believe, there being several Instances in History of those that have fancied themselves Monarchs, Popes, and Emperours, whenas yet they have been but Foot-boys, Grooms, and Serving-men.

Whether there might not be as much of *Villany* as *Melancholy* in some of these false *Messiaes*, if it be suspected, it will be hard to take off the suspicion. But there was a *German*, in whom we may more safely instance, not many years agoe here in *England*. He styled himself a *Warriour of God*, *David the second*, and in deep compassion of the sufferings of his Countrey would very fain have got some few Forces here to carry over; with which he was confident he could have silenced the enemy, and settled all *Germany* in peace.

The man seemed to be a very religious man, and a great hater of Tyranny and oppression, and very well in his wits to other things; onely he was troubled with this infirmity, that he fancied himself that *David* the Prophets foretell of, who should be that peaceable Prince and great Deliverer of the Jews. He published a short writing of his, which I had the opportunity of seeing, which was full of zeal and Scripture-eloquence: I saw his person in *London*, if he that shewed me him was not mistaken. He was a tall proper man, of a good age, but of a very pale wasted *Melancholy* countenance.

Another also of later years I had the hap to meet withall, whose discourse was not onely rational, but pious, and he seemed to have his wits very well about him; nor could I discover the least intimation to the contrary, onely he had this flaw, that he conceited that he was by God appointed to be that fifth Monarch of which there is so much noise in this age; which imagination had so possessed him, that he would sometime have his servant to serve him all in plate and upon the knee, as a very learned and religious friend of mine told me afterward.

SECT. XXXIII.

David George *his prophecy of his rising again from the Dead, and after what manner it was fulfilled.*

WHEREFORE I do not look upon this man as so sober as the former, nor on either as comparable to that *David* that was born at *Delph*, lived first in lower *Germany* with those of his Sect, after came to *Basil*, Anno 1544. and there dyed 1556. and was digged up again 1559. Wherein his prophecy of himself was in an ill-favoured manner fulfilled, who, to uphold the fluctuating minds of his followers, whom he would have perswaded that he was immortall, told them at his death, that he should rise again within three years, presaging that of himself that he denied would ever come to passe in any one else.

SECT. XXXIV.

*A description of the person, manners, and doctrine of David George.*

THIS *David George*, a man of very low parentage, was yet, in the judgement of his very enemies, one of notable natural parts, a comely person to look upon, and of a gracefull presence. He was also square of body, yellow-bearded, gray-ey'd bright and shining, grave and sedate in speech; in a word, all his motions, gestures and demeanours were so decent and becoming, as if he had been wholly composed to honesty and godlinesse. He lived very splendidly and magnificently in his house, and yet without the least stir or disorder. He was a religious frequenter of the Church, a liberal reliever of the poor, a comfortable visiter of the sick, obedient to the Magistrate, kind and affable to all persons, discreet in all things, very cunning in some, as in his closeness and reservedness in his Doctrine to those of *Basil*, where he liv'd, to whom he communicated not one *Iota* of it, but yet he sedulously dispersed it in the further parts of *Germany* both by Books and Letters; the main Heads whereof you shall hear as follows.

1. That the Doctrine hitherto delivered by *Moses*, the *Prophets*, *Christ* himself, and *his Apostles*, is maimed and imperfect, published onely to keep men in a childish obedience for a time, till the fulness and perfection of *David George* his Doctrine should be communicated to the world, which is the onely Doctrine that can make mankind happy, and replenish them with the knowledge of God.

2. That *David George* is the true *Christ* and *Messias*, the dear Son of God, born not of the flesh, but of the holy Ghost and Spirit of *Christ*, which God had reserved in a secret place, his Body being reduced to nothing, and has infused it wholly into the Soul of *David George*.

3. That this *David* the *Messias* is to restore the house of *Israel*, and re-erect the Tabernacle of God, not by the Crosse, afflictions and death,



as the other *Messias*; but by that sweetnesse and love and grace that is given to him of his Father.

4. That the power of remission of sins is given to this *David George*, and that it is he that is now come to judge the world with the last Judgement.

5. That the holy Scriptures, the Sayings and Testimonies of the Prophets, of Christ and of his Apostles, do all point, if rightly understood in the true mystery of them, to the glorious coming of *David George*, who is greater then Christ himself, as being born of the spirit, and not of the flesh.

6. That all sin and blasphemy against the *Father* or the *Son* may be remitted or pardoned; but the sin against the *holy Ghost*, that is, against *David George*, is never to be remitted.

7. That the resurrection of Christ out of the grave, and the resurrection of the dead, is a mere Myserie or Allegorie.

8. That Angels and Devils are onely Good men and Evil men, or their Vertues and Vices.

9. That Matrimony is free, no obligation, and that no man thereby is confined to one woman; but that procreation of children shall be promiscuous or in common to all those that are born again or regenerated by the spirit of *David George*.

These things are recorded in the Life and Doctrine of *David George*, published by the Rector and University of *Basil* 1559.

## SECT. XXXV.

*The evident Causes of that power of speech in David George.*

AS for his own Writings, not a little admired by some, his moving Eloquence, his powerfull animations to the great duties of Godlinesse, I have already laid down such *natural* Principles as they may be easily resolved into, without any recourse to any *supernatural* Spirit. For a man illiterate, as he was, but of good parts, by constant reading of the Bible will naturally contract a more winning and commanding Rhetorick then those that are learned; the intermixture of Tongues and of artificiall Phrases debasing their style, and making it sound more after the manner of men, though ordinarily there may be more of God in it then in that of the *Enthusiast*.

## SECT. XXXVI.

*An account of those seeming graces in David George.*

IF he may with some zeal and commotion of mind recommend to his Reader *Patience*, *Peaceableness*, *Meekness*, *Brotherly-kindness*, *Equity*, *Discretion*, *Prudence*, *Self denial*, *Mortification*, and the like, there is nothing

nothing in all this but what his own *Sanguine* temper may suggest without any inspiration from God.

For there is no *Christian Virtue* to be named which concerns manners, but *Complexion* will afford a *spurious imitation* of it: and therefore they answering in so near similitude one to another, it will be an easie thing to colour over those mere *Mock-graces* with Scripture Phrases; so that he that has but these *complexionall Vertues* and a *Scripturall style*, amongst the lesse skillfull will look like an *Apostle* or *Prophet*, but amongst the rude Multitude he may boast himself to be what he will, without suspicion or contradiction.

The most unlikely of all these *imitations* is *Self-denial*, which seems abhorrent from a *Sanguine* temper: But *Enthusiasm* is not without a mixture of *Melancholy*, and we are speaking now of *Enthusiastick Sanguine*, in which the fiercer Passions will also lodge; and therefore this *Self-denial* and *Mortification* may be nothing else but the *Sanguine's conflict and victory over the most harsh and fierce Melancholy*.

And that it is *the Reign of Sanguine*, not *the Rule of the Spirit*, is discoverable both from the complexion of the Head of this Sect, as also from the general disposition of his followers, and that tender love they bear to their own dear carcasses, who would not, I dare say, suffer the least aching of their little fingers by way of external *Martyrdome* for any Religion; and therefore their prudence and discretion consists most in jugglings, equivocations, and slight tergiversations, peaceable compliances with any thing rather then to suffer in body or goods: which is the natural dictate of *Sanguine* triumphant.

Which dominion yet seems far better then the Tyranny of *Choler* and *Melancholy*, whose pragmatik ferocity can neither prove good to it self nor just to others; being prone to impose, and as forward to avenge the refusal of every frivolous and impertinent foppery or abhorred falsitie, with inhumane and cruel persecutions.

## SECT. XXXVII.

*That David George was a man of a Sanguine Complexion.*

NOW that *Sanguine* was the Complexion of *David George*, the foregoing description of his person will probably intimate to any *Physiognomer*. For it is very hard to find an healthy body very comely and beautifull, but the same proves more then ordinarily venereous and lustfull. We might instance in several both men and women, *Helena*, *Lais*, *Faustina*, *Alcibiades*, *Ismael Sophi* of *Persia*, and *Demetrius*, who is said to have been of an admirable countenance and majestick graceful presence, mingled with gravity and benignity, also exceeding full of clemency, justice, piety and liberality; but so libidinous and voluptuous, that no King was ever to be compared to him.

See Jo. Baptist.  
Port. de Hu-  
man. Physiogn.  
lib. 2. cap. 13.



## SECT. XXXVIII.

*Further and more sure Proofs that David George was of a Sanguine Temper.*

**B**UT two surer signs are yet behind of this Prophet's natural Constitution, which are, *His denying of a life to come and Existence of Angels or Spirits*, and his *allowing of plurality or community of Wives*.

The former whereof I must confesse I cannot so much impute to any thing as to a more luscious and fulsome mixture of *Sanguine* in his *Enthusiastick* complexion. For nothing will so flake a mans desires, or dead his belief of that more *Spiritual* and *Immaterial* state and condition, as this sweet glut of Blood that so thickens and clouds the Spirits, that the Mind cannot imagine or presage any thing beyond the present concernment of this mortal Body.

And of the *latter* I think it is acknowledged by all, that no such genuine cause can be assigned as this same complexion of *Sanguine* that disposes men so strongly to the love of women.

## SECT. XXXIX.

*That it was a dark fulsome Sanguine that hid the truth of the great Promises of the Gospel from his eyes.*

**W**HEREFORE this *Enthusiast* being overborn by the power of his own constitution into the misbelief of those great *Promises of Eternal life* set forth in the Scripture, took the Holy Writers thereof either to be mistaken, or onely to have intended *Allegories* by what they writ. And that *Fervour* that he found in himself to *Love*, and *Peace*, and *Equity*, and the like, boiling so high as to the driving of him into a persuasion that he was *inspired*, he conceited his misbelief of those precious *Promises of Immortality* and *Glory* in the heavens a special piece of *Illumination* also; and the *Resurrection of the dead* to be nothing else but to be raised into a like ardency towards such things with himself, and to a like misbelief with him of that *celestial Crown* the Apostle speaks of. And therefore he not being able to raise his mind by faith to heaven, he brought heaven to earth in his vain imagination: Which was less pains then *Mahomet* took, who was fain to walk to the mountain, when he saw the mountain would not move to him.

## SECT. XL.

*The exact likeness betwixt David George and the Father of the modern Nicolaitans, with the Authour's censure of them both.*

**T**HIS is a brief account of *David George*, whose error the Father of our modern *Nicolaitans* did drink in so carefully, as if he were loath one drop should spill beside. Never was that in *Solomon* so plainly verified in any as in these two, *As face answers to face, so the heart of man to man.*

Wherefore concerning them both I dare pronounce, That though they equalized themselves to Christ, and made themselves Judges of the quick and the dead, yet they were more devoid of true judgment in matters of Religion then the meanest of sincere Christians: And though they have so deified or (as they phrase it) *begodded* themselves all over, I might say, bedaubed themselves with the feigned and counterfeit colours or paint of high swelling words of vanity to amaze the vulgar; yet they were in truth mere men, of shallow mindes and liquorsome bodies, cleaving to the pleasures of the flesh, and so deeply relishing the sweet of *this present Life*, that all hope or desire of *that better* was quite extinct in them; and therefore their settled and radicate ignorance made them so *Enthusiastically* confident in their own error.

## SECT. XLI.

*A seasonable Advertisement in the behalf of them that are unawares taken with such Writers; as also a further confirmation that Enthusiastick madness may consist with sobriety in other matters.*

**B**UT that my zeal to the Truth may not turn to the injury of any, I cannot pass by this Advertisement; That this poison we speak of is so subtilly conveyed and silently supposed in the reading these writings, that a good man and a true Christian may be easily carried away into an approbation of them without any infection by them (as not minding what they imply or drive at) or yet any defection from the main Principles of Christianity: and indeed by how much the heat seems greater toward the highest perfection of Holiness, the Reader is made the more secure of the Writer's soundness in the main Essentials of Religion, though it be far otherwise at the bottome.

For *Madness* and *Melancholy* drive high, and we have prov'd by divers Instances that a man may be most ridiculously and absurdly wild in some one thing, and yet sound and discreet in the rest; as *Gazens* handsomely sets it out in a story of an old man that conceited himself God the Father. And *Acosta* verifies it in a true history of his own knowledge concerning a certain learned and venerable Professor of Divinity in the Kingdome of *Peru*, whom he doth affirm to have been as perfectly in his senses, as to soundness



soundness of brain, as himself was at that time when he wrote the Narration; which being something long, I shall transcribe only what precisely makes to my purpose.

This *Peruvian* Doctor would sadly and soberly affirm that he should be a King, yea and a Pope too, the Apostolical See being translated to those parts; as also that holiness was granted unto him above all Angels and heavenly hosts, and above all Apostles; yea, that God made profer unto him of Hypostatical union, but that he refused to accept of it. Moreover that he was appointed to be Redeemer of the world as to matter of Efficacy, which Christ, he said, had been no further then to Sufficiency onely. That all Ecclesiastical estate was to be abrogated, and that he would make new Laws, plain and easy, by which the restraint of Clergy-men from Marriage should be taken away, and multitude of Wives allowed, and all necessity of Confession avoided. Which things he did maintain before the Judges of the Inquisition with that earnestness and confidence, with so many and so large citations out of the Prophets, Apocalyps, Psalmes, and other books, with such unexpected Applications and Allegorical interpretations of them, that the Auditory knew not whether they should laugh more at his fancy, or admire his memory. But himself was so well assured of the matter, that nothing but death could quit him of the *delirium*. For he dyed a Martyr to this piece of madness of his, to the eternal infamy of his Judges, who were either so unwise, as not to know that *Melancholy* may make a man delirous as to some one particular thing, though his Intellectuals be sound in others; or else so cruel and barbarous, as to murder a poor distracted man. The story you may read more at large in a late \* Treatise concerning Enthusiasme.

\* Dr. Meric  
Causaubon's  
Treatise con-  
cerning En-  
thusiasm, chap. 3.

What I have transplanted hither, is further to evidence the truth of what Physicians say of *Melancholy*, that it may onely befool the Understanding in some one point, and leave it sound in the rest; as also to confirm what I did above observe, that *Enthusiasts* for the most part are intoxicated with vapours from the lowest region of their Body, as the *Pythia* of old are conceived to have been inspired through the power of certain exhalations breathed from those caverns they had their recess in. For what means this bold purpose of contriving a new law for *plurality of Wives* amongst Christians, but that his judgment was overclouded by some venereous fumes and vapours?

## S E C T. XLII.

### of Philosophical Enthusiasm.

**T**HAT other kinde of Enthusiasm I propounded was *Philosophical*, because found in such as are of a more *Speculative* and *Philosophical* complexion. And *Melancholy* here making them prone to Religion and devotion, as well as to the curious Contemplation of things, these natural motions and affections towards God may drive them to a belief that

that he has a more then ordinary affection towards them, and that they have so special an assistance and guidance from him, nay such a mysterious, but intimate and real, union with him, that every fine thought or fancy that steals into their mind ought to be look't upon by them as a pledge of the Divine favour, and a singular illumination from God himself.

Wherein they seem to me to imitate the madness of *Elionora Meliorina*, a Gentlewoman of *Mantua*, who being fully perswaded she was married to a King, would kneel down and talk with him, as if he had been there present with his retinue; and if she had by chance found a piece of glass in a muck-hill, light upon an oyster-shell, piece of tin or any such like thing that would glister in the Sun-shine, she would say it was a jewel sent from her Lord and husband, and upon this account fill'd her cabinet full of such trash.

In like manner these inspired *Melancholists* stuff their heads and writings with every flaring fancy that *Melancholy* suggests to them, as if it were a precious Truth bestowed upon them by the holy Spirit; and with a devotional reverence they entertain the unexpected Paroxysms of their own natural distemper, as if it were the power and presence of God himself in their Souls.

## SECT. XLIII.

*Sundry Chymists and Theosophists obnoxious to this disease.*

THIS disease many of your *Chymists* and several *Theosophists*, in my judgement, seem very obnoxious to, who dictate their own Conceits and Fancies so magisterially and imperiously, as if they were indeed Authentick messengers from God Almighty. But that they are but Counterfeits, that is, *Enthusiasts*, no infallible illuminated men, the gross fopperies they let drop in their writings will sufficiently demonstrate to all that are not smitten in some measure with the like Lunacy with themselves. I shall instance in some few things, concealing the names of the Authors, because they are so sacred to some.

## SECT. XLIV.

*A promiscuous Collection of divers odde conceits out of several Theosophists and Chymists.*

Listen therefore attentively, for I shall relate very great mysteries. The virtues of the Planets do not ascend, but descend. Experience teaches as much, viz. That of *Venus* or *Copper* is not made *Mars* or *Iron*, but of *Mars* is made *Venus*, as being an inferior sphere. So also *Jupiter* or *Tinne* is easily changed into *Mercury* or *Quick-silver*, because *Jupiter* is the second from the firmament, and *Mercury* the second from the Earth.

*Saturn*



*Saturn* is the first from the Heaven, & *Luna* the first from the Earth. *Sol* mixeth it self with all, but is never bettered by his Inferiours. Now know that there is a great agreement betwixt *Saturn* or *Lead*, and *Luna* or *Silver*, *Jupiter* and *Mercury*, *Mars* and *Venus*, because in the midst of these *Sol* is placed.

What can it be but the heaving of the *Hypochondria* that lifts up the Mind to such high comparisons from a supposition so false and foolish? But I have observed generally of *Chymists* and *Theosophists*, as of several other men more palpably mad, that their thoughts are carried much to *Astrology*, it being a fancifull study built upon very slight grounds, and indeed I do not question, but a relique of the ancient Superstition and Idolatry amongst the rude Heathens, which either their own *Melancholy*, or something worse, instructed them in.

There are other pretty conceits in these Writers concerning those heavenly Bodies: as, That the *Starres* and *Planets*, the *Moon* not excepted, are of the same quality with *precious stones* that glister here on the earth; and that though they act nothing, yet they are of that nature as that the wandring Spirits of the aire see in them, as in a looking-glass, things to come, and thereby are inabled to prophesy.

That the *Stars* are made of the *Sun*, and yet that the *Sun* enlightens them.

That our *Eyes* have their originall from the *Stars*, and that that is the reason why we can see the *Stars*.

That our *Eyes* work or act upon all they see, as well as what they see acts on them. That also is a very speciall mystery for an inspired man to utter; That there is onely Evening and Morning under the *Sun*.

That the *Stars* kindle heat in this world every where for generation, and that the difference of *Stars* makes the difference of Creatures.

That were the heat of the *Sun* taken away; he were onelight with God.

That all is Gods self.

That a mans self is God, if he live holily.

That God is nothing but an hearty Loving, friendly Seeing, good Smelling, well Tasting, kindly Feeling, amorous Kissing, &c. Nor the Spirit, say I, that inspires this mystery any thing but *Melancholy* and *Sanguine*.

That God the Father is of himself a dale of darknesse, were it not for the light of his Sonne.

That God could not quell *Lucifer's* rebellion, because the battel was not betwixt God and a Beast, or God and a man, but betwixt God and God, *Lucifer* being so great a share of his own Essence.

That Nature is the Body of God, nay God the Father, who is also the World, and whatsoever is any way sensible or perceptible.

That the *Star-powers* are Nature, and the *Star-circle* the mother of all things; from which all is, subsists, and moves.

That the Waters of this world are mad, which makes them rave and run up and down so as they do in the channels of the Earth.

That the blew Orb is the waters above the Firmament.

That

That there be two kinds of Fires, the one cold and the other hot, and that Death is a cold fire.

That *Adam* was an Hermaphrodite.

The the Fire would not burn, nor there have been any darknesse, but for *Adam's* fall.

That it is a very suspicable matter that *Saturn* before the fall was where *Mercury*, and *Mercury* where *Saturn* is.

That there are Three Souls in a man, *Animal*, *Angelical*, and *Divine*; and that after Death the *Animal* Soul is in the grave, the *Angelical* in *Abraham's* bosome, and the *Divine* Soul in Paradise.

That God has eyes, ears, nose, and other corporeal parts.

That every thing has *Sense*, *Imagination*, and a *fiducial Knowledge* of God in it, *Metalls*, *Meteors* and *Plants* not excepted.

That this Earth at last shall be calcined into Crystill.

That at the Center of the Earth is the Fire of hell, which is caused and kindled by the *Primum mobile* and influences of the Stars.

That the *Arctick* pole draws waters by the Axle-tree, which after they are entered in, break forth again by the Axle-tree of the *Antarctick*.

That the Moon, as well as the Stars, is made of a lesse pure kind of Fire mixed with Aire.

That the pure *Blood* in man answers to the Element of Fire in the great world, his Heart to the Earth, his Mouth to the *Arctick* pole, and the opposite Orifice to the *Antarctick* pole.

That the proper seat of the Mind or Understanding is in the mouth of the Stomack or about the Splene.

That Earthquakes and Thunders are not from natural causes, but made by Angels or Devils.

That there were no Rain-bows before *Noah's* flood.

That the Moon is of a congeliated substance, having a cold light of her own, whereby the light of the Sun which she receives and casts on us becomes so cool.

SECT. XLV.

*A particular Collection out of Paracelsus.*

**H**itherto our Collections have been promiscuous, what follows is out of *Paracelsus* onely; as for example:

That the variety of the Altitudes of the Sun does not cause Summer and Winter, because the Sun has the same heat, be he higher or lower; but that there be *Æstivall* and *Hybernall* Stars that are the grand causes of these seasons.

*Paracels. de Meteoris, c. 3.*

That the absence of the Sun is not the cause of Night, forasmuch as his light is so great that it may illuminate the Earth all over at once as clear as broad day; but that Night is brought on by the influence of *dark Stars* that ray out darkness and obscurity upon the Earth, as the Sun does light.



Paracels. de  
Meteor. cap. 4.

That the *Gnomi*, *Nymphæ*, *Lemures* and *Penates*, Spirits endued with Understanding as much or more then Men, are yet wholly mortall, not having so much as an immortal Soul in them.

De Meteoris  
cap. 5.

That the Stars are as it were the Phials, or Cucurbits, in which the Meteorical *Sal*, *Sulphur* and *Mercury* are contained; and that the Winds which are made of these, by the *Æthereal Vulcanes*, are blown forth out of these Emunctories, as when a man blows or breaths out of his mouth.

De Meteor. c. 6.

That the Stars are as it were the Pots in which the *Archeus* or heavenly *Vulcan* prepares pluvius matter, which exhaled from thence first appears in the form of clouds, after condenses to rain.

De Meteor. c. 7.

That Hail and Snow are also the fruits of the Stars, proceeding from them as flowers and blossomes from herbs or trees.

De Meteor. c. 8.

That Thunder is caused by the *Penates*, who taking *Æthereal Sulphur*, *Sal-nitre* and *Mercury*, and putting them into their *Aludel*, that is their Star, after a sufficient preparation there, the Star then poures them forth into the Aire; and so they become the matter of Thunder, whose sound is so great and terrible, because it is re-echoed from the arched roof of Heaven; as when a Gun is let off under an hollow vault.

De Meteor. c. 9.

That the Lightnings without Thunder are as it were the deciduous flowers of the *Æstivall* Stars.

De Meteor.  
cap. 10.

That the Stars eat and are nourished, and therefore must ease themselves; and that those falling Stars, as some call them, which are found on the earth in the form of a trembling gelly, are their excrement.

That those Meteors called *Dracones volantes* have a brutish understanding and sense in them.

That the *Parelii* and *Paraselenæ* are made by the *Penates* as by Artificers, that counterfeit the form and shape of a silver Pot in adulterate metall.

See Paracelsus  
his Scientia  
Astronomica.

That all Humane and natural understanding is in the Stars, and conveyed from thence to man, and that he must suck it from thence to feed his Soul, as he takes in meat to nourish his Body.

That the reason of *Divination* is this, That a man has a fydereall body besides this terrestriall which is joyned with the Stars; and so when this fydereall body is more free from the Elements, as in sleep, this body and the Stars confabulating together, the Mind is informed of things to come.

That the Stars are struck with a terrour or horror of the approach of any mans death, whence it is that no man dies without some sign or notice from them, as the *dances of dead men*, some *noise in the house*, or the like.

That as by a *Divine faith* the dead are raised and mountains cast into the midst of the Sea; so by the *faith of Nature* the influence of the Stars, who know all the secrets of Nature, is to be commanded, and thereby a man may know naturally what is to come.

That *Giants*, *Nymphs*, *Gnomi* and *Pygmies* were the conceptions and births of the *Imaginative* power of the influence of the Stars upon Matter prepared by them, and that they had no Souls; as it is most likely the Inhabitants of the more remote parts of the world have none, as not being the offspring of *Adam*. That

That a Fowler by the help of his Star need not goe after Birds, for they will flie after him; and so Fishes swim to the Fisherman, and wilde Beasts follow the Hunter upon the same account of his Stars.

That the separation of the three parts of the world, *Europe, Asia, Africa*, is a certain representation of the three Chymicall principles, *Sal, Sulphure and Mercury*, of which three the whole World was made.

That there is an artificial way of making an *Homunculus*, and that the *Fairies* of the woods, *Nymphs* and *Giants* themselves had some such originall, and that these *Homunculi* thus made will know all manner of secrets and mysteries of art, *themselves receiving their lives, bodies, flesh, bone, and blood from an artificiall principle.*

Paracels. de  
Naturarum  
lib. 1.

## SECT. XLVI.

*That Paracelsus has given occasion to the wildest Philosophick Enthusiasms that ever were yet on foot.*

THESE are the rampant and delirous Fancies of that great boaster of Europe *Paracelsus*, whose unbridled Imagination and bold and confident obtrusion of his uncouth and supine inventions upon the world has, I dare say, given occasion to the wildest *Philosophical Enthusiasms* that ever were broached by any either Christian or Heathen. That last conceit of his some have endeavoured to *Allegorize*, as the *Persians* do the *Alcoran*, ashamed of the gross sense of it, but in my apprehension so frigidly and unsutably, that it would confirm a man the more, that the letter is the intended truth; and if one compare it with what he writes of *Nymphs, Giants and Fairies* in his *Scientia Astronomica*, he will make no further doubt of it.

## SECT. XLVII.

*That Paracelsus his Philosophy, though himself intended it not, is one of the safest sanctuaries for the Atheist, and the very prop of ancient Paganism.*

THERE is some *affectation of Religion*, I confesse, in his Writings, and farre more in his Followers, who conceive themselves taught of God; when I plainly discern, their Brains are merely heated and infected by this strong spirit of *Phantastrie* that breaths in *Paracelsus* his Books.

I know it is no part of *Prudence* to speak slightly of those that others admire; but that *Prudence* is but *Craft* that commands an unfaithfull silence. And I know not how any honest man can discharge his conscience in prudentially conniving at such falsities as he sees insnare the Minds of men, while they do not onely abuse their Intellectuals by foppish and ridiculous conceptions, but insinuate such dangerous and



mischievous Opinions as supplant and destroy the very Fundamentalls of Christian Religion.

For I appeal to any man, What is nearer to ancient *Paganism* then what this bold writer has uttered concerning the *Stars*? or what Sanctuary so safe for the Atheist that derides and eludes all Religion, as such a *miraculous Influence* of the Heavens as *Paracelsus* describes in his *Scientia Astronomica*? Wherefore I should be very much amazed at the Madnes and Inconsistency of him and his followers, who have ever and anon a sling against *Heathen Philosophy*, when themselves take into their writings the very dregs of it, *viz.* the grosse Principles of the ancient *Pagan Superstition* and *Idolatry*, did I not remember that they are *Enthusiasts*, and follow not the guidance of *Reason*, but the strength of *Phansy*.

*Jupiter est quodcunque vides, &c.*

This taken in the coursest sense, I make no question but it was the grand Principle from whence did flow so many Varieties and Impurities of the *Pagan Superstition*, they fancying they met God in every object of their senses; and our exorbitant *Enthusiasts* professe, That every thing is God, in love or wrath: Which, if I understand any thing, is no better then *Atheism*. For it implies that God is nothing else but the *Universal Matter* of the World, dressed up in several shapes and forms, in sundry properties and qualities; some gratefull, some ungratefull; some holy, some profane; some wise, some senselesse; some weak, some strong, and the like. But to slice God into so many parts is to wound him and kill him, and to make no God at all.

## S E C T. XLVIII.

*How the Paracelsian Philosophy justifies the Heathens worshipping of the Starres, derogates from the authority of the Miracles of our Saviour, makes the Gospel ineffectuall for the establishing of the belief of a God and a particular Providence, and gratifies that professed Atheist Vaninus in what he most of all triumphs in, as serving his turn the best to elude all Religion whatsoever.*

**A**Gain, how does *Paracelsus* justify the *Heathen's worshipping the Stars*, he making them such knowing, powerfull, and compassionate spectatours of humane affairs! And why might they not pray to them as *Anne Bodenham* the Witch did to the Planet *Jupiter* for the curing diseases, if they have so much power and knowledge as to generate men here below, and conferre gifts upon them? For it would be no more then asking a mans Father or Godfather blessing. For if it be admitted that any one Nation is begot by the Starres, the Atheist will assuredly assume that they are all so.

Moreover how shall we repair the losse and damage done to the Authority of our blessed Saviour his Miracles? whereby not onely Christianity, but the first Fundamentalls of all true Religion are eminently established, *viz.* The discovery of a *Speciall and Particular Providence of God*,  
and

and an hope of a Life to come. For if the *Stars* can make such living creatures of prepared Matter that have sense and understanding, which yet have no *immortal* Souls, but wholly return into dead Matter again, why is it not so with men as well as them? And if they can contribute the power of such wonder-working wisdom as was in *Moses* and in *Christ*, or what is so very nigh to it; what footsteps do there remain of proof that there is any *God* or *Spirits*? for all is thus resolvable into the power of the *Stars*. A thing that that zealous and industrious Atheist *Cesar Vaninus* triumphs in exceedingly, in his *Amphitheatrum aeternae Providentiae*; where he cites several *Astrological* passages out of *Cardan*, under pretence to refute them, in which he fetches the Original of those three eminent Law-givers, *Moses*, *Christ*, and *Mahomet*, from the influence of the *Stars*.

The Law of *Moses* is from *Saturn*, saies *Cardan*, that of *Christ* from *Jupiter* and *Mercury*, that of *Mahomet* from *Sol* and *Mars*; the Law of the *Idolaters* from the *Moon* and *Mars*.

And in another place *Cardan* imputes that sweetness, and meekness, and wisdom, and eloquence that was in our Saviour, whereby he was able to dispute in the Temple at twelve years of age, to the influence of *Jupiter*.

*Pomponatius* also acknowledges the wisdom and miracles of *Christ*, but refers all to the *Stars*; a man as far laps'd into *Atheism*, I conceive, as *Vaninus* himself: so that these wilde Fancies of the *Enthusiasts* are in truth the chief Props or Shelters that Atheists uphold or defend themselves by. \* But, how fanciful and confounded an account there is of *Astrology*, let any man that has patience, as well as sobriety of reason, judge.

See my Explan.  
of the Mystery  
of Godliness,  
Book 7. chap.  
15, 16, 17.

## S E C T. XLIX.

*That Paracelsus and his followers are neither Atheisticall nor Diabolicall;  
and what makes the Chymist ordinarily so pitifull a Philosopher.*

**I** Do not speak these things as if I thought either *Paracelsus* or his followers thus Atheistical, but to shew their *Phantastrie* & *Enthusiasm*, they so hotly pretending to matters of Christianity and Religion, and yet handling them so grossly and indiscreetly, blurring out any garish foolery that comes into their mind, though it be quite contrary to the Analogie of *Faith*, nor has any shew of ground in solid *Reason*, onely to make themselves to be stared upon and wondred at by the world.

But the Event of it is, that as some admire them, so others execrate them, as men of an impious and diabolical spirit. Which I confesse I think too harsh a censure, well-meaning men being lyable to *Melancholy* and *Lunacies* as well as to *Agues* and burning *Feavers*. Yet a man should be so far off from thinking the better of any discovery of Truth by an *Enthusiastick* spirit, that he should rather for that very cause suspect it; because that Temper that makes men *Enthusiastical* is the greatest enemy



to *Reason*, it being more thick and muddy, and therefore once heated intoxicates them like *Wine* in the muste, and is more likely to fill their Brains full of odde fancies, then with any true notions of Philosophy.

But men of a purer blood and finer spirits are not so obnoxious to this distemper: For this is the most natural seat of sublimer Reason; whenas that more Mechanical kind of *Genius* that loves to be tumbling of and trying tricks with the *Matter* (which they call *making Experiments*) when *desire of knowledge* has so heated it that it takes upon it to become *Architectonical* and flie above its sphere, it commits the wildest hallucinations imaginable, that material or corporeal fancie egregiously fumbling in more subtle and spiritual speculations.

This is that that commonly makes the *Chymist* so pitiful a *Philosopher*, who from the narrow inspection of some few toys in his own art, conceives himself able to give a reason of all things in *Divinity* and *Nature*; as ridiculous a project, in my judgment, as that of his, that finding a piece of a broken Oar on the sand, busied his brains above all measure to contrive it into an entire Ship.

## SECT. L.

*The Writer of this Discourse no foe to either Theosophist or Chymist, onely he excuses himself from being over-credulous in regard of either.*

WHAT I have hitherto spoken I would have so understood, as coming from one that neither contemns the well-meaning of the *Theosophist*, nor disallows of the industry of the *Chymist*; but I shall ever excuse my self from giving any credit to either, any further then some lusty Miracle, transcendent Medicine, or solid Reason shall extort from me.

## SECT. LI.

*The Cure of Enthusiasm by Temperance, Humility, and Reason.*

WE have spoken of the *Kinds of Enthusiasm* so far as we held it serviceable for our design, we shall now touch upon the *Cure of this Disease*. Where waving all pretence to the knowledge of *Physick* or acquaintance with the *Apothecarie's* shop, we shall set down onely such things as fall under a *Moral* or *Theological* consideration, giving onely instructions for the guidance of a mans life in reference to this grand error of *Enthusiasm*: which a sober man cannot well determine whether it be more ridiculous, or deplorable and mischievous.

Now the most *sovereign Medicine* that I know against it is this *Dia-trion*, or *Composition* of Three excellent *Ingredients*, to wit, *Temperance*, *Humility*, and *Reason*; which as I do not despair but that it may recover those that are somewhat farre gone in this *Enthusiastick* distemper,

per, so I am confident that it will not fail to prevent it in them that are not as yet considerably smitten.

SECT. LII.

*What is meant by Temperance.*

**BY** *Temperance* I understand a measurable Abstinence from all hot or heightning meats or drinks, as also from all venereous pleasures and tactuall delights of the Body, from all softness and effeminacy; a constant and peremptory adhesion to the perfectest degree of *Chastity* in the single life, and of *Continency* in wedlock, that can be attain'd to. For it is plain in sundry examples of *Enthusiasm* above named, that the more hidden and lurking fumes of *Lust* had tainted the Phantries of those Pretenders to *Prophecy* and *Inspiration*.

We will adde also to these, moderate exercise of Body, and seasonable taking of the fresh aire, and due and discreet use of Devotion, whereby the Blood is ventilated and purged from dark oppressing vapors; which a temperate diet, if not fasting, must also accompany: or else the more hot and zealous our addressees are, the more likely they are to bring mischief upon our own heads, they raising the feculency of our intemperance into those more precious parts of the Body, the *Brains* and *Animal Spirits*, and so intoxicating the Mind with fury and wildness.

SECT. LIII.

*What is meant by Humility, and the great advantage thereof for Wisdome and Knowledge.*

**BY** *Humility* I understand an entire Submission to the will of God in all things, a Deadness to all self-excellency and preeminency before others, a perfect Privation of all desire of singularity or attracting of the eyes of men upon a mans own person, as little to relish a mans own praise or glory in the world as if he had never been born into it; but to be wholly contented with this one thing, that his Will is a subduing to the Will of God, and that with thankfulness and reverence he doth receive whatever Divine Providence brings upon him, be it sweet or sour, with the hair or against it, it is all one to him; for what he cannot avoid, it is the gift of God to the world in order to a greater good.

But here I must confess, that he that is thus affected, as he seeks no knowledge to please himself, so he cannot avoid being the *most knowing man* that is. For he is surrounded with the beams of Divine Wisdome, as the low depressed Earth with the raies of the Stars; his deeply and profoundly *humbled* Soul being as it were the Centre of all heavenly illuminations, as this little globe of the Earth is of those celestial influences. I professe I stand amazed while I consider the ineffable advantages



of a Mind thus submitted to the Divine Will, how calm, how comprehensive, how quick and sensible she is, how free, how sagacious, of how tender a touch and judgment she is in all things. Whenas *Pride* and strong desire ruffles the Mind into uneven waves and boisterous fluctuations, that the eternal light of *Reason* concerning either *Nature* or *Life* cannot imprint its perfect and distinct image or character there; nor can so subtle and delicate motions and impressions be sensible to the Understanding disturbed and agitated in so violent a storm.

That man therefore who has got this *Humble frame of Spirit*, which is of so mighty concernment for acquiring all manner of *Wisdom*, as well *Natural* as *Divine*, cannot possibly be so foolish as to be mistaken in that which is the genuine result of a contrary temper; and such is that of *Enthusiasm*, that puffs up men into an opinion that they have a more than ordinary influence from God that acts upon their Spirits, and that he designes them by special appointment to be *new Prophets*, *new Law-givers*, *new Davids*, *new Messiahes*, and what not? when it is nothing but the working of the *Old man* in them in a fanatical manner.

---

#### SECT. LIV.

*What meant by Reason, and what the danger of leaving that Guide; as also the mistake of them that expect the Spirit should not suggest such things as are rationally.*

**B**Y *Reason* I understand so settled and cautious a Composure of Mind as will suspect every high-flown & forward Fancy that endeavours to carry away the assent before deliberate examination; she not enduring to be gulled by the vigour or garishness of the representation, nor at all to be born down by the weight or strength of it; but patiently to try it by the known Faculties of the Soul, which are either the *Common notions* that all men in their wits agree upon, or the *Evidence of outward Sense*, or else a *clear and distinct Deduction from these*.

Whatever is not agreeable to these three, is *Fancy*, which testifies nothing of the *Truth* or *Existence* of any thing, and therefore ought not, nor cannot be assented to by any but mad men or fools.

And those that talk so loud of that higher Principle, *The Spirit*, with exclusion of these, betray their own ignorance; and while they would by their wilde Rhetorick dissuade men from the use of their *Rational* faculties under pretence of expectation of an higher and more glorious Light, do as madly, in my mind, as if, a company of men travelling by night with links, torches and lanthorns, some furious Orator amongst them should by his wonderful strains of Eloquence so besool them into a misconceit of their present condition, comparing of it with the sweet and chearful splendor of the day, as thereby to cause them, through impatience and indignation, to beat out their links and torches, and break a-pieces their lanthorns against the ground, and so chuse rather to foot it in the dark with hazard of knocking their noses against the next Tree they

they meet, and tumbling into the next ditch, then to continue the use of those convenient lights that they had in their sober temper prepared for the safety of their journey.

But the *Enthusiast's* mistake is not onely in leaving his present Guide before he has a better, but in having a false notion of him he does expect. For assuredly that *Spirit of illumination* which resides in the Souls of the faithful, is a Principle of the *purest Reason* that is communicable to the humane Nature. And what *this Spirit* has, he has from Christ (as Christ himself witnesseth) who is the Eternal *λόγος*, the all-comprehending Wisdom and Reason of God, wherein he sees through the Natures and *Ideas* of all things, with all their respects of Dependency and Independency, Congruity and Incongruity, or whatever Habitue they have one to another, with one continued glance at once.

Whatever of *Intellectual light* is communicated to us, is derived from hence, and is in us *Particular Reason*, or *Reason in Succession*, or by *piecemeal*. Nor is there any thing the *holy Spirit* did ever suggest to any man but it was agreeable to, if not demonstrable from, what we call *Reason*. And to be thus perswaded, how powerful a Curb it will be upon the exorbitant impressions and motions of *Melancholy* and *Enthusiasm*, I leave it to any man to judge.

## SECT. LV.

*Further Helps against Enthusiasm.*

TO these three notable and more generall Helps, we might adde some particular Considerations whereby we may keep off this *Enthusiastical* pertinacity from our selves, or discover it when it has taken hold upon others. As for example; If any man shall pretend to the discovery of a Truth by *Inspiration*, that is of no good use or consequence to the Church of God, it is to me little less then a Demonstration that he is *Fanatical*. If he heaps up *Falshoods* as well as *Truths*, and pretends to be *inspired in all*, it is to me an Evidence he is *inspired in none* of those Mysteries he offers to the world.

## SECT. LVI.

*Of the raised language of Enthusiasts, and of what may extraordinarily fall from them.*

THEre are certain advantages also that *Enthusiasts* have, which are to be taken notice of, whereby they have imposed upon many; as, That they have spoken very *raisedly* and *divinely*, which most certainly has happened to sundry persons a little before they have grown stark mad; and that they may hit of something extraordinary is no pledge of the truth of the rest.

For



For this unquiet and tumultuous spirit of *Melancholy* shaking their whole bodily frame, is like an Earthquake to one in a dungeon, which for a small moment makes the very walls gape and cleave, and so lets in light for a while at those chinks; but all closes up again suddenly, and the prisoner is confined to his wonted darkness. This therefore was a Chance in Nature, not a gracious visit of the Spirit of God.

## SECT. LVII.

*Of Enthusiastick Prophecy that ordinarily happens to fools and mad-men, and the reason why; as also why Ecstaticall men foresee things to come, and of the uncertainty of such Predictions.*

HEREunto you may also joyn the luck of Prophecy, be it sleeping or waking; for such things have happened to mad-men and fools, and *Aristotle* offers at a pretty reason that may reach both. Ἡ γὰρ διάνοια τῶν τοιούτων ἐφροντιστική, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἔρημος καὶ κενὴ πάντων, καὶ κενθεῖσα καὶ τὸ κινεῖν ἀγνοῖ. To which he also addes why Ecstaticall men foresee future things, Ὅτι αἱ οἰκείαι κινήσεις ἐκ ἐνοχλῶσιν, ἀλλ' ἀπορραπίζον, τῶν ξενικῶν δὲ ὡς μάλιστα αἰσθάνονται. All which intimates thus much, That an alienation of mind, and rest from our own motions, fits us for a reception of impressions from something else, and so by a quick sense and touch we may be advertised through a communication of motion from the Spirit of the world what is done at a distance, or what Causes are conspiring to bring this or that to passe; which turning off again make the Prediction false: For every thing that offers to be, does not come into actuall Being. Wherefore all these Presages are not θεόπεμπτα, but may be onely δαιμόνια. Ἡ γὰρ φύσις δαιμονία, καὶ θεία. they are the words of *Aristotle*, but such as some skilfull *Platonist* will most easily explain.

All that I aim at is this, That Prophecies may arise from on this side of the pure and infallible Deity, and it is our mistake that we think that what Predictions fall out true, are certainly foreknown by the Foreteller. For the present conspiracy of Causes that shoot into the vacant mind may corrupt and alter, and be blown away like clouds, that at first seem to assure the husbandman of a following rain.

## SECT. LVIII.

*That if an Enthusiast should cure some diseases by touching or stroaking the party diseased, yet it might be no true Miracle.*

BUT there is yet a stronger allurements then Prophecy to draw on belief to the Enthusiast, which is a semblance of doing some Miracle, as the curing some desperate disease; as it hapned very lately in this Nation. For it is very credibly reported, and I think cannot be denied, That one by the stroaking of a mans arm that was dead and useles to him,

him, recovered it to life and strength. When I heard of it, and read some few pages of that miraculous Physician's writing, my judgment was, that the *cure* was *natural*, but that his Blood and Spirits were boiled to that height, that it would hazard his Brain: which proved true, for he was stark mad not very long after.

There may be very well a Sanative and healing Contagion as well as morbid and venomous. And the Spirits of *Melancholy* men being more massy and ponderous, when they are so highly refined and actuated by a more then ordinary heat and vigour of the Body, may prove a very powerfull *Elixir*, Nature having outdone the usual pretences of *Chymistry* in this case.

SECT. LIX.

*Of the Willingness and Patience to suffer in Enthusiasts.*

THEIR *Willingness also to suffer or Patience in suffering* may seem to give an extraordinary Testimony to some *Enthusiasts*, as if there were something Divine or Supernatural in them. But admiration will abate, if we consider how passionately some abhor from the Sense of *Pleasure*, accounting it the *Summum malum*, the greatest evil. For which Paradox *Antisthenes* is noted in \* *Aulus Gellius*, as also for his suitable Motto, *Μακροθυμῶν ἢ ἡδονῶν*, as if downright *Madness* were more tolerable than it. Others there are, who according to mere Complexion love to conflict with troubles and dangers: such as those are who undergoe Warfares and Sea-voyages with a natural delight. Others make it their study, and pride themselves in it, to become insensible of pain, or to bear it as if they were not at all affected by it; insomuch that the Condition has passed into a term of Art amongst the *Stoicks*, who call this power *Ἀνδράχεια* and *Ἀναλγησία*.

\* Noct. Attic.  
lib. 9. cap. 9.

But this is nothing but a *Spartan* obfirmation of Mind back'd with the sense of shame, a desire of glory, or the contentment of being conscious to themselves of their own Stoutness and tolerance. Of which a notorious Instance is that of the *Lacedæmonian* Lad, who having concealed a Fox under his coat, would not cry out though he was a gnawing of his very entrails.

*Anaxarchus* his pain though it seems not so sharp, yet his courage appears as great; in that he could Philosophize so freely, while he was by the cruelty of *Archelaus* braying in a mortar; whence he cried out in the midst of their thumpings upon him, *Πῶς εἰ, πῶς εἰ Ἀναξάρχου Σίλακον, ἐν τῷ πῶσις τῷ Ἀναξάρχον* adding therein wit to his philosophy, and comparing his Body to the Sack, but making his Soul as good as absent, and the Sack empty, by her professed insensibleness of the strokes and unconcernedness in what befell the Body: Which yet notwithstanding, setting aside his natural surmise of the Soul's Immortality, was nothing but sullen and inconsiderate *Stoicism*; for his Body had then more reason to defie their blows than his Soul, she alone being capable

Nonnus in his  
Synagog. His-  
tor upon Greg.  
Nazianzen's  
Invectives a-  
gainst Julian  
the Apostate.

of



of sense and pain. So that the special support of his Mind was but an inveterate error and fancy.

How *Wrath* and *Indignation* will also hold up the Spirits against *Fear* and *Pain*, is seen in that brief Instance of *Theano*, who being forcibly urged to betray the secrets of her Country, bit out her tongue and spit it at the face of the Tyrant. These are Examples evident enough of that affected and not altogether unattainable power of *Indolency* amongst the Heathen.

\* *Noſt. Attic.*  
l. 12. c. 5.

What to call that which \* *Gellius* reports of a certain Gladiator of *Caesar's*, who would laugh when his wounds were a drying and cleansing, I know not: for it seems more than a simple *Ἀναλγησία* or *Indolentia*. But out of these Examples and Considerations it is manifest, That there is no such divinity or supernatural holiness in the stoutly and peremptorily bearing of pain, nor any necessity of a Divine assistance therein. Either simple Resolution of mind upon some imbibed *Dogma*, or the power of some concealed Passion, may enable them to bear up against all.

And yet these are but small things in comparison of what the *Enthusiast* is armed with upon the account of his peculiar condition. For besides that his very *Complexion* makes him stiff, inflexible and unyielding, (for there is no Temper so sturdy and peremptory as *Melancholy* is, even in cases more dispensable) there is yet a further force added thereto from the strong conceit he has of being inspired, and consequently of his Cause being infallibly good: For this tends naturally to the making of him invincible in his Sufferings, he being conscious to himself both of the firm goodness of his Cause, as he conceives, and of the indispensableness of his duty in adhering thereto. To which you may add the certain expectation of future glory and happiness for his Martyrdom. So plain it is that there is nothing supernatural or miraculous in the case.

## SECT. LX.

*That the resolved Sufferings for mistaken points in Religion is no good argument against the truth of all Religion.*

I Must confess that an ordinary reflexion upon this *resolvedness* of suffering to the utmost extremity in persons that are thus mistaken in the points they suffer for, cannot but make such as are *Atheistically* inclined subject to think That there is no Truth nor Certainty at all in Religion; since that where men seem to themselves so certain, that they dare and do actually pawn their lives upon it, yet they are so grossly mistaken. And it is plain they are so, in that persons of contrary persuasions suffer with the like confidence and to the like extremity, choosing rather to leave their lives than their Opinions and Party. Which is found true both in *Jewes*, *Mahometans*, *Papists* and *Protestants*.

This indeed at first sight bears no small shew of Reason; but if more nearly lookt into, will prove but a weak and sorry Sophism. For if this Ratiocination were solid, it would follow That there were nothing true in

in Philosophy neither. For assuredly men are as firmly perswaded contrary ways in the same points there, as they are in Religion; and there can be but one part true. But that they are not so perswaded of the matter that they will die for it, is not because they do not as firmly believe their Opinions in Philosophy, but because there is no obligation of Conscience and an Eternal interest founded in them as there is in Religion. Otherwise if it were a conscientious point of Religion to be a *Copernican*, *Tychonist*, or *Aristotelean*, in reference to the Systeme of the World; I think there is no question to be made but there would be Martyrs for them all, at least for two of them; the one being so exquisitely consonant to *Reason*, the other so grossly accommodated to *Sense*.

Besides, I cannot but note, That it is very low and unphilosophical in these *Atheistical* Wits, to make their Appeal concerning these noble Theoremes of the *Existence of God and the Truth of Religion* to so petty a Court of Judicature as mere *Humane Testimony*. For such in their arguing do they make the Sufferings of Martyrs in opposite Religions, and fancy their laying down of their lives but as the laying of great wagers. Which *Topick* some have Sarcastically called the Argument of Fools.

But whatever force *Humane Testimony* hath in these Cases, it is so farre from serving the Atheist's turn, that it makes against him. For admit that these *Anti-Martyrs* (as I may so call them) give witness singly one against another, yet they jointly give witness against the Atheist, sealing it with their blood, *That there is a God, and a Life to come*. Which I take not to be onely the Effect of *Education*, but of a *natural Sagacity* in the better sort of men, and a proneness in them to think so: which being further strengthened by the Institutes of *Religion*, especially so clear and convictive as *Christianity*, may very well get the power of engaging a mans Conscience to lay down his life even for such things as mere *Education* has impressed upon him, or some *Melancholy* conceit. But the firme bottome and support of all, and that without which they would not suffer for any thing, is the sincere and unshaken belief *That there is a God, and an Happiness to be expected after this life*. Whereupon the Conscience being scrupulous, and not daring to act or assent to such things as it may be she onely strongly suspects to be evil or false, chuses the *safer way* for her main interest, namely, rather to suffer than to sin.

So that it is not so much the firm belief of these things they suffer for (suppose either Papist or Protestant) as the care of doing nothing that they suspect is sinfull, which makes them undergoe *Martyrdome*.

Whence the very ground of the Atheist's *Paralogism* is also found invalid. Nor is it plain from their suffering that they are so firm and determinate in the points they suffer for that are false. But admit the *Enthusiast* be, *Fanaticism* is but a disease of Religion, and implies no more that there is no Religion, then *Madness* that there is no *Reason*, or any Corporeal *Disease* that there is no such thing as *Health* or an humane *Body* in the world.



## SECT. LXI.

*Of the remote Notions, mysterious Style, and moving Eloquence of Enthusiasts.*

Whatever credit the *Enthusiast* may conciliate to himself from his *moving Eloquence*, his *mysterious style* and *unexpected notions*, they are easily to be resolved into that Principle of *Melancholy* above named, the sense of which Complexion is so deep and vigorous, that it cannot fail to inable the Tongue to tell her story with a great deal of life and affection; and the *Imagination* is so extravagant, that it is farre easier for her to ramble abroad and fetch in some odd skue conceit from a remote obscure corner, then to think of what is nearer and more ordinarily intelligible.

But these things are so fully and plainly comprehended in those *Generall Causes of Enthusiasm* we have already declared, besides what we have particularly touched upon before, that it will not be worth our labour to insist any longer upon them. When we have satisfied a Scruple or two concerning what we have said of *Melancholy* and *Enthusiasm*, I think we shall have omitted nothing materially pertinent to this present Speculation.

## SECT. LXII.

*How we shall distinguish betwixt pure Religion and Complexion.*

AND the first is, How we can distinguish betwixt *Religion* and *Melancholy*, we having attributed so notable Effects thereunto. The second is, Whether we have not reviled and vilified all *Enthusiasm* whatsoever, and invited men to a cold *Pharisaicall* stupidity and acting, merely according to an outward letter without an inward testimony of life.

The meaning of the first Scruple must be restrain'd to such things as in their externals are laudable and approveable, *viz.* whether *such as they* be out of a *Divine* or *Natural* principle, whether from *God* or *Complexion*. For in those things that are at their very first view discerned to be culpable, it is plain that they are not from God.

I answer therefore, That there are three main discriminations betwixt the *Spirit* and the most *Specious Complexion*. The first is, That that *Piety* or *Goodness* which is from the Spirit of God is *universal*, extirpating every vice, and omitting nothing that is truly a divine vertue.

The second is, A belief of those Holy Oracles comprehended in the Old and New Testament, they being rightly interpreted; and particularly of that Article, That *Jesus Christ*, even he that died on the Crosse at *Jerusalem* betwixt two thieves, is the *Son of God*, and *Sovereign of men and Angels*, and that he in his own person shall come again to judge the quick and the dead.

The

The third and last is, An *universal Prudence*, whereby a man neither admits nor acts any thing but what is solidly rational at the bottome, and of which he can give a good account, let the successe be what it will. He that finds himself thus affected, may be sure it is the *Spirit of God*, not the power of *Complexion* or *Nature* that rules in him. But this man to others, if they be unbelieving, and so rude and unprepared as not to be capable of *Reason*, he is nothing to them, unlesse he can doe a *Miracle*. How vain then is the *Enthusiast* that is destitute of both? But those ancient Records of *Miracles* done in the behalf of Christianity are a sufficient Testimony of the Truth of our Religion to those whose hearts are rightly fitted for it.

## SECT. LXIII.

*That the devotional Enthusiasm of Holy and Sincere souls has not at all been taxed in all this Discourse.*

TO the Second scruple I answer, That there has not one word all this time been spoken against that *true* and *warrantable Enthusiasm* of devout and holy Souls, who are so strangely transported in that vehement *Love* they bear towards God, and that unexpressible *Foy* and *Peace* they find in him. For they are modest enough and sober in all this, they witnessing no other thing to the world then what others may experience in themselves, and what is plainly set down in the holy Scriptures, That the *Kingdome of God is Righteousness and Peace and Foy in the Holy Ghost*.

But in none of these things do they pretend to equalize themselves to Christ, whom God has exalted above men and Angels, but do professe the efficacie of his Spirit in them to the praise and glory of God, and the comfort and encouragement of their drooping Neighbour. But what is above this, without evident *Reason* or a *Miracle*, is most justly deemed to proceed from no *Supernatural* assistance, but from some *Hypochondriacall* distemper.

And what I have said in behalf of Christians, is in its measure due to those diviner sort of Philosophers, such as *Plato* and *Plotinus*, whom you shall finde, upon the more then ordinary sensible visits of the divine Love and Beauty descending into their enravished Souls, profess themselves no less moved then what the sense of such expressions as these will beare, ἀναμυεῖσθαι, ἐκστασιάζεσθαι, ἐνθουσιάζειν or ἐνθουσιάζειν. To such Enthusiasm as this, which is but the triumph of the Soul of man inebriated, as it were, with the delicious sense of the divine life, that blessed Root and Originall of all holy wisdom and vertue, I must declare my self as much a friend, as I am to the vulgar fanatical Enthusiasm a professed enemy. And eternall shame stop his mouth that will dare to deny but that the fervent love of God and of the pulchritude of vertue, will afford the spirit of man more joy and triumph then ever was tasted in any lustfull pleasure, which the pen of unclean Wits do so highly magnify both in Verse and Prose.



## SECT. LXIV.

*That the Fewell of Devotion even in warrantable and sincere Enthusiasm is usually Melancholy.*

**M**OREOVER for these Rapturous and Enthusiasticall affections *even in them that are truly good and pious, it cannot be denied but that the fewell of them is usually naturall or contracted Melancholy*; which any man may perceive that is *Religious*, unlesse his Soul and Body be blended together, and there be a confusion of all; as it is in mistaken *Enthusiasts*, that impute that to God which is proper to Nature.

But *Melancholy* usually *disposes*, and the Mind *perfects* the action through the power of the Spirit. And a wise and holy man knows how to make use of his opportunity, according to that Monition of the Apostle, *If a man be sad, let him pray; if chearfull, let him sing Psalmes.*

James, ch. 5.  
v. 13.

## SECT. LXV.

*That there is a peculiar advantage in Melancholy for Divine speculations, with a prevention of the Atheist's objection thereupon.*

**B**UT there is also a peculiar advantage in *Melancholy* for Divine *Speculations*: And yet the Mysteries that result from thence are no more to be suspected of proving mere Fancies, because they may occasionally spring from such a Constitution, then *Mathematicall Truths* are, who owe their birth to a *Mathematicall Complexion*; which is as truly a complexion as the *Religious* complexion is, and yet no sober man will deny the truth of her Theorems. And as it would be a fond and improper thing to affirm that such a *Complexion* teaches a man *Mathematicks*, so it would also be to affirm that *Melancholy* is the onely mother of *Religion*.

## SECT. LXVI.

*How it comes to passe that men are so nimble and dexterous in finding the truth of some things, and so slow and heavy in other some; and that the dulnesse of the Atheist's perception in Divine matters is no argument against the truth of Religion.*

**B**UT most certain it is, and Observation will make it good, That the Souls of men while they are in these mortall Bodies are as so many Prisoners immured in severall prisons, with their single loop-holes looking into severall quarters, and therefore are able to pronounce no further then their proper prospect will give them leave. So the severall Complexions of mens Bodies dispose or invite them to an easie and happy discovery

discovery of some things, when yet notwithstanding if you confer with them concerning other some, that lie not within their prospect or the limits of their natural *Genius*, they will be enforced either to acknowledge their ignorance; or if they will take upon them to judge (which is the more frequent) they will abundantly discover their error and mistake.

Which sometimes seems so gross and invincible, that a man may justly suspect that they want not only the patience, but even the power of contemplating of some Objects, as being not able to frame any conception of what they are required to think of: And such are the duller sort of *Atheists*, that rank the notion of a *Spirit*, and consequently of a *God*, in the list of *Inconsistencies* and ridiculous *Non-sense*. Wherein though they seek to reproach *Religion*, they seem to me mainly to shame *themselves*, their *Atheism* being very easie to be parallel'd with *Enthusiasm* in this regard. For as some *Enthusiasts* being found plainly *mad* in some one thing, have approved themselves *sober* enough in the rest: so these *Atheists*, though they shew a tolerable wit and acuteness in *other* matters, yet approve themselves sufficiently slow and heavy in *this*.

## SECT. LXVII.

*That the Enthusiast, though he be necessarily assaulted by his own Complexion, yet not irresistibly; and that therefore the guilt of his extravagancies lies at his own door.*

**I** Have now with what briefness I intended run through the *Nature*, *Causes*, *Kinds*, and *Cure* of *Enthusiasm*, and looking considerably back on the Stage I have gone, fancy all my steps perfect, unless in that part that concerns the *Causes* of this Distemper; whose enumeration may seem defectuous, in that I have omitted the activity of the Devil, and the wilfull wickedness of the Mind of man, but resolved all into Complexion, or present temper, or rather distemper, of the body arising from natural causes that necessarily act thereupon. Whence men may judge my Discourse as well an excuse for, as a Discovery of, this Disease of *Enthusiasm*.

But I answer, That though these causes do act necessarily upon the body, and the body necessarily upon the Mind, yet they do not act irresistibly, unless a man have brought himself to such a weakness by his own fault; as he that by his intemperance has cast himself into a Fever, who then fatally becomes subject to the laws thereof. And though the Devil of himself may doe much, yet he can doe no more then God permits, who will suffer no man to be tempted above what he can bear, provided he be sincere and faithfull, and give not himself to fanatick fits, either from Pride, or for some sinister projects in the world. For to such as these Enthusiasm may prove *Balneum diaboli*, as is vulgarly said of Melancholy; whenas, on the contrary, it may be the laver of Regeneration to them that unfeignedly love and fear God, and endeavour to be



simple and true of heart in all things. So plainly unexcusable are those that have so notoriously miscarried in this *fanatick Distemper*.

And further touching the Defectuousness in my *Enumeration* of the *Causes* of Enthusiasm, in that I omitted the Agency of the Devil, I answer, that his *Causality* is more vagrant, more lax and general then to be brought in here, where my aim was to indigitate the more proper and constant causes of that *Disease*. I might adde also less philosophical for this present search, which was onely into the *natural* principles of the said *Distemper*. And for that of the *vitiosity of mans will*, it is evidently supposed in my prescription of the *Cure* of Enthusiasm, the neglect whereof is plainly a mans own fault. For it is his own fault that he is not *temperate, humble, and attentive to Reason*: without recourse to which indispensable vertues he can never be freed from that foulness and uncleanness of his Astral Spirit ( which is the inmost lodge and Harbour of all imposturous fancies and Enthusiastick dreams ) nor can ever arrive to that secure state of the Soul, where the importunities of deceitfull Imagination are alwaies declined and eluded by the safe Guidance and Conduct of the *Intellectual Powers*.

sect. 51, 52,  
53, 54.

See *Mystery of  
Godliness*,  
Book 6. ch. 13.  
sect. 7.

THE

# THE CONTENTS

## OF

### This Discourse of ENTHUSIASM.

SECT. I. <b>T</b> HE great Affinity and Correspondency betwixt Enthusiasm and Atheism.	fol. 1	ning of the authority of bold Enthusiasts.	9
SECT. II. What Inspiration is, and what Enthusiasm.	2	SECT. XIV. That the causality of Melancholy in this distemper of Enthusiasm is more easily traced then in other Extravagancies.	10
SECT. III. A search of the Causes of Enthusiasm in the Faculties of the Soul.	ibid.	SECT. XV. Melancholy a pertinacious and religious complexion.	ibid.
SECT. IV. The severall Degrees and Natures of her Faculties.	ibid.	SECT. XVI. That men are prone to suspect some special presence of God or of a Supernatural power in whatever is Great or Vehement.	11
SECT. V. Why Dreams, till we awake, seem reall transactions.	3	SECT. XVII. The mistake of heated Melancholy for holy Zeal and the Spirit of God.	12
SECT. VI. The enormous strength of Imagination the Cause of Enthusiasme.	4	SECT. XVIII. The Ebbs and Flows of Melancholy a further Cause of Enthusiasm.	13
SECT. VII. Sundry natural and corporeal Causes that necessarily work on the Imagination.	5	SECT. XIX. The notorious mockery of Melancholy in reference to Divine love.	ibid.
SECT. VIII. The power of Meats to change the Imagination.	6	SECT. XX. That Melancholy partakes much of the Nature of Wine, and from what complexion Poets and Enthusiasts arise, and what the difference is betwixt them.	14
SECT. IX. Baptista Porta his Potion to work upon the Phansy.	7	SECT. XXI. That a certain Dosis of Sanguine mixt with Melancholy is the Spirit that usually inspires Enthusiasts, made good by a large Induction of Examples.	15
SECT. X. The power of Diseases upon the Phansy.	ibid.	SECT. XXII. More examples to the same purpose.	17
SECT. XI. Of the power of Melancholy, and how it often sets on some one absurd conceit upon the Mind, the party in other things being sober.	8	SECT. XXIII. Of Enthusiastical Joy.	ibid.
SECT. XII. Several Examples of the foregoing Observation.	ibid.		
SECT. XIII. A seasonable application of the foregoing Examples for the weak-			



# The CONTENTS.

- SECT. XXIV. *Of the mystical Allegories of Enthusiasts.* ibid.
- SECT. XXV. *Of Quaking, and of the Quakers.* 18
- SECT. XXVI. *That Melancholy disposes to Apoplexies and Epilepsies.* 19
- SECT. XXVII. *Of the nature of Enthusiastick Revelations and Visions.* ibid.
- SECT. XXVIII. *Of Ecstasie; the nature and causes thereof.* ibid.
- SECT. XXIX. *Whether it be in mans power to cast himself into an Enthusiastick Apoplexie, Epilepsie or Ecstasie.* 20
- SECT. XXX. *Of Enthusiastick Prophecy.* 21
- SECT. XXXI. *Of the Presage of a mans own heart from a Supernatural impulse sensible to himself, but unexplicable to others, where it may take place, and that it is not properly Enthusiasm.* ibid.
- SECT. XXXII. *Several Examples of Political Enthusiasm.* 22
- SECT. XXXIII. *David George his prophecy of his rising again from the Dead, and after what manner it was fulfilled.* 23
- SECT. XXXIV. *A description of the person, manners, and doctrine of David George.* ibid.
- SECT. XXXV. *The evident Causes of that power of speech in David George.* 24
- SECT. XXXVI. *An account of those seeming graces in David George.* ibid.
- SECT. XXXVII. *That David George was a man of a Sanguine Complexion.* 25
- SECT. XXXVIII. *Further and more sure Proofs that David George was of a Sanguine Temper.* 26
- SECT. XXXIX. *That it was a dark sulsome Sanguine that hid the truth of the great Promises of the Gospel from his eyes.* ibid.
- SECT. XL. *The exact likeness betwixt David George and the Father of the modern Nicolaitans, with the Authour's censure of them both.* 27
- SECT. XLI. *A seasonable Advertisement in the behalf of them that are unawares taken with such Writers; as also a further confirmation that Enthusiastick madness may consist with sobriety in other matters.* ibid.
- SECT. XLII. *Of Philosophical Enthusiasm.* 28
- SECT. XLIII. *Sundry Chymists and Theosophists innocuous to this disease.* 29
- SECT. XLIV. *A promiscuous Collection of divers odd conceits out of several Theosophists and Chymists.* ibid.
- SECT. XLV. *A particular Collection out of Paracelsus.* 31
- SECT. XLVI. *That Paracelsus has given occasion to the wildest Philosophick Enthusiasms that ever were yet on foot.* 33
- SECT. XLVII. *That Paracelsus his Philosophy, though himself intended it not, is one of the safest sanctuaries for the Atheist, and the very prop of ancient Paganism.* ibid.
- SECT. XLVIII. *How the Paracelsian Philosophy justifies the Heathens worshipping of the Starres, derogates from the authority of the Miracles of our Saviour, makes the Gospel ineffectual for the establishing of the belief of a God and a particular Providence, and gratifies that professed Atheist Vaninus in what he most of all triumphs in, as serving his turn the best to elude all Religion whatsoever.* 34
- SECT. XLIX. *That Paracelsus and his followers are neither Atheistical nor Diabo-*

## The C O N T E N T S.

- Diabolicall; and what makes the Chymist ordinarily so pitifull a Philosopher.* 35
- SECT. I. *The Writer of this Discourse no foe to either Theosophist or Chymist, onely he excuses himself from being over-credulous in regard of either.* 36
- SECT. II. *The Cure of Enthusiasm by Temperance, Humility, and Reason.* ib. 37
- SECT. III. *What is meant by Humility, and the great advantage thereof for Wisdom and Knowledge.* ibid.
- SECT. LIV. *What meant by Reason, and what the danger of leaving that Guide; as also the mistake of them that expect the Spirit should not suggest such things as are rationall.* 38
- SECT. LV. *Further Helps against Enthusiasm.* 39
- SECT. LVI. *Of the raised language of Enthusiasts, and of what may extraordinarily fall from them.* ibid.
- SECT. LVII. *Of Enthusiastick Prophecy that ordinarily happens to fools and mad-men, and the reason why; as also why Ecstaticall men foresee things to come, and of the uncertainty of such Predictions.* 40
- SECT. LVIII. *That if an Enthusiast should cure some diseases by touching or stroaking the party diseased, yet it might be no true Miracle.* ibid.
- SECT. LIX. *Of the Willingness and Patience to suffer in Enthusiasts.* 41
- SECT. LX. *That the resolved sufferings for mistaken points in Religion is no good argument against the truth of all Religion.* 42
- SECT. LXI. *Of the remote Notions, mysterious Style, and moving Eloquence of Enthusiasts.* 44
- SECT. LXII. *How we shall distinguish betwixt pure Religion and Complexion.* ibid.
- SECT. LXIII. *That the devotional Enthusiasm of Holy and Sincere souls has not at all been taxed in all this Discourse.* 45
- SECT. LXIV. *That the Fewell of Devotion even in warrantable and sincere Enthusiasm is usually Melancholy.* 46
- SECT. LXV. *That there is a peculiar advantage in Melancholy for Divine speculations, with a prevention of the Atheist's objection thereupon.* ibid.
- SECT. LXVI. *How it comes to passe that men are so nimble and dexterous in finding the truth of some things, and so slow and heavy in other some, and that the dulnesse of the Atheist's perception in Divine matters is no argument against the truth of Religion.* ibid.
- SECT. LXVII. *That the Enthusiast, though he be necessarily assaulted by his own complexion, yet not irresistibly; and that therefore the guilt of his extravagancies lies at his own door.* 47





H E N R I C I M O R I  
E P I S T O L Æ  
Q U A T U O R

A D

R E N A T U M D E S - C A R T E S :

C U M

Responſis Clariffimi Philoſophi ad duas  
Priores, cūmq; aliis aliquot Epiftolis, qua-  
rum Occaſiones, Argumenta, Ordinem  
verſa pagina tibi commonſtrabit.

---

Ariſtot.

Τοῖς ὑπορῖσαι βυλομυθίοις τῶν ὄργων ἐστὶ ὁ δὲ ἀναπορῖσαι καλῶς.

---



---

L O N D I N I ,

Typis J. Fleſher, & venales proſtant apud G. Morden Bibliopolam  
Cantabrigienſem. MDC LXII.



NEW YORK


# LIST OF DONORS

TO

THE NEW YORK

LIBRARY

Report of the Committee on the  
Library of the City of New York,  
for the year 1881.



Printed by the City of New York,  
under the authority of the Board of Aldermen.

## Continentur in hac parte,

1. *Epistola Claudii Clerfelier ad H. Morum, quâ veniam ab eo petit publicandi literas ejus ad Cartesium.*
2. *Responsum H. Mori.*
3. *Epistola prima H. Mori ad R. Des-Cartes, ubi præcipuè agitur de Natura Corporis & Vacui, de Mundi extensione, deque sensu Brutorum.*
4. *Responsum R. Cartesii.*
5. *Epistola secunda H. Mori ad R. Cartesium, ubi Responfa ad priores Objectiones novis, ut plurimum, Instantiis diluit, Variasque proponit Quæstiones de Mundi extensione, de natura Motûs, de particulis striatis, de Animæ unionem cum Corpore, ipsiusq; in corpus imperio, de conversione globulorum æthereorum in elementum primum, de flexibilitate particularum aquearum, & de Materiæ denique ἀνεκτικότητα.*
6. *Responsum Cartesii ad dictas Instantias & Quæstiones.*
7. *H. Mori Epistola tertia ad R. Cartesium, quâ quæ hætenus disputata sunt breviter recognoscit, dein varia è Principiis Philosophiæ nunc probanda nunc explicanda proponit.*
8. *Henrici Mori Epistola quarta ad R. Cartesium, quæ varia item tum è Dioptrice tum è Meteoris proponit aut probanda aut dilucidanda.*
9. *Fragmentum Responfi R. Des-Cartes ad Epistolam tertiam H. Mori, ubi agitur de sensu Angelorum Mentisque separatæ, de contractione & dilatatione Spiritûs, de Dei amplitudine, de quiete motuque Materiæ, &c.*
10. *Responsum H. Mori ad dictum Fragmentum.*
11. *Epistola H. Mori ad V. C. quæ Apologiam complectitur pro Cartesio, quæque Introductionis loco esse poterit ad universam Philosophiam Cartesianam.*





*Clarissimo Viro*

## HENRICO MORO.

**L**EGI, vir eximie, & perlegi summa cum voluptate tuas ad D. Cartesium difficultates, quas ei tertio Idus Decembris 1648. tertio nonas Martii, 10. Calendas Augusti, & duodecimo Calendas Novembris 1649. proposuisti; miratusque sum ingenium tuum, & summam humanitatem, quâ fretus ausus sum hæc ad te confidenter rescribere, ut de iis quæ facere instituo te certiore faciam, & à te impetrem ea quæ mihi necessaria sunt, ut opus quod suscepi ad finem perducam. Scies igitur me habere præ manibus præcipua Autographa quæ incomparabilis Philosophus D. Cartesius, D. Chanuto, olim apud Serenissimam Sueciæ Reginam, nunc verò apud Batavos legato meritisimo, affini meo, apud quem Sueciæ vitâ functus est, reliquit: Inter quæ sunt & illa literarum quas pluribus ex amicis suis rescripsit, ex quibus præcipuas colligo, quæ vel Philosophiam suam tangunt, vel ea quæ perficienda susceperat respiciunt, vel difficultates à plerisque summis viris, inter quos non minimum tenes locum, ipsi propositas solvunt, ut eas omnes publici juris faciam, quod spero me brevi peracturum. Sed quia literæ illæ quæ difficultatibus respondent vix possunt intelligi, nisi etiam eæ quæ occasionem ipsi dederunt tale quid respondendi simul in lucem edantur, nec tamen mihi honestum visum fuerit hoc exequi absque venia & licentia eorum qui ipsi rescripserunt, à quibusdam petii, & impetravi, ut illud mihi concederent, quod etiam spero à te, pro summa tua humanitate & incredibili erga Cartesium studio, mihi concessum iri. Sed præterea cuperem ut mihi exemplaria mitteres earum omnium quas à D. Cartesio accepisti epistolarum; duas enim tantum præ manibus habeo, quarum prior respondet tuis tertio Idus Decembris datis; altera, iis quæ tertio nonas Martii scriptæ sunt. Superest igitur tertia, quæ mihi deest, quæque tuis 10. Calendas Augusti & 12. Calendas Novembris datis satisfacere debet: quæ profectò non potest non esse pulcherrima, & continere plura scitu dignissima, cum tot tuis tantisque difficultatibus & quæstionibus, cum ex principiis Philosophiæ tum ex Dioptrice excerptis, respondere debeat, cujus ramen duas duntaxat paginas inveni; quæ tantum instantiis tuis satisfacere tentant, nec ullum verbum ad quæsitâ tua super Principiis & Dioptrice continent. Quare summo opere exopto & enixe præcor, ut & mihi licentiam concedas literas tuas simul cum responsis imprimendi, & ut simul ad me mittas quas habes à D. Cartesio, ut & posteritatis utilitati, & Amici nostri famæ ac memoriæ consulamus. Præter hæc autem literarum Autographa, plura adhuc habeo celeberrimi Viri præclara monumenta, quæ singula suo tempore lucem videbunt, & quæ non parùm jucunditatis puto tibi fore allatura, utpote qui in evolvendis Cartesianis scriptis tam impiger videris. Si mihi vernaculâ linguâ uti licuisset, aptius atque ornatius sententiam meam explicuisssem: sed



nè in varios errores inciderem, styllum contraxi, & ut potui, non ut volui, mentem meam tibi aperui; quod rogo ut mihi condones, & scias me tuæ semper humanitatis & sapientiæ laudatorem & cultorem fore.

Parisiis 12. Dec.

1654.

CLAUDIUS CLERSELIER.

*Responsio*

HENRICI MORI.

**L**iteræ tuæ, Vir Clarissime, datæ Lutetiæ Parisiorum pridie Idus Decembris, anno 1654. non pervenerunt ad manus meas ante decimum septimum Calendarum Maii. Miror tantum temporis interfluxisse. Granthamiæ tunc agebam in agro Lincolnienſi. Rus enim conſeſſeram cùm aliis de cauſis tum ad confirmandam valetudinem. Vehementer equidem gaudebam poſtquam intellexi præclarum tuum inſtitutum edendi omnia Carteſſi ſcripta quæ apud te ſunt, quo non ſolùm nobiliſſimi Philoſophi famæ ac memoriæ, verùm etiam communi omnium literatorum utilitati optimè conſules. In neminem enim aptiùs quadrat, quàm in divinum illum virum, Horatianum illud,

— *Qui nil molitur ineptè.*

Quam ob cauſam ſi ego tibi à conſiliis eſſem, nihil quicquam eorum ſupprimeretur quæ vel ille tentavit ullo modo in rebus Philoſophicis, vel feliciter ad exitum perduxit; ſed lucem viderent omnia, in majus Reipub. Literariæ commodum. Ac proinde, ut nullum impedimentum eſſet tam utili ac generoſo propoſito, vel ultrò tibi concederem copiam edendi primas meas ſecundâſque literas ad Carteſium conſcriptas; quippe quòd abſque eis, ut rectè mones, reſponſa ejus tam commodè intelligi non poſſint: nec multùm abs re fore diffiteor, ſi tertias meas ſimul edideris, cùm per eas reſponſum ſit alteris illis Carteſianis. Sed cùm quartæ meæ nullis illius literis reſpondeant, nec illis ab ipſo reſponſum ſit quicquam, urpote inopinatâ morte prærepto, de iis aliquantùm hæſito an publici juris facerem. Caterùm omnem ſcrupulum eximeret, ſi quis ex amicis ipſius aut familiaribus, qui frequentiùs eum inviſerunt, & collocti ſunt, vel cum eo vixerunt conjunctiùs, reſpondendi vices ſuppleret; tunc enim parùm dubito quin operæ eſſet pretium illas etiam in lucem dare. Quòd ſi hoc in præſens impetrari non poſſit, modò probabile eſſet quòd literæ illæ meæ, tertię quartæque, editæ allicerent aliquem ex peritioribus Philoſophiæ Carteſianæ ſectatoribus ad reſpondendum omnibus difficultatibus inibi Carteſio ipſi propoſitis, ex illa ſaltem ſpe faciliùs animum inducerem ut jus tibi concedam eas in publicum proferendi. Quid autem futurum ſit in hac re ipſe forſan opportuniùs quàm ego conjecturam capies. Nè multis igitur te morer, totum hoc negotium judicio tuo ac candori permitto, ut, quod faſto opus ſit, facias. Incredibile eſt quanto mœrore ſum affectus, audito præmaturo Carteſſi fato, quippe qui ingenium

nium virtutésque incomparabilis viri impensè amavi & miratus sum. Præterea, accessit ingens desiderium perlegendi responsa ejus, quæ expectavi, ad tertias quartasque meas literas, quæ universam illius Philosophiam percurrunt. Inchoasse integrum responsum ad meas datas 10. Cal. Aug. ex te intelligo. Quod fragmentum scripsisse eum conjicio cum Egmondæ esset in Hollandia. Destitit autem, ut per amicos suos certior me fecit, ab incepto, quod animus occupatissimus paratu ad iter Suecicum non potuit vacare tam subtilibus tantique, uti ipse dixit, momenti difficultatibus & disquisitionibus; sed constanter pollicitus est suis, se proximo vere reversum, & tunc mihi copiosè & perspicuè omnia explicaturum. Sed cum invida mors cætera nobis præripuerit, nollem vel illud Fragmentum duarum paginarum, quarum mentionem facis, interire. Quod ad solidiora illa Cartesii monumenta attinet, quæ proferis te habere, quæque, uti promittis, lucem visura sunt suo tempore, gestit profectò animus ad tam lætum gratumque nuncium; avidèque interim cupio, si tibi non sit molestum, ut argumenta titulósve singulorum librorum recenseas in proximis tuis literis. Revixit enim in me, ex quo nuperas tuas accepi, pristinus ille ardor erga Philosophiam Cartesianam, qui aliquantulum ab obitu desideratissimi nostri Amici deferbuerat, cum nova legendi materies non suppeteret. Sed, ut ingenuè fatear quod res est, illud solum in causa non fuit, sed peculiaris quædam studia quæ aliò animum avocârunt. Est enim illud rerum pondus, veritatis pulchritudo, amplitudo ingenii & acumen, Theorematum denique omnium admirabilis ille ordo & consensus in scriptis Cartesianis, ut vel millies lecta non sordescant: non magis quàm lux Solis, cujus ortum singulis diebus aves, pecudes, ipsique adeò homines gratulabundi contemplantur.

Nec certè solum lectu jucunda est hæc Cartesianæ Philosophia, sed apprime utilis, quicquid aut mussitent aut deblaterent alii, ad summum illum omnis Philosophiæ finem, putà Religionem. Cum enim Peripatetici formas quasdam contendunt esse substantiales, quæ è potentia materiæ oriuntur, quæque cum materia ita coalescunt, ut absque illa subsistere non possint, ac proinde necessariò demum redeunt in potentiam materiæ (cui ordini accensent viventium ferè omnium animas, etiam eas quibus sensum cogitationemque tribuunt; ) Epicurei autem, explosis illis substantialibus formis, ipsi materiæ vim sentiendi cogitandique inesse statuunt; solus, quod scio, inter Physiologos extitit Cartesius, qui substantiales illas formas, animasve materiâ exortas, è Philosophia sustulit, materiâque ipsam omni sentiendi cogitandique facultate planè spoliavit. Unde, si principiis staretur Cartesianis, certissima esset ratio ac Methodus demonstrandi, & quòd Deus sit, & quòd anima humana mortalis esse non possit. Quæ sunt illa duo solidissima fundamenta ac fulcra omnis veræ Religionis. Hæc breviter noto, cum possim & alia bene multa huc adjicere, quæ eodem spectant. Sed summatim dicam, nullam extare Philosophiam, nisi Platoniam fortè exceperis, quæ tam firmiter Atheis viam præcludit ad perversas istas cavillas & subterfugia quò se solent recipere, quàm hæc Cartesianæ, si penitiùs intelligatur. Unde spero, quòd omnes boni clementiùs ferent amplissimas illas laudes quibus incomparabilem Virum cumulo, in iis quas ad eum scripsi literis; credòque, quicquid hæc præ-



sens ætas senserit de Cartesio (nam ut nunquam vivis, ita rarò recenti defunctorum memoriæ parcat invidia) quòd posteritas eum omni cum laude & veneratione sit exceptura, optimùmque illius Philosophiæ usum sit agitura. Quod lubentiùs prædico, ut majorem in modum tibi animos accendam ad pergendum in nobili illo instituto, edendi omnia quæ habes Cartesii scripta Philosophica; quo pacto cum alios multos, tum me præter cæteros, devincies, qui in illis evolvendis tantam percipere soleo voluptatem.

Si tibi visum fuerit meas ad Cartesium literas publicare, vehementer hoc abs te efflagito, ut nè fiat juxta illa exemplaria quæ jam habes, quia multò correctiora tibi paro. Deprehendi enim, postquam attentius legeram, non pauca corrigenda, quæ imprudenti mihi exciderunt præ nimio animi fervore ac festinatione cum ad Cartesium scriberem. Expunxi etiam quædam ex Quæsitis in tertiis quartisque meis literis; sed primæ secundæque integræ sunt.

Quòd mensis ferè jam elapsus est ex quo tuas accepi literas, nec tamen ad te rescripsi, id profectò factum est per nullam negligentiam aut incuriam. Non possum enim non magni te æstimare, tum propter eximium tuum ingenium, ad omnem, quòd satè ex literis tuis perspexi, æquitatem & humanitatem compositum ac conformatum, tum propter honorificam Clarissimi fratris tui Chanuti, olim apud Suevos, nunc verò, uti narras, apud Batavos Legati meritissimi, in Cartesium defunctum pietatem. Sed totum id temporis quòd effluxit partim negotiis, quibus eram ruri districtus, partim meis ad Cartesium literis castigandis transcribendisque, postquam ad Academiam rediissem, impensum est; nec putabam fore operæ pretium ad te rescribere, priùs quàm ista perfecissem. Jam verò in parato sunt omnia, tam mearum quàm Cartesianarum literarum exemplaria: neutra tamen ad te mitto hâc vice, quippe quòd experiundum putavi priùs, quàm tutò hæ, quas jam scripsi, literæ ad manus tuas pervenerint: postquam id intellexerim, mittam ad te continuo. Perlubenter interim ex te audire vellem, quò usque devenieris in nobili illo negotio quòd scribis te suscepisse. Rem sanè mihi pergratam præstabis, si per proximas tuas literas ea de re certio rem me feceris. Vale, Vir Clarissime, & generosum illud opus quòd moliris feliciter exequere. Sic optat.

Cantabrigiæ, è Collegio Christi,  
pridie Idus Maii, 1655.

*Tibi Cartesianisque  
omnibus addictissimus*  
HENRICUS MORUS.

*Clarissimo*

Clarissimo Virò

## RENATO DES-CARTES

HENRICUS MORUS ANGLUS.

**Q**uantâ voluptate perfusus est animus meus, Vir Clarissime, in scriptis tuis legendis, nemo quisquam præter te unum potest conjectare.

Equidem ausim asseverare me haud minùs exultâsse in recognoscendis intelligendisque præclaris tuis Theorematis, quàm ipse in inveniendis; æquæque charos habere atque deamare pulcherrimos illos ingenii tui fœtus, ac si proprius eos enixus esset animus. Quod & certè fecisse aliquò modo mihi videtur, exerendo sese atque expediendo in eisdem sensus ac cogitationes, quos generosa tua mens præconcepit & præmonstravit; Qui sanè istiusmodi sunt, ut, cùm intellectui judicioque meo adedò sint congenères, ut non sperem fore ut incidam in quicquam conjunctum magis ac consanguineum, ità sanè à nullius ingenio alieni esse possint; cujus itidem ingenium non sit à recta ratione alienum.

Liberè dicam quod sentio: Omnes quotquot exstiterunt, aut etiamnum existunt, Arcanorum Naturæ Antistites, si ad Magnificam tuam indolem comparentur, Pumilos planè videri ac Pygmæos: meque, cùm vel unicâ vice evolvissem Lucubrationes tuas Philosophicas, suspicatum esse, illustrissimam tuam discipulam, Serenissimam Principem Elizabetham, universis Europæis, non fœminis solùm, sed viris, etiam Philosophis, longè evaluisse sapientiorē. Quod mox evidentius deprehendi, cùm inceperim scripta tua paulò penitiùs rimari & intelligere.

Tandem enim clarè mihi affulsit Cartesiana Lux, (i. e.) libera, distincta, sibi que constans Ratio, quæ Naturam pariter ac paginas tuas mirificè collustravit; ità ut aut nullæ aut paucissimæ supersint latebræ, & loci quos non patefecit nobilis illa fax, aut saltem vel levissimo negotio, mihi cùm libitum fuerit, mox sit patefactura. Omnia profectò tam concinna in tuis Philosophiæ Principiis, Dioptricis & Meteoris, tamque pulchrè sibi ipsis Naturæque consona sunt, ut mens Ratióque humana jucundius vix optaret lætiùsve spectaculum.

In Methodo tua, lusorio quodam, sed eleganti sanè, modestiæ genere, talem te exhibes virum ut nihil indole genióque tuo suavius & amabilius, nihil excelsius & generosius vel fingi possit, vel expeti.

Quorsum autem hæc? Non quòd putarem, Vir Clarissime, aut tuâ interesse aut Reipublicæ Literariæ ut hæc conscriberem; sed quòd mirabilis illius voluptatis ac fructûs quem ex scriptis tuis percepi conscientia extorqueret hoc qualecunque est animi in te grati testimonium. Præterea, ut certum te facerem, etiam apud Anglos esse qui te tuâque magni æstimaant, divinâque animi tui dotes vehementer suspiciunt & admirantur: Neminem autem hominem meipso impensius te amare posse, eximiamque tuam Philosophiam arctiùs amplexari.



Sed revera, illustrissime Cartesi, ut nihil dissimulem; quamvis pulcherrimum illud Philosophiæ tuæ corpus ac essentiam valde depeream, fateor tamen paucula excidisse in secunda Principiorum parte, quæ certè animus meus aut paulò hebetior est quàm ut capiat, aut ut admittat, averfator.

Sed præclaræ tuæ Philosophiæ Summa nihil indè periclitatur, cum hujusmodi ista sint, ut cum aut falsa meritò aut incerta judicari possint, ità nihil ad essentiam Philosophiæ tuæ ac fundamenta pertinere, illaque sine istis optimè possit constare. Quæ verò ea sint, si tibi non sit tædio, breviter nunc exponam.

Primò, definitionem Materiæ seu Corporis instituis multò quàm par est latiore. Res enim extensa Deus videtur esse, atque Angelus, imò verò res qualibet per se subsistens; ità ut eisdem finibus claudi videatur extensio atque essentia rerum absoluta, quæ tamen variari potest pro essentiarum ipsarum varietate. Atq; equidem quòd Deus extenditur suo modo, hinc arbitror patere, nempe quòd sit omnipræsens, & universam mundi machinam singulâsque ejus particulas intimè occupet. Quomodo enim motum imprimeret materiæ, quod fecisse aliquando, & etiamnum facere, ipse fateris, nisi proximè quasi attingeret materiam universi, aut saltem aliquando attigisset? Quod certè nunquam fecisset nisi adfuisset ubique, singulâsque plagas occupavisset. Deus igitur suo modo extenditur atque expanditur, ac proinde est res extensa.

Neque tamen ille corpus istud est, sive materia, quam ingeniosa illa Artifex, Mens scilicet tua, in globulos striatâsque particulas tam affabrè tornavit. Quamobrem res extensa latior corpore est.

Animûmque mihi ulterius addit ut à te hac in re dissentiam, quòd ad confirmationem hujusce tuæ definitionis *tam scævum adhibes argumentum, & ferme Sophisticum*. Quòd utiquè corpus possit esse corpus sine mollitie, vel duritie, vel pondere, vel levitate, &c. illis enim aliisq; omnibus qualitatibus quæ in materia corporea sentiuntur ex ea sublati, ipsam integram remanere. Quod perinde est ac si dixeris, libram Cerae, cum possit esse libra ceræ, quamvis spoliatur figurâ sphæricâ, vel cubicâ, vel pyramidali, &c. sub nulla figura posse remanere integram ceræ libram. Quod tamen impossibile est. Quamvis enim hæc vel illa figura non tam arctè cohareat cum cera quin illam exuere possit, ut tamen cera semper sit figurata necessitas summa est & arctissima. Ità quamvis materia non sit necessariò mollis, nec dura, nec calida, nec frigida, ut tamen sit *sensibilis* est summè necessarium; vel, si malles, *tangibilis*, prout optimè definit Lucretius,

*Tangere enim, & tangi, nisi corpus nulla potest res.*

Quæ certè notio minùs debet à tua mente abhorrere, cum Philosophia tua omnem sensum, cum antiquis illis apud Theophrastum *μερὲς αἰσθητικῆς*, tactum planissimè constituat. Quod vero verius esse ipse facillimè admittam. Sed si minùs placet *corpus definire ab habitudine ad sensus nostros*, Tangibilitas hæc latior sit ac diffusior, & significet mutuam illum contactum tangendique potentiam inter corpora quælibet, sive animata sive inanimata fuerint, estoque superficierum duorum pluriûmve corporum immediata juxtapositio. Quod & aliam innuit materiæ sive corporis conditionem

ditionem, quam appellare poteris *impenetrabilitatem*; nempe quòd nec penetrare alia corpora, nec ab illis penetrari possit. Unde manifestissimum est discrimen inter Naturam divinam ac corpoream, cùm illa hanc penetrare, hæc verò se ipsam penetrare non possit. Unde sanè felicius mihi videtur cum Platoniciis suis Virgilius philosophari, quàm Cartesius ipse, cùm ex illorum sententia sic cecinerit,

——— *Totámque infusa per artus*

*Mens agitat molem, & magno se corpore miscet.*

Mitto alias insigniores Divinæ extensionis conditiones, cùm non opus sit hoc loco explicare. Vel hæc pauca suffecerint ad demonstrandum multò tutius fuisse materiam definivisse substantiam *tangibilem*, vel modo suprà explicato *impenetrabilem*, quàm Rem extensam. Dicta enim vel *Tangibilitas*, vel *Impenetrabilitas*, competit corpori adæquatè; tua autem definitio peccat in legem *καθόλου πᾶσι*, neque enim est reciproca cum definito.

Secundò, Quando innuis nè *virtute quidem divinâ fieri posse ut propriè dictum existat vacuum*, & si omne corpus ex vase tolleretur, quòd latera necessariò coirent; ista profectò mihi videntur non solum falsa, sed minùs consona antecedentibus. Si enim Deus motum materiæ imprimat, quod suprà docuisti, annon ille potest contrà obniti, & inhibere nè coeant vasis latera? Sed contradictio est distare vasis latera, & tamen nihil interjacere. Idem non sensit literata Antiquitas, Epicurus, Democritus, Lucretius, aliique. Sed ut leviusculum illud argumenti genus missum faciam; divinam contendo interjacere extensionem, tuumque hîc suppositum esse infirmum, materiam solummodo extendi: Latera tamen ut antea coitura non necessitate Logicâ sed naturali; Deumque solum hanc coitionem inhibere posse. Cùm enim particulæ, primi præsertim secundique Elementi, tam furibundo motu agitentur, necesse est quâ ceditur, eò ruant præcipites, aliisque sibi contiguas secum abripiant.

Infeliciter igitur successit, quòd tam bellum Theorema de modo Rarefactionis & Condensationis, quod certè ego aliis de causis verissimum esse censeo, tam lubrico suffulcias fundamento.

Tertiò, Singularem illam subtilitatem non capio, quâ atomos, id est particulas suâ naturâ indivisibiles, non dari evincas. Ut enim, inquis, effecerit Deus eas particulas à nullis creaturis dividi posse, non certè sibi ipsi easdem dividendi facultatem potuit adimere, quia fieri non potest ut propriam suam potentiam imminuat. Eodem argumento probaveris, Deum nunquam fecisse ut hesternus oriretur Sol, quoniam potentia ejus jam efficere non potest ut Sol hesternus non esset ortus; nec vilissimam posse muscam occidere,

*Si modo qui periit, non periisse potest,*

quod scitè de seipso Ovidius; aut materiam non creâsse, cùm sit divisibilis in semper divisibilia, ac proinde Deus nunquam posset absolvere ac perficere hanc divisionem. Pars enim restat indivisa, quamvis divisibilis, atque ità perpetuò eluditur potentia divina, nec plenè se exerere potest, finemque sortiri.

Quartò, Indefinitam tuam mundi extensionem non intelligo. Extensio enim illa indefinita vel simpliciter infinita est, vel tantum quoad nos.

Si



Si intelligis extensionem infinitam simpliciter, cur mentem tuam obscuras vocabulis nimium suppressis ac modestis? Si tantum quoad nos infinitam, revera erit finita extensio; neque enim mens nostra aut rerum aut veritatis mensura est. Ac proinde, cum alia sit simpliciter infinita expansio, divinæ utique essentiae, materia tuorum vorticum à centrīs suis recedet, totaque mundi machina in dissipatas atomos vagosque abibit pulvisculos.

Atque sanè eò magis hinc admiror modestiam tuam atque metum, quod adeò tibi caves à materiae infinitudine, cum particulas actu & infinitas & divisas ipse agnoveris Art. 34, & 35. Quod certè si non fecisses, extorqueri tamen posse videtur hoc modo. Nam cum quantum sit in infinitum divisibile, partes actu infinitas habere oportet. Ut enim cultello aliòve quovis instrumento corpus in partes palpabiles, quæ non actu sunt tales, mechanicè dissecare prorsus est ἀμύχρον, sive impossibile; ita vel mente quantitatem dividere in partes toti realiter actûque non inexistentes, planè ἄλογον est ac rationi absoum.

Quibus insuper adjungi potest, hypothesein hanc, quod mundus simpliciter ac revera sit infinitus, æqualem vim habere ad explicandam juxta ac confirmandam rationem rarefactionis & condensationis, quam supra proposuisti Art. 6, 7. atque istud principium, *solum corporis esse extensionem, & nihilum non posse extendi*. Quod enim ibi præstat Logica seu contradictoria necessitas, idem hinc necessitas Physica vel mechanica certissime præstabit.

Cum enim omnia in infinitum usque materiâ seu corporibus sint plena ac referta, penetrationis lex impediet nè fiat ulla distantia in rarefactione corporibus nuda, aut accessio partium ad se invicem in condensatione, sine interjacentium particularum expulsionē.

Atque hætenus quæ à me dicta sunt rationi mentique meæ maximè videntur perspicua, tuisque placitis longè longèque certiora.

Cæterum à nulla tuarum opinionum animus meus, pro ea quæ est mollitie ac teneritudine, æquè abhorret, ac ab internecina illa & jugulatrice sententia, quam in Methodo tulisti, brutis omnibus vitam sensumque eripiens, dicam, an potius præripiens? neque enim vixisse unquam pateris. Hinc non tam suspicio rutilantem tui ingenii aciem, quàm reformido, utpote de animantium fato sollicitus, acumenque tuum non subtile solum agnosco, sed chalybis instar rigidum ac crudele, quod uno quasi ictu universum ferme animantium genus vitâ aufit sensûque spoliare, in marmora & machinas vertendo.

Sed videamus obsecro quid in causa est quod in brutas animantes quicquam tam severiter statuas. Loqui utique non possunt, causamque suam apud judicem dicere, & quod crimen aggravat, cum ad loquelam organis satis sint instructæ, uti patet in Picis & Psittacis. Hinc vitâ sensûque mulcandæ sunt.

Verum enimvero quomodo fieri possit ut aut Psittaci aut Picæ voces nostras imitentur, nisi audirent, sensûque perciperent quid loquimur? Sed non intelligunt, inquis, quid sibi volunt istæ voces quas effutunt imitando. Quidni tamen ipsi quid volunt satis intelligant, cibum scilicet quem à Dominis hoc artificio acquirunt? putant igitur se cibum mendicare,

dicare, quòd istâ loquacitate toties voti compotes fiunt. Et quorsum, quæso, illa attentio est & auscultatio in avibus cantatoriis, quam præ se ferunt, si nullus sit in ipsis sensus nec animadversio? Unde illa vulpium canumque astutia & sagacitas? Quî fit ut minæ & verba ferocientes cohibeant belluas? Canis famelicus cùm furtim quid abstulit, cur quasi facti conscius clâm se surripit, & meticulosè ac diffidenter incedens nemini occurrenti gratulatur, sed averso pronoque rostro suam ad distans pergit viam, suspiciosè cautus nè ob patratum scelus poenas luat? Quomodo ista fieri possunt sine interna facti conscientia? Copiosa ista historiolarum congeries, quibus nonnulli conantur demonstrare rationem inesse animalibus brutis, hoc saltem evincet, sensum ipsis memoriâque inesse. Sed infinitum esset tales narratiunculas hîc attexere. E quibus scio bene multas istius modi esse, ut earum vim vel subtilissimum acumen haud possit eludere.

Sed video planè quid te huc adegit, ut bruta pro machinis habeas; Immortalitatis utique animarum nostrarum demonstrandæ ratio, quæ cùm supponat corpus nullo modo cogitare posse, concludit, ubicumque est cogitatio, substantiam à corpore realiter distinctam adesse oportere, adeoque immortalem. Unde sequitur, bruta si cogitent, substantias immortales sibi annexas habere.

Atqui obsecro te, Vir perspicacissime, cùm ex ista demonstrandi ratione necesse esset bruta animantia aut sensu spoliare, aut donare immortalitate, cur ipsa malles inanimes machinas statuere quàm corpora animabus immortalibus actuata? præsertim cùm illud ut naturæ phænomenis minimè consonum, ità planè sit inauditum hætenus; hoc verò apud sapientissimos veterum ratum sit ac comprobatum, Pythagoram putà, Platonem, aliósque. Et certè animos hoc adderet Platoniciis omnibus perscrutandi in sua de brutorum immortalitate sententia, cùm tam insigne ingenium eò angustiarum redactum sit, ut si animas brutorum immortales esse non concedatur, universa bruta insensatas machinas necessariò statuat.

Hæc sunt paucula illa (magne Cartesi) in quibus mihi fas esse putabam à te dissentire. Cætera mihi adeò arrident atque adblandiuntur, ut nihil illis habeam magis in deliciis; adeoque intimis animi mei sensibus consona sunt atque cognata, ut non solum tardioribus commodè explicare, sed etiam contra pugnacissimos quosque feliciter, si opus esset, defendere me posse confidam.

Quod reliquum est, exorandus es, Vir illustrissime, ut hæc nostra boni consulas, nec me ullius levitatis vanæque ambitionis suspectum habeas, quasi affectarem Clarissimorum virorum familiaritates ac amicitias, cùm & ipse si possem, haud cuperem, inclarescere, rem turbulentam famam judicans, privatoque otio valde inimicam.

Neque profectò quamvis animo sim in te admodum pronus ac proclivis, id unquam tibi significâsem, nisi ab aliis instigatus; sed te tuæque amore latenti tacitæque veneratione prosequi contentus fuisset.

Nec obnixè à te efflagito ut rescribas, utpote quem contemplationibus summè arduis, vel experimentis faciundis maximè utilibus pariter ac difficilibus, occupatissimum autumo.

Permitto igitur hîc tibi tuo jure uti, nè sim in publicum injurius. Quòd



ſi tamen hæc noſtra, qualia qualia fuerint, reſponſione quâlibetunque  
cohoneſtare dignatus fueris, rem ſanè non ingratam præſtabis

*Cantabrigia, è Collegio Chriſti,  
Idus Decembris, anno 1648.*

*Singulari tuæ ſapientia  
cultori devotiſſimo,*

HENRICO MORO.

*Doctiſſimo & Humaniſſimo Viro*

H E N R I C O M O R O

R E N A T U S D E S - C A R T E S.

**L**Audes quas in me congeris, Vir humaniſſime, non tam ullius mei  
meriti, utpote quòd eas æquare nullum poteſt, quàm tuæ erga me  
benevolentiaæ teſtes ſunt. Benevolentia autem ex ſola ſcriptorum  
meorum lectione contracta candorem & generoſitatem animi tui tam  
apertè oſtendit, ut totum me tibi, quamvis antehac non noto, devinciat.  
Ideoque perlibenter iis quæ ex me quæris reſpondebo.

I. Primum eſt, cur ad corpus definiendum dicam illud eſſe ſubſtantiam  
extenſam potiùs quàm ſenſibilem, tangibilem, vel impenetrabilem. At res  
te monet, ſi dicatur ſubſtantia ſenſibilis, tunc *definiri ab habitudine ad ſen-  
ſus noſtros*, quâ ratione quædam ejus proprietas duntaxat explicatur, non  
integra natura, quæ cùm poſſit exiſtere, *quamvis nulli homines exiſtant*,  
certè à ſenſibus noſtris non pendet. Nec proinde video cur dicas, eſſe  
ſummè neceſſarium ut omnis materia ſit ſenſibilis. Nam contrà, nulla eſt  
quæ non ſit planè inſenſibilis, ſi tantùm in partes *nervorum noſtrorum  
particulis multo minores*, & ſingulas ſeorſim ſatis celeriter agitatæ, ſit  
diviſa.

Meumque illud argumentum quod ſcævum & ferme Sophiſticum  
appellæ, adhibui tantùm ad eorum opinionem reſutandam, qui tecum  
exiſtimant omne corpus eſſe ſenſibile, quam, meo judicio, apertè & de-  
monſtrativè reſutat. Poteſt enim corpus retinere omnem ſuam corporis  
naturam, *quamvis non ſit ad ſenſum molle*, nec durum, nec frigidum, nec  
calidum, nec denique habeat ullam ſenſibilem qualitatem.

Ut verò inciderem in eum errorem quem videris mihi velle tribuere,  
per comparationem ceræ, quæ quamvis poſſit non eſſe quadrata, nec ro-  
tunda, non poteſt tamen non habere aliquam figuram, debuifſem, ex eo  
quòd juxta mea principia omnes ſenſibiles qualitates in eo ſolo conſiſtant  
quòd particulæ corporis certis modis moveantur, vel quieſcant, debuif-  
ſem, inquam, concludere, corpus poſſe exiſtere, quamvis nullæ ejus par-  
ticulæ moveantur, nec quieſcant; quod mihi nunquam in mentem venit.  
Corpus itaque non rectè definitur ſubſtantia ſenſibilis.

Videamus nunc an fortè aptiùs dici poſſit ſubſtantia impenetrabilis, vel  
tangibilis, eo ſenſu quem explicuiſti.

Sed rurfus iſta tangibilitas & impenetrabilitas in corpore, eſt tantùm *ut*  
*in*

*in homine Risibilitas, proprium quarto modo, juxta vulgares Logicæ leges, non vera & essentialis differentia, quam in extensione consistere contendendo; atque idcirco, ut homo non definitur animal risibile, sed rationale; ita corpus non definiri per impenetrabilitatem, sed per extensionem. Quod confirmatur ex eo, quod tangibilitas & impenetrabilitas habeant relationem ad partes, & præsupponant conceptum divisionis vel terminationis. Possimus autem concipere corpus continuum indeterminatæ magnitudinis, sive indefinitum, in quo nihil præter extensionem consideretur.*

Sed, inquis, Deus etiam & Angelus, resque alia quælibet per se subsistens est extensa, ideoque latius patet definitio tua quam definitum. Ego verò non soleo quidem de nominibus disputare, atque ideo si ex eo quod Deus sit ubique, dicat aliquis eum esse quodammodo extensum, per me licet. *Atqui nego veram extensionem*, qualis ab omnibus vulgò concipitur, vel in Deo, vel in Angelis, vel in mente nostra, vel denique in ulla substantia quæ non sit corpus, reperiri. Quippe per ens extensum, communiter omnes intelligunt aliquid imaginabile, (sive sit ens rationis, sive reale, hoc enim jam in medium relinquo;) atqui in hoc ente varias partes determinatæ magnitudinis & figuræ, quarum una nullo modo alia sit, possunt imaginatione distinguere, unâque in locum aliarum possunt etiam imaginatione transferre, sed non duas simul in uno & eodem loco imaginari: Atqui de Deo, ac etiam de mente nostra, nihil tale dicere licet; neque enim est imaginabilis, sed intelligibilis duntaxat, nec etiam in partes distinguibilis, præsertim in partes quæ habeant determinatas magnitudines & figuras. Denique, facilè intelligimus & mentem humanam, & Deum, & simul plures Angelos in uno & eodem loco esse posse. Unde manifestè concluditur, nullas substantias incorporeas propriè esse extensas: sed eas intelligo tanquam virtutes aut vires quasdam, quæ quamvis se applicent rebus extensis, non idcirco sunt extensæ; ut quamvis in ferro candenti sit ignis, non ideo ignis ille est ferrum. Quod verò nonnulli substantiæ notionem cum rei extensæ notionem confundant, hoc fit ex falso præjudicio, quia nihil putant existere, vel *esse intelligibile, nisi sit etiam imaginabile*, ac revera nihil sub imaginationem cadit, quod non sit aliquo modo extensum. Jam verò quemadmodum dicere licet sanitatem soli homini competere, quamvis per analogiam & Medicina; & aër temperatus, & alia multa dicantur etiam sana; ita illud solum quod est imaginabile, ut habens partes extra partes, quæ sint determinatæ magnitudinis & figuræ, dico esse extensum, quamvis alia per analogiam etiam extensa dicantur.

2. Ut autem transeamus ad secundam tuam difficultatem; si examinemus quodnam sit ens extensum à me descriptum, inveniemus planè idem esse cum spatio, quod vulgus aliquando plenum, aliquando vacuum, aliquando reale, aliquando imaginarium esse putat. In spatio enim, quantumvis imaginario & vacuo, facilè omnes imaginantur varias partes determinatæ magnitudinis & figuræ, possuntque *unas in locum aliarum imaginatione transferre*; sed nullo modo duas simul se mutuò penetrantes in uno & eodem loco concipere, quoniam implicat contradictionem ut hoc fiat, & spatii pars nulla tollatur. Cùm autem ego considerarem tam reales proprietates non nisi in reali corpore esse posse, ausus sum affirmare, nul-



lum dari spatium prorsus vacuum, atque omne ens extensum esse verum corpus: nec dubitavi à magnis viris, Epicuro, Democrito, Lucretio hac in re dissentire; vidi enim illos non firmam aliquam rationem esse secutos, sed falsum præjudicium, quo omnes ab ineunte ætate fuimus imbuti. Quippe quamvis sensus nostri non semper nobis exhibeant corpora externa qualia sunt omni ex parte, sed tantum quatenus ad nos referuntur, & prodesse possunt aut nocere, ut in Art. 3. partis 2. præmonui; judicavimus tamen omnes, cum essemus adhuc pueri, nihil aliud in mundo esse quam quod à sensibus exhibebatur, ac proinde nullum esse corpus nisi sensibile, locaque omnia in quibus nihil sentiebamus vacua esse. Quod præjudicium cum ab Epicuro, Democrito, Lucretio non fuerit unquam rejectum, illorum auctoritatem sequi non debeo.

Miror autem virum cætera perspicacissimum, cum videat se negare non posse *quin aliqua in omni spatio substantia sit*, quoniam in eo omnes proprietates extensionis revera reperiuntur, malle tamen dicere divinam extensionem implere spatium in quo nullum est corpus, quam fateri nullum omnino spatium sine corpore esse posse. Etenim, ut jam dixi, prætenso illa Dei extensio nullo modo subjectum esse potest verarum proprietatum, quas in omni spatio distinctissimè percipimus. Neque enim Deus est imaginabilis, nec in partes distinguibilis quæ sint mensurabiles & figuratæ.

Sed facilè admittis nullum vacuum naturaliter dari. Sollicitus es de potentia divina, quam putas tollere posse id omne quod est in aliquo vase, simulque impedire nè coëant vasis latera. Ego verò cum sciam meum Intellectum esse finitum, & Dei potentiam infinitam, nihil unquam de hac determino; sed considero duntaxat quid possit à me percipi vel non percipi, & caveo diligenter nè iudicium ullum meum à perceptione dissentiat. Quapropter audacter affirmo, Deum posse id omne quod possibile esse percipio; non autem è contra audacter nego, illum posse id quod conceptui meo repugnat, sed dico tantum implicare contradictionem. Sic quia video conceptui meo repugnare ut omne corpus ex aliquo vase tollatur, & in ipso remaneat extensio, non aliter à me concepta quam prius concipiebatur corpus in eo contentum; dico implicare contradictionem, ut talis extensio ibi remaneat post sublatum corpus, ideoque debere vasis latera coire: Quod omnino consonum est meis cæteris opinionibus. Dico enim alibi *nullum motum dari nisi quodammodo circularem*; unde sequitur non intelligi distinctè, Deum aliquod corpus ex vase tollere, quin simul intelligatur, in ejus locum aliud corpus, vel ipsa vasis latera motu circulari succedere.

3. Eodem modo etiam dico implicare contradictionem, ut aliquæ dentur atomi, *quæ concipiantur extensa ac simul indivisibiles*; quia quamvis Deus eas tales efficere potuerit ut à nulla creatura dividantur, certè non possumus intelligere ipsum se facultate eas dividendi privare potuisse. Nec valet tua comparatio de iis quæ facta sunt, quòd nequeant infecta esse. Neque enim pro nota impotentiae sumimus, quòd quis non possit facere id quod non intelligimus esse possibile; sed tantum quòd non possit aliquid facere ex iis quæ tanquam possibilia distinctè percipimus. At sanè percipimus esse possibile ut atomus dividatur, quandoquidem eam extensam esse supponimus; atque ideo si iudicemus eam à Deo dividi non posse,

posse, judicabimus Deum aliquid non posse facere, quod tamen possibile esse percipimus. Non autem eodem modo percipimus fieri posse, ut quod factum est sit infectum, sed è contrà, percipimus hoc fieri planè non posse; ac proinde non esse ullum potentiae defectum in Deo, quòd istud non faciat. Quantum autem ad divisibilitatem materiae, non eadem ratio est: etsi enim non possim numerare omnes partes in quas est divisibilis; earumque idcirco numerum dicam esse indefinitum; non tamen possum affirmare illarum divisionem à Deo nunquam absolvi, quia scio Deum plura posse facere quàm ego cogitatione meâ complecti; atque istam indefinitam quarundam partium materiae divisionem revera fieri solere in Artic. 34. concessi.

4. Neque verò affectatae modestiae est, sed cautelae, meo iudicio, necessariae, quòd quaedam dicam esse indefinita potius quàm infinita; solus enim Deus est quem positivè intelligo esse infinitum: de reliquis, ut de mundi extensione, de numero partium in quas materia est divisibilis, & similibus, *an sint simpliciter infinita necne, profiteor me nescire*; scio tantum me in illis nullum finem agnoscere, atque idcirco respectu mei dico esse indefinita.

Et quamvis mens nostra non sit rerum vel veritatis mensura, certè debet esse mensura eorum quae affirmamus aut negamus. Quid enim est absurdius, quid inconsideratius, quàm velle iudicium ferre de iis ad quorum perceptionem mentem nostram attingere non posse confitemur?

Miror autem te non modò id velle facere videri, cum ais, *si tantum quoad nos sit infinita, revera erit finita* extensio, &c; sed praeterea etiam divinam quandam extensionem imaginari, quae latius pateat quàm corporum extensio, atque ita supponere Deum partes habere extra partes, & esse divisibilem, omnemque prorsus rei corporeae essentiam illi tribuere.

Nè verò quis scrupulus hinc superfit; Cum dico extensionem materiae esse indefinitam, sufficere hoc puto ad impediendum nè quis extra illam locus fingi queat, in quem meorum vorticum particulae abire possint. *Ubi cumque enim locus ille concipiatur, ibi*, jam juxta meam opinionem, *aliqua materia est*; quia dicendo eam esse indefinitè extensam, dico ipsam latius extendi quàm omne id quod ab homine concipi potest.

Sed nihilominus existimo maximam esse differentiam inter amplitudinem istius corporeae extensionis, & amplitudinem divinae, non dicam extensionis, utpote quae propriè loquendo nulla est, sed substantiae vel essentiae; ideòque hanc simpliciter infinitam, illam autem indefinitam appello.

Ceterum non admitto quod pro singulari tua humanitate concedis, nempe reliquas meas opiniones posse constare, quamvis id quod de materiae extensione scripsi refutetur: *unum enim est ex praecipuis, meoque iudicio certissimis, Physica meae fundamentis*, profiteorque mihi nullas rationes satisfacere in ipsa Physica, nisi quae necessitatem illam, quam vocas Logicam sive contradictoriam, involvant; modò tantum ea excipias quae per solam experientiam cognosci possunt, ut quod circa hanc terram unicus sit Sol vel unica Luna, & similia. Cumque in reliquis à meo sensu non abhorreas, spero etiam his te faciliè assensurum, si modò consideres praëiudicium esse quòd multi existiment ens extensum, in quo nihil est quod moveat sensus, non esse veram substantiam corpoream, sed spatium



vacuum duntaxat; quòdque nullum sit corpus nisi sensibile, atque nulla substantia nisi quæ sub imaginationem cadat, ac proinde sit extensa.

5. *Sed nulli præjudicio magis omnes assuevimus* quàm ei, quod nobis ab ineunte ætate persuasit bruta animantia cogitare. Quippe nulla ratio nos movit ad hoc credendum, nisi quòd videntes pleraque brutorum membra in figura externa & motibus à nostris non multùm differre, unicùmque in nobis esse credentes istorum motuum principium, animam scilicet, quæ eadem moveret corpus & cogitaret, non dubitavimus quin aliqua talis anima in illis reperiretur.

Postquam autem ego advertissem distinguenda esse duo diversa motuum nostrorum principia, unum scilicet planè mechanicum & corporeum, quod à sola spirituum vi & membrorum conformatione dependet, potèstque *anima corporea* appellari; aliud incorporeum, *mentem* scilicet, sive animam illam quam definis substantiam cogitantem; quæsi diligentiùs an ab his duobus principiis oriantur animalium motus, an ab uno duntaxat. Cùmque clarè perspexerim posse omnes oriri ab eo solo quod corporeum est & mechanicum, pro certo ac demonstrato habui, nullo pacto à nobis probari posse, aliquam esse in brutis animam cogitantem. Nec moror astutias & sagacitates canum & vulpium, nec quæcunque alia quæ propter cibum, venerem, vel metum à brutis fiunt. *Profitcor enim me posse perfacile illa omnia ut à sola membrorum conformatione profecta explicare.*

Quamvis autem pro demonstrato habeam, probari non posse aliquam esse in brutis cogitationem; non ideo puto posse demonstrari nullam esse, quia mens humana illorum corda non pervadit. Sed examinando quidnam sit hac de re maximè probabile, nullam video rationem pro brutorum cogitatione militare *præter hanc unam*, quòd cùm habeant oculos, aures, linguam, & reliqua sensuum organa sicut nos, verisimile sit illa sentire sicut nos; & quia in nostro sentiendi modo cogitatio includitur, similem etiam illis cogitationem esse tribuendam. Quæ ratio cùm sit maximè obvia, mentes omnium hominum à prima ætate occupavit. Sunt autem aliæ rationes multò plures & fortiores, sed non omnibus ità obviæ, quæ contrarium planè persuadent. Inter quas suum quidem locum obtinet, *quòd non sit tam probabile omnes vermes, culices, erucas, & reliqua animalia immortali animâ prædita esse*, quàm machinarum instar se movere.

Primò, quia certum est in corporibus animalium, ut etiam in nostris, esse ossa, nervos, musculos, sanguinem, spiritus animales, & reliqua organa ità disposita, ut se solis absque ulla cogitatione omnes motus quos in brutis observamus ciere possint. Quod patet in convulsionibus, cùm mente invitâ machinamentum corporis vehementiùs sæpe ac magis diversis modis solum se movet, quàm ope voluntatis soleat moveri.

Deinde, quia rationi consentaneum videtur, cùm ars sit naturæ imitatrix, possintque homines varia fabricare automata in quibus sine ulla cogitatione est motus, ut Natura etiam sua automata, sed arte factis longè præstantiora, nempe bruta omnia, producat, præsertim cùm nullam agnoscamus rationem propter quam, ubi est talis membrorum conformatio qualem in animalibus videmus, cogitatio etiam debeat adesse; atque ideo

ideo majori admiratione dignum sit, quòd mens aliqua reperiat in unoquoque humano corpore, quàm quòd nulla sit in ullis brutis.

Sed rationum omnium quæ bestias cogitatione destitutas esse persuadent meo iudicio præcipua est, quòd quamvis inter illas unæ aliis ejusdem speciei sint perfectiores, non secus quàm inter homines, ut videre licet in equis & canibus, quorum aliqui cæteris multò felicius quæ docentur addiscunt; & quamvis omnes perfacile nobis impetus suos naturales, ut iras, metus, famem, & similia, voce vel aliis corporis motibus significant; numquam tamen hætenus fuerit observatum, ullum brutum animal eò perfectionis devenisse ut verâ loquelâ uteretur, hoc est, *ut aliquid vel voce vel nutibus indicaret*, quod ad solam cogitationem, non autem ad impetum naturalem, posset referri. Hæc enim loquela unicum est cogitationis in corpore latentis signum certum, atque ipsâ utuntur omnes homines, etiam *quàm maximè stupidi & mente capti*, & linguâ vocisque organis destituti, *non autem ullum brutum*; eamque idcirco pro vera inter homines & bruta differentia sumere licet.

Reliquas rationes cogitationem brutis adimentes brevitatis causâ hîc omitto. Velim tamen notari me loqui de cogitatione, non de vita vel sensu: vitam enim nulli animali denego, utpote quam in solo cordis calore consistere statuo; nec denego etiam sensum quatenus ab organo corporeo dependet. Sicque hæc mea opinio non tam crudelis est erga belluas, quàm pia erga homines, Pythagoreorum superstitioni non addictos, quos nempe à criminis suspitione absolvit quoties animalia comedunt vel occidunt.

Hæc autem omnia fortasse prolixius scripsi quàm acumen ingenii tui requirebat; volui enim hoc pacto testari paucissimorum objectiones mihi hætenus æquè gratas fuisse ac tuas, humanitatémque & candorem tuum maximè tibi devinxisse

*Egmondæ prope Alchmariam,  
Nonis Februarii 1649.*

*Omnium veræ sapientiæ studiosorum  
cultorem observantissimum,*

RENATUM DES-CARTES.

*Clarissimo Viro, Nobilissimoque Philosopho;*

RENATO DES-CARTES,

HENRICUS MORUS ANGLUS.

**O**pinionis quam de te concepi, nuperisque meis literis apud te testatus sum, quantâ quantâ sit (Vir illustrissime) me non pœnitet, nec unquam, fat scio, poterit pœnitere. Quin & adauget plurimum tui apud me existimationem, quòd ad stupendam illam mentis tuæ amplitudinem divinumque acumen, suavitas tanta morum accesserit & humanitas. Quam certè ut nunquam suspectam habui, ità nunc sanè eru-



dicissimas tuas literas habeo pro certissimo illius argumento. Cæterum nè tanti favoris te poeniteat, quasi in servum caput collati, nève vilescat meum erga te studium, atque amor, tanquam ab abjecto jacentique animo profectus, quo tandem modo responsa tua mihi satisfecerint, palàm, uti hominem liberum decet, aperteque profitebor. Quod tamen nè nimium tibi vel mihi ipsi negotium facessat, fusiores orationis texturas missas faciens, rem totam in Instantias quasdam breves, aut saltem notatiunculas super singulis responso- rum tuorum particulis, compingam.

## Ad Responsum circa primam Difficultatem

### Instantia I.

*Definiri ab habitudine ad sensus nostros, &c.*

Hic regeri potest; Cùm radix rerum omnium ac essentia in æternas defossa lateat tenebras, rem quamlibet necessariò definiri ab habitudine aliqua. Quæ habitudo proprietas dici potest in substantiis, cùm non sit substantia; quamvis agnoscam libenter *proprietates alias aliis esse priores*; hoc autem tantum me voluisse, Satiùs nimirum esse per adæquatam quamlibet proprietatem, quàm per formam, quam vocant, definito latiorrem, rem definivisse. Porro, cùm ipse corpus definis rem extensam, ipsam illam extensionem insuper adnoto consistere in habitudine quadam partium ad se invicem, quatenus aliæ extra alias productæ sunt. Quam habitudinem non esse rem absolutam manifestum est.

### II.

*Quamvis nulli homines existant.*

Si omnes mortales conniverent, Sol tamen non exueret suam videndi aptitudinem, quamprimùm oculos aperuerint denuò; ut neque securis, secandi, quamprimùm ligna aut lapides oblatis fuerint.

### III.

*Nervorum nostrorum particulis multò minores.*

Deum tamen artificem adaptare posse credo nervos satis exiguis istis materiæ particulis, ac proinde sensibilitatem materiæ hoc modo comminutæ integram manere. Porro, hæ particulæ à motu cessare possunt, atque coalescere, nostrisque hoc modo nervis sensibiles denuò evadere; quod de substantia incorporea nullo modo verum est.

### IV.

*Quamvis non sit ad sensum molle, &c.*

Certum est aut ad nervos nostros sensorios durum fore vel molle, &c. aut saltem ad istiusmodi nervos, quales, si vellet, Deus fabricare poterit, ut modò monuimus; atque hoc satis est, quamvis Deus nunquam fabricaturus sit istiusmodi nervos. Ut revera partes terræ versus centrum sunt ex se visibiles, quamvis nunquam extrahendæ sint in Solis conspectum, nec eò descendurus sit quisquam cum lychno vel lampade.

## V.

*Est tantum, ut in homine Risibilitas, proprium quarto modo.*

Quòd si ratio etiam aliis competeret animalibus, rectius definiretur homo animal risibile quàm rationale. *Nondum autem à quopiam demonstratum est tangibilitatem aut impenetrabilitatem proprias esse substantiæ extensæ affectiones*, quamvis corporis esse meritò quivis agnoverit. Equidem possum clarè concipere substantiam extensam quæ nullam ullo modo habeat tangibilitatem vel impenetrabilitatem. Igitur tangibilitas vel impenetrabilitas non immediatè substantiam extensam consequitur, quatenus extensa est.

## VI.

*Atqui nego veram extensionem, &c.*

Per veram extensionem intelligis quam tangibilitas & impenetrabilitas comitatur. Hanc ipse etiam nego in Deo, nudisve vel mente vel Angelo reperiri. Interea tamen *asserò aliam esse extensionem æquè veram*, quamvis non æquè vulgarem Scholisque tritam, quæ in Angelis mentisque humana ut terminos, ita & figuram habet, sed pro imperio Angeli mentisque variabilem; Mentisque sive animas nostras atque Angelos, eadem prorsus manente substantiâ, contrahere se posse, & certos denuò ad limites se expandere.

## VII.

*Nihil esse intelligibile nisi sit etiam imaginabile, &c.*

Equidem aliquantò sum pronior in illam Aristotelis sententiam, ὅτι ἀνὰ τῆς φαντασματικῆς ἐκείνης νοῦναι. Sed hîc quisque mentis suæ vires experiatur.

## Ad Responsum circa secundam Difficultatem

## Instantia I.

*Unas in locum aliarum imaginatione transferre.*

Mea quidem imaginatio non potest, nec concipere si transferantur, quin una vacui spatii partes absorbeant alteras, penitusque coincidant & penetrent se invicem.

## II.

*Nec dubitari à magnis viris, Epicuro, Democrito, &c.*

Nullus dubito quin optimo jure dissentias, cùm non solum istis, sed universis Naturæ interpretibus longè major sis ( meâ sententiâ ) longèque augustior.

## III.

*Quin aliqua in omni spatio substantia sit, &c.*

Id sanè concessi pacis ergò. Sed clarè mihi non constat. Nam si Deus hanc mundi universitatem annihilaret, & multò post aliam crearet de nihilo, *Intermundium illud*, seu absentia mundi, suam haberet durationem quam tot dies, anni, vel secula mensurâssent. Non existentis igitur est duratio, quæ extensio quædam est. Ac proinde Amplitudo Nihili, putà Vacui, per ulnas vel orgyas mensurari potest, ut Non-existentis in sua



non existentia duratio per horas, dies mensēsque mensuratur. Sed concedo, quamvis nondum vi coactus, in omni spatio aliquam substantiam inesse; neque tamen sequi eam esse corpoream, cum extensio sive præsentia divina possit esse subiectum mensurabilitatis, v. g. Præsentiam sive extensionem divinam occupare assero unam alteramque orgyam in hoc vel illo vacuo; nec tamen omnino sequi Deum esse corporeum, ut patet ex suprâ dictis, Instantiâ 5. Sed super hac re est agendum alibi.

## IV.

*Dico implicare contradictionem, ut talis extensio, &c.*

Sed hîc libenter quærerem, numquid necesse sit ut aut talis extensio sit qualem in corpore concipis, aut nulla. Deinde, cum & alias res præter corpora extendi suo modo concesseris, annon analogica illa extensio, quam vocas, vices obeat extensionis corporeæ, atque ita illam vim contradictoriam retundat. Præsertim cum analogica hæc extensio ad propriè dictam tam propè accedat, ut sit mensurabilis, certosque pedum ulnarumve numeros occupet.

## V.

*Nullum motum dari, nisi quodammodo circularem.*

Hoc necessariò consequi concedo, necessitate putâ Physicâ, supponendo duntaxat omnia corporibus plena, nullamque extensionem aliam integram mundi extensionem excedere: qua in parte ego satis sum securus; sed inexpugnabilem hanc contradictionis vim fateor me nondum satisprehendisse.

## Ad Responsum circa tertiam Difficultatem.

*Quæ concipiuntur extensa ac simul indivisibiles.*

Cum mentem tuam sic explicueris, nulla inter nos est controversia.

## Ad Responsum circa quartam Difficultatem

## Instantia I.

*An sint simpliciter infinita necne, profiteor me nescire.*

Haud tamen latere te potest, quin sint vel simpliciter infinita, vel revera finita, quamvis utrum horum sint tam facîle statuere non possis. Quòd autem vortices tui non disrumpantur & fatiscant, non obscurum videatur indicium mundum reverâ esse infinitum. Ipse tamen interea liberè profiteor, quamvis audacter possim assentire huic axiomati, *Mundus finitus est, aut non finitus*, vel, quod idem hîc est, *infinitus*, me tamen non posse plenè animo complecti rei cujusvis infinitudinem; sed illud imaginationi meæ hîc accidere, quod Julius Scaliger alicubi scribit de dilatatione & contractione Angelorum, non posse scilicet se in infinitum extendere, nec in puncti *ἐδρόμῳ* coangustare. Qui autem *Deum positivè infinitum agnoscit* (i. e. *ubique existentem*) quod tu meritò facis, non video, si liberæ rationi permittatur, quòd hæsitet, quin continuò etiam admittat nullibi otiosum, sed eodem jure, eâdemque facilitate quâ hanc nostram, ubi nos degimus, vel quousque oculi, animusque noster pervadit,

vadit, materiam ubique produxisse. Sed fusiùs acturus eram quàm institui; hunc impetum supprimo, nè tibi sim molestior.

## II.

*Cùm ais, si tantùm quoad nos sit infinita, revera erit finita.*

Aio, addóque insuper consequentiam esse manifestissimam, quoniam particula (*tantùm*) planè excludit omnem infinitatem à re quæ tantùm quoad nos dicitur infinita, ac proinde revera erit finita extensio; Mentem autem meam hîc attingere ea de quibus pronuncio, cùm planissimè mihi constet, mundum aut finitum esse aut infinitum, ut paulò antè insinuavi.

## III.

*Atque ità supponere Deum habere partes extra partes, & esse divisibilem, omnémque prorsus rei corporeæ essentiam illi tribuere.*

Nullam tribuo. Nego enim extensionem corpori competere quatenus corpus est, sed quatenus ens, aut saltem substantia est. Præterea cùm Deus, quantum mens humana Deum capit, sit totus ubique, integræque sua essentia omnibus locis sive spatiis spatiorumque punctis adsit, non sequitur quòd partes haberet extra partes, aut, quod consequens est, quòd sit divisibilis, quamvis arctè confertimque loca omnia occupet, nullis relictis intervallis. Unde præsentiam, seu amplitudinem, ut ipse vocas, divinam, mensurabilem agnoscam, Deum autem ipsum divisibilem nullo modo.

Quòd autem Deus singula mundi puncta occupet, fatentur ad unum omnes tam Idiotæ quàm Philosophi, ipsèque clarè & distinctè animo percipio & complector. Jam verò eodem modo se habet essentia divina intra atque extra mundum, ità ut si fingamus mundum claudi cœlo stellato visibili, centrum divinæ essentia, totalisque ejus præsentia, eodem modo repeteretur extra cœlum stellatum, quo intra clarè concipimus repeti atque reiterari. Hanc autem repetitionem centri divini, quæ mundum occupat, ulteriùs productam, infinita par est extra cœlum visibile spatia secum expandere; quam nisi comitetur materia tua indefinita, actum erit de tuis vorticibus. Atque ut hæc molliora videantur, experiamur assensus nostros in successiva Dei duratione.

Deus est æternus, h. e. vita divina omnes seculorum evolutiones rerumque rationes, præteritarum, futurarum & præsentium, simul comprehendit. Hæc tamen vita æterna singulis etiam temporis insidet quasi atque inequitat momentis; ità ut rectè verèque dicamus Deum per tot dies, menses, horasve suâ æternitate fretum. Exempli causâ, si supponamus mundum ante centum annos conditum, annon integra illa omniâque complectens Dei æternitas per horas, dies, menses & annos (putà centum) succedentes ad hunc usque diem duravit? At verò nihilo aliter est Deus à mundo condito ac fuit ante mundum conditum.

Manifestum igitur est, præter æternitatem infinitam, in Deum etiam cadere durationis successionem. Quod si admittimus, cur non extensionem etiam infinita spatia adimplentem pariter ac infinitam durationis successionem illi tribuamus?

Imò verò quoties altiùs & anquisitiùs istis de rebus mecum cogito, ea  
sum



sum in sententia, quòd utraque extensio, tam spatii quàm temporis, Non-entibus juxtà atque Entibus competere possit; suspicòrque æquè ex præjudicio fieri posse, cùm omnia ea quæ sensu manibùsque usurpamus, utpote crassa & corporea, semper sint extensa, quòd è contra omnia extensa protinus concludimus corporea, quàm quòd ullum sensùs præjudici-um facit ut putemus aliqua quæ non sunt corporea extendi.

Quòd autem extensio cadat in non-ens, ex eo conjecturam capimus, quòd *extendi* nihil aliud innuit nisi *partes extare extra partes*. Pars autem & totum, subjeetum & adjunctum, causa & effectum, adversa & relata, contradicentia & privantia, & id genus universa, notiones Logicæ sunt; easque tam non entibus quàm entibus applicamus: Unde non sequitur, quòd quicquid concipimus partes habere extra partes, ens sit reale concipiendum.

Sed quoties hîc colluctantur mentes humanæ cum propriis umbris, aut, lascivientium catulorum instar, propriis ludunt cum caudis? Nam istiufmodi profectò pugnae atque lusus sibi instituuntur à mente nostra, dum rationes modòsque Logicos, juxta quos res externas considerat, non advertit suos duntaxat esse cogitandi modos, sed putans eos esse aliquid in rebus ipsis à se distinctum, suam captando quasi caudam, ad lassitudinem usque luditur miserèque illaqueatur. Sed plura quàm vellem imprudens hîc effutii: Ad reliqua propero.

## IV.

*Ubi cumque enim locus ille concipiatur, ibi aliqua materia est.*

Næ tu hîc cautus homo es, & eleganter modestus; admittis tamen tandem mundum esse infinitum, si Aristoteles infinitum rectè definivit, Phys. I. 3. *ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἐξω ἐστὶν, cujus aliquid semper est extrà*. Nihil nunc est ulterius quòd diffideamus.

## V.

*Sed nihilominus existimo maximam esse differentiam inter amplitudinem istius corporea extensionis, &c.*

Et ipse pariter existimo immane quantum differre divinam amplitudinem & corpoream. Primò, quòd illa sub sensum cadere non possit, hæc possit sub sensum cadere. Deinde, quòd illa sit increata & independens, hæc dependens & creata. Illa porrò penetrabilis, per omnia pervadens, hæc crassa & impenetrabilis. Denique, quòd illa ex totalis & integræ essentiae repetitione ubiquitaria, hæc ab externa, sed immediata, partium applicatione & juxtapositione orta sit; ità ut nemo, nisi plumbeus planè sit atque insigniter hebes, suspicari possit,

*Impia nos rationis inire elementa, viàmque  
Indogredi sceleris, (ut & ille loquitur.)*

Præsertim cùm ex Theologis sint, iisque aliàs fortasse sat scrupulosis, qui tamen agnoscunt Deum, si voluisset, potuisse mundum ab æterno creare. Et tamen æquè absurdum videtur infinitam durationem, ac magnitudinem infinitam mundo tribuere.

## VI.

*Unum enim est ex præcipuis, meoque judicio certissimis, Physicæ  
meæ fundamentis.*

Quòd sit materia indefinitè saltem extensa, nullumque vacuum, fundamentum esse Physicæ tuæ apprimè necessarium sat intelligo, & certè nullus dubito quin verum sit; sed an veram demonstrandi rationem insequutus sis, id equidem ambigo: Cùm principium illius demonstrationis sit, *omne extensum esse reale ac corporeum*; quod mihi fateor nondum constare, ob rationes à me suprâ datas. Imò verò, ut ingenuè fatear quod mihi jam in mentem venit, si neque nudum spatium, prout postulat tua demonstratio, nec Deus omnino extenditur, nè indefinitâ quidem materiâ opus est tuæ Philosophiæ, *certus finitusque stadiorum numerus suffecerit*. Mundi enim hujus finiti latera non habebunt quò recedant, nec dehiscere poterunt mediû vortices, nè intermedium spatium extendatur, novâsque non-ens induat dimensiones. Sed tamen naturalis impetus aliò me præcipitat, in hanc utique fidem, fecunditatem nempe divinam, cùm nullibi sit otiosa, ubique locorum materiam produxisse, nullis vel angustissimis prætermis- sis intervallis.

Quæ tam facilè cùm admitto, Philosophia tua apud me non corruet ob defectum dicti fundamenti. Planèque video Physices tuæ veritatem non tam apertè & ostensivè se exerere in hoc vel illo articulo, quàm ex universo omnium filo & textura elucescere, ut ipse rectissimè mones Part. 4. artic. 225. Quòd si quis integram tuæ Philosophiæ faciem simul contue- tur, tam concinna est; sibi que juxtâ ac rerum phænomenis consona, ut meritò imaginetur, se Naturam ipsam opificem vidisse ab hoc polito spe- culo enitentem.

## Ad Responsum circa Difficultatem ultimam

## Instantia I.

*Sed nulli præjudicio magis omnes assuevimus, &c.*

Quod mihi de me ipso constat plùs quàm satis, ab hujusce enim præju- dici laqueis sentio me expediri non posse ullo modo.

## II.

*Prositeor enim me posse perfacilè illa omnia ut à sola membrorum  
conformatione profecta explicare.*

Læta sanè & jucunda Provincia! *Hoc si præstiteris*, (& credo quantum ingenium humanum poterit te hac in re præstiturum in quinta sextâve parte Physices tuæ; quas, ut audio ferè à te perfectas jam esse & absolu- tas, ità avidè expecto efficitimque rogo, ut quamprimùm possit fieri lucem videant, vel potius ut nos in iplis ulteriorem naturæ lucem videamus: sed ad rem redeo) Hoc, inquam, si præstiteris, agnosco te demon- strâsse in brutis animantibus inesse animam, neminem demonstrare posse: Sed interea loci, quod & ipse submones, quòd non sit anima in brutis, te necdum demonstrâsse, nec demonstrare posse ullo modo.

## III.



## III.

*Præter hanc unam, quod cum habeant oculos, aures, &c.*

Maximum, meo judicio, argumentum est, quod tam subtiliter sibi præca-  
veant & prospiciant; ut narratiunculis veris pariter ac mirandis, si  
otium esset, demonstrare possem. Sed credo te in consimiles historias in-  
cidisse, meæ autem in nullis extant libris.

## IV.

*Quod non sit tam probabile omnes vermes, culices, erucas, &c.*

Nisi fortè imaginemur istiusmodi animas, *Mundi Vitæ*, quem appellat  
*Ficinus*, arenam quasi esse ac pulverem, & infinita ferè ex isto penario  
animarum agmina fatali quodam impetu in præparatam materiam semper  
prolabi. Sed concedo hæc citius dici posse quàm demonstrari.

## V.

*Ut aliquid voce vel nutibus indicaret, &c.*

Annon canes annuunt caudis, ut nos capitibus? annon brevibus latra-  
tibus cibum sæpius ad mensam mendicant? Imò verò aliquando Domini  
cubitus pede, qua possunt cum reverentia, tangentes, quasi sui oblitum,  
blando hoc eum signo commonefaciunt.

## VI.

*Quàm maximè stupidi ac mente capti, &c. non autem ullum  
brutum, &c.*

Nec infantes ulli per aliquàm multa saltem mensium spatia, quamvis  
plorent, rideant, irascantur, &c. Nec diffidis tamen, opinor, quin infan-  
tes sint animati, animamque habeant cogitantem.

Responsa hæc sunt (Vir Illustrissime) quæ tuis præclaris Responsis  
mihi visum est reponere. Quæ an æquè grata futura sint ac nuperæ meæ  
objectiones, sanè præfagire non possum.

Humanitas tua quam versus istas perspexi, & diuturnior cum scriptis  
tuis consuetudo, audentior me fecerunt; vereor nè fuerim prolixus  
nimium ac molestus.

Equidem ferme oblitus eram potissimi mei instituti, quod non fuit æter-  
nas tecum altercationes reciprocare; sed cum hanc opportunitatem sim  
nactus, tanti viri de rebus quæ se obtulerint Philosophicis judicium pla-  
cidè experiri, & præcipuè si qua difficultas emerferit inter legendos tuos  
libros, te ipsum audire interpretantem. Quam profectò gratiam si lubens  
facilisque concesseris, sum mopere me tibi devincies.

Et sanè quàm lubenter eximiæ tuæ artis ac peritiæ mihi copiam fece-  
ris, certum est jam nunc in paucis quibusdam periculum facere.

Primò igitur quæro, An à Deo ita statui, aut alio quovis modo  
fieri potuisset, ut mundus esset finitus, id est certo aliquo milliari-um nu-  
mero circumscriptus. Non leve enim argumentum videtur mundum  
posse esse finitum, quod plerique omnes impossibile putent esse infi-  
nitum.

Secundò, Siquis mundi hujus finibus propè assideret, quæro an possit  
gladium per mundi latera ad capulum usque transmittere, ita ut totus  
ferè

ferè gladius extra mundi moenia emeretur. Quòd enim nihil extra mundum sit quod resistat, videtur factum facile; quòd autem nihil extensum sit extra mundum quod recipiat, videtur ex ea parte impossibile.

Tertiò (ad Artic. 29. Part. 2.) Si A B corpus transferatur à corpore C D, quæro quæ constet translationem esse reciprocã. Putemus enim C D turrin esse, & A B ventum occidentalem per latera turris transeuntem. Turris C D aut quiescit, aut saltem non recedit à vento A B. Si recedit, vel, quod ais, motu transfertur, utique versus occidentem moveatur. Sed non fertur versus occidentem, cum & terra & ventus ferantur versus orientem. Videtur igitur respectu venti quiescere, cum nullum motum ab ipso suscipiat. Dicis tamen translationem (quæ quidem translatio motus est) ipsius turris & venti esse reciprocã. Turris igitur respectu ejusdem venti & moveretur & quiesceret, quod proximè abest à contradictione. Signum autem est, cum ille qui à me sedente recessit ambulando, putà mille passus, rubuerit vel lassus fuerit, ego verò sedens nec ruborem contraxerim nec lassitudinem, illum solum motum fuisse, me verò per id temporis quievisse. Notionalem igitur duntaxat variatæ distantiae respectum illius motu suscipio, nullum motum realem & Physicum.

Quartò, Artic. 149. Part. 3. *Sicque etiam efficiet ut terra circa suum axem gyret, &c.* Quomodo efficiet Luna ut terra uno die gyros suos absolvat, cum ipsa 30 ferè dies in suas absumat periodos? Quæ verò scribuntur Artic. 151. hanc quæstionem, opinor, non attingunt.

Quintò, de particulis istis contortis, quas striatas vocas, Quomodo ita contorqueri potuerunt, & eo ipso in infinita fragmina & atomos non disjungi? Quem lentorem, quam tenacitatem in prima illa materia, sibi ubique simili & homogenea, imaginari possumus? Unde mollescebant istæ particulæ primùm, indeque obduruerunt?

Sextò, Artic. 189. Part. 4. *animam sive mentem intimè cerebro conjunctam.* Perlubenter equidem hîc audirem sententiam tuam de conjunctione animæ cum corpore: An cum toto corpore jungatur, an cum cerebro solo, an verò in solum conarium, tanquam in parvulum aliquod ergastulum, compingatur. Id enim sedem sensûs communem, animæque ἀρχὸν, à te monitus agnosco. Dubito tamen annon per universum corpus anima pervadat. Deinde quæro ex te, cum anima nullas habeat nec ramosas nec hamatas particulas, quomodo tam arctè unitur cum corpore. Sciscitòrque subindè, annon aliquid exerit se in natura, cujus nulla ratio Mechanica reddi potest. Illud ἀνέκδοτον, cujus in nobis conscii sumus, quo oritur modo? Quæque ratio sit imperii animæ nostræ in spiritus animales, quâ potest eos amandare in quamlibet corporis partem? Quomodo sagarum spiritus, quos vocant familiares, materiam tam aptè sibi adaptant atque constringunt, ut visibiles & palpabiles se exhibeant excreandis verulis? Hoc autem fieri non solum verulæ, sed juvenes sagæ, nullâ vi coactæ, sponte mihi fastæ sunt non paucæ. Porro, annon & ipsi hoc ipsum aliquo modo in animabus nostris experimur, dum pro arbitrio nostro spiritus nostros animales ciere & sistere, exerere & revocare possumus? Quæro igitur, numquid dedecet hominem Philosophum in rerum universitate substantiam aliquam agnoscere incorpoream, quæ tamen



possit aut omnes, aut saltem plurimas, affectiones corporeas, non secus ac ipsa corpora in se mutuò, in corpus aliquod imprimere, quales sunt motus, figura, situs partium? &c. Imò verò, cum ferme constet de motu; sine mora superaddere etiam quæ motus consequentia sunt, ut dividere, conjungere, dissipare, vincere, figurare particulas, figuratas disponere, dispositas rotare, vel quovis modo movere, rotatas continere, & id genus alia; unde lumen, colores, & reliqua sensus objecta prodire necesse est, juxta eximiam tuam Philosophiam.

Præterea, cum nihil nec corporeum neque incorporeum potest agere in aliud nisi per applicationem suæ essentiæ, necesse insuper ducere, ut, sive Angelus sit, sive Dæmon, sive anima, sive Deus, qui agat prædictis modis in materiam, essentia cujuslibet inequitet quasi illis materiæ partibus in quas agit, aut aliquibus aliis quæ in has ipsas agant per motus transmissionem, imò ut integræ aliquando adsit materiæ quam gubernat & modificat; ut constat in Geniis, sive bonis sive malignis, qui se humanis oculis patefecerunt: Aliter enim quæ poterant constringere materiam, & in hac vel illa figura continere?

Postremò, Cum tam stupendam virtutem habeat substantia incorporea, ut per nudam sui applicationem, sine funiculis aut uncis, sine fundis aut cuneis, materiam constringat, explicet, dividat, projiciat, & simul retineat, annon verisimile videatur ut in seipsam se possit colligere, cum nulla obstat impenetrabilitas, & diffundere se denuò, & similia?

Hæc abs te peto, Vir doctissime, quantum per otium licebit, ut digneris exponere, utpote quem scio tam intima quam extima Naturæ mysteria rimatum esse, commodèque interpretari posse.

Septimò, de globulis æthereis quæro, Si Deus mundum ab æterno condidisset, annon multis abhinc annis comminuti & confracti fuissent isti globuli in partes indefinitè subtiles, mutuis collisionibus vel attritionibus, primique Elementi faciem jam olim induissent, ita ut universus mundus in unam immensam flammam multa antè secula abiisset?

Octavò, de particulis tuis aqueis, longis, teretibus, & flexibilibus, Numquid habent poros? Id sanè mihi non videtur probabile, cum sint simplicia corpora, particulæque primæ ex nullis aliis particulis complicatæ, sed fragmina ex integra primæque materia elisa, ac proinde planè homogenea. Hinc dubito, quæ poterunt flecti sine penetratione dimensionum. Putemus enim aliquando ad annuli instar incurvari; Superficies concava minor erit convexâ, &c. Rem probè tenes. Non est quòd hîc immorer.

Nec tamen si poros habere contenderes, quod nunquam opinor facies, difficultatem tollet. Quippe quòd quæstio tunc instituetur de pororum labris vel lateribus: Necessariò enim aliquid flectetur quod non habet poros.

Atque hæc difficultas pertinet non solum ad oblongas tuas particulas, sed etiam ad ramosas illas, aliàsque ferme omnes, quas flecti necesse est, & tamen non disrumpi.

Nonò, & ultimò, Utrùm materia, sive æternam fingamus sive hesternò die creatam, sibi liberè permissa, nullumque aliunde impulsu suscipiens, moveretur, an quiesceret. Deinde, an quies sit modus corporis privativus,

privativus, an verò positivus. Et sive positivum malles sive privativum, unde constet utrumlibet. An denique ulla res affectionem ullam habere possit naturaliter & à se, quâ penitus potest destitui; vel quam aliunde potest adsciscere.

Haftenus ferè circa generalia præclaræ tuæ Physices fundamenta lusi, dicam, an potius laboravi? progressurus posthac ad specialiora, si facilitas tua atque comitas eò me invitaverit, aut saltem permiserit. Et æquiori fanè animo feres, cum hîc de primis agatur principiis, si superstitiosè omnia examinavi, viamque quasi palpando, singulâque curiosius contrectando, lentè me promovi & testudineo gradu. Video enim ingenium humanum ità comparatum esse, ut facilius longè quid consequens sit dispiciat, quàm quid in natura primò verum; nostramque omnium conditionem non multùm abludere ab illa Archimedis, *δὸς πᾶσι καὶ τῷ κοινῷ ὡφελῆς*. Ubi primùm figamus pedem invenire multò magis satagimus, quàm ubi invenimus ulteriùs progredi.

Quod ad mirificas illas structuras attinet quas ex illis principiis generalibus erexisti, quamvis primâ fronte adeò sublimes & ab aspectu nostro remotæ viderentur, ut omnia apparerent nubibus tenebrisque obvoluta, dies tamen difficultates comminuit, paulatimque evanuerunt istæ obscuritates, adeò ut perpaucæ, præ quod tum factum est, in conspectum jam veniant.

Hoc autem necesse duxi ut profiterer, nè æternum à me expectes tibi creatum iri negotium, sed lubentiùs mihi rescribas, parique humanitate hæc sciscitationes meas accipias quâ primas quas misi objectiones. Quod si feceris (clarissime Cartesi) suprà quàm dici potest tibi obstrictum dabis

*Cantabrigia, è Christi Collegio,  
3. Nonarum Martii, 1649.*

*Humanitatis tuæ ac Sapientiæ  
admiratorem religiosissimum*

HEN. MORUM.

*Clarissimo Doctissimoque Viro,*

HENRICO MORO,

RENATUS DES-CARTES.

**V**IR clarissime, gratissimas tuas literas 3. Non. Mart. datâs eo tempore accipio quo tam multis aliis occupationibus distrahor, ut cogar vel hâc ipsâ horâ festinantissimè rescribere, vel responsum in multas hebdomadas differre. Sed vincet ea pars quæ festinationem persuadet; malo enim minùs peritus quàm minùs officiosus videri.

Ad Instantiâs primas.

*Proprietates alias aliis esse priores, &c.* Sensibilitas nihil mihi videtur esse in re sensibili, nisi denominatio extrinseca. Nec etiam rei est ad-

B b 2

æquata;



æquata : nam si referatur ad sensus nostros, non convenit tenuissimis materiæ particulis: si ad alios imaginarios, quales vis à Dei posse fabricari, forsan etiam Angelis & Animabus conveniet; non enim facilius intelligo nervos sensorios adeò subtiles, ut à quàm minutissimis materiæ particulis moveri possint, quàm aliquam facultatem cujus ope mens nostra possit alias mentes immediatè sentire sive percipere. Quamvis autem in extensione habitudinem partium ad invicem facilè comprehendamus, videor tamen extensionem optimè percipere, quamvis de habitudine partium ad invicem planè non cogitem: Quod debes etiam potiori jure quàm ego admittere, quia extensionem ità concipis, ut Deo conveniat, & tamen in eo nullas partes admittis.

*Nondum demonstratum Tangibilitatem aut Impenetrabilitatem proprias esse substantiæ extensæ affectiones.* Si concipis extensionem per habitudinem partium ad invicem, non videris negare posse quin unaquæque ejus pars alias vicinas tangat, hæcque tangibilitas est vera proprietas, & rei intrinseca, non autem ea quæ à sensu tactûs denominatur.

Non potest etiam intelligi unam partem rei extensæ aliam sibi æqualem penetrare, quin hoc ipso intelligatur mediam partem ejus extensionis tolli vel annihilari; quod autem annihilatur aliud non penetrat: sicque meo judicio demonstratur impenetrabilitatem ad essentiam extensionis, non autem ullius alterius rei, pertinere.

*Affero aliam esse extensionem æquè veram.* Tandem igitur de re convenimus, superest quæstio de nomine, an hæc posterior extensio æquè vera sit dicenda. Quantum autem ad me, nullam intelligo nec in Deo nec in Angelis vel mente nostra extensionem substantiæ, sed potentiæ duntaxat; ità scilicet ut possit Angelus potentiam suam exerere nunc in majorem, nunc in minorem substantiæ corporeæ partem: nam si nullum esset corpus, nullum etiam spatium intelligerem cui Angelus vel Deus esset coëxtensus. Quòd autem quis extensionem, quæ solius potentiæ est, tribuat substantiæ, ejus præjudicii esse puto, quo omnem substantiam, & ipsum Deum, supponit imaginabilem.

### Ad secundas Instantias.

*Una vacui spatii partes absorbeant alteras, &c.* Hic repeto, si absorbeantur, ergò media pars spatii tollitur & esse desinit; quod autem esse desinit aliud non penetrat; ergò impenetrabilitas in omni spatio est admittenda.

*Intermundium illud suam haberet durationem, &c.* Puto implicare contradictionem, ut concipiamus aliquam durationem intercedere inter destructionem prioris mundi & novi creationem. Nam si durationem istam ad successionem cogitationum divinarum vel quid simile referamus, erit error intellectûs, non vera ullius rei perceptio. Ad sequentia jam respondi, notando extensionem quæ rebus incorporeis tribuitur esse potentiæ duntaxat, non substantiæ; quæ potentia cùm sit tantùm modus in re ad quam applicatur, sublato extenso cui coëxistat, non potest intelligi esse extensa.

### Ad penultimas Instantias.

*Deum positivè infinitum, id est, ubique existentem, &c.* Hoc ubique non admitto. Videris enim hîc infinitatem Dei in eo ponere, quòd ubique existat : cui opinioni non assentior ; sed puto Deum ratione suæ potentiae ubique esse, ratione autem suæ essentiae nullam planè habere relationem ad locum. Cum autem in Deo potentia & essentia non distinguantur, satius esse puto in talibus de mente nostra vel Angelis, tanquam perceptioni nostrae magis adæquatis, quàm de Deo, ratiocinari. Sequentes difficultates ex eo præjudicio mihi videntur omnes ortæ, quòd nimis assueverimus quaslibet substantias, etiam eas quas corpora esse negamus, tanquam extensas imaginari, & de entibus rationis intemperanter Philosophari, *entis* sive *rei* proprietates *non enti* tribuendo. Sed rectè meminisse oportet, non entis nulla esse posse vera attributa, nec de eo posse ullo modo intelligi *partem* & *totum*, *subjectum*, *adjunctum*, &c. Ideoque optimè concludis cum propriis umbris mentem ludere, cum entia Logica considerat.

*Certus finitusque stadiorum numerus suffecerit, &c.* Sed repugnat meo conceptui ut mundo aliquem terminum tribuam, nec aliam habeo mensuram eorum quæ affirmare debeo vel negare quàm propriam perceptionem. Dico idcirco mundum esse indeterminatum vel indefinitum, quia nullos in eo terminos agnosco ; sed non ausim vocare infinitum, quia percipio Deum esse mundo majorem, non ratione extensionis, quam, ut sæpe dixi, nullam propriam in Deo intelligo, sed ratione perfectionis.

### Ad ultimas Instantias.

*Hoc si præstiteris, &c.* Non certus sum meæ Philosophiæ continuationem unquam in lucem prodituram, quia pendet à multis experimentis, quorum faciendorum nescio an copiam sim unquam habiturus ; sed spero me hâc ætate brevem tractatum de Affectibus editurum, ex quo apparebit quo pacto in nobis ipsis omnes motus membrorum, qui affectus nostros comitantur, non ab anima, sed à sola corporis machinatione peragi existimem. Quòd autem *Canes annuant caudis, &c.* Sunt tantum motus qui comitantur affectus, eosque accuratè distinguendos puto à loquela, quæ sola cogitationem in corpore latentem demonstrat. *Nec infantes ulli, &c.* Dispar est ratio infantum & brutorum : Nec judicarem infantes esse mente præditos, nisi viderem eos esse ejusdem naturæ cum adultis : bruta autem eorumque nunquam adolescunt, ut aliqua in iis cogitationis nota certa deprehendatur.

### Ad Quæstiones.

*Ad primam.* Repugnat conceptui meo, sive, quod idem est, puto implicare contradictionem, ut mundus sit finitus vel terminatus, quia non possum non concipere spatium ultra quoslibet præsuppositos mundi fines ; tale autem spatium apud me est verum corpus : nec moror quòd ab



aliis imaginarium vocetur, & ideo mundus finitus existimetur; novi enim ex quibus præjudiciis error iste profectus sit.

*Ad secundam.* Imaginando gladium trajici ultra mundi fines, ostendis te etiam non concipere mundum finitum, omnem enim locum ad quem gladius pertingit revera concipis ut mundi partem, quamvis illud quod concipis vacuum voces.

*Ad tertiam.* Non melius possum explicare vim reciprocam in mutua duorum corporum ab invicem separatione, quam si tibi ponam ob oculos navigiolum aliquod hærens in luto juxta fluminis ripam, & duos homines, quorum unus stans in ripa navigiolum manibus pellat, ut illud à terra removeat, eodémque prorsus modo alius stans in navigio ripam manibus pellat, ut illud idem à terrare moveat. Si enim horum hominum vires sint æquales, conatus ejus qui terræ insistit, terræque idcirco conjunctus est, non minus confert ad motum navigii quam conatus alterius qui cum navigio transfertur. Unde patet actionem quâ navigium à terra recedit non minorem esse in ipsa terrâ quam in navigio. Nec est difficultas de eo qui à te sedente recessit; cùm enim de translatione hîc loquor, intelligo tantùm eam quæ fit per separationem duorum corporum se immediatè tangentium.

*Ad quartam.* Motus Lunæ determinat materiam cœlestem, & ex consequenti etiam terram in ea contentam, ut versus unam partem potius quam versus aliam, nempe in figura ibi posita, ut ab A versus B, potius quam versus D, flectatur; non autem dat ei celeritatem motûs: & quia hæc celeritas pendet à materia cœlesti, quæ præter propter eadem est juxta Terram ac juxta Lunam, deberet Terra duplo celerius convolvi quam convolvitur, ut circiter sexagies circulum suum absolveret eo tempore quo Luna semel percurrit suum sexagies majorem, nisi obstarat magnitudo, ut in Artic. 151. p. 3. dictum est.

*Ad quintam.* Nullum suppono esse lentorem nullamque tenacitatem in minimis materiæ particulis, nisi quemadmodum in sensibilibus & magnis, quæ nempe ex motu & quiete partium dependet. Sed notandum est, ipsas particulas striatas formari ex materia subtilissima, & divisa in minutias innumerabiles vel numero indefinitas, quæ ad ipsas componendas simul junguntur, adeò ut plures diversas minutias in unaquaque particula striata concipiam quam vulgus hominum in aliis corporibus valde magnis.

*Ad sextam.* Conatus sum explicare maximam partem eorum quæ hîc petis in tractatu de affectibus. Addo tantùm, nihil mihi hætenus occurrisse circa naturam rerum materialium cujus rationem mechanicam non facillimè possim excogitare. Atque ut non dedecet hominem Philosophum putare Deum posse corpus movere, quamvis non putet Deum esse corporeum; ità etiam eum non dedecet aliquid simile de aliis substantiis incorporeis judicare. Et quamvis existimem nullum agendi modum Deo & creaturis univocè convenire; fateor tamen me nullam in mente mea ideam reperire quæ repræsentet modum quo Deus vel Angelus materiam potest movere, diversam ab ea quæ mihi exhibet modum quo ego per meam cogitationem corpus meum movere me posse mihi conscius sum.

Nec verò mens mea potest se modò extendere, modò colligere, in ordine ad locum, ratione substantiæ suæ, sed tantùm ratione potentiæ quam potest ad majora vel minora corpora applicare.

• *Ad septimam.* Si mundus ab æterno fuisset, proculdubio hæc Terra non mansisset ab æterno; sed aliæ alibi productæ fuissent, nec omnis materia abiisset in primum Elementum: ut enim quædam ejus partes uno in loco comminuuntur, ità aliæ in alio loco simul coalescunt; nec plus est motûs sive agitationis in tota rerum universitate uno tempore quàm alio.

*Ad octavam.* Particulas aquæ, aliásque omnes quæ sunt in terra, poros habere sequitur evidenter ex modo quo terræ productionem descripsi, nempe à particulis materiæ primi elementi simul coalescentibus: cum enim hoc primum Elementum nullis constet particulis nisi indefinitè divis, hinc sequitur concipiendos esse poros usque ad ultimam possibilem divisionem in omnibus corporibus ex eo conflatis.

*Ad nonam.* Ex iis quæ paulò antè dixi de duobus hominibus, quorum unus moveretur unà cum navigio, alius in ripa stat immotus, satis ostendi me putare nihil esse in unius motu magis positivum quàm in alterius quiete.

Quid sibi velint hæc tua ultima verba, *An ulla res affectionem habere potest naturaliter & à se, quâ penitus potest destitui, vel quam aliunde potest adsciscere*, non satis percipio.

Cæterum velim ut pro certo existimes mihi semper fore gratissimum ea accipere quæ de scriptis meis vel quæres vel objicies, & pro viribus responsurum esse

Egmunda, 17. Kalendis  
Maii, 1649.

Tibi addictissimum

RENATUM DES-CARTES.

*Illustrissimo viro, Principique Philosopho,*

RENATO DES-CARTES,

HENRICUS MORUS.

**V**IX me abstinebam (Vir Clarissime) quin ab acceptis tuis literis continuò ad te rescriberem: quamvis profectò id à me factum fuisset incivilius; quippe quòd satis ex iisdem intelligerem te per septimanas bene multas negotiis fore districtissimum. Quin & mihi ipsi tunc temporis à patris obitu acciderunt multa quæ me aliò avocârunt, impediveruntque adeò ut quod voluissem maximè præstare, haud commodè potuissem. Jam verò ad te tuâque reversus, satisque nactus otii, rescribo, gratiâque ago maximas, quòd quærendi de tuis scriptis quod lubet objiciendique plenum mihi jus tam liberè benignèque concesseris.

Cæterum, nè abuti videar hâc summâ humanitate tuâ ad prolixiores altercationes (nam hætenus eo in loco Philosophiæ versati sumus qui



λογιστικαῖς lubricisq̃ue subtilitatibus opportunior extitit, in confiniis utique Physices, Metaphysicæ & Logicæ) ad ea proprio quæ certum magis firmumque iudicium capiunt.

Obiter tantum notabo, atque primò ad Responſionem ad Instantias primas; Quantum ad Angelos animasque separatas, si immediatè suas invicem deprehendant essentias, *id non dici posse sensum propriè, si ipsosingas penitus incorporeos*. Me verò lubentem cum Platoniciſ, antiquis Patribus, Magisq̃ue ferme omnibus, & animas & genios omnes, tam bonos quàm malos, planè corporeos agnoscere, ac proinde sensum habere propriè dictum (i. e.) mediante corpore, quo induuntur, exortum. Et profectò cum nihil non magnum de tuo ingenio mihi pollicear, perquam gratissimum esset si conjecturas tuas, quas credo pro ea qua polles sagacitate ac acumine fore ingeniosissimas, mecum breviter communices super hac re. Nam quòd quidam magnificè se efferunt in non admittendo substantias ullas quas vocant separatas, ut dæmonas, Angelos, animasque post mortem superstites, & maximopere hîc sibi applaudunt, quasi re bene gestâ, & tanquam eo ipso longè sapientiores evassent cæteris mortalibus, id ego non hujus æstimo. Nam quod sæpius observavi, hi sunt, ut plurimum, aut Taurini sanguinis homines, perditèque melancholici, aut immane quantum sensibus & voluptatibus dediti, Athei denique, saltem si permitteret religio, quâ solâ superstitiosè freti Deum esse agnoscunt. Me verò non pudet palàm profiteri, me vel semoto omni Religionis imperio, meâ sponte agnoscere genios esse atque Deum; nec ullum alium tamen me posse admittere, nisi qualem optimus quisque ac sapientissimus exoptaret, si deesset, existere. Unde semper suspicatus sum, profligatissimæ improbitatis summæque stupiditatis triumphum esse Atheismum; Atheorumque gloriationem perinde esse ac si stultissimus populus de sapientissimi benignissimique Principis cæde ovarent inter se & gratularentur. Sed nescio quo impetu huc excursus est. Redeo.

Secundò, Quod ad demonstrationem illam tuam attinet, quâ concludis omnem substantiam extensam esse tangibilem & impenetrabilem; videor mihi hæc posse regerere: in aliqua scilicet substantia extensa partes extra partes esse posse, sine ulla ἀντιπυμῆ, seu mutua resistantia; atque hinc perit propriè dicta Tangibilitas. Deinde, extensionem simul cum substantia in reliquam replicari extensionem & substantiam, nec deperdi magis quàm illam substantiæ partem quæ retrahitur in alteram; atque hinc cadit illa Impenetrabilitas: quæ profiteor me clarè & distinctè animo concipere. Quòd autem *aliquod reale claudi possit* (sine ulla sui diminutione) *minoribus majoribûsque terminis, constat in motu*, ex tuis ipsius principiis. Nam idem numero motus nunc majus nunc minus subiectum occupat, juxta tuam etiam sententiam. Ego verò pari facilitate & perspicuitate concipio dari posse substantiam quæ sine ulla sui imminutione dilatari & contrahi possit, sive per se id fiat, sive aliunde.

Postremò igitur; Et demiror equidem quòd nè in intellectum tuum cadere possit, quòd aut mens humana aut Angelus hoc ferme modo sint extensi, quasi implicaret contradictionem. Cum ego potiùs putarem implicare contradictionem quòd potentia mentis sit extensa, cum mens ipsa non sit extensa ullo modo. Cum enim potentia mentis sit modus  
mentis

mentis intrinsecus, non est extra mentem ipsam, ut patet. Et consimilis ratio est de Deo : unde me consimilis ferit admiratio, quòd in Respon- sione ad penultimas Instantias *concedis enim ubique esse ratione potentia, non ratione essentia* ; quasi potentia Divina, quæ Dei modus est, extra Deum esset sita, cum modus realis quilibet intimè semper insit rei cuius est modus : Unde necesse est Deum esse ubique, si potentia ejus ubi- que sit.

Neque suspicari possum per potentiam Dei intelligi te velle effectum in materiam transmissum. Quòd si hoc intelligas, non video tamen quin eodem res recidat. Nam hic effectus non transmittitur nisi per poten- tiam Divinam, quæ attingit materiam suscipientem, hoc est, modo aliquo reali unitur cum ea, ac proinde extenditur ; nec tamen interea separatur ab ipsa Divina Essentia. Videtur enim, ut dixi, conspicua contradictio. Sed hisce statui non immorandum.

Ad Quæstiones transvolo, postquam monuerim, quàm contristat ani- mum continuationis tuæ Philosophiæ desperatio : Sed æquè refocillat tamen certa spes Tractatûs illius desideratissimi quem hæc ætas partu- rit ; citò & feliciter in lucem prodeat exopto.

### Ad Respons. ad Quæstiones.

Ad primam & secundam respondes sanè constanter & convenienter tuis principiis, quod à quolibet, nisi sententia vicerit melior, & expecto, & laudo.

Ad tertiam ; Ex navigiolo illo tuo has mihi comparavi merces. 1. In motu esse mutuum eorum quæ moveri dicuntur renixum. 2. *Quietem esse actionem, nempe renixum quendam*, sive resistantiam. 3. *Moveri duo corpora, esse immediate separari*. 4. Immediatam illam separationem esse motum illum, sive translationem, præcisè sumptum.

Cum verò duo corpora se expediunt à se invicem, nisi vim in utroque expeditricem & avulsoriam adjeceris notioni translationis, seu motûs, *motus hic erit extrinsecus tantum respectus, aut aliquid fortasse levius*. Separari enim vel significat, superficies corporum quæ se modò mutuò tangebant distare à se invicem, (distantia autem corporum extrinsecus tantum est respectus ; ) vel significat non tangere quæ modò tangebant, quæ privatio duntaxat est, vel negatio. Certè de sententia tua hac in re non satis clarè mihi constat.

Ego verò, si mihi ipsi pèmitterer, judicarem motum esse vim illam vel actionem quâ se à se invicem mutuò expediunt corpora quæ dicis moveri ; immediatam autem illam separationem eorundem esse effectum dictorum motuum, quamvis sit vel nudus duntaxat respectus, vel privatio. Sed aliter tibi visum est Philosophari in explicatione definitionis Motûs, Artic. 25. Part. 2. ubi equidem mentem tuam non plenè capio.

Ad reliquas Quæstiones omnes quas proposui respondisti perspicuè & appositè. Sed ad pleniorè intelligentiam eorum quæ ad sextam accum- ulavi, expecto dum prodeat exoptatissimus tuus libellus de Affe- ctibus.

Cæterum, quantum ad verba illa mea ultima, *Annullares, &c.* partu- ribat



ribat profectò mihi mens evanidam aliquam subtilitatem, quæ jam effugit, nec meâ interest revocare.

Hoc tantùm quæram denuò, *Utrùm materia sibi liberè permiffa*, i.e. *nullum aliundè impulsū suscipiens, moveretur, an quiesceret*. Si movetur à se naturaliter, cùm materia sit homogœnea, & ea propter motus ubique esset æqualis, sequitur quòd tota materia simulac fuerit, disjiceretur in partes tam infinitè exiles, ut nihil ullo modo ulteriùs abradi posset ab ulla particula. Quicquid enim abradendum imaginæ, jam disjectum est ac dissolutum, ob intimam vim motûs per universam materiam pervadentis, vel, si malles, insiti. Nec partium aliæ aliis magis mutuò adhærescent, aliòve cursum flectent quàm aliæ, cùm sint omnes prorsus consimiles juxta quamlibet rationem imaginabilem. Nulla enim figuræ asperitas vel angulositas fingi potest, quæ non jam contusa sit ad ultimum quod motus poterit præstare; nec ulla motûs inæqualitas in ullis particulis ponenda est, cùm materia supponatur perfectè homogœnea. Si naturaliter igitur moveretur materia, nec Sol, nec Cœlum, nec Terra esset, nec vortices ulli, nec heterogeneum quicquam, sive sensibile sive imaginabile, in rerum natura. Ideòque periret tuum condendi cœlos terræque, cæteraque sensibilia, mirificum artificium.

Quòd si materiam quiescere dicis ex se nisi aliunde movetur, quòdque hæc quies sit positivum quid, vim indè materia æternùm pateretur, & affectio naturalis destrueretur in perpetuum, ut contraria dominaretur: quod videtur duriusculum. Nec tamen tutius forsan esset quietem statuere motûs privationem, sive negationem; caderet enim omnis resistendi actio in materia quiescente, quam tamen agnoscis: Quamvis & id ipsum intellectui meo nonnihil negotii faceffat. Dum enim quietem actionem statuis materiæ, motum etiam eandem esse statuas necesse est; siquidem materia non agit nisi movendo, aut saltem conando motum. Malè profectò me habent isti scrupuli, quos quàm primùm eximere mihi poteris, obsecro ut eximas.

Quinetiam adeò superstitiosè hæc prima principia pensito, ut nova jam mihi ingeratur difficultas de natura motûs. *Cùm scilicet motus corporis modus sit*, ut figura, situs partium, &c. *quâ fieri posset*, ut *transcat ab uno corpore in aliud, magis quàm alii modi corporei*? Et universim imaginatio mea non capit, quâ possit fieri ut quicquam quod extra subjectum esse non potest (cujusmodi sunt modi omnes) in aliud migret subjectum. Deinde quæram, cùm unum corpus in aliud minus, sed quiescens, impingit, secumque desert, annon quies quiescentis corporis similiter transmigrat in deferens, æquè ac motus moventis in quiescens? Videtur enim quies res adeò otiosa ac pigra, ut eam tædæet itineris. Cùm tamen æquè realis sit ac motus, ratio coget eam transire. Postremò, obstupesco planè, dum considero quòd tam levicula ac vilis res ac motus, solubilis etiam à subjecto & transmigrabilis, adeoque debilis ac evanidæ naturæ ut periret protinus nisi sustentaretur à subjecto, tam potenter tamen contorqueret subjectum, & hæc vel illac tam fortiter impelleret. Equidem prior sum in hanc sententiam, quòd nullus prorsum sit motuum transitus, sed quòd ex impulsu unius corporis aliud corpus in motum quasi expergiscatur, ut anima incogitationem ex hac vel illa occasione; quòdque corpus

corpus non tam suscipiat motum, quàm se in motum exerat à corpore alio commonefactum ; & , quod paulò antè dixi, eodem modo se habere motum ad corpus ac cogitatio se habet ad mentem, nimirum neutrum recipi, sed oriri utrosque ex subiecto in quo inveniuntur ; atque omne hoc quod corpus dicitur, *stupidè & temulentè esse vivum*, utpote quod *ultimam infimamque Divinæ essentia*, quàm perfectissimam vitam autumo, *umbram esse statuo* ac idolum, veruntamen sensu ac animadversione destitutam.

Cæterùm transitus ille tuus motuum à subiecto in subiectum, idque à majori in minus, & vicissim, ut suprà monui, optimè repræsentat naturam meorum Spirituum extensorum, qui contrahere se possunt, & rursus expandere ; penetrare facillimè materiam, & non implere ; agitare quovis modo ac movere, & tamen sine machinis ullis & uncorum nexu. Verùm diutiùs in hoc loco hæsi quàm putàram : sed ad institutum propero, hoc est, ad novas Quæstiones proponendas, super singulis illis Articulis Principiorum tuæ Philosophiæ, quorum vim nondum satis intelligo.

### Ad Partis primæ Artic. 8.

*Perspicuè videmus*, &c. Nec perspicuè videmus extensionem, figuram, & motum localem, ad naturam nostram pertinere, nec videmus perspicuè non pertinere. Utinam hîc breviter demonstrares, nullum corpus posse cogitare.

### Ad Artic. 37.

Annon major perfectio est id solum velle posse hominem quod sibi optimum esset, quàm posse etiam contrarium ; cùm melius sit semper felicè esse quàm vel summis aliquando efferri laudibus, vel etiam semper ?

### Ad Artic. 54.

Hîc rursus repeto, quòd oportebat demonstrare, nihil extensum cogitare, aut, quod videbitur facilius, nullum corpus posse cogitare. Est enim dignum ingenio tuo argumentum.

### Ad Artic. 60.

Quamvis mens possit contemplari seipsam ut rem cogitantem, exclusâ omni corporeâ extensione in hoc conceptu, non tamen evincit quicquam aliud nisi quòd mens possit esse corporea vel incorporea, non quòd sit de facto incorporea. Iterum igitur rogandus es ut demonstrares, ex aliquibus operationibus mentis humanæ quæ corporeæ naturæ competere non possunt, hanc mentem nostram esse incorpoream.

### Ad Partis secundæ Artic. 25.

*Non vim vel actionem quæ transfert, ut ostendam illum semper esse in mobili*, &c. Annon igitur vis ipsa atque actio motus est in re mota ?

Ad



## Ad Artic. 26.

Estne igitur in quiescentibus perpetua quædam vis statoria, vel actio sistendi se, & corroborandi contra impetus omnes, quibus partes eorum divelli possint & disjici, vel totum corpus aliò abripi & transferri? Adeò ut Quies rectè definiri possit, Vis quædam vel actio interna corporis, quâ corporis partes arcè constringuntur ad se invicem & comprimuntur, adeoque à divisione vel dimotione per impulsu alieni corporis defenduntur? Hinc enim illud consurgeret, quod à meo intellectu minime alienum est, Materiam utique vitam esse quandam obscuram (utpote quam ultimam Dei umbram existimo) nec in sola extensione partium consistere, sed in aliquali semper actione, hoc est, vel in quiete vel in motu, quorum utrumque revera actionem esse ipse concedis.

## Ad Artic. 30.

Hic articulus videtur continere demonstrationem evidentissimam, quòd translatio sive motus localis (nisi extrinsecus sit corporum respectus duntaxat) non sit reciprocus ullo modo.

## Ad Artic. 36.

Quæro, annon mens humana dum spiritus accendit attentius diutiusque cogitando, corpusque insuper ipsum calefacit, motum auget universi?

## Ad Artic. 55.

Numquid igitur cubus perfectè durus perfectèque planus motus super mensa, putà perfectè dura perfectèque plana, eo ipso instanti quo à motu sistitur æquè firmiter coalescit cum mensa ac cubi vel mensæ partes cum seipsis, an manet divisus à mensa semper, aut ad tempus saltem, post quietem? Nulla enim est compressura cubi in mensam, cum hunc motum tanquam in vacuo factum imaginemur super mensam extra mundi parietes, si fieri posset, sitam, (ac proinde ubi nullus locus est gravitati vel levitati) motumque sisti ex ea parte ad quam tendit cubus. Videntur igitur ex lege naturæ, cum jam divisa sint cubus & mensa, & nulla actio realis detur quâ conjungantur, mansura semper actu divisa.

## Ad Artic. 56, &amp; 57.

Non video quid sit opus ut tam amplos particularum gyros ac lusus circa corpus B describas. Videtur enim satis, si putemus singulas aquæ particulas simili impetu moveri à materia subtili, & æquales esse particularum magnitudines. Hinc enim, cum B à quolibet latere brevissimis gyris vel semigyris (vel aliâ quacumque ratione) motus proximè adjacentium particularum contunditur, necessariò quiescet, nec in unam partem magis quam in aliam promovebitur.

Ad

## Ad Artic. 57. lineâ 19.

*Nec incedent per lineas tam rectas, &c.* Quid? quòd jam ad circumlarem magis accedunt, cùm antea ovalem magis referebant figuram? Non plenè capio.

## Ad Artic. 60.

*Sed ipsas quatenus celerius aguntur in quolibet alias partes ferri.* Possuntne igitur celeritas motûs & ejusdem determinatio divortium pati? Perinde enim videtur ac si fingamus viatorem currentem, cursum quidem dirigere Londinum versus, sed celeritatem cursûs nihilominus ferri Cantabrigiam versus, vel Oxonium. Subtilitas quam neutra Universitas capiet, nisi fortè intelligas per *ferri*, motum moliri, vel niti ut aliquorsum fiat motus.

## Ad Partis tertiæ Articulum 16.

Annon juxta Ptolemaicam hypothesein Veneris lumen, ad modum Lunæ, nunc decresceret, nunc cresceret, quamvis non eisdem mensuris & legibus?

## Ad Artic. 35.

Quî fit ut Planetæ omnes in eodem non circumgyrentur Plano, videlicet in Plano Eclipticæ, maculæque adeò Solares; aut saltem in planis Eclipticæ parallelis, ipsâque Luna; aut in Æquatore, aut in Plano Æquatori parallelo, cùm à nulla interna vi dirigantur, sed externo tantùm ferantur impetu?

## Ad Artic. 36, 37.

Vellem etiam mihi subindices rationem Apheliorum & Periheliorum Planetarum, & quam ob causam locum subindè mutant singula: tum maximè cùm in eodem sint vortice omnia, cur non iisdem in locis inveniuntur Planetarum omnium Primariorum Aphelia & Perihelia? Præcessio etiam Æquinoctiorum quomodo ex tuis oriatur principiis? Hic enim tu veras & naturales horum Phænomenon causas explicare poteris, cùm alii ficticias tantùm exponant Hypotheses.

## Ad Artic. 55.

*Quæ in orbem aguntur.* Sed quomodo primùm inceperunt tam immensa materiæ spatia in gyros convolvi, vorticisque fieri?

## Ad Artic. 57.

*Ejus partem quæ à funda impeditur, &c.* Videtur perceptu difficilius, quòd lapis A impediatur à motu in D; cùm nec de facto illuc unquam feratur, nec si impedimentum tolleretur illuc naturaliter pergeret; pergeret enim omnino versus C.



## Ad Artic. 59.

Novam vim motûs acquiri, & tamen conatum renovari hîc dicis : Nescio quàm bene cohærent. Nam si nova vis acquiritur & superadditur, non est renovatio motûs, sed augmentatio. Quòd si globulus A movendo motum auget in eodem puncto baculi existens, (nam vorticis globulos hoc exemplum respicit) cur non semper motus seipsum movendo accendit & auget? Hoc autem modo jam pridem omnia in flammam abiissent.

## Ad Artic. 62.

Hîc quæro, cùm conatus globulorum, in quo lux & lumen consistit, fiat per integram vorticis amplitudinem, ità ut basis trianguli BFD multò major esse possit quàm DB, & ab utrisque productæ diametri DB, decies putà vel centies majoris factæ, extremitatibus globuli obliquo conatu in cuspidem aliquam ad F, oculum cujuslibet intuentis, reprimantur, cur lux, putà Solis, non major videtur quàm quæ sit intra circulum DCB?

## Ad Artic. 72.

Non penitus hoc artificium contorquendi materiam primi elementi in spirales sive cochleares formas intelligo; præsertim in locis ab axe paulò remotioribus. Nisi hoc fiat, non tam quòd globuli torqueantur circa particulas primi elementi, quàm quòd ipsum primum elementum, ab ipsis fortasse globulis leviter in gyrationem determinatum, se ipsum inter triangularia illa spatia contorqueat, lineasque spirales in se describat. Oro te, ut hîc mentem plenius explices. Sed & alia subindè hîc oritur dubitatio. Cùm particulæ hæ contortæ constent ex minutissimis particulis & rapidissime agitatis, quomodo illæ minutissimæ particulæ in ullam formam vel magnitudinem majorem coalescant, præsertim cùm in formandis hisce particulis striatis distortio illa sit motûsque obliquitas.

## Ad Artic. 82.

*Tam supremi quàm infimi*, &c. Prodigii instar mihi videtur rapidus hic globulorum supremorum cursus, (præsertim si cum mediorum comparetur) & qui causas quas in subsequenti Articulo profers longè excedat. Si quid ulteriùs adinvenire possis, quo mollius hoc dogma reddatur, gratum profectò esset audire.

## Ad Artic. 84.

*Cur cometarum caudæ*, &c. Primam quamque impatienter tibi obtrudo occasionem explicandi quodlibet : Rogo ut hanc rem etiam hoc in loco breviter expedias.

## Ad Artic. 108.

*Per partes vicinas Eclipticæ* *2 H.* in cælum abire coguntur. Quî fit ut non

non omnes ferè illuc abeant, potiùs quàm à polo ad polum migrando vorticem, quem vocas, componant ?

Ad Artic. 121. lineâ ultimâ.

*A variis causis assiduè potest mutari, &c.* A quibus ?

Ad Artic. 129. lin. 15.

*Non priùs apparere quàm, &c.* Cur circumfluxus illius materiæ, cùm sit adeò transparens, impedit Cometam nè videatur ? Circumfluens enim materia Jovem Planetam non abdit ab oculis nostris. Et cur necesse est ut non nisi obvolutus materiâ relictæ vortice Cometa indè egrediatur ?

Ad Artic. 130. lineâ 21.

*Minuitur quidem, &c.* Cur non deletur penitus, si vortex AEIO fortius, vel æquè fortiter, urget vicinos vortices, quàm ille ab ipsis urgetur ?

Ad Artic. 149.

*Brevi accedet ad A, &c.* Cur non ad F usque pergit, impingitque in ipsam terram ?

*Quia sic à recta linea minùs deflectet.* Non solum constat lineam NA continuatam cum AB, lineam magis rectam constituere quàm eandem NA cum AD continuatam ; sed cùm Luna à centro S recedat ad modum globulorum cœlestium, magis naturaliter videtur consurgere versus B, quàm versus D descendere.

Ad Partis quartæ Artic. 22.

*Nec Terra proprio motu cieatur, &c.* Non video quid refert unde sit motus ille circularis, modò sit in Terra ; nec deprehendo quin illi celerissimi gyri Telluris imposita omnia rejicerent versus cœlos, quamvis motus non esset proprius, sed ab interna materia cœlesti profectus, nisi agitatio circumjacentis ætheris, quam supponis multò celeriolem, fatum illud præverteret. Nec videtur Terra habere rationem corporis quiescentis, quoad conatum partium recedendi à centro ; (Videtur enim illud necessarium in omni corpore circulariter moto : ) sed quòd simul circumvolvitur cum ambiente æthere, nec separantur superficies, hâc forsan ratione dicatur Terra quiescere. Hæc autem dico ut ex te intelligam, annon ratio quòd partes Terræ non dissiliant ad solam celeritatem motûs particularum Ætheris referenda sit.

Ad Artic. 25.

*Propter suarum particularum motum inest levitas.* Quid igitur existimas de frigido & candenti ferro ? Utrum præponderat ? Præterea, quomodo moles aquæ levior sit ob motum partium, cùm motus harum par-



tium tandem à globulis determinatur deorsum. Hinc enim videtur magis accelerari descensus corporis, unde major æstimabitur gravitas. Atque hoc modo aqua auro præponderabit.

Ad Artic. 27.

*Nisi fortè aliqua exterior causa, &c.* Quænam sint illæ causæ, paucis obsecro ut innuas.

Ad Artic. 133. lin. 12.

*Axi parallelos.* Parallelismi mentio hîc me monet de difficultatibus quibusdam ferè inextricabilibus. Primò, Cur tui vortices non fiant in modum columnæ, seu cylindri, potius quam ellipsis, cùm quodlibet punctum axis sit quasi centrum à quo materia cœlestis recedat, & quantum video, æquali prorsus impetu. Deinde, Primum elementum (cùm ubique ab axe oporteat globulos æquali vi recedere) cur non æqualiter per axem totum in cylindri formam productum jacet, sed in sphæricam figuram congestum ad medium ferè axis relegatur? Nam occursum hujus elementi primi ab utroque polo vorticis nihil impedit quo minùs totus axis producta flammâ luceret. Cùm enim ubique cujuslibet axis æquali vi recedant globuli, faciliùs præterlabentur se invicem, rectâque pergent ad oppositos polos Materiæ subtilissimæ irruentia fluentia, quàm excavabunt vel distudent sibi in aliqua axis parte spatium majus quàm præsens & æquabilis vorticis circumvolutio lubens admitteret, vel sponte suâ offerret. Tertiò denique, Cùm globuli cœlestes circa axem vorticis ferantur ἀλλήλων & axi & sibi invicem, nec parallelismum perdant dum locum aliquatenus inter seipfos mutant, impossibile videtur ut ulla omnino fiat particularum striatarum intortio, nisi ipsæ particulæ striatæ in triangularibus illis spatiis circa proprios axes circumrotentur; quod quàm commodè fieri possit non video, quemadmodum suprâ monui.

Ad Artic. 187.

*Nulla sympathia vel antipathia miracula, &c.* Utinam igitur hîc explices, si breviter fieri possit, quâ ratione mechanicâ evenit ut in duabus chordis, etiam diversorum instrumentorum, vel unisonis, vel ad illud intervallum Musicum quod ὁμοπασιών dicitur attemperatis, si una percutiatur, altera in altero instrumento subsiliat, cùm quæ propiores & laxiores etiam sint, imò & in eodem instrumento in quo chorda percussa tensæ, non omnino moveantur. Experimentum vulgare est & notissimum. Nulla verò sympathia mihi videtur magis rationes mechanicas fugere quàm hic chordarum consensus.

Ad Artic. 188.

*Ac sextam de homine essem, &c.* Perge, Divine Vir, in isthoc opere excolendo & perficiendo. Pro certissimo enim habeo, nihil unquam Reipub. literariæ aut gratius aut utilius in lucem proditurum. Nec est quòd experimen-

perimentorum defectum hîc causeris. Nam quantum ad corpus nostrum, accepi à dignis fide authoribus, te, quæ ad humani corporis Anatomem spectant, accuratissimè universa explorâsse. Quod autem ad animam, cum talem ipse nactus sis, quæ in maximè sublimes amplissimæque operationes evigilavit, spiritûsque habeas agillimos & subtilissimos, generosa tua mens, innatâ suâ vi cœlestique vigore, tanquam igni Chymicorum aliquo, freta, ità excutiet se, variâsque in formas transmutabit, ut ipsa sibi facîle esse possit infinitorum experimentorum officina.

## Ad Artic. 195.

*Et Meteoris explicui*, &c. Pulcherrimam sanè colorum rationem in Meteoris explicuisti. Est tamen ea de re improba quædam difficultas, quæ magnum imaginationi meæ negotium faceffit. Quippe quòd cum colorum varietatem statuas ex proportionem quam habet globulorum motus circularis ad rectilinearem oriri, eveniet necessariò ut aliquando etiam in iisdem globulis & motus circularis rectilinearem, & rectilinearis circularem eodem tempore superet: Verbigratiâ, In duobus parietibus oppositis, quorum unus rubro, alter cæruleo colore obductus est, interjacentes globuli ob rubrum parietem celerius movebuntur in circulum quàm in lineam rectam, ob parietem tamen cæruleum celerius in lineam rectam movebuntur quàm in circulum, & eodem prorsus tempore, quæ sunt planè *αὐτίκα*. Vel sic, In eodem pariete cujus pars, putà dextra, rubet, media nigra est, sinistra cærulea, cum ad oculum semper fiat decussatio, omnes globuli ob radiorum concursum singulorum globulorum motus proportionem, circularis nimirum ad rectum, fuscipient; adeò ut necesse sit colores omnes in imò oculi permisceri & confundi. Neque ullam rationem solvendi hunc nodum excogitare possum, nisi fortè supponendum sit, motum hunc circularem esse duntaxat breves quosdam & celeres conatus ad circulationem, non plenum motum, ut revera fit in motu recto dictorum globulorum. Et ad plerasque omnes alias difficultates quas tibi jam proposui, aliquales saltem solutiones vel proprio Marte eruere forsan potuerò. Sed cum humanitas tua hanc veniam mihi concesserit, cumque singularis tua dexteritas in solvendis hujusmodi nodis, quam in nuperis tuis literis perspexi, me insuper invitaverit, (quamvis enim breviter, pro angustiis temporis in quas conjectus tunc eras, egisse te video; tam plenè tamen mihi satisfacis, tamque fortiter animi sensus mihi moves, ac si præfens digitum digito premeres;) cum denique majorem præ se laturæ sint auctoritatem elucidationes tuæ, tum apud me ipsum, tum apud alios, si usus fuerit; è re nostra putavi fore, hasce omnes difficultates tibi ipsi proponere, quas cum solveris, nisi magnopere fallor, penitissimè tuæ Philosophiæ Principia intelligam universa. Quòd equidem quanti facio vix credibile est. Hosce autem præsentis gryphos mihi cum expediveris (quod quantò citius fit, propter impotentem illum amorem quo in tua rapior, eò gratius futurum est) quæstiones alias è Dioptrice tua petitas mox accipies à

*Philosophia tua studiosissimo*

HEN. MORO.





A ferri ad B, ubi aliquò usque penetrabit, sed statim suffocabitur vis cursûs tam versùs HE quàm versùs CE; quod tamen non fieret, si pila ferretur secundùm lineam CBE, sed sine impedimento pergeret versùs HE, præsertim si nulla inesset pilæ gravitas: unde patet planitiem CE opponi pilæ B descendentia ab A, etiam quatenus fertur versùs HE, quod oportebat demonstrare.

*Dimidiam suæ velocitatis partem amittat*, lin. 27. Partem hîc aliquam velocitatis amissam esse lubens concedam; sed quòd & in hoc Articulo & in proximè sequenti supponis hanc partem velocitatis deperdi tantùm versùs CE, non versùs FE, nullus capio. Cùm enim unicus realis motus sit pilæ, (quamvis varias imaginari possimus pro libitu tendentias hujus motûs, sive metas;) si minuitur hic motus, quâcunque pergere fingis pilam, tardiùs incedet quàm ante motum minutum. Causa igitur tendentiæ pilæ ad I potiùs quàm ad D, non petenda est à tarditate vel celeritate motûs, sed à resistantia magni illius anguli CBD, & à debilitate minoris illius anguli EBD, cujus acies ob exilitatem suam & materiæ fluiditatem faciliùs cedit pilæ projectæ quàm obtusus angulus CBD. Alioqui si causa referenda esset ad celeritatem vel tarditatem, pila descendens ab H in B cursum etiam deflecteret. Hîc schema tuum consule, si opus est, pag. 84.

#### Ad Artic. 6. lin. 7.

*Tam obliquè incumbat, ut linea FE ducta*, &c. Perpetua hæc tua demonstrandi ratio, quòd pila profectura sit, lepidam profectò in se habet subtilitatem, sed quæ causam rei non videtur attingere. Vera enim & realis causa intelligenda est ex amplitudine anguli CBD, & exilitate EBD anguli, & ex magnitudine etiam pilæ, quæ quò major est, eò minorem depressionem lineæ AB versùs CE requirit, ad resiliendum versùs aërem L. Major enim pila non tam commodè levat atque aperit cuspidem acutioris anguli, quo intret in ipsam putà aquam, sed contundendo potiùs transvolat reflexa.

*Quod vim ejus motûs augeat*, lin. 22. Augmentum motûs nihil efficiet ad detorquendum cursum pilæ inceptum, nisi sit positura alicujus corporis quod dictum cursum pilæ versùs partem aliam determinet. Quod ego hoc modo fieri auguror in mediis illis quæ tu fingis radium faciliùs admittere, qualia sunt crySTALLUS, vitrum, &c. Nempe cum acies anguli EBD in istiusmodi substantiis adeò dura sit & pervicax, ut nihil cedat, radius impingens in constipam & inclinantem anguli aciem nonnihil avertitur ab incepto cursu, & introrsùm perpendiculum versùs abigitur. Utraque igitur refractione reflexio quædam mihi videtur, vel saltem reflexionis quædam inchoatio. Atque quemadmodum in plena & libera reflexione determinatio tollebatur sine ulla retardatione cursûs pilæ, ità hîc ad minuendam vel mutandam determinationem nova tarditas vel celeritas non videtur necessaria. Sola igitur determinatio minuta vel aucta sufficit ad utramvis refractionem. Neque enim A cùm ad CE superficiem pervenerit, quatenus celerior vel tardior cursum flectit, sed quatenus impingit in corpus determinationem mutans. Alioqui, si nuda duntaxat accesserit celeritas vel tarditas, A semper pergeret à B in D.



In priori igitur refractione, videlicet à perpendiculo, determinatio deorsum minuitur necessariò, pila autem retardatur per accidens, ob molliorem cursum immutantis. In posteriori determinatio deorsum augetur; pila autem si acceleratur, acceleratur per accidens, ob novi medii facilioris transitum. Determinationis igitur mutatio ejusque causa ad refractiones juxtà ac reflexionem sunt planè necessariae; velocitas & tarditas ipsius motus sunt duntaxat accessoriae, vel potius planè supervacaneae. Imò verò, novam quod pilae seu globuli accelerationem attinet in medio faciliore, videtur quidem illa perceptu perquam difficilis; propterea quòd novum illud medium non suppeditat novos gradus motus, sed tantum permittit pilae quos etiamnum habet superstites sine ulteriori ulla diminutione integros possidere, cum nullos ad se arripiat, vel imbibat. Aequèque absurdum videtur, novos, vel, si malles, pristinos motus gradus restitui pilae medium facilius intranti, ac concedere in puncto reflexionis pilam aliquo momento hærere priusquam resiliat, quod meritiò explodis Art. 2. hujus cap.

### Caput 6. Ad Artic. 9.

*Sed ex solo situ exiguarum partium cerebri, &c.* Suntne igitur istiusmodi in cerebri dissectione particulae visibiles, an ratione duntaxat colligis istiusmodi esse oportere in hunc usum destinatas? Mihi verò nihil opus harum esse videtur, sed eadem organa quae motum transmittunt, animam etiam commonefacere necessariò, unde illa fiat motus transmissio, si nullum interjacet impedimentum.


### Ad Artic. 13.

*Similem illi, quâ Geometra per duas stationes, &c.* Duriuscula hæc videtur obscuriorque comparatio, in nihilòque consentiens, nisi quòd utrobique binæ sumuntur stationes. Geometrae enim, vel, si malles, Geodætae, stationes sumunt, in linea ab arbore putà vel turri rectà producta; Oculus locum mutans in linea transversa, & ferme objecto parallela, si rectè rem capio.

### Ad Artic. 16.

*Ex cognitione seu opinione quam de distantia habemus, &c.* Adæquatas fortasse causas apparentis corporum magnitudinis explicare perquam difficile esset. Sed in uno hoc maximè consistere opinor, nimirum in magnitudine & parvitate decussationis anguli. Ille enim quò major est, major apparebit ejusdem corporis magnitudo; quò minor, minor. Deinde, quò observatu dignissimum est, cum objectum aliquod, pollicem putà tuum, intra grani unius distantiam oculo admoveris, hic decussationis angulus quater aut quinquies major erit quàm ille qui fit ad oculum à pollice distantem decem ferme grana; & si adhuc amovebitur pollex ab oculo per aliquot dena grana, semper angustior reddetur angulus decussationis, sed minori semper proportionem, per dena quæque grana, & minori; semper tamen aliquantò angustior evadit quàm antea, donec tandem

dem fiat tam angustus, ut rationem unius lineæ rectæ habere intelligatur. Hinc nemo mirabitur, si multò majorem pollicem deprehendat unico grano ab oculo distantem, quàm cum decem abest ab oculo, & postea per multa dena grana remotum, ad singula grana dena, non multùm magnitudinis deperdere; tam longinquè tamen removeri posse, ut prorsus desinat ulterius apparere. Distantia enim crurum interni decussationis anguli minor esse poterit quàm unius capillamenti nervi optici diameter. Quid autem hîc facit opinio de distantia cum imaginis magnitudine comparata, parùm intelligo. Neque certò scio quomodo aut oculus aut anima istam comparisonem secum instituat. Deprehensionem autem magnitudinis ex dicto angulo quo modo oriri concipio, sic videor mihi posse explicare.



HI & KL sint fundi duorum oculorum, majoris scilicet & minoris, CD sit objectum majus & remotius, EF objectum minus, sed propinquius, EGF vel KGL Angulus decussationis.

Primum, hîc statuo esse nîsum quendam, seu transmissionem motûs ab E in L & à D in K. Et animadversionem meam rectâ excurrentem per lineam KGF D offendere unam extremitatem objecti CD, videlicet D, eo revera quo inest loco, & per lineam LGE C offendere alteram extremitatem objecti CD, videlicet C, in suo itidem loco, & sic de cæteris partibus tam extimis quàm intermediis objecti CD. Recto igitur excursu hoc animadversionis meæ, obversam objecti magnitudinem deprehendo, cujus diametri apparentis mensura est angulus EGF. Servatis igitur eisdem rectis lineis per quas excurrat mea animadversio, & eâdem anguli magnitudine in oculo HI, quæ modò in KL, dico objectum DC æquè magnum apparere ac in oculo KL. Unde postea colligo, magnitudinem objecti apparentem ad anguli decussationis magnitudinem, non ad magnitudinem imaginis, referri. Postremò, ut magnitudo apparens objecti non fit ex magnitudine imaginis in oculi fundo (utî porrò patet ex eo, quòd eadem sit imaginis magnitudo objecti minoris EF quæ majoris CD, tam in HI oculo quàm in KL) ità neque simpliciter ex magnitudine anguli decussationis: alioquin objectum EF æquè magnum appareret ac objectum CD, cum idem sit decussationis angulus. Sed amoto EF minore objecto, objectum CD revera multò majus apparebit quàm apparebat modò objectum EF, cum tamen utraque cernerentur sub eodem decussationis angulo. Unde meritò concludi potest, apparentem cujusque objecti magnitudinem partim ex anguli decussationis, partimque ex reali corporis magnitudine oriri. Neque mirum est animadversionem meam per lineas rectas nîsus illius sive motûs transmissi pergentem eò usque penetrare, ibique se sistere ubi motus hic primum incipit, videlicet ad



ad C & D ; ut neque eas ( cum revera magis distant quàm E F , nec sub minori angulo videntur ) apparere etiam magis distantes quàm E & F , totumque adeò objectum C D majus simpliciter apparere quàm objectum totum E F .

### Ad Artic. 19.

*Quoniam sumus assueti judicare, &c.* Quid igitur censes de cæco illo à nativitate sua quem sanavit Christus, si speculum planum ipsi objectum fuisset antequam consuetudo judicium depravâset ? Numquid ille vultum suum citra speculum, non ultra, vel pone speculum, deprehendisset ? Mirificè torfit & fatigavit imaginationem meam hic imaginis pone speculum lusus, cujus causas nondum me satîs percepisse fateor. Neque enim mihi ullo modo satisfacit hæc depravata judicandi consuetudo. Si rationes reales magis magisque mechanicas excogitare poteris, & nobiscum communicare, rem sanè gratissimam præstabis.

### Ad Artic. 20. lin. ultimâ.

*Indè sequitur diametrum illorum, &c.* Cur non diameter Solis vel Lunæ videatur pedalis vel bipedalis, ob angulum decussatorium ad eam rationem diminutum, quæ apta sit corpora ejusdem realis magnitudinis, cujus sunt Sol & Luna, sub hanc pedalem vel bipedalem magnitudinem apparentem, ad istas distantias, representare ?

### Ad Artic. 21.

*Quia tam versus Horizontem quàm versus verticem, &c.* Igitur majores Sol & Luna ad Horizontem apparent quàm pro distantia oportet apparere. Et ea potius est dicenda vera magnitudo apparens, sive non fallax, quæ certæ legi subjicitur, quàm quæ externis aliquibus adjunctis alteratur.

### Ad Caput 7. Artic. 22.

*Quâ arte ob alias causas, &c.* Quam invertendi artem hîc intelligis ? Et quas ob causas ab ipsa abstines ?

### Ad Caput 8. Artic. 20.

*Aut diversis partibus parallelos.* Quid sibi hinc velint radii diversis partibus paralleli, nullo modo intelligo. Nihil enim hujusmodi quicquâ exhibetur in schemate hoc, pag. 172. depicto. Ut mentem hîc apertiùs explices oro. Obscurissimum etiam illud est, nisi ego sim tardissimus, quod habetur ad calcem hujus Articuli, de decussatione radiorum duo vitra convexa, D B Q & d b q , permeantium. Sed ad marginem hujus loci in editione tua Gallica relegas nos ad paginam 108. id est, ad figuram illam quæ in Latina editione habetur paginâ 164. Ego verò ibi in vitris illis nullam omnino video radiorum decussationem, sed tantum inter vitra, ad communem focum I. Nulli enim ibi radii apparent nisi paralleli, qui paralle-

lissimum

lismum servant donec ad convexitates vitrorum B D, & b d, pervenerint, ubi demum ita incipiunt inflecti, ut omnium tandem fiat decussatio in foco I, non alibi. Hic autem dicis radios etiam in illis vitris D B Q, & d b q, primò decussari in superficie prioris, putà D B Q, deinde in altera posterioris, putà d b q. Quam autem intelligis superficiem? Planam, an convexam? & an eandem in utraque? Pergis porrò, *Si saltem qui ex diversis partibus allabuntur. Quid est ex diversis partibus allabi?* Numquid intelligis ex adversis sive oppositis? Nam paralleli etiam qui ab eodem objecto emanant rectè dici possunt allabi ex diversis partibus. Hic prorsus in luto hæreo.

Ad Caput 9. Artic. 5. pag. 185. lin. 10.

*Quò magis hac perspicilla objectorum imagines agent, eò pauciora simul representant.* Cùm perfectiora hæc perspicilla aperturam vitri exterioris majorem habent, eaque plures proinde parallelos radios ab objecto suscipit quàm imperfectiorum minor apertura, omnesque illi radii ad fundum oculi à convexa dicti vitri superficie contorquentur, cur non plura etiam objecta, æquè ac majores imagines, in oculo poterunt depingere?

Ad Caput 10. Artic. 4. lin. 17.

*Hyperbole omnino similis & æqualis priori deprehendetur.* Supponis igitur Hyperbolas omnes, quarum foci æquidistant à verticibus, quamvis hæ per conum, illæ per funem & regulam describantur, per *ἐφαρμογήν* coincidere: quod ut falsum non video, ita puto tamen veritatem illius; cùm fundamentum sit totius quam mox expositurus es machinæ, fuisse operæ pretium demonstrasse, aut saltem rationem levi aliquo indicio innuisse.

Ad Artic. 6. pag. 202. lin. 27.

*Habebit enim & aciem & cuspidem.* Aciem habeat, sed quam cuspidem habere poterit non video, præsertim cùm acies hujus instrumenti fabricanda sit recta, non concava, sic enim esset sphærica; quæ si contingat extremos circulos latitudinis Rotæ, ad interiores tamen non adaptabitur; major enim erit quàm ut cum illis conveniat. Unde nec tanget instrumenti hujus cuspis circumductam Rotam in mediis latitudinis spatiis;

Ad Artic. 7. lineâ 17.

*Tantam esse non debere ut ejus semidiameter, distantia quæ erit inter lineas 12 & 55. &c.* Hujusce rei rationem autumo, quòd tunc concava vitri superficies sphærica fieret, non Hyperbolica.

Ad Artic. 10.

*Ut nonnullos ex maximè industriis & curiosis, &c.* Lubenter ex te audirem numquis ex peritioribus illis artificibus periculum fecerit adhuc ingenio-



ingeniosissimo hoc tuo invento, & quo successu. Nam quod quidam hîc mussitant, aliquos tentasse, operamque lussisse, id aut falsum arbitror, aut opifices illos qui tentârunt ex peritioribus non fuisse.

Quod ad Meteora attinet, difficultates quæ ibi occurrunt pauciores sunt, & levioris, opinor, momenti. Quales autem sint mox audies.

Meteororum Cap. 1. Artic. 4. pag. 210. lin. 7.

*Et denique prope terram quàm prope nubes.* Hoc asseris de radiis tam rectis quàm reflexis. Quî autem fieri possit ut recti, nisi quatenus reflectuntur & replicantur iterum in se prope Terram, vim caloris augeant, non video. Tum verò non sunt simpliciter recti, sed recti cum reflexis conjuncti. Imò verò potius minui videtur vis caloris in aëre terræ vicino, cùm nonnihil sui motûs ætherei globuli communicent cum particulis terrestribus, unde prope terram tardior erit motus eorum & languentior quàm in superioribus aëris regionibus. Non igitur abs re esset si hîc explices, cur cale scat aër prope Terram magis quàm prope nubes. Et annon fieri possit, ut quamvis motus minor sit prope Terram quàm in supernis aëris partibus, major tamen calor sentiat, ob inæqualitatem hujusce motûs.

Caput 7. Artic. 6. pag. 283. lin. 4.

*Sed etiam inferiores adeò raras atque extensas,* &c. At cùm tam raræ sint, quî possunt alias in se cadentes nubes excipere, ibique sistere? Videntur potius præ sua tenuitate ad Terram transmissuræ, si eò, aliàs, profecturæ essent.

Ad Artic. 7. lin. 2.

*Ob aëris circumquaque positi resonantiam,* &c. Ità sanè fingit Paracelsus tonitru tam immaniter boare & mugire, ob arcuata coeli templa, non ab simili ratione atque si quis æneam machinam nitrato pulvere onustam disploderet sub Tecto testudineato. Tu verò, fat scio, nullis laquearibus ætherem claudi sustines, ac proinde videatur verisimilius, quòd quò magis ictus distat à Terra, eò debilior futurus sit sonitus; cùm nec tam commodè fiat resonantia, quòd quò reverberetur sonus, tam longè absit ab allisis corporibus.

Caput 9. Artic. 2. lin. 19.

*Pauci quippe tantummodo radii,* &c. Numquid igitur radiorum paucitas cæruleum colorem generat? Videtur hoc haud ità consonum præcedentibus. Quippe quòd cùm suprà statueris, colores oriri ex varia proportionem rotationis sphæricularum ad motum earundem rectum, & particulatim cæruleum ex rotatione minore quàm progressu proficisci, quasi in eo ipso constaret ipsa cærulei coloris ratio; nunc tamen causam refert non tam ad rotationis defectum, quàm paucitatem radiorum resilientium à superficie maris. Hîc igitur quæro utrùm sentias nullam aliam esse colorum

rum rationem præter eam quam ipse tam subtiliter & ingeniosè exposuisti; an & aliis modis colores oriri possint, nullâ habitâ ratione rotationis globulorum motûsque rectilinei: præsertim cum & ipse innuis aquam marinam cæruleam videri ob paucitatem duntaxat radiorum. Et certè explicatu haud facile est, cum globuli in æquoris superficiem impingunt; cur non aut albescat mare aut rubescat, cum fortiùs impingunt, aut illis resistitur fortiùs in superficie maris, quàm in cœlo præ vaporibus albescente.

Proposui jam omnia quæ in scriptis tuis Physicis mihi visâ sunt aut intellectu difficilia, aut intellectu difficulter vera. In quibus legendis mirari non immeritò tibi subeat ingenii mei conditionem & fatum; qui cum profiteri ausim me cætera omnia in tuis scriptis satis intimè intelligere, (ubi plurima tamen reperiuntur, quæ multò difficiliora videri possint quàm de quibus sæpius hæsito) ista tamen quæ tibi proposui explicanda aut munienda, non æquè ac illa cætera intelligerem. Ego verò hanc naturam meam atque indolem, quam à puero usque in me ipso observavi, (quâ nempe maxima sæpenumero feliciter vinco, victus interim à minimis) ad hunc usque diem emendare non potui. Humanitatis tuæ erit ignoscere quod nefas est corrigere, nullòque pacto aut affectatæ ignorantiae aut disputandi prurigini imputare, quòd tam multa congefferim. Feci enim non ex effræni aliquo disputandi desiderio, sed potiùs ex religioso quodam erga tua studio,

*Non tam certandi cupidus, quàm propter amorem,  
Quòd te imitari aueo:*

Quod scitè quidem ille; Ego vero hac in causa verissimè. Quod reliquum est, Clarissime Cartesi, exorandus es, ut ista omnia quæ scripsi æqui bonique consulas, & cum primo tuo otio rescribas. Quod si dignatus fueris, peritissimum illum tandem efficies, qui semper fuit hætenus

*Cantabrigia, è Collegio Christi,  
12. Calend. Novemb. 1649.*

*Philosophiæ tuæ studiosissimus,*

HEN. MORUS.

*Ce qui suit a esté trouvé parmy les Papiers de Monsieur  
Des-Cartes, comme vn projet ou commencement de la réponse qu'il  
préparoit aux deux précédentes Lettres de Monsieur More.*

CUM tuam Epistolam decimo Calendas Augusti datam accepi, parâbam me ad navigandum Sueciam versus, &c.

*I. An sensus Angelorum sit propriè dictus, & an sint corporei, necne.*

*Resp.* Mentis humanas à corpore separatas sensum propriè dictum non habere; de Angelis autem non constare ex solâ ratione naturali an creati sint instar mentium à corpore distinctarum, an verò instar earundem corpori unitarum; nec me unquam de iis de quibus nullam habeo certam

D d

rationem



rationem quicquam determinare, & conjecturis locum dare. Quòd Deum dicas non esse considerandum nisi qualem omnes boni esse cuperent, si deesset, probò.

2. Ingeniosa instantia est de acceleratione motûs, ad probandam eandem substantiam nunc majorem nunc minorem locum posse occupare, sed tamen est magna disparitas, in eo quòd motus non sit substantia, sed modus, & quidem talis modus, ut intimè concipiamus quo pacto minui vel augeri possit in eòdem loco. Singulorum autem entium quædam sunt propriæ notiones, de quibus ex iis ipsis tantum, non autem ex comparatione aliorum, est judicandum: Ità figuræ non competit quod motui, nec utrique quod rei extensæ. Qui autem semel bene perspexit nihili nullas esse proprietates, atque ideo illud quod vulgò vocatur spatium vacuum non esse nihil, sed verum corpus, omnibus suis accidentibus (sive iis quæ possunt adesse & abesse sine subjecti corruptione) exutum, notaveritq; quomodo unaquæque pars istius sive spatii sive corporis sit ab omnibus aliis diversa & impenetrabilis, faciliè percipiet nulli alteri rei eandem divisibilitatem, & tangibilitatem, & impenetrabilitatem, posse competere.

3. Dixi Deum extensum ratione Potentiæ, quòd scilicet illa Potentia se exferat, vel exserere possit, in re extensa: Certumque est Dei essentiam debere ubique esse præsentem, ut ejus potentia ibi possit se exserere; sed nego illam ibi esse per modum rei extensæ, hoc est, eo modo quo paulò antè rem extensam descripsi.

4. Inter merces quas ais te ex navigiolo meo tibi comparasse, duæ mihi videntur adulteratæ. Una est, quòd quies sit actio sive renixus quidam; etsi enim res quiescens, ex hoc ipso quòd quiescat, habeat illum renixum, non ideo ille renixus est quies. Altera est, quòd moveri duo corpora sit immediatè separari; sæpe enim ex iis quæ ità separantur unum dicitur moveri, & aliud quiescere, ut in Art. 25, & 30. partis 2. explicui.

5. Translatio illa, quam motum voco, non est res minoris entitatis quàm sit figura, nempe est modus in corpore. Vis autem movens potest esse ipsius Dei conservantis tantumdem translationis in materia, quantum à primo creationis momento in ea posuit; vel etiam substantiæ creatæ, ut mentis nostræ; vel cujusvis alterius rei, cui vim dederit corpus movendi. Et quidem illa vis in substantia creata est ejus modus, non autem in Deo; quod quia non ità faciliè ab omnibus potest intelligi, nolui de ista re in scriptis meis agere, nè viderer favere eorum sententiæ qui Deum tanquam animam mundi materiæ unitam considerant.

6. Considero materiam sibi liberè permissam, & nullum aliunde impulsus susipientem, ut planè quiescentem; illa autem impellitur à Deo, tantumdem motûs sive translationis in ea conservante quantum ab initio posuit; neque ista translatio magis violenta est materiæ quàm quies: Quippe nomen violenti non refertur nisi ad nostram voluntatem, quæ vim pati dicitur, cum aliquid sit quod ei repugnat. In natura autem nihil est violentum, sed æquè naturale est corporibus quòd se mutuò impellant, vel elidant, quando ità contingit, quàm quòd quiescant. Tibi autem puto ea in re parare difficultatem, quòd concipias vim quandam in corpore quiescente per quam motui resistit, tanquam si vis illa esset positivum quid, nempe actio quædam, ab ipsa quiete distinctum; cum tamen nihil planè sit à modali entitate diversum.

7. Rectè

7. Rectè advertis motum, quatenus est modus corporis, non posse transire ex uno in aliud: sed neque etiam hoc scripsi; quinimo puto motum, quatenus est talis modus, assiduè mutari. Alius est enim modus in primo puncto corporis A, quòd à primo puncto corporis B separetur, & alius quòd separetur à secundo puncto, & alius quòd à tertio, &c. Cùm autem dixi tantumdem motus in materia semper manere, hoc intellexi de vi ejus partes impellente, quæ vis nunc ad unas partes materiæ, nunc ad alias se applicat, juxta leges in Artic. 45. & sequentibus partis secundæ propositas. Non itaque opus est ut sis sollicitus de transmigratione quietis ex uno subjecto in aliud, cùm nè quidem motus, quatenus est modus quieti oppositus, ita transmigret.

8. Quæ addis, nempe tibi videri corpus stupidè & temulentè esse vivum, &c. tanquam suavia considero: & pro libertate quam mihi concedis, hîc semel dicam, nihil magis nos à veritate inveniendâ revocare, quàm si quædam vera esse statuamus, quæ nulla positiva ratio, sed sola voluntas nostra, nobis persuadet, quando scilicet aliquid commentari sive imaginati sumus, & postea nobis Commentum placet; ut tibi, de Angelis corporeis, de umbra Divinæ essentiæ, & similibus; quale nihil quisquam debet amplecti, quia hoc ipso viam ad veritatem sibi præcludat.

---

*Responsio ad Fragmentum Cartesii, ex Epistola  
Henrici Mori ad Claudium Clerfelier.*

**Q**uòd tantopere tibi placuerunt nuperæ meæ literæ (Vir Clarissime) id profectò nulli earum lepori aut acumini, sed singulari tuæ humanitati imputandum est. Cujus & locupletius adhuc argumentum dedisti, quòd ad me nec rogantem nec expectantem gratissimum illud misisti Epistolæ Cartesianæ Fragmentum; ultròque nonnullis earum difficultatum quas Cartesio proposui, ipse tam benignè tentasti satisfacere. Quod quidem officium aut hâc aut nullâ possum ratione compensare, nempe si eis omnibus quæ uterque vestrûm scripsistis breviter respondeam.

1. Primò igitur, quantum ad Cartesiana illa attinet; De animarum separatarum angelorumque sensu, dum omni penitus corpore destituuntur, inter nos convenit, neutros nempe habere sensum propriè dictum. Quòd verò Angeli subtilissimis semper corporibus induti fuerint, indicio est, quòd nonnulli ex ipsis propriâ voluntate mali evaserunt. Spiritus autem purè ac perfectè immaterialis nulli labi aut lapsui obnoxius esse videtur; non est enim, cùm adeò simplex sit, unde possit tentari stationemque suam deferere.

2. Nullo modo eludi potest instantia mea de eodem numero motu qui nunc majus nunc minus subjectum occupat, ni malè mentem explicaverit suam, aut sententiam à me monitus retractaverit. Nam motum à



\* *Philos. natural. lib. 1. cap. 5.*

corpore in corpus transferri ipse docet disertis verbis, discipulusque ejus ac interpres \* *Henricus Regius* eodem modo transire affirmat ac hæreditas à *Sticho* pervenit ad *Seium*. Nec disparitas illa quicquam huc facit, quòd motus sit tantum modus, spiritus autem substantia, cum utrumque quid reale sit; imò verò causæ nostræ magis favet, cum impossibile sit ut idem numero modus nunc hoc, nunc illud subjectum, subjectivè partem occupet, idem autem numero spiritus sat commodè possit. Miror igitur infelicitatem Regiani ingenii, qui cum eundem numero motum tam liberè à corpore ad corpus vagari passus sit, animam tamen humanam foetulo cadaveri tam inhumaniter incarcerationi, nec exesis sive absumptis Naturæ vinculis foràs evolare permiserit. Quod ad ideam spatii attinet, illumque toties inculcatum Aphorismum, *Nihili nullam esse affectionem*, tam fusè & copiosè ad ista respondi in superioribus meis literis ad Cartesium, ut planè supervacaneum ducam quicquam hîc adjicere.

3. De Dei etiam, quam vocant, Omnipræsentia nullum superest inter nos dissidium, cum ubique eum esse agnoscat, vimque suam in subjectam materiam exerere; extensionem porro aliqualem ei competere, sed longè diversam ab ea quæ divisibili ac impenetrabili corpori competit.

4. Nullas ego merces in Cartesiano navigio adulteravi; nam quòd conqueritur me ita permiscere ac confundere illum corporis quiescentis renixum cum quiete, ut nullam inter ipsa distinctionem admittam, id contendo optimo jure esse factum. Quid enim est, si non sit quies, quo se corpus quiescens ab abreptione seu translatione, quam ille motum vocat, defendit? Est igitur renixus ille nihil aliud nisi ipsissima quies, rem quiescentem conservans in statu quietis; hoc est, res perseverat in eo statu quo est juxta leges Naturæ, donec fortior aliqua causa eum mutaverit. Quòd si renixus hic, sive constantia, quietis actio aliqua esset, cum omnis actio corporea sit motus, quietis etiam motus aliquis esset; quod videtur valde rationi absonum. Ego igitur potius suspicor incomparabilem Philosophum aliorum culpâ, qui satis pro imperio omnia agunt, rationem motûs adulterasse, nè videretur, quod superstitiosa Peripateticorum schola pro piaculo ferè habet, telluris motum asserere, dum eam in communi omnium Planetarum vortice agnoscit circa Solem circumferri.

Pari etiam facilitate adulteratio illa altera diluitur. Nam cum ipse Cartesius motum seu translationem reciprocam esse statuatur, nec tamen eam vim ullam esse vel actionem in corporibus divulsis ac translatis, quid, quæso, potest esse nisi immediata corporum separatio? Quòd si motus sit immediata corporum separatio, continuò sequitur, quòd moveri duo corpora sit immediatè separari. Quòd autem unum ex istis sæpius dicatur quiescere, id profectò gratis dictum est, cum sit impossibile. At verò nisi quiescat terra E F G H, dum corpus A B transfertur ab E versus F, ac C D ab H versus G, terra uno eodémque tempore in contrarias partes movebitur. Unde iterum constat ipsum Cartesium genuinam motûs notionem adulterasse. Vide Part. 2. Art. 30.

5. Videtur Translatio minus habere entitatis quàm Figura, quoniam hæc est magis absoluta affectio corporis in quo est, illa ad aliud duntaxat relatio. Quod ad vim motricem spectat, sive in Deo sive in Mente Divina

vina sive in Anima Mundi cum Platoniciis statuat; præclare tamen factum est quod tam egregius Philosophus hanc virtutem materiæ ipsi non tribuerit, sed alii alicui subjecto, quod proinde non potest non esse immateriale seu incorporeum. Videbat enim proculdubio Vir perspicacissimus, nisi quis licentiam sibi arriperet quidlibet temerè & precario affirmandi vel negandi, quod necesse esset agnoscere universam materiam suâ naturâ esse homogeneam, juxta ideam ejus animo nostro obversantem, præsertim cum nulla causa fingi possit ullius in ea diversitatis. Hinc sequitur mundanam materiam totam suâ naturâ aut moveri aut quiescere. Quod si tota per se moveatur, nullius rei esset, nè ad momentum quidem, permanens compages, diffluentibus statim suâ sponte à se invicem particulis, vel potius nunquam in unum coalescentibus; quod abunde satis probavi in Literis meis ad Cartesium.

6. Apertè igitur profitetur Cartesius se, cum Ficino reliquisque Platoniciis, materiam sibi liberè permissam, nullumque aliunde impulsus suscipientem, considerare ut planè quiescentem. Quod verò impulsus hic ipsi non sit violentus, juxta cum illo sentio: non solum quod nomen violenti propriè non referatur nisi ad nostram voluntatem, quæ vim pati dicitur cum aliquid sit quod ei repugnat; sed quod materia quodammodo motu hoc vel impulsu perficiatur. Nec quicquam obstat renixus ille qui fingitur in materia quiescente, cum non propriè actio sit, sed tantum rei quiescentis in sua quiete persistencia, ut ipse innuit hoc in loco Cartesius.

7. Rectè me hîc dicit advertere motum, quatenus est modus corporis, non posse transire ex uno in aliud, neque se ullubi hoc scripsisse. Regius verò datâ operâ rem sic explicat ac si error esset aliter sentire, prout supra monui. Quin & ipsius Cartesii verba hunc sensum præ se planissimè ferre videntur, Part. 2. Art. 40. ubi asserit corpus majorem vim habens ad pergendum alterum corpus secum movere, ac quantum ei dat de suo motu tantundem perdere. Imò verò & vis illa qua de hîc agit idem mihi videtur atque motus iste. Sed cuilibet Authori sua scripta interpretandi jus esto.

8. Mea illa *suavia* quæ vocat si miscerentur cum ejus severis, optimum crederem inde factum iri temperamentum. Ego tamen interim venustum Cartesiani ingenii rigorem non retrectanter suavior ac deoscolor; quamvis hoc sæpius notaverim, nempe eos qui Mathematicam certitudinem in rebus omnibus tam pertinaciter affectant, infelicissimè omnium in quibusdam vacillasse. Ea enim argumentandi ratio quæ demonstrationis speciem præ se fert, simul atque deprehensa sit non esse legitima demonstratio, nullius loci argumentum meritò judicatur.

Præterea, in adhibendo allusiones quasdam & similitudines nulla fraus subesse potest, modò meminerimus res propriis nominibus non appellari; sed tralatitiis; nec materiam sive universum mundi corpus idèò esse umbram, quod quasi umbram esse divinæ essentiæ indigitaverim. Hæc enim allusio non docet corpus revera esse umbram, sed à Deo pendere ut umbra à corpore. Deinde, ut umbra aliqualem corporis imaginem refert, sed obscurissimam maximèque degenerem; sic in corpore sive materia cæca quædam ac evanida esse Divinæ essentiæ vestigia, quæ cum, uti dixi;



vita sit perfectissima, ipsa analogia postulat, ut omni prorsus vitæ imagine materia non destituatur. Aliqualem autem vitæ speciem mentitur in eo, quòd dum duo corpora occurrunt, ità motus eorum attemperari possit, ut mutuò quasi monita, alterum de acceleratione motûs, de retardatione alterum, utraque tandem in eundem motûs tenorem conspirent. Eadèmq̃ue est ratio in reliquis translationis legibus. Nam motum illum qui in uno corpore est transire in aliud, ipse vix audet affirmare Cartesius.

Quòd verò addit externam aliquam esse vim, sive à Deo sit, sive à substantia aliqua incorporea à Deo creata, quâ materia in motum excitatur, id etiam laudo, cùm proculdubio in genere sit verissimum. Quòd si ità rem intellexerit ac si Divina illa vis singula corpora immediatè impelleret quæ moventur, magna erit difficultas; frustrà enim essent mutui corporum impulsus. Experienciâ autem constat unum corpus alterum impellere, ut videre est in projectis manu lapidibus, globisque ferreis è machina bellica explosis. Quòd si quasdam materiæ partes exuscitet illa vis, alias verò immediatè non exuscitet, partes illæ divinitùs excitatæ alias impulsu suo in motum excitabunt. Cùm verò nullus motus transeat ab uno corpore in aliud, manifestum est, unum alterum quasi è somno expergefacere, atque hoc pacto expergefacta corpora de loco in locum se suâ vi transferre; quam corporis proprietatem ego tanquam umbram vitæ aliquam ac imaginem considero. Quamobrem tandem liquet cassas nos non captare umbras, sed quæ usum suum habent, optimèque veritatem illustrent severiori argumentandi genere demonstrabilem.

Alterum illud *suave* quod spectat, Angelos scilicet corporeos; eorum sanè existentiam testantur sexcentæ ampliùs non fabulæ, sed verissimæ de Dæmonibus historiæ. Vanos autem illos vagulòsque genios corporeos esse oportere, hoc est, vehiculis indui corporeis, ipse mihi videor satùs suprà demonstrâsse.

## Epistola H. MORI ad V. C.

1. Non omnia se Cartesianæ sine delectu amplecti. 2. Ad tria ferè genera revocari quicquid uspiam lapsus est Cartesius. 3. Primi generis exempla. 4. Exempla secundi. 5. Tertiæ exempla. 6. Cur tantopere sibi indulget lectionem Philosophiæ Cartesianæ; Prima Ratio. 7. Ratio secunda. 8. Tertia Ratio. 9. Quarta. 10. Quinta Ratio. 11. Ratio ultima. 12. Cartesium injustè ab imperito vulgo Atheismi insimulari. 13. Qualia sunt quæ potissimum hujus criminis eum suspectum reddunt. 14. Quòd Existentiæ Dei demonstratione perfectissimâ probavit. 15. Quòd in demonstranda Animæ immortalitate tam propè scopum attingit, ut certum sit illum firmiter eam credidisse immortalē. 16. Huic consonare dicta ejus pia ac generosa supremo instanti fato. 17. Multa occurrere in ejus Philosophia quæ Dei existentiam Animæque immortalitatem necessariò inferunt. 18. Tredecim loca in Epistolis eodē spectantia. 19. Insignem solummodò Naturæ peritiam eum Atheismi reddidisse

didisse suspectum. 20. Ridicula quorundam obrectatio, qui eum tanquam vertiginosum mentisque malè compotem considerant. 21. Inventa ejus maximè paradoxa cum nuperis Philosophorum observationibus arctissimè coherere. 22. Quomodo ex Tychonica cæli fluiditate primum suum secundumque Elementum collegerit. 23. Quomodo ex Hypothesi Copernicana detexerit Materiam cælestem circa Solem, ad modum Vorticis, circumrotari. 24. Quomodo ex raptu hujus Vorticis Solis Stellarumque generationem intellexerit. 25. Quomodo hinc Luminis ac Colorum intima natura illi enotuerit. 26. Quæ Philosophorum Observationes cum invitaverint ad credendum Terram olim fuisse Solem Stellamve fixam. 27. Enumeratio quarundam Magnetis proprietatum, generalisque ex eis Conclusio; Quid, si Terra Magnes sit, in axe alicujus Vorticis eam olim sitam esse oportuerit. 28. Eadem conclusio particulatim tum è Duritie Terræ Magnetica, 29. Tum è subtilitate particularum & foraminulorum magneticorum illata. 30. Cartesii indoles modesta ac sobria. 31. Nimiùm tamen illum indulgisse suo Genio Mechanico, sed in immensum Reipublicæ literariæ commodum. 32. Qui nihil sciri posse conquerruntur, non tam opprobrio Philosophiam afficere quàm suam excusare ignaviam. 33. Aliquid sciri posse in rebus naturalibus Cartesium clarè edocuisse. 34. Qui ea quæ ad mentem excolendam inserviunt nihil ad vitam humanam conferre statuunt, apertè profiteri se degere belluinam.

I. **R**EM magnam à me postulas, V. C. nempe ut de Philosophorum Triumviratu hujus seculi maximè insignium sententiam feram. Quorum quidem de duobus nihil planè statuere possum, utpote quos nondum perlegi; nec è re credo fore mea eos unquam perlegere. Miror equidem quòd ex me quæras quid de tertio illo sentiam, cum præclaram illam opinionem quam de eo concepi plùs semel publicè testatus sim. Sed dum porrò sciscitaris, quas potissimùm ob causas illius Philosophiam tam avidè sim amplexus, uberioris Responsi argumentum mihi suppeditat importunior illa interrogatio. Neque enim quæstio est una atque simplex, sed accusatiunculæ cujusdam aculeo præarmata, quasi Cartesiana omnia sine delectu admitterem & foverem.

Verùm multò aliter se res habet ac suspicaris. Quamvis enim incomparabilis Philosophus in Inventis suis ac Ratiociniis plerisque omnibus adeò supra humanam sortem felix sit ac ingeniosus ut, quod ubique ferè præstat, id nullubi eum non præstitisse credere cogi videamur; me tamen Natura tam tardo ac hæsitabundo ingenio finxit, ut nullius mortalis auctoritas mentis aciem ità potuerit unquam perstringere, ut hoc fascino devinctus eis Theorematis fidem haberem quorum veritas satès solidis argumentis non sit suffulta, multò minùs eis quæ propriis animi sensibus ac rationi repugnant. Itaque breviter dicam; Tantum abest ut tam avidè Cartesiana omnia cruda cocta perinde devorem, ut liberè apud te profitendum censuerim, me in illius Scriptis observasse nonnulla quæ nullo pacto deglutire possum. Quæ operæ pretium fore existimo tibi recensere, ut postquam Cartesium perlegeris, quod brevi te facturum scribis, judicium tuum experiri possim, an de eisdem Theorematis juxtà mecum sentias;



2. Ad tria causarum genera revocare possumus quicquid uspiam lapsus est Cartesius. Nimirum vel ad simplicem nudamve inadvertentiam, qualis in omnes ferè mortales cadere solet: Vel ad nimium sive prudentiæ sive honestæ cujusdam astutiæ studium, cujus haud adeò multi rei sunt: Vel denique ad enormem quandam Mathematicæ certitudinis ac necessitatis in singulis suis conclusionibus affectationem; quò certè perpauci adhuc aspirârunt in rebus naturalibus, nemo prorsus eò usque pervenit, nec fortassis unquam est perventurus.

3. Ad primum genus referri potest modus ille quem explicat Refractionis, Dioptric. cap. 2. & ratio sitûs imaginum in Reflexione, cap. 6. cum paucis aliis, de quibus forsan mox plura dicemus.

4. Secundi generis duo insignia occurrunt exempla. Primum est, explicatio naturæ Motûs, quem dicit semper esse reciprocum. Quæ quidem notio manifestis contradictionibus mihi semper visa est involvi. Maluit tamen hoc modo obscurare verbis scientiam, quàm non videri minus motûs tribuere terræ quàm aut Copernicus tribuit aut Tycho; imò omnem motum illi adimere, ut majorem gratiam Philosophiæ suæ conciliaret, sibi que melius caveret ab eis hominibus apud quos inveterata consuetudo cæcæque autoritas plus valet quàm luculentissima quævis demonstratio. Manebat enim proculdubio altæ menti infixum durum illud Galilæi fatum, qui tam liberos circuitus terræ tribuendo circa Solem, libertatem sibi ademit suam, gressûsque proprios intra carceris limites circumscripsit.

Alterum exemplum est de brutis animantibus, quas inanimas Machinas insensatæque Automata esse fingit. Quod lepidum commentum ipsi fuit necesse comminisci, nè brutorum animas pariter ac nostras ex sua Philosophandi ratione concluderet immortales. Cùm enim firmiter teneret nè vilissimum quidem cogitandi actum cadere in Materiam qualitercunque modificatam, si agnovisset sensum inesse brutis, debuisset etiam concedere substantiam ipsis inesse realiter à materia distinctam, hoc est, animam immortalem. Sensu igitur maluit bruta privare, quàm se sinere insensatorum & captiosorum hominum odiosis quæstiunculis de brutorum statu post mortem irretiri & torqueri.

Huic generi accenferi debet quod obiter profert Princip. part. 3. Art. 2. de non investigandis finibus earum rerum quas in Naturæ complexu videmus. Quo monito proculdubio sibi præcavit ab importunis illis sciscitationibus quas malè feriat homines urgere possent, de universo genere tam Cometarum quàm Planetarum, uti etiam de Stellis, quas totidem quasi Soles esse ipse planè agnoscit. Admodum enim proclive erat porrò interrogare, in quem finem tot Soles creâsset Deus, quibûsve lucerent. Et, cùm in Planetis omnibus (utpote qui eandem ferè originem, ab incrustatis scilicet solibus, eundemque productionis modum, habuerint) sit terra, mare, aër, magnes, aurifodinæ, &c. quærere insuper, annon etiam tum bruta animalia, tum nobiliores illi incolæ, homines, singulis ineffent. Transcurrentes denique Planetas hospitiumque sibi in aliquo vortice quærentes, annon credibile sit novorum ipsos Terrarum orbium esse jacta rudimenta. E quibus spinosis quæstionibus facillimè se expedire posse sperabat Cartesius, maturè præmonendo tam profundum esse Dei consilium

lium in Naturæ operibus, ut summæ sit temeritatis fines eorum investigare. Novit enim homo nasutissimus potiorē multò esse ignorantia simulationem, quàm intempestivæ venditationem scientiæ.

5. Ad tertium genus spectat id quod adhibet ad demonstrandum Rarefactionem & Condensationem fieri ad modum spongiæ: nempe Distantiam, sive spatium, ac corpus idem esse realiter, nec ullam ullubi fingi posse extensionem quæ non sit realis affectio alicujus corporis. Quod fundamentum magnopere Cartesio placuit, quoniam certitudine, si fieri potest, plusquam Mathematicâ suum Rarefactionis & Condensationis modum confirmat, ac præterea totam doctrinam de immensis numero ac magnitudine Vorticibus, deque particulis primi elementi in infinitum divisis, mirificè suffulcit. Mihi verò Fundamentum illud non arridet ullo modo. — Tum quòd rationes illæ quas pro eo adducit Cartesius non satis validæ sunt, prout fusè in literis meis probavi; tum quòd innuit Materiam aut per se independentem existere, aut saltem ab omni æternitate simul cum Deo extitisse, necessariò ab ipso productam eique coævam. Quorum prius cum vera Dei notione planè *ἀνοήτων* est, posterius durum ac temerarium. Quamvis non sit diffidendum fuisse semper, atque etiamnum esse, qui utramvis opinionem cum Dei Existentiâ cultūque religioso seriò conjungunt.

Porro, ad morbum hunc Mathematicum summæque certitudinis pruriginem reducenda est & illa Cartesii de conclusionibus ex Mechanica motûs necessitate, per universam suam Philosophiam, perpetuò deducendis magnifica Pollicitatio. Neque enim putabat Vir sagacissimus se satis securum de certitudine eorum modorum quibus Naturæ Phænomena fieri asserit, si Divina consilia (quæ variis modis eadem Phænomena exhibere possint) cum Materiæ Motûsque legibus miscerentur. Sed ingens hic ardor atque studium deducendi singula ex certa hac atque inevitabili Materiæ lege Motûsque, ejusdem mensurâ in universo Mundo semper permanentis, generosum Cartesii ingenium ita effascinauit, ut non rarò præproperè nimis imaginatus sit se id præstitisse, quod tam efflictim ubique præstare desiderat. Omisiss aliis, unum duntaxat, sed præfulgidum maximique momenti, producam exemplum, nempe de efformatione particularum striatarum, earundemque motu. Tantum enim abest ut necessariò fiant eo modo quo ille rem explicat, ut valde improbabile videatur, imò forsan impossibile, eas ita efformari, aut formatas ejusmodi legibus moveri.

Intorsionem enim particularum striatarum ex motu globulorum Vorticis per quem transeunt oriri asserit, magisque vel minùs intortas esse pro celeritate motûs globulorum circa axem Vorticis circumvolutorum; Eas nempe quæ longiùs, magis, quæ verò propiùs absunt ab Axe, minùs intorqueri; quemadmodum constat ex \* Artic. 90, & 91. tertiæ part. Princip. Philosophiæ. Sed nulla prorsus videtur Mechanica necessitas ut columellæ illæ triangulares communi vorticis raptu in gyrum vertantur circa proprios axes. Idem enim hîc experiri possemus in qualibet materia, præsertim in rotunda pariter ac longa, positâque in tubo vel canali aliquo Telluris axi parallelo. Hanc enim nemo somniaverit ex raptu terræ in circuitum, circa proprium itidem axem in canali suo gyratum iri. Pari


igitur

\* Vide Transl. Gallic. Et que ces trois canaux sont plus ou moins tournez, à proportion de ce qu'elles passent par des endroits qui sont plus ou moins éloignés de cet essieu, à cause que les parties du second élément tournent plus vite en ces endroits plus éloignés qu'aux autres plus proches.



igitur, si non potiori, ratione intelligamus triangulares illas particulas in columnæ formam productas communi Vorticis motu circumagi, nec tamen interim sibi ullos proprios gyros acquirere ex hac circumactione. Nam æquè certum est ( idque certitudine prorsus mechanicâ ) omnes globulos ab axe vorticis illâ circumrotationis vi repelli, quàm gravia omnia crassâque corpora versus centrum terræ remitti; itâ ut omne subterfugium hinc præcludi videatur inania responsa comminiscenti. Quibus addas vel ipsam figuram harum columnarum triangularium magno fore impedimento istis propriis ipsarum gyrationibus quas fingit Cartesius. Nam simul ac lentor ille materiæ satis sit induratus ad retinendam hanc formam triangularem, anguli columellarum adeò erunt robusti ob crassitiem suam ut haud facile siverint se intorqueri. Recto igitur sed celerrimò cursu pergent triangulares hæ columnulæ per spatia illa triangularia sine ulla sui intorsione, modò continuâ serie spatiorum anguli in eisdem ferè reperiantur lineis.

Quòd si anguli horum spatiorum triangularium in eisdem lineis non reperiantur, sed anguli & latera alternatim se mutuò secant ( quod sanè factu facilius videtur, globulis eo situ in formam stabiliorem magisque compactam relabentibus ) videamus tandem an hoc modo res feliciùs successerit, exstiteritque ulla Mechanica necessitas ut dictæ columnulæ in formam cochlearem torqueantur. Supponamus igitur materiam primi Elementi transeundo per spatium triangulare  $ABC$  sibi acquisivisse figuram triangularem, ipsi verò hoc modo formatae proximè occurrere



alterum spatium triangulare  $DEF$ , angulis suis prioris latera secans, si eo nempe situ committerentur. Profectò longè abest ut intorqueantur hæ particulæ eis legibus quibus intorqueri contendit Cartesius. Nam tametsi Materia subtilissima simul ac satis lentuerit formam necessariò acquirat triangularem transeundo, putà per  $ABC$ ; præ teneritudine tamen consistentiæ suæ motûsque celeritate vix credibile est quin, dum impingit hæ columnula in  $DE$ ,  $EF$ ,  $FD$ , latera trianguli  $DEF$  abradat prorsus, & deperdat omnem illam materiam quæ continetur angulis  $aAa$ ,  $bBb$ ,  $cCc$ , fiatque indè non triangularis, sed sexangularis, penèque rotunda; unde & contorsionis necessitas illa Mechanica planè periret. Et certè si daremus productos illos angulos columnulæ triangularis allisione illâ non abradi, sed protuberantiâ globulorum, qui succedens triangulare spatium claudunt, inverti duntaxat & intorqueri ( quod tamen, ut dixi, ob celeritatem

celeritatem transitus recensque formatae particulae teneritudinem nullo modo est probabile) sequeretur tamen nihilominus rem admodum esse fortuitam quas in partes hae columnulae intorqueantur, nempe an secundum ordinem Vorticis *GH*, an verò contrà. Nam cum globuli aetherei proximè sibi adjacentes sint ejusdem magnitudinis, triangularia illa spatia aequalia erunt aequaliterque se interfecabunt, ita ut angulus *A*, dum impingit in latus *FD*, in ipsum medium lateris necessario cadat; & sic de reliquis. Unde nulla suppetit ratio quare columnulae illae triangulares intorqueantur versus *H* magis quam versus *G*, & vice versa: Ac proinde merito concludi possit, particulas striatas nunc hanc nunc illac in efformatione sua torqueri, nec omnes ab eodem polo venientes in easdem partes esse intortas. Quo quidem pacto everterentur penitus notissimae illae Magnetismi leges, Mundique Phaenomena mutarentur. Quamobrem necesse est altiore aliquam causam & diviniorem quam Materiam Motumque purè Mechanicum ad hoc opus adsciscere, si tam affabrè, tam constanti artificio, inque tam utiles fines destinato, cochlearem in formam columnulae illae triangulares sint torquendae.

Idemque statuendum est de cursu & tendentia ipsarum hoc modo jam intortarum. Nam ad certas partes lege certâ pergere supponuntur, quae tamen Mechanica esse non potest. Ut quando transeunt per Materiam subtilem sideris jam cortice incrustari incipientis, aut jam ferme incrustati; Nisi hic vis aliqua directrix Mechanicâ diviniore striatarum cursum regat ac moderetur, impossibile est quin ab axe sideris latera versus rejiciantur, alterâque extremitate eò porrectâ corticem feriant lineâ ad axem sideris non parallelâ, sed ad angulos ferè rectos eum secanti. Incredibile enim est alteram extremitatem striatarum particularum alteri ut plurimum non præponderare magisve solidam esse. Hoc saltem manifestum est, cum hae striatae simul cum sidere circumrotentur, necesse fore ut ab axe recedant, confertimque versus eas sideris partes quae propius ab sunt ab Ecliptica retrudantur; unde maxima vis Magnetismi versus Telluris Aequatorem, nulla ferè versus Polos reperiretur. Quòd si minùs pura jam evaserit Elementi primi Materia, contractisque sordibus aliquantulum lentuerit, particulae striatae tam longo itinere motum suum perderent, viam sibi findendo per hunc Materiae lentorem crassiorémque consistentiam.

Sed concedamus rectè hinc omnia intus peragi ac feliciter, videamus quid fiat de his striatis particulis cum integro impetu exsiluerint foras: Certè mihi credibile non est, si nullam aliam vim haberent moderatricem præter legem purè mechanicam, eas tam prospero exitu redituque cursus suos repetere posse. Nam ut omittam quàm facile sit particulas Australes in foramina Borealia & Boreales in Australia impingere, illisque impactionibus meatus magneticos (praesertim dum teneri sunt recensque formati) turpiter deformare; id certè mihi videtur supra omnem Mechanicæ legem positum, quòd factis quasi agminibus tam constanti cursu revertantur à Polo ad Polum, & in liberum aetherem non rectâ proficiantur ut jacta spicula vel sagittae. Mechanicis enim legibus magis consonum esset ut viam sibi perforarent per aërem (etiamsi eum fingeremus aliquanto crassiorém) motumque suum ac vim hisce conatibus impen-

dendo



dendo perderent, quàm ut, datâ quasi operâ, reditum mōlirentur, cursúmque ad alterum polum tam longè distantem dirigerent. Nám cūm semel è partibus Terræ magneticis in aërem se projecerint, clauduntur protinus aëris partibus omnimodè consimilibus, ut quæ proximè sibi invicem adjacent. Unde manifestum est, nihil corporei in causa esse posse cur hæ particule homogeneis undique aëris partibus isthoc modo involutæ hæc potius erumperent quàm illæ, aut quòd reverti mallent quàm rectâ viam conficere, vel in sublime ferri; sed subesse aliud Principium & divinius quod errantes revocet, quòdque motus cursúsque earum in fines certos & destinatos ubique moderetur & gubernet.

Postremò, ad *κυματισίαν* hanc sive *μικρολογία* Mathematicam referre poteris cautum illud ac scrupulosum Principium, viz. Quòd nè tantillo quidem plus minúsve motús sit in rerum Universitate uno tempore quàm alio. Quod nullis, quod sciam, rationibus defendi potest nisi precariis vel fictis. Cujus generis duæ mihi occurrunt. Prima est, nec Genios nec Animas humanas materiam posse movere, sed motus ejus duntaxat versus hanc vel illam partem determinare; cūm planè gratis dictum sit Essentiam ullam activam ac operativam, qualis ab omnibus æstimatur substantia spiritualis, habere vim coërcendi, sistendi ac gubernandi materiam motam, & tamen nè minimam quidem vim unquam habere posse eandem ullatenus movendi. Altera est, Corpus quod alteri corpori motum imprimit, quantum illi motús imprimit, tantumdem de suo semper perdere, partémq; quam perdit eandem numero in alterum corpus transire: quod credo me, si vacaret, ex speculatione Potentiarum, quas vocant, Mechanicarum facillimè posse refutare. Sed cūm hæc de eodem prorsus, tam numero quàm mensurâ, motu in Mundo semper permanente opinio ad quosdam Cartesii sequaces magis quàm ad ipsum pertineat, illis potiùs quàm ipsi impingenda est hæc temeritatis culpa.

Vides tandem quàm non omnes illas dapes quibus tam lautè amicos suos excipit Cartesius, promiscuâ ingluvie devoro.

6. Postquam igitur hanc suspicionem dilui, libenter quæstioni responderem, si verba sensúmque paululùm mutaveris. Utique si mihi non exprobraveris tam avidos Inventorum Cartesianorum arctósque amplexus, sed interrogaveris solummodo quare profiteor me tanto cum studio & voluptate Philosophiam evolvere Cartesianam. Habeo enim in promptu multa quæ respondere possum.

Primò enim, nullus dubito quin omne id quod appellit ad sensus nostros à Mundo sensibili, (hoc est, ab externis Objectis, quæ Phænomena vulgò vocantur, quibúsque sensus nostri afficiuntur) nihil omnino sit aliud quàm motus corporeus aliter atque aliter ex magnitudine, figura, sitúsque partium Materiæ modificatus. Quod manifestò patebit omnes sensus ipsorúmque objecta percurrenti.

De tactu palàm est, qui non afficitur nisi alicujus corporis pressione, adfrictione, impactione sive illusione, & similibus. Porro, quòd id quod admovetur corpori nostro videatur molle vel durum, calidū vel frigidum, & id genus reliqua, motui tribuendum esse æquè manifestum est. Saccharum enim, saxa & ferrum attritione confracta & in tenues pulvisculos comminuta mollia fiunt; Aqua verò, ex motús privatione partiúmque unione

ac quiete in glaciem compacta, dura. Unde constat duritiem consistere in firma unione quiescentiū partium, mollitiem in earum disjunctione, modò satis tenues sint, majorémque fore mollitiem si motus tenuitati accesserit; quod fusè, si opus esset, demonstrari posset. Eandem etiam esse rationem de calido & frigido ex eo liquet, quòd motu ad hunc vel illum gradum adsurgente calor excitatur, & remisso illo motus gradu vel diminuitur vel tollitur: Quemadmodum clarè videmus in aqua bulliente super ignem in vase posita. Quin & ipsius ignis naturam in vehementissima particularum agitatione consistere ex eo planè deprehendimus, quòd maximam partem pabuli sui in flammam, quæ vehementi motu agilique vibratione sursum fertur, absomit, ipsosque cineres in minutissimas partes disjungit, unde & ipsi molles aliquatenus evadunt. Pari ratione reliquæ qualitates tactiles ex natura motus explicari possent; sed id justı voluminis, non unius Epistolii, opus esset.

Cùm autem de tactu constet, quòd nihil id sit aliud quàm motus corporeus quod ipsum afficit, securi esse possumus idem contingere in gustu, cùm & ipse sit tactus quidam (etiam astipulante \* Aristotele) illiusque perceptiones fiant ex Objecti atque Organi contactu corporeo, varianturque ex variis motus effectis in Objecto. Omnes enim cibi ex aliis atque aliis ignis ministeriis (cujus naturam in vehementiori particularum agitatione consistere modò probatum est) alios atque alios sapes sibi adsciscunt, variisque modis gustum afficiunt. Quod æquè verum est de Medicamentorum tam saporibus quàm viribus. Utraque enim ignis arte (qui, ut sæpius dixi, nihil aliud est quàm motus quidam Materiæ modificatus) augentur, minuuntur, variantur. Est autem & ipse Sol ignis, cujus itidem calore fructus terræ omnes maturitatis gradus subeunt.

Et quod ad odoratum attinet, quamvis non videatur hîc esse idem ille organi Objectique contactus, sensationem tamen motu corporeo fieri ex eo constat, quòd odores vento feruntur ad nares, & subindè divertuntur. Unde palàm est eos esse particulas quasdam aëri innatantes & odoratus organo impingentes. Quod adhuc manifestius apparet in suffumigationibus, ubi agitatione ignis odores majori copiâ excitantur fortiusque nares feriunt.

Soni etiam ab aëre transvehuntur, deflectuntur corporum obstaculis, & ab adversis ventis impediuntur. Unde planè suam produnt naturam, indicantque se esse certos quosdam motus per aërem transmissos: Quod etiam planius apparet ex ipsorum generatione. Nunquam enim auditur sonus nisi ex aliquorum corporum collisione: Quemadmodum palàm est tam in Animalium vocibus & in pulsandis inflandisque instrumentis Musicis quàm in inconditis quibuscumque strepitibus & fragoribus. Ipsa etiam Echo huic veritati accinit, quæ nihil aliud est nisi sonus à corpore aliquo concavo percussus, sive reflexus. Quid autem, quæso, à corpore reflecti potest quod ipsum non sit corpus? Sonus igitur nihil aliud est quàm motus quidam aëris, Echo autem nihil præter motus hujus reverberationem.

Quemadmodum verò ex Echo deprehendimus sonum motum esse quendam corporeum, ita pari ratione concludere possumus id quod ad oculos nostros appellit ab Objectis visibilibus nihil esse aliud præter hujus-



modi motum distinctis quibusdam legibus modificatum. Nam species illas visibiles, quas vocant, à corporibus reflecti apud omnes est in confesso. Nihil autem à corpore reverberari posse nisi corpus, jam monuimus ex se satis esse manifestum. Universim igitur verum est, Sensationem nihil esse aliud nisi motûs corporei perceptionem.

Cujus quidem Theorematis (quod obiter moneo) insignis est utilitas ad eos refutandos qui specificas nescio quas somniant Materiæ differentias, finguntq; certas particularum congeries, omni figuræ, motûs, soliditatis, sitûsque vi sepositâ, ex sola specifica sua natura immediata & immutabili varia illa Mundi Phænomena sensibus nostris exhibere. Nam planè constat ex prædictis, aliisque id genus quamplurimis quæ adjici possint, tum species hujusmodi materiales omnes subindè mutari, tum sensus nostros non aliter ab ipsis affici quàm per certas figuræ, motûs, magnitudinis, sitûsque leges in ipsis particulis.

Et certè quod ad prius attinet, Nemo qui hujusmodi specificas differentias in Materia fingit, nisi temerè & absque omni ratione philosophari velit, negare potest, quin quæ, sensu judice, maximè discrepant, specie etiam eadem oporteat differre. Jam verò, quæ major, obsecro, differentia sensibus nostris unquam occurrit, quàm quæ Stellam inter & opacam hanc terram, quam calcamus, intercedit? Quod præclarum esset argumentum demonstrandi eandem numero materiam species quàm maximè oppositas subire, ac proinde materiam nullubi specie differre, si Hypothesis Cartesianæ de mutatione Stellarum in Planetas nuda Hypothesis non esset, sed agnita veritas. Hoc enim pacto constaret, quodlibet corpus terrestre, quantumvis durum & crassum, ex subtilissima omnium materia (quæ ex ramentis globulorum æthereorum, ubique, uti patet ex uniformi luminis perceptione, homogeneorum, originem duxit) conflatum esse, & si arte quidem non possit, saltem Naturâ & Temporum Factorumque serie in eadem minutias dereri posse ac dissolvi. Cæterum ut Hypotheses missas faciamus, succedaneam sanè ac ferme æqualem vim habet solida illa macularum Solis observatio, quæ proculdubio ex subtilissimis illis particulis fiunt ipso æthere tenuioribus. Quin & quæ cominùs conspiciuntur idem testantur, ut crassorum corporum, putà sebi, ceræ, ligni in tenues splendentisque flammæ transmutatio; quemadmodum & graminum herbarumque in sanguinem, carnem, ossa, pellésque bovinas vel ovinas conversio. Gramina enim, si sensus nostros consulamus, ab istis animalium partibus immane quantum differunt, ac proinde, juxta suprâ dictum postulat, specificè.

Quod verò ad alterum illud spectat, de particulis Materiæ specie distinctis, quasi solâ hâc specificâ virtute Phænomenon varietatem sensibus exhiberent, motu, situ, quiete, figurâ, cæterisque Materiæ modificationibus seclusis, abundè mihi refutatum videtur ex prædictis observationibus, quibus clarè constabat, Omne id quod ad sensus nostros appellit motum esse corporeum aliter atq; aliter ex magnitudine, figura & similibus partium Materiæ affectionibus modificatum. Nec opus est quicquam huc adjicere, postquam animadverteris quàm manifesta hujus veritatis instantia è natura luminis & colorum elucescat. Lumen enim oriri ex motu indè patet, quòd, si vehemens sit aut propinquum, calor sensibilis ipsum comi-

tetur.

tetur. Colores autem non esse specificas quasdam qualitates, sed motum certis legibus modificatum, constat ex Iride & Prismate; quandoquidem nec in roridis illis nubium guttis, nec in ipso prismate, utpote diaphanis, ullus insit color, sed lumen certis modis refractum reflexumve in istam colorum varietatem degenerat. Quod manifestum est indicium nec ullos específicos colores corporibus opacis inesse, sed lumen ab eorum superficie aliter atque aliter, pro situ exteriorum particularum, reflecti; quo mutato colores protinus mutantur: uti constat in ære, ferro, aliisque metallis, quorum superficies colorem mutant aquis corrodentibus vel salinis aëris particulis impetitæ & fodicatæ. Quippe quod necesse sit, quod particularum situs saltem, si non figuræ, in superficie æris ferrive hâc insulturâ atque impetu mutantur, globulique ætherei aliter ab ære, putâ, nitenti, ab ærugineo aliter reflectantur.

Quamobrem cum tam clarè constet omnia mundi Phænomena, quatenus sensibus nostris patefunt, motu perfici, certè ille mihi verissimas Philosophiæ leges observare videtur qui tam accuratè causas horum Phænomenon & tam profundè scrutatur, ut præcisè nobis enarret quo situ, quâ tenuitate, quibûsque particularum figuris motus illi omnes, qui variè sensus nostros afficiunt, modificantur. Hoc autem stupendum in modum nobis præstitit à me nunquam satis laudatus Cartesius.

7. Præterea, nemo quisquam est qui materiæ motûsque naturam vel mediocriter intellexerit, qui non planè viderit ex eo solo quod Deus certum motûs gradum (eundem putâ quem in Mundo jam experimur) Materiæ impresserit, quod varia indè Phænomena sint emerfura. Fieri enim non potest quin ea motûs mensura materiam ita diffingat & in exiles minutias conterat ut, quanquam quædam dura (id enim ex minori motûs gradu alicubi contingeret) alia tamen mollia, quædam sensui frigida, alia calida, alia planè ignea apparerent. Credoque Deum ex destinato duobus hisce simplicissimis rerum Principiis liberos suos vagosque gyros semper permisisse, quamdiu intra illos limites continerentur qui æquè commodi rerum Naturæ forent, atque si ipsorum impetus diviniore quadam vi ac lege compescerentur; ut eo magis adblandiretur ingenio humano rerum naturalium contemplatio.

Physicum enim puto esse neminem qui, si mentem propositumque suum probè noverit, non agnoscat se causas rimari effectrices rerum corporeas, easque, si fieri potest, longiori serie deductas, nexûque necessario concatenatas. Quales certè nullæ reperirentur, si naturalibus & in se necessariis motûs corporei legibus Deus, intermediente superiori aliquâ virtute, ubique sedulò obsisteret: Nulliusque causæ efficientis investigatio esse posset nisi immaterialis nobisque minimè omnium intelligibilis: qualis est Peripateticorum forma substantialis, quæ eâdem ferè notione pariter ac nomine per res singulas pervagatur, nihilque nobis indicat præter ignorantiam nostram ac nugacitatem, quos non puderet interroganti de Aqua, Igni & similibus, quid & unde sint; elatis superciliis respondere, Ignem & Aquam Aquam esse & Ignem, ex eo quod formæ quædam substantiales, quæ Ignem & Aquam constituunt, è gremio Materiæ in nescio quas Materiæ partes prorepserint, eoque pacto duo illa elementa Mundo exhibuerint. Apage frivolas istas ac otiosas nœnias,



quibus omnis humani ingenii industria consopitur & sufflaminatur, omnisque ejus sagacitas & acumen retunditur & inutile redditur ! Non tam torpidum naturalis Contemplationis objectum nobis proposuit Deus : sed tantum necessariis Motûs ac Materiæ legibus prudenter permisit quantum ad perscrutandas rerum naturalium causas nos excitare, & inventarum voluptate delinire possit. Adeò ut non sit ubique necesse ad cæcum illud ignaviæ & ignorantiaæ asyllum confugere, *internas* scilicet *formas substantiales*. Quis enim qui inter Philosophos nomen suum proficitur rogatus de Lunæ phasibus, de eclipsibus utriusque luminaris, si omissis apertis illis ac necessariis Matheſeos ac Naturæ rationibus, responderet ea omnia proficisci ex internis Lunæ Solisque principiis formisque essentialibus, quæ faciunt ut certis temporibus Sol juxtâ ac Luna lumine privetur, Lunaque stasis vicibus sub hac vel illa phasi videatur, quis, inquam, est è Philosophorum grege qui tam frigidè & jejunè respondens non altis cachinnis ab omnibus exciperetur ?

Quid autem faceret misellus hic homuncio, si de Planetarum stationibus, directionibus, & retrogradationibus fieret quæstio ? Neque enim recipere se potest ad Hypothesin Ptolemaicam, utpote quæ manifestissimis scatet contradictionibus, uti omnes jam nôrunt qui vel primoribus labiis rem Astronomicam delibârunt. Succedat igitur Tychonica, ubi in libero æthere Planetæ omnes gyros suos perficiunt ; & rogemus hunc nostrum quid in causa sit, cur Mars, Jupiter & Saturnus, postquam festinantiùs perrexerint secundùm ordinem Signorum, mox tanquam obtutu tacito defixi derepente subsistant, posteaque, quasi jam in memoriam revocassent rem aliquam cujus obliti fuerant, inopinatò recurrant. Proculdubio eadem semper oberraret chordâ, diceretque id fieri ex internis horum Planetarum formis quas ipsis à prima creatione indiderat Deus, omnesque eorum lusus, progressus, regressus & stationes eis naturales esse ex principiis suis constitutivis, quemadmodum motus deorsum lapidi motusque sursum igni connatus est. •Præclarum quidem Responsum, talisque Responsoris ignaviâ & inscitiâ nequaquam indignum ! Dimisso igitur Nugatore hoc nugacissimo, experiamur quomodo huic quæstioni fatisferi possit ex apertis & confessis Materiæ Motûsque legibus, quales Naturæ Artique Mechanicæ planè communes esse meritò statuit Cartesius.

Venerem citra ultrâque Solem circuitus suos peragere ex ipsius phasibus constat, eademque ratio est de Mercurio. Martem autem, Jovem & Saturnum circa Solem ferri nemo adhuc dubitavit. Hos igitur quinque Planetas circa Solem ire & redire manifestum est. Quarendum est deinceps an moventur viam sibi secando per materiam ætheris, an motu ipsius ætheris circumvehuntur. Primum autem non fieri ex eo liquet, quòd tam celeres Planetarum transitus materiæ cœlestis resistantia impediret, perderentque pauxillo tempore motum suum fluido ipsi ætheri communicando. Reliquum est igitur ut circumvehantur ipsius ætheris motu, totaque materia cœlestis, cui innatant, vorticis instar circa ipsum Solem torqueatur. Investigemus tandem quid de Terra fiat, quæ proculdubio intra limites hujus vorticis invenitur. Stabitne illa in rapido hoc flumine, an movebitur ? Quibus autem uncis, quibus funibus & anchoris in profundo

fundo hoc mari detinebitur? Sed fingamus eam vi aliquâ supernaturali & immateriali stabilem & defixam. Deus bone! quantas procellas excitabit hoc contra sanctissimas Naturæ leges Admissum? Cœlestis enim Materia rapidissimi Torrentis instar Telluris faciem tanto insultu impetūque affligeret, ut animalia, arbores, turres, omniâque prorsus ædificia dirueret, secumque abriperet, imò universam terram decorticaret, & saltem ad metallicas usque regiones penitus diffringeret, abruptâsque partes, ad modum infandi naufragii, secum in vasto hoc ætheris pelago transporteret. Terram igitur oportet permittere, juxta Naturæ motûsque leges, cum reliquis Planetis æthere quietè innatantibus circa Solem circumduci.

Et nè fortè interim de Luna sis sollicitus; cùm certum sit eam circa terram perpetuò singulis mensibus tanquam assiduam illius pedissequam circumcurrere, nec id fieri posse nisi ope vorticis, quemadmodum jam demonstratum est; necesse est ut Luna peculiari vortice circa Tellurem circumferatur. Cujus in medio cùm sit ipsa Tellus, omnésque illius poros materia cœlestis, quæ in hunc particularem vorticem torquetur, pervadat, fieri non potest per leges Naturæ quin ipsa Tellus hujus vorticis vi in gyros circa proprium axem rapiatur. Ut summatim igitur dicam, impossibile est, si motûs corporei leges consulamus, quin Terra diurno illo motu annuòque feratur quibus eam ferri olim docuit Ethnicorum sapientissimus Pythagoras, cujusque doctrinam ante seculum unum & alterum Nicolaus Copernicus in lucem revocavit.

Vides ex quàm perspicuis simplicibûsque Principiis vel inviti ducimur ad eam Hypothesin (si modò Hypothesis illa dicenda sit quæ reali Naturæ compage necessariò continetur) quâ positâ rationes & causæ non possibiles vel probabiles, sed necessariæ & ineluctabiles, omnium ferè Phænomenon quæ Astronomorum ingenia per tam multa secula torserant, manifestò deteguntur. Non enim magis necessariò corpus nostrum in Sole umbram projicit, quàm ex hoc rerum, quod demonstravimus, systemate Pythagorico, nota illa Planetarum Phænomena omnia, quæ mox ordine breviter recensēbimus, consequuntur.

Cujusmodi sunt, motus Saturni, Jovis, Martis, Mercurii, Veneris in Epicyclis suis; quâ tamen interim supellectile Sol destituetur.

Quòd dicti illi quinque Planetæ sint directi, stationarii, & retrogradi in Epicyclis suis; cùm tamen Luna in suo Epicyclo nec stationaria videbitur, nec retrograda.

Quòd circuitus Epicyclorum Saturni, Jovis & Martis eam habeant ad motum Solis rationem, ut semper perficiantur eo temporis spatio quod elabatur ab una singulorum conjunctione cum Sole ad alteram; quòdque in singulis istis conjunctionibus cum Sole reperiantur in Apogeis Epicyclorum, Oppositionibus verò in eorundem Perigeis.

Præterea, Periodos Epicycli Saturni celeriores fore quàm Jovis, & Jovis quàm Martis; Martis verò Retrogressiones majores fore quàm Jovis, Jovisque quàm Saturni.

Porrò, quòd Venus ac Mercurius nunquam procul distent à Sole, Centrâque Epicyclorum utriusque Soli videantur *ισόθερα*.

Denique, Nodos Lunæ mobiles fieri, Eclipsésque utriusque Luminaris



in aliis atque aliis signis Zodiaci posse contingere. Ut nihil dicam de Phænomenis ex motu Terræ diurno emergentibus; Stellæ nempe Planetæque omnes, quamvis immensis spatiis & à terra & à se invicem distantes, viginti tamen quatuor horarum spatio circa terram ineffabili celeritate impetûque contrario retorqueri.

Quorum Phænomenon omnium, necnon aliorum quorundam, simplex hæc Pythagoræ Hypothesis (quam veram esse tam certi esse possumus, quàm quòd folia quæ ab arbore in fluvium decidunt secundo, non adverso, flumine feruntur) tam evidentes & necessarias causas exhibet, ut nemo nisi planè stupidus & delirus de eis possit dubitare, nisi Deum datâ operâ Naturæ leges turbare, cùm non opus sit, fingere vellet. Quod quàm sit insulsum figmentum satis suprâ demonstravimus.

Tandem perspicias, V. C. quàm pulchra sit & apprimè grata humano ingenio hæc philosophandi ex immutabilibus & necessariis Naturæ legibus petita ratio: quo in genere cùm Cartesius cæteros mortales infinitis parafangis antecelluerit,

Lucret. de re-  
rum natura,  
lib. 3.

*Qui genus humanum ingenio superavit, & omnes  
Præstinxit, stellas exortus uti æthereus Sol,*

minimè mirari debes si aliquantò frequentior scriptorum ipsius lectionem mihi soleo indulgere.

8. Veruntamen quamvis admodum certus sim aliquàm multa Naturæ Phænomena ex Mechanicis legibus demonstrari posse; nihil tamen æquè persuasum habeo quàm non omnia, imò nè millesimam quidem eorum partem, eo modo posse explicari. Primò enim, si ex eo solo, quòd Deus ad certum aliquem gradum Materiam agitaverit & in motum civerit, totius Mundi fabrica facta fuerit, plantis brutorumque corporibus, imò & hominum, non exceptis; creatio Universi Benignitati solummodo Divinæ ac Omnipotentiae, exclusâ illius Sapientiæ, esset tribuenda. Nisi quis fortè putaret, non minoris esse sapientiæ ex consilio talem Mundi Materiam creâsse quæ ex solis Mechanicæ legibus necessariis in hanc rerum formam pulcherrimam emergeret, quàm aliam aliquam quæ innumeris aberrantium motuum correctionibus & castigationibus indigeret.

Deinde, hæc motuum leges adeò simplices sunt idémque ferè ubique præstantes, ut incredibile prorsus videatur miram hanc rerum varietatem indè posse oriri. Quid enim præstat motus ullubi nisi quòd rectà pergat, aut saltem rectà pergere conetur? quòd pars materiæ ab altera parte reflectatur, aut eam secum auferat, partémque sui motûs ipsi communicet? quòd denique in varias minutias diffingatur magnitudine, figurâ, situ distinctas? Diffringe igitur, si lubet, corpus quodvis durum, & pistillo in pulverem contunde, mox adhibito microscopio singulos pulvisculos contemplare. Videbis, proculdubio, pulvisculorum figuras à rudium fragmentis nihilo differentes, nisi quòd minores sint; nec primi tertiisque elementi particulas à pulvisculis hisce differre, nisi quòd ipsis adhuc multò sint minores. I nunc & judica quàm bellæ rerum formæ ex cæcis confusorum horum fragminum concursibus, allisionibus & coalitionibus orientur, quali artificio illa depingent aut papilionum alas aut caudas pavonum. Ut nihil dicam de stupendo Divinæ Mentis consilio in formando

formando internas omnium animalium partes : ubi nihil ineptè admissum est, sed singula tam accuratâ arte perfectâ, ut necesse sit agnoscere Principium aliquod Materiâ motûve corporeo longè sanctius ac divinius huic provinciæ invigilare. Quamvis enim concederemus, (quod tamen ego nullo modo concedam) viliora quædam animalcula hoc modo produci posse; tamen omnes animalium species sic esse productas, nullâsque interim à tam cæco & fortuito principio ineptè esse formatas, omnino est impossibile; quemadmodum copiosè demonstravi in Tractatu adversus Atheos.

Quamobrem ex eo, quòd quædam Phænomena exhibere possit simplex Materiæ motus, omnia hoc pacto præstari posse confidere, abjectissima quædam ὑλολαγρία, i. e. ridicula & superstitiosa quædam Materiæ cæcæ adoratio & cultus, mihi videtur, non legitima philosophandi ratio. Quade re cùm semper fuerim satîs persuasus, certè ex lectione Cartesii jam evasi omnium persuasissimus. Neque enim dubito, quantum ingenium humanum præstare possit ex Mechanicis rerum rationibus, incomparabilem hunc Philosophum præstitisse. Deprehendo tamen eum magnis illis pollicitis de perpetua conclusionum certitudine ex necessariis Mechanicæ legibus deducendarum sæpiusculè excidisse, idque in reddenda ratione rudiorum generaliorumque Naturæ Phænomenων; neque enim ultra illos limites adhuc processerat. Quid igitur eum fuisse facturum putemus si tentasset humani corporis vel aliûs alicujus Animalis generationem ex eis solis principiis demonstrare?

Sive vacillet igitur Cartesius, sive firmiter figat pedem, utrumque sanè mihi per jucundum est Spectaculum. Nam si incedit firmiter, speculationem hoc pacto necessariam purèque naturalem nactus sum. Si titubat, id etiam in lucro pono. Hoc enim non parùm facit ad veritatum Metaphysicarum certitudinem, & ad demonstrationem Essentiæ à Materia prorsus distinctæ. Nam si istiusmodi in Mundo inveniuntur Phænomena quorum generatio Materiæ leges excedit, necesse est ut introducamus Principium immateriale & incorporeum, quem vulgò Spiritum appellant. Ad quam vocem quàm exhorrescunt, tanquam pueri ad spectrum, barbati quidam ac grandævi hujus seculi Philosophastri, nemo est qui ignorat.

9. Sed nequa fiat injuria mirando Cartesii ingenio, quamvis omnia per universam illius Philosophiam nexu hoc Mechanico planèque necessario non cohæreant, ità ut unam perpetuam ac congenerem catenam exhibere possint; fatendum est tamen, non paucas hujusmodi inveniri catenulas verè aureas affabréque factas. Ex quibus omnibus, non nudis quidem Materiæ legibus, sed diviniore aliquâ vi coarctatis & ligatis, pulchra sanè satîsque firma conclusionum omnium fit concatenatio. Verbi causâ, Quamvis certi esse non possimus ex legibus Mechanicis striatas illas particulas solâ vorticis contorsione formari, quemadmodum jam diximus; facilè tamen supponere possumus (nisi ὑλομανία quidam correpti eousque insanire velimus, ut audacter affirmemus omnia prorsus Universi Phænomena, nè stirpibus quidem, necdum animalibus, eâ conditione exemptis, solo motu corporeo fieri) facilè, inquam, possumus supponere vim aliquam virtuti illi analogam, quâ animales fœtus (sive matrum in utero, sive in Telluris communis omnium parentis matrice) tam admirabili arti-



ficio efformantur, in coelo juxtà ac in terra regnare, id est, Divinam Providentiam nullis locis aut spatiis excludi, sed ubique præstò esse paratamque ad attenuatæ subactæque Materiæ motus ità moderandos, ut nihil ullubi omittatur aut fiat quod non cedat aut in utilitatem aut in ornatum Universi: atque ex hac vi (sive Animam, cum Cartesio, illam appellare malles, sive Spiritum) ubique & omnibus sedulò prospiciente, effectusque suos præcipuos in subtilissimis & fluidissimis Materiæ partibus exhibente, cochleares illas particulas (sine quibus Axis terrestris parallelismus, Tempestatum cardines, Magnes, Navigatio, Gentium commercia stare non possint) maturè fuisse efformatas.

Eviatà autem earum efformatione, vel supposità, cætera omnia quæ tradit egregius Philosophus, usque ad locupletissimas illas de virtutibus magneticis demonstrationes, mirificè inter se consentiunt. Quamvis nollem vel hîc fidem dare Universa Mechanicâ planè necessitate ubique concatenari, prout suprà monui. Sed è contrà, ut dicam summatim, suspicor potius in Phænomenis plerisque omnibus producendis, ubi conspicitur satis magna partium multiformitas conspirans in insignem aliquam utilitatem aut pulchritudinem, rudes Materiæ impetus cæcâque propensiones & tentamina à divina illa virtute semper gubernari ac perfici. Nam quòd ad Halones Iridésque spectat, & id genus reliqua quæ suam habent pulchritudinem, à causis simplicissimis fiunt; nec ea partium varietas, quam diximus, ullo modo in eis reperitur. Multò plus meretur admirationis illa quæ vel oculum vel ardentem lampadem referre videtur, Pavonis pluma. Cujus artificium tot distinctis filis, tot & tam amœnis coloribus, nunc intermissis nunc resumptis, tamque scitè attemperatis ad efformandam diversicolorellam Ellipsin, consistit; ut tam operosum effectum bruto Materiæ motui vel casui, non consilio, tribuere extremi mihi videatur stuporis aut dementiæ.

Eadem igitur rerum series quæ reperitur apud Cartesium tutò agnosci potest, sed non eadem ubique hujus seriei connexio. Necessè enim est ut subindè se intermisceat Divina illa Mundi rerumque generandarum Gubernatrix Providentia.

10. Quamvis autem id à Cartesio non sit præstitum quod à nullo mortali præstari posse pro certissimo habeo, nempe ut causæ rerum omnium naturalium uno tenore congenerique serie à capite ad calcem deducantur, nullâ aliâ interpositâ vi præter mechanicam illam prorsusque corpoream, cujus effectus cognoscere proculdubio pura puta illa Naturæ scientia habenda est: tamen in immensam Gentis philosophicæ voluptatem pariter ac commodum hoc saltem accuratè perfecit, ut clarè scilicet intelligamus immediatas causas effectrices, easque congeneres semper puræque corporeas, omnium ferè rerum sensibilibum quas tractat. Quæ certè difficilis est provincia, & quam nulli præter eum susceperere quos non meritò poeniteret eam unquam suscepisse. Persentiscis tandem ob quàm multas gravesque causas tanti facio Cartesium.

11. Sed ut nihil te celem, una adhuc mihi superest peculiaris ratio, quæ quamvis forsan aliis admodum paradoxa videri possit, apud me tamen non parùm gratiæ conciliat Philosophiæ Cartesianæ. Est autem illius cum Mosaica Mundi creatione conformitas. Rem miram, inquires, narras.

narras. Sed, mihi crede, valde verisimilem. Nam, quod nôsti, Pythagoram suam sapientiam à Judæis mutuatum fuisse constans sustinuit fama. Præterea, extiterunt per singula ferè secula qui operam dabant applicandis nunc his nunc illis Philosophiæ principiis textui Mosaico. Quo autem successu mallet alii judicent quàm ego. Communibus igitur omnium suffragiis expectandus est illîc sensus aliquis Philosophicus; addo, Mose Deoque dignus. Neque enim vilia ac puerilia sanctissimo illo Literæ velamine abscondisse credendum est intimum illum Dei sapientissimi Amicum, sed tam ampla, tam augusta & tam fulgida, ut meritò verendum esset vulgi oculos ea ferè non potuisse. Mosem tamen ejusque posteros, Prophetas intelligo & Sacerdotes, cum probatissimis quibusque maximèque cordatis tum suæ tum aliarum gentium hominibus ea liberè communicasse.

Hanc Cabbalam à Judæis acceptam, numerisque singulorum dierum opera adumbrantibus involutam, magni fecit Pythagoras; nec sivit Arcanum in vulgus emanare, quamvis fortè de eo discipuli ejus symbolicis istis numeris sensum tegentibus vel apud imperitos aliquando garrire non recusarent. Nucleum igitur sibi servantes, putaminis fragmina ἀμύττω populo projecerunt; quæ alii risu, stomachatione alii, alii suspicaci quadam veneratione exceperunt; indeque quàm plurimas numerorum & appellationes & virtutes verè Pythagoricas literis mandârunt. Quorsum autem ista omnia? inquires. Breviter tibi dicam. Equidem mihi videor horum corticis fragminum ope nucleum ipsum invenisse ac recuperasse. Dum enim Mosaicæ creationis sensum Philosophicum seriò meditabar, oculis hinc inde, nunc in verissima quælibet, quod judicare potui, Philosophiæ principia, nunc in Textum ipsum conjectis, revera nulla invenire potui quæ tam examussim Mosaicæ paginæ congruerent quàm illa Cartesiana.

Tria ejus Elementa, non numero solum sed & naturis eorum haud obscurè indigitatis, ibidem contineri deprehendi. Tellurem etiam observavi circa Solem circumvolvi, imò verò eam cum reliquis Planetis ejus esse naturæ tanquam si ipsi olim fuissent Soles. Ex materia denique cœlesti Terram, Lunam, cæteraque astra universa generari. Quæ omnia, pro tenui illa, quâ polleo, vocum Hebraicarum peritia, in Defensione Cabbalæ meæ Philosophicæ Mosaico Textui ita convenire demonstravi, ut nemo sit, modò tam certus esset de Philosophiæ Cartesianæ veritate quàm plures se profiteantur de Principiis Aristotelicis, quin statim agnoscat me verissimum fidissimūque egisse Interpretem. Quòd si postea animadverterit quàm exactè Pythagoricorum illorum numerorum & nominibus & virtutibus res illæ congruant, quas singulis diebus adjudicavi, novum certè argumentum, neque id levissimum ad Philosophiæ Cartesianæ fidem faciendam, se reperisse exultanter gaudebit, mirabiturque operosissimum hoc ingenii humani inventum divino calculo tam clarè esse comprobatum. Ipse tamen hujusmodi demonstrationibus non audeo nimium confidere. Conjecturam malui appellari, nihilque prorsus statui; sed maturis sapientissimorum virorum judiciis rem totam permisi.

12. Quod ad vagos illos susurros ac rumores spectat quos spargi ais de Cartesio, quasi de Deo non rectè sentiret, nihil eos moror. Novi enim maximorum ac liberrimorum ingeniorum perpetuum ferè fuisse fatum à semidocto



femidocto vulgo Atheismi esse suspecta. Nec tamen diffiteor in illius scriptis paucula reperiri quæ vel ab invidis, vel imperitis, in eam partem nimis facile possint torqueri: qualia sunt tria illa præcipuè. viz.

13. Primum, Implicare contradictionem Spatium vel Extensionem dari quæ revera non sit corporea; quo tamen morbido dogmate ipsas etiam Scholas laborare memini me observasse.

Alterum, Ex Mechanicis motûs materiæ legibus omnia Naturæ Phænomena esse demonstranda.

Postremum, Fines Phænomenon ab ingenio humano non esse indagandos.

Quæ tria tam pravo aspectu subdoloque nictu sese mutuò contuentur, ac si Deum ac Providentiam è Mundo exturbare seriò conspirarent. Sed nihil prorsus ab eorum aut consiliis aut viribus est metuendum. Primam enim illam opinionem ipse satis copiosè ac solidè refutasse mihi videor in Literis meis ad Cartesium. Alterius verò, Tractatûs mei adversus Atheos pars secunda perpetua est & inexpugnabilis Confutatio. Sed aliter respondi atque institui. Dico igitur eum non ex morbo aliquo Atheistico, sed, prout \* *suprà* monui, solummodo ex effræni quodam pruritu omnia concludendi certitudine planè Mathematicâ priores illas duas; ex nimio autem prudentiæ studio, opinionem tertiam tenuisse: neque opus esse

\* *Seft. 2, & 5.*

\* *Seft. 2, & 3.*

hiscæ diutiùs immorari, cum ex \* *suprà* dictis ipse tibi possis plenissimum colligere Responsum.

14. Quòd porrò addis, quosdam submuffitare, eum causam illam quam suscepit, Existentiæ Dei Animæque immortalitatis demonstrandæ, datâ operâ prodidisse, suspicio est omnium injustissima & contumeliosissima. Nam quod ad Dei existentiam attinet, primum illud argumentum quod adhibet non solum omnium optimum est quæ ratio humana excogitare potest, sed revera absoluta perfectâque demonstratio, & cui maxime confisus est Cartesius, prout videre est alicubi in Responsionibus suis Metaphysicis. Unde palam est eum duo illa altera (quæ minùs firmiter concludunt, nec tamen suâ probabilitate carent atque acumine) primo huic, nè solum in campo stare videretur, in pompam potissimum, succenturiasse.

15. In demonstranda autem Animæ immortalitate vix latum quidem pilum aberravit; cumque tam propè scopum attigerit, nullo modo dubitare possum quin constanter crediderit se revera eum attigisse. Cui confidentiæ vim insuper addidit illud ingenii sui fatum, quo ità addictus erat virtutibus Materiæ Mechanicis contemplandis, ut nihil in ea somniare quidem potuerit præter motum localem, situm, figuram & similia: unde securus erat cogitationem toto cœlo ab eis differentem alii alicui substantiæ esse tribuendam.

16. Porrò, piæ ac generosæ illæ ad animam suam hortationes ac gratulationes paulò ante ejus exitum, quibus eam monebat de ferendo morbo cum patientia, & de expectando liberationem ex hoc corporis ergastulo cum gaudio, abundè testantur eum seriò de Animæ immortalitate fuisse philosophatum.

17. Quibus omnibus adjici potest tam de Dei existentia quàm de conditione Animæ (nisi Illum existere, hanc verò substantiam esse crediderit

derit à Materia planè distinctam) quàm plurima in illius scriptis occurrere (ubi tamen absque omni astu fucòve eum agere ipsæ circumstantiæ fatìs arguunt) quibus ipse sibi pugnare manifestò deprehendatur: Cujusmodi sunt,

1. Materiam ubique unam esse perfectèque homogeam.  
2. Ex eo nos certos esse quòd non fallimur ubi clarè ac distinctè rem percipimus, quòd non fortuitò nati sumus, sed à benignissimo Deo creati.

3. Substantiam esse quæ suâ vi existit, ac proinde Deo ac creaturæ non univocè competere, Materiæ tamen mentique nostræ competere univocè.

4. Cogitationem substantiam intelligentem, Extensionem corpus constituere. Et quemadmodum motus localis, situs, figura sunt modi corporis; ità imaginationem, memoriam, voluntatem esse modos substantiæ cogitantis.

5. Imaginationem esse duplicem, corpoream & incorpoream; illam ope cerebri mentem nostram exerere, hanc absque illius ope.

6. Libero nos pollere arbitrio, in ejúsque usu legitimo veram consistere generositatem.

7. Per imaginem quandam non magnam sanè, sed tamen in varias partes extensam, Conariòque impressam, objectorum nos visibilium perceptionem habere.

8. Menti nostræ inesse quasdam non à sensibus haustas, sed ipsi planè connatas, notiones communes rerùmque ideas.

9. Denique, quòd alio prorsus modo concipimus magnitudines, figuras; alio dolores, colores, & similia.

Quæ omnia partim cum Dei existentia, partim cum Animæ à corpore distinctione reali tam intimè conjuncta sunt, ut nisi planè deliraverit Cartesianus, impossibile sit quin utramque ex animo tenuerit.

Nam quòd ad primum attinet, manifestum est ex lumine Naturæ, simplicibus ejusdem speciei substantiis easdem prorsus genere ac gradu proprietates competere. Quemadmodum igitur certi sumus cuilibet circulo cujuscunque magnitudinis eandem ubique esse rationem diametri ad peripheriam; ità easdem esse in qualibet Materiæ particula proprietates securi esse possumus. Quamobrem, si Materia immediatè ex sua natura movetur, continuò sequetur, Omnem Materiam, saltem si nullâ vi detinetur, eodem motûs gradu agitari. Unde necesse esset ut Terra reliquique Planetæ liquescerent in materiam subtilitate & fluiditate aëri saltem, si non ætheri, parem; vel potiùs, ut nunquam in tam crassam consistentiam coaluissent. Palàm est igitur Materiam ex se quiescere, quod & apertè mihi professus est perspicacissimus Philosophus in suis ad me Literis. Unde impossibile est quin animitùs agnoscat omnipotentem aliquem Materiæ motorem Deum: Imò & animæ nostræ à corpore realem distinctionem, nisi & omnem prorsus Materiam sentire vellet, quòd valdè ridiculum esset, tantòque Philosopho indignum.

Deinde, alterum illud principium tantifacit, ut seriò agnoscat ipsum certitudinis illius, quam credit se habere de omnibus suis naturalium rerum demonstrationibus, præcipuum esse fundamentum; prout videre poteris Princ. Philos. part: 4. Art. 206.

Hæc



Hæc autem si rectè pensitaveris, modúmque scribendi distinctum & sobrium quem adhibet (Part. I. Art. 51, 52, 53, 54.) debitè observaveris, non suspicaberis eum Theorema tertium quartúmque lusu vel joco, sed bonâ fide descripsisse; præsertim si insuper cogitaveris, minimè esse probabile eum Metaphysicæ suæ compendium Philosophiæ principiis præattexere voluisse, nisi sensisset hoc pacto universa uno quasi filo, eoque renacissimo firmissimóque, cohæsura.

Quinta conclusio planè Platónica est, quæ est Philosophia omnium religiosissima. Atque reliquæ quatuor ejusdem ferè generis sunt, clarèque arguunt aliquid Materiâ longè præstantius longèque divinius in nobis habitare.

18. Plurima huc possim accumulare, quæ passim in Epistolis ejus occurrunt, quorum nonnulla operæ esse pretium duco tibi recensere, ut indè perspicere possis quàm ubique sibi constans unúsque sit Cartesius. Hujusmodi sunt,

1. Animam videre, non oculos.

2. Animam ex unione cum corpore quædam bona majora sibi repræsentare quàm revera sunt.

3. Liberum nostrum arbitrium nos Deo quodammodo æquiparare. Ad Reginam Sueciæ Epist. 1.

4. Quòd minus sit damni vitam perdere quàm usum Rationis, quoniam ipsa Philosophia sola, etiam sine Fidei documentis, spem nobis ingenerat melioris statûs post mortem, facitque ut Anima nostra nihil æquè onerosum fore præfagiat quàm tali corpori alligari quod suam prorsus adimat libertatem.

5. Duo esse voluptatum genera, Unum quod ad Animam solam, alterum ad Hominem, i.e. ad animam quatenus corpori unitam, spectat. Has fluxas esse & caducas; illas, quemadmodum ipsa Anima, immortales.

6. Quòd tria potissimùm cognitu necessaria sunt ad beatam vitam; Existentia Dei, Animarum nostrarum immortalitas, & Immensitas Universi. Ad Elizab. Princip. Epist. 6.

7. Animam, quando datâ operâ cogitat de rebus imaginabilibus pariter ac intelligibilibus, novâ signare cerebrum impressione; eamque respectu animæ actionem esse, non passionem, proprièque hanc dici imaginationem.

8. Providentiam Dei omnia complecti, tam minima quàm maxima. Ad eandem, Epist. 8.

9. Amorem duplicem esse, vel Intellectualem, vel Corporeum; hunc propriè passionem esse, illum Animæ etiam à corpore separatæ competere.

10. Deum esse Spiritum, sive Rem cogitantem infinitæ perfectionis, nostramque Animam illius esse quasi subobscuram quandam imaginem. Ad D. Chanutum, Epist. 35.

11. Hominem corpore non intelligere. Mentem enim, etsi impediatur à Corpore, ab illo tamen ad intellectionem rerum immaterialium juvari planè non posse, sed tantummodo impediri. Ad Hen. Regium, Epist. 81.

12. In rebus corporeis omnem actionem & passionem in solo motu locali

locali consistere, nomina autem illa ad res immateriales extendi posse, quando aliquid motui analogum in ipsis consideratur; atque ita volitionem in mente Actionem dici posse, intellectionem verò & visionem Passionem. Ad eundem, Epist. 83.

13. Perceptionem Universalium ad imaginationem non pertinere, sed ad intellectum solum, qui Ideam ex seipsa singularem ad multa refert. Ad eundem, Epist. 88.

Superfunt multa alia quæ huc faciunt tum in Epistolis tum in Tractatu de Affectibus; quæ tamen lubens prætereo, nè sim infinitus. Addo duntaxat, nullatenus esse verisimile tam purum & defæcatum ingenium, tantâ modestiâ, humanitate, morûmque integritate stipatum, in tam sordidam foveam foetidumque barathrum incidere potuisse.

19. Nihil igitur restat, quod sciam, ob quod Cartesius Atheismi suspectus esse possit, nisi quòd meritò audiat omnium Philosophorum præcellentissimus. Est enim fanaticum quoddam genus hominum, qui quantò quis sapientior sit Naturæque consultior, tantò eum semper autumant ab omni Religione alieniorem: quasi quantò quis imperitior sit & stolidior, tantò magis ad Dei cultum foret idoneus.

Gentes olim Judæos statuam quandam asinino capite colere finxerunt, magnòque se hoc pacto sperabant eos opprobrio afficere. Pari equidem contumeliâ mihi videntur illi Deum ipsum onerare, qui imaginantur à nullis eum ritè coli posse nisi Onocephalis. Ignorantiam sanè rerûmque inscitiam nihil necesse est ad cultum divinum adhibere, sed Innocentiam omni nive ac luce candidiorem.

20. Cætera quæ sæpenumero objici scribis magis toleranda sunt, sed non minùs ridicula. Mente utique emotum fuisse incomparabilem Philosophum ac vertigine correptum. Allusisse ineptulos illos credo ad doctrinam de Vorticibus. Præclarum quidem jocus, & Cartesii obrectatoribus dignum! Sed urgent seriò tam inopinata, tam vaga, tamque longè petita commenta in Scriptis ejus reperiri, ut in neminem hominem nisi mente captum possint ullo modo cadere. Ecquis enim est, inquit, homo sobrius & consideratus qui unquam suscipere ausit rationem condendi Solem, Stellas, Planetasque demonstrare? quibûsque Materiæ figuris motibûsque lux singulique colores fiunt particulatim definire? duram hanc denique opacamque Terram, quam calcamus, lucidam aliquando fuisse Stellam apertè statuere? Verùm nihil diffido quin facile evincere possim Democritum non insanire, sed populum; nec tam ulli Cartesii dementiæ tribuendum esse quòd tam mira Paradoxa invenerit, quàm aliorum socordiæ & stupori quòd in consimiles cogitationes non incidissent.

21. Nihil enim in hisce omnibus excogitavit Cartesius nisi quod partim ex obviis quibusdam experimentis, partim ex novis & accuratis tam præsentis quàm proximorum seculorum observationibus & conclusionibus, sagaci animo admodum proclive esset cogitare. Varii enim tum Philosophi tum Astronomi, tanquam inferioris ordinis Operarii, rudera jam sustulerant, materiâque præparaverant sublimi huic ingenio verèque Architectonico.

Tycho Planetarum orbes solidos è cœlo deturbaverat, totumque eo-



rum spatium in fluidum reduxerat ætherem. Astronomi & Philosophi nobiliores plerique omnes doctrinam veterem de Telluris motu à Copernico renovatam uno ore comprobaverant, ipsamque Terram (quippe quam non solum circa Solem se gyram, sed etiam, Lunæ instar, Solis lumen, idque in ipsam Lunam, Eclipsibus & Noviluniis reflectentem, deprehenderunt) in Planetarum album communi consensu conscripserant. Galilæus Solem stellam fixam, stellasque fixas tot Soles esse statuerat, Jovémque quatuor Satellitibus eum circumcursantibus, tanquam tot Lunulis, circumstipatum, Tubo suo optico detexerat. Scheinerus immenso volumine Doctrinam de Solis maculis earumque generatione, dissipatione, motuque circa Solem, Solisque circa proprium Axem, plenam perfectamque tradiderat. E stellis fixis quasdam nunc majores, nunc minores videri, imò novas prorsus apparere aliquando, mox evanescere, multi observaverant. Cometas magnitudine terræ pares, vel majores, in Planetarum regione discurre ipse iterum Tycho alique certissimis indiciis demonstraverant. Gilbertus denique non solum virtutes Magnetis summâ arte & industriâ explicaverat; sed, quod caput rei est, ipsam Terram ingentem quandam esse magnetem argumentis evidentissimis confirmaverat.

22. Dispicimus, quæso, jam sedulò quàm nec vagas nec longè petitas conclusiones hinc deduxerit Cartesius, sed obvias & cum dictis probatissimorum Philosophorum Observationibus arctissimè conjunctas. Præcipuum verò Fundamentum ejus Philosophiæ in eo jactum videbimus quod Perigeum Martis phasésque Veneris invito Tychoni extorserant, in cœlorum nempe Fluiditate. Quid enim sit esse fluidum optimè intellexit Cartesius, fierique non posse nisi Materia, vehementi motu per omnes ejus partes pervadente, easque quaquaversum agitante & disjungente, in minutissimas particulas diffingatur: quarum pars maxima (quicquid in eis exstat assiduis agitationibus & allisionibus detricto) non possunt tempore procedente non rotundæ evadere, nec earum triangularia intervalla non longè minutoribus materiæ particulis, rotundarum formatione abrafis, impleri; nec denique ramenta hæc tam commensurata esse triangularibus rotundarum intervallis, quin eorum major sit copia quàm quæ ad spatia illa implenda suffecerit, ità ut sphæricæ illæ particulae, quas globulos vocat, huic subtilissimæ omnium materiæ laxiùs possint innatare.

23. Porro, cum in confesso sit apud omnes Cœlum non solum esse fluidum, sed Tellurem cum Planetis circa Solem in liquido hoc cœlo circumferri, cumque legibus Naturæ \* repugnet ut aliter vel Tellus vel Planetæ circa Solem ferrentur quàm ipso motu Materiæ cœlestis deveci, planè constabat Cartesio, ingentem hanc cœlestis Materiæ molem, in qua Planetæ Tellusque inveniuntur, necessariò circa Solem in gyrum rapi. Cujus adhuc ulterius indicium esse potuit ipsius Solis circa suum axem circumrotatio; quemadmodum & aquarum vortex festucas & folia suo margine circumvehentium familiare quoddam illius exemplum levèque documentum.

24. Postremò, ex hoc raptu Materiæ cœlestis quem jam fieri deprehendimus circa Solem, ipsum Solem olim fuisse generatum, ab obvio illo plumbi fundæ circumacti experimento, non potuit non moneri. Oportebat

\* Vide Sect. 7.

bat igitur eum concludere, solidioribus cœli particulis, globulis nempe æthereis, à centro vorticis recedentibus, subtilissimam materiam, quam aliquantulum redundasse diximus, eorum locum occupavisse, totumque illud implevisse spatium ubi Solem nunc conspiciamus; vel, si malles, spatium illud subtilissimâ hâc materiâ isthac modo repletum nihil aliud esse nisi eum ipsum quem contuemur Solem. Cùm verò observâset tantam affinitatem Soli intercedere cum stellis fixis, ut utrique in se lucem habeant, neutri loco dimoveantur, pronum erat facileque opus, ad exemplum Galilæi, Solem hunc nostrum inter fixas stellas numerare, eundemque productionis modum utrisque pariter attribuere, adeoque universam Mundi visibilis materiam, pro Stellarum numero, in infinitos ferè vortices dispescere.

25. Quibus evictis, continuò illi enotuit intima lucis luminisque natura Stellis Solique communis: In eo utique illam consistere, quòd globuli coelestes partim suo, partim materiæ subtilissimæ motu protrusi, versus oculos nostros premerentur. Cujus rei certissimus esse potuit ex eo, quòd Sensum nihil esse aliud nisi \* motus corporei, certis legibus modificati & in organum ab objecto transmissi, perceptionem ipsi clarè constabat, aliisque omnibus, nisi qui planè stupent, facile potest constare. Luminis autem naturâ penitus perspectâ, colores ipsi se ultrò prodiderunt. Admodum enim illi proclive erat cogitare, si motus per hos globulos transmissi perceptio sit Lux, variato motu hoc ipsam perceptionem variatum iri. Variatio autem nulla occurrebat tam facilis atque obvia quàm rationum circularis motus globulorum ad rectilineum; séque hac in re probè divinasse ex prismatis experimento tam solidè & ingeniosè demonstravit, ut dubitandi in posterum de hujus Theorematis certitudine nullum prorsus locum reliquerit.

\* Vide Sect. 6.

26. Et quod ultimum illud spectat maximùmque omnium paradoxon, Tellurem scilicet hanc, quam pedibus calcamus tradamusque manibus, Solem aliquando fuisse Stellamve fixam; certè non pauca sunt quæ eum non modò invitaverint, sed ferè coegerint, ità cogitare. Nam etiamnum eam Planetam esse omnes, nisi qui fortè infimi subfellii sint philosophi, audacter profitentur. Satellites autem Jovis non obscure indigitabant eum adinstar Solis, qui tot Planetis jam cingitur, lucido solio olim regnavisse, quémque fulgentem circumluserant fideles comites hunc luce cassum lapsùmque non deferuisse. Unde non levis eum suspicio occupare poterat, Soles Stellæve fixas in Planetas procedentibus seculis mutari posse.

Modum autem quo id possit fieri facile intelligebat è maculis Solis, quæ illius faciem aliquando ità obtexerunt, ut calor ejus maturandis frugibus vix suffecerit, pavidique mortales supremum Mundi fatum imminere putaverint. Cujus tristissimi casus etiam Virgilius meminit in Georgicis,

*Cùm caput obscurâ nitidum ferrugine tinxit,  
Impiâque aeternam timuerunt secula noctem.*

Sed & de facto stellas solæve aliquando ità obduci & incrustari maculis ut omni luce priventur, multiplicique cortice indurescant, facillimum illi erat augurari ex stellis illis novis in Cassiopea, Cygno, alibique ex impro-



vifo apparentibus, & evanescentibus denuò post aliquem temporis lapsum. Quibus insuper addas Pleiadum unam è septem numero elisam.

Quid autem postea hujusmodi incrustatis opacisque globis accidere posset, ex natura Vorticum, quam callebat perfectissimè, pari facilitate conjiciebat. Probè enim novit extinctâ stellâ languere vorticem multumque debilitari, indèque necesse esse eum spoliari & diripi à vicinis vorticibus ad centrum ejus usque inundantibus, incrustatumque sidus ab ipsorum fortissimo mox abreptum iri: pro soliditate autem sua vel è raptoris manu elapsurum, vel tam propè ad centrum descensurum ut circa Stellam Solémve vorticis circumcurrere cogatur.

Huic autem conjecturæ fidem faciebant tum Planetæ pro diversa sua soliditate intervallis diversis circa Solem circumrotati, præsertim Jupiter, Saturnus, atque Tellus, (quos olim Soles Stellæve fuisse Lunarum suarum subindicabat satellitium) tum Cometarum discursus in summo Solis nostri vortice oberrantium. In promptu enim illi erat divinare ex Cometarum mole ac distantia, eos esse fixas incrustatas, sive Planetas itinerantes, certamque sedem in vortice aliquo sibi quærentes, & ad nostram Planetarum regionem descendere tentantes. Quid igitur hîc faceret homo ingenio sagaci pariter ac libero? quomodo se tot adblandientibus & verisimilibus indiciis pellectum ab assensu cohiberet?

27. Nec tamen adhuc ad rei apicem pervenimus. E longinquo tantum hætenus eum monebant illa Phænomena, fieri posse quòd Planetæ omnes olim fuissent Soles: Cùm verò Planetam hunc nostrum (Tellurem intelligo) cominus contemplatus fuerit, eumque Magnetem, juxta Gilberti doctrinam, revera esse deprehenderit, nec tamen eum esse posse nisi ferreis ferròve durioribus corticibus obvolutum; præcipuam verò Magnetis vim in eo consistere, quòd particulæ quædam insensibiles tali figurâ fuerint formatæ, ut quæ per unum Magnetis polum intrant per alterum intrare non possint, (quod tum ex mutuo Magnetum repulsu polis eorum cognominibus ad invicem admotis, tum ex Magnetici Vorticis vestigiis in ferri limatura signatis, certò illi liquebat;) dictas porrò particulas tam subtiles esse ut lignum, vitrum, aurum, & quodlibet aliud corpus quantumvis solidum penetrarent, cùmque de coelo etiam illas defluere Polorum Telluris directio ipsi indicârit, maximam verò illarum vim ac copiam circa coelestium Vorticum axes reperiri, tum formatarum magnitudo, tum formandarum ratio persuaserit; formari enim debent ubi Materia elementi primi jam lentorem incipit contrahere ob minorem vorticis motum (quod proculdubio contingit propè axes vorticum, maximèque versus polos,) formatæ verò, si quando ab axibus vorticum multum divagantur (cùm majores sint ac seigniores reliquis primi elementi particulis) versus vorticum axes iterum retrudi: Cùm hæc omnia, inquam, tam clarè perspexerit Cartesius, res mira fuisset, nisi non tam pellectus quàm coactus apud se agnovisset Tellurem olim in axe alicujus Vorticis positam fuisse, ibique tanquam in loco omnium maximè opportuno magnetismum suum acquisivisse.

28. Sed ut ad reliqua argumentorum capita recurramus: Etiam major adhuc illi ita concludendi incumberebat necessitas, quòd universam Mundi aspectabilis materiam, idque summo cum judicio, in tot vortices distinxe-

rat,

rat, qui duobus tantummodo elementis constarent, materiâ scilicet subtilissimâ & globulis. Globulos autem nullo modo coalescere posse demonstrabat ipsorum figura & glabrities : Materiam verò subtilissimam id posse facillimè, luculenter ostendebant illæ toties in Sole observatæ maculæ. Hujus autem Materiæ tantam copiam, quæ ingentem telluris molem componeret, præterquam in alicujus Vorticis centro reperiri, ipsi singula ad Naturæ leges expendenti videbatur prorsus impossibile.

Neque enim hujus argumenti vim eludere poterat, fingendo durissimos illos terræ cortices magneticos revera non esse obductos cortices, sed terram interiorem jam esse, fuisseque semper partem materiæ ex se solidam & duram, id est, nondum in minutas particulas ab universo illo motu, qui tentat omnia, diffractam. Quippe huic commento repugnat tum Telluris mora circa Solem, tum ipse magnetismus. Si enim tam solidâ esset, ex hoc Vortice erumperet protinus, & in alterum injecta ab illo continuo evaderet; & ita in æternum à vortice ad vorticem erraret, nec intraret ullum, nisi Catonis lege, ut statim exiret. Sed neque Magnes ullo modo esse posset. Quomodo enim exiles illæ particulae magneticæ in tam solido corpore foramina sibi excavarent?

29. Molles igitur aliquando fuisse vel interiores Terræ crustas clarissimè illi constabat, id est, ex minutis quibusdam particulis coaluisse; neque id solum, sed omnium minutissimis. Eam enim particularum magneticarum subtilitatem esse ab experimentis ante oculos factis intelligebat, ut planè deprehenderet nullum corpus particulis quàm primi elementi majoribus coagmentatum, capax esse foraminum tam tenui & delicato artificio efformandorum. Intervalla enim nimis laxa esse, particulas autem ipsas nimis duras, nec satis fortasse latas ut in tortilem illam formam terebrarentur; omnemque materiam crassiori filo ac texturâ consistentem quàm sit illa omnium subtilissima, multò ineptiorem esse ad recipiendum minutissima hæc, & distinctissimo tamen artificio excavanda, foraminula, quàm rudem quercum vel fraxinum ad imagines Cæsarum pari spatii angustia quâ in gemmis pretiosissimis insculpi solent: Quo pacto iterum magneticos Terræ cortices ex elementi primi materia constare manifestò sibi demonstrabat. Cujus cum tantam copiam quæ terræ condendæ sufficeret extra centra Vorticum invenire non posset, necesse erat ut primam Telluris materiam in ipsò alicujus Vorticis axe collocaret; ut hoc modo Planeta Terra, vel Magnes esse posset, postquam Sol vel Stella esse desisset.

30. Si igitur insaniit Cartesius, summa sanè cum ratione eum insaniisse dicendum est. Sed nec eò usque insanivit, ut quicquam amplius ex tam luculentis indicationibus statueret, quàm quòd ita Natura rerum comparata sit, ac si Terra hæc, cujus incolæ sumus, olim fuisset Sol vel Stella fixa. Vides Cartesii indolem, quàm cauta ac modesta sit, quàm undequaque solida ac sobria.

31. Sed si nullubi magnopere culpandus sit nobilissimus Philosophus; ob illud potissimum eum reprehendendum censeo, quòd Mathematico suo Genio ac Mechanico in Phænomenis Naturæ explicandis nimium quantum indulserit. Eam tamen interim agnosco summorum Ingeniorum felicitatem, ut vel vitia eorum & errores aliquam virtutis speciem habeant



atque fructum. Et profectò mihi planè incredibile viderur, nisi ingentem illam spem concepisset demonstrandi omnia ferè Mundi Phænomena ex necessariis Mechanicæ legibus, eum unquam tot tantæque tentare voluisse, aut tentata potuisse perficere. Jam verò tam prosperè res successit, ut non possim non suspicari eum Antiquorum illam scientiam quæ ad Naturam spectat maxima ex parte restaurasse. Qua in re si rectè me conjectasse judicaverit perspicax & pacifica Posteritas, reliquæ meæ Cabalæ majorem adjungent fidem. Ubi tamen, uti in parte illa altera Physica, deprehendent paucas me tantummodo sive conclusiones, sive principia rerum Metaphysicarum indigitasse; vastas autem & hiantes interjacere lacunas, & è scriptis Platonis potissimum implendas, aut saltem ab aliquo quem ingenio plusquam Platonico fera Fata Mundo exhibuerint; qui Dei rerumque aliarum incorporearum naturas penitiùs rimando, quique status earundem innumeros prorsum retrorsumque spectando, immensósque illarum circuitus metiendo, qui denique tum ex summi Numinis attributis, tum ex propriis immaterialium Ordinum facultatibus omnia pensitando, singulos illos griphos nexúsque, quibus nefarii & maleferiati homines devotos Religionis cultores irretire solent, tam facili operâ solverit, ut nihil in posterum nisi misera quædam animi angustia, nisi despicibilis stoliditas, aut impotens quædam & deplorabilis ad omnia flagitia perpetranda proclivitas, & ex perpetratis futuri supplicii anxia & discrucians formido, obicem mortalibus ponere possit, quò minùs præcipua Religionis Fundamenta sincero & inconcussò assensu amplectantur. Quam quidem spem non dissimulasse, sed eis de rebus verba fecisse, quas ipsi fortasse nulla ex parte præstare valemus, agnosco quidem non adeò gloriosum quibusdam videri posse: nihil tamen interim dubito quin sit honestum, ardorem suum ac studium promovendi publicum humani generis commodum obiter monstrasse, & aliquo saltem modo succedentibus seculis facem prætulisse.

32. Quod ad eos attinet quos ob Aristotelis nugas universam Philosophiam vilipendere ais, quique nihil earum rerum de quibus scribunt Philosophi sciri posse securè præsumunt, aut, si scirentur, parùm ad communem vitæ usum conferre, non habeo quicquam quod illis reponam aptius aut accommodatius, quàm quod olim hujusmodi farinæ hominibus regessit Scaliger, *Nullam utique majorem ignavis inscitiam parere solere voluptatem quàm expeditam fastidiosumque contemptum*. Quanquam profectò ea non tam voluptas censenda videtur, quàm consolatio quædam ac lenitio doloris quem capere possint ex sensu damni proprii rerumque oprimarum jacturæ. Est enim à Natura nobis omnibus inditum satis magnum sciendi desiderium, nec minimam naturalis conscientiae partem complectitur, nos ad pecudum instar stupidos rerumque ignaros esse non debere; nec tamen ad impossibile vel inutilem scientiam teneri. Unde manifestum est eos qui nihil sciri posse tam stridulâ voce conqueruntur, non tam opprobrio afficere Philosophiæ speculationes, quàm sibi honestum quærere prætextum, seseque excusare quòd luxui, avaritiæ, aut ambitioni totam ferè vitam impendant.

33. Aliquid autem in rebus naturalibus sciri posse tam clarè edocuit Cartesius, ut nemo sit qui de eo dubitet quin de Mathematicis demonstrationibus

strationibus eundem necesse sit dubitare. Imò verò, ut liberiùs dicam, excusâ hâc injuriosâ modestiâ ac sepositâ, si intra communes utriusque Philosophiæ limites nos contineamus, tantundem scivisse Cartesium statuere oportet in investigandis Naturæ causis quantum ignoravit Aristoteles. Neque enim judicandum est quid in Philosophia fieri possit à severo ac sagaci ingenio, ex eo quod jam præstitum sit ab homine arguto sanè, sed parùm solido, ut qui nè prima quidè veræ Philosophiæ principia invenerat.

34. Sed demus, inquier, Cartesium vera illa Principia invenisse, causasque effectrices omnium *Phænomenon* naturales & immediatas, quas nescivit argurus ille Græculus, in lucem eruisse; quid ista ad vitæ usum faciunt? Si per usum vitæ intelligunt honores, opes, corporisque voluptates, non multùm eò facere lubens fateor: interim tamen contendo, in vera philosophandi ratione reperiri aliquid honoribus multò excelsius, pretiosius opibus, & universis denique corporis voluptatibus suavius longè longèque jucundius. Qui autem quæ ad mentem ornandam, pascendam, & divino quodam gaudio exhilarandam conducunt, ad humanam vitam nihil conferre existimant, næ illi mihi videntur se mentem habere penitùs oblitì, apertèque profiteri vitam se degere prorsus belluinam.

Vale, V. C. & si fortè fusiùs ac liberiùs quàm par erat apud te de his rebus disserui, nimium hoc tibi obsequendi studium ignosce, nèque, prout soles, amare perge,

H. M.





THE  
IMMORTALITY  
OF  
THE SOUL,

So farre forth as it is demonstrable from  
the Knowledge of NATURE and  
the Light of REASON.

---

By HENRY MORE, D.D.  
Fellow of *Christ's College* in *Cambridge*.

---

Pythag.

Πάντα τ' αἴετα ἔμπλεον εἶναι ψυχῶν, ἔτερος δαίμονας τε καὶ ἥρωας  
νομίζεσθαι.

Cardanus.

*Quid jucundius quàm scire quid simus, quid fuerimus, quid erimus; atque  
cum his etiam divina atque suprema illa post obitum Mundi quæ vicissi-  
tudines?*

---



---

L O N D O N,  
Printed by *James Fleisher*, for *William Morden* Book-seller in *Cambridge*,  
MDC LXII.



part

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO


LIBRARY

2005-2006 Academic Year  
Department of Chemistry  
The University of Chicago

1000 S. EAST ASIAN AVENUE

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60607-7070

For more information, please contact:  
The University of Chicago  
Department of Chemistry  
1000 S. East Asian Avenue  
Chicago, IL 60607-7070  
Tel: 773/936-7070  
Fax: 773/936-7071  
E-mail: [chemlib@uchicago.edu](mailto:chemlib@uchicago.edu)



1000 S. EAST ASIAN AVENUE  
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60607-7070  
Tel: 773/936-7070  
Fax: 773/936-7071  
E-mail: [chemlib@uchicago.edu](mailto:chemlib@uchicago.edu)

---

To the Right Honourable  
E D W A R D,  
Lord Viscount  
C O N W A Y and K I L U L T A.

*My Lord,*

**T**Hough I be not ignorant of your Lordships aversness from all Addresses of this kinde, ( whether it be that your Lordship has taken notice of that usual Vanity of those that dedicate Books, in endeavouring to oblige their Patrons by over-lavish praises, such as much exceed the worth of the party they thus unmeasurably commend; or whether it be from a natural Modesty that cannot bear, no not so much as a just representation of your own Vertues and Abilities; or lastly from a most true Observation, That there are very few Treatises writ which are any thing more then mere Transcriptions or Collections out of other Authors, whose Writings have already been consecrated to the Name and Memory of some other worthy Persons long since deceased; so that they do but after a manner rob the dead, to furnish themselves with Presents to offer to the living) Yet notwithstanding this your aversness, or whatever grounds there may be surmised thereof, I could not abstain from making this present Dedication. Not so much I confess to gratify your Lordship ( though it be none of the best Complements ) as for mine own satisfaction and content. For I do not take so great pleasure in any thing as in the sense and conscience of the fitness and sutableness of mine own actions; amongst which I can finde none more exactly just and besitting then this; there being many Considerations that give you a peculiar right and title to the Patronage of this present Discourse. For besides your skill in Philosophy  
and



---

## *The Epistle Dedicatory.*

---

and real sense of Piety, two such Endowments as are rarely to be found together ( especially in Persons of high quality ) and yet without which matters of this nature can neither be read with any relish nor easily understood ; there are also other things still more peculiar, and which naturally do direct and determine me to the choice I have made. For whether I consider the many civilities from your self and nearest Relations, especially from your noble and vertuous Lady, whom I can never think on but with admiration, nor mention without the highest respect : or whether I recollect with my self the first occasion of busying my thoughts upon this Subject, which was then when I had the honour and pleasure of reading *Des-Cartes* his *Passions* with your Lordship in the Garden of *Luxenburg* to pass away the time, ( in which Treatise though there be nothing but what is handsome and witty, yet all did not seem so perfectly solid and satisfactory to me but that I was forced in some principal things to seek satisfaction from my self : ) or lastly, call to minde that pleasant retirement I enjoyed at *Ragley* during my abode with you there ; my civil treatment from that perfect and unexceptionable pattern of a truly Noble and Christian Matron, the Right Honourable your Mother ; the solemnness of the Place, those shady Walks, those Hills & Woods, wherein often having lost the sight of the rest of the World, and the World of me, I found out in that hidden solitude the choicest Theories in the following Discourse: I say, whether I considered all these circumstances, or any of them, I could not but judge them more then enough to determine my choice to so Worthy a Patron.

Nor could the above-mentioned surmises beat me from my design, as not at all reaching the present case. For as for my part, I am so great a Lover of the Truth, and so small an Admirer of vulgar Eloquence, that neither the presage of any gross Advantage could ever make me stoop so low as to expose my self to the vile infamy or suspicion of turning *Flatterer*, nor yet the tickling sense of applause and vain-glory, to affect the puffy name and title of an *Orator*. So that your Lordship might be secure as touching the First surmise.

And

---

## *The Epistle Dedicatory.*

---

And verily for the Second, though I confess I might not be at all averse from making a just and true representation of your Vertues and Accomplishments; yet considering the greatness of them, & the meanness of mine own Rhetorick, I found it not so much as within my power, if I would, to entrench upon your Modesty; and therefore I must leave it to some more able Pen to doe you and the World that right whether you will or no.


And lastly, for that scruple concerning the theft or petty sacriledge of several *Plagiaries*, who, as it were, rob the Monuments of the dead to adorn the living; it is the onely thing that I can without vanity profess, that what I offer to you is properly my own, that is to say, that the invention, application and management of the Reasons and Arguments comprised in this Book, whether for confutation or confirmation, is the genuine result of my own anxious and thoughtful Mind, no old stuff purloined or borrowed from other Writers. What truth and solidity there is in my Principles and Reasonings were too great a piece of arrogance for me to predetermine. This must be left to the judgements of such free and discerning spirits as your Lordship: With whom if what I have writ may find acceptance or a favourable censure, it will be the greater obligation and encouragement to,

My Lord,

Your Lordships humbly devoted Servant,

HENRY MORE.





## The CONTENTS of the Preface.

1. The Title of the Discourse how it is to be understood. 2. The Author's submission of his whole Treatise to the infallible Rule of Sacred Writ. 3. A plain and compendious Demonstration that *Matter* consists of parts *indiscerpible*. 4. An Answer to an Objection touching his Demonstration against the Sun's superintendency over the affairs of the Earth. 5. A confirmation of Mr *Hobbs* his Opinion, That Perception is really one with Corporeal Motion and Re-action, if there be nothing but *Matter* in the World. 6. An Apologie for the Vehicles of *Demons* and Souls separate. 7. As also for his so punctually describing the State of the other life, and so curiously defining the nature of a particular *Spirit*. 8. That his *Elysiums* he describes are not at all *Sensual*, but *Divine*. 9. That he has not made the State of the wicked too easy for them in the other world. 10. That it is not *one Universal Soul* that hears, sees and reasons in every man, demonstrated from the Acts of Memory. 11. Of the *Spirit of Nature*; that it is no obscure Principle, nor unseasonably introduced. 12. That he has absolutely demonstrated the Existence thereof. 13. That the admission of that Principle need be no hinderance to the progress of *Mechanick Philosophy*. 14. The great pleasure of that study to pious and rational persons. 15. Of what concernment it would be if *Des-Cartes* were generally read in all the Universities of Christendome. 16. An excuse of the prolixity of his Preface from his earnest desire of gratifying the publick, without the least offence to any rational or ingenuous Spirit.

**T**hat the present Treatise may pass more freely and smoothly through the hands of men, without any offence or scruple to the good and pious, or any real exception or probable cavil from those whose Pretensions are greater to Reason than Religion; I shall endeavour in this Preface to prevent them, by bringing here into view, and more fully explaining and clearing, whatever I conceive obnoxious to their mistakes and obloquies.

1. And indeed I cannot be well assured but that the very Title of my Discourse may seem liable to both their dislikes. To the dislike of the one, as being confident of the contrary Conclusion, and therefore secure That that cannot be demonstrated to be true, which they have long since judged not worthy to be reckoned in the rank of things probable; it may be not so much as of things possible. To the dislike of the other, as being already persuaded of the truth of our Conclusion upon other and better grounds: which would not be better, if the natural light of Reason could afford Demonstration in this matter. And therefore they may haply pretend, that so ambitious a Title seems to jostle with the high Prerogative of Christianity, which has brought life and immortality to light.

But of the former I demand, By what Faculty they are made so secure of  
G g 2
their



their being wholly mortal. For unless they will ridiculously conceit themselves inspired, whenas they almost as little believe there is either God or Spirit, as that they have in them an Immortal Soul, they must either pretend to the experience of Sense, or the clearness of Reason. The former whereof is impossible; because these bold deniers of the Immortality of the Soul have not yet experienced whether we subsist after Death or no. But if they would have us believe they have thus concluded upon rational grounds; I dare appeal unto them, if they can produce any stronger Reasons for their Cause than what I have \* set down for them, and if I have not fully and fundamentally answered them. If they will say their confidence proceeds from the weak arguings of the adverse party; I answer, it is weakly done of them, (their own Arguments being as unconcluding as they can fancy their adversaries) to be so secure, that Truth is on their own part rather than on theirs. But this can touch onely such managements of this Cause as they have seen already and censured. But that is nothing to me, who could never think I stood safe but upon my own legs. Wherefore I shall require them onely to peruse what I have written, before they venture to judge thereof; and after they have read, if they will declare that I have not demonstrated the Cause I have undertook, I think it reasonable and just, that they punctually shew in what part or joynt of my Demonstration they discern so weak a coherence as should embolden them still to dissent from the Conclusion.

But to the other I answer with more modesty and submission, That the Title of my Book doth not necessarily imply any promise of so full and perfect a Demonstration, that nothing can be added for the firmer assurance of the Truth; but onely that there may be expected as clear a Proof as Natural Reason will afford us. From which they should rather inferre, That I do acknowledge a further and a more palpable evidence comprehended in Christian Religion, and more intelligible and convictive to the generality of the World, who have neither leisure nor inclination to deal with the spinosities and anxieties of humane Reason and Philosophy. But I declined the making use of that Argument at this time; partly because I have a design to speak more fully thereof in my Treatise Of the \* Mystery of Christian Religion, if God so permit; and partly because it was unsutable to the present Title, which pretends to handle the matter onely within the bounds of Natural Light, unassisted and unguided by any miraculous Revelation.

2. Which will be a pleasant spectacle to such as have a Genius to these kinde of Contemplations, and wholly without danger; they still remembering that it is the voice of Reason and Nature, (which being too subject to corruption may very well be defectuous or erroneous in some things,) and therefore never trusting their dictates and suggestions, where they clash with the Divine Oracles, they must needs be safe from all seduction: though, I profess, I do not know any thing which I assert in this Treatise that doth disagree with them. But if any quicker-sighted then my self do discover any thing not according to that Rule, it may be an occasion of humble thankfulness to God for that great priviledge of our being born under an higher and exacter light: whereby those that are the most perfectly exercis'd therein, are inabled as well to rectifie what is perverse, as to supply what is defectuous in the light of Nature; and they have my free leave afore-hand to doe both throughly all along the ensuing Discourse.

And

\* Book 3.  
chap. 14.

\* Book 5. ch. 1,  
2, and 3. Also  
Book 6. ch. 11.  
sect. 13. and  
Book 8. ch. 17.

*And this may serve by way of a more general Defence. But that nothing may be wanting, I shall descend to the making good also of certain Particulars, as many as it is of any consequence further to clear and confirm.*

3. *In the First Book there occurre onely these Two that I am aware of. The one concerning the Center of a particular Spirit, whose Idea I have described, and demonstrated possible. The other concerns my Demonstration of the Impossibility of the Sun's seeing any thing upon Earth, supposing him merely corporeal. In the making good the former, I have taken the boldness to assert, That Matter consists of parts indiscerpible, understanding by indiscerpible parts, particles that have indeed real extension, but so little, that they cannot have less and be any thing at all, and therefore cannot be actually divided. Which minute Extension, if you will, you may call Essential (as being such that without that measure of it, the very Being of Matter cannot be conserved,) as the extension of any Matter compounded of these you may, if you please, term Integral; these parts of this compounded Matter being actually and really separable one from another. The Assertion, I confess, cannot but seem paradoxical at first sight, even to the ingenious and judicious. But that there are such indiscerpible particles into which Matter is divisible, viz. such as have Essential extension, and yet have parts utterly inseparable, I shall plainly and compendiously here demonstrate (besides what I have said in the Treatise it self) by this short Syllogism.*

*That which is actually divisible so farre as actual division any way can be made, is divisible into parts indiscerpible.*

*But Matter (I mean that Integral or Compound Matter) is actually divisible as farre as actual division any way can be made.*

*It were a folly to goe to prove either my Proposition or Assumption, they being both so clear, that no common notion in Euclide is more clear, into which all Mathematical Demonstrations are resolved.*

*It cannot but be confessed therefore, That Matter consists of indiscerpible particles, and that Physically and really it is not divisible in infinitum, though the parts that constitute an indiscerpible particle are real, but divisible onely intellectuallly; it being of the very essence of whatsoever is, to have Parts or Extension in some measure or other. For, to take away all Extension, is to reduce a thing onely to a Mathematical point, which is nothing else but pure Negation or Non-entity; and there being no medium betwixt extended and not-extended, no more then there is betwixt Entity and Non-entity, it is plain that if a thing be at all, it must be extended. And therefore there is an Essential Extension belonging to these indiscerpible particles of Matter; which was the other Property which was to be demonstrated.*

*I know unruly Fancy will make mad work here, and clamour against the Conclusion as impossible. For Finite Extension (will she say) must needs have Figure, and Figure extuberancy of parts at such a distance, that we cannot but conceive them still actually divisible. But we answer, That when Matter is once actually divided as farre as possibly it can, it is a perfect contradiction it should be divided any further; as it is also that it cannot be divided actually as farre as it can actually be divided. And no stronger*



*Demonstration then this against them can be brought against us by either Fancy or Reason : and therefore supposing we were but equal in our reasoning, this is enough to give me the day, who onely contend for the possibility of the thing. For if I bring but fully as good Demonstration that it is, as the other that it is not, none can deny me but that the thing is possible on my side.*

*But to answer the above-recited Argument, though they can never answer ours ; I say, those indiscerpible particles of Matter have no Figure at all : As infinite Greatness has no Figure, so infinite Littleness has none also. And a Cube infinitely little in the exactest sense, is as perfect a contradiction as a Cube infinitely great in the same sense of Infinity ; for the Angles would be equal in magnitude to the Hedra thereof. Besides, wise men are assured of many things that their Fancy cannot but play tricks with them in ; as in the Infinity of Duration and of Matter, or at least of Space. Of the truth whereof though they are never so certain, yet if they consider this infinite Matter, Space, or Duration, as divided, suppose, into three equal parts ( all which must needs be infinite, or else the whole will not be so ) the middle part of each will seem both finite and infinite ; for it is bounded at both ends. But every thing has two handles ; as Epictetus notes ; and he is a fool that will burn his fingers with the hot handle, when he may hold safe by the other that is more tractable and cool.*

4. *Concerning my Demonstration of the Impossibility of the Suns being a Spectator of our particular affairs upon Earth, there is onely this one Objection, viz. That though the Sun indeed, by reason of his great distance, cannot see any particular thing upon Earth, if he kept always in that ordinary shape in which we should suppose that, if he were devoid of sense, he would doe ; yet he having life and perception, he may change some part of his Body ( as we do our Eye in contracting or dilating the pupil thereof ) into so advantageous a Figure, that the Earth may be made to appear to him as bigge as he pleases.*

*Though some would be more ready to laugh at, then answer to, so odde a surmise, which supposes the Sun blinking and peering so curiously into our affairs, as through a Telescope ; yet because it comes in the way of reasoning, I shall have the patience seriously to return this Reply.*

*First, That this Objection can pretend to no strength at all, unless the Body of the Sun were Organical, as ours is ; whereas he is nothing but fluid Light : so that unless he hath a spiritual Being in him, to which this Light should be but the Vehicle, this arbitrariou figuring of his fluid Matter cannot be effected. But to grant that there is any such incorporeal Substance in the Sun, is to yield me what I contend for, viz. That there are Immaterial Substances in the World.*

*But that there is no such Divine Principle in him, whereby he can either see us, or aim at the producing any apparition on the Earth in reference to any one of us, by the activity of that Spirit in him, it is apparent from the scum and spots that lie on him : Which is as great an Argument that there is no such Divinity in him as some would attribute to him, (such as Pomponatius, Cardan, Vaninus and others) as the dung of Owls and Sparrows, that is found on the faces and shoulders of Idols in Temples, are clear evidences that they are but dead Images, no true Deities.*

*Lastly,*

*Lastly, though we should suppose he had a particular sentient and intelligent Spirit in him, yet the consideration of the vast distance of the Earth from him, and the thickness of her Atmosphere, with other disadvantages I have already mentioned in my Treatise, makes it incredible that he should be able to frame his Body into any Figure so exquisite as will compensate these insuperable difficulties.*

*5. In my Second Book the first Exception is concerning the 20<sup>th</sup> Axiome, which, say they, I have not proved, but onely brought in the testimony of Mr. Hobbs for the support thereof; which therefore onely enables me to argue with him upon his own Principles, wherein others will hold themselves unconcerned. But I answer, first, that it will concern all his followers as well as himself, so that it is no contemptible victory to demonstrate against all those so confident Exploders of Immaterial Substances, That their own acknowledged Principles will necessarily inferre the Existence of them in the World. But in the next place, it will not be hard to produce undeniable Reasons to evince the truth of the above-named Axiome, viz. That Sense and Perception in Matter, supposing nothing but Matter in the World, is really the same with Corporeal Motion and Re-action.*

*For it is plain in Sensation, there being alwayes external motion from Objects when our Senses are affected. And that inward Cogitation is thus performed, appears from the heat that Thinking casts a man into: Wherefore generally all Cogitation is accompanied with motion corporeal. And if there be nothing but Body or Matter in the World, Cogitation it self is really the same thing with Corporeal Motion.*

*Moreover as in Sensation the Corporeal Motion is first, and Perception follows; so it is necessary that universally in all internal Cogitations also certain Corporeal Motions immediately precede those Perceptions, though we did admit that Matter moved it self: For no Sense would thence arise without resistance of something it hit against. Insomuch that the subtlest Matter unresisted or not imprest upon, would be no more capable of Cogitation then a Wedge of Gold or Pig of Lead. And therefore if we will but confess (what none but mad men will venture to deny) that a Pig of Lead or Wedge of Gold has not any Thought or Perception at all without some knock or allision proportionable to their bigness and solidity, the subtlest Matter must likewise have none without some proportionable impression or resistance. Whence it is plain that alwaies corporeal Re-action or Collision precedes Perception, and that every Perception is a kind of feeling, which lasts so long as this resistance or impress of motion lasts; but that ceasing, is extinguish'd, the Matter being then as stupid as in a Pig of Lead. And that therefore as in general there is alwaies Corporeal motion where there is Cogitation, so the diversification of this motion and collision causes the diversification of cogitations, and so they run hand in hand perpetually; the one never being introduced without the fore-leading of the other, nor lasting longer then the other lasteth. But as heat is lost (which implies a considerable motion or agitation of some very subtle Matter,) so our Understanding and Imagination decays, and our Senses themselves fail, as not being able to be moved by the impression of outward Objects, or as not being in a due degree of liquidity and agility, and therefore in death our Bodies become as senseless as a lump of clay.*



*All Sensation therefore and Perception is really the same with Motion and Re-action of Matter, if there be nothing but Matter in the world.*

*And that every piece of Matter must perceive according as it self is moved, whether by it self (if it were possible) or by corporeal impress from other parts, is plain, in that Matter has no subtile rayes, or any power or efflux streaming beyond it self, like that which the Schools call species intentionales, nor yet any union more mysterious then the mere Juxta-position of parts.*

*For hence it is manifest that there can be no communication of any impress that one part of the Matter receives or is affected with from another at a distance, but it must be by jogging or crouding the parts interjacent. So that in every regard corporeal Motion or Re-action, with sufficient tenuity of parts and due duration, will be the adequate cause of all perception, if there be nothing but Matter in the world. This I think may suffice to assure any indifferent man of the truth of this part of Mr Hobbs his Assertion, if himself could make the other part true, That there is nothing existent in Nature but what is purely corporeal. But out of the former part, which is his own acknowledged Principle, I have undeniably demonstrated that there is.*

*6. The other Exception is against that Opinion I seem to embrace touching the Vehicles of Dæmons and Souls separate, as having herein offended against the authority of the Schools. And I profess this is all the reason I can imagine that they can have against my Assertion. But they may, if they please, remember that the Schools trespass against a more ancient authority then themselves, that is to say, the Pythagoreans, Platonists, Jewish Doctours, and the Fathers of the Church, who all hold That even the purest Angels have corporeal Vehicles. But it will be hard for the Schools to alledge any ancient Authority for their Opinion. For Aristotle their great Oracle is utterly silent in this matter, as not so much as believing the Existence of Dæmons in the world (as Pomponatius and Vaninus his sworn disciples have to their great contentment taken notice of:) And therefore being left to their own dry subtilties, they have made all Intellectual Beings that are not grossly terrestrial, as Man is, purely Immaterial. Whereby they make a very hideous Chasme or gaping breach in the order of things, such as no moderate judgment will ever allow of, and have become very obnoxious to be foiled by Atheistical wits, who are forward and skilful enough to draw forth the absurd consequences that lye hid in false suppositions, as Vaninus does in this. For he does not foolishly collect from the supposed pure Immateriality of Dæmons, that they have no knowledge of particular things upon Earth; such purely Incorporeal Essences being incapable of impress from Corporeal Objects, and therefore have not the Species of any particular thing that is corporeal in their mind. Whence he infers that all Apparitions, Prophecies, Prodigies, and whatsoever miraculous is recorded in ancient History, is not to be attributed to these, but to the influence of the Stars; and so concludes that there are indeed no such things as Dæmons in the Universe.*

*By which kinde of reasoning also it is easy for the Psychopannychites to support their Opinion of the Sleep of the Soul. For the Soul being utterly rescinded from all that is corporeal, and having no vital union therewith at*  
all,

all, they will be very prone to infer, that it is impossible she should know any thing *ad extrâ*, if she can so much as dream. For even that power also may seem incompetent to her in such a state, she having such an essential aptitude for vital union with Matter. Of so great consequence is it sometimes to desert the opinion of the Schools, when something more rational and more safe and useful offers it self unto us.

7. These are the main Objections my First and Second Book seem liable unto. My last I cannot but suspect to be more obnoxious. But the most common Exception I foresee that will be against it, is, That I have taken upon me to describe the state of the other World so punctually and particularly, as if I had been lately in it: For over-exquisiteness may seem to smell of art and fraud. And as there is a diffidency many times in us when we hear something that is extremely sutable to our desire, being then most ready to think it too good to be true; so also in Notions that seem over-accurately fitted to our Intellectual faculties, and agree the most naturally therewith, we are prone many times to suspect them to be too easy to be true; especially in things that seemed at first to us very obscure and intricate. For which cause also it is very likely that the Notion of a particular Spirit, which I have so accurately described in my First \* Book, may seem the less credible to some, \* Chap. 5, 6, 7. because it is now made so clearly intelligible, they thinking it utterly improbable that these things, that have been held alwaies such inextricable perplexities, should be thus of a suddain made manifest and familiar to any that has but a competency of Patience and Reason to peruse the Theory.

But for my own part, I shall not assume so much to my self, as peremptorily to affirm that the Indiscernibility of a Spirit arises that way that I have set down, that is to say, that God has made a particular Spirit just in that manner that I have delineated. For his Wisdome is infinite, and therefore it were an impious piece of boldness to confine him to one certain way of framing the nature of a Being, that is, of endowing it with such Attributes as are essential to it, as Indiscernibility is to the Soul of Man. But onely to have said in general, It is possible there may be a particular Essence of its immediate nature penetrable and indiscernible, and not particularly to have described the manner how it may be so; might have seemed to many more slight and unsatisfactory, Deceit lurking in Universals, as the Proverb has it. And therefore for the more fully convincing of the adverse party, I thought fit to pitch upon a punctual description of some one way, how the Soul of Man or of a Dæmon may be conceived necessarily indiscernible, though dilatable; not being very solicitous whether it be just that way or no, but yet well assured that it is either that way or some better. But this one way shews the thing possible at large: (As that mean contrivance of an Indian Canoa might prove the possibility of Navigation.) And that is all that I was to aim at in that place; saving that I had also a Zeal for the credit of the Platonists, whose imaginative presages I have often observed to hold a faithfull compliance with the severest Reason. And I think I have here demonstrated that their Fancy is not at all irrational in so usually comparing Form or Spirit to the radiant Light.

So in my description of the state of the other world, I am not very solicitous whether things be just so as I have set them down: but because  
some



*some men utterly misbelieve the thing, because they can frame no particular conceit what the Receptions and Entertainments of those Aerial Inhabitants may be, or how they pass away their time ; with many other intricacies which use to entangle this Theory ; I thought it of main concernment to take away this Objection against the Life to come (viz. That no man can conceive what it is, and therefore it is not at all, which is the ordinary Exception also against the Existence of all Incorporeal Substances) by a punctual and rational Description of this future state. Which I exhibit to the world as an intelligible Hypothesis, and such as may very well be, even according to the dictates of our own Faculties, being in the mean time fully assured, that things are either thus, or after a better or more exact order. But, as I said, to propound some particular probable way, I thought it of no small service to those who totally distrust all these things for that reason mainly, as being such as we can make no rational representation of to the Understandings of men.*

8. *But there are also particular Objections. The first whereof is against our Aerial and Æthereal Elysiums, which forsooth, to make their reproach more witty, they will parallel with the Mahometan Paradise. But besides that I do in the very place where I treat of these things suspend my assent after the description of them, there is nothing there offered in their description, but, if it were assented to, might become the most refined spirit in the World. For there is nothing more certain then That the Love of God and our Neighbour is the greatest Happiness that we can arrive unto, either in this life, or that which is to come. And whatever things are there described, are either the Causes, Effects, or Concomitants of that noble and divine Passion. Neither are the External incitements thereto, which I there mention, rightly to be deemed Sensual, but Intellectual : For even such is also sensible Beauty, whether it shew it self in Feature, Musick, or whatever graceful Deportments and comely Actions, as Plotinus has well defined. And those things that are not properly Intellectual, suppose Odours and Sapours, yet such a Spirit may be transfused into the Vehicles of these Aerial Inhabitants thereby, that may more then ordinarily raise into act their Intellectual Faculties. Which he that observes how our Thoughts and Inclinations depend immediately on a certain subtle Matter in our Bodies, will not at all stick to acknowledge to be true. And therefore whatever our Elysiums seem to the rash and injudicious, they are really no other thing then pure Paradises of Intellectual pleasure, Divine Love and blameless Friendship being the onely delight of those places.*

9. *The next Objection is concerning the state of the Wicked, as if I had made their condition too easy for them. But this methinks any man might be kept off from, if he would but consider, that I make the rack of Conscience worse then a perpetually-repeated death. Which is too-too credible to come to pass there, whenas we finde what execution Passions will doe upon us even in this life ; the Sicilian Tyrants having not found out a more exquisite torture then they. And as for those Souls that have lost the sense of Conscience, if any can doe so, I have allotted other punishments that are more corporeal, and little inferiour to the fire of that great Hell that is prophesied of, as the portion of the Devils and the damned at the last Day.*

By

By which neither then nor before could they be tortured (if we appeal to humane Reason, whom alone we appeal to, as judge, in this Treatise) if they were not vitally united with corporeal Vehicles.

10. The two last Exceptions are, the one touching the Soul of the World, the other the Spirit of Nature. The first is against our over-favourable representation of their Opinion that make but one Soul in the whole Universe, indwelling her with Sense, Reason, and Understanding: which Soul they will have to act in all Animals, Dæmons themselves not excepted. In all which, say they, it is One and the same Universal Soul that Hears, Sees, Reasons, Understands, &c. This Opinion I think I have \* confuted in this Third Book, as sufficiently as any one Error can be con-  
\* confuted in all Natural Philosophy. And that favourable representation I have made \* there of it, has that in it, whereby, unless a man be very remiss and  
\* mindless, he may easily demonstrate the falseness of the Supposition. For  
\* though we may well enough imagine how, the Body being unchanged, and  
\* this Soul of the Universe exquisitely the same every where, that though  
\* the party change place, and shift into another part of the Soul of the  
\* World, he may retain the same Opinions, Imaginations and Reasonings,  
\* so farre forth as they depend not on Memory (this Universal Soul raising  
\* her self into the same Thoughts upon the same Occasions;) yet Memory is  
\* incompetent unto that part which has not had the Perception before of what  
\* is remembred. For there is necessarily comprehended in Memory a Sense or  
\* Perception that we have had a Perception or Sense afore of the thing which  
\* we conceive our selves to remember.

\* Book 3.  
chap. 16.

\* Chap. 16.  
sect. 4.

To be short therefore, and to strike this Opinion dead at one stroke; They that say there is but one Soul of the World, whose perceptive Power is every where, they must assert, that what one part thereof perceives, all the rest perceives; or else that perceptions in Dæmons, Men and Brutes are confined to that part of this Soul that is in them, while they perceive this or that. If the former, they are confutable by Sense and Experience: For though all Animals lie steeped, as it were, in that subtile Matter which runs through all things, and is the immediate Instrument of Sense and Perception; yet we are not conscious of one anothers thoughts, nor feel one anothers pains, nor the pains and pleasures of Brutes, when they are in them at the highest. Nor yet do the Dæmons feel one anothers affections, or necessarily assent to one anothers opinions, though their Vehicles be exceeding pervious; else they would be all Avenroists, as well as those that appeared to Facius Cardanus, supposing any were. Wherefore we may generally conclude, that if there were such an Universal Soul, yet the particular perceptions thereof are restrained to this or that part in which they are made: which is contrary to the Unity of a Soul, as I have already said in its due place.

Book 3. ch. 16:  
sect. 2.

But let us grant the thing (for indeed we have demonstrated it to be so, if there be such an Universal Soul, and none but it) then the grand Absurdity comes in, which I was intimating before, to wit, That that part of the Soul of the World that never perceived a thing, shall notwithstanding remember it, that is to say, that it shall perceive it has perceived that which it never perceived: And yet one at Japan may remember a countreyman arrived thither that he had not seen nor thought of for twenty years before.

Nay,



*Nay, which is more to the purpose, supposing the Earth move, what I write now, the Earth being in the beginning of Aries, I shall remember that I have written when she is in the beginning of Libra, though that part of the Soul of the World that possesses my Body then will be twice as distant from what does guide my hand to write now, as the Earth is from the Sun.*

*Nor can the plainness of this Demonstration be eluded by any Evasion whatsoever. For First, if we should admit that there be certain Marks sealed in the Brain upon the seeing or considering this or that Object, whereby the Soul would impress the Memory thereof upon her more deeply; the virtue of remembering by this would be in that she had once joyned such a Thought or Representation with such an Impress or Mark, otherwise it would avail nothing. Wherefore the Soul of the World, in B suppose, not having joyned such a Representation with this Mark in the Brain as she did in A, can remember nothing thereby. For it is utterly unconceivable how any Figuration or Motion whatsoever in the Brain can represent to the Soul a Perception as perceiv'd heretofore, if the Soul her self has heretofore had no such Perception. For there can be no Basis of this reflexive and comparative Act but the foregoing Perception of which the Soul is still conscious: Of which she cannot be conscious, if she never perceiv'd it. Whence it is plain that these supposed Marks have not a capacity in them to impose upon the Soul of the World in B, so as to make her conceit she had a Perception of a thing, when indeed she never had.*

*But then again in the Second place, It is very evident That the power of Memory does not consist in such Marks or Figures in the Brain, nor in any Vibration or Motion there, as I have sufficiently proved in the following* \* *Discourse. Which further assures us, That Memory is wholly in the Soul her self, and that She is the sole Repository of all the Perceptions she has had; and that therefore the Soul of the World cannot perceive her self to have perceived a thing when she has not perceived it.*

*And Thirdly and lastly, It is hence also manifest (I mean from Memory being seated onely in the Soul her self, she acting in this, as in all other functions, onely by virtue of a fit tenour of Spirits and due temper of Brain) That the Body changing place from A to B, that part of the Soul of the World in it at B will have the remembrance of such things as were never perceived in A, and forget, or rather have no knowledge of, what the Soul perceived there; and that therefore by changing place a man may chance to become in a moment an excellent Physician, Mathematician, or the like, or of a sudden become a Sott, and lose all his learning; which is the likelier of the two. For the Fruits of that Meditation and Study are lost, when once the Body has left that part of the Soul of the World which did thus study and meditate. So impossible is it that every man should not have a particular Soul of his own.*

*Nor can this Error in the Soul of the World, of perceiving she has perceived when she has not, be argued possible in her from the adherence of that perpetual deemed mistake in our Outward Senses; as that we feel a pain, suppose, in our finger, or white upon the wall; whenas there is neither white in the one, nor pain in the other, but only in our Common Percipient which is confined within our Brain. For it is apparent that if this be an Error, yet there is a plain and necessary Foundation thereof.*

*For*

\* Book 2. ch. 5.  
sect. 7. also ch.  
11. sect. 4, 5, 6.

*For as when we thrust a Cane against the ground, we necessarily feel different feelings; one when against Gravel, another against Stone, and a third against Mud or Earth, and feel them also at the distance of the Cane. So also is it in Colours; the Medium betwixt the Object and the Eye being as the Cane, and the variety of feelings at the end of the Cane like that variety of Colours; of which there is a necessary causality in the variety of the Surfaces of the Objects; which the Common Percipient must needs perceive, and at such a distance as the Medium engages, as it was before in the length of the Cane. So that to perceive such differences at that distance they are and where they doe causally exist, is not so much an Errour as a Truth. And there is the same reason in ticklings or prickings in any part of the Body: For it is true that those differences are also causally there; and therefore our Perception is rightly carried thither: For there is there that harshness and dis-harmony to Nature, which the Soul cannot perceive but with an harsh and painfull perception, not only by reason of her interest and vitall union with the Body, but also from the speciall nature of the Perception it self.*

*So that it seems to me an hard Censure to say the Soul does mistake in these Perceptions: and if she do in some sort, yet we can trace the necessary and determinate Cause, and that both very palpable and very intelligible. But for this Errour of the Soul of the World perceiving, suppose in B, that she has perceived what notwithstanding she never perceived, it is a thing quite of another kind, and an entire and undoubted mistake of which no imaginable Cause can be produced that should lead her into it. Whence it follows that she never commits it; and that therefore the reflexive Act of Memory, which does firmly assure us of a foregoing Perception, (no other Faculty having any power or pretence to evidence the contrary,) does necessarily inferr, That every man has a Particular Soul of his own, and that such an Universal Soul, as the Avenroists fancy, will not salve all Phænomena.*

*And yet I dare say, this wild Opinion is more tenable then theirs that make nothing but mere Matter in the world. But I thought it worth the while with all diligence to confute them both, the better of them being but a more refined kinde of Atheism, tending to the subversion of all the Fundamentals of Religion and Piety amongst men.*

*II. As for the Spirit of Nature, the greatest exceptions are, That I have introduced an obscure Principle for Ignorance and Sloth to take sanctuary in, and so to enervate or foreslack the useful endeavours of curious Wits, and hinder that expected progress that may be made in the Mechanick Philosophy; and this, to aggravate the crime; before a competent search be made what the Mechanical powers of Matter can doe. For what Mechanical solutions the present or foregoing Ages could not light upon, the succeeding may; and therefore it is as yet unseasonable to bring in any such Principle into Natural Philosophy.*

*To which I answer, That the Principle we speak of is neither obscure nor unseasonable; nor so much introduced by me, as forced upon me by inevitable evidence of Reason. That it is no obscure Principle, the clear Description I have given of it in my Treatise will make good. Against which I know no imaginable exception, unless it may seem harsh to any one that a*

Book 3. ch. 12.



Substance devoid of all sense and perception, and therefore incapable of premeditated contrivance, should be supposed fit to form the Matter into such exquisite organization. But this can appear no difficulty to him that duly considers that what Phantasmie is to our Soul, that Fabrick is to the Spirit of Nature : and that as the \* tenour of our Spirits (which are but subtile matter) will cause the Soul immediately to exert it self into this or that Imagination, no knowledge or premeditation interceding ; so such or such a preparation or predisposition of the Matter of the World will cause the Spirit of Nature to fall upon this or that kinde of Fabrication or Organization, no perception or consultation being interposed.

Those that pretend that the introduction of this Principle is unseasonable, I demand of them when they will think it to be seasonable. For this simple surmise, That although all the Mechanical solutions of some Phænomena which have been hitherto offer'd to the world be demonstrably false, yet future Ages may light upon what is true ; can be held nothing else by the judicious, but a pitiful subterfuge of fearful Souls, that are very loath to let in any such affrightfull Notion as an Immaterial or Spiritual Substance into the world, for fear the next step must be the acknowledgment also of a God ; from whom they would fain hide themselves by this poor and precarious pretence. But I say, if the introduction of this Principle be not seasonable now, it will never be seasonable. For that admirable Master of Mechanicks Des-Cartes has improved this way to the highest, I dare say, that the Wit of man can reach to in such Phænomena as he has attempted to render the Causes of. But how in sundry passages he falls short in his account, I have both in the forenamed and following Chapter, as also elsewhere, taken notice. I will instance here onely in the Phænomenon of Gravity, wherein I think I have perfectly demonstrated that both He and Mr. Hobbs are quite out of the story, and that the Causes they assign are plainly false. And that I have not mentioned the Opinions of others in this way, it was onely because I look'd upon them as less considerable.

12. But you'l say that though these be all mistaken, yet it does not follow but that there may arise some happy Wit that will give a true Mechanical solution of this Probleme. But I answer, That I have not onely confuted their Reasons, but also from Mechanical principles granted on all sides and confirmed by Experience, demonstrated that the Descent (suppose) of a Stone, or Bullet, or any such like heavy Body, is enormously contrary to the Laws of Mechanicks ; and that according to them they would necessarily, if they lye loose, recede from the Earth, and be carried away out of our sight into the farthest parts of the Aire, if some Power more then Mechanical did not curb that Motion, and force them downwards towards the Earth. So that it is plain that we have not arbitrarily introduced a Principle, but that it is forced upon us by the undeniable evidence of Demonstration. From which to suspend our assent till future Ages have improved this Mechanical Philosophy to greater height, is as ridiculous, as to doubt of the truth of any one plain and easy Demonstration in the first Book of Euclide, till we have travelled through the whole field of that immense study of Mathematicks.

13. Nor lastly needs the acknowledgment of this Principle to damp our endeavours in the search of the Mechanical causes of the Phænomena of  
Nature,

\* See Antidote,  
Book 2. ch. 10.  
sect. 12.

Nature, but rather make us more circumspect to distinguish what is the result of the mere Mechanical powers of Matter and Motion, and what of an Higher Principle. For questionleß this secure presumption in some, That there is nothing but Matter in the world, has emboldned them too rashly to venture on Mechanical solutions where they would not hold, because they were confident there were no other solutions to be had but those of this kinde.

14. Besides that to the Rational and Religious there is a double Pleasure to carry them on in this way of Philosophy: The one from the observation how far in every thing the Concatenation of Mechanical causes will reach; which will wonderfully gratifie their Reason: the other from a distinct apprehension where they must needs break off, as not being able alone to reach the Effect; which necessarily leads them to a more confirmed discovery of the Principle we contend for, namely the Spirit of Nature, which is the Vicarious power of God upon the Matter, and the first step to the abstrusest Mysteries in Natural Theologie; which must needs highly gratifie them in point of Religion.

15. And truly for this very cause, I think it is the most sober and faithful advice that can be offered to the Christian World, that they would encourage the reading of Des-Cartes in all publick Schools or Universities. That the Students of Philosophy may be thoroughly exercised in the just extent of the Mechanical powers of Matter, how farre they will reach, and where they fall short. Which will be the best assistance to Religion that Reason and the Knowledge of Nature can afford. For by this means such as are intended to serve the Church will be armed betimes with sufficient strength to grapple with their proudest Deriders or Opposers. Whenas for want of this, we see how liable they are to be contemned and born down by every bold, though weak, pretender to the Mechanick Philosophy.

16. These are the main Passages I could any way conceive might be excepted against in the ensuing Discourse: which yet are so innocent and firm in themselves, and so advantageously circumstantiated in the places where they are found, that I fear the Reader may suspect my judgement and discretion in putting myself to the trouble of writing, and him of reading, so long and needleß a Preface. Which oversight though it be an argument of no great Wit, yet it may be of much Humanity, and of an earnest desire of doing a publick good without the least offence or dissatisfaction to any that are but tolerable Retainers to Reason and Ingenuity. But for those that have bid a dieu to both, and measure all Truths by their own humourfome fancy, making every thing ridiculous that is not sutable to their own ignorant conceptions; I think no serious man will hold himself bound to take notice of their perverse constructions and mis-representations of things, more then a religious Eremitte or devout Pilgrim to heed the ugly mows and grimaces of Apes and Monkeys he may haply meet with in his wearisome passage through the WilderNESS.





# THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

## CHAP. I.

1. *The Usefulness of the present Speculation for the understanding of Providence, and the management of our lives for our greatest Happiness;*
2. *For the moderate bearing the death and disasters of our Friends;*
3. *For the begetting true Magnanimity in us, 4. and Peace and Tranquillity of Mind. 5. That so weighty a Theory is not to be handled perfunctorily.*

1.



F all the Speculations the *Soul* of man can entertain her self withall, there is none of greater moment, or of closer concernment to her, then this of her own *Immortality*, and *Independence* on this *Terrestriall Body*. For hereby not onely the intricacies and perplexities of *Providence* are made more easy and smoooth to her, and she becomes able, by unravelling this clue from end to end, to pass and repass safe through this Labyrinth, wherein many both anxious and careless Spirits have lost themselves; but also (which touches her own interest more particularly) being once raised into the knowledge and belief of so weighty a Conclusion, she may view from this Prospect the most certain and most compendious way to her own *Happiness*; which is, the bearing a very moderate affection to whatever tempts her, during the time of this her Pilgrimage, and a carefull preparing of her self for her future condition, by such Noble actions and Heroicall qualifications of Mind as shall render her most welcome to her own Countrey.

2. Which Belief and Purpose of hers will put her in an utter incapacity of either *envying* the *life* or *successes* of her most embittered *Enemies*, or of *over-lamenting* the *death* or *misfortunes* of her dearest *Friends*; she having no Friends but such as are Friends to God and Vertue, and whose Afflictions will prove advantages for their future Felicity, and their departure hence a passage to present possession thereof.

Hh 3

3: Where



3. Wherefore, being fully ground and rooted in this so concerning a Perswasion, she is freed from all *poor* and *abject* thoughts and designs; and as little admires him that gets the most of this World, be it by Industry, Fortune or Policy, as a discreet and serious man does the spoils of School-boys, it being very inconsiderable to him who got the victory at Cocks or Cob-nut, or whose bag returned home the fullest stuffed with Counters or Cherry-stones.

4. She has therefore no *emulation*, unless it be of doing good, and of out-stripping, if it were possible, the noblest examples of either the present or past Ages; nor any *contest*, unless it be with her self, that she has made no greater proficiency towards the scope she aims at: and aiming at nothing but what is not in the power of men to confer upon her, with courage she sets upon the main work; and being still more faithfull to her self, and to that Light that assists her, at last tastes the *first fruits* of her future *Harvest*, and does more then presage that *great Happiness* that is accreuing to her. And so quit from the troubles and anxieties of this present world, *staies* in it with *Tranquillity* and *Content*, and at last *leaves* it with *Joy*.

5. The Knowledge therefore and belief of the *Immortality of the Soul* being of so grand Importance, we are engaged more carefully and punctually to handle this so weighty a Theory: which will not be performed by multiplying of words, but by a more frugall use of them; letting nothing fall from our pen, but what makes closely to the matter, nor omitting any thing materiall for the evincing the truth thereof.

## C H A P. II.

1. *That the Soule's Immortality is demonstrable, by the Authors method, to all but mere Scepticks.* 2. *An Illustration of his First Axiome.* 3. *A confirmation and example of the Second.* 4. *An explication of the Third.* 5. *An explication and proof of the Fourth.* 6. *A proof of the Fifth.* 7. *Of the Sixth.* 8. *An example of the Seventh.* 9. *A confirmation of the truth of the Eighth.* 10. *A demonstration and example of the Ninth.* 11. *Penetrability the immediate Property of Incorporeall Substance.* 12. *As also Indiscerpibility.* 13. *A proof and illustration of the Tenth Axiome.*

1. **A**ND to stop all Creep-holes, and leave no place for the subterfuges and evasions of confused and cavilling spirits, I shall prefix some few *Axiomes*, of that plainness and evidence, that no man in his wits but will be ashamed to deny them, if he will admit any thing at all to be true. But as for perfect *Scepticisme*, it is a disease incurable, and a thing rather to be pitied or laught at, then seriously opposed. For when a man is so fugitive and unsetled, that he will not stand to the verdict of his own Faculties, one can no more fasten any thing upon him, then he can write in the water, or tye knots of the wind. But for those  
that

that are not in such a strange despondency, but that they think they know something already and may learn more, I do not doubt, but by a seasonable recourse to these few Rules, with others I shall set down in their due place, that they will be perswaded, if not forced, to reckon this Truth, of *the Immortality of the Soul*, amongst such as must needs appear undeniable to those that have parts and leisure enough accurately to examine, and throughly to understand what I have here written for the demonstration thereof.

## AXIOME I.

*What ever things are in themselves, they are nothing to us, but so far forth as they become known to our Faculties or Cognitive powers.*

2. **T**His *Axiome* is plain of it self, at the very first proposal. For as nothing, for example, can concern the *Visive* faculty, but so far forth as it is *visible*; so there is nothing that can challenge any stroke to so much as a touching, much less determining, our *Cognitive* powers in generall, but so far forth as it is *cognoscible*.

## AXIOME II.

*Whatsoever is unknown to us, or is known but as merely possible, is not to move us or determine us any way, or make us undetermined; but we are to rest in the present light and plain determination of our owne Faculties.*

3. **T**His is an evident Confectary from the foregoing Axiome. For the Existence of that that is *merely possible* is utterly unknown to us to *be*, and therefore is to have no weight against any Conclusion, unless we will condemn our selves to eternall *Scepticisme*. As for example, If after a man has argued for a *God* and *Providence*, from the wise contrivance in the frame of all the Bodies of Animals upon earth, one should reply, That there may be, for all this, Animals in *Saturn*, *Jupiter*, or some other of the Planets, of very inept fabricks; Horses, suppose, and other Creatures, with onely one Eye, and one Eare, (and that both on a side, the Eye placed also where the Eare should be,) and with onely three Leggs; Bulls and Rams with horns on their backs, and the like: Such allegations as these, according to this Axiome, are to be held of no force at all for the enervating the Conclusion.

See *Antidote*,  
Book 1. ch. 2,  
and 9.

## AXIOME III.

*All our Faculties have not a right of suffrage for determining of Truth, but onely Common Notions, Externall Sense, and evident and undeniable Deductions of Reason.*

4. **B**Y *Common Notions* I understand whatever is *Noëmatically* true, that is to say, true at first sight to all men in their wits, upon a clear perception of the Terms, without any further discourse or reasoning.



soning. (From *Externall Sense* I exclude not *Memory*, as it is a faithfull Register thereof.) And by *undeniable Deduction of Reason*, I mean such a collection of one Truth from another, that no man can discover any looseness or disjointedness in the cohesion of the Argument.

#### AXIOME IV.

*What is not consonant to all or some of these, is mere Fancy, and is of no moment for the evincing of Truth or Falschood, by either it's Vigour or Perplexiveness.*

5. **I** Say *mere Fancy*, in Counter-distinction to such Representations as, although they be not the pure Impresses of some reall Object, yet are made by *Rationall deduction* from them, or from *Common Notions*, or from both. Those Representations that are not framed upon such grounds, I call *mere Fancies*; which are of no value at all in determining of Truth. For if *Vigour of Fancy* will argue a thing true, then all the dreams of mad-men must goe for Oracles: and if the *Perplexiveness* of *Imagination* may hinder assent, we must not believe Mathematicall demonstration, and the 16<sup>th</sup> Proposition of the 3<sup>d</sup> Book of *Euclide* will be confidently concluded to contain a contradiction.

See *Antidote*  
Book 1. ch. 4.  
sect. 2.

#### AXIOME V.

*Whatever is clear to any one of these Three Faculties, is to be held undoubtedly true, the other having nothing to evidence to the contrary.*

6. **O**R else a man shall not be assured of any sensible Object that he meets with, nor can give firm assent to such Truths as these, *It is impossible the same thing should be, and not be, at once; Whatever is, is either finite, or infinite; and the like.*

#### AXIOME VI.

*What is rejected by one, none of the other Faculties giving evidence for it, ought to goe for a Falschood.*

7. **O**R else a man may let pass such Impossibilities as these for Truth, or doubt whether they be not true or no, viz. *The part is greater then the whole; There is something that is neither finite nor infinite; Socrates is invisible; and the like.*

#### AXIOME VII.

*What is plainly and manifestly concluded, ought to be held undeniable, when no difficulties are alledged against it, but such as are acknowledged to be found in other Conclusions held by all men undeniably true.*

8. **A**S for example, suppose one should conclude, *That there may be Infinite Matter, or That there is Infinite Space*, by very rationall arguments; and that it were objected onely, *That then the Tenth part*  
of

of that *Matter* would be Infinite ; it being most certain That there is *Infinite Duration* of something or other in the world, and that the *Tenth* part of this *Duration* is Infinite ; it is no enervating at all of the former Conclusion, it being incumbred with no greater incongruity then is acknowledged to consist with an undeniable Truth.

### AXIOME VIII.

*The Subject, or naked Essence or Substance of a thing, is utterly unconceivable to any of our Faculties.*

9. **F**OR the evidencing of this Truth, there needs nothing more then a silent appeal to a mans owne Mind , if he do not find it so ; and that if he take away all *Aptitudes, Operations, Properties* and *Modifications* from a *Subject*, that his conception thereof vanishes into nothing, but into the *Idea* of a mere *Undiversificated Substance* ; so that one *Substance* is not then distinguishable from another, but onely from *Accidents* or *Modes*, to which properly belongs no subsistence.

### AXIOME IX.

*There are some Properties, Powers and Operations, immediately appertaining to a thing, of which no reasons can be given, nor ought to be demanded, nor the Way or Manner of the cohesion of the Attribute with the Subject can by any means be fancied or imagined.*

10. **T**HE evidence of this Axiome appears from the former. For if the *naked substance* of a Thing be so utterly unconceivable , there can be nothing deprehended there to be a connexion betwixt it and it's first Properties. Such is *Actual Divisibility* and *Impenetrability* in *Matter*. By *Actual Divisibility* I understand *Discerpibility*, gross tearing or cutting one part from another. These are *Immediate Properties of Matter* ; but why they should be there, rather then in any other Subject, no man can pretend to give, or with any credit aske, the reason. For *Immediate Attributes* are indemonstrable, otherwise they would not be *Immediate*.

11. So the *Immediate Properties* of a *Spirit* or Immateriall Substance are *Penetrability* and *Indiscerpibility*. The necessary cohesion of which Attributes with the Subject is as little demonstrable as the former. For supposing that, which I cannot but assert, to be evidently true, That there is no Substance but it has in some sort or other the Three dimensions ; This Substance, which we call *Matter*, might as well have been *penetrable* as *impenetrable*, and yet have been Substance: But now that it does so certainly and irresistibly keep one part of it self from *penetrating* another, it is so, we know not why. For there is no necessary connexion discernible betwixt *Substance* with *three dimensions*, and *Impenetrability*. For what some alledge, that it implies a contradiction, that *Extended Substance*



stance should run one part into another; for so part of the *Extension*, and consequently of the *Substance*, would be lost; this, I say, (if nearly looked into) is of no force. For the *Substance* is no more lost in this case, then when a string is doubled and redoubled, or a piece of wax reduced from a long figure to a round: The dimension of *Longitude* is in some part lost, but without detriment to the *Substance* of the wax. In like manner when one part of an *Extended Substance* runs into another, something both of *Longitude*, *Latitude* and *Profundity* may be lost, and yet all the *Substance* there still; as well as *Longitude* lost in the other case without any loss of the *Substance*.

And as what was lost in *Longitude* was gotten in *Latitude* or *Profundity* before; so what is lost here in all or any two of the dimensions, is kept safe in *Essential Spissitude*: For so I will call this *Mode* or *Property* of a *Substance*, that is able to receive one part of it self into another. Which *fourth Mode* is as easy and familiar to my Understanding, as that of the *Three dimensions* to my Sense or Phantasy. For I mean nothing else by *Spissitude*, but the redoubling or contracting of Substance into less space then it does sometimes occupy. And Analogous to this is the lying of two Substances of several kinds in the same place at once.

To both these may be applied the termes of *Reduplication* and *Saturation*: The former, when Essence or Substance is but once redoubled into it self or into another; the latter, when so oft, that it will not easily admit any thing more. And that more *Extensions* then one may be commensurate, at the same time, to the same Place, is plain, in that *Motion* is coextended with the Subject wherein it is, and both with *Space*. And *Motion* is not nothing; wherefore two things may be commensurate to one Space at once.

12. Now then *Extended Substance* (and all Substances are extended) being of it self indifferent to *Penetrability* or *Impenetrability*, and we finding one kind of Substance so *impenetrable*, that one part will not enter at all into another, which with as much reason we might expect to find so irresistibly united one part with another that nothing in the world could dis sever them: (For this *Indiscerpibility* has as good a connexion with Substance as *Impenetrability* has, they neither falling under the cognoscence of Reason or Demonstration, but being *Immediate Attributes* of such a Subject. For a man can no more argue from the *Extension* of Substance, that it is *Discerpible*, then that it is *Penetrable*; there being as good a capacity in *Extension* for *Penetration* as *Discerption*) I conceive, I say, from hence we may as easily admit that *some Substance* may be of it self *Indiscerpible*, as well as others *Impenetrable*; and that as there is one kind of *Substance*, which of it's own nature is *Impenetrable* and *Discerpible*, so there may be another *Indiscerpible* and *Penetrable*. Neither of which a man can give any other account of, then that they have the *Immediate Properties* of such a Subject.

## AXIOME X.

*The discovery of some Power, Property, or Operation, incompatible to one Subject, is an infallible argument of the Existence of some other, to which it must be compatible.*

13. **A**S when *Pythagoras* was spoken unto by the River *Nessus*, when he passed over it, and a Tree by the command of *Thespesion* the chief of the *Gymnosophists* saluted *Apollonius* in a distinct and articulate voice, but small as a womans; it is evident, I say, That there was something there that was neither *River* nor *Tree*, to which these salutations must be attributed, no *Tree* nor *River* having any Faculty of *Reason* nor *Speech*.

Iamblich. de  
vita Pythag.  
cap. 18.  
Philostrat. de  
vita Apollon.  
lib. 6.

## CHAP. III.

1. *The general Notions of Body and Spirit.* 2. *That the Notion of Spirit is altogether as intelligible as that of Body.* 3. *Whether there be any Substance of a mixt nature, betwixt Body and Spirit.*

1. **T**HE greatest and grossest Obstacle to the belief of *the Immortality of the Soul*, is that confident opinion in some, as if the very notion of a *Spirit* were a piece of Non-sense and perfect Incongruity in the conception thereof. Wherefore to proceed by degrees to our maine designe, and to lay our foundation low and sure, we will in the first place expose to view the genuine notion of a *Spirit*, in the generall acception thereof; and afterwards of severall kinds of *Spirits*: that it may appear to all, how unjust that cavill is against *Incorporeal Substances*, as if they were mere Impossibilities and contradictory Inconsistencies. I will define therefore a *Spirit* in generall thus, *A substance penetrable and indiscerpible*. The fitness of which Definition will be the better understood, if we divide *Substance* in generall into these first kindes, viz. *Body* and *Spirit*, and then define *Body* to be *A Substance impenetrable and discernible*. Whence the contrary kind to this is fitly defined, *A Substance penetrable and indiscerpible*.

2. Now I appeal to any man that can set aside prejudice, and has the free use of his Faculties, whether every term in the Definition of a *Spirit* be not as intelligible and congruous to Reason, as in that of a *Body*. For the precise Notion of *Substance* is the same in both, in which, I conceive, is comprised *Extension* and *Activity* either connate or communicated. For *Matter* it self once moved can move other *Matter*. And it is as easy to understand what *Penetrable* is as *Impenetrable*, and what *Indiscerpible* as *Discerpible*; and *Penetrability* and *Indiscerpibility* being as immediate to *Spirit*, as *Impenetrability* and *Discerpibility* to *Body*, there is as much reason to be given for the Attributes of the one as of the other, by

Axiome



Axiome 9. And *Substance* in its precise notion including no more of *Impenetrability* then *Indiscernibility*, we may as well wonder how one kind of Substance can so firmly and irresistibly keep out another Substance (as *Matter*, for example, does the parts of *Matter*) as that the parts of another Substance hold so fast together, that they are by no means *Discernible*, as we have already intimated. And therefore this *holding out* in one being as difficult a business to conceive as the *holding together* in the other, this can be no prejudice to the notion of a *Spirit*. For there may be very fast union where we cannot at all imagine the cause thereof, as in such Bodies which are exceeding hard, where no man can fancy what holds the parts together so strongly; and there being no greater difficulty here, then that a man cannot imagine what holds the parts of a *Spirit* together, it will follow by Axiome 7. that the Notion of a *Spirit* is not to be excepted against as an incongruous notion, but is to be admitted for the notion of a thing that may really exist.

3. It may be doubted, whether there may not be Essences of a middle condition betwixt these *Corporeal* and *Incorporeal* Substances we have described, and that of two sorts, The one *Impenetrable and Indiscernible*, the other *Penetrable and Discernible*. But concerning the first, if *Impenetrability* be understood in reference to *Matter*, it is plain there can be no such Essence in the world; and if in reference to its own parts, though it may then look like a possible *Idea* in it self, yet there is no footsteps of the existence thereof in Nature, the Souls of men and Demons implying contraction and dilatation in them.

As for the latter, it has no privilege for any thing more then *Matter* it self has, or some *Mode* of *Matter*. For it being *Discernible*, it is plain it's union is by *Juxtaposition* of parts, and the more *penetrable*, the less likely to convey Sense and Motion to any distance. Besides the ridiculous sequel of this supposition, that will fill the Universe with an infinite number of shreds and rags of Souls and Spirits, never to be reduced again to any use or order. And lastly, the proper Notion of a Substance *Incorporeal* fully counter-distinct to a *Corporeal* Substance, necessarily including in it so strong and indissoluble union of parts, that it is utterly *Indiscernible*, whenas yet for all that in this general notion thereof neither *Sense* nor *Cogitation* is implied, it is most rational to conceive, that that Substance wherein they are must assuredly be *Incorporeal* in the strictest signification; the nature of *Cogitation* and *communion of Sense* arguing a more perfect degree of union then is in mere *Indiscernibility of parts*.

But all this Scrupulosity might have been saved; for I confidently promise my self, that there are none so perversly given to tergiversations and subterfuges, but that they will acknowledge, wherever I can prove that there is a Substance distinct from Body or Matter, that it is in the most full and proper sense *Incorporeal*.

## CHAP. IV.

1. *That the Notions of the several kinds of Immaterial Beings have no Inconsistency nor Incongruity in them.* 2. *That the Nature of God is as intelligible as the Nature of any Being whatsoever.* 3. *The true Notion of his Ubiquity, and how intelligible it is.* 4. *Of the Union of the Divine Essence.* 5. *Of his Power of Creation.*

1. **W**E have shewn that the Notion of a *Spirit* in general is not at all incongruous nor impossible: And it is as congruous, consistent and intelligible in the *sundry kinds* thereof; as for example that of God, of Angels, of the Souls of Men and Brutes, and of the *λόγοι σπέρματικοί* or *Seminal Forms* of things.

2. The Notion of God, though the knowledge thereof be much prejudiced by the confoundedness and stupidity of either superstitious or profane men, that please themselves in their large Rhetorickations concerning the unconceivableness and utter incomprehensibleness of the Deity; the one by way of a devotional exaltation of the transcendency of his Nature, the other to make the belief of his Existence ridiculous, and craftily and perversly to intimate that there is no God at all, the very conception of him being made to appear nothing else but a bundle of inconsistencies and impossibilities: Nevertheless I shall not at all stick to affirm, that his *Idea* or Notion is as easy as any Notion else whatsoever, and that we may know as much of him as of any thing else in the world. For the *very Essence* or *naked Substance* of nothing can possibly be known, by Axiome 8. But for His *Attributes*, they are as conspicuous as the Attributes of any Subject or Substance whatever: From which a man may easily define Him thus; *God is a Spirit Eternal, Infinite in Essence and Goodness, Omniscient, Omnipotent, and of himself necessarily Existent.*

I appeal to any man, if every term in this Definition be not sufficiently intelligible. For as for *Spirit*, that has been already defined and explained. By *Eternal* I understand nothing here but Duration without end or beginning: by *Infiniteness of Essence*, that his Essence or Substance has no bounds, no more then his Duration: by *Infinite in Goodness*, such a benign Will in God as is carried out to boundless and innumerable benefactions: by *Omniscieny* and *Omnipotency*, the ability of knowing or doing any thing that can be conceived without a plain contradiction: by *Self-existency*, that he has his Being from none other: and by *necessary Existence*, that he cannot fail to be. What terms of any Definition are more plain then these of this? or what Subject can be more accurately defined then this is? For the naked Subject or Substance of any thing is no otherwise to be known then thus. And they that gape after any other Speculative knowledge of God then what is from his *Attributes* and *Operations*, they may have their heads and mouths filled with many hot scalding fancies and words, and run mad with the boisterousness of their own Imagination, but they will never hit upon any sober Truth.



3. Thus have I delivered a very explicite and intelligible Notion of *the Nature of God*; which I might also more compendiously define, *An Essence absolutely Perfect*, in which all the terms of the former Definition are comprehended, and more then I have named, or thought needful to name, much less to insist upon; as his *Power of Creation*, and his *Omnipresence* or *Ubiquity*, which are necessarily included in the *Idea* of *absolute Perfection*. The latter whereof some ancient Philosophers endeavouring to set out, have defined God to be *a Circle whose Centre is every where and Circumference no where*. By which Description certainly nothing else can be meant, but that the Divine Essence is *every where present* with all those adorable Attributes of *Infinite* and *absolutely-Perfect Goodness, Knowledge and Power*, according to that sense in which I have explained them. Which *Ubiquity* or *Omnipresence* of God is every whit as intelligible as the overspreading of *Matter* into all places.

4. But if here any one demand, How the Parts, as I may so call them, of the Divine Amplitude hold together, that of *Matter* being so discernible; it might be sufficient to re-mind him of what we have already spoken of the general Notion of a *Spirit*. But besides that, here may be also a peculiar rational account given thereof, it implying a contradiction, that an *Essence absolutely Perfect* should be either limited in presence, or change place in part or whole, they being both notorious Effects or Symptoms of Imperfection, which is inconsistent with the Nature of God. And no better nor more cogent reason can be given of any thing, then that it implies a contradiction to be otherwise.

5. That *Power* also of *creating things of nothing*, there is a very close connexion betwixt it and the *Idea* of *God*, or of a *Being absolutely Perfect*. For this Being would not be what it is conceived to be, if it were destitute of the *Power of Creation*; and therefore this Attribute has no less coherence with the Subject, then that it is a contradiction it should not be in it, as was observed of the foregoing Attribute of *Indiscernibility* in God. But to alledge that a man cannot imagine how God should create something of nothing, or how the Divine Essence holds so closely and invincibly together, is to transgress against the 3, 4, and 5. Axiomes, and to appeal to a Faculty that has no right to determine the case.

## C H A P. V.

1. *The Definition belonging to all Finite and Created Spirits.* 2. *Of Indiscernibility, a Symbolical representation thereof.* 3. *An Objection answered against that representation.*

1. **W**E have done with the Notion of that *Infinite* and *Uncreated Spirit* we usually call *God*: we come now to those that are *Created* and *Finite*, as the *Spirits of Angels, Men and Brutes*; we will cast in the *Seminal Forms* also, or *Archei*, as the *Chymists* call them, though haply the world stands in \* no need of them. The *Properties*

\* See Book 3.  
ch. 12, 20, 13.

erties of a *Spirit*, as it is a Notion common to all these, I have already enumerated in my *Antidote*, *Self-motion*, *Self-penetration*, *Self-contraction and dilatation*, and *Indivisibility*, by which I mean *Indiscernibility*: to which I added *Penetrating*, *Moving* and *Altering the matter*. We may therefore define *This kind of Spirit* we speak of, to be *A substance Indiscernible, that can move it self, that can penetrate, contract, and dilate it self, and can also penetrate, move, and alter the Matter*. We will now examine every term of this Definition, from whence it shall appear, that it is as congruous and intelligible, as those Definitions that are made of such things as all men without any scruple acknowledge to exist.

Book 1. ch. 4.  
sect. 3.

1. Of the *Indiscernibility* of a *Spirit* we have already given rational grounds to evince it not impossible, it being an *Immediate Attribute* thereof, as *Impenetrability* is of a *Body*; and as conceivable or imaginable, that one *Substance* of its own nature may invincibly hold its parts together, so that they cannot be disunited nor dissevered, as that another may keep out so stoutly and irresistibly another Substance from entering into the same space or place with it self. For this ἀντιστοιχία or *Impenetrability* is not at all contained in the precise conception of a *Substance as Substance*, as I have already signified.

But besides that *Reason* may thus easily apprehend that it may be so, I shall a little gratify *Imagination*, and it may be *Reason* too, in offering the manner how it is so, in this kind of *Spirit* we now speak of. That ancient notion of *Light* and *Intentional species* is so far from a plain impossibility, that it has been heretofore generally, and is still by very many persons, looked upon as a Truth, that is, That *Light* and *Colour* do ray in such sort as they are described in the Peripatetical Philosophie. Now it is observable in *Light*, that it is most vigorous towards its fountain, and fainter by degrees. But we will reduce the matter to one *lucid point*, which, according to the acknowledged Principles of Opticks, will fill a distance of space with its rays of light: Which rays may indeed be reverberated back towards their Centre by interposing some opaque body, and so this *Orbe of light* contracted; but, according to the *Aristotelean Hypothesis*, it was alwayes accounted impossible that they should be clipt off, or cut from this *lucid point*, and be kept apart by themselves:

\* Those whom dry Reason will not satisfy, may, if they please, entertain their Phantasy with such a Representation as this, which may a little ease the anxious importunity of their Mind, when it too eagerly would comprehend the manner how this *Spirit* we speak of may be said to be *Indiscernible*. For think of any ray of this *Orbe of light*, it does sufficiently set out to the *Imagination* how *Extension* and *Indiscernibility* may consist together.

\* See further in my *Antidote*, Book 1. ch. 4. sect. 3. Also the Appendix, chap. 3. ad 10.

3. But if any object, That the *lucid Centre of this Orbe*, or the *Primary Substance*, as I\* elsewhere call it, is either *divisible* or *absolutely indivisible*; and if it be *divisible*, that as concerning that *Inmost* of a *Spirit*, this Representation is not at all serviceable to set off the nature thereof, by shewing how the parts there may hold together so indiscernibly; but if *absolutely indivisible*, that it seems to be nothing: To this I answer; what Scaliger somewhere has noted, That what is infinitely great or infi-

\* Append. c. 13. sect. 2.



nitely small, the Imagination of man is at a loss to conceive it. Which certainly is the ground of the perplexedness of that Probleme concerning Matter, whether it consists of points, or onely of particles divisible in infinitum.

But to come more closely to the business; I say that though we should acknowledg the *Inmost Centre of life*, or the very First point, as I may so call it, of the *Primary Substance* (for this *Primary Substance* is in some sort gradual) to be purely indivisible, it does not at all follow, no not according to *Imagination* it self, that it must be nothing. For let us imagine a perfect *Plane*, and on this *Plane* a perfect *Globe*, we cannot conceive but this *Globe* touches the *Plane*, and that in what we ordinarily call a *point*, else the one would not be a *Globe*, or the other not a *Plane*. Now it is impossible that one Body should touch another, and yet touch one another in nothing. This *inmost Centre therefore of life* is something, and something so full of essential vigour and virtue, that though gradually it diminish, yet can fill a certain Sphere of Space with its own presence and activity, as a spark of light illuminates the dusky air.

Wherefore there being no greater perplexity nor subtilty in the consideration of this *Centre of life* or *Inmost of a Spirit*, then there is in the *Atomès of Matter*, we may by Axiome 7. rightly conclude, That *Indiscernibility* has nothing in the notion thereof, but what may well consist with the possibility of the existence of the Subject whereunto it belongs.

## CHAP. VI.

1. *Axiomes that tend to the demonstrating how the Centre or First point of the Primary Substance of a Spirit may be Indiscernible.* 2. *Several others that demonstrate how the Secondary Substance of a Spirit may be Indiscernible.* 3. *An application of these Principles.* 4. *Of the union of the Secondary Substance considered transversely.* 5. *That the Notion of a Spirit has less difficulty then that of Matter.* 6. *An Answer to an Objection from the Rational faculty.* 7. *Answers to Objections suggested from Fancy.* 8. *A more compendious satisfaction concerning the Notion of a Spirit.*

1. **A**ND thus we have fairly well gratified the *Fancy* of the Curious concerning the *Extension* and *Indiscernibility* of a *Spirit*; but we shall advance yet higher, and demonstrate the possibility of this Notion to the severest Reason, out of these following Principles.

### AXIOME XI.

*A Globe touches a Plane in something, though in the least that is conceivable to be reall.*

### AXIOME XII.

*The least that is conceivable is so little, that it cannot be conceived to be discernible into less.*

AXIOME

## AXIOME XIII.

*As little as this is, the repetition of it will amount to considerable magnitudes.*

AS for example, if this Globe be drawn upon a Plane, it constitutes a *Line*; and a *Cylinder* drawn upon a Plane, or this same *Line* described by the Globe multiplied into it self, constitutes a *superficies*, &c. This a man cannot deny, but the more he thinks of it, the more certainly true he will find it.

## AXIOME XIV.

*Magnitude cannot arise out of mere Non-Magnitudes.*

FOR multiply *Nothing* ten thousand millions of times into nothing, the Product will be still *Nothing*. Besides, if that wherein the Globe touches a Plane were more then *Indiscerpible*, that is, *purely Indivisible*; it is manifest that a *Line* will consist of *Points* Mathematically so called, that is, *purely Indivisible*; which is the grandest absurdity that can be admitted in Philosophy, and the most contradictory thing imaginable.

## AXIOME XV.

*The same thing by reason of its extreme littleness may be utterly Indiscerpible, though intellectually Divisible.*

THIS plainly arises out of the foregoing Principles: For every Quantity is *intellectually* divisible; but something Indiscerpible was afore demonstrated to be Quantity, and consequently divisible, otherwise Magnitude would consist of Mathematicall points. Thus have I found a possibility for the Notion of *the Center of a Spirit*, which is not a Mathematicall point, but Substance, in Magnitude so little, that it is *Indiscerpible*; but in virtue so great, that it can send forth out of it self so large a Sphere of *Secondary Substance*, as I may so call it, that it is able to actuate grand Proportions of *Matter*, this whole Sphere of life and activity being in the mean time utterly *Indiscerpible*.

2. This I have said, and shall now prove it by adding a few more Principles of that evidence, as the most rigorous Reason shall not be able to deny them.

## AXIOME XVI.

*An Emanative Cause is the Notion of a thing possible.*

BY an *Emanative Cause* is understood such a Cause as merely by Being, no other activity or causality interposed, produces an Effect. That this is possible is manifest, it being demonstrable that there is *de facto* some such Cause in the world; because something must move it self. Now if there be no *Spirit*, *Matter* must of necessity move it self, where you cannot imagine any activity or causality, but the bare essence of the



See Append. to  
the *Anidote*,  
chap. 13. sect. 4.

*Matter* from whence this motion comes. For if you would suppose some former motion that might be the cause of this, then we might with as good reason suppose some former to be the cause of that, and so *in infinitum*.

#### AXIOME XVII.

*An Emanative Effect is coexistent with the very Substance of that which is said to be the Cause thereof.*

**T**His must needs be true, because that very Substance which is said to be the Cause, is the adequate and immediate Cause, and wants nothing to be adjoyned to its bare essence for the production of the Effect; and therefore by the same reason the Effect is at any time, it must be at all times, or so long as that Substance does exist.

#### AXIOME XVIII.

*No Emanative Effect, that exceeds not the virtues and powers of the Cause, can be said to be impossible to be produced by it.*

**T**His is so plain, that nothing need be added for either explanation or proof.

#### AXIOME XIX.

*There may be a Substance of that high Virtue and Excellency, that it may produce another Substance by Emanative causality, provided that Substance produced be in due graduall proportions inferiour to that which causes it.*

**T**His is plain out of the foregoing Principle. For there is no contradiction nor impossibility of a Cause producing an Effect less noble than it self, for thereby we are the better assured that it does not exceed the capacity of its own powers: Nor is there any incongruity, that one Substance should cause something else which we may in some sense call Substance, though but *Secondary* or *Emanatory*; acknowledging the *Primary Substance* to be the more adequate Object of Divine Creation, but the *Secondary* to be referrible also to the *Primary* or *Centrall* Substance by way of causall relation. For suppose God created the *Matter* with an immediate power of *moving it self*, God indeed is the Prime Cause as well of the *Motion* as of the *Matter*, and yet nevertheless the *Matter* is rightly said to *move it self*. Finally, this *Secondary* or *Emanatory* Substance may be rightly called *Substance*, because it is a Subject indued with certain powers and activities, and that it does not inhere as an *Accident* in any other Substance or Matter, but could maintain its place, though all Matter or what other Substance soever were removed out of that space it is extended through, provided its *Primary Substance* be but safe.

3. From these four Principles I have here added, we may have not an imaginative but rationally apprehension of that part of a *Spirit* which we call the *Secondary Substance* thereof. Whose *Extension* arising by graduall Emanation from the First and Primest Essence, which we call the *Centre of the Spirit* (which is no impossible supposition by the 16, 18, and 19.

Axiomes)

Axiomes ) we are led from hence to a necessary acknowledgment of perfect *Indiscerpibility* of parts, though not intellectuall *Indivisibility*, by Axiome 17. For it implies a contradiction that an *Emanative* effect should be disjoyned from its originall.

4. Thus have I demonstrated how a *Spirit*, considering the lineaments of it (as I may so call them) from the Centre to the Circumference, is utterly *indiscerpible*. But now if any be so curious as to ask how the parts thereof hold together in a line drawn crosse to these from the Centre, (for *Imagination*, it may be, will suggest they lye all loose,) I answer, that the conjecture of *Imagination* is here partly true and partly false, or is true or false as she shall be interpreted. For if she mean by loose, actually disunited, it is false and ridiculous: but if only so discernible, that one part may be disunited from another, that may not only be true, but, upon supposition the essentiall rayes are not fully enough redoubled within, plainly necessary; otherwise a *Spirit* could not contract one part and extend another, which is yet an Hypothesis necessary to be admitted. Wherefore this Objection is so far from weakning the possibility of this Notion, that it gives occasion more fully to declare the exact concinnity thereof.

To be brief therefore, a *Spirit* from the Centre to the Circumference is utterly *indiscerpible*, but in lines crosse to this it is closely coherent, but need not be indiscerpibly; which cohesion may consist in an immediate union of these parts, and transverse penetration and transcursion of *Secondary Substance* through this whole Sphere of life which we call a *Spirit*.

Nor need we wonder that so full an Orbe should swell out from so subtil and small a point as the *Centre of this Spirit* is supposed. Εἰ γὰρ ὁ πῶς ὄγκος μικρόν ἐστι, δυνάμει καὶ τιμῇ πολλὸν μᾶλλον ὑπερέχει πάντων, as *Aristotle* speaks of the Mind of man. And besides, it is but what is seen in some sort to the very eye in light, how large a spheare of Aire a little spark will illuminate.

*Ethic. ad Nicomach. lib. 10. cap. 7.*

5. This is the pure *Idea* of a *created Spirit* in general, concerning which if there be yet any cavil to be made, it can be none other then what is perfectly common to it and to *Matter*, that is, the unimaginableness of Points and smallest Particles, and how what is discernible or divisible can at all hang together: but this not hindering *Matter* from actual existence, there is no reason that it should any way pretend to the inferring of the impossibility of the existence of a *Spirit*, by Axiome 7.

But the most lubricous supposition that we goe upon here, is not altogether so intricate as those difficulties in *Matter*. For if that be but granted, in which I find no absurdity, That a Particle of *Matter* may be so little that it is utterly incapable of being made less, it is plain that one and the same thing, though intellectuallly divisible, may yet be really indiscerpible. And indeed it is not only possible, but it seems necessary that this should be true: For though we should acknowledge that *Matter* were discernible in infinitum, yet supposing a Cause of Infinite distinct perception and as Infinite power, (and God is such) this Cause can reduce this capacity of infinite discernibleness of *Matter* into act, that is to



say, actually and at once discern it or disjoin it into so many particles as it is discernible into. From whence it will follow, that one of these particles reduced to this perfect Parvitude is then utterly indiscernible, and yet intellectually divisible, otherwise Magnitude would consist of mere points, which would imply a contradiction.

We have therefore plainly demonstrated by reason, that *Matter* consists of parts indiscernible; and therefore there being no other Faculty to give suffrage against it, for neither Sense nor any Common Notion can contradict it, it remains by Axiome 5. that the Conclusion is true.

6. What some would object from Reason, that these *perfect Parvitudes* being acknowledged still intellectually divisible, must still have parts into which they are divisible, and therefore be still discernible; To this it is answered, That *division into parts* does not imply any *discernibility*, because the parts conceived in one of these *Minima Corporalia* (as I may so call them) are rather *essential* or *formal* parts then *integral*, and can no more actually be disjoined, then Sense and Reason from the Soul of a man. For it is of the very Essence of *Matter* to be *divisible*, but it is not at all included in the essence thereof to be *discernible*; and therefore where *discernibility* fails there is no necessity that *divisibility* should fail also. See the Preface, Sect. 3.

7. As for the trouble of spurious suggestions or representations from the *Phanasy*, as if these *perfect Parvitudes* were *Round* bodies, and that therefore there would be *Triangular intervalls betwixt*, void of Matter; they are of no moment in this case, she alwayes representing a *Discernible* magnitude in stead of an *Indiscernible* one. Wherefore she bringing in a false evidence, her testimony is to be rejected; nay if she could perplex the cause far worse, she was not to be heard, by Axiome the 4.

Wherefore *Phanasy* being unable to exhibit the Object we consider, in its due advantages, for ought we know these *perfect Parvitudes* may lye so close together, that they have no *intervalls betwixt*: nay it seems necessary to be so; For if there were any such *intervalls*, they were capable of particles less then these least of all; which is a contradiction in Reason, and a thing utterly impossible.

But if we should gratifie *Phanasy* so far as to admit of these *intervalls*, the greatest absurdity would be, that we must admit an insensible *Vacuum*, which no Faculty will be able ever to confute. But it is most rationally to admit none, and more consonant to our determination concerning these *Minima Corporalia*, as I call them, whose largeness is to be limited to the least real touch of either a Globe on a Plane, or a Cone on a Plane, or a Globe on a Globe: if you conceive any real touch less then another, let that be the measure of these *Minute Realities* in *Matter*. From whence it will follow, they must touch a whole side at once, and therefore can never leave any empty *intervalls*.

Nor can we imagine any Angulosities or Round protuberancies in a quantity infinitely little, more then we can in one infinitely great, as I have already declared in my Preface. I must confess, a mans *Reason* in this speculation is mounted far beyond his *Imagination*; but there being worse intricacies in Theories acknowledged constantly to be true, it can be

be no prejudice to the present Conclusion, by the 4, and 7. Axiomes.

8. Thus have we cleared up a *full and distinct Notion of a Spirit*, with so unexceptionable accuracy, that no Reason can pretend to assert it impossible nor unintelligible. But if the Theory thereof may seem more operose and tedious to impatient wits, and the punctuality of the Description the more hazardous and incredible, as if it were beyond our Faculties to make so precise a Conclusion in a Subject so obscure, they may ease their Understanding, by contenting themselves with what we have set down Chap. 2. Sect. 11, 12. and remember that that Wisdom and Power that created all things, can make them of what nature He pleases; and that if God will that there shall be a Creature that is *penetrable and indiscerpible*, that it is as easy a thing for him to make one so of its own nature, as one *impenetrable and discernible*, and indue it with what other Properties he pleases, according to his own will and purpose: which induments being immediately united with the Subject they are in, Reason can make no further demand how they are there, by the 9. Axiome.

## CHAP. VII.

1. *Of the Self-motion of a Spirit.* 2. *Of Self-penetration.* 3. *Of Self-contraction and dilatation.* 4. *The power of penetrating of Matter.* 5. *The power of moving,* 6. *And of altering the Matter.*

1. **W**E have proved the *Indiscerpibility of a Spirit* as well in *Centre* as *Circumference*, as well in the *Primary* as *Secondary* Substance thereof, to be a very consistent and congruous Notion. The next Property is *Self-motion*, which must of necessity be an Attribute of something or other; For by *Self-motion* I understand nothing else but *Self-activity*, which must appertain to a Subject active of it self. Now what is simply active of it self, can no more cease to be active then to Be; which is a sign that *Matter* is not active of it self, because it is reducible to Rest: Which is an Argument not only that *Self-activity* belongs to a *Spirit*, but that there is such a thing as a *Spirit* in the world, from which *activity* is communicated to *Matter*. And indeed if *Matter* as *Matter* had motion, nothing would hold together; but Flints, Adamant, Brasses, Iron, yea this whole Earth would suddenly melt into a thinner Substance then the subtile Aire, or rather it never had been condensed together to this consistency we finde it. But this is to anticipate my future purpose of proving That there are Spirits existing in the world: It had been sufficient here to have asserted, That *Self-motion* or *Self-activity* is as conceivable to appertain to *Spirit* as to *Body*, which is plain at first sight to any man that appeals to his own Faculties. Nor is it at all to be scrupled at, that any thing should be allowed to *move it self*; because our Adversaries, that say there is nothing but *Matter* in the world, must of necessity (as I have intimated already) confess that *this Matter moves it self*, though it be very incongruous so to affirm.

2. The congruity and possibility of *Self-penetration* in a created Spirit is



is to be conceived, partly from the limitableness of the Subject, and partly from the foregoing Attributes of *Indiscernibility* and *Self-motion*. For *Self-penetration* cannot belong to God, because it is impossible any thing should belong to him that implies imperfection, and *Self-penetration* cannot be without the lessening of the presence of that which does penetrate it self, or the implication that some parts of that Essence are not so well as they may be; which is a contradiction in a Being which is *absolutely Perfect*. From the Attributes of *Indiscernibility* and *Self-motion* (to which you may adde *Penetrability* from the general notion of a *Spirit*) it is plain that such a *Spirit* as we define, having the power of Motion upon the whole extent of its essence, may also determine this Motion according to the Property of its own nature: and therefore if it determine the motion of the exterior parts inward, they will return inward towards the Centre of essential power; which they may easily doe without resistance, the whole Subject being *penetrable*, and without damage, it being also *indiscernible*.


3. From this *Self-penetration* we do not only easily, but necessarily, understand *Self-contraction* and *dilatation* to arise. For this *Self-moving Substance*, which we call a *Spirit*, cannot penetrate it self, but it must needs therewith contract it self; nor restore it self again to its former state, but it does thereby dilate it self: so that we need not at all insist upon these Terms.

4. That power which a *Spirit* has to *penetrate Matter* we may easily understand if we consider a *Spirit* only as a Substance, whose immediate property is *Activity*. For then it is not harder to imagine this Active Substance to pervade this or the other part of *Matter*, then it is to conceive the pervading or disspreading of motion it self therein.

5. The greatest difficulty is to fancy how this *Spirit*, being so *Incorporeal*, can be able to move the *Matter*, though it be in it. For it seems so subtle, that it will pass through, leaving no more footsteps of its being there, then the Lightning does in the Scabbard, though it may haply melt the Sword, because it there findes resistance. But a *Spirit* can find no resistance any where, the closest *Matter* being easily penetrable and pervious to an *Incorporeal Substance*. The ground of this difficulty is founded upon the unconceivableness of any *Union* that can be betwixt the *Matter*, and a Substance that can so easily pass through it. For if we could but once imagine an *Union* betwixt *Matter* and a *Spirit*, the activity then of the *Spirit* would certainly have influence upon *Matter*, either for *begetting*, or *increasing*, or *directing* the motion thereof.

But notwithstanding the *Penetrability* and easy passage of a *Spirit* through *Matter*, there is yet for all that a capacity of a strong union betwixt them, and every whit as conceivable as betwixt the parts of *Matter* themselves. For what glue or Cement holds the parts of hard matter in stones and metalls together, or, if you will, of what is absolutely hard, that has no pores or particles, but is one continued and perfectly homogeneous body, not only to Sense, but according to the exact *Idea* of Reason? what Cement holds together the parts of  
such

such a body as this? Certainly nothing but *immediate Union and Rest*. Now for *Union*, there is no comparison betwixt that of *Matter* with *Matter*, and this of *Spirit* with *Matter*. For the first is only superficial; in this latter the very inward parts are united point to point throughout. Nor is there any feare it will not take hold, because it has a capacity of passing through. For in this absolutely solid hard Body, which let be A, in which let us conceive some inward superficies, suppose E A C, this superficies is so smooth as nothing can be conceived smoother: why does not therefore the upper E D C slide upon the neather part E F C upon the least motion imaginable, especially E F C being supposed to be held fast whilst the other is thrust against? This facility therefore of one Body passing upon another without any sticking, seeming as necessary to our Phansy as a *Spirit's* passing through all Bodies without taking hold of them, it is plain by Axiome 7. That a firm union of *Spirit* and *Matter* is very possible, though we cannot conceive the manner thereof.



And as for *Rest*, it is competible also to this conjunction of *Matter* with *Spirit*, as well as of *Matter* with *Matter*. For suppose the whole body A moved with like swiftness in every part, the parts of A then are according to that sense of *Rest*, by which they would explain the adhesion of the parts of *Matter* one with another, truly quiescent. So say I that in the *Union* of *Matter* and *Spirit*, the parts of the *Matter* receiving from the *Spirit* just such a velocity of motion as the *Spirit* exerts, and no more, they both rest in firm *Union* one with another. That which comes to pass even then when there is far less immediate *Union* then we speak of. For if we do but lay a Book on our Hand, provided our Hand be not moved with a swifter motion then it communicates to the Book, nor the Book be pusht on faster then the swiftness of our Hand; the Book and our Hand will most certainly retain their *Union* and goe together. So naturall and easy is it to conceive how a *Spirit* may move a *Body* without any more perplexity or contradiction then is found in the *Union* and *Motion* of the parts of *Matter* it self. See the Appendix to my Antidote.

Chap. 3. sect. 7,  
and 8.

6. The last Terme I put in the Definition of a *Spirit* is, *the power of altering the Matter*; which will necessarily follow from its power of moving it or directing its motion. For *Alteration* is nothing else but the varying of either the Figures, or postures, or the degrees of motion in the particles; all which are nothing else but the results of *Local motion*. Thus have we cleared the *intelligibility* and *possibility* of all the Terms that belong to the Notion of a *created Spirit* in general, at least of such as may be rationally conceived to be the causes of any visible *Phænomena* in the world: We will now descend to the defining of the chief *Species* thereof.



## C H A P. VIII.

1. *Four main Species of Spirits.* 2. *How they are to be defined.* 3. *The definition of a Seminal Form;* 4. *Of the Soul of a Brute;* 5. *Of the Soul of a Man.* 6. *The difference betwixt the Soul of an Angel and an Humane Soul.* 7. *The definition of an Angelical Soul.* 8. *Of the Platonical Noës and Evâdes.* 9. *That Des-Cartes his Demonstration of the Existence of the Humane Soul does at least conclude the possibility of a Spirit.*

1. **W**E have enumerated *Four kinds of Spirits*, viz. The λόγοι σπερματικοὶ or *Seminal Forms*, the *Souls of Brutes*, the *Humane Soul*, and that *Soul or Spirit which actuates or informs the vehicles of Angels*: For I look upon *Angels* to be as truly a compound Being, consisting of *Soul and Body*, as that of *Men & Brutes*. Their Existence we shall not now goe about to prove, for that belongs to another place. My present design is onely to expound or define the notion of these things, so far forth as is needful for the evincing that they are the *Ideas* or *Notions* of things which imply no contradiction or impossibility in their conception; which will be very easy for us to perform: the chief difficulty lying in that *more General notion* of a *Spirit*, which we have so fully explained in the foregoing Chapters.

2. Now this *General notion* can be contracted into *Kindes*, by no other *Differences* then such as may be called peculiar Powers or Properties belonging to one *Spirit* and excluded from another, by the 8. Axiome. From whence it will follow, that if we describe these *several kindes of Spirits* by *immediate* and *intrinsic* Properties, we have given as good Definitions of them as any one can give of any thing in the world.

3. We will begin with what is most simple, the *Seminal Forms* of things which, for the present, deciding nothing of their existence, according to their *idæa possibilis*, we define thus; *A Seminal Form is a created Spirit organizing duly-prepared Matter into life and vegetation proper to this or the other kind of Plant.* It is beyond my imagination what can be excepted against this Description, it containing nothing but what is very coherent and intelligible. For in that it is a *Spirit*, it can move *Matter* intrinsically, or at least direct the motion thereof: But in that it is not an *Omnipotent Spirit*, but *Finite* and *Created*, its power may well be restrained to *duly-prepared Matter* both for vital union and motion; He that has made these *Particular Spirits*, varying their Faculties of Vital union according to the diversity of the preparation of *Matter*, and so limiting the whole comprehension of them all, that none of them may be able to be vitally joyned with any *Matter* whatever: And the same first Cause of all things that gives them a power of uniting with & moving of *matter duly prepared*; may also set such laws to this motion, that when it lights on matter fit for it, it will produce such and such a Plant,

Plant, that is to say, it will shape the matter into such Figure, Colour and other properties, as we discover in them by our Senses.

4. This is the First degree of *Particular Life* in the world, \* if there be any purely of this degree Particular. But now, as *Aristotle* has somewhere noted, the Essences of things are like Numbers, whose *Species* are changed by adding or taking away an Unite: adde therefore another *Intrinscally* power to this of *Vegetation*, viz. *Sensation*, and it becomes the *Soul of a Beast*. For in truth the bare Substance it self is not to be computed in explicite knowledg, it being utterly in it self unconceivable, and therefore we will onely reckon upon the Powers, *A Subject therefore from whence is both Vegetation and Sensation is the general notion of the Soul of a Brute*. Which is distributed into a number of kindes, the effect of every *Intrinscally* power being discernible in the constant shape and properties of every distinct kind of Brute Creatures.

\* See Book 3.  
ch. 12, & 13.

5. If we adde to *Vegetation* and *Sensation* *Reason* properly so called, we have then a settled notion of the *Soul of Man*; which we may more completely describe thus: *A created Spirit indued with Sense and Reason, and a power of organizing terrestrial Matter into humane shape by vital union therewith.*

6. And herein alone, I conceive, does the *Spirit* or *Soul* of an *Angel* (for I take the boldness to call that *Soul*, whatever it is, that has a power of vitally actuating the *Matter*) differ from the *Soul* of a *Man*, in that the *Soul* of an *Angel* may vitally actuate an *Aerial* or *Æthereal* Body, but cannot be born into this world in a *Terrestrial* one.

7. To make an end therefore of our Definitions: an *Angelical Soul* is very intelligibly described thus; *A created Spirit indued with Reason, Sensation, and a power of being vitally united with and actuating of a Body of Aire or Æther onely*. Which power over an *Aerial* or *Æthereal* Body is very easily to be understood out of that general notion of a *Spirit* in the foregoing Chapters. For it being there made good, that union with *Matter* is not incompatible to a *Spirit*, and consequently nor moving of it, nor that kind of motion in a *Spirit* which we call *Contraction* and *Dilatation*; these Powers, if carefully considered, will necessarily infer the possibility of the Actuation and Union of an *Angelical Soul* with an *Æthereal* or *Aiery* Body.

8. The *Platonists* write of other Orders of *Spirits* or *Immaterial Substances*, as the *Noës* and *Εννδες*. But there being more Subtily then either usefulness or assurance in such like Speculations, I shall pass them over at this time; having already, I think, irrefutably made good, That there is no incongruity nor impossibility comprised in the Notion of *Spirit* or *Incorporeal Substance*.

9. But there is yet another way of inferring the same, and it is the Argument of *Des-Cartes*, whereby he would conclude that there is *de facto* a Substance in us distinct from *Matter*, viz. our own *Mind*. For every Real Affection or Property being the *Mode* of some Substance or other, and real *Modes* being unconceivable without their *Subject*, he infers that, seeing we can doubt whether there be any such thing as *Body* in the world (by which doubting we seclude *Cogitation* from *Body*)



there must be some other Substance distinct from the *Body*, to which *Cogitation* belongs.

But I must confess this Argument will not reach home to *Des-Cartes* his purpose, who would prove in Man a *Substance distinct from his Body*. For being there may be *Modes* common to more Subjects then one, and this of *Cogitation* may be pretended to be such as is competible as well to Substance *Corporeal* as *Incorporeal*, it may be conceived apart from either, though not from both. And therefore his Argument does not prove That that in us which does *think* or *perceive* is a Substance distinct from our Body, but onely That there may be such a Substance which has the power of *thinking* or *perceiving*, which yet is not a *Body*. For it being impossible that there should be any *real Mode* which is in no Subject, and we clearly conceiving *Cogitation* independent for existence on *Corporeal* Substance; it is necessary, That there may be some other Substance on which it may depend; which must needs be a Substance *Incorporeal*.

## C H A P. IX.

1. *That it is of no small consequence to have proved the Possibility of the Existence of a Spirit.* 2. *The necessity of examining of Mr. Hobbs his Reasons to the contrary.* 3. *The first Excerption out of Mr. Hobbs.* 4. *The second Excerption.* 5. *The third.* 6. *The fourth.* 7. *The fifth.* 8. *The sixth.* 9. *The seventh.* 10. *The eighth and last Excerption.*

1. **I** Have been, I believe, to admiration curious and solicitous to make good, That the Existence of a *Spirit* or *Incorporeal Substance* is possible. But there is no reason any one should wonder that I have spent so much pains to make so small and inconsiderable a progresse, as to bring the thing onely to a *bare possibility*. For though I may seem to have gained little to my self, yet I have thereby given a very signal overthrow to the adverse party, whose strongest hold seems to be an unshaken confidence, That the very Notion of a *Spirit* or *Substance Immaterial* is a perfect Impossibility and pure Non-sense. From whence are insinuated no better Consequences then these: That it is impossible that there should be any God, or Soul, or Angel, Good or Bad; or any Immortality or Life to come. That there is no Religion, no Piety nor Impiety, no Vertue nor Vice, Justice nor Injustice, but what it pleases him that has the longest Sword to call so. That there is no Freedome of Will, nor consequently any Rational remorse of Conscience in any Being whatsoever, but that all that is, is nothing but *Matter* and *corporeal Motion*; and that therefore every trace of mans life is as necessary as the tracts of Lightning and the fallings of Thunder; the blind *impetus* of the *Matter* breaking through or being stopt every where, with as certain and determinate necessity as the course of a Torrent after mighty storms and showers of Rain.

2. And

2. And verily considering of what exceeding great consequence it is to root out this fullen conceit that some have taken up concerning *Incorporeal Substance*, as if it bore a contradiction in the very termes, I think I shall be wanting to so weighty a Cause, if I shall content my self with a bare recitation of the Reasons whereby I prove it possible, and not produce their Arguments that seem most able to maintain the contrary. And truly I do not remember that I ever met with any one yet that may justly be suspected to be more able to make good this Province then our Countreyman Mr. *Hobbs*, whose inexuperable confidence of the truth of the Conclusion may well assure any man that duely considers the excellency of his natural Wit and Parts, that he has made choice of the most Demonstrative Arguments that humane Invention can search out for the eviſtion thereof.

3. And that I may not incur the suspicion of mistaking his Assertion, or of misrepresenting the force of his Reasons, I shall here punctually set them down in the same words I find them in his own Writings, that any man may judge if I doe him any wrong. The first place I shall take notice of is in his \* *Leviathan*. The word Body in the most general acceptation signifies that which filleth or occupieth some certain room or imagined place; and dependeth not on the Imagination, but is a real part of that we call the Universe. For the Universe being the Aggregate of all Bodies, there is no real part thereof that is not also Body; nor any thing properly a Body, that is not also part of (that Aggregate of all Bodies) the Universe. The same also, because Bodies are subject to change, that is to say, to variety of appearance to the sense of living Creatures, is called Substance, that is to say, subject to various Accidents; as sometimes to be moved, sometimes to stand still, and to seem to our Senses sometimes Hot, sometimes Cold, sometimes of one Colour, Smell, Taſt, or Sound, sometimes of another. And this diversity of seeming, (produced by the diversity of the operation of Bodies on the Organs of our Sense) we attribute to alterations of the Bodies that operate, and call them Accidents of those Bodies. And according to this acceptance of the word, Substance and Body signifie the same thing; and therefore Substance Incorporeal are words which when they are joyned together destroy one another, as if a man should say an Incorporeal Body.

\* Chap. 34.

4. The second place is in his \* *Physicks*. But it is here to be observed that certain Dreams, especially such as some men have when they are betwixt sleeping and waking, and such as happen to those that have no knowledge of the nature of Dreams, and are withall superstitious, were not heretofore nor are now accounted Dreams. For the Apparitions men thought they saw, and the voices they thought they heard in sleep, were not believed to be Phantasmes, but things subsisting of themselves, and Objects without those that Dreamed. For to some men, as well sleeping as waking, but especially to guilty men, and in the night, and in hallowed places, Fear alone, helped a little with the stories of such Apparitions, hath raised in their mindes terrible Phantasmes, which have been and are still deceitfully received for things really true, under the names of Ghosts and Incorporeal Substances.

\* Part. 4. chap. 25. Article 9.

5. We will adde a third out of the same Book. For seeing Ghosts, sen-

\* Part. 1. chap. 5. Article 4.



*sible species, a shadow, light, colour, sound, space, &c. appear to us no less sleeping then waking, they cannot be things without us, but onely Phantasmes of the mind that imagines them.*

6. And a fourth out of his Humane Nature. But Spirits supernatural commonly signifie some Substance without dimension, which two words do flatly contradict one another. And Artic. 5. Nor I think is that word Incorporeal at all in the Bible, but it is said of the Spirit, that it abideth in men, sometimes that it dwelleth in them, sometimes that it cometh on them, that it descendeth, and goeth, and cometh, and that Spirits are Angels, that is to say, Messengers; all which words do imply Locality, and locality is Dimension, and whatsoever hath dimension is Body, be it never so subtile.

7. The fifth Excerption shall be again out of his Leviathan. And for the Matter or Substance of the Invisible agents so fancyed, they could not by natural cogitation fall upon any other conceit, but that it was the same with that of the Soul of Man, and that the Soul of Man was of the same Substance with that which appeareth in a Dream to one that sleepeth, or in a Looking-glass to one that is awake: Which, men not knowing that such Apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the Fancy, think to be real and external Substances, and therefore call them Ghosts, as the Latines called them Imagines and Umbræ; and thought them Spirits, that is, thin aerial bodies; and those invisible Agents, which they feared, to be like them, save that they appear and vanish when they please. But the opinion that such Spirits were Incorporeal or Immaterial could never enter into the mind of any man by nature; because, though men may put together words of contradictory signification, as Spirit and Incorporeal, yet they can never have the imagination of any thing answering to them.

We will help out this further from what he also writes in his Humane Nature. To know that a Spirit is, that is to say, to have natural evidence of the same, it is impossible. For all evidence is conception, and all conception is imagination, and proceedeth from Sense; and Spirits we suppose to be those Substances which work not upon the Sense, and therefore are not conceivable.

8. The sixth, out of Chap. 45. where he writes thus: *This nature of Sight having never been discovered by the ancient pretenders to Natural knowledge, much less by those that consider not things so remote (as that Knowledge is) from their present use; it was hard for men to conceive of those Images in the Fancy and in the Sense, otherwise then of things really without us. Which some (because they vanish away they know not whither nor how) will have to be absolutely Incorporeal, that is to say, Immaterial, or Forms without Matter, Colour and Figure, without any coloured or figured body, and that they can put on airy bodies, (as a garment) to make them visible when they will to our bodily eyes; and others say, are Bodies and living Creatures, but made of Aire, or other more subtile and athereal matter, which is then, when they will be seen, condensed. But both of them agree on one general appellation of them, Dæmons. As if the dead of whom they dreamed were not the Inhabitants of their own Brain, but of the Aire, or of Heaven or Hell, not Phantasmes, but Ghosts; with just as much reason as if one should say he saw his own Ghost in a Looking-glass, or the Ghosts of the*

Chap. 11.  
Article 4.

Leviathan,  
chap. 12.

Chap. 11. Ar-  
ticle 5.

Leviathan,  
chap. 45.

the stars in a River, or call the ordinary Apparition of the Sun of the quantity of about a foot, the Demon or Ghost of that great Sun that enlightneth the whole visible world.

9. The seventh is out of the next Chapter of the same book. Where he again taking to task that *Fargon*, as he calls it, of *Abstract Essences* and *Substantial Formes*, writes thus: *The world (I mean not the Earth onely, but the Universe, that is, the whole mass of all things that are) is Corporeal, that is to say, Body, and hath the Dimensions of Magnitude, namely Length, Breadth and Depth; also every part of Body is likewise Body, and hath the like dimensions; and consequently every part of the Universe is Body, and that which is not Body is no part of the Universe: And because the Universe is all, that which is no part of it is nothing, and consequently nowhere.* Leviathan chap. 46.

10. The eighth and last we have a little after in the same Chapter, which runs thus; *Being once fallen into this error of Separated Essences, they are thereby necessarily involved in many other absurdities that follow it. For seeing they will have these Forms to be real, they are obliged to assign them some place. But because they hold them Incorporeal without all dimension of Quantity, and all men know that Place is Dimension, and not to be filled but by that which is corporeal, they are driven to uphold their credit with a distinction, that they are not indeed any where Circumscriptive, but Definitive. Which termes, being mere words; and in this occasion insignificant, pass onely in Latine, that the vanity of them might be concealed. For the Circumscription of a thing is nothing else but the determination or defining of its place, and so both the termes of distinction are the same. And in particular of the essence of a man, which they say is his Soul, they affirm it to be all of it in his little finger, and all of it in every other part (how small soever) of his Body, and yet no more Soul in the whole Body then in any one of these parts. Can any man think that God is served with such Absurdities? And yet all this is necessary to believe to those that will believe the existence of an Incorporeal Soul separated from the Body.*

## CHAP. X.

1. An Answer to the first Excerption. 2. To the second. 3. An Answer to the third. 4. To the fourth Excerption. 5. An Answer to the fifth. 6. To the sixth. 7. To the seventh. 8. An Answer to the eighth and last. 9. A brief Recapitulation of what has been said hitherto.

1. **W**E have set down the chiefest passages in the Writings of Mr. *Hobbs*, that confident Exploder of *Immaterial Substances* out of the world. It remains now that we examine them, and see whether the force of his Arguments bears any proportion to the firmness of his belief, or rather mis-belief, concerning these things. To strip therefore the first Excerption of that long *Ambages* of words, and to reduce it to a more plain and compendious forme of reasoning,



the force of his Argument lies thus: *That seeing every thing in the Universe is Body (the Universe being nothing else but an Aggregate of Bodies) Body and Substance are but names of one and the same thing; it being called Body as it fills a place, and Substance as it is the Subject of several Alterations and Accidents. Wherefore Body and Substance being all one, Incorporeal Substance is no better sense then an Incorporeal Body, which is a contradiction in the very termes.* But it is plain to all the world that this is not to prove, but to suppose what is to be proved, That the Universe is nothing else but an Aggregate of Bodies: When he has proved that, we will acknowledge the sequel, till then, he has proved nothing, and therefore this first argumentation must pass for nought.

2. Let us examine the strength of the second, which certainly must be this, if any at all; *That which has its originall merely from Dreams, Fears and Superstitious Fancies, has no reall existence in the world: But Incorporeal Substances have no other Original.* The Proposition is a Truth indubitable, but the Assumption is as weak as the other is strong; whether you understand it of the real Original of these Substances, or of the Principles of our knowledge That they are. And be their Original what it will, it is nothing to us, but so far forth as it is cognoscible to us, by Axiome first. And therefore when he sayes, they have no other Original then that of our own Phanfy, he must be understood to affirme that there is no other Principle of the knowledge of their Existence then that we vainly imagine them to be; which is grossly false.

For it is not the *Dreams* and *Fears* of Melancholick and Superstitious persons, from which Philosophers and Christians have argued the Existence of *Spirits* and *Immaterial Substances*; but from the evidence of

\* See my *Antidote* against *Atheism*, the whole second Book.

\* *Externall Objects of Sense*, that is, the ordinary *Phænomena* of Nature, in which there is discoverable so profound Wisdom and Counsell, that they could not but conclude that the Order of things in the world was from a higher Principle then the blind motions and jumbings of *Matter* and mere *Corporeal* Beings.

\* See my *Antidote*, the whole third Book.

To which you may adde what usually they call \* *Apparitions*, which are so far from being merely the *Dreams* and *Fancies* of the Superstitious, that they are acknowledged by such as cannot but be deemed by most men over-Atheistical, I mean *Pomponatius* and *Cardan*, nay by *Vaninus* himself, though so devoted to Atheisme, that out of a perfect mad zeale to that despicable cause he died for it, I omit to name the *Operations of the \* Soul*, which ever appeared to the wisest of all Ages of such a transcendent condition, that they could not judge them to spring from so contemptible a Principle as *bare Body* or *Matter*. Wherefore to decline all these, and to make representation onely of *Dreams* and *Fancies* to be the occasions of the world's concluding that there are *Incorporeal Substances*, is to fancy his Reader a mere fool, and publickly to profess that he has a mind to impose upon him.

\* *Antid.* Book 1. chap. 11.

3. The third argumentation is this: *That which appears to us as well sleeping as waking, is nothing without us: But Ghosts, that is Immaterial Substances, appear to us as well sleeping as waking.* This is the weakest Argument that has been yet produced: for both the Proposition and Assumption

Assumption are false. For if the Proposition were true, the Sun, Moon, Stars, Clouds, Rivers, Meadows, Men, Women, and other living creatures were nothing without us : For all these appear to us as well when we are sleeping as waking. But *Incorporeal Substances* do not appear to us as well sleeping as waking. For the Notion of an *Incorporeal Substance* is so subtile and refined, that it leaving little or no impression on the *Phansy*, its representation is merely supported by the free power of *Reason*, which seldom exercises it self in *sleep*, unless upon easy imaginable *Phantasmes*.

4. The force of the fourth Argument is briefly this : *Every Substance has dimensions ; but a Spirit has no dimensions*. Here I confidently deny the Assumption. For it is not the Characteristicall of a *Body* to have dimensions, but to be *Impenetrable*. All Substance has *Dimensions*, that is, Length, Breadth, and Depth : but all has not *Impenetrability*. See my Letters to Monsieur *Des-Cartes*, besides what I have here writ in this \* present Treatise.

\* Book 1, ch. 2.  
& 3.

5. In the Excerptions belonging to the fifth place these Arguments are comprised. 1. *That we have no principle of knowledge of any Immaterial Being, but such as a Dream or a Looking-Glasse furnisheth us withall.* 2. *That the word Spirit or Incorporeal implies a contradiction, and cannot be conceived to be sense by a natural Understanding.* 3. *That nothing is conceived by the Understanding but what comes in at the Senses, and therefore Spirits not acting upon the Senses must remain unknown and unconceivable.*

We have already answered to the first in what we have returned to his second Argument in the second Excerption.

To the second I answer, That *Spirit* or *Incorporeal* implies no contradiction, there being nothing understood thereby but *Extended Substance* with *Activity* and *Indiscernibility*, leaving out *Impenetrability* : Which I have above demonstrated to be the Notion of a thing possible, and need not repeat what I have already written.

To the third I answer, That *Spirits* do act really upon the *Senses*, by acting upon *Matter* that affects the *Senses* ; and some of these Operations being such, that they cannot be rationally attributed to the *Matter* alone, *Reason* by the information of the *Senses* concludes, that there is some other more noble Principle distinct from the *Matter*. And as for that part of the Argument that asserts that there is nothing in the Understanding but what comes in at the Senses, I \* have, and shall again in its \* due place demonstrate it to be a very gross Errour.

\* Antidote,  
Book 1. ch. 6.  
Append. ch. 2.  
sect. 4, 5, 6, &c.  
\* Book 2 ch. 2.  
sect. 9, 10, 11.

But in the mean time I conclude, that the Substance of every thing being utterly unconceivable, by Axiome 8. and it being onely the *Immediate Properties* by which a man conceives every thing, and the Properties of *Penetrability* and *Indiscernibility* being as easy to conceive, as of *Discernibility* and *Impenetrability*, and the power of communicating of motion to *Matter* as easy as the *Matter's* reception of it, and the Union of *Matter* with *Spirit*, as of *Matter* with *Matter* ; it plainly follows, that the Notion of a *Spirit* is as naturally conceivable as the Notion of a *Body*.

6. In this sixth Excerption he is very copious in jeering and making



ridiculous the opinion of *Ghosts* and *Demons*; but the strength of his Argument, if it have any, is this, viz. *If there be any such things as Ghosts or Demons, then they are (according to them that hold this opinion) either those Images reflected from water or Looking-glasses, cloathing themselves in aiery garments, and so wandring up & down; or else they are living Creatures made of nothing but Aire or some more subtile and Aethereal Matter.* One might well be amazed to observe such flight and vain arguing come from so grave a Philosopher, were not a man well aware that his peculiar eminency, as himself somewhere professes, lies in *Politics*, to which the humours and Bravadoes of Eloquence, especially amongst the simple, is a very effectually and serviceable instrument. And certainly such Rhetorizations as this cannot be intended for any but such as are of the very weakest capacity.

Those two groundless conceits that he would obtrude upon the sober Assertors of *Spirits* and *Demons* belong not to them, but are the genuine issue of his own Brain. For, for the former of them, it is most justly adjudged to him, as the first Author thereof; it being a Rarity, which neither my self nor (I dare say) any else ever met with out of Mr *Hobbs* his Writings. And the latter he does not onely not goe about to confute here, but makes a shew of allowing it, for fear he should seem to deny Scripture, in Chap. 34. of his *Leviathan*. But those that assert the Existence of *Spirits*, will not stand to Mr *Hobbs* his choice for defining of them, but will make use of their own Reason and Judgment for the settling of so concerning a Notion.

7. In this seventh Excerption is contained the same Argument that was found in the first; but to deal fairly and candidly, I must confess it is better back'd then before. For there he supposes, but does not prove, the chief ground of his Argument; but here he offers at a proof of it, couched, as I conceive, in these words [*and hath the dimensions of Magnitude, namely Length, Breadth and Depth*] for hence he would infer that the whole Universe is *Corporeal*, that is to say, every thing in the Universe, because there is nothing but has *Length, Breadth and Depth*. This therefore is the very last ground his Argument is to be resolved into. But how weak it is I have already intimated, it being not *Trinal Dimension*, but *Impenetrability*, that constitutes a *Body*.

8. This last Excerption seems more considerable then any of the former, or all of them put together: but when the force of the Arguments therein contained is duly weighed, they will be found of as little efficacy to make good the Conclusion as the rest. The first Argument runs thus; *Whatsoever is real, must have some place: But Spirits can have no place.* But this is very easily answered. For if nothing else be understood by *Place*, but *Imaginary Space*, *Spirits* and *Bodies* may be in the same *Imaginary Space*, and so the Assumption is false. But if by *Place* be meant the *Concave Superficies of one Body immediately environing another Body*, so that it be conceived to be of the very Formality of a *Place*, immediately to environ the *corporeal Superficies* of that Substance which is said to be placed; then it is impossible that a *Spirit* should be properly said to be in a *Place*, and so the Proposition will be false. Wherefore there being these

two acceptions of *Place*, that Distinction of being there *Circumscriptivè* and *Definitivè* is an allowable Distinction, and the terms may not signify one and the same thing. But if we will with Mr. *Hobbs* ( and I know no great hurt if we should doe so ) confine the Notion of *Place* to *Imaginary Space*, this distinction of the Schools will be needless here, and we may, without any more adoe, assert, That *Spirits* are as truly in *Place* as *Bodies*.

His second Argument is drawn from that Scholastick Riddle, which I must confess seems to verge too near to profound Non-sense, That the Soul of man is *tota in toto* and *tota in qualibet parte corporis*. This mad Jingle it seems has so frightened Mr. *Hobbs* sometime or other, that he never since could endure to come near the Notion of a *Spirit* again, not so much as to consider whether it were a mere Bug-bear, or some real Being. But if Passion had not surpris'd his better Faculties, he might have found a true settled meaning thereof, and yet secluded these wilde intricacies that the heedless Schools seem to have charged it with: For the *Immediate Properties* of a *Spirit* are very well intelligible without these Ænigmatical flourishes, viz. That it is a *Substance Penetrable and Indiscerpible*, as I have already shewn at large.

Nor is that Scholastick Ænigme necessary to be believed by all those that would believe the Existence of an *Incorporeal Soul*; nor do I believe Mr. *Hobbs* his interpretation of this Riddle to be so necessary. And it had been but fair play to have been assured that the Schools held such a perfect contradiction, before he pronounced the belief thereof necessary to all those that would hold the Soul of Man an *Immaterial Substance*, separable from the Body. I suppose they may mean nothing by it, but what *Plato* did by his making the Soul to consist *ἐκ μερῶν ἃ ἀμερίζεσθαι* nor *Plato* any thing more by that *divisible* and *indivisible Substance*, then an Essence that is intellectually divisible, but really indiscerpible.

9. We have now firmly made good, that the Notion of a *Spirit* implies no contradiction nor impossibility in it; but is the Notion or *Idea* of a thing that may possibly be. Which I have done so punctually and particularly, that I have cleared every *Species* of *Substances Incorporeal* from the imputation of either obscurity or inconsistency. And that I might not seem to take advantage in pleading their cause in the absence of the adverse party, I have brought in the most able Advocate and the most assured that I have hitherto ever met withall; and dare now appeal to any indifferent Judge, whether I have not demonstrated all his Allegations to be weak and inconclusive. Wherefore having so clearly evinced the *possibility* of the Existence of a *Spirit*, we shall now make a step further, and prove That it is not onely a thing *possible*, but that it is *really* and *actually* in Nature.



## CHAP. XI.

1. *Three grounds to prove the Existence of an Immaterial Substance, whereof the first is fetch'd from the Nature of God.* 2. *The second from the Phenomenon of Motion in the World.* 3. *That the Matter is not Self-moveable.* 4. *An Objection that the Matter may be part Self-moved, part not.* 5. *The first Answer to the Objection.* 6. *The second Answer.* 7. *Other Evasions answered.* 8. *The last Evasion of all answered.* 9. *The Conclusion, That no Matter is Self-moved, but that a certain quantity of motion was impressed upon it at its first Creation by God.*

1. **T**Here be Three main Grounds from whence a man may be assured of the *Existence of Spiritual or Immaterial Substance.* The one is the consideration of the transcendent excellency of the Nature of God; who being, according to the true *Idea* of him, an *Essence absolutely Perfect*, cannot possibly be *Body*, and consequently must be something *Incorporeal*: and seeing that there is no contradiction in the Notion of a *Spirit in general*, nor in any of *those kinds of Spirits* which we have defined, (where the Notion of God was set down amongst the rest) and that in the very Notion of him there is contained the reason of his Existence, as you may see at large in my \* *Antidote*; certainly if we find any thing at all to be, we may safely conclude that He is much more. For there is nothing besides Him of which one can give a reason why it is, unless we suppose him to be the Author of it. Wherefore though God be neither *Visible* nor *Tangible*, yet his very *Idea* representing to our Intellectual Faculties the necessary reason of his Existence, we are, by Axiome 5. (though we had no other Argument drawn from our Senses) confidently to conclude That He is.

2. The second ground is the ordinary *Phænomena* of Nature, the most general whereof is *Motion*. Now it seems to me demonstrable from hence, That there is some Being in the World distinct from *Matter*. For *Matter* being of one simple homogeneous nature, and not distinguishable by specificall differences, as the Schools speak, it must have every where the very same Essentiall properties; and therefore of it self it must all of it be either without motion, or else be self-moving, and that in such or such a tenor, or measure of motion; there being no reason imaginable, why one part of the *Matter* should move of it self lesse then another; and therefore if there be any such thing, it can onely arise from externall impediment.

3. Now I say, if *Matter* be utterly devoid of motion in it self, it is plain it has its motion from some other Substance, which is necessarily a Substance that is not *Matter*, that is to say, a *Substance Incorporeal*. But if it be moved of it self, in such or such a measure, the effect here being an *Emanative effect*, cannot possibly fail to be wherever *Matter* is, by Axiome 17. especially if there be no external impediment: And there is no impediment at all, but that the Terrestrial parts might regain an activity  
very

\* Book I.  
chap. 7. 8.

very nigh equal to the *Æthereal*, or rather never have lost it. For if the Planets had but a common *Dividend* of all the motion which themselves and the Sun and Stars, and all the *Æthereal* matter possess, (the matter of the Planets being so little in comparison of that of the *Sun*, *Stars* and *Æther*) the proportion of motion that will fall due to them would be exceeding much above what they have. For it would be as if four or five poor men in a very rich and populous City should, by giving up that estate they have, in a levelling way, get equal share with all the rest; Wherefore every Planet could not faile of melting it self into little less finer Substance then the purest *Æther*. But they not doing so, it is a signe they have not that Motion nor Agitation of themselves, and therefore rest content with what has extrinsically accrued to them, be it less or more.

4. But the pugnacious, to evade the stroke of our *Dilemma*, will make any bold shift; and though they affront their own Faculties in saying so, yet they will say, and must say, That part of the *Matter* is self-moving, part without motion of it self.

5. But to this I answer, That first, this Evasion of theirs is not so agreeable to Experience; but, so far as either our Sense or Reason can reach, there is the *same Matter* every where. For consider the *subtilest parts of Matter* discoverable here below, those which for their Subtily are invisible, and for their Activity wonderfull, I mean those particles that cause that vehement agitation we feel in *Winds*: They in time lose their motion, become of a visible vaporous consistency, and turn to Clouds, then to Snow or Rain, after haply to Ice it self; but then in process of time, first melted into Water, then exhaled into Vapours, after more fiercely agitated, do become *Wind* again. And that we may not think that this Reciprocation into *Motion* and *Rest* belongs onely to *Terrestrial* particles; that the *Heavens* themselves be of the same Matter, is apparent from the Ejections of *Comets* into our *Vortex*, and the perpetuall rising of those Spots and Scum upon the Face of the Sun.

6. But secondly, to return what is still more pungent. This *Matter* that is *Self-moved*, in the impressing of Motion upon other *Matter*, either looses of its own motion, or retains it still entire. If the first, it may be despoiled of all its motion: and so that whose immediate nature is to *move*, shall *rest*, the entire cause of its motion still remaining, viz. it self: which is a plain contradiction by Axiome 17. If the second, no meaner an inconvenience then this will follow, That the whole world had been turned into pure *Æther* by this time, if not into a perfect flame, or at least will be in the conclusion, to the utter destruction of all corporeal Consistencies. For, that these *Self-moving parts of Matter* are of a considerable copiousness, the event does testify, they having melted almost all the world already into *Suns*, *Stars* and *Æther*, nothing remaining but *Planets* and *Comets* to be dissolved: Which all put together scarce beare so great a proportion to the rest of the Matter of the Universe, as an ordinary grain of sand to the whole ball of the Earth. Wherefore so potent a Principle of Motion still adding new motion to *Matter*, and no motion once communicated being lost, (for according  
to



to the laws of Motion, no Body loses any more motion then it communicates to another) it plainly follows, that either the World had been utterly burnt up ere now, or will be at least in an infinite less time then it has existed, nay, I may say absolutely, in a very little time, and will never return to any frame of things again; which though it possibly may be, yet none but a mad-man will assert, by Axiome 2. And that it has not yet been since the first *Epoques* of History, seems a Demonstration that this second Hypothesis is false.

7. There is yet another Evasion or two, which when they are answered there will be no Scruple remaining touching this point. The first is, That the *Matter* is all of it homogeneous, of the like nature every where, and that it is the common Property of it all to be of it self indifferent to *Motion* or *Rest*; and therefore, that it is no wonder that some of it *moves*, and other some of it *rests*, or *moves less* then other some. To which I answer, That *this Indifferency* of the *Matter* to *Motion* or *Rest* may be understood two ways: Either *privatively*, that is to say, That it has not any real or active propension to *Rest* more then to *Motion*, or *vice versa*, but is merely passive and susceptible of what *Motion* or *Fixation* some other Agent confers upon it, and keeps that modification exactly and perpetually, till again some other Agent change it; (in which sense I allow the Assertion to be true, but it makes nothing against us, but for us, it plainly implying That there is an *Incorporeal Substance* distinct from the *Matter*, from whence the *Matter* both is and must be *moved*.) Or else, *this Indifferency* is to be understood *positively*, that is to say, That the *Matter* has a real and active propension as well to *Motion* as to *Rest*, so that it *moveth* it self and *fixeth* it self from its own immediate nature. From whence there are but these two Absurdities that follow: the first, That two absolutely contrary properties are *immediately* seated in one simple Subject; then which nothing can seem more harsh and unhandsome to our Logical faculties; unless the second, which is, That *Motion* and *Rest* being thus the *Emanative* effects of this one simple Subject, the *Matter* will both *move* and *rest at once*; or, if they do not understand by *Rest*, Fixation, but a mere absence of motion, That it will both move and not move at once. For what is *immediate* to any Subject, will not cease to be, the Subject not being destroyed, by Axiome 17.

Nor will they much help themselves by fancying that *Matter* necessarily exerting both these *immediate* powers or properties at once of *Motion* and *Rest*, moves her self to such a measure and no swifter. For this position is but coincident with the second member of the *Dilemma*, Sect. 3. of this Chapter; and therefore the same Argument will serve for both places.

The other Evasion is, by supposing part of the *Matter* to be *Self-moving*, and part of it *Self-resting*, in a positive sense, or *Self-fixing*: Which is particularly directed against what we have argued Sect. 6. For thus they would avoid that hasty and universal Conflagration there inferred. But that this Supposition is false, is manifest from Experience. For if there be any such *Self-fixing* parts of *Matter*, they are certainly in Gold and Lead and such like Metalls; but it is plain that they are not there.

there. For what is *Self-fixing*, will immediately be reduced to *Rest*, so soon as external violence is taken off, by Axiome 17. Whence it will follow, that though these *Self-fixing parts of Matter* may be carried by other Matter while they are made fast to it, yet left free they will suddenly *rest*, they having the *immediate* cause of *Fixation* in themselves. Nor can any one distrust that the change will be so suddain, if he consider how suddainly an external force puts *Matter* upon motion. But a Bullet of gold or lead put thus upon motion, swift or slow, does not suddainly reduce it self to *rest*. Whence it plainly appears that this other Evasion contradicts Experience, and therefore has no force against our former Arguments.

8. The utmost Evasion the Wit of man can possibly excogitate is that Figment of a certain *Divine Matter* dispersed in the World, which some conceit the onely *Numen* thereof, whose motions they make not *necessary*, but *voluntary*; whereby they would decline that exorbitant inconvenience mentioned in the sixth Section of this Chapter. But the opinion to me seems very harsh and prodigious for these reasons following.

First, they seem very absurd in imagining this to be the *Numen* of the World or God himself, it being so inconsistent with *Personality* and the *Unity* of the Godhead to be made up of an Infinite number of interspersed *Atoms* amidst the Matter of the World: For this cannot be *one* God in any sense; nor a single *Divine* Atome an Entire Deity. From whence it would follow that there is no God at all.

And then in the second place, They acknowledge this *Divine Matter* to be *Matter*, acknowledge therewith *Impenetrability* and *Juxta-position* of parts, diversity also of *figure*, and, where there are no pores at all, absolute *Solidity* and *Hardness*. Whence it is manifest that whatsoever Reasonings are strong against *Ordinary Matter* for making it incapable of *Perception* and *free Action*, from the *Nature* and *Idea* thereof, they are as strong against this, on which they have conferred the title of *Divine*.

And thirdly and lastly, That there is no such *Divine Matter* interspersed amongst the *subtile Matter* of the World, that can act freely and knowingly, *Effects* also and *Experiments* plainly declare, as I have abundantly noted in my \* *Antidote against Atheism*.

9. Wherefore it is most rational to conclude; That no *Matter* whatsoever of its own Nature has any active Principle of *Motion*, though it be receptive thereof; but that when God created it, he superadded an impress of *Motion* upon it, such a measure and proportion to all of it; which remains still much-what the same for quantity in the whole, though the parts of *Matter* in their various occursion of one to another have not alwaies the same proportion of it. Nor is there any more necessity that God should reiterate this impress of *Motion* on the *Matter* created, then that he should perpetually create the *Matter*. Neither does his conservation of this quantity of Motion any thing more imply either a repetition or an augmentation of it, then the conservation of the *Matter* does the superaddition of new *Matter* thereunto. Indeed he need but con-

\* See Book 2.  
ch. 2. sect. 8.



serve the *Matter*, and the *Matter* thus conserved will faithfully retain, one part with another, the whole summe of Motion first communicated to it, some small moments excepted, which are not worth the mentioning in this place.

## C H A P. XII.

1. *That the Order and Nature of things in the Universe argue an Essence Spiritual or Incorporeal.* 2. *The Evasion of this Argument.* 3. *A preparation out of Mr Hobbs to answer the Evasion.* 4. *The first Answer.* 5. *The second Answer.* 6. *Mr Hobbs his mistake, of making the Ignorance of Second Causes the onely Seed of Religion.*

1. **W**E have discovered out of the simple *Phænomenon* of *Motion*, the necessity of the Existence of some *Incorporeal Essence distinct from the Matter*: But there is a further assurance of this Truth, from the consideration of the Order and admirable Effect of this Motion in the world. Suppose *Matter* could move it self, would mere *Matter*, with Self-motion, amount to that admirable wise contrivance of things which we see in the World? Can a blind *impetus* produce such Effects, with that accuracy and constancy, that, the more wise a man is, the more he will be assured *That no Wisdome can adde, take away, or alter any thing in the works of Nature, whereby they may be bettered*? How can that therefore that has not so much as *Sense*, arise to the Effects of the highest pitch of *Reason* or *Intellect*? But of this I have spoke so fully and convincingly in the second Book of my *Antidote*, that it will be but a needless repetition to proceed any further on this Subject.

2. All the Evasion that I can imagine our Adversaries may use here, will be this: That *Matter* is capable of *Sense*, and the finest and most subtile of the most refined *Sense*, and consequently of *Imagination* too, yea haply of *Reason* and *Understanding*. For *Sense* being nothing else, as some conceit, but *Motion*, or rather *Re-action of a Body pressed upon by another Body*, it will follow that all the *Matter* in the World has in some manner or other the power of *Sensation*.

3. Let us see now what this Position will amount to. Those that make *Motion* and *Sensation* thus really the same, they must of necessity acknowledge, That no longer *Motion*, no longer *Sensation*, (as Mr *Hobbs* has ingenuously confessed in his \* *Elements of Philosophy* :) And that every *Motion* or *Re-action* must be a new *Sensation*, as well as every ceasing of *Re-action* a ceasing of *Sensation*.

4. Now let us give these busie active *particles* of the *Matter* that play up and down every where the advantage of *Sense*, and let us see if all their heads laid together can contrive the *Anatomical* fabrick of any Creature that lives. Assuredly when all is summ'd up that can be imagined, they will fall short of their account. For I demand, Has every one of these particles that must have an hand in the framing of the Body of an Animal, the whole design of the work by the impress of some Phan-

tasm

\* Chap. 25.

tasm upon it, or, as they have several offices, so have they several parts of the design? If the first, it being most certain, even according to their opinion whom we oppose, that there can be no *knowledge* nor *perception* in the *Matter*, but what arises out of the *Re-action* of one part against another, how is it conceivable that any one particle of *Matter* or many together (there not existing yet in Nature any Animal) can have the *Idea* impressed of that Creature they are to frame? Or if one or some few particles have the sense of one part of the Animal (they seeming more capable of this, the parts being far more simple then the whole *Compages* and contrivement) and other some few of other parts, how can they confer notes? by what language or speech can they communicate their counsel one to another? Wherefore that they should mutually serve one another in such a design, is more impossible then that so many men blind and dumb from their nativity should joyn their forces and wits together to build a Castle, or carve a Statue of such a Creature as none of them knew any more of in several then some one of the smallest parts thereof, but not the relation it bore to the whole.

5. Besides this, *Sense* being really the same with *Corporeal Motion*, it must change upon new impresses of Motion; so that if a particle by *Sense* were carried in this line, it meeting with a counterbuffe in the way, must have quite another Impress and *Sense*, and so forget what it was going about, and divert its course another way. Nay though it scaped free, *Sense* being *Re-action*, when that which it bears against is removed; *Sense* must needs cease, and perfect Oblivion succeed. For it is not with these particles as with the Spring of a Watch or a bent Cross-bow, that they should for a considerable time retain the same *Re-action*, and so consequently the same *Sense*. And lastly, if they could, it is still nothing to the purpose; for let their *Sense* be what it will, their motion is necessary, it being merely corporeal, and therefore the result of their motion cannot be from any kind of knowledge. For the corporeal motion is first, and is onely felt, not directed by feeling. And therefore whether the *Matter* have any *Sense* or no, what is made out of it is nothing but what results from the wild jumbings and knockings of one part thereof against another, without any purpose, counsel or direction. Wherefore the ordinary *Phænomena* of Nature being guided according to the most Exquisite Wisdom imaginable, it is plain that they are not the Effects of the mere motion of *Matter*, but of some *Immaterial Principle*, by Axiome 10.

6. And therefore *the Ignorance of Second Causes* is not so rightly said to be the *Seed of Religion*, (as Mr. *Hobbs* would have it) as of *Irreligion* and *Atheism*. For if we did more punctually and particularly search into their natures, we should clearly discern their insufficiency for such effects as we discover to be in the world. But when we have looked so closely and carefully into the nature of *Corporeal Beings*, and can finde no Causality in them proportionable to these Effects we speak of, still to implead our selves rather of Ignorance, then the *Matter* and *Corporeal motion* of Insufficiency, is to hold an opinion upon humour, and to transgress against our first and second Axiomes.



## C H A P. XIII.

1. *The last proof of Incorporeal Substances, from Apparitions.* 2. *The first Evasion of the force of such Arguings.* 3. *An Answer to that Evasion.* 4. *The second Evasion.* 5. *The first kind of the second Evasion.* 6. *A description out of Virgil of that Genius that suggests the dictates of the Epicurean Philosophy.* 7. *The more full and refined sense of that Philosophy now-a-days.* 8. *The great efficacy of the Stars (which they suppose to consist of nothing but Motion and Matter) for production of all manner of Creatures in the world.*

1. **T**HE Third and last ground which I would make use of, for evincing the Existence of *Incorporeal Substances*, is such extraordinary Effects as we cannot well imagine any natural, but must needs conceive some free or spontaneous Agent to be the Cause thereof, whenas yet it is clear that they are from neither Man nor Beast. Such are speakings, knockings, opening of doors when they were fast shut, sudden lights in the midst of a room floating in the aire, and then passing and vanishing; nay, shapes of Men and severall sorts of Brutes, that after speech and converse have suddainly disappeared. These and many such like extraordinary Effects (which, if you please, you may call by one generall terme of *Apparitions*) seem to me to be an undeniable Argument, that there be such things as *Spirits* or *Incorporeal Substances* in the world; and I have demonstrated the sequel to be necessary in the last Chapter of the *Appendix to my Treatise against Atheism*; and in the third Book of that Treatise have produced so many and so unexceptionable Stories concerning *Apparitions*, that I hold it superfluous to adde any thing here of that kind, taking far more pleasure in exercising of my Reason then in registering of History. Besides that I have made so carefull choice there already, that I cannot hope to cull out any that may prove more pertinent or convictive; I having penn'd down none but such as I had compared with those severe lawes I set my self in the first Chapter of that third Book, to prevent all tergiversations & evasions of gain-sayers.

2. But, partly out of my own observation, and partly by information from others, I am well assured there are but two wayes whereby they escape the force of such evident Narrations. The first is a firm perswasion that the very *Notion* of a *Spirit* or *Immaterial Substance* is an *Impossibility* or *Contradiction* in the very termes. And therefore such stories implying that which they are confident is *impossible*, the Narration at the very first hearing must needs be judged to be false; and therefore they think it more reasonable to conclude all those that profess they have seen such or such things to be mad-men or cheats, then to give credit to what implies a *Contradiction*.

3. But this Evasion I have quite taken away, by so clearly demonstrating that the *Notion* of a *Spirit* implies no more *contradiction* then the *Notion* of *Matter*; and that its Attributes are as conceivable as the Attributes of *Matter*: so that I hope this creep-hole is stopt for ever.

4. The

4. The second Evasion is not properly an Evasion of the truth of these stories concerning *Apparitions*, but of our deduction therefrom. For they willingly admit of these *Apparitions* and *Prodigies* recorded in History, but they deny that they are any Arguments of a truly *Spiritual* and *Incorporeal Substance* distinct from the *Matter* thus changed into this or that shape, that can walk and speak, &c. but that they are special Effects of the influence of the Heavenly Bodies upon this region of Generation and Corruption.

5. And these that answer thus are of two sorts. The one have great Affinity with *Aristotle* and *Avenroes*, who look not upon the Heavenly Bodies as mere Corporeal Substances, but as actuated with Intelligencies, which are Essences separate and Immaterial. But this Supposition hurts not us at all in our present design; they granting that which I am arguing for, viz. a *Substance Incorporeal*. The use of this perverse Hypothesis is only to shuffle off all Arguments that are drawn from *Apparitions*, to prove that the Souls of men subsist after death, or that there are any such things as *Demons* or *Genii* of a nature permanent and immortal. But I look upon this Supposition as confutable enough, were it worth the while to encounter it.

That of the *Sadducees* is far more firm, they supposing their ἀποψοιαι to be nothing else but the efficacy of the presence of God altering *Matter* into this or the other Apparition or Manifestation; as if there were but one Soul in all things, and God were that Soul variously working in the Matter. But this I have already confuted in my Philosophicall Poems, and shall again in this present Treatise.

Book 3. ch. 16.

6. The other *Influenciaries* hold the same power of the Heavens as these; though they do not suppose so high a Principle in them, yet they think it sufficient for the salving of all Sublunary *Phænomena*, as well ordinary as extraordinary. Truly it is a very venerable *Secret*, and not to be uttered or communicated but by some old *Silenus* lying in his obscure Grot or Cave, nor that neither but upon due circumstances, and in a right humour, when one may find him with his veins swell'd out with wine, and his Garland fallen off from his head through his heedless drowsiness: Then if some young *Chromis* and *Mnasylus*, especially assisted by a fair and forward *Ægle*, that by way of a love-frolick will leave the tracks of her fingers in the blood of Mulberries on the temples and forehead of this aged Satyre, while he sleeps dog-sleep, and will not seem to see, for fear he forfeit the pleasure of his feeling; then, I say, if these young lads importune him enough, he will again sing that old song of the *Epicurean* Philosophy in an higher strain than ever, which I profess I should abhor to recite, were it not to confute; it is so monstrous and impious. But because no sore can be cured that is concealed, I must bring this *Hypothesis* into view also, which the Poet has briefly comprised in this summary.

*Namque canebat, uti magnum per inane coacta  
Semina terrarumque animaque marisque fuissent,  
Et liquidi simul ignis; ut his exordia primis  
Omnia, & ipse tener mundi concreverit orbis.*

Virgil. Eclog. 6.



7. The fuller and more refined sense whereof now-a-daies is this; That *Matter* and *Motion* are the Principles of all things whatsoever; and that by *Motion* some *Atomes* or particles are more subtile then others, and of more nimbleness and activity. That motion of one Body against another does every where necessarily produce Sense, *Sense* being nothing else but the *Re-action* of parts of the *Matter*. That the *subtiler* the *Matter* is, the *Sense* is more subtile. That the *subtilest* *Matter* of all is that which constitutes the *Sun* and *Stars*, from whence they must needs have the purest and *subtilest* *Sense*. That what has the most perfect *Sense*, has the most perfect *Imagination* and *Memory*, because *Memory* and *Imagination* are but the same with *Sense* in reality, the latter being but certain *Modes* of the former. That what has the *perfectest* *Imagination*, has the *highest* *Reason* and *Providence*; *Providence* and *Reason* being nothing else but an exacter train of Phantasies, Sensations or Imaginations. Wherefore the *Sun* and the *Stars* are the *most Intellectual Beings* in the world, and in them is that *Knowledge*, *Counsel* and *Wisdom* by which all Sublunary things are framed and governed.

8. These, by their several impresses and impregnations have filled the whole Earth with vital Motion, raising innumerable sorts of Flowers, Herbs and Trees out of the ground. These have also generated the several Kinds of living Creatures. These have filled the Seas with Fishes, the Fields with Beasts, and the Aire with Fowles; the Terrestrial matter being as easily formed into the living shapes of these several *Animals* by the powerful impress of the *Imagination* of the *Sun* and *Stars*, as the *Embryo* in the womb is marked by the strong fancy of his Mother that bears him. And therefore these *Celestial powers* being able to frame living shapes of Earthly matter by the impress of their *Imagination*, it will be more easy for them to change the vaporous Aire into like transfigurations.

So that admitting all these Stories of *Apparitions* to be true that are recorded in Writers, it is no Argument of the Existence of any *Incorporeal* Principle in the world. For the piercing Fore-sight of these glorious Bodies, the *Sun* and *Stars*, is able to raise what *Apparitions* or *Prodigies* they please, to usher in the *Births* or fore-signify the *Deaths* of the most considerable persons that appear in the world; of which \* *Pomponatius* himself does acknowledge that there are many true examples both in *Greek* and *Latine* History. This is the *deepest Secret* that old *Silenus* could ever sing to ensnare the ears of deceivable Youth. And it is indeed *φειλὸν μυστήριον*, in the very worst sense, *Horrendum mysterium*, a very dreadful and dangerous Mystery, saving that there is no small hope that it may not prove true. Let us therefore now examine it.

\* *De Immortalitate Animæ*, cap. 14.

## CHAP. XIV.

1. That the Splendor of the Celestial Bodies proves no Fore-sight nor Sovereignty that they have over us.
2. That the Stars can have no knowledge of us, Mathematically demonstrated.
3. The same Conclusion again demonstrated more familiarly.
4. That the Stars cannot communicate Thoughts, neither with the Sun nor with one another.
5. That the Sun has no knowledge of our affairs.
6. Principles laid down for the inferring that Conclusion.
7. A demonstration that he cannot see us.
8. That he can have no other kind of knowledge of us, nor of the frame of any Animal on Earth.
9. That though the Sun had the knowledge of the right frame of an Animal, he could not transmit it into Terrestrial matter.
10. An Answer to that Instance of the Signature of the Fœtus.
- 11, 12. Further Answers thereto.
13. A short Incepcion of the confident Exploders of Incorporeal Substance out of the world.

1. **T**Hat the *Light* is a very glorious thing, and the lustre of the *Stars* very lovely to look upon, and that the Body of the *Sun* is so full of splendour and Majesty, that without flattery we may profess our selves constrained to look aside, as not being able to bear the brightness of his aspect; all this must be acknowledged for Truth: but that these are as so many *Eyes* of Heaven to watch over the Earth, so many kind and careful *Spectators* & *Intermedlers* also in humane affairs, as that phansiful Chymist \* *Paracelsus* conceits, who writeth that not onely Princes and Nobles, or men of great and singular worth, but even almost every one, near his death has some prognostick sign or other (as knockings in the house, the dances of dead men, and the like) from these compassionate Fore-seers of his approaching Fate; this I must confess I am not so paganly Superstitious as to believe one syllable of; but think it may be demonstrated to be a mere fancy, especially upon this present Hypothesis, That the *Sun* and *Stars* have no immaterial Being residing in them, but are mere *Matter* consisting of the subtilest Particles and most vehemently agitated. For then we cannot but be assured that there is nothing in them more Divine then what is seen in other things that shine in the dark, suppose rotten wood, glo-worms, or the flame of a rush-candle.

2. This at least we will demonstrate, That let the *Sun* and *Stars* have what knowledge they will of other things, they have just none at all of us, nor of our affairs; which will quite take away this last Evasion. That the *Stars* can have no knowledge of us is exceeding evident: For whenas the *Magnus Orbis* of the Earth is but as a Point compared with the distance thereof to a fixed Star, that is to say, whenas that Angle which we may imagine to be drawn from a Star, and to be subtended by the Diameter of the *Magnus Orbis*, is to Sense no Angle at all, but as a mere Line; how little then is the Earth it self? and how utterly invisible to any Star, whenas her Diameter is above 1100. times less then that of her *Magnus Orbis*? From whence it is clear that it is perfectly impos-

\* See *Enthusiasm. Triumphant. sect. 45.*



fible that the *Stars*, though they were endued with sight, could so much as see the *Earth* it self, ( much less the inhabitants thereof ) to be *Spectators* and *Intermedlers* in their affaires for good or evil ; and there being no higher Principle to inspire them with the knowledge of these things, it is evident that they remain utterly ignorant of them.

3. Or if this Demonstration ( though undeniably true in it self ) be not so intelligible to every one, we may adde what is more easy and familiar, viz. That the *Stars* being lucid Bodies, and those of the first magnitude near an hundred times bigger then the *Earth*, and yet appearing so small things to us, hence any one may collect, that the opaque *Earth* will either be quite invisible to the *Stars*, or else at least appear so little, that it will be impossible that they should see any distinct Countries, much less Cities, Houses, or Inhabitants.

4. Wherefore we have plainly swept away this numerous Company of the celestial Senators from having any thing to doe to consult about, or any way to oversee the affairs of Mankind ; and therefore let them seem to wink and twinkle as cogitabundly as they will, we may rest in assurance that they have no plot concerning us, either for good or evil, as having no knowledge of us. Nor if they had, could they *communicate their thoughts* to that great deemed Sovereign of the world, the *Sun* ; they being ever as invisible to him, as they are to us in the day-time. For it is nothing but his light that hinders us from seeing so feeble Objects, and this hinderance consisteth in nothing else but this, That that motion which by his Rayes is caused in the Organ is so fierce and violent, that the gentle vibration of the light of the *Stars* cannot master it, nor indeed bear any considerable proportion to it : What then can it do in reference to the very Body of the *Sun* himself, the matter whereof has the most furious motion of any thing in the world ?

5. There is nothing now therefore left, but the *Sun* alone, that can possibly be conceived to have any knowledge of, or any superintendency over our terrestrial affairs. And how incapable he is also of this office, I hold it no difficult thing to demonstrate. Whence it will plainly appear, that those *Apparitions* that are seen, whether in the Aire or on Earth ( which are rightly looked upon as an Argument of Providence and Existence of some *Incorporeal Essence* in the world ) cannot be attributed to the power and prevision of the *Sun*, supposing him purely corporeal.

6. For it is a thing agreed upon by all sides, That *mere Matter* has no connate Ideas in it of such things as we see in the world ; but that upon Re-action of one part moved by another arises a kind of *Sense*, or *Perception*. Which opinion as it is most rational in it self to conceive ( supposing *Matter* has any sense in it at all ) so it is most consonant to experience, we seeing plainly that *Sense* is ever caused by some outward corporeal motion upon our Organs, which are also corporeal. For that *Light* is from a corporeal motion, is plain from the reflexion of the rayes thereof ; and no Sound is heard but from the motion of the Aire or some other intermediate Body ; no Voice but there is first a moving of the Tongue ; no Musick but there must either be the blowing of wind,

or

or the striking upon strings, or something Analogical to these; and so in the other Senses.

Wherefore if there be nothing but *Body* in the world, it is evident that *Sense* arises merely from the *motion* of one part of *Matter* against another, and that *Motion* is ever first, and *Perception* follows, and that therefore *Perception* must necessarily follow the laws of *Motion*, and that no *Perceptient* can have any thing more to conceive than what is conveyed by Corporeal motion. Now from these Principles it will be easy to prove that, though we should acknowledge a power of *Perception* in the *Sun*, yet it will not amount to any ability of his being either a *Spectator* or *Governor* of our affairs here on Earth.

7. According to the Computation of *Astronomers*, even of those that speak more modestly, the *Sun* is bigger than the *Earth* above an hundred and fifty times. But how little he appears to us every eye is able to judge. How little then must the *Earth* appear to him? If he see her at all, he will be so far from being able to take notice of any Persons or Families, that he cannot have any distinct discerning of Streets, nor Cities, no not of Fields, nor Countries; but whole Regions, though of very great Extent, will vanish here, as *Alcibiades* his Patrimony in that Map of the world *Socrates* shewed him, to repress the pride of the young Heire. The *Earth* must appear considerably less to him than the *Moon* does to us, because the *Sun* appears to us less than the *Moon*. It were easy to demonstrate that her *discus* would appear to the *Sun* near thirty, nay sixty times less than the *Moon* does to us, according to *Lansbergius* his computation.

Now consider how little we can discern in that broader Object of sight, the *Moon*, when she is the highest, notwithstanding we be placed in the dark, under the shadow of the *Earth*, whereby our sight is more passive and impressible. How little then must the fiery eye of that *Cyclops* the *Sun*, which is all Flame and Light, discern in this lesser Object the *Earth*, his vigour and motion being so vehemently strong and unyielding? What effect it will have upon him, we may in some sort judge by our selves: For though our Organ be but moved or agitated with the reflexion of his Rayes, we hardly see the *Moon* when she is above the Horizon by day: What impress then can our *Earth*, a less Object to him than the *Moon* is to us, make upon the *Sun*, whose Body is so furiously hot, that he is as boiling Fire, if a man may so speak, and the Spots about him are, as it were, the scum of this fuming Cauldron?

Besides that our *Atmosphere* is so thick a covering over us at that distance, that there can be the appearance of nothing but a white mist enveloping all and shining like a bright cloud; in which the rayes of the *Sun* will be so lost, that they can never return any distinct representation of things unto him. Wherefore it is as evident to *Reason* that he cannot see us, as it is to *Sense* that we see him; and therefore he can be no *Overseer* nor *Intermedler* in our actions.

8. But perhaps you will reply That though the *Sun* cannot see the *Earth*, yet he may have a *Sense* and *Perception* in himself (for he is a  
fine



fine glittering thing, and some strange matter must be presumed of him) that may amount to a wonderful large sphere of *Understanding*, *Foreknowledge* and *Power*. But this is a mere fancyful surmise, and such as cannot be made good by any of our Faculties: Nay the quite contrary is demonstrable by such Principles as are already agreed upon. For there are no *connate Ideas* in the *Matter*, and therefore out of the collision and agitation of these *Solar* particles, we cannot rationally expect any other effect in the *Sun*, then such as we experiment in the percussion of our own eyes, out of which ordinarily follows the sense of a confused light or flame. If the *Sun* therefore has any sense of himself, it must be only the perception of a very vigorous *Light* or *Fire*, which being still one and the same representation, it is a question whether he has a sense of it or no, any more then we have of our bones, which we perceive not by reason of our accustomary and uninterrupted sense of them, as Mr *Hobbs* ingeniously conjectures in a like supposition.

But if you will say that there is a perception of the jogging or jostling, or of whatever touch or rubbing of one *Solar* particle against another, the body of the *Sun* being so exceeding liquid, and consequently the particles thereof never resting, but playing and moving this way and that way; yet they hitting and fridging so fortuitously one against another, the perceptions that arise from hence must be so various and fortuitous, so quick and short, so inconsistent, flitting and unpermanent, that if any man were in such a condition as the *Sun* necessarily is, according to this Hypothesis, he would both be, and appear to all the world to be, stark mad; he would be so off and on, and so unsettled, and doe, and think, and speak all things with such ungovernable rashness and temerity.

In brief, that the *Sun* by this tumultuous agitation of his *fiery Atoms* should hit upon any rational contrivance or right *Idea* of any of these living Creatures we see here on Earth, is utterly as hard to conceive, as that the Terrestrial particles themselves should jostle together into such contrivances and formes, which is that which I have \* already sufficiently confuted.

\* Chap. 12.  
sect. 4, 5.

9. And if the *Sun* could light on any such true frame or forme of any Animal, or the due rudiments or contrivance thereof, it is yet unconceivable how he should convey it into this Region of Generation here on *Earth*, partly by reason of the *Earth's* Distance and Invisibleness, and partly because the deepest Principle of all being but mere Motion, without any superior power to govern it, this *Imagination* of the *Sun* working on the *Earth* can be but a simple *Rectilinear* impress, which can never arise to such an inward solid organization of parts in living Creatures, nor hold together these *Speëtres* or *Apparitions* in the Aire, in any more certain form then the smoak of chimnies or the fume of Tobacco.

10. Nor is that Instance of the power of the Mother's fancy on the *Fætus* in the womb, any more then a mere flourish; for the disparity is so great, that the Argument proves just nothing: For whereas the Mother has an Explicite *Idea* of the *Fætus* and every part thereof, the *Sun* and *Stars* have no distinct *Idea* at all of the parts of the *Earth*; nay

I dare say that what we have already intimated will amount to a Demonstration, That though they had *Sense*, yet they do not so much as *know* whether this Earth we live on be *in rerum Naturâ* or no.

11. Again, the *Mark* that is impressed on the *Fœtus*, the Mother has a clear and vivid conception of; but the curious contrivance in the *Idea* of Animals, I have shewn how incompetent it is to the fortuitous jostling of the fiery particles of either *Sun* or *Stars*.

12. Thirdly, the *Impress* on the *Fœtus* is very simple and slight, and seldom so curious as the ordinary impresses of Seals upon Wax, which are but the modifications of the surface thereof; but this supposed Impress of the *Imagination* of the *Sun* and *Stars* is more than a solid Statue, or the most curious *Automaton* that ever was invented by the wit of man; and therefore impossible to proceed from a mere *Rectilinear* impress upon the *Æther* down to the *Earth* from the *Imagination* of the *Sun*, no not if he were supposed to be actuated with an *Intelligent* Soul, if the *Earth* and all the space betwixt her and him were devoid thereof. Nor do I conceive, though it be an infinitely more slight business, that the direction of the *Signature* of the *Fœtus* upon such a part were to be performed by the *Fancy* of the Mother, notwithstanding the advantage of the organization of her body, were not both her self and the *Fœtus* animated Creatures.

13. Wherefore we have demonstrated beyond all Evasion, from the *Phænomena* of the Universe, That of necessity there must be such a thing in the world as *Incorporeal Substance*; let inconsiderable Philosophasters hoot at it, and deride it as much as their Follies please.

---

THE

---




# THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

## The Second Book.

### CHAP. I.

- I. *An addition of more Axiomes for the demonstrating that there is a Spirit or Immaterial Substance in Man.* 2. *The Truth of the first of these Axiomes confirmed from the testimony of Mr Hobbs, as well as demonstrated in the Preface.* 3, 4. *That Demonstration further cleared and evinced by answering a certain Evasion.* 5. *The proof of the second Axiome.* 6. *The proof of the third.* 7. *The confirmation of the fourth from the testimony of Mr Hobbs, as also from Reason.* 8. *An explication and proof of the fifth.* 9. *A further Proof of the Truth thereof.* 10. *An Answer to an Evasion.* 11. *Another Evasion answered.* 12. *A further management of this first Answer thereto.* 13. *A second Answer.* 14. *A third Answer, wherein is mainly contained a confirmation of the first Answer to the second Evasion.* 15. *The plainness of the sixth Axiome.* 16. *The proof of the seventh.*

I.  Having cleared the way thus far as to prove That there is no Contradiction nor Inconsistency in the Notion of a Spirit, but that it may Exist in Nature, nay that *de facto* there are Incorporeal Substances really Existent in the world; we shall now drive more home to our main design, and demonstrate That there is such an Immaterial Substance in Man, which, from the power it is conceived to have in actuating and guiding the Body, is usually called the Soule. This Truth we shall make good first in a more general way, but not a whit the lesse stringent, by evincing That such Faculties or Operations as we are conscious of in our selves, are utterly incompatible to Matter considered at large without any particular organization. And then afterwards we shall more punctually consider the Body of man, and every possible fitness in the structure thereof that is worth

worth taking notice of for the performance of *these Operations* we ordinarily find in our selves. And that this may be done more plainly and convincingly, we will here adde to the number of our Axiomes these that follow.

## AXIOME XX.

Motion or Re-action of one part of the Matter against another, or at least a due continuance thereof, is really one and the same with Sense and Perception, if there be any Sense or Perception in Matter.

2. **T**HIS Axiome, as it is plain enough of it self (supposing there were nothing but *Body* in the world) so has it the suffrage of our most confident and potent adversary Mr. *Hobbs* in his \* Elements of Philosophy. Whose judgment I make much of in such cases as these, being perswaded as well out of Reason as Charity, that he seeing so little into the nature of *Spirits*, that defect is compensated with an extraordinary Quick sightedness in discerning of the best and most warrantable wayes of salving all *Phænomena* from the ordinary allowed properties of *Matter*. Wherefore I shall not hold it impertinent to bring in his Testimony in things of this nature, my Demonstrations becoming thereby more recommendable to men of his own Conclusions. But my design being not a particular victory over such a sort of Men, but an absolute establishing of the Truth, I shall lay down no Grounds that are merely *Argumenta ad hominem*; but such as I am perswaded (upon this Hypothesis, That there is nothing but *Body* in the world) are evident to any one that can indifferently judge thereof. And the demonstration of this present Axiome I have prefixed in my Preface, Sect. 5.

\* Chap. 25.  
Artic. 2.

3. Against which I cannot imagine any possible Evasion, unless one should conceit that a *general agitation* onely of the particles of the *Matter* will suffice to *excite* them to *thinking*, and that they being thus *excited*, can freely run out to other *cogitations* and *Phantasmes* then what adequately arise from the impress of *Motion*.

But to this may briefly be answered, First, That since from the *Agitation* and *Collision* of these particles *Sense* must needs arise (for they being near upon of the same magnitude, they will effectually act one upon another) the *Animadversion* of these particles will be so taken up and fixt upon their *sensible* perceptions, that though they otherwise had a power of freely thinking, yet they would alwaies be necessarily detained in these sensible *Phantasmes*.

And then, Secondly, All that is perceived, is perceived *in common* by that which is capable of being the *Percipient*. But nothing that is not really the same with corporeal motion, or an immediate and adequate effect thereof, can be *communicated* to the common particles of this or that *Matter*. Hence therefore it is plain that there is not any *congeries* of *Matter* that does run into *free cogitations*, whether *grosser* *Phantasmes* or *second* *Notions*, for the want of mutual communication of them in one Particle to another, as I have more particularly demonstrated in its \* due place.

\* Chap. 6.  
Sect. 4, 5, 6,



Thirdly and lastly, It is sufficiently manifest from sense and experience that *Matter* is a principle *purely passive*, and no otherwise *moved* or *modified* then as some other thing *moves* and *modifies* it, but cannot move it self at all. Which is most demonstrable to them that contend for *Sense* and *Perception* in it. For if it had any such *Perception*, it would by virtue of its *Self-motion* withdraw it self from under the knocks of hammers or fury of the fire; or of its own accord approach to such things as are most agreeable to it and pleasing, and that without the help of *Muscles*, it being thus immediately endowed with a *Self-moving Power*. But the *Matter* being so stupid as to want *this Power*, how can it be thought a Subject wherein a Power and activity *infinitely more divine* should reside, that is, the free expatiating into *Variety of thoughts*, the exercise of *Invention*, *Judgement* and *Memory*, and that in such Objects as are supposed not to be the Impresses of the *Motion* of the particles one upon another?

Nor would I be thought cunning and fraudulent in naming *such gross* and *massy Matter* as uses to be struck with Hammers or hewen with Axes, and to conclude from thence that no *Matter* at all, no not the most subtle, does move it self: For *Self-motion* is as competible to a *massy* piece of *Matter* as the *most minute* particle imaginable; for Force will be to Force as Magnitude to Magnitude; and therefore the most *massy* pieces of *Matter* will move themselves the most strongly and most irresistibly. From whence it appears that the *minute* particle of any *Massy* body separate from it has not one jot of advantage toward *Self-motion* thereby, but onely becomes less irresistible in its *Self-motion*.

\* See Book 4.  
chap. 11. sect. 8.

4. Nor can you help your self by recurring to the *Figment* of a *Matter specifically distinct* from what men ordinarily speak of, (which \* some adorn with the title of *Divine*, as if it were the very substance of the highest Godhead: ) For we may easily undeceive our selves if we do but contemplate some considerable quantity of this *Divine Matter*, suppose a *Globe* of some few inches Diameter, and perfectly *solid*, that is, the parts thereof immediately united without pores or intervalls; and then consider how it cannot fail of being more hard then the *Pig of Lead*, or the *Wedge of Gold*, which I mention in my \* *Demonstration* of this Axiome, and as *Opake* as any body whatsoever. For hence this *Divine Matter* will appear to our mind as incapable of *spontaneous Motion* and of *free Cogitations* and *Perceptions* unimpressed from corporeal motion as the *Pig of Lead* and *Wedge of Gold* there mentioned; and that therefore this *Figment* is but a mere Mockery of words, and as ill put together in this sense, as a *divine Pig of Lead* or *divine Wedge of Gold* would be.

\* See Preface  
sect. 5.

And what I have said of the *whole Globe*, there is the same reason of any *particle* of the same nature with it; which will be no more capable of *free cogitation*, then the particles of that *Matter* that makes up *Gold* or *Lead*. For if there be any *perception*, it must be by *corporeal Re-action* in both, if we impartially attend to the dictates of our own Faculties. And let them be as they will, *communication of free Perceptions* will not be found possible in either; the *Divinest Matter* imaginable having no other union then *Juxta-position* of parts, as our Adversaries themselves freely will acknowledge.

To which faithful presages and rational conclusions of our own Mind you may finally adde the suffrage of Nature in Experiments, which do clearly assure us that there is no such *Divine Matter* endued with *free cogitation* and free Agency intermingled or interspersed in the *common Matter* of the World, as I have plainly shown in my \* Antidote. And therefore we will conclude that no *Matter* whatsoever has any *perception* in any other manner or according to any other laws then what Mr *Hobbs* has already defined, and my self in this twentieth Axiome have declared; if *Matter* have any *perception* at all.

\* Book 2. ch. 2.  
sect. 8.

## AXIOME XXI.

*So far as this continued Re-action reaches, so far reaches Sense or Perception; and no farther.*

5. **T**HIS Axiome is to be understood as well of Duration of Time, as Extension of the Subject, viz. That *Sense* and *Perception* spread no further in *Matter* then *Re-action* does, nor remain any longer then this *Re-action* remains. Which Truth is fully evident out of the foregoing Axiome.

## AXIOME XXII.

*That diversity there is of Sense or Perception does necessarily arise from the diversity of the Magnitude, Figure, Position, Vigour and Direction of Motion in parts of the Matter.*

6. **T**HE truth of this is also clear from the 20<sup>th</sup> Axiome. For *Perception* being really one and the same thing with *Re-action* of *Matter* one part against another, and there being a diversity of *Perception*, it must imply also a diversity of modification of *Re-action*; and *Re-action* being nothing but *Motion in Matter*, it cannot be varied but by such *variations* as are competible to *Matter*, viz. such as are *Magnitude*, *Figure*, *Posture*, *Local Motion*, wherein is contained any endeavour towards it, as also the *Direction* of that either full Motion or curb'd endeavour, and a *Vigour* thereof; which if you run to the lowest degrees, you will at last come to *Rest*, which therefore is some way referrible to that head, as to *Magnitude* you are to refer *Littleness*. These are the first conceivables in *Matter*, and therefore diversity of *Perception* must of necessity arise from these.

## AXIOME XXIII.

*Matter in all the variety of those Perceptions it is sensible of, has none but such as are impressed by Corporeal Motions, that is to say, that are Perceptions of some Actions or modified Impressions of parts of Matter bearing one against another.*

7. **T**O this Truth Mr *Hobbs* sets his seal with all willingness imaginable, or rather eagerness, as also his Followers, they stoutly contending that we have not the *perception* of any thing but the Phantasms



of material Objects, and of sensible words or Marks, which we make to stand for such and such Objects. Which certainly would be most true if there were nothing but *Matter* in the world ; so that they speak very consonantly to their own Principles : I say, this is not only true in that School, but also rational in it self, supposing nothing but *Matter* in the world, and that *Perception* and *Re-action* is really one. For that *Re-action* being in Brutes as well as in Men, there must not be any difference by a perception of quite another kind, but by an external way of communication of their perceptions. And therefore the distinction betwixt *Men* and *Beasts* must consist onely in this, that the one can agree in some common mark, whether *Voices* or *Characters*, or whatever else, to express their *perceptions*, but the other cannot ; but the *perceptions* themselves must be of one kind in both, they neither of them perceiving any thing but *corporeal impressions*, such as they feel by the parts of the *Matter* bearing one against another.

#### AXIOME XXIV.

*The distinct Impression of any considerable extent of variegated Matter cannot be received by a mere point of Matter.*

Book I. ch. 6.

8. **B**Y a mere point of *Matter* I do not mean a mere Mathematical point, but a perfect *Parvitude*, or the least *Reality* of *Matter*, (concerning which I have spoke already.) Which being the least quantity that *discerpible Matter* can consist of, no particle of *Matter* can touch it less then it self. This *Parvitude* therefore that is so little that it has properly no integral parts, really distinguishable, how can it possibly be a Subject distinctly receptive of the view, haply, of half an Horizon at once ? which sight is caused by real and distinct motion from real distinct parts of the Object that is seen. But this perfect *Parvitude* being the minutest quantity that *Matter* is divisible into, no more then one real line of motion can be directed upon it, the rest will goe beside. To which you may adde that if this so perfect *Parvitude* were distinctly perceptive of variegated Objects, it were a miracle if it could not perceive the particles of the *Aire* and of the Atmosphere, the *Globuli* of light, and subtilest contexture of the parts of Opake bodies.

9. Again, this Object we speak of may be so variegated, I mean with such colours, that it may imply a contradiction, that one and the same particle of *Matter* (suppose some very small round one, that shall be the Cuspe of the visual Pyramide or Cone) should receive them all at once ; the opposite kindes of those colours being uncommunicable to this round particle otherwise then by contrariety of Motions, or by *Rest* and *Motion*, which are as contrary ; as is manifest out of that excellent *Théoreme* concerning Colours in *Des-Cartes* his \* *Meteors*, which if it were possible to be false, yet it is most certainly true, that seeing *Motion* is the cause of *Sight*, the contrariety of Objects for Colour must arise out of contrary modifications of Motion in this particle we speak of, that immediatly communicates the Object to the *Sentient* : which contrariety of Motions

\* Cap. 8. Artic.  
4, 5, 6, 7, 8.

at the same time and within the same surface of the adequate place of a Body is utterly incompatible thereto.

10. Nor is that Evasion any thing available, That there is not any contrariety of real Motion here, but that there is onely endeavour to Motion: For it is plain that Endeavour is as real as Motion it self, and as contrary, because it does really affect the sight, and in a contrary manner. Besides, this Endeavour toward Motion is Motion it self, though of an exceeding small progress: But be it as little as it will, it is as great a contradiction, for example, that the Globe A should upon the same centre, and within the same superficies (which is its adequate place according to the meaning of that Notion in *Aristotle's* School) be turned never so little from C to B, and from B to C, at once, as to be turned quite about in that manner. To which you may adde that some Colours imply the ones *Motion*, and the others *Rest*; but a Globe if it rest in any one part from turning, rests in all. From whence it will follow, That it is impossible to see *Red* and *Black* at once.




11. This Subterfuge therefore being thus clearly taken away, they substitute another, viz. That the distinct parts of the Object do not act upon this round particle, which is the Cuspe of the visual Pyramide, at once, but successively, and so swiftly, that the Object is represented at once; as when one swings about a fire-stick very fast, it seems one continued circle of fire. But we shall find this instance very little to the purpose, if we consider, that when one swings a fire-stick in a circle, it describes such a circle in the bottome of the Eye, not upon one point there, but in a considerable distance; and that the Optick Nerve, or the Spirits therein, are touched successively, but left free to a kind of *Tremor* or *Vibration* as it were, (so as it is in the playing of a Lute) till the motion has gone round, and then touches in the same place again, so quick, that it findes it still vigorously moved: But there being but one particle to touch upon here, some such like inconveniences will recurre as we noted in the former case.

12. For as I demonstrated before, that some Colours cannot be communicated at once to one and the same round particle of *Matter*; so from thence it will follow here, That, such Colours succeeding one another, the impress of the one will take off immediatly the impress of the other; from whence we shall not be able to see such various Colours as are discernible in a very large Object at once. For unless the impression make some considerable stay upon that which receives it, there is no Sensation; insomuch that a man may wag his finger so fast that he can scarce see it: and if it do make a due stay, suppose a large Object checkered with the most opposite Colours, it were impossible that we should see that checker-work at once in so large a compass as we do, but we shall onely see it by parts, the parts vanishing and coming again in a competent swiftnes, but very discernible.

13. Again; If we could possibly imagine the *vicissitudes* of the impresses, from the distinct parts of the Basis of the visual Cone to the point of it, which we will suppose to be a very small *globulus*, such as



*Des-Cartes* his second Element consists of, it being thus *successively* thrust against, things must then be as I have represented them in the adjoining figure, where C. A is the Object, G H the Sentient Matter, and I the *Globulus*, which will be born from E directly toward F, where there will be received such a colour in the *least Reality* of the Sentient Matter in F; but from A it will be born towards B, and with a very short rowling touch in another *Reality*, or it may be more distantly from F, and impress such a colour from A upon B, or thereabout, and so from C upon D: so that hereby also it is manifest that no one perfect *Parvitude* receives the whole Object C E A.



14. Lastly, this quick vicissitude of impulse or impression would contaminate all the Colours, and make the whole Object as it were of one confounded colour, as a man may easily perceive in a *painted Wheel*: For what is it but a quick coming on of one colour upon the same part of the Optick nerve upon which another was, immediately that makes the whole *Wheel* seem of one blended colour? But not to impose upon any one, this instance of the *Wheel* has a peculiar advantage above this present Supposition for making all seem one confounded colour, because the colours of the *Wheel* come not onely upon one and the same part of the Nerve, but in one and the same line from the Object; so that in this regard the instance is less accommodate. But it is shrewdly probable, that *fluid perceptive Matter* will not fail to find the colours tintured from one another in some measure in the whole Object here also, especially if it be nigh and very small, by reason of the instability of that particle that is successively plaid upon from all parts thereof. But at least this instance of the *Wheel* is an unexceptionable confirmation of our first Demonstration of the weakness of the second Evasion, from the necessity of a considerable stay upon the percipient Matter, and that Sensation cannot be but with some leisurely continuance of this or that Motion before it be wiped out. We might adde also that there ought to be a due permanency of the Object that presses against the Organ, though no new impression suddenly succeeded to wipe out the former, as one may experiment in swiftly swinging about a painted Bull in a string, which will still more fully confirm what we aime at. But this is more then enough for the making good of this 24. Axiome; whose evidence is so clear of it self, that I believe there are very few but will be convinced of it at the first sight.

## AXIOME XXV.

*Whatever impression or parts of any impression are not received by this perfect Parvitude or Real point of Matter, are not at all perceived by it.*

15. **T**His is so exceeding plain of it self, that it wants neither explication nor proof.

## AXIOME XXVI.

*Whatever Sense or Motion there is now in Matter, it is a necessary impression from some other part of Matter, and does necessarily continue till some part or other of Matter has jostled it out.*

16. **T**hat what *Motion* there is in any part of *Matter* is necessarily there, and there continues till some other part of *Matter* change or diminish its *Motion*, is plain from the laws of *Motion* set down by *Descartes* in his \* *Principia Philosophiæ*. And that there is the same Reason of *Sense* or *Perception* (supposing there is nothing but *Matter* in the world) is plain from *Axiome* 20. that makes *Motion* and *Sense* or *Perception* really the same.

\* Part. I.  
Artic. 37.

## CHAP. II.

1. *That if Matter be capable of Sense, Inanimate things are so too: And of Mr Hobbs his wavering in that point.* 2. *An Enumeration of several Faculties in us that Matter is utterly incapable of.* 3. *That Matter in no kind of Temperature is capable of Sense.* 4. *That no one point of Matter can be the Common Sensorium.* 5. *Nor a multitude of such Points receiving singly the entire image of the Object.* 6. *Nor yet receiving part part, and the whole the whole.* 7. *That Memory is incompetent to Matter.* 8. *That the Matter is incapable of the notes of some circumstances of the Object which we remembred.* 9. *That Matter cannot be the Seat of second Notions.* 10. *Mr Hobbs his Evasion of the foregoing Demonstration clearly confuted.* 11. *That the Freedom of our Will evinces that there is a Substance in us distinct from Matter.* 12. *That Mr Hobbs therefore acknowledges all our actions necessary.*

1. **W**E have now made our addition of such *Axiomes* as are most useful for our present purpose. Let us therefore, according to the order we propounded, before we consider the *fabrick and organization of the Body*, see if such *Operations* as we find in our selves be competent to *Matter* looked upon in a more general manner. That *Matter* from its own nature is incapable of *Sense*, plainly appears from *Axiome* 20, and 21. For *Motion* and *Sense* being really one and the same thing, it will necessarily follow, that wherever there is *Motion*, especially



any considerable duration thereof, there must be *Sense* and *Perception*: Which is contrary to what we find in a *Catochus*, and experience daily in dead Carcasses; in both which, though there be *Re-actiō*, yet there is no *Sense*.

In brief, if any *Matter* have *Sense*, it will follow that upon *Re-actiō* all shall have the like, and that a Bell while it is ringing, and a Bow while it is bent, and every Jack-in-a-box that School-boys play with, while it is held in by the cover pressing against it, shall be living Animals, or Sensitive Creatures. A thing so foolish and frivolous, that the mere recital of the opinion may well be thought confutation enough with the sober.

And indeed Mr. *Hobbs* himself, though he resolve *Sense* merely into *Re-actiō of Matter*, yet is ashamed of these odd consequences thereof, and is very loth to be reckoned in the company of those Philosophers, (though, as he saies, learned men) who have maintained That *all Bodies are endued with Sense*, and yet he can hardly abstain from saying that they are; onely he is more shie of allowing them *Memory*, which yet they will have whether he will or no, if he give them *Sense*. As for Example, in the ringing of a Bell, from every stroke there continues a *tremor* in the Bell, which decaying, must (according to \* his Philosophie) be *Imagination*, and referring to the stroke past must be *Memory*; and if a stroke overtake it within the compass of this *Memory*, what hinders but *Discrimination* or *Judgment* may follow? But the Conclusion is consonant enough to this absurd Principle, *That there is nothing but Matter in the Universe, and that it is capable of perception*.

2. But we will not content our selves onely with the discovery of this one ugly inconvenience of this bold assertion, but shall further endeavour to shew that the Hypothesis is false, and that *Matter* is utterly *uncapable of such operations as we find in our selves*, and that therefore there is *Something in us Immaterial or Incorporeal*. For we find in our selves, that one and the same thing both *heares*, and *sees*, and *tasts*, and, to be short, *perceives* all the variety of Objects that Nature manifests unto us. Wherefore *Sense* being nothing but the impress of corporeal motion from Objects without, that part of *Matter* which must be the common *Sensorium*, must of necessity receive all that diversity of impulsions from Objects; it must likewise *Imagine*, *Remember*, *Reason*, and be the fountain of *Spontaneous Motion*, as also the Seat of what the Greeks call the *τὸ αὐτεξόνον* or *liberty of Will*: Which supposition we shall finde involved in unextricable difficulties.

3. For first, we cannot conceive of any *Portion of Matter* but it is either *Hard* or *Soft*. As for that which is *Hard*, all men leave it out as utterly unlike to be endued with such Cognitive faculties as we are conscious to our selves of. That which is *Soft* will prove either *opaque*, *pellucid*, or *lucid*. If *opaque*, it cannot *see*, the exterior superficies being a bar to the inward part. If *pellucid*, as *Aire* and *Water*, then indeed it will admit inwardly these *Particles* and that *Motion* which are the conveyers of the *Sense*, and distinction of *Colours*; and *Sound* also will penetrate. But this *Matter* being *heterogeneall*, that is to say, consisting of parts of a different nature and office, the *Aire*, suppose, being proper for *Sound*, and those

See his *Elements of Philosophy*, chap. 25. Artic. 5.

\* Chap. 25. Artic. 7, 8.

those *Round particles* which *Cartesius* describes for *Colour* and *Light*; the perception of these Objects will be differently lodged: but there is some one thing in us that perceives both. Lastly, if *lucid*, there would be much what the same inconvenience that there is in the *opaque*, for its own fieriness would fend off the gentle touch of external impresses; or if it be so mild and thin that it is in some measure *diaphanous*, the inconveniences will again recur that were found in the *pellucid*.

And in brief, any *liquid Matter* has such variety of particles in it, that if the Whole, as it must, (being the common *Sensorium*) be affected with any impress from without, the parts thereof must be variously affected, so that no Object will seem *homogeneall*, as appears from Axiome 22. Which Truth I shall further illustrate by a homely, but very significant, representation. Suppose we should put Feathers, Bullets and Spur-rowels in a Box, where they shall lye intermixedly, but close, one with another: upon any jog this Box receives, supposing all the stuffage thereof has *Sense*, it is evident that the several things therein must be differently affected, and therefore if the common *Sensorium* were such, there would seem no homogeneall Object in the world. Or at least these severall particles shall be the several *Receptives* of the several motions of the same kinde from without, as the Aire of Sounds, the *Cartesian Globuli* of Light and Colours. But what receives all these, and so can judge of them all; we are again at a loss for, as before: unless we imagine it some very fine and *subtile Matter*, so *light* and *thin*, that it feels not it self, but so *yielding* and *passive*, that it easily feels the several assaults and impresses of other Bodies upon it, or in it; which yet would imply, that *this Matter* alone were *Sensitive*, and the others not; and so it would be granted, that not all *Matter* (no not so much as in *Fluid Bodies*) has *Sense*.

Such a tempered *Matter* as this is analogous to the *Animal Spirits* in Man, which, if *Matter* could be the *Soul*, were the very *Soul* of the *Body*, and *Common percipient* of all Motions from within or without, by reason of the tenuity, passivity and near homogeneity, and \* (it may be) imperceptibility of any change or alteration from the playing together of its own tenuous and light particles; and therefore very fit to receive all manner of impresses from others. Whence we may rationally conclude, That some such *subtile Matter* as this is either the *Soul*, or her *immediate Instrument* for all manner of perceptions. The latter whereof I shall prove to be true in its due place. That the *former* part is false I shall now demonstrate, by proving more stringently, That no *Matter* whatsoever is capable of such *Sense* and *Perception* as we are conscious to our selves of.

4. For concerning that part of *Matter* which is the Common *Sensorium*, I demand whether some one point of it receive the whole image of the Object, or whether it is wholly received into every point of it, or finally whether the whole *Sensorium* receive the whole image by expanded parts, this part of the *Sensorium* this part of the image, and that part that. If the first, seeing that in us which *perceives* the external Object *moves* also the Body, it will follow, That one little point of *Matter* will give local motion to what is innumerable millions of times bigger


\* But why it may not be, something is suggested in the foregoing chapter, sect. 30.



bigger then it self; of which there cannot be found nor imagined any example in Nature.


5. If the second, this difficulty presents it self, which also reflects upon the former Position, How so small a point as we speak of should receive the images of so vast, or so various Objects at once, without Obliteration or Confusion; a thing impossible, as is manifest from Axiome 24. And therefore not receiving them, cannot perceive them, by Axiome 25. But if every point or particle of this *Matter* could receive the whole image, which of these innumerable particles, that receive the Image entirely, may be deemed *I myself* that perceive this Image? But if I be all those Points, it will come to pass, especially in a small Object, and very near at hand, that the line of impulse coming to divers and distant Points, will seem to come as from several places, and so one Object will necessarily seem a Cluster of Objects. And if I be but one of these Points, what becomes of the rest? or *who* are they?

6. There remains therefore onely the third way, which is that the parts of the image of the Object be received by the parts of this portion of *Matter* which is supposed the common *Sensorium*. But this does perfectly contradict experience; for we finde our selves to perceive the whole Object, when in this case nothing could perceive the whole, every part onely perceiving its part; and therefore there would be nothing that can judge of the whole. No more then three men, if they were imagined to sing a song of three parts, and none of them should heare any part but his own, could judge of the Harmony of the whole.

7. As concerning the *Seat of Imagination and Memory*, especially *Memory*, what kinde of *Matter* can be found fit for this function? If it be *Fluid*, the images of Objects will be prone to vanish suddainly, as also to be perverted or turned contrary wayes. For example, C,  a particle of this *fluid Matter*, receiving an impress from B, must feel it as coming from B; but in toying and tumbling up and down, as the particles of *fluid Matter* doe, turns the side E F which received that impress from B towards L, whence it will feel as if the impress had been from L, for it must feel it as from the place directly opposite to it self, (if it can after the removal of the present Object, against which the *Re-action* is, feel it at all:) and the same reason will be in other particles of this *fluid Matter*, which must needs force a great deal of preposterous confusion both upon the *Fancy* and *Memory*. If it be *Hard*, it will soon be composed to *Rest*, as in a Bell whose *tremor* is gone in a little time; but we *remember* things some years together, though we never think of them till the end of that term. If *Viscid*, there is the like inconvenience, nay it is the unfittest of all for either receiving of *Motion* or continuing it, and therefore unlikely to be the *Seat* of either *Fancy* or *Memory*. For if *Motion* or *Re-action* and *Sense*, whether internal or external, be all one, *Motion* ceasing *Memory* must needs cease, by Axiome 21. Nor can it any more *remember* when it is again moved in the same manner, then a Stone or a piece of Lead that was flung up into the Aire, can become more light or more prone to flie upwards when they have once ceased from Motion;

Motion ; for they are both exquisitely as if they had never been moved.

8. Lastly, we remember some things of which there can be no *Signatures* in *Matter* to represent them, as for example, *Wideness* and *Distance*. For as for both of them, there is no note can be made in the *Matter* E by lines from the two Objects A B and C D, whereby the difference of remoteness of A E above C E; or of the wideness of A B above C D, can be discerned ; for both the Objects make one and the same signature in the matter E.



9. Those that are commonly called by the name of *Secundæ Notiones*, and are not any sensible Objects themselves, nor the Phantasmes of any sensible Objects, but onely our manner of conceiving them, or reasoning about them, in which number are comprehended all *Logical* and *Mathematical termes* ; these, I say, never came in at the *Senses*, they being no impresses of corporeal motion, which excite in us, as in *Dogs* and other *Brutes*, the sense onely of *Sounds*, of *Colours*, of *Hot*, of *Cold*, and the like. Now *Matter* being affected by no perception but of corporeal impression, by the bearing of one Body against another ; it is plain from *Axiome 23.* that these *Second Notions*, or *Mathematical* and *Logical* conceptions, cannot be seated in *Matter*, and therefore must be in some other Substance distinct from it, by *Axiome 10.*

10. Here Mr. *Hobbs*, to avoid the force of this Demonstration, has found out a marvellous witty invention to befool his followers withall, making them believe that there is no such thing as these *Secundæ Notiones*, distinct from the *Names* or *Words* whereby they are said to be signified ; and that there is no perception in us, but of such *Phantasmes* as are impressed from external Objects, such as are common to *Us* and *Beasts* : and as for the *Names* which we give to these, or the *Phantasmes* of them, that there is the same reason of them as of other *Marks*, *Letters*, or *Characters* ; all which coming in at the *Senses*, he would bear them in hand that it is a plain case, that we have the perception of nothing but what is impressed from corporeal Objects. But how ridiculous an Evasion this is, may be easily discovered, if we consider ; that if these *Mathematical* and *Logical Notions* we speak of be nothing but *Names*, *Logical* and *Mathematical Truths* will not be the same in all Nations, because they have not the same names. For Example, *Similitudo* and *ὁμοιότης*, *ἀναλογία* and *Proportio*, *λόγος* and *Ratio*, these names are utterly different, the *Greek* from the *Latine* ; yet the *Greeks*, *Latines*, nor any Nation else, do vary in their conceptions couched under these different names : Wherefore it is plain, that there is a settled *Notion* distinct from these *Words* and *Names*, as well as from those corporeal *Phantasmes* impressed from the Object ; which was the thing to be demonstrated.

11. Lastly, we are conscious to our selves of that Faculty which the *Greeks* call *ἀντεξέσιον*, or a *Power in our selves*, notwithstanding any outward assaults or importunate temptations, to cleave to that which is virtuous and honest, or to yield to pleasures or other vile advantages. That we have this *Liberty* and freedom in our selves, and that we refuse the good ;



good, and chuse the evil, when we might have done otherwise; that natural Sense of *Remorse of Conscience* is an evident and undeniable witness of. For when a man has done amiss, the pain, grief, or indignation that he raises in himself, or at least feels raised in him, is of another kind from what we find from misfortunes or affronts we could not avoid. And that which pinches us and vexes us so severely, is the sense that we have brought such an evil upon our selves, when it was in our power to have avoided it. Now if there be no *Sense* nor *Perception* in us but what arises from the *Re-action of Matter* one part against another; whatever Representation of things, whatever Deliberation or Determination we fall upon, it will by Axiome 26. be *purely necessary*, there being upon this Hypothesis no more *Freedome* while we deliberate or conclude, then there is in a pair of scales, which rests as *necessarily* at last as it moved before. Wherefore it is manifest that this Faculty we call *Free-will* is not found in *Matter*, but in some other Substance, by Axiome 10.

12. Mr *Hobbs* therefore, to give him his due, consonantly enough to his own principles, does very peremptorily affirm *That all our actions are necessary*. But I having proved the contrary by that Faculty which we may call *Internal Sense* or *Common Notion*, found in all men that have not done violence to their own Nature; unless by some other approved Faculty he can discover the contrary, my Conclusion must stand for an undoubted Truth, by Axiome 5. He pretends therefore some Demonstration of *Reason*, which he would oppose against the dictate of this *Inward Sense*; which it will not be amiss to examine, that we may discover his Sophistry.

### CHAP. III.

1. Mr *Hobbs* his Arguments whereby he would prove all our actions necessitated. His first Argument. 2. His second Argument. 3. His third Argument. 4. His fourth Argument. 5. What must be the meaning of these words, Nothing taketh beginning from it self, in the first Argument of Mr *Hobbs*. 6. A fuller and more determinate explication of the foregoing words, whose sense is evidently convinced to be, That no Essence of it self can vary its modification. 7. That this is onely said by Mr *Hobbs*, not proved, and a full confutation of his Assertion. 8. Mr *Hobbs* imposed upon by his own Sophistry. 9. That one part of this first Argument of his is groundless, the other sophistical. 10. The plain proposall of his Argument, whence appears more fully the weakness and sophistry thereof. 11. An Answer to his second Argument. 12. An Answer to the third. 13. An Answer to a difficulty concerning the Truth and Falsehood of future Propositions. 14. An Answer to Mr *Hobbs* his fourth Argument, which, though slighted by himself, is the strongest of them all. 15. The difficulty of reconciling Free-will with Divine Prescience and Prophecies. 16. That the Faculty of Free-will is seldome put in use. 17. That the use of it is properly in Moral conflict. 18. That the

the Soul is not invincible there neither. 19. That Divine decrees either finde fit Instruments or make them. 20. That the more exact we make Divine Prescience, even to the comprehension of any thing that implies no contradiction in it self to be comprehended, the more clear it is that mans Will may be sometimes free. 21. Which is sufficient to make good my last Argument against Mr Hobbs.

1. **H**IS first Argument runs thus (I will repeat it in his own words, as also the rest of them as they are to be found in his Treatise of Liberty and Necessity; ) I conceive, (saith he) that nothing taketh beginning from it self, but from the action of some other immediate agent without it self; and that therefore, when first a man hath an appetite or Will to something to which immediatly before he had no appetite nor Will, the cause of his Will is not the Will it self, but something else not in his own disposing: So that whereas it is out of controversy, that of voluntary actions the Will is the necessary cause, and by this which is said the Will is also caused by other things, whereof it disposeth not, it followeth, that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes, and therefore are necessitated.

2. His second thus; I hold (saith he) that to be a sufficient cause, to which nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the effect: The same also is a necessary cause. For if it be possible that a sufficient cause shall not bring forth the effect, then there wanteth somewhat which was needful for the producing of it, and so the cause was not sufficient; but if it be impossible that a sufficient cause should not produce the effect, then is a sufficient cause a necessary cause, for that is said to produce an effect necessarily that cannot but produce it. Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced, is produced necessarily. For whatsoever is produced, hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or else it had not been. What follows is either the same, or so closely depending on this, that I need not adde it.

3. His third Argument therefore shall be that which he urges from Future disjunctions. For example, let the case be put of the Weather, 'Tis necessary that to morrow it shall rain, or not rain; If therefore, saith he, it be not necessary it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not rain, otherwise there is no necessity that the Proposition, It shall rain or not rain, should be true.

4. His fourth is this, That the denying of Necessity destroyeth both the Decrees and the Prescience of God Almighty. For whatsoever God hath purposed to bring to pass by man, as an Instrument, or foreseeeth shall come to pass; a man, if he have liberty from necessitation, might frustrate, and make not to come to pass; and God should either not foreknow it, and not decree it, or he should foreknow such things shall be as shall never be, and decree that which shall never come to pass.

5. The Entrance into his first Argument is something obscure and ambiguous, Nothing taketh beginning from it self: But I shall be as candid and faithfull an Interpreter as I may. If he mean by beginning, beginning of Existence, it is undoubtedly true, That no Substance, nor Modification of Substance, taketh beginning from it self; but this will not infer the Conclusion he drives at. But if he mean, that Nothing



taketh beginning from it self, of being otherwise affected or modified then before; he must either understand by *nothing*, no Essence, neither Spirit nor Body, or no Modification of Essence. He cannot mean Spirit, as admitting no such thing in the whole comprehension of Nature. If Body, it will not infer what he aims at, unless there be nothing but Body in the Universe; which is a mere precarious Principle of his, which he beseeches his credulous followers to admit, but he proves it no where, as I have already noted. If by *Modification* he mean the *Modification of Matter or Body*; that runs still upon the former Principle, That there is nothing but Body in the world, and therefore he proves nothing but upon a begg'd Hypothesis, and that a false one; as I have elsewhere demonstrated. Wherefore the most favourable Interpretation I can make is, That he means by *nothing*, no Essence, nor Modification of Essence, being willing to hide that dearly-hug'd Hypothesis of his (*That there is nothing but Body in the World*) under so general and uncertain termes.

6. The words therefore in the other senses having no pretence to conclude any thing, let us see how far they will prevail in this, taking *nothing*, for *no Essence*, or *no Modification of Essence*, or what will come nearer to the matter in hand, *no Faculty of an Essence*. And from this two-fold meaning, let us examine two Propositions that will result from thence, viz. *That no Faculty of any Essence can vary its Operation from what it is, but from the action of some other immediate Agent without it self*; or, *That no Essence can vary its Modification or Operation by it self, but by the action of some other immediate Agent without it*. Of which two Propositions the latter seems the better sense by far, and most natural. For it is very harsh, and, if truly looked into, as false, to say, *That the Mode or Faculty of any Essence changes it self*; for it is the Essence it self that exerts it self, into these variations of Modes, if no externall Agent is the cause of these changes. And Mr Hobbs opposing an *External Agent to this Thing* that he saies does not change it self, does naturally imply, That they are both not *Faculties* but *Substances* he speaks of.

7. Wherefore there remains onely the latter Proposition to be examined, *That no Essence of it self can vary its Modification*. That some Essence must have had a power of moving is plain, in that there is *Motion* in the world, which must be the Effect, of some Substance or other. But that *Motion* in a large sense, taking it for mutation or change, may proceed from that very Essence in which it is found, seems to me plain by Experience: For there is an Essence in us, whatever we will call it, which we find endued with this property; as appears from hence, that it has variety of perceptions, *Mathematical, Logical*, and I may adde also *Moral*, that are not any impresses nor footsteps of Corporeal Motion, as I have already demonstrated: and any man may observe in himself, and discover in the writings of others, how the Mind has passed from one of these perceptions to another, in very long deductions of Demonstration; as also what stilness from bodily Motion is required in the excogitation of such series of Reasons, where the Spirits are to run into no other posture nor motion then what they are guided into by the Mind it self, where these immaterial and intellectual Notions have the leading and rule.

rule. Besides in grosser Phantasmes, which are supposed to be somewhere impressed in the Brain, the composition of them, and dissolution and various disposal of them, is plainly an arbitrary act, and implies an Essence that can, as it lists, excite in it self the variety of such Phantasmes as have been first exhibited to her from External Objects, and change them and transpose them at her own will. But what need I reason against this ground of Mr Hobbs so solicitously? it being sufficient to discover, that he onely saies, that *No Essence can change the Modifications of it self*, but does not prove it; and therefore whatever he would infer hereupon is merely upon a begg'd Principle.

8. But however, from this precarious ground he will infer, that *when-ever we have a Will to a thing, the cause of this Will is not the Will it self, but something else not in our own disposing*; the meaning whereof must be, *That whenever we Will, some corporeal impress, which we cannot avoid, forces us thereto*. But the Illation is as weak as bold; it being built upon no foundation, as I have already shown. I shall onely take notice how Mr. Hobbs, though he has rescued himself from the authority of the Schools, and would fain set up for himself, yet he has not freed himself from their fooleries in talking of *Faculties* and *Operations* (and the absurditie is alike in both) as separate and distinct from the *Essence* they belong to, which causes a great deal of distraction and obscurity in the speculation of things. I speak this in reference to those expressions of his, of the *Will being the cause of willing*, and of its being the *necessary* cause of voluntary actions, and of things not being in its disposing. Whenas, if a man would speak properly, and desired to be understood, he would say, *That the Subject in which is this power or act of willing, (call it Man or the Soul of Man) is the cause of this or that voluntary action*. But this would discover his Sophistry, wherewith haply he has entrapt himself, which is this, *Something out of the power of the Will necessarily causes the Will; the Will once caused is the necessary cause of voluntary actions; and therefore all voluntary actions are necessitated*.

9. Besides that the first part of this Argumentation is groundless (as I have already intimated) the second is Sophisticall, that sayes *That the Will is the necessary cause of voluntary actions*: For by *necessary* may be understood either *necessitated*, forced and made to act, whether it will or no; or else it may signify that the Will is a *requisite* cause of voluntary actions, so that there can be no voluntary actions without it. The latter whereof may be in some sense true, but the former is utterly false. So the Conclusion being inferred from assertions whereof the one is groundless, the other Sophisticall, the Illation cannot but be ridiculously weak and despicable. But if he had spoke in the *Concrete* in stead of the *Abstract*, the Sophistry had been more grossly discoverable, or rather the train of his reasoning languid and contemptible. Omitting therefore to speak of the *Will* separately, which of it self is but a blind Power or Operation, let us speak of that *Essence* which is endued with *Will*, *Sense*, *Reason*, and other *Faculties*, and see what face this Argumentation of his will bear, which will then run thus;

10. *Some external, irresistible Agent does ever necessarily cause that*  
N n 2
*Essence*



*Essence* (call it *Soul* or what you please) which is endued with the *Faculties of Will and Understanding, to Will*: This *Essence*, endued with the power of exerting it self into the act of *Willing*, is the necessary cause of *Voluntary actions*: Therefore all *voluntary actions* are necessitated. The first Assertion now at first light appears a gross falshood, the *soul* being endued with *Understanding* as well as *Will*, and therefore she is not necessarily determined to will by external impresses, but by the displaying of certain notions and perceptions she raises in her self, that be purely intellectual. And the second seems a very slim and lank piece of Sophistry. Both which my reasons already alledged do so easily and so plainly reach, that I need adde nothing more, but pass to his second Argument, the form whereof in brief is this;

II. *Every Cause is a sufficient cause, otherwise it could not produce its effect: Every sufficient cause is a necessary cause, that is to say, will be sure to produce the effect, otherwise something was wanting thereto, and it was no sufficient cause: And therefore every cause is a necessary cause, and consequently every Effect or Action, even those that are termed Voluntary, are necessitated.* This reasoning looks smartly at first view; but if we come closer to it, we shall find it a pitifull piece of Sophistry, which is easily detected by observing the ambiguity of that Proposition, *Every sufficient cause is a necessary cause*: For the force lyes not so much in that it is said to be *Sufficient*, as in that it is said to be a *Cause*; which if it be, it must of necessity have an *Effect*, whether it be *sufficient* or *insufficient*; which discovers the Sophisme. For these relative terms of *Cause* and *Effect* necessarily imply one another. But every Being that is *sufficient* to act this or that *if it will*, and so to become the *Cause* thereof, doth neither act, nor abstain from acting *necessarily*. And therefore if it do act, it addes *Will* to the *Sufficiency* of its power; and if it did not act, it is not because it had not sufficient power, but because it would not make use of it. So that we see that every *sufficient Cause* rightly understood without captiositie is not a *necessary cause*, nor will be sure to produce the *Effect*; and that though there be a sufficiency of power, yet there may be something wanting, to wit, the exertion of the *Will*; whereby it may come to pass, that what might have acted if it would, did not: but if it did, *Will* being added to sufficient Power, that it cannot be said to be *necessary* in any other sense, then of that Axiome in Metaphysicks, *Quicquid est, quamdiu est, necesse est esse*: The reason whereof is, because it is impossible that a thing should be and not be at once. But before it acted, it might have chosen whether it would have acted or no; but it did determine it self. And in this sense is it to be said to be a *free Agent*, and not a *necessary* one. So that it is manifest, that though there be some prettie perverseness of wit in the contriving of this Argument, yet there is no solidity at all at the bottome.

12. And as little is there in his third. But in this, I must confess, I cannot so much accuse him of *Art* and *Sophistry*, as of ignorance of the rules of *Logick*; for he does plainly assert That the necessity of the truth of that Proposition there named depends on the necessity of the truth of the parts thereof; then which no grosser error can be committed in the

Art

Art of reasoning. For he might as well say that the necessity of the truth of a *Connex* Axiome depends on the necessity of the truth of the parts, as of a *Disjunct*. But in a *Connex*, when both the parts are not onely false, but impossible, yet the Axiome is necessarily true. As for example, *If Bucephalus be a man, he is endued with humane reason*; this Axiome is necessarily true, and yet the parts are impossible. For *Alexander's* horse can neither be a man, nor have the reason of a man, either radically or actually. The necessity therefore is only laid upon the *connexion* of the parts, not upon the parts themselves. So when I say, *To morrow it will rain, or it will not rain*, this *Disjunct* Proposition also is necessary, but the necessity lies upon the *Disjunction* of the parts, not upon the parts themselves: For they being immediately disjoyned, there is a necessity that one of them must be, though there be no necessity that this must be determined rather than that. As when a man is kept under custody where he has the use of two rooms only, though there be a necessity that he be found in one of the two, yet he is not confined to either one of them. And to be brief, and prevent those frivolous both answers and replies that follow in the pursuit of this Argument in Mr *Hobbs*; As the necessity of this *Disjunct* Axiome lies upon the *Disjunction* it self, so the truth, of which this necessity is a mode, must lye there too; for it is the *Disjunction* of the parts that is affirmed, and not the parts themselves, as any one that is but moderately in his wits must needs acknowledge.

13. There is a more dangerous way that Mr *Hobbs* might have made use of, and with more credit, but yet scarce with better success, which is the consideration of a simple Axiome that pronounces of a *future Contingent*, such as this, *Cras Socrates disputabit*. For every Axiome pronouncing either true or false, as all do agree upon; if this Axiome be now true, it is impossible but *Socrates* should dispute to morrow; or if it be now false, it is impossible he should: and so his Action of disputing or the omission thereof will be necessary, for the Proposition cannot be both true and false at once. Some are much troubled to extricate themselves out of this Nooze; but if we more precisely enquire into the sense of the Proposition, the difficulty will vanish. He therefore that affirms that *Socrates* will dispute to morrow, affirms it (to use the distinction of *Futurities* that *Aristotle* somewhere suggests) either as a *πὸ μὲλλον*, or *πὸ εἰσέμενον*, that is, either as a thing that is likely to be, but has a possibility of being otherwise, or else as a thing certainly to come to pass. If this latter, the Axiome is false; if the former, it is true: and so the liberty of *Socrates* his action, as also of all like *contingent* effects, are thus easily rescued from this sophistical entanglement. For every *Future* Axiome is as incapable of our judgment, unless we determine the sense of it by one of the forenamed modes, as an *Indefinite* Axiome is, before we in our minds adde the notes of *Universality* or *Particularity*: Neither can we say of either of them, that they are true or false, till we have compleated and determined their sense.

14. His fourth Argument he proposes with some diffidence and dislike, as if he thought it *not good Logick* (they are his own words) to make



use of it, and adde it to the rest. And for my own part, I cannot but approve of the consistency of his judgment, and coherency with other parts of his Philosophie: For if there be nothing but *Body* or *Matter* in the whole comprehension of things, it will be very hard to find out any such *Deity* as has the *knowledge* or *fore-knowledge* of any thing: And therefore I suspect that this last is onely cast in as *Argumentum ad hominem*, to puzzle such as have not dived to so profound a depth of natural knowledge, as to fancy they have discovered there is no God in the world.

15. But let him vilifie it as he will, it is the only Argument he has brought that has any tolerable sense or solidity in it; and it is a Subject that has exercised the wits of all Ages, to reconcile the *Liberty* of mans Will with the *Decrees* and *Prasceience* of God. But my *Freeneß*, I hope, and *Moderation* shall make this matter more easy to me, then it ordinarily proves to them that venture upon it. My Answer therefore in brief shall be this;

16. First, That though there be such a Faculty in the Soul of man as *Liberty of Will*, yet she is not alwaies in a state of acting according to it. For she may either *degenerate so far*, that it may be as certainly known what she will doe upon this or that occasion, as what an hungry Dog will doe when a crust is offered him; which is the general condition of almost all men in most occurrences of their lives: or else she may be so *Heroically good*, though that happen in very few, that it may be as certainly known as before what she will doe or suffer upon such or such emergencies: and in these cases the use of *Liberty of Will* ceases.

17. Secondly, That the use of the Faculty of *Free-will* is properly there, where we finde our selves so near to an *Equiponderancy*, being touch'd with the sense of *Vertue* on the one side, and the ease or *Pleasure* of some *vitious action* on the other, that we are conscious to our selves that we ought, and that we may, if we will, abandon the one and cleave to the other.

18. Thirdly, That in this Conflict the Soul has no such absolute power to determine her self to the one or the other action, but *Temptation* or *Supernatural assistance* may certainly carry her this way or that way; so that she may not be able to use that liberty of going indifferently either way.

19. Fourthly, That Divine *Decrees* either find men fit, or make them so, for the executing of whatever is absolutely purposed or prophesied concerning them.

20. Fifthly, That the *Prasceience* of God is so vast and exceeding the comprehension of our thoughts, that all that can be safely said of it is this, That this knowledge is most perfect and exquisite, accurately representing the *Natures, Powers* and *Properties* of the thing it does foreknow. Whence it must follow, that if there be any Creature *free* and undetermined, and that in such circumstances and at such a time he may either act thus or not act thus, this perfect *Fore-knowledge* must discern from all eternity, that the said Creature in such circumstances may either act thus, or so, or not. And further to declare the perfection of this *Fore-knowledge*

knowledge and *Omniscience* of God; as His *Omnipotence* ought to extend so far, as to be able to doe whatsoever implies no contradiction to be done; so his *Præscience* and *Omniscience* ought to extend so far, as to know precisely and fully whatever implies no contradiction to be known.

To conclude therefore briefly; *Free* or *Contingent* Effects do either imply a contradiction to be *foreknown*, or they do not imply it. If they imply a contradiction to be *foreknown*, they are no object of the *Omniscience* of God; and therefore there can be no pretence that his *Foreknowledge* does determinate them, nor can they be argued to be determined thereby. If they imply no contradiction to be *foreknown*, that is to acknowledge that Divine *Præscience* and they may very well consist together. And so either way, notwithstanding the Divine *Omniscience*, the Actions of men may be *free*.

21. The sum therefore of all is this, That mens actions are sometimes *free* and sometimes *not free*; but in that they are at any time *free*, is a Demonstration that there is a Faculty in us that is incompetible to mere *Matter*: which is sufficient for my purpose.

## CHAP. IV.

1. *An Enumeration of sundry Opinions concerning the Seat of Common Sense.* 2. *Upon supposition that we are nothing but mere Matter, That the whole Body cannot be the Common Sensorium;* 3. *Nor the Orifice of the Stomack;* 4. *Nor the Heart;* 5. *Nor the Brain;* 6. *Nor the Membranes;* 7. *Nor the Septum lucidum;* 8. *Nor Regius his small and perfectly-solid Particle.* 9. *The probability of the Conarion being the common Seat of Sense.*

I Have plainly proved, that neither those more Pure and Intellectual faculties of *Will* and *Reason*, nor yet those less pure of *Memory* and *Imagination*, are competible to mere *Bodies*. Of which we may be the more secure, I having so convincingly demonstrated, That not so much as that which we call \* *External Sense* is competible to the same: all which Truths I have concluded concerning *Matter generally considered*.

\* See chap. 1.  
sect. 8, 9, 10,  
11, 12, 13, 14.  
and chap. 2.  
sect. 3, 4, 5, 6;

But because there may be a suspicion in some, which are over-credulous concerning the powers of *Body*, that *Organization* may doe strange feats (which Surmise notwithstanding is as fond as if they should imagine, that though neither Silver, nor Steel, nor Iron, nor Lute-strings, have any Sense apart, yet being put together in such a manner and formed as will (suppose) make a compleat *Watch*, they may have *Sense*; that is to say, that a *Watch* may be a living creature, though the several parts have neither *Life* nor *Sense*;) I shall for their sakes goe more particularly to work, and recite every Opinion that I could ever meet with by converse with either men or books concerning the *Seat of the Common Sense*, and after trie whether any of these Hypotheses can possibly be admitted for



Truth, upon supposition that we consist of nothing but *mere modified and organized Matter*.

I shall first recite the Opinions, and then examine the possibility of each in particular, which in brief are these. 1. That the whole Body is the Seat of Common Sense. 2. That the Orifice of the Stomack. 3. The Heart. 4. The Brain. 5. The Membranes. 6. The *Septum lucidum*. 7. Some very small and perfectly-solid particle in the Body. 8. The *Coronarion*. 9. The concurse of the Nerves about the fourth ventricle of the Brain. 10. The Spirits in that fourth ventricle.

2. That the first Opinion is false is manifest from hence, That, upon supposition we are nothing but *mere Matter*, if we grant the *whole Body* to be one common *Sensorium*, perceptive of all Objects, *Motion* which is impressed upon the Eye or Eare, must be transmitted into all the parts of the Body. For *Sense* is really the same with *communication of Motion*, by Axiome 20. And the variety of Sense arising from the modification of Motion, which must needs be variously modified by the different temper of the parts of the Body, by Axiome 22. it plainly follows that the Eye must be otherwise affected by the motion of Light, then the other parts to which this motion is transmitted. Wherefore if it be the *whole Body* that perceives, it will perceive the Object in every part thereof several wayes modified at once; which is against all Experience. It will also appear in all likelihood in several places at once, by reason of the many windings and turnings that must happen to the transmission of this *Motion*, which are likely to be as so many Refractions or Reflexions.

3. That *the Orifice of the Stomack* cannot be *the seat of Common Sense*, is apparent from hence, That that which is the common *Sentient* does not only *perceive* all Objects, but has the power of *moving* the Body. Now besides that there is no organization in the mouth of the Stomack that can elude the strength of our Arguments laid down in the foregoing Chapters, which took away all capacity from *Matter* of having any *perception* at all in it, there is no Mechanical reason imaginable to be found in the Body, whereby it will appear possible, that supposing the mouth of the Stomack were the *common Percipient* of all Objects, it could be able to *move* the rest of the members of the Body, as we finde something in us does. This is so palpably plain, that it is needless to spend any more words upon it.

4. The same may be said concerning *the Heart*. For who can imagine that, if the *Heart* were that *common Percipient*, there is any such Mechanical connexion betwixt it and all the parts of the Body, that it may, by such or such a perception, command the motion of the Foot or little Finger? Besides that it seems wholly imployed in the performance of its *Systole* and *Diastole*, which causes such a great difference of the situation of the *Heart* by turns, that if it were that Seat in which the sense of all Objects centre, we should not be able to see things steddily or fix our sight in the same place.

5. How incapable the *Brain* is of being so active a Principle of *Motion* as we find in our selves, the *visciduity* thereof does plainly indicate. Besides that Physicians have discovered by experience, that *the Brain* is so far

far from being the *common Seat* of all senses, that it has in it none at all. And the *Arabians*, that say it has, have distinguished it into such severall offices of *Imagination*, *Memory*, *Common Sense*, &c. that we are still at a loss for some one part of *Matter* that is to be the *Common Percipient* of all these. But I have so clearly demonstrated the impossibility of the *Brain's* being able to perform those functions that appertain truly to what ordinarily men call the *Soul*, in my *Antidote against Atheism*, that it is enough to refer the Reader thither.

See Book 1. ch.  
11. sect. 5, 6, 7.

6. As for the *Membranes*, whether we would fancy them all the *Seat* of *Common Sense*, or *some one* Membrane, or *part* thereof; the like difficulties will occur as have been mentioned already. For if *all the Membranes*, the difference and situation of them will vary the aspect and sight of the Object, so that the same things will appear to us in several hues and several places at once, as is easily demonstrated from Axiome 22. If *some one Membrane*, or *part* thereof, it will be impossible to excogitate any Mechanical reason, how this *one* particular Membrane, or any *part* thereof, can be able so strongly and determinately to *move* upon occasion every part of the Body.

7. And therefore for this very cause cannot the *Septum lucidum* be the *Common Percipient* in us, because it is utterly unimaginable how it should have the power of so stoutly and distinctly *moving* our exterior parts and limbs.

8. As for that new and marvelous Invention of *Henricus Regius*, That it may be a *certain perfectly-solid, but very small, particle of Matter in the Body, that is the seat of common perception*; besides that it is as boldly asserted, that such an *hard* particle should have *Sense* in it, as that the filings of Iron and Steel should; it cannot be the spring of *Motion*: For how should so small an Atome *move* the whole Body, but by moving it self? But it being more subtile then the point of any needle, when it puts it self upon motion, especially such strong thrustings as we sometimes use, it must needs passe through the Body and leave it.

Philosoph. Natural. lib. 5.  
cap. 1.

9. The most pure Mechanical Invention is that of the use of the *Conation*, proposed by \* *Des-Cartes*; which, considered with some other organizations of the Body, bids the fairest of any thing I have met withall, or ever hope to meet withall, for the resolution of the Passions and Properties of living Creatures into mere *Corporeal* motion. And therefore it is requisite to insist a little upon the explication thereof, that we may the more punctually confute them that would abuse his Mechanical contrivances to the exclusion of all Principles but *Corporeal*, in either Man or Beast.

\* *Dioptr. cap. 5. Artic. 13. and De Passion. Part. 1. Artic. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16.*



## C H A P. V.

1. *How Perception of external Objects, Spontaneous Motion, Memory and Imagination, are pretended to be performed by the Conarion, Spirits and Muscles, without a Soul.* 2. *That the Conarion, devoid of a Soul, cannot be the Common Percipient, demonstrated out of Des-Cartes himself.* 3. *That the Conarion, with the Spirits and Organization of the Parts of the Body, is not a sufficient Principle of Spontaneous motion, without a Soul.* 4. *A description of the use of the Valvulæ in the Nerves of the Muscles for spontaneous motion.* 5. *The insufficiency of this contrivance for that purpose.* 6. *A further demonstration of the insufficiency thereof, from whence is clearly evinced that Brutes have Souls.* 7. *That Memory cannot be saved the way above described;* 8. *Nor Imagination.* 9. *A Distribution out of Des-Cartes of the Functions in us, some appertaining to the Body, and others to the Soul.* 10. *The Author's Observations thereupon.*

1. **T**HE sum of this Abuse must in brief be this, That the *Glandula Pinealis* is the common Sentient or Percipient of all Objects; and without a Soul, by virtue of the *Spirits* and *Organization* of the Body, may doe all those feats that we ordinarily conceive to be performed by Soul and Body joyned together. For it being one, whereas the rest of the Organs of Sense are double, and so handsomely seated as to communicate with the *Spirits* as well of the posteriour as anteriour Cavities of the *Brain*; by their help all the motions of the *Nerves* (as well of those that transmit the sense of outward Objects, as of them that serve for the inward affections of the Body, such as Hunger, Thirst and the like) are easily conveyed unto it: and so being variously moved, it does variously determine the course of the *Spirits* into such and such *Muscles*, whereby it moves the Body.

Cartes. De  
Passion. Part. 1.  
Artic. 32.

Moreover that the transmission of Motion from the Object, through the *Nerves*, into the inward concavities of the *Brain*, and so to the *Conarion*, opens such and such Pores of the *Brain*, in such and such order or manner, which remain as tracts or footsteps of the presence of these Objects after they are removed. Which tracts, or signatures, consist mainly in this, that the *Spirits* will have an easier passage through these Pores then other parts of the *Brain*. And hence arises *Memory*, when the *Spirits* be determined, by the inclining of the *Conarion*, to that part of the *Brain* where these tracts are found, they moving then the *Conarion* as when the Object was present, though not so strongly.

Des-Cart. De  
Pass. Part. 1.  
Artic. 21.

From the hitting of the *Spirits* into such like tracts, is also the nature of *Imagination* to be explained; in which there is little difference from *Memory*, saving that the reflexion upon time as past, when we saw or perceived such or such a thing, is quite left out. But these are not all the operations we are conscious to our selves of, and yet more then can be made out by this Hypothesis, That *Perception of Objects, Spontaneous Motion,*

*Motion, Memory and Imagination*, may be all performed by virtue of this *Glandula*, the Animal Spirits, and mere Organization of the Body; as we shall plainly find, though but upon an easy examination.

2. For that the *Conarion*, devoid of a Soul, has no *perception* of any one Object, is demonstrable from the very description *Cartesius* makes of the transmission of the image, suppose through the Eye to the Brain, and so to the *Conarion*. For it is apparent from what he sets down in his *Treatise of the Passions of the Soul*, that the Image that is propagated from the Object to the *Conarion*, is impressed thereupon in some latitude of space. Whence it is manifest that the *Conarion* does not, nor can perceive the whole Object, though severall parts may be acknowledged to have the *perception* of the several parts thereof. But something in us *perceives* the whole, which therefore cannot be the *Conarion*. Part. 1. Art. 35.  
See Book 2. ch  
2. sect. 6.

And that we do not *perceive* the external Object *double*, is not so much because the Image is united in the Organ of *Common Sense*, as that the lines come so from the Object to both the Eyes, that it is felt in one place; otherwise if the Object be very near, and the direction of our Eyes be not fitted to that nearness, it will seem *double* however. Which is a Demonstration that a man may see with both Eyes at once; and for my own part, I'm sure that I see better at distance, when I use both, then when one.

3. As for *Spontaneous Motion*, that the *Conarion* cannot be a sufficient Principle thereof, with the *Spirits* and *organization of other parts of the Body*, though we should admit it a fit seat of *Common Sense*, will easily appear, if we consider, that so weak and so small a thing as that *Glandula* is, seems utterly unable to *determine* the *Spirits* with that force and violence we find they are determined in *running, striking, thrusting* and the like; and that it is evident, that sometimes scarce the thousandth part of the *Conarion* shall be director of this force; viz. when the Object of Sight, suppose, is as little as a pin's point, or when a man is prick'd with a needle, these receptions must be as little in the *Glandula* as in the exterior Sense. See the Appen-  
dix to my An-  
tidote chap. 10.  
sect. 6.

But suppose the whole *Conarion* alwaies did act in the *determining the motion* of the *Spirits* into this or that *Muscle*; it is impossible that such *fluid Matter* as these *Spirits* are, that upon the noddings of the *Conarion* forward may easily recede back, should ever determine their course with that force and strength they are determined.


But haply it will be answered, That such subtile and fluid bodies as the *Animal Spirits*, that are in a readiness to be upon Motion any way, the least thing will *determine* their course; and that the *Muscles* themselves, being well replenish'd with *Spirits*, and framed with such *Valvulae* as will easily intromit them from the *Brain*, and also conveigh them out of one opposite *Muscle* into another upon the least redundance of *Spirits* in the one above the other, and so shut them in; that that force we find in *spontaneous Motion* may very well be salved by this Mechanical Artifice.

4. That the insufficiency of this Answer may appear, let us more accurately consider the contrivance in the following Figure, which  
must



\* *Philos. Natural.* lib. 4.  
cap. 16.  
\* *Art.* 1.  
*Artic.* 11.

must be some such thing as \* *Regius* has ventured at in his Philosophy, and which may serve for the more easy understanding of what \* *Des-Cartes* writes in his Book of Passions. Here B C are two opposite Muscles, the known Instruments of spontaneous Motion; K, some part of the Body to be moved; D E and F G are the Nerves through which Spirits are transmitted from the Brain into the foresaid Muscles; D and F two *Valvula* to let pass the Spirits from the Brain into the Muscles, but stop them if they would regurgitate; G is a Valve that lets the Spirits out of the Muscle C into B, and E another Valve that lets the Spirits out of B into C. Now in brief, the result of this Mechanicall contrivance is this, viz. That the Spirits being determined by the *Conarion* never so little more copiously into B then into C, those in C will pass through the Valve G into B, and so B swelling, and consequently shortning it self, it must needs bring up the member K.



5. We will not here alledge that this may be onely a mere fancy, these *Valvula* in the *Nerves* not being yet discovered by any Anatomist to be part of the *Organization* of the Body of any Animal; but rather shew, that they would not effect what is aimed at, though they were admitted. For first, it does not appear that the Spirits will make more hast out of C into B, then the pressure caused in B by the determination of the Spirits from the *Conarion* forces them to. For all places being alike to them to play in, they will goe no further then they are driven or pressed, as Wind in a Bladder. And how the *Conarion* should drive or press the Spirits into B, so as to make it press those in C, and force them out so quick and smart as we find in some Actions, is a thing utterly unconceivable.

6. Besides, admit that the *Conarion* could determine them with some considerable force so into B, that they would make those in C come to them through the Valve G, there being the Valve E to transmit them into C again, it is impossible but that the Tenth part of that force which we ordinarily use to open a mans hand against his will, should whether he would or no easily open it. For a very ordinary strength moving K from B towards C, must needs so press the Spirits in B, that they will certainly pass by E into C, if our *Body* be nothing but *Matter Mechanically organized*. And therefore it is the mere *Imperium* of our *Soul* that does determine the *Spirits* to this *Muscle* rather then the other, and holds them there in despite of external force. From whence it is manifest that brute Beasts must have *Souls* also.

7. Concerning *Memory* and *Imagination*, that the mere Mechanical reasons of *Des-Cartes* will not reach them, we shall clearly understand, if we consider that the easy aperture of the same Pores of the *Brain*, that were opened at the presence of such an Object, is not sufficient to represent the Object, after the *Conarion* has by inclining it self thitherward determined the course of the Spirits into the same Pores. For this could  
only

*De Passion.*  
*Part.* 1.  
*Artic.* 42.

only represent the *Figure* of a thing, not the *Colours* thereof. Besides; a man may bring an hundred Objects, and expose them to our view at the same distance, the Eye-keeping exactly in the same posture, insomuch that it shall be necessary for these images to take up the very same place of the *Brain*, and yet there shall be a *distinct remembrance* of all these; which is impossible, if there be no *Soul* in us, but all be *mere Matter*. The same may be said of so many *Names* or *Words* levell'd if you will out of a Trunk into the Eare kept accurately in the same posture, so that the *Sound* shall beat perpetually upon the same parts of the Organ, yet if there be five hundred of them, there may be a *distinct memory* for every one of them; which is a power perfectly beyond the bounds of *mere Matter*, for there would be a necessary confusion of all.

8. Lastly, for those imaginations or representations that are of no one Object that we ever see, but made up of several that have taken their distinct places in the *Brain*, some (suppose) before and others behind, how can the *Conarion* joyn these together, and in such a posture of conjunction as it pleases? Or rather in one and the same Object, suppose this Man or that House, which we see in a right posture, and has left such a signature or figure in the *Brain* as is fit to represent it so, how can the *Conarion* invert the posture of the image, and make it represent the House and Man with the heels upwards? Besides the difficulty of representing the *Distance* of an Object, or the *Breadth* thereof, concerning which we have spoken \* already. It is impossible the *Conarion*, if it be *mere Matter*, should perform any such operations as these. For it must raise motions in it self, such as are not necessarily convey'd by any corporeal impress of another Body, which is plainly against Axiome 26.

See Cartes. *De Passion*. Part. 1. Artic. 43.

\* Chap. 2. sect. 8.

9. And therefore that sober and judicious Wit *Des-Cartes* dares not stretch the power of Mechanical organization thus far, but doth plainly confess, That as there are *some Functions* that belong to the *Body* alone; so there are others that belong to the *Soul*, which he calls *Cogitations*; and are according to him of two sorts, the one *Actions*, the other *Passions*. The *Actions* are all the operations of our *Will*, as in some sense all *Perceptions* may be termed *Actions*. And these *Actions of the Will* are either such as are *mere Intellectual Operations*, and end in the *Soul* her self, such as her stirring up her self to love God, or contemplate any *Immaterial Object*; or they are such as have an influence on the *Body*, as when by virtue of our *Will* we put our selves upon going to this or that place.

*De Passion*. Part. 1. Artic. 17, 18.

He distinguishes again *Perceptions* into two sorts, whereof the one has the *Soul* for their Cause, the other the *Body*. Those that are caus'd by the *Body* are most what such as depend on the *Nerves*. But besides these there is one kind of *Imagination* that is to be referred hither, and that properly has the *Body* for its cause, to wit, that \* *Imagination* that arises merely from the hitting of the *Animal Spirits* against the tracts of those Images that external Objects have left in the *Brain*, and so representing them to the *Conarion*; which may happen in the day-time when our *Fancy* roves, and we do not set our selves on purpose to think on things, as well as it does in sleep by night. Those *Perceptions* that arrive to the *Soul* by the interposition of the *Nerves* differ one from another

*Cartes. De Passion*. Part. 1. Artic. 19, 20.

\* *De Passion*. Part. 1. Artic. 21.

Artic. 22, 23, 24, 25.



in this, that some of them refer to *outward Objects* that strike our Sense, others to *our Body*, such as *Hunger, Thirst, Pain, &c.* and others to the *Soul* it self, as *Sorrow, Joy, Fear, &c.*

Those *Perceptions* that have the *Soul* for their Cause, are either the *Perceptions* of her own *Acts of Will*, or else of her *Speculation of things purely Intelligible*, or else of *Imaginations made at pleasure*, or finally of *Reminiscency*, when she searches out something that she has let slip out of her Memory.

Artic. 19.  
20, 42.

Cartes. Dissert.  
De Methodo,  
Artic. 5. & de  
Passion. Part. 1.  
Artic. 16.

10. That which is observable in this Distribution is this, That all those *Cogitations* that he calls *Actions*, as also those kind of *Perceptions* whose Cause he assigns to the *Soul*, are in themselves (and are acknowledged by him) of that nature, that they cannot be imitated by any creature by the *mere organization* of its Body. But for the other, he holds they may, and would make us believe they are in *Bodies of Brutes*, which he would have mere *Machinas*, that is, That from the mere Mechanical frame of their Body, outward Objects of Sense may open Pores in their Brains so, as that they may determine the Animal Spirits into such and such Muscles for Spontaneous Motion: That the course of the Spirits also falling into the Nerves in the Intestines and Stomack, Spleen, Heart, Liver, and other parts, may cause the very same effects of Passion, suppose of Love, Hatred, Joy, Sorrow, in these brute *Machinas*, as we feel in our Bodies; though they, as being senseless, feel them not: and so the vellication of certain Tunicles and Fibres in the Stomack and Throat may affect their Body as ours is in the Sense of Hunger or Thirst: And finally, That the hitting of the Spirits into the tracts of the Brain that have been sign'd by External Objects, may act so upon their Body as it does upon ours in *Imagination* and *Memory*.

Now adde to this *Machina* of *Des-Cartes*, the capacity in *Matter* of *Sensation* and *Perception*, (which yet I have demonstrated it to be incapable of) and it will be exquisitely as much as Mr. *Hobbs* himself can expect to arise from mere Body, that is, All the Motions thereof being purely Mechanical, the perceptions and propensions will be fatal, necessary and unavoidable, as he loves to have them.

But being no *Cogitations* that *Des-Cartes* terms *Actions*, as also no kind of *Perceptions* that he acknowledges the *Soul* to be the Cause of, are to be resolved into any *Mechanical* contrivance; we may take notice of them as a *peculiar* rank of Arguments, and such, as that if it could be granted that the *Souls of Brutes* were nothing but *Sentient Matter*, yet it would follow that a *Substance of an higher nature*, and truly *Immaterial*, must be the Principle of those *more noble Operations* we find in our selves, as appears from Axiome 20, and 26.

## CHAP. VI.

1. *That no part of the Spinal Marrow can be the Common Sensorium without a Soul in the Body.* 2. *That the Animal Spirits are more likely to be that Common Percipient.* 3. *But yet it is demonstrable they are not:* 4. *As not being so much as capable of Sensation;* 5. *Nor of directing Motion into the Muscles;* 6. *Much less of Imagination and rational Invention;* 7. *Nor of Memory.* 8. *An Answer to an Evasion.* 9. *The Author's reason, why he has confuted so particularly all the suppositions of the Seat of Common Sense, when few of them have been asserted with the exclusion of a Soul.*

1. **T** Here remain now onely Two Opinions to be examined: the one, *That place of the Spinal Marrow where Anatomists conceive there is the nearest concourse of all the Nerves of the Body;* the other, *the Animal Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain.* As for the former, viz. *That part of the Spinal Marrow where the concourse of the Nerves is conceived to be,* as I have answered in like case, so I say again, that besides that I have already demonstrated, that *Matter* is incapable of *Sense*, and that there is no modification thereof in the *Spinal Marrow*, that will make it more likely to be indued with that Faculty than the pith of Elder or a mess of Curds; we are also to take notice, that it is utterly inept for *Motion*, nor is it conceivable how that part of it, or any other that is assigned to this office of being the *Common Percipient* in us of all Thoughts and Objects, (which must also have the power of *moving* our members) can, having so little agitation in it self, (as appearing nothing but a kind of soft Pap or Pulp) so nimbly and strongly *move* the parts of our Body.

2. In this regard the *Animal Spirits* seem much more likely to perform that office; and those, the importunity of whose gross fancies constrains them to make the Soul *Corporeal*, do nevertheless usually pitch upon some *subtile thin Matter* to constitute her nature or Essence: And therefore they imagine her to be either *Aire, Fire, Light*, or some such like Body; with which the *Animal Spirits* have no small affinity.

3. But this opinion, though it may seem plausible at first sight, yet the difficulties it is involved in are insuperable. For it is manifest, that all the Arguments that were brought \* before will recur with full force in this place. For there is no *Matter* that is so perfectly *liquid* as the *Animal Spirits*, but consists of particles onely contiguous one to another, and actually upon Motion playing and turning one by another as busy as Atomes in the Sun. Now therefore, let us consider whether that Treasury of pure *Animal Spirits* contained in the *fourth Ventricle* be able to sustain so noble an office as to be the *common Percipient* in our Body; which, as I have often repeated, is so complex a Function, that it does not onely contain the *Perception of external Objects*, but *Motion, Imagination, Reason* and *Memory*.

4. Now at the very first dash, the transmission of the image of the

\* Chap. 2. sect. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, &c.



Object into this crowd of particles cannot but hit variously upon them, and therefore they will have several *Perceptions* amongst them, some haply perceiving part of the Object, others all, others more then all, others also perceiving of it in one place, and others in another. But the *Percipient in us* representing no such confusion or disorder in our beholding of Objects, it is plain that it is not the *Animal Spirits* that is it.

5. Again, That which is so confounded a *Percipient*, how can it be a right Principle of *directing Motion* into the *Muscles*? For besides what disorder may happen in this function upon the distracted representation of present Objects, the power of *thinking, excogitating, and deliberating*, being in these *Animal Spirits* also, (and they having no means of *communicating* one with another, but jostling one against another; which is as much to the purpose, as if men should knock heads to communicate to each other their conceits of Wit,) it must needs follow that they will have their *perceptions, inventions, and deliberations* apart; which when they put in Execution, must cause a marvelous confusion in the Body, some of them commanding the parts this way, others driving them another way: or if their factions have many divisions and subdivisions, every one will be so weak, that none of them will be able to command it any way. But we find no such struggling or countermands of any thing in us, that would act our Body one way when we would another; as if when one was a going to write

Μὴνιν ἀείδε, δαδ—

something stronger in him, whose conceits he is *not privy* to, should get the use of his hand, and in stead of that write down

Arma virumque cano—

And the like may be said of any other *Spontaneous Motion*, which being so constantly within our deliberation or command as it is, it is a sufficient Argument to prove that it is not such a lubricous Substance as the *Animal Spirits*, nor so disunited; but something more *perfectly One* and *Indivisible*, that is the Cause thereof.

6. We need not instance any further concerning the power of *Invention* and *Reason*, how every particle of these *Animal Spirits* has a liberty to *think* by it self, and *consult* with it self, as well as to *play* by it self, and how there is no possible means of *communicating* their Thoughts one to another, unless it should be, as I have said, by hitting one against another: but that can onely communicate *Motion*, not their determinate *Thought*; unless that these particles were conceived to figure themselves into the shape of those things they think of, which is impossible by Axiome 26. And suppose it were possible one particle should shape it self, for example, into a *George on Horse-back* with a Lance in his hand, and another into an *Inchanted Castle*; this *George on Horse-back* must run against the *Castle*, to make the *Castle* receive his impress and similitude. But what then? Truly the encounter will be very unfortunate: For *S. George* indeed may easily break his Lance, but it is impossible that he should by jostling against the Particle in the form of a *Castle* convey the entire shape of himself and his Horse thereby, such as we find our selves able to imagine of a man on horse-back. Which is a Truth as demonstrable

strable as any Theorem in Mathematicks, but so plain at first sight, that I need not use the curiosity of a longer Demonstration to make it more firm.

Nor is there any colourable Evasion by venturing upon a new way, as if this particle having transformed it self into a *Castle*, and that into an *Horseman*, all the others then would see them both and they one another. For by *what light*, and *how little* would they appear, and in *what different places*, according to the different posture of the particles of the *Animal Spirits*, and with what *different faces*, some seeing one side, others another?

But besides this there is a further difficulty, that if such *Sensible representations* as these could be conveyed from one particle to another by corporeal encounters and justlings, or by that other way after alledged; *Logical* and *Mathematical Notions* can not. So that some of the *Animal Spirits* may think of one Demonstration in *Mathematicks*, or of part of that Demonstration, and others of another: insomuch that if a *Mathematician* be to write, while he would write one thing upon the determination of these *Animal Spirits*, others may get his hand to make use of for the writing something else, to whose Thoughts and Counsel he was not at all privy; nor can tell any thing, till those other *Animal Spirits* have writ it down. Which Absurdities are so mad and extravagant, that a man would scarce defile his pen by recording them, were it not to awaken those that dote so much on the *power of Matter* (as to think it of it self sufficient for all *Phænomena* in the world) into due shame and abhorrence of their foolish Principle.

7. The last Faculty I will consider is *Memory*, which is also necessarily joyned with the rest in the *Common Percipient*; of which not onely the *fluidity* of parts, but also their *dissipability*, makes the *Animal Spirits* utterly incapable. For certainly, the *Spirits* by reason of their *Subtility* and *Activity* are very *dissipable*, and in all likelihood remain not the same for the space of a week together; and yet things that one has not thought of for many years, will come as freshly into a mans mind as if they were transacted but yesterday.

8. The onely Evasion they can excogitate here is this, That as there is a continual supply of *Spirits* by degrees, so, as they come in, they are *seasoned*, *fermented* and *tinctured* with the same *Notions*, *Perceptions* and *Propensions* that the *Spirits* they find there have. These are fine words, but signifie nothing but this, that the *Spirits* there present in the Brain communicate the *Notions* and *Perceptions* they have to these new-comers; which is that which I have already proved impossible in the foregoing Sections. And therefore it is impossible that the *Animal Spirits* should be that *Common Percipient* that *hears*, *sees*, *moves*, *remembers*, *understands*, and does other functions of life that we perceive performed in us or by us.

9. We have now particularly evinced, that neither the *whole Body*, nor any of those *parts* that have been pitched upon, if we exclude the presence of a *Soul* or *Immaterial Substance*, can be the *Seat of Common Sense*. In which I would not be so understood, as if it implied that there are none



of these parts, but some or other have affirmed might be the *common Sensorium*, though we had no Soul: But because they have been stood upon, all of them, by some or other to be the *Seat of Common Sense*; supposing a *Soul* in the *Body*, that there might no imaginable doubt or scruple be left behind, I have taken the pains thus punctually and particularly to prove, that none of them can be the place of *Common Sense* without one.

And thus I have perfectly finished my main design, which was to demonstrate *That there is a Soul or Incorporeal Substance residing in us, distinct from the Body*. But I shall not content my self here, but for a more full discovery of her *Nature* and *Faculties*, I shall advance further, and search out her *chief Seat in the Body*, where and from whence she exercises her most noble Functions, and after enquire whether she be *confined* to that part thereof alone, or whether she be *spread* through all our members; and lastly consider after what manner she *sees, feels, hears, imagines, remembers, reasons, and moves the Body*. For beside that I shall make some good use of these discoveries for further purpose, it is also in it self very pleasant to have in readiness a rational and coherent account, and a determinate apprehension of things of this nature.

## CHAP. VII.

1. *His Enquiry after the Seat of Common Sense, upon supposition there is a Soul in the Body.* 2. *That there is some particular Part in the Body that is the seat of Common Sense.* 3. *A general division of their Opinions concerning the place of Common Sense.* 4. *That of those that place it out of the Head there are two sorts.* 5. *The Invalidity of Helmont's reasons whereby he would prove the Orifice of the Stomack to be the principal Seat of the Soul.* 6. *An Answer to Helmont's stories for that purpose.* 7. *A further confutation out of his own concessions.* 8. *Mr. Hobbs his Opinion confuted, that makes the Heart the Seat of Common Sense.* 9. *A further confutation thereof from Experience.* 10. *That the Common Sense is seated somewhere in the Head.* 11. *A caution for the choice of the particular place thereof.* 12. *That the whole Brain is not it;* 13. *Nor Regius his small solid Particle;* 14. *Nor any external Membrane of the Brain, nor the Septum Lucidum.* 15. *The three most likely places.* 16. *Objections against Cartesius his Opinion concerning the Conarion answered.* 17. *That the Conarion is not the Seat of Common Sense;* 18. *Nor that part of the Spinal Marrow where the Nerves are conceived to concur, but the Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain.*

1. **I**T will therefore be requisite for us to resume the former Opinions, altering the Hypothesis; and to examine which of them is most reasonable, supposing there be a *Substance Immaterial* or *Soul* in man.

2. That

2. That there is *some particular* or restrain'd *Seat of the Common Sense*, is an Opinion that even all Philosophers and Physicians are agreed upon. And it is an ordinary Comparison amongst them, that the *External Senses* & the *Common Sense* considered together are like a Circle with five lines drawn from the Circumference to the Centre. Wherefore as it has been obvious for them to finde out particular Organs for the *External Senses*, so they have also attempted to assign some distinct part of the Body for to be an Organ of the *Common Sense*; that is to say, as they discovered Sight to be seated in the Eye, Hearing in the Eare, Smelling in the Nose, &c. so they conceived that there is some part of the Body wherein Seeing, Hearing and all other Perceptions meet together, as the lines of a Circle in the Centre: and that there the Soul does also judge and discern of the difference of the Objects of the outward Senses. They have justly therefore excluded all the *External* parts of the Body from the lightest suspicion of any capacity of undergoing such a function as is thus general, they being all employed in a more particular task, which is to be the Organ of some one of these five outward Senses; and to be affected no otherwise then by what is impressed upon themselves, and chiefly from their proper Objects; amongst which five, *Touch* properly so called has the greatest share, it being as large as the Skin that covers us, and reaching as deep as any Membrane and Nerve in the limbs and trunk of the Body, besides all the *Exterior* parts of the Head. All which can no more see then the Eye can hear, or the Eare can smell.

3. Besides this, all those Arguments that do so clearly evince that the place of *Common Sense* is somewhere in the *Head*, are a plain demonstration that *the whole Body* cannot be the Seat thereof, and what those Arguments are you shall hear anon. For all those Opinions that have pitched on any *one Part* for the Seat of *Common Sense*, being to be divided into two Ranks, to wit, either such as assign some particular place in the *Body*, or else in the *Head*, we will proceed in this order: as first to confute those that have made choice of any part for the Seat of *Common Sense* out of the *Head*; and then in the second place we will in general shew, that the common *Sensorium* must be in *some part* of the *Head*; and lastly, of those many opinions concerning *what part of the Head* this common *Sensorium* should be, those which seem less reasonable being rejected, we shall pitch upon what we conceive the most unexceptionable.

4. Those that place the *Common Sensorium* out of the *Head*, have seated it either in the *upper Orifice of the Stomack*, or in the *Heart*. The former is \* *Van-Helmont's* Opinion, the other *Mr Hobbs* his.

\* *Helmont de  
Sede Anima.*

5. As for *Van-Helmont*, there is nothing he alledges for his Opinion but may be easily answered. That which mainly imposed upon him was the *exceeding Sensibility* of that part, which Nature made so, that, as a faithfull and sagacious Porter, it might admit nothing into the *Stomack* that might prove mischievous or troublesome to the Body. From this *tender Sensibility*, great offences to it may very well cause *Swoonings*, and *Apoplexies*, and cessations of Sense. But *Fear* and *Foy* and *Grief* have dispatch'd some very suddainly, when yet the first entrance of that deadly stroke has been at the *Eare* or the *Eye*, from some unsupportable ill



De Passiōn.  
Part. 1. Artic. 33.

newes or horrid spectacle. And the harsh handling of an angry Sore, or the treading on a Corn on the Toe, may easily cast some into a swoon, and yet no man will ever imagine the Seat of the *Common Sense* to be placed in the *Foot*. In fine, there is no more reason to think the *Common Sensorium* is in the *mouth of the Stomack*, because of the *Sensible Commotions* we feel there, then that it is seated in the *Stars*, because we so clearly perceive their Light, as *Des-Cartes* has well answered upon like occasion. Nor can *Phrensies* and *Madnesses*, though they may sometimes be observed to take their rise from thence, any more prove that it is the Seat of the *Common Sense*, then the *Furor uterinus*, *Apoplexies*, *Epilepsies*, and *Syncopes* proceeding from the *Wombe*, do argue that the common *Sensorium* of Women lies in that part.

6. And if we consider the great *Sympathy* betwixt the *Orifice of the Stomack* and the *Heart*, whose *Pathemata* are so alike and conjoyned that the Ancients have given one name to both parts, calling them promiscuously *καρδία*, and the pains of the Stomack *καρδιαλγίαι*, and *καρδιωγμῆι*, as also that the *Heart* is that part from which manifestly are the supplies of Life, whence the *Pulse* ceasing, Life cannot long continue for want of Warmth and Spirits; here is an evident reason, how it may happen that a Wound about the *mouth of the Stomack* may dispatch a man more suddainly then a wound in the *Head*, they being both supposed mortal, though the seat of the *Sensitive Soul* be not chiefly in the afore-said *Orifice*. For partly the natural *Sympathy* betwixt the *Orifice of the Stomack* and the *Heart*, and partly the horreur and pain perceived by the *Soul* in the common *Sensorium*, which we will suppose in the *Head*, does so dead the *Heart*, that, as in the suddain *Passions* above named, it ceases to perform the ordinary functions of Life, and so *Pulse* and *Sense* and all is gone in short time; whenas the *Head* being wounded mortally, *Perception* is thereby so diminished, that the *Heart* escapes the more free from the force of that lethiferous passion; and so though *Sense* be gone, can continue the *Pulse* a longer time: which is a perfect answer to *Helmont's* stories he recites in his *Sedes Anima*.

7. To all which I may adde, That himself does acknowledge in the end of that Treatise, that the power of *Motion*, of *Will*, *Memory* and *Imagination*, is in the *Brain*; and therefore unless a man will say and deny any thing, he must say that the *Common Sense* is there also.

8. The Opinion of Mr *Hobbs* bears more credit and countenance with it, as having been asserted heretofore by Philosophers of great fame, *Epicurus*, \* *Aristotle*, and the School of the *Stoicks*: but if we look closer to it, it will prove as little true as the other; especially in his way, that holds there is no *Soul* in a Man, but that all is but *organized Matter*. For let him declare any Mechanical reason whereby his *Heart* will be able to move his Finger. But upon this Hypothesis I have confuted this Opinion already. It is more maintainable, if there be granted a *Soul* in the Body, that the *Heart* is the chief Seat thereof, and place of *Common Sense*, as *Aristotle* and others would have it, as also the Spring of *Spontaneous Motion*. But it is very unlikely that that part that is so continually employed in that natural Motion of *contracting and dilating* it self, should be

Elements of  
Philosophy,  
Part 4. ch 25.  
Art. 4.  
\* *Aristot. de  
Juventute &  
Senectute,  
cap. 3.*

be the Seat of that Principle which commands *Free* and *Spontaneous* progressions : *Perceptions* also would be horribly disturbed by its squeezing of it self, and then flagging again by vicissitudes. Neither would Objects appear in the same place, or at least our sight not fixt on the same part of the Object, when the *Heart* is drawn up and when it is let down again, as I have above intimated : the *extreme heat* also of it could not admit that it be affected with the gentle motions of the Objects of Sense, the Blood being there in a manner scalding hot. And it is in this sense that that Aphorisme in *Aristotle* is to be understood, τὸ μέσον κριπτόν, *That which must receive the variety of external impresses, must not be it self in any high temper or agitation.*

9. Wherefore it is a very rash thing to assert, That the *Heart* is the Seat of *Common Sense*, unless by some plain experience it could be evinced to be so, whenas indeed Experiments are recorded to the contrary. As, that if we *bind* a Nerve, *Sense* and *Motion* will be betwixt the *Ligature* and the *Brain*, but not betwixt the *Heart* and the *Ligature*. And that the *Crocodile*, his *Heart* being cut out, will live for a considerable time, and fight, and defend himself. The like is observed of the *Sea-Tortoise*, and the *wild Goat*, as *Calcidius* writes. To which you may adde what *Galen* relates of sacrificed Beasts, that their *Hearts* being taken out and laid upon the Altar, they have been seen in the mean time not onely to breath, and roar aloud, but also to run away, till the expence of Blood has made them fall down. Which Narrations to me are the more credible, I having seen with mine own eyes a *Frog* quite exenterated, heart, stomach, guts and all taken out by an ingenious friend of mine, and dexterous Anatomist ; after which the *Frog* could see, and would avoid any object in its way, and skipped as freely and nimbly up and down as when it was entire, and that for a great while. But a very little wound in the *Head* deprives them immediatly of *Life* and *Motion*. Whence it is plain that the derivation of *Sense* and *Spontaneous Motion* is not from the *Heart*. For if the *Motion* be intercepted betwixt the *Brain* and the *Heart*, by \* Mr *Hobbs* his own concession, there will be no perception of the Object. And there is the same reason of the *Orifice of the Stomack* : so that this one Experiment does clearly evince these two Opinions to be erroneous.

10. And that no man hereafter may make any other unhappy choice in the parts of the Body, we shall now propose such Reasons as we hope will plainly prove, That the common *Sensorium* must needs be in the *Head* ; or indeed rather repeat them : For some of those whereby we proved that the *Heart* is not the Seat of *Common Sense*, will plainly evince that the *Head* is. As that out of *Laurentius*, that a *Nerve* being tied, *Sense* and *Motion* will be preserved from the *Ligature* up towards the *Head*, but downwards they will be lost. As also that experiment of a *Frog*, whose brain if you pierce will presently be devoid of *Sense* and *Motion*, though all the Entrals being taken out it will skip up and down, and exercise its Senses as before. Which is a plain evidence that *Motion* and *Sense* is derived from the *Head* ; and there is now no pretence to trace any *Motion* into a farther fountain, the *Heart*, ( from whence the

*Galen. de Placitis Hippocratis & Platonis, lib. 2.*

\* In his Elements of Philosophy, Part 4. ch. 25. Artic. 4.

*Histor. Anatom. lib. 4. quæst. 7.*

*Nerves*



*Nerves* were conceived to branch by *Aristotle*, and from whence certainly the *Veins and Arteries* do, as appears by every *Anatomie* ) being so justly discharged from that office.

To which it may suffice to adde the consideration of those Diseases that seize upon all the Animal functions at once, such as are the *Lethargie*, *Apoplexie*, *Epilepsie*, and the like, the causes of which Physicians find in the *Head*, and accordingly apply remedies. Which is a plain detection that the Seat of the Soul, as much as concerns the Animal Faculties, is chiefly in the *Head*. The same may be said of *Phrensy* and *Melancholy*, and such like distempers, that deprave a mans *Imagination* and *Judgment*; Physicians alwaies conclude something amiss within the *Cranium*.

Lastly, if it were nothing but the near attendance of the outward Senses on the *Soul*, or her *discerning Faculty*, being so fitly placed about her in the *Head*; this, unless there were some considerable Argument to the contrary, should be sufficient to determine any one that is unprejudiced, to conclude that the Seat of *Common Sense*, *Understanding*, and *command of Motion*, is there also.

11. But now the greatest difficulty will be to define *In what part thereof it is to be placed*. In which, unless we will goe over-boldly and carelessly to work, we are to have a regard to Mechanical congruities, and not pitch upon any thing that, by the advantage of this Supposal, *That there is a Soul in man*, may goe for possible; but to chuse what is most handsome and convenient.

12. That the *whole Brain* is not the Seat of *Common Sense*, appears from the wounds and cuts it may receive without the destruction of that Faculty; for they will not take away *Sense* and *Motion*, unless they pierce so deep as to reach the *Ventricles of the Brain*, as *Galen* has observed.

13. Nor is it in *Regius* his *small solid particle*. For besides that it is not likely the *Centre of Perception* is so minute, it is very incongruous to place it in a Body so perfectly *solid*, more *hard* then Marble or Iron. But this Invention being but a late freak of his petulant fancy, that has an ambition to make a blunder and confusion of all *Des-Cartes* his Metaphysical Speculations, (and therefore found out this rare quirk of wit to shew, how though the *Soul* were nothing but *Matter*, yet it might be *incorruptible* and *immortal*) it was not worth the while to take notice of it here in this Hypothesis, which we have demonstrated to be true, viz. *That there is a Soul in the Body, whose nature is Immaterial or Incorporeal*.

14. Nor are the *Membranes in the Head* the common *Sensorium*; neither those that envelop the *Brain*, (for they would be able then to see the light through the hole the *Trepan* makes, though the party *Trepan'd* winked with his eyes; to say nothing of the conveyance of the *Nerves*, the Organs of external Sense, that carry beyond these exterior Membranes, and therefore point to a place more inward, that must be the *Recipient* of all their impresses) nor any *Internal membrane*, as that which bids fairest for it, the *Septum Lucidum*, as being in the midst of the upper Ventricle. But yet if the levell of Motion through the externall Senses be accurately considered, some will shoot under, and some in a distant parallel,

parallel, so that this Membrane will not be struck with all the Objects of our Senses. Besides that it seems odd and ridiculous that the *Centre of Perception* should be either driven out so into plates, or spread into hollow convexities, as it must be supposed, if we make either the *external* or *internal Membranes of the Brain* the Seat of *Common Sense*.

15. The most likely place is some one of those that the three last Opinions point at, viz. either the *Conarion*, or the *Concourse of the Nerves in the fourth Ventricle*, or the *Animal Spirits* there.

16. The first is *Des-Cartes* Opinion, and not rashly to be refused, neither do I find any Arguments hitherto that are valid enough to deface it. Those that are recited out of *Bartholine*, and subscribed to by the learned \* Author of *Adenographia*, in my apprehension have not the force to ruine it. We will first repeat them, and then examine them.

\* Wharton.  
*Adenograph.*  
cap. 23.

The first is, That this *Glandula* is too little to be able to represent the Images of all that the Soul has represented to her.

The second, That the *external Nerves* do not reach to the *Glandula*, and that therefore it cannot receive the impresses of sensible Objects.

The third, That it is placed in a place of excrements which would soile the *Species* of things.

The fourth, That the *Species* of things are perceived there where they are carried by the *Nerves*. But the *Nerves* meet about the beginning or head of the *Spinal Marrow*, a more noble and ample place than the *Glandula pinealis*.

To the first I answer, That the *amplitude* of that place where the *Nerves* meet in the *Spinal Marrow* is not large enough to receive the distinct impresses of all the Objects the Mind retains in *Memory*. (Besides, that the other parts of the *Brain* may serve for that purpose, as much as any of it can.) But it must be the Soul her self alone that is capable of retaining so distinct and perfect representations of things, though it were admitted that she might make an occasional use of some private marks she impresses in the *Brain*; which haply may be nothing at all like the things it would remember, nor of any considerable magnitude nor proportion to them, such as we observe in the words *Arx* and *Atomus*, where there is no correspondency of either likeness or bigness betwixt the words and the things represented by them.

See chap. 11.  
sect. 4, 5.

To the second, That though there be no continuation of *Nerves* to the *Conarion*, yet there is of *Spirits*; which are as able to convey the impresses of Motion from external Sense to the *Conarion*, as the *Aire* and *Aether* the impress of the Stars unto the Eye.

To the third, That the *Glandula* is conveniently enough placed, so long as the Body is sound; for no excrementitious humours will then overflow it or besmear it. But in such distempers wherein they do, *Apoplexies*, *Catalepsies*, or such like diseases will arise; which we see do fall out, let the Seat of *Common Sense* be where it will.

To the last I answer, That the *Nerves*, when they are once got any thing far into the *Brain*, are devoid of *Tunicles*, and be so soft and spongy, that the motion of the *Spirits* can play through them, and that therefore they may ray through the sides, and so continue their motion



to the *Conarion*, wherever their extremities may seem to tend.

17. But though these Arguments do not sufficiently confute the Opinion, yet I am not so wedded to it, but I can think something more unexceptionable may be found out, especially it being so much to be suspected that all Animals have not this *Conarion*; and then, that what pleased *Des-Cartes* so much in this Invention, was, that he conceited it such a marvelous fine instrument to beat the *Animal Spirits* into such and such Pores of the Brain; a thing that I cannot at all close with for reasons \* above alledged. Besides that *Stones* have been found in this *Glandula*, and that it is apparent that it is environ'd with a net of *Veins* and *Arteries*, which are indications that it is a part assigned for some more inferiour office. But yet I would not dismiss it without fair play.

\* Chap. 5. sect.  
3, 4, 5, 6.

Adenograph.  
Cap. 23.

18. Wherefore that Opinion of the forecited Author, who places the Seat of *Common Sense* in that part of the *Spinal Marrow* where the *Nerves* are suspected to meet, as it is more plain and simple, so it is more irrefutable, supposing that the Soul's *Centre of perception* (whereby she does not onely apprehend all the Objects of the external Senses, but does *imagine, reason, and freely command and determine* the *Spirits* into what part of the Body she pleases) could be conveniently seated in such dull pasty Matter as the *Pith of the Brain* is; a thing, I must needs profess, that pleases not my Palate at all, and therefore I will also take leave of this Opinion too, and adventure to pronounce, *That the chief Seat of the Soul, where she perceives all Objects, where she imagines, reasons, and invents, and from whence she commands all the parts of the Body, is those purer Animal Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain.*

## C H A P. VIII.

1. The first reason of his Opinion, the convenient Situation of these *Spirits*.
2. The second, that the *Spirits* are the immediate Instrument of the Soul in all her functions.
3. The proof of the second Reason from the general Authority of Philosophers, and particularly of Hippocrates;
4. From our Sympathizing with the changes of the *Aire*;
5. From the celerity of Motion and Cogitation;
6. From what is observed generally in the Generation of things;
7. From Regius his experiment of a Snail in a glass;
8. From the running round of Images in a Vertigo;
9. From the constitution of the Eye, and motion of the *Spirits* there;
10. From the dependency of the actions of the Soul upon the Body, whether in Meditation or corporeal Motion;
11. From the recovery of Motion and Sense into a stupefied part;
12. And lastly, from what is observed in swooning fits, of paleness and sharpness of visage, &c.
13. The inference from all this, That the *Spirits* in the fourth Ventricle are the Seat of *Common Sense*, and that the main use of the Brain and Nerves is to preserve the *Spirits*.

I. THAT

1. **T**HAT which makes me embrace this Opinion rather than any other is this ; That, first, this situation of the common *Sensorium* betwixt the *Head* and the trunk of the *Body* is the most exactly convenient to receive the impresses of Objects from both, as also to impart Motion to the Muscles in both the *Head* and in the *Body*. In which I look upon it as equall with the last Opinion, and superiour to all them that went before. For whatever may be objected, is already answered in what I have said to the last Objection against *Des-Cartes*.

2. But now in the second place, ( wherein this Opinion of mine has a notorious advantage above all else that I know ) It is most reasonable that that Matter which is the *immediate Instrument* of all the Animal functions of the Soul, should be the chiefest Seat from whence and where she exercises these functions, and if there be any place where there is a freer plenty of the purest sort of this Matter, that her *peculiar residence* should be there. Now the *immediate Instrument* of the functions of the Soul is that *thinner Matter* which they ordinarily call *Animal Spirits*, which are to be found in their greatest purity and plenty in the *fourth Ventricle of the Brain*. From whence it must follow that that precious and choice part of the Soul which we call *the Centre of perception* is to be placed in that Ventricle, not in any pith of the Brain thereabout, but in the midst of these Spirits themselves ; for that is the most natural situation for the commanding them into the parts of the *Head* and *Body* ; besides a more delicate and subtile use of them at home, in pursuing various imaginations and inventions.

3. That this *thin and Spirituous Matter* is the immediate engine of the Soul in all her operations, is in a manner the general opinion of all Philosophers. And even those that have placed the Common *Sensorium* in the *Heart*, have been secure of the truth of this their conceit, because they took it for granted, that the left Ventricle thereof was the fountain of these pure and subtile Spirits, and please themselves very much, in that they fancied that Oracle of Physicians, the grave and wise *Hippocrates*, to speak their own sense so fully and significantly. Γνώμην γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πέφυκεν ἐν τῇ λαίῃ καὶ καρδίᾳ. ἡρέφει δὲ ὅτε σπύριοισιν ἔτε ποτοῖσιν ἀπὸ τῆς κοιλίας, ἀλλὰ καθαρήν καὶ φωτεινὴν περιέσσει γήινον ἐκ τῆς ἀκακείας καὶ αἵματος. that is to say, *That the Mind of man is in the left Ventricle of his Heart ; and that it is not nourished from meats and drinks from the belly, but by a clear and luminous Substance that redounds by separation from the blood : which is that which happens exactly in the Brain*. For the *Spirits* there are nothing else but more pure and subtile parts of the blood, whose tenuity and agitation makes them separate from the rest of the mass thereof, and so replenish the Ventricles of the Brain.

Hippocrat. libello de Cordis.

4. Moreover our *sympathizing* so sensibly with the changes of the *Aire*, which *Hippocrates* also takes notice of, that in *clear Aire* our *Thoughts* are more *clear*, and in *cloudy* more *obscure* and *dull*, is no slight indication that that which conveys *Sense*, *Thoughts*, and *Passions* immediately to the Soul, is very tenuious and delicate, and of a nature very congenerous to the *Aire* with which it changes so easily.

P p

5. The



De Natura Re-  
rum, lib. 3.

5. The strange *Agility* also of *Motions* and *Cogitations* that we find in our selves, has forced the most sluggish witts, even such as have been so gross as to deem the Soul *Corporeal*, yet to chuse the freest, subtlest & most active Matter to compound her of, that their imaginations could excogitate. And *Lucretius*, the most confident of the *Epicurean* Sect, thinks he has hit the nail on the head in his choice ;

*Nunc igitur quoniam est animi natura reperta  
Mobilis egregiè, per quam constare necesse est  
Corporibus parvis & levibus atque rotundis :*

whose Testimony I account the better in this case, by how much the more crafts Philosopher he is, the necessity of the tenuity of particles that are to pervade the Body of a Man being convinced hence to be so plain, that the dimmest eyes can easily discover it.

6. But we will advance higher to more forcible Arguments ; amongst which this, I think, may find some place, That we cannot discover any immediate operation of any kind of Soul in the world, but what it first works upon *that Matter* which participates in a very great measure of this *fineness* and *tenuity of parts*, which will easily yield and be guided ; as may be universally observed in all *Generations*, where the *Body* is alwaies *organized* out of *thin fluid liquor*, that will easily yield to the plastick power of the Soul. In which I do not doubt but it takes the advantage of moving the most subtle parts of all first, such as *Des-Cartes* his first and second Element, which are never excluded from any such humid and tenuous substance : which Elements of his are that true *Heavenly* or *Aethereal Matter* which is every where, as *Ficinus* somewhere saith Heaven is ; and is that *Fire* which *Trismegist* affirms is the most inward vehicle of the Mind, and the instrument that God used in the forming of the world, and which the Soul of the world, wherever she acts, does most certainly still use.

Trismegist.  
Pæmand. cap.  
10. five Clavis.

Philos. Natu-  
ral. l. 4. c. 16.

7. And to make yet a step further, That ocular demonstration that *Henricus Regius* brings into view seems to me both ingenious and solid : It is in a *Snail*, such as have no shells, moving in a glass : so soon as she begins to creep, certain Bubbles are discovered to move from her tail to her head ; but so soon as she ceases moving, those Bubbles cease. Whence he concludes, That a gale of Spirits that circuit from her head along her back to her tail, and thence along her belly to her head again, is the cause of her progressive motion.

8. That such *thin Spirits* are the immediate Instruments of *Sense*, is also discovered by what is observed in a *Vertigo*. For the *Brain* it self is not of such a *fluid* substance as to turn round, and to make external Objects seem to doe so. Wherefore it is a sign that the immediate corporeal Instrument of conveying the images of things is the *Spirits* in the Brain.

9. And that they are the chief Organ of *Sight* is plain in the exterior parts of the Eye : for we may easily discern how full they are of that *καθαρή & φωτεινὴ ὁσία*, pure and lucid substance, which *Hippocrates* speaks of, though he seat it in a wrong place ; and how upon the passions of

of

of the Mind these *Spirits* ebbe or flow in the Eye, and are otherwise wonderful-significantly modified; infomuch that the Soul even seems to speak through them, in that silent voice of Angels, which some fancy to be by nothing but by dumb shews, \* but I do not at all believe it. It is also plain enough, that dimness of sight comes from deficiency of these *Spirits*, though the parts of the Eye otherwise be entire enough. The wider opening also of the pupill of one Eye upon the shutting of the other does indicate the flux and more copious presence of *Spirits* there, as *Galen* has ingeniously collected.

\*See *Antidote*,  
Book 3. ch. 3.  
sect. 8.

10. To which we may adde that in those more noble operations of the Mind, when she meditates and excogitates various Theorems, that either she uses some part of the Body as an Instrument then, or acts freely and independently of the Body. That the latter is false is manifest from hence, that then the change of Air, or Distemper and Diseasedness, could not prejudice her in her *Inventive* and purely *Intellectual* Operations; but it is manifest that they doe, and that a mans Mind is much more cloudy one time then another, and in one Country then another, whence is that proverbial Verse,

*Bæotum crasso jurares aëre natum.*

If she uses any part of the Body, it must be either these *Animal Spirits*, or the *Brain*. That it is not the *Brain*, the very consistency thereof so clammy and sluggish is an evident demonstration.

Which will still have the more force, if we consider what is most certainly true, That the Soul has not any power, or else exceeding little, of moving Matter; but her peculiar priviledge is of determining Matter in motion; which the more subtile and agitated it is, the more easily by reason of its own mobility is it determined by her. For if it were an immediate faculty of the Soul to contribute motion to any Matter, I do not understand how that faculty never failing nor diminishing no more then the Soul it self can fail or diminish, that we should ever be weary of motion. Infomuch that those nimble-footed *Menades* or she-Priests of *Bacchus*, with other agile Virgins of the Country, which *Dionysius* describes dancing in the flowry meadows of *Meander* and *Cayster*, might, if life and limbs would last, be found dancing there to this very day, as free and frolick as wanton Kids (as he pleases to set out their activity) and that without any lassitude at all. For that immediate motive faculty of the Soul can still as fresh as ever impart motion to all the Body, and sooner consume it into air or ashes by heating and agitating it; then make her self weary, or the Body seem so.

Wherefore it is plain that that motion or heat that the Soul voluntarily confers upon the Body is by virtue of the *Spirits*, which she, when they are playing onely and gently toying amongst themselves, sends forth into the exterior members, and so agitates and moves them: but they being so subtile and dissippable, the Soul spends them in using of them; and they being much spent, she can hardly move the Body any longer, the sense whereof we call *Lassitude*. These are the *τὰ ὀρμῶντα* Hippocrat. Epid. lib. 6. or *ὀρμῶντα* of *Hippocrates*, and the Soul's immediate engine of motion through all the parts of the Body.



De Human.  
Corpor. fabric.  
lib. 7. cap. 1.

11. As they are also of *Sense* in the more remote parts as well as in the Head, as *Spigelius* handsomely insinuates by that ordinary example of a mans legge being stupefied or asleep, as some call it, by compression or whatever hinderance may be of the propagation of the Spirits into that part. For as *Sense* and *Motion* is restored, a man may plainly feel something creep into it tingling and stinging like Pismires, as he compares it ; which can be nothing but the *Spirits* forcing their passage into the part. Wherein what they suffer is made sensible to the Soul, they being her immediate Vehicle of life and sense.

12. Lastly, In *swooning fits*, when *Motion* and *Sense* fails, the exterior parts are *pale* and *fallen*, the Face looking more *lean* and *sharp* ; of which there can be no other meaning, then that that benign gale of vital air that fill'd up the parts before, is now absent and retreated from them ; that is, that the *fluid Spirits* are retired, without which no *Sense* nor *Motion* can be performed : whence it is apparent that they are the immediate Instrument of both.

13. I have proved that the *Animal Spirits* are the Soul's immediate organ for *Sense* and *Motion*. If therefore there be any place where these *Spirits* are in the fittest plenty and purity, and in the most convenient situation for Animal functions ; that in all reason must be concluded the chief seat and *Acropolis* of the Soul. Now the *Spirits* in the *middle ventricle of the Brain* are not so indifferently situated for both the *Body* and the *Head*, as those in the *fourth* are ; nor so pure. The upper Ventricle, being two, are not so fit for this office, that is so very much one and singular. Besides that the sensiferous impresses of motion through the eyes play under them ; to say nothing how the *Spirits* here are less defecate also then in the *fourth* Ventricle.

Wherefore there being *sufficient plenty*, and *greatest purity*, and *fittest situation of the Spirits in this fourth Ventricle*, it is manifest that in these is placed the *Centre of Perception*, and that they are the *common Sensorium* of the Soul : And that as the *Heart* pumps out *Blood* perpetually to supply the whole *Body* with nourishment, to keep up the bulk of this Edifice for the Soul to dwell in, and also, from the more subtile and agile parts thereof, to replenish the *Brain* and *Nerves* with *Spirits*, (which are the immediate Instrument of the Soul for *Sense* and *Motion* ; ) So likewise is it plain that the main use of the *Brain* and *Nerves* is to keep these *subtile Spirits* from over-speedy dissipation ; and that the *Brain* with its Caverns is but one great round *Nerve* ; as the *Nerves* with their invisible porosities are but so many smaller productions or slenderer prolongations of the *Brain* : And so all together are but one continued Receptacle or Case of that immediate Instrument of the sensiferous motions of the Soul, the *Animal Spirits*, wherein also lies her hidden Vehicle of life in this mortal body.

## CHAP. IX.

1. *Several Objections against Animal Spirits.* 2. *An Answer to the first Objection touching the Porosity of the Nerves.* 3. *To the second and third, from the Extravasation of the Spirits and pituitous Excrements found in the Brain.* 4. *To the fourth, fetcht from the incredible swiftness of motion in the Spirits.* 5. *To the last, from Ligation.* 6. *Undeniable Demonstrations that there are Animal Spirits in the Ventricles of the Brain.*

1. **B**Efore we proceed to our other \* two Enquiries, we are forced to make a stop a while, and listen to some few Objections made by some late Authours, who, against the common stream of all other Philosophers, Physicians and Anatomists, are not ashamed to deny that there are any such things as *Spirits* in the Body; or at least that there are any in the Ventricles of the Brain. For as for the *Nerves*, say they, they have no Pores or Cavities to receive them; and besides, it is plain that what is fluid in them is nothing but a milky white juice, as is observed in the pricking of a *Nerve*. And as for the *Ventricles of the Brain*, those Cavities are too big; and the *Spirits*, if they issue into them, will be as *extravasated* Blood, whence they must needs be spoiled and corrupt. Besides that they will evaporate at those passages through which the mucous or pituitous excrements pass from the Brain. Whose appearance there, is, say they, another great argument that these Ventricles were intended onely for receptacles and conveyances of such excrementitious Humours which the Brain discharges it self of. Lastly, if *Spontaneous Motion* be made by means of these *Spirits*, it could not be so extremely sudden as it is; for we can wagge our finger as quick as thought, but *corporeal Motion* cannot be so swift. And if the *Spirits* be continued from the Head to the Finger, suppose, in the ligation of the Nerve there would be sense from the Ligature to the Fingers end; which is, say they, against Experience. These are the main Objections I have met withall in *Hofman* and others; but are such as I think are very easily answered: and indeed they do in some sort clash some of them one with another.

2. For how can the *Nerves* derive juice if they have no Pores, or are not so much as passable to these thin active *Spirits* we speak of? or from whence can we better conceive that juice to arise, then from these *Spirits* themselves, as they lose their agitation, and sag into a more gross consistency?

3. Neither can the *Spirits* be looked upon as *extravasated* in the Ventricles of the Brain, more then the Blood in the Auricles or Ventricles of the Heart. Nor is there any fear of their sliding away through the *Infundibulum*, the pituitous excrements having no passage there but what they make by their weight, as well as their insinuating moistness, which alwaies besmearing these parts makes them more impervious to the light *Spirits*, whose agility also and componderancy with the outward Aire renders them incapable of leaving the Caverns in which they are.

\* See chap. 6.  
Sect. 9.



That arguing from the *pituitous excrements* found there, that they were made onely for a Receptacle of such useles redundancy, is as ineptly inferred, as if a man should argue from what is found in the *Intestinum rectum*, that the Stomack and all the Intestines were made for a Receptacle of Stercoreous excrement. The Spirits in the Ventricles of the Brain, playing about and hitting against the sides of the Caverns they are in, will in process of time abate of their agitation, the grosser parts especially; and so necessarily come to a more coarse consistency, and settle into some such like moist Sediment as is found at the bottome of the Ventricles, which nature dischargeth through fit passages, whereby the Spirits are left more pure. But because this necessary feculency is found in these Cavities, to conclude that that is the only use of them, is as ridiculous as to inferre That because I spit at my Mouth, and blow my Nose, that that was the chief end and use of these two parts of my Body, or that my Eyes were not made for seeing, but weeping.

4. The nature of the *swiftness of Motion* in these *Spirits* is much like that of *Light*, which is a Body as well as they. But that Lucid Matter in the Sun does not, so soon as he appears upon the Horizon, fly so many thousand miles in a moment to salute our eyes,; but Motion is propagated as it were at once from the Sun to our Eye through the æthereal Matter betwixt. Or suppose a long Tube, as long as you will, and one to blow in it; in a moment, so soon as he blows at one end, the Motion will be felt at the other, and that downwards as well as upwards, and as easily; to satisfy that other frivolous Objection I find in *Hofman*, as if it were so hard a business that these *Spirits* should be commanded downwards into the *Nerves*. But the Opposers of this ancient and solid Opinion are very simple and careless.

5. That of the *Ligature* proves nothing. For though the *Nerve* betwixt the *Ligature* and the Finger be well enough stored with Spirits, yet the *Centre of Perception* being not there, and there being an interruption and division betwixt the Spirits that are continued to their Common *Sensorium*, and these on the other side of the *Ligature*; 'tis no more wonder that we feel nothing on this side of the *Ligature*, then that we see nothing in our neighbour's garden when a wall is betwixt, though the Sun shine clearly on both sides of the wall.

6. We see how invalid their Arguments are against this received Opinion of almost all both Physicians and Philosophers: It is needless to produce any for the confirmation of it; Those which we have made use of for proving that the *Spirits* are the *immediate Instrument* of the Soul, being of equal force most of them to conclude their existence in the Body.

And yet for an overplus I will not much care to cast in a brief suggestion of the use of the *Lungs*, which the best Physicians and Anatomists adjudge to be chiefly for conveyeing prepared aire to the Heart; as also of the *Rete mirabile* and *Plexus Choroides*, whose bare situation discover their use, that they may more plentifully evaporate the thinner and more agile particles of the Blood into the Ventriclees of the Brain.

The *Diastole* also of the *Brain* keeping time with the *Pulse* of the *Heart*, is a manifest indication what a vehement steam of *Spirits*, by the direct  
and

and short passage of the *Arteria Carotides*, are carried thither. For if one part of the Blood be more fiery and subtile then another, it will be sure to reach the Head. From whence considering the sponginess and laxness of the Brain, and thinness of the Tunicles in the little Arteries that are there; it will follow by Mechanical necessity that the Ventricles thereof will be filled with that *κατὰ τὴν καὶ φωτοδὸν πρὸς τὴν διὰ τὴν σῶσιν τῆς αἵματός*, which *Hippocrates* so fitly describes, though he fancy the Seat of it in an unfitting place.

But the purest of these Spirits being in the fourth Ventricle, as *Bartholine* and others have judiciously concluded, it follows plainly from what has been alledged, *That the Common Sensorium is to be placed in the midst of these purer Spirits of the fourth Ventricle of the Brain.*

*Institution.  
Anatom. lib. 3.  
cap. 4.*

## CHAP. X.

1. *That the Soul is not confined to the Common Sensorium.*
2. *The first Argument from the Plastick power of the Soul.*
3. *Which is confirmed from the gradual dignity of the Soul's Faculties, of which this Plastick is the lowest;*
4. *External Sensation the next;*
5. *After that, Imagination, and then Reason.*
6. *The second Argument from Passions and Sympathies in Animals.*
7. *An illustration of the manner of Natural Magick.*
8. *The third Argument from the Perception of Pain in the exterior parts of the Body.*
9. *The fourth and last from the nature of Sight.*

1. **W**E are now at leisure to resume the two remaining Enquiries; the former whereof is, whether the Soul be so in this *fourth Ventricle*, that it is essentially no where else in the Body, or whether it be spread out into all the Members. *Regius* would coup it up in the *Conarion*, which he believes to be the *Common Sensorium*, and so by consequence it should be confined to the *fourth Ventricle*, and not expatiate at all thence, supposing that the Seat of *Common Sense*. The reason of this conceit of his is this, That whatever is in the rest of the Body, may come to pass by powers merely *Mechanical*; wherein he does very superstitiously tread in the footsteps of his Master *Des-Cartes*. But for my own part, I cannot but dissent, I finding in neither any sufficient grounds of so novel an opinion, but rather apparent reasons to the contrary.

*Philos. Natural.  
lib. 5. cap. 2.*

2. As first, the *Frame of the Body*, of which I think most reasonable to conclude the *Soul* her self to be the more particular *Architect* (for I will not wholly reject *Plotinus* his opinion;) and that the *Plastick power* resides in her, as also in the Souls of Brute animals, as very learned and worthy Writers have determined. That the *Fabrick of the Body* is out of the concurse of *Atomes*, is a mere precarious Opinion, without any ground or reason. For *Sense* does not discover any such thing, the first rudiments of life being out of some *liquid homogeneous Matter*; and it is



\* See my *An-*  
*tidote*, Book 2.  
chap. 12. lect.  
2, 3, 4, &c.

against \* *Reason*, that the tumbling of *Atomes* or corporeal particles should produce such exquisite frames of creatures, wherein the acutest wit is not able to find any thing inept, but all done exquisitely well every where, where the foulness and coarseness of *Matter* has not been in fault.

That God is not the *immediate Maker* of these *Bodies*, the particular miscarriages demonstrate. For there is no *Matter* so perverse and stubborn but his *Omnipotency* could tame; whence there would be no Defects nor Monstrosities in the generation of Animals.

\* *Picinus* calls  
them *περὶ πνο-*  
*ρᾶς*, and  
*περὶ σφύρας*  
*ἐν λάρυγγος*  
*ἐκ τῆς ἐννεαδ. 6.*  
*lib. 7. cap. 7.*

Nor is it so congruous to admit, that the *Plastick* faculty of the *Soul of the World* is the *sole* contriver of these *Fabricks* of particular Creatures, (though I will not deny but she may give some rude \* preparative strokes towards Efformation;) but that in every *particular World*, such as Man is especially, his own Soul is the peculiar and most perfective Architect thereof, as the Soul of the World is of it. For this *vital* Fabrication is not as in *artificial* Architecture, when an external person acts upon Matter; but implies a more particular and near union with that Matter it thus intrinsically shapes out and organizes. And what ought to have a more particular and close union with our Bodies than our Souls themselves?

My opinion is therefore, That the Soul, which is a *Spirit*, and therefore *contractible* and *dilatable*, begins within less compass at first in Organizing the fitly-prepared Matter, and so bears it self on in the same tenour of work till the Body has attained its full growth; and that the Soul *dilates* it self in the dilating of the Body, and so possesses it through all the members thereof.

*Enthuf. Tri-*  
*umph. lib. 3.*  
*4. 5.*

3. The congruity of this Truth will further discover it self, if we consider the nature of the Faculties of the Soul (of which you may read more fully in *Enthusiasmus Triumphatus*) in what a *natural graduality* they arise till they come to the *most free* of all. The *deepest* or *lowest* is this *Plastick power* we have already spoke of, in virtue whereof is continued that perpetual *Systole* and *Diastole* of the *Heart*, as I am more prone to think then that it is merely Mechanical, as also that *Respiration* that is performed without the command of our Will: For the *Libration* or *Reciprocation* of the *Spirits* in the *Tensility* of the *Muscles* would not be so perpetual, but cease in a small time, did not some more mystical Principle then what is merely Mechanical give Assistance; as any one may understand by observing the insufficiency of those devices that *Henricus Regius* propounds for adequate causes of such motions in the Body. These I look upon as the *First Faculties* of the Soul, which may be bounded by this general character, That the exercise of them does not at all imply so much as our *Perception*.

*Philos. Natu-*  
*ral. lib. 4.*  
*cap. 16.*

4. Next to these is the *Sensation of any external Object*, such as *Hearing*, *Seeing*, *Feeling*, &c. All which include *Perception* in an irresistible necessity thereof, the Object being present before us, and no external Obstacle interposing.

5. *Imagination* is more *free*, we being able to avoid its representations for the most part, without any external help; but it is a degree on  
this

this side *Will* and *Reason*, by which we correct and silence unallowable fancies. Thus we see how the *Faculties* of the Soul rise by *Degrees*; which makes it still the more easy and credible, that the *lowest* of all is competible to her as well as the *highest*.

6. Moreover, *Passions* and *Sympathies*, in my judgment, are more easily to be resolved into this Hypothesis of the Soul's pervading the *whole Body*, then in restraining its essential presence to *one part* thereof. \* For to believe that such an horrible Object as, suppose, a Bear or Tiger, by transmission of Motion from it through the Eyes of an Animal to the *Conarion*, shall so reflect thence, as to determine the Spirits into such Nerves as will streighten the Orifice of the Heart, and lessen the Pulse, and cause all other symptomes of *Fear*; seems to me little better then a mere piece of *Mechanical Credulity*. Those Motions that represent the *Species* of things, being turned this way or the other way, without any such *impetus* of Matter as should doe such feats as *Des-Cartes* speaks of in his Book of *Passions*. And that which he would give us as a pledge of this Truth is so false, that it does the more animate me to dis-believe the Theorem. \* For the wasting of one's hand near the Eye of a mans friend, is no sufficient proof That external Objects will necessarily and Mechanically determine the Spirits into the Muscles, no Faculty of the Soul intermeddling. For if one be fully assured, or rather can keep himself from the fear of any hurt, by the wasting of his friend's Hand before his Eye, he may easily abstain from winking: But if fear surprise him, the Soul is to be entitled to the action, and not the mere *Mechanisme* of the Body. Wherefore this is no proof that the *Phænomena* of *Passions*; with their consequences, may be salved in brute Beasts by pure Mechanics; and therefore neither in Men.

But it is evident, that they arise in us *against* both our *Will* and *Appetite*. For who would bear the tortures of *Fears* and *Jealousies*, if he could avoid it? And therefore the Soul sends not nor determines the Spirits thus to her own Torture, as she resides in the Head. Whence it is plain that it is the Effect of her as she resides in the *Heart* and *Stomack*, which sympathize with the horrid representation in the Common *Sensorium*, by reason of the exquisite unity of the Soul with her self, and of the continuity of Spirits in the Body, the necessary instrument of all her Functions. And there is good reason the *Heart* and *Stomack* should be so much affected, they being the chief Seats of those Faculties that maintain the *Life* of the Body; the danger whereof is the most eminent Object of *Fear* in any Animal.

7. From this Principle, I conceive that not onely the *Sympathy* of parts in one particular Subject, but of *different and distant Subjects*, may be understood: such as is betwixt the party wounded, and the Knife or Sword that wounded him, besmeared with the Weapon-salve; and kept in a due temper: Which certainly is not *purely Mechanical*, but *Magical*, though not in an unlawful sense; that is to say, it is not to be resolved into *mere Matter*, of what thinness or subtilty soever you please, but into the *Unity* of the *Soul of the Universe* \* which is interess'd in all Plastick powers, and into the *Continuity* of the *subtile Matter*, which

\* See *Des-Cartes De Passionibus*, Part. 1. Artic. 36,

\* *De Passionibus*, Part. 1. Artic. 13,

\* See Book 3. chap. 6. sect. 7, 8, 9,

answers



\* Ἡ ἀληθινὴ  
μαγεία ἢ ἐν  
τῷ παντὶ φι-  
λία καὶ τὸ νῦν  
καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ ὁ  
ζῶνς ὁ πρῶτος  
καὶ ὁ φαρμακεὺς  
ἐπὶ τὸν ὄντα.  
Plotin. En-  
nead. 4. lib. 4.  
cap. 40.  
\* Book 3. chap.  
12, & 13.


answers to our *Animal Spirits*. And in this sense it is that \* *Plotinus* sayes, that the World is ὁ μέγας ζῶνς, *the grand Magus or Enchanter*. And I do not question, but that upon this score merely, without the association of any Familiar Spirit, several odde things may be done, for evil as well as good. For this *Spirit of the World* has Faculties that work not by Election, but fatally or naturally, as several *Gamaieu's* we meet withall in Nature seem somewhat obscurely to subindicate. Of this Principle we shall speak more fully in its \* due place.

8. But we have yet a more clear discovery, that our Soul is *not confined to any one part* of the Head, but possesses the whole Body, from the *Perception of Pain* in the parts thereof: For it is plainly impossible that so high a torture as is felt but in the pricking of a Pin, can be communicated to the *Centre of Perception* upon a mere Mechanical account. For whether the *immediate Instrument of Sense* be the *Pith of the Nerves*, as *Des-Cartes* would have it, or whether it be the *Spirits*, as is most true; it is ridiculous to think, that by the forcible parting of what was joyned together at ease (when this case is not communicated to either the *Spirits*, or *Pith of the Nerves*, from the place of the Puncture, to the very seat of Common Sense) the Soul there seated should feel so smart a torment, unless that her very Essence did reach to the part where the pain is felt to be. For then the reason of this is plain, that it is the *Unity of Soul* possessing the whole Body, and the *Continuity of Spirits* that is the cause thereof.

And it is no wonder, if the continuation and natural composure of the Spirits be Rest and Ease to the Soul, that a violent disjoyning and bruising of them, and baring the Soul of them, as I may so speak, should cause a very harsh and torturous sense in the *Centre of Perception*. This Argument bears undeniable Evidence with it, if we do but consider the fuzziness of the *Pith of the Nerves*, and the fluidity of the *Spirits*, and what little stress or crouding so small a thing as a Pin or Needle can make in such soft and liquid Matter. The consideration whereof ought eternally to silence their scrupulosity who are so amused that the harms of the Body should be the pains of the Soul, the Body in the mean time being not pained. For this is infinitely more conceivable, then that some part of *Matter* in my Head should feel pain by a prick in my finger, that Matter in my Head being not at all incommodated, if so much as in the least measure moved thereby; and yet that *Perception* is within the Head alone, has been abundantly demonstrated.

9. Lastly, unless the very Essence of the Soul reach from the Common *Sensorium* to the Eye, there will be very great difficulties how there should be so distinct a representation of any visible Object. For it is very hard to conceive that the *Colours* will not be confounded, and the bigness of the Object diminished, and indeed that the image will not be quite lost before it can come to the Soul, if it be onely in the Common *Sensorium*. For it is plain, and Experience will demonstrate, that there is a very perfect Image of the Object in the bottome of the Eye, which is made by the decussation of the lines of Motion from it, thus: The Line A B from the Object A C bears against that point in the bottome of

of the Eye in B, and the line C D against the point D; whereby C and A are felt in their place, and in such a distance as they are in the Object



C A: and so of all the lines which come from the Object C A into the bottome of the Eye B D. From whence the Object is felt in such a length and breadth as it is capable of being perceived in at such a distance from the Eye. And as the

Motion that is conveyed from A to B and from C to D is felt there; so the modification of it, whereby the Object in those parts may seem red, yellow, green, or any other colour, is felt there also. Whence it is plain that there will be an exquisite impression, according to all circumstances of the Object, in the bottome of the Eye: so that if the Soul receive it there, and convey it thence to her *Centre of Perception* intirely in the same circumstances, the representation will be compleat.

But if the Soul be not there, but the conveyance thereof must be left to the bare laws of *Matter*, the Image will be much depraved, or lost, before it can come to the *Common Sensorium*. For this Motion must be propagated from B and D till it come to the hole E, and so pass into the Optick Nerve, to be carried into the Brain, and so to the seat of Common Sense: but betwixt B and E, or D and E, there may be the depainture of sundry colours, whence it will be necessary that F be tintured with the colour D, and G with the colour of both D and F; & so of the rest of the Lines drawn from the Object to the Eye: so that all their *Colours* would be blended before they came to E. Now at that harsh flexure at E, where the visual Line is as crooked as B E R, according to the experiments of *Reflexion* and *Refraction*, the breadth or length of the Object C A would be lost. For we must needs expect, that as it is in *Reflexions* and *Refractions*, where the Object will appear in that Line that immediately conveys the sense of it; so here it must be also, and therefore the point C and A must appear about Q, whence the Object will shrivel up in a manner into nothing.

And suppose it might appear in some tolerable latitude, for all this, the *Brain* being an *opaque* substance, so soon as the Motion comes thither, it would be so either changed or lost, that the Image could not pass the opacity of it in any splendour or entireness. Wherefore I do not doubt but that the Image which the Soul perceives is that in the Eye, and not any other corporeally produced to the inside of the Brain (where *Colour* and *Figure* would be so strangely depraved, if not quite obliterated) I mean it is the concurse of the *lucid Spirits* in the bottome of the Eye, with the outward Light conveyed through the Humours thereof (which is the best sense of the Platonick *συναγωγή* that *Plutarch* speaks of) wherein the great Mystery of *Sight* consists.



## C H A P. XI.

1. That neither the Soul without the Spirits, nor the Spirits without the presence of the Soul in the Organ, are sufficient Causes of Sensation.
2. A brief declaration how Sensation is made.
3. How Imagination.
4. Of Reason and Memory, and whether there be any Marks in the Brain.
5. That the Spirits are the immediate Instrument of the Soul in Memory also; and how Memory arises;
6. As also Forgetfulness.
7. How Spontaneous Motion is performed.
8. How we walk, sing, and play, though thinking of something else.
9. That though the Spirits be not alike fine every where, yet the Sensiferous Impression will pass to the Common Sensorium.
10. That there is an Heterogeneity in the very Soul her self; and what it is in her we call the Root, the Centre, and the Eye; and what the Rayes and Branches.
11. That the sober and allowable Distribution of her into Parts, is into Perceptive and Plastick.

1. **A**FTER our evincing that the Soul is not confined to the Common Sensorium, but does essentially reach all the Organs of the Body; it will be more easy to determine the Nature of Sensation & other Operations we mentioned,\* which is the third thing we proposed. For we have already demonstrated these two things of main consequence; That the Spirits are not sufficient of themselves for these Functions; nor the Soul of her self, without the assistance of the Spirits: as is plain in the interception or disjunction of the Spirits by Ligature or Obstruction; whence it is, that Blindness sometimes happens merely for that the Optick Nerve is obstructed.

\* See chap. 6.  
sect. 9.

2. Wherefore briefly to dispatch our \* third Querie; I say in general, That Sensation is made by the arrival of motion from the Object to the Organ; where it is received in all the circumstances we perceive it in, and conveyed by virtue of the Soul's presence there, assisted by her immediate Instrument the Spirits, by virtue of whose continuity to those in the Common Sensorium, the Image or Impress of every Object is faithfully transmitted thither.

\* Ch. 6. sect. 9.

3. As for Imagination, there is no question but that Function is mainly exercised in the chief seat of the Soul, those purer Animal Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain. I speak especially of that Imagination which is most free, such as we use in Romantick Inventions, or such as accompany the more severe Meditations and Disquisitions in Philosophy, or any other Intellectual entertainments. For Fasting, fresh Aire, moderate Wine, and all things that tend to an handsome supply and depuration of the Spirits, make our thoughts more free, subtile, and clear.

4. Reason is so involved together with Imagination, that we need say nothing of it apart by it self. Memory is a Faculty of a more peculiar consideration; and if the Pith of the Brain contribute to the Functions of any power of the Mind, (more then by conserving the Animal Spirits) it is to this. But that the Brain should be stored with distinct images (whether they consist of the Flexures of the supposed Fibrille, or the orderly

orderly puncture of Pores, or in a continued modified Motion of the parts thereof, some in this manner, and others in that) is a thing, as I have \* already proved, utterly impossible.

If there be any *Marks* in it, it must be a kind of *Brachygraphie*, some small dots here and there standing for the recovering to Memory a series of things that would fill, it may be, many sheets of paper to write them at large. As if a man should tie a string about a friends finger to remember a business, that a whole daies discourse, it may be, was but little enough to give him full instructions in. From whence it is plain that the *Memory* is in the *Soul*, and not in the *Brain*. And if she do make any such *Marks* as we speak of, she having no perception of them distinct from the representation of those things which they are to re-mind her of, she must not make them by any *Cognitive power*, but by some such as is Analogous to her *Plastick Faculty* of organizing the Body, where she acts and perceives it not.

5. But whether the Soul act thus or no upon the *Brain* is a matter of uncertain determination; nor can it be demonstrated by any experiment that I know. And therefore if we will contain our selves within the capacities of the *Spirits*, which I have so often affirmed to be the immediate Instrument of the Soul in all her operations, that Position will be more unexceptionable. And truly I do not understand but that they and the Soul together will perform all the Functions of *Memory* that we are conscious to our selves of.

Wherefore I shall conclude that *Memory* consists in this, That the Soul has acquired a greater *Promptitude* to think of this or that Phantasm, with the circumstances thereof, which were raised in her upon some occasion. Which *Promptitude* is acquired by either the *often representation* of the same Phantasm to her; or else by a *more vivid impress* of it from its *novelty, excellency, mischievousness*, or some such like condition that at once will pierce the Soul with an extraordinary resentment; or finally by *voluntary attention*, when she very carefully and on set purpose imprints the *Idea* as deeply as she can into her inward Sense. This *Promptitude* to think on such an *Idea* will lessen in time, and be so quite spent, that when the same *Idea* is represented again to the Soul, she cannot tell that ever she saw it before.

But before this inclination thereto be quite gone, upon this proneness to return into the same conception, with the circumstances, the *Relative Sense* of having seen it before (which we call *Memory*) does necessarily emerge upon a fresh representation of the Object.

6. But *Forgetfulness* arises either out of mere *Desuetude* of thinking on such an Object, or on others that are linked in with it, in such a Series as would represent it as past, and so make it a proper Object of *Memory*. Or else for that the *Spirits*, which the Soul uses in all her Functions, be not in a due temper; which may arise from overmuch *Coolness*, or *Wearisomeness in the Head*, to which alone *Sennertus* ascribes *Obliviousness*.

7. The last thing we are to consider is *Spontaneous Motion*. Which that it is performed by the continuation of the *Spirits* from the Seat of Common Sense to the *Muscles*, which is the gross Engine of *Motion*, is

\* See Chap. 5.  
sect. 7. also ch.  
2. sect. 7, 8.

Institution.  
Medicin. lib. 2.  
part. 3 sect. 2.  
cap. 4.



out of doubt. The manner how it is, we partly feel and see ; that is to say, we find in our selves a power, at our own pleasure to *move* this or the other member with very great force, and that the *Muscle swells* that *moves* the part ; which is a plain indication of influx of *Spirits*, thither directed or there guided by our mere Will : a thing admirable to consider , and worth our most serious meditation.

That this direction of the impresse of *Motion* is made by our mere Will, and Imagination of doing so, we know and feel it so intimately, that we can be of nothing more sure. That there is some fluid and subtile Matter, which we ordinarily call *Spirits*, directed into the *Muscle* that *moves* the Member, its *swelling* does evidence to our sight ; as also the experience, that moderate use of *Wine* which supplies *Spirits* apace will make this motion the more strong.

As for the manner, whether there be any such *Valvula* or no in the *Nerve*, common to the opposite *Muscles*, as also in those that are proper to each, it is not material. This great *priviledge* of our Soul's *directing the motion of Matter thus*, is wonderfull enough in either Hypothesis. But I look upon the *Fibrous* parts of the *Muscle* as the main Engine of motion ; which the Soul moistning with that subtile liquor of the *Animal Spirits*, makes them swell and shrink, like Lute-strings in rainy weather : And in this chiefly consists that notable strength of our Limbs in *Spontaneous motion*. But for those conceived *Valvula* that Experience has not found out yet, nor sufficient Reason, they are to wait for admission till they bring better evidence. For the presence of the *Animal Spirits* in this *Fibrous* flesh, and the command of the Soul to move, is sufficient to salve all *Phanomena* of this kind. For upon the Will conceived in the Common *Sensorium*, that part of the Soul that resides in the *Muscles*, by a power near a-kin to that by which she *made* the Body and the Organs thereof, *guides* the *Spirits* into such Pores and parts as is most requisite for the shewing the *use* of this excellent Fabrick.

8. And in virtue of some such power as this do we so easily *walk*, though we think not of it, as also *breath*, and *sing*, and *play* on the Lute, though our Mindes be taken up with something else. For Custome is another Nature : and though the *Animal Spirits*, as being merely corporeal, cannot be capable of any habits ; yet the Soul, even in that part thereof that is not *Cognitive*, may, and therefore may move the Body, though *Cogitation* cease ; provided the members be well replenished with *Spirits*, whose assistance in naturall motions of Animals is so great, that their *Heads* being taken off, their Body for a long time will move as before : as *Chalcidius* relates of *Wasps* and *Hornets*, who will fly about, and use their wings, a good part of an houre after they have lost their Heads : which is to be imputed to the residence of their Soul in them still, and the intireness of the *Animal Spirits*, not easily evaporating through their crustaceous Bodies.

For it is but a vulgar conceit to think, that the *Head* being taken off, the Soul must presently fly out, like a Bird out of a Basket, when the Lid is lifted up. For the whole World is as much throng'd with *Body*, as where she is ; and that *Tye* of the *Spirits* as yet not being lost, it is a greater

greater engagement to her to be there than any where else. This motion therefore in the *Wass*, that is so perfect and durable, I hold to be *Vital*; but that in the parts of dismembred creatures, that are less perfect, may be usually *Mechanical*.

9. We have now, so far forth as it is requisite for our design, considered the *Nature and Functions of the Soul*; and have plainly demonstrated, That she is a Substance distinct from the Body, and that her very Essence is spread throughout all the Organs thereof: as also that the generall Instrument of all her Operations is the subtile *Spirits*; which though they be not in like quantity and sincerity every where, yet they make all the Body so pervious to the impresses of Objects upon the external Organs, that like Lightning they pass to the Common *Sensorium*. For it is not necessary that the *Medium* be so fine and tenuious as the Matter where the most subtile motion begins. Whence Light passes both Aire and Water, though Aire alone is not sufficient for such a motion as Light, and Water almost uncapable of being the Seat of the fountain thereof. This may serve to illustrate the passage of Sense from the Membranes (or in what other seat soever the Spirits are most subtile and lucid) through thicker places of the Body to the very *Centre of Perception*.

10. Lastly, we have discovered a kind of *Heterogeneity* in the Soul; and that she is not of the same power every where. For her *Centre of Perception* is confined to the *Fourth Ventricle of the Brain*; and if the *Sensiferous Motions* we speak of be not faithfully conducted thither, we have no knowledge of the Object. That part therefore of the Soul is to be looked upon as most precious; and she not being an independent Mass, as *Matter* is, but one part resulting from another, that which is the noblest is in all reason to be deemed the cause of the rest. For which reason (as *Syneſius* calls God, on whom all things depend,  $\rho\iota\zeta\omega\nu\ \rho\iota\zeta\alpha\nu$ , so) I think *this Part* may be called the *Root of the Soul*.

Which apprehension of ours will seem the less strange, if we consider that from the highest *Life*, viz. the *Deity*, there does result that which has no *Life* nor *Sense* at all, to wit the *stupid Matter*. Wherefore in very good Analogie we may admit, that that precious part of the Soul in which resides *Perception*, *Sense* and *Understanding*, may send forth such an *Essential Emanation from it self* as is utterly devoid of all *Sense* and *Perception*; which you may call, if you will, the *Exterior branches of the Soul*, or the *Rayes of the Soul*, if you call that nobler and diviner part the *Centre*; which may very well merit also the appellation of the *Eye of the Soul*, all the rest of its parts being but mere darkness without it. In which, like another *Cyclops*, it will resemble the World we live in, whose one Eye is conspicuous to all that behold the light.

11. But to leave such lufurious Considerations, that rather gratifie our Fancy then satisfy our severer Faculties; we shall content our selves hereafter, from those two notorious Powers, and so perfectly different, which Philosophers acknowledge in the Soul, (to wit, *Perception* and *Organization*), onely to term that more noble part of her in the Common *Sensorium*, the *Perceptive*, and all the rest the *Plastick* part of the Soul.



## CHAP. XII.

1. *An Answer to an Objection, That our Arguments will as well prove the Immortality of the Souls of Brutes as of Men.*
2. *Another Objection inferring the Præexistence of Brutes Souls, and consequently of ours.*
3. *The first Answer to the Objection.*
4. *The second Answer consisting of four parts.*
5. *First, That the Hypothesis of Præexistence is more agreeable to Reason than any other Hypothesis.*
6. *And not onely so, but that it is very solid in it self.*
7. *That the Wisdome and Goodness of God argue the truth thereof.*
8. *As also the face of Providence in the World.*
9. *The second part of the second Answer, That the Præexistence of the Soul has the suffrage of all Philosophers in all Ages, that held it Incorporeal.*
10. *That the Gymnosophists of Ægypt, the Indian Brachmans, the Persian Magi, and all the learned of the Jews were of this Opinion.*
11. *A Catalogue of particular famous persons that held the same.*
12. *That Aristotle was also of the same mind.*
13. *Another more clear place in Aristotle to this purpose, with Sennertus his Interpretation.*
14. *An Answer to an Evasion of that Interpretation.*
15. *The last and clearest place of all out of Aristotle's Writings.*

1. **H**AVING thus discovered the Nature of the Soul, and that she is a Substance distinct from the Body; I should be in readiness to treat of her Separation from it, did I not think my self obliged first, to answer an envious Objection cast in our way, whereby they would make us believe, That the Arguments which we have used, though they be no less then Demonstrations, are mere Sophisms, because some of them, and those of not the least validity, prove what is very absurd and false, *viz.* That the Souls of Brutes also are Substances Incorporeal, distinct from the Body: from whence it will follow, that they are Immortal. But to this I have answered already in the Appendix to my Antidote, and in brief concluded, That they are properly *no more Immortal* then the *stupid Matter*, which *never perishes*, and that out of a *terrestrial* Body they may have no more sense then it. For all these things are as it pleases the first Creatour of them.

2. To this they perversly reply, That if the Souls of Brutes subsist after death, and are then senseless and unactive, it will necessarily follow that they must come into Bodies again. For it is very ridiculous to think that these Souls, having a Being yet in the world, and wanting nothing but fitly-prepared Matter to put them in a capacity of living again, should be alwaies neglected, and never brought into play, but that new ones should be daily created in their stead: for those innumerable Myriads of Souls would lie useles in the Universe, the number still increasing even to infinity. But if they come into Bodies again, it is evident that they *præexist*: and if the Souls of Brutes *præexist*, then certainly the Souls of Men doe so too. Which is an Opinion so wild and extravagant, that a wry mouth and a loud laughter (*the Argument that every Fool is able to use*) is sufficient to silence it and dash it out of countenance.

No

No *wise man* can ever harbour such a conceit as this, which every *Idiot* is able to confute by consulting but with his own *Memory*. For he is sure, if he had been before, he could *remember* something of that life past. Besides the unconceivableness of the Approach and Entrance of these *præexistent* Souls into the *Matter* that they are to actuate.

3. To this may be answered two things. The first, That though indeed it cannot be well denied, but that the concession of the *Præexistence* of the Souls of Brutes is a very fair introduction to the belief of the *Præexistence* of the Souls of Men also; yet the sequel is not at all *necessary*, but one may be without the other.

4. The second is this, That if the sequel were granted, no Absurdity can be detected from thence in Reason, if the prejudices of Education, and the blind suggestion of unconcerned Faculties, that have no right to vote here, be laid aside. To speak more explicitly, I say, This consequence of our Soul's *Præexistence* is more agreeable to Reason than any other Hypothesis whatever; Has been received by the most learned Philosophers of all Ages, there being scarce any of them that held the Soul of man *Immortal* upon the mere light of Nature and Reason, but asserted also her *Præexistence*; That *Memory* is no fit Judge to appeal to in this Controversie; and lastly, That *Traduction* and *Creation* are as intricate and unconceivable as this opposed Opinion.

5. I shall make all these four parts of my Answer good in order. The truth of the first we shall understand, if we compare it with those Opinions that stand in competition with it, which are but two that are considerable. The one is of those that say the Soul is *ex traduce*; the other of those that say it is *created*, upon occasion. The first Opinion is a plain contradiction to the *Notion* of a Soul, which is a *Spirit*, and therefore of an *Indivisible*, that is, of an *Indiscerpible*, Essence. The second Opinion implies both an Indignity to the Majesty of God, (in making him the chief assistant and actour in the highest, freest, and most particular way that the Divinity can be conceived to act, in those abominable crimes of Whoredome, Adultery, Incest, nay Buggery it self, by supplying those foul coitions with new created Souls for the purpose :) and also an injury to the Souls themselves; that they being ever thus created by the immediate hand of God, and therefore pure, innocent and immaculate, should be imprisoned in unclean, diseased and disordered Bodies, where very many of them seem to be so fatally overmastered, and in such an utter incapacity of closing with what is good and vertuous, that they must needs be adjudged to that extreme calamity which attends all those that forget God. Wherefore these two Opinions being so incongruous, what is there left that can seem probable, but the *Præexistency* of the Soul?

6. But I shall not press the *Reasonableness* of this Opinion onely from comparing it with others, but also from the concinnity that is to be found in it self. For as it is no greater wonder that every *particular* mans *Soul* that lives now upon Earth should be *à mundo condito*, then the *particular Matter* of their *Bodies* should, (which has haply undergone many Millions of Alterations and Modifications, before it lighted



into such a contexture as to prove the entire Body of any one person in the world, has been in places unimaginably distant, has siled, it may be, through the triangular passages of as many *Vortices* as we see Stars in a clear frosty night, and has shone once as bright as the Sun (as the *Cartesian* Hypothesis would have all the Earth to have done) insomuch that we eat, and drink, and cloath our selves with that which was once pure Light and Flame :) So, that *de facto* they do bear the same date with the Creation of the World, that unavoidable certainty of the *Præexistence* of the Souls of Brutes does, according to the very concession of our Adversaries, fairly insinuate.

7. But this is not all. Both the *Attributes* of God, and Face of things in the world, out of which his *Providence* is not to be excluded, are very strong Demonstrations thereof to Reason unprejudiced. For first, If it be good for the Souls of men to be at all, the sooner they are, the better. But we are most certain that the *Wisdom* and *Goodness* of God will doe that which is the best; and therefore if they can enjoy themselves before they come into these *Terrestrial* Bodies, (it being better for them to enjoy themselves then not,) they must be before they come into these Bodies; that is, they must be in a capacity of enjoying themselves without them for long periods of time, before they appeared here in this Age of the World. For nothing hinders but that they may live before they come into the Body, as well as they may after their going out of it: the latter whereof is acknowledged even by them that deny the *Præexistence*.

Wherefore the *Præexistence* of Souls is a necessary result of the *Wisdom* and *Goodness* of God, who can no more fail to doe that which is best, then he can to understand it: for otherwise his *Wisdom* would exceed his *Benignity*; nay there would be less hold to be taken of His *Goodness*, then of the *Bounty* of a very benign and good man, who, we may be well assured, will slip no opportunity of doing good that lies in his power, especially if it be neither damage nor trouble to him; both which hinderances are incompatible to the Deity.

8. Again, The face of *Providence* in the World seems very much to suit with this Opinion; there being not any so natural and easie account to be given of those things that seem the most harsh in the affairs of men, as from this Hypothesis, That their Souls did once subsist in some other state; where, in several manners and degrees, they forfeited the favour of their Creatour. And so according to that just Nemesis that He has interwoven in the constitution of the Universe and of their own natures, they undergoe several calamities and asperities of Fortune, and sad drudgeries of Fate, as a punishment inflicted, or a disease contracted from the several Obliquities of their Apostasie. Which key is not onely able to unlock that recondite mystery of some particular mens almost fatal aversness from all Religion and Vertue, their stupidity and dulness and even invincible slowness to these things from their very childhood, and their uncorrigible propension to all manner of Vice; but also of that squalid forlornness and brutish Barbarity that whole Nations for many Ages have layen under, and many do still lie under at this very day.

Which

Which sad Scene of things must needs exceedingly cloud and obscure the waies of *Divine Providence*, and make them utterly unintelligible; unless some light be let in from the present Hypothesis we speak of.

It is plain therefore that there are very weighty Reasons may be found out to conclude *the Præexistence of Souls*. And therefore this Opinion being so demonstrable from this Faculty, and there being no other that can contradict it, (for that the verdict of *Memory* in this case is invalid I shall prove anon) we are according to the Light of Nature undoubtedly to conclude, *That the Souls of Men do præexist*, by Axiome 5.

9. And as this Hypothesis is *Rational* in it self, so has it also gained the suffrage of all Philosophers of all Ages, of any note, that have held the Soul of Man *Incorporeal* and *Immortal*. And therefore I am not at all solicitous what either the *Epicureans* or *Stoicks* held concerning this matter; this contest being betwixt those onely that agree on this Truth, *That the Soul is a Substance Immaterial*. And such amongst the Philosophers as held it so, did unanimously agree *That it does Præexist*. This is so plain, that it is enough onely to make this challenge; every one in the search will satisfie himself of the Truth thereof. I shall onely adde, for the better countenance of the business, some few Instances herein, as a pledge of the Truth of my general Conclusion. Let us cast our Eye therefore into what corner of the World we will, that has been famous for *Wisdom* and *Literature*, and the *wisest* of those Nations you shall find the Assertours of this Opinion.

15. In *Egypt*, that ancient Nurse of all hidden Sciences, that this Opinion was in vogue amongst the wise men there, those fragments of *Trismegist* do sufficiently witness. For though there may be suspected some fraud and corruption in several passages in that Book, in reference to the interest of Christianity; yet this Opinion of the *Præexistence of the Soul*, in which Christianity did not interest it self, cannot but be judged, from the Testimony of those Writings, to have been a Branch of the *Wisdom* of that Nation: of which Opinion not onely the *Gymnosophists* and other wise men of *Egypt* were, but also the *Brachmans* of *India*, and the *Magi* of *Babylon* and *Persia*; as you may plainly see by those *Oracles* that are called either *Magical* or *Chaldaical*, which *Pletho* and *Pfellus* have commented upon. To these you may adde the abstruse Philosophy of the *Jews*, which they call their *Cabbala*, of which *the Soul's Præexistence* makes a considerable part; as all the learned of the *Jews* do confess. And how naturally applicable this Theory is to those three first mysterious chapters of *Genesis*, I have, I hope, with no contemptible success, endeavoured to shew in my *Conjectura Cabbalistica*.

11. And if I should particularize in persons of this Opinion, truly they are such, of so great fame for depth of Understanding and abstruse Science, that their Testimony alone might seem sufficient to bear down any ordinary modest man into an assent to their doctrine. And in the first place, If we can believe the *Cabbala* of the *Jews*, we must assign it to *Moses*, the greatest Philosopher certainly that ever was in the world; to whom you may adde *Zoroaster*, *Pythagoras*, *Epicharmus*, *Em-*



pedocles, Cebes, Euripides, Plato, Euclide, Philo, Virgil, Marcus Cicero, Plotinus, Iamblichus, Proclus, Boethius, Psellus, and severall others which it would be too long to recite. And if it were fit to adde *Fathers* to *Philosophers*, we might enter into the same list *Synesius* and *Origen*: the latter of whom was surely the greatest Light and Bulwark that antient Christianity had; who, unless there had been some very great matter in it, was far from that *levity* and *vanity*, as to entertain an Opinion so vulgarly slighted and neglected by other men: and the same may be said of others that were Christians, as *Boethius*, *Psellus*, and the late learned *Marfilus Ficinus*. But I have not yet ended my Catalogue: that admirable Physician *Johannes Fernelius* is also of this perswasion, and is not content to be so himself onely, but discovers those two grand Masters of Medicine, *Hippocrates* and *Galen*, to be so too; as you may see in his \* *De abditis rerum causis*. \* *Cardan* also, that famous Philosopher of his Age, expressly concludes, that the *Rational Soul* is both a distinct being from the *Soul of the World*, and that it does *praexist* before it comes into the Body: and lastly *Pomponatius*, no friend to the Soul's Immortality, yet cannot but confess, that the safest way to hold it is also therewith to acknowledge her *Pra-*  
*existence*.

\* 1 ib. 2. cap. 4.

\* *De Animorum Immortalitate*, sub titulo, *Aristotelis de Animorum immortalitate opinio*. pag. 235, 236, 237, &c. usque ad 239.

\* *Lib. 1. cap. 3.*

12. And that nothing may be wanting to shew the frivolousness of this part of the Objection, we shall also evince that *Aristotle*, that has the luck to be believed more then most Authors, was of the same opinion, in his Treatise \* *De Anima*. Where he speaking of the necessity of the qualification of the Body that the Soul is to actuate, and blaming those that omit that consideration, saies, That they are as careless of that matter, as if it were possible that, according to the *Pythagorick fables*, any Soul might enter into any Body. Whenas every Animal, as it has its proper *species*, so it is to have its peculiar *form*. But those that define otherwise, Παιραπήσιον λέγουσι, saith he, ὡς περ εἰς φαίντω τέκτονικὴν εἰς αὐλὴς ἐνδύεσθαι \* δεῖ γὰρ τέχνῳ χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὀργάνοις, ἢ ὅτι ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι, i. e. They speak as if one should affirm that the skill of a Carpenter did enter into a Flute or Pipe; for every Art must use its proper Instruments, and every Soul its proper Body. Where (as *Cardan* also has observed) *Aristotle* does not find fault with the Opinion of the Soul's going out of one Body into another, (which implies their *Praexistence*;) but that the Soul of a Beast should goe into the Body of a Man, and the Soul of a Man into a Beast's Body: this is the Absurdity that *Aristotle* justly rejects, the other Opinion he seems tacitely to allow of.

*De Animorum Immortalitate*, pag. 237.

1 ib. 3. cap. 11.

13. He speaks something more plainly in his *De Generat. Animal*. There are generated, saith he, in the Earth, and in the moisture thereof, Plants and living Creatures; because in the Earth is the moisture, and in the moisture Spirit, and in the whole Universe an Animal warmth or heat; insomuch that in a manner all places are full of Souls, ὥς τε ποῦντινὰ πάντα ψυχῆς εἶναι πλήρη, Aded ut modo quodam omnia sint Animarum plena, as *Sennertus* interprets the place: *Aristotle* understanding by ψυχὴ, the same that he does afterwards by ψυχικὴ ἀρχή, that Principle

ciple we call *Soul*, according to the nobility whereof he asserts that Animals are more or less noble; which assertion therefore reaches Humane Souls as well as these of Beasts.

14. Nor can this Text be eluded by being so injurious to *Aristotle*, as to make him to assert that there is but one Soul in the world, because he saies ψυχῆς, not ψυχῶν. For the text admitting of *Sennertus* his exposition as well as this other, that which is most reasonable is to be attributed to him. Now if his meaning was, that there is but One Soul in the World that goes through all things, and makes the Universe one great Animal, as the *Stoicks* would have it; he need not say that all places are *in a manner* full of this Soul, but *absolutely* full of it, as our Body is *wholly* actuated by the Soul in it. And therefore the Sense must be, that all places indeed are *in a manner* full of Souls: not that they have opportunity to actuate the *Matter*, and shew their presence there by vital operation; but are there dormant as to any visible energie, till *prepared Matter* engage them to more sensible actions.

15. We will adde a third place still more clear, out of the same Treatise, where he starts this very question of the *Præexistence of Souls*, of the *Sensitive* and *Rational* especially; περὶ αἰδνητικῆς ψυχῆς καὶ περὶ νοητικῆς, whether both kinds do προὔπαρχειν, that is *præexist*, before they come into the Body, or whether the *Rational* onely: and he concludes thus, Λείπει δὲ τὸ νοεὶν μόνον εἰσάγειν ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώματος καὶ δεῖον εἶναι μόνον. ἐδὲν γὰρ ὡς τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινῶς συμμέλει ἐνέργεια, i. e. *It remains that the Rational or Intellectual Soul onely enter from without, as being onely of a nature purely divine; with whose actions the actions of this gross Body have no communication.* Concerning which point he concludes like an Orthodox Scholar of his excellent Master *Plato*; to whose footsteps the closer he keeps, the less he ever wanders from the Truth. For in this very place he does plainly profess, what many would not have him so apertly guilty of, that the Soul of man is *Immortal*, and can perform her proper Functions without the help of this *Terrestrial Body*.

*De Generatione Animal.*  
lib. 2. cap. 3.

And thus I think I have made good the two first parts of my Answer to the proposed Objection; and have clearly proved, That the *Præexistence of the Soul* is an Opinion both in it self the most rational that can be maintained, and has had the suffrage of the renownedst Philosophers in all Ages of the World; and that therefore this Sequel from our Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul is no discovery of any fallacy in them.



## C H A P. XIII.

1. *The third part of the second Answer, That the forgetting of the former state is no good Argument against the Soule's Præexistence.* 2. *What are the chief causes of Forgetfulness.* 3. *That they all conspire, and that in the highest degree, to destroy the memory of the other state.* 4. *That mischances and Diseases have quite taken away the Memory of things here in this life.* 5. *That it is impossible for the Soul to remember her former condition without a Miracle.* 6. *The fourth part of the second Answer, That the Entrance of a Præexistent Soul into a Body is as intelligible as either Creation or Traduction.*

1. **A**S for the two last Difficulties, concerning the *Soul's Memory of her former state, and the manner of her coming into the Body*; I hope I shall with as much ease extricate my self here also, especially in the former. For if we consider what things they are that either quite take away, or exceedingly diminish our Memory in this life; we shall find the concurrence of them all, and that in a higher degree, or from stronger causes, contained in our descent into this *Earthly Body*, then we can meet with here: they none of them being so violent as to dislodge us out of it.

2. Now the things that take away our Memory here are chiefly these; either *The want of opportunity of being re-minded of a thing*, as it happens with many, who rise confident they slept without dreaming such a night, and yet before they goe to bed again, recover a whole Series of representations they had in their last sleep, by something that fell out in the day, without which it had been impossible for them to recall to mind their Dream. Or else, in the second place, *Desuetude of thinking of a matter*; whereby it comes to pass, that what we have earnestly meditated, laboured for, and penn'd down with our own hands when we were at School, were it not that we saw our names written under the Exercise, we could not acknowledge for ours when we are grown men. Or lastly, *Some considerable change in the frame and temper of our Body*, whether from some externall mischance, or from some violent Disease, or else from old age, which is disease enough of it self: which often do exceedingly impair, if not quite take away, the Memory, though the Soul be still in the same Body.

3. Now all these Principles of *Forgetfulness*, namely, *The want of something to re-mind us, Desuetude of thinking, and an Extraordinary change in the Body*, are more eminently to be found in the *Descent* of the Soul into these *Earthly prisons*, then can happen to her for any time of her abode therein. For there is a greater difference, in all probability, betwixt that Scene of things the Soul sees out of the Body and in it, then betwixt what she sees sleeping and waking: and the perpetuall occurrences of this present life continue a long *Desuetude* of thinking on the former. Besides that their *Descent* hither in all likelihood scarce befalls them but in their state of *Silence* and *Inactivity*, in which myriads  
of

of Souls may haply be for many Ages, as the maintainers of this Opinion may pretend, by reason of the innumerable expirations of the *Aëreal periods of life*, and the more narrow Lawes of preparing *Terrestrial Matter*. And lastly, her coming into this *Earthly Body* is a greater and more disadvantageous change, for the utter spoiling of the *Memory* of things she was acquainted with before, then any *Mischance* or *Disease* can be for the bringing upon her a *forgetfulness* of what she has known in this life.

4. And yet that *Diseases* and *Casualties* have even utterly taken away all *memory*, is amply recorded in History. As that *Messala Corvinus* forgot his own name; that one, by a blow with a stone, forgot all his learning; another, by a fall from an Horse, the name of his Mother and kinsfolks. A young Student of *Montpelier*, by a wound, lost his Memory so, that he was fain to be taught the letters of the Alphabet again. The like befell a *Franciscan* after a Feaver. And *Thucydides* writes of some, who after their recovery from that great Pestilence at *Athens*, did not onely forget the names and persons of their friends, but themselves too, not knowing who themselves were, nor by what name they were called:

*Atque etiam quosdam cepisse obliuiarerum  
Cunctarum, neque se possent cognoscere ut ipsi;*

as the Poet *Lucretius* sadly sets down in his description of that devouring Plague, out of the fore-named Historian.

*De Natura  
rerum lib. 6.*

5. Wherefore without a miracle it is impossible the Soul should remember any particular circumstance of her former condition, though she did really *præexist*, and was in a capacity of acting before she came into this Body, (as *Aristotle* plainly acknowledges she was) her change being far greater by coming into the Body then can ever be made while she stais in it. Which we haply shall be yet more assured of, after we have considered the manner of her descent, which is the last Difficulty objected.

6. I might easily decline this Controversie, by pleading onely, That the Entrance of the Soul into the Body, supposing her *Præexistence*, is as intelligible as in those other two wayes, of *Creation* and *Traduction*. For how this newly-created Soul is infused by God, no man knows; nor how, if it be traducted from the Parents, both their Souls contribute to the making up a new one. For if there be decision of part of the Soul of the Male, in the injection of his seed into the matrix of the Female, and part of the Female Soul to joyn with that of the Male's; besides that the decision of these parts of their Souls makes the Soul a *Disceerpible essence*, it is unconceivable how these two parts should make up one Soul for the Infant: a thing ridiculous at first view. But if there be no decision of any parts of the Soul, and yet the Soul of the Parent be the Cause of the Soul of the Child, it is perfectly an act of *Creation*; a thing that all sober men conclude incompetent to any particular Creature. It is therefore plainly unintelligible, how any Soul should pass from the Parents into the Body of the seed of the *Fœtus*, to actuate and inform it: which might be sufficient to stop the mouth of the



the Opposer, that pretends such great obscurities concerning the *entrance of Præexistent Souls into their Bodies.*

#### CHAP. XIV.

1. *The knowledge of the difference of Vehicles, and the Soul's Union with them, necessary for the understanding how she enters into this Earthly Body.*
2. *That though the Name of Vehicle be not in Aristotle, yet the Thing is there.*
3. *A clearing of Aristotle's notion of the Vehicle, out of the Philosophy of Des-Cartes.*
4. *A full interpretation of his Text.*
5. *That Aristotle makes onely two Vehicles, Terrestrial and Æthereal; which is more then sufficient to prove the Soul's Oblivion of her former state.*
6. *That the ordinary Vehicle of the Soul after death is Aire.*
7. *The duration of the Soul in her several Vehicles.*
8. *That the Union of the Soul with her Vehicle does not consist in Mechanical Congruity, but Vital.*
9. *In what Vital congruity of the Matter consists.*
10. *In what Vital congruity of the Soul consists, and how it changing, the Soul may be free from her Aiery Vehicle, without violent precipitation out of it.*
11. *Of the manner of the Descent of Souls into Earthly Bodies.*
12. *That there is so little Absurdity in the Præexistence of Souls, that the concession thereof can be but a very small prejudice to our Demonstrations of her Immortality.*

1. **B**UT I shall spend my time better in clearing the Opinion I here defend, then in perplexing that other that is so gross of it self, that none that throughly understand the nature of the Soul can so much as allow the possibility thereof: wherefore for the better conceiving how a *Præexistent Soul* may enter this *Terrestrial Body*, there are two things to be enquired into; *the difference of the Vehicles of Souls, and the cause of their union with them.* The *Platonists* do chiefly take notice of *Three* kinds of *Vehicles*, *Æthereal*, *Aereal*, and *Terrestrial*, in every one whereof there may be several degrees of purity and impurity, which yet need not amount to a new *Species*.

Lib. 2. cap. 3.

2. This Notion of *Vehicles*, though it be discoursed of most in the School of *Plato*, yet is not altogether neglected by *Aristotle*, as appears in his *De Generat. Animal.* where, though he does not use the Name, yet he does expressly acknowledge the Thing it self: For he does plainly affirm, That every Soul partakes of a Body distinct from this organized terrestrial Body, and of a more divine nature then the Elements so called; and that as one Soul is more noble then another, so is the difference of this diviner Body; which yet is nothing else with him then that warmth or heat in the seed, τὸ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι ἐνυπάρχον τὸ καλέμενον θερμὸν, which is not Fire, but a Spirit contained in the spumeous seed, and in this Spirit a nature analogous to the Element of the Stars.

3. Of which neither *Aristotle* himself had, nor any one else can have, so explicite an apprehension as those that understand the first and second Element

Element of *Des-Cartes* ; which is the most subtile and active Body that is in the World, and is of the very same nature that the Heaven and Stars are, that is to say, is the very Body of Light, (which is to be understood chiefly of the first Element ) though so mingled with other Matter here below that it does not shine, but is the Basis of all that natural warmth in all generations, and the immediate Instrument of the Soul, when it organizeth any Matter into the figure or shape of an Animal ; as I have also intimated \* elsewhere, when I proved, *That the Spirits are the immediate Instrument of the Soul in all Vital and Animal functions*. In which *Spirits* of necessity is contained this *Celestial* Substance, which keeps them from congealing, as it does also all other liquid bodies, and must needs be in the Pores of them ; there being no *Vacuum* in the whole comprehension of Nature.

\* In this  
2. Book,  
chap. 8.

4. The full and express meaning therefore of *Aristotle's* text must be this, That in the spumeous and watry or terrene moisture of the seed is contained a Body of a more spirituous or aëreal consistency, and in this aëreal or spirituous consistency is comprehended φύσις ἀνάλογος τοῖς ἀστέροις τῶν ἀέρων στοιχείῳ, a nature that is analogous or like to the Element of the stars, namely that is of it self *athereal* and *lucid*.

5. And it is this *Vehicle* that *Aristotle* seems to assert that the Soul does act in separate from the Body ; as if she were ever either in this *Terrestrial* Body, or in her *Aethereal* one : which if it were true, so vast a change must needs obliterate all *Memory* of her former condition, when she is once plunged into this earthly prison. But it seems not so probable to me, that Nature admits of so great a Chasme ; nor is it necessary to suppose it for this purpose : the descent of the Soul out of her *Aiery* Vehicle into this *terrestrial* Body, and besmearing moisture of the first rudiments of life, being sufficient to lull her into an eternal oblivion of whatever hapned to her in that other condition ; to say nothing of her long state of *Silence* and *Inactivity* before her turn come to revive in an *earthly* body.

6. Wherefore not letting go that more orderly conceit of the *Platonists*, I shall make bold to assert, That the Soul may live and act in an *Aëreal* Vehicle as well as in the *Aethereal* ; and that there are very few that arrive to that high Happiness, as to acquire a *Celestial* Vehicle immediately upon their quitting the *Terrestrial* one : that *Heavenly Chariot* necessarily carrying us in triumph to the greatest Happiness the Soul of man is capable of : which would arrive to all men indifferently, good and bad, if the parting with this *Earthly* Body would suddainly mount us into the *Heavenly*. Wherefore by a just *Nemesis*, the Souls of Men that are not very Heroically vertuous will find themselves restrained within the compass of this caliginous *Aire*, as both Reason it self will suggest, and the *Platonists* have unanimously determined.

7. We have competently described the difference of those *Three* kinds of *Vehicles*, for their *purity* and *consistency*. The *Platonists* adde to this the difference of *duration*, making some of them of that nature as to entertain the Soul a longer time in them, others a shorter. The shortest of all is that of the *Terrestrial* Vehicle. In the *Aëreal* the Soul may inhabit, as they define, many ages, and in the *Aethereal* for ever.



8. But this makes little to the clearing of the *manner of their descent* εἰς γένεσιν, which cannot be better understood, then by considering their *Union* with the Body generated or indeed with any kind of Body whatever, where the Soul is held captive, and cannot quit her self thereof by the free *imperium* of her own Imagination and Will. For what can be the cause of this cohesion, the very Essence of the Soul being so easily penetrative of *Matter*, and the dimensions of all *Matter* being alike penetrable every where? For there being no more *Body* or *Matter* in a Vessel filled with *Lead* then when it is full of *Water*, nor when full with *Water* then when with *Aire*, or what other subtiler Body soever that can be imagined in the Universe; it is manifest that the *Craßities* of *Matter* is every where alike, and alike penetrable and passable to the Soul. And therefore it is unconceivable how her *Union* should be so with any of it, as that she should not be able at any time to glide freely from one part thereof to another as she pleases.

It is plain therefore, that this *Union of the Soul with Matter* does not arise from any such gross *Mechanical* way, as when two Bodies stick one in another by reason of any toughness and viscosity, or streight commixture of parts; but from a *congruity* of another nature, which I know not better how to term then *Vital*: which *Vital Congruity* is chiefly in the *Soul* it self, it being the noblest Principle of Life; but is also in the *Matter*, and is there nothing but such modification thereof as fits the *Plastick* part of the Soul, and tempts out that Faculty into act.

9. Not that there is any *Life* in the *Matter* with which this in the *Soul* should sympathize and unite; but it is termed *Vital* because it makes the *Matter* a *congruous* Subject for the Soul to reside in, and exercise the functions of *life*. For that which has no *life* it self, may tie to it that which has. As some men are said to be tied by the teeth, or tied by the ear, when they are detained by the pleasure they are struck with from good Musick or delicious Viands. But neither is that which they eat *alive*, nor that which makes the Musick, neither the Instrument, nor the Air that conveys the sound. For there is nothing in all this but mere Matter and corporeal motion, and yet our *vital* functions are affected thereby. Now as we see that the *Perceptive* part of the Soul is thus vitally affected with that which has no life in it, so it is reasonable that the *Plastick* part thereof may be so too; That there may be an Harmony betwixt *Matter* thus and thus modified, and that Power that we call *Plastick*, that is utterly devoid of all *Perception*. And in this alone consists that which we call *Vital Congruity* in the prepared Matter, either to be organized, or already shaped into the perfect form of an Animal.

10. And that *Vital Congruity* which is in the Soul, I mean in the *Plastick* part thereof, is analogous to that Pleasure that is perceived by the Sense, or rather to the capacity of receiving it, when the Sense is by agreeable motions from without or in the Body it self very much gratified, and that whether the Mind will or no. For there are some Touches that will in their *Perception* seem pleasant, whether our Judgment would have them so or nor. What this is to the *Perceptive* part of the

the Soul, that other *Congruity of Matter* is to the *Plastick*. And therefore that which ties the Soul and this or that Matter together, is an unresistible and unperceptible pleasure, if I may so call it, arising from the *congruity of Matter* to the *Plastick* faculty of the Soul: which *Congruity in the Matter* not failing, nor that in the Soul, the *Union* is at least as necessary as the continuation of eating and drinking, so long as Hunger and Thirst continues, and the Meat and Drink proves good. But either satiety in the Stomack or some ill taste in the Meat may break the *congruity* on either side, and then the action will cease with the pleasure thereof. And upon this very account may a Soul be conceived to quit her *Aiery Vehicle* within a certain period of Ages, as the *Platonists* hold she does, without any violent precipitation of her self out of it.

II. What are the *strings* or *cords* that tie the Soul to the Body, or to what Vehicle else soever, I have declared as clearly as I can. From which it will be easy to understand the *manner of her descent*. For assuredly, the same *cords* or *strings* that tie her there, may draw her thither: Where the carcass is, there will the Eagles be gathered. Not that she need use her *Perceptive* faculty in her descent, as Hawks and Kites by their sight or smelling fly directly to the lure or the prey: but she being within the *Atmosphere* (as I may so call it) of Generation, and so her *Plastick* power being reached and toucht by such an invisible reek, (as Birds of prey are, that smell out their food at a distance;) she may be fatally carried, all *Perceptions* ceasing in her, to that Matter that is so fit a receptacle for her to exercise her efformative power upon. For this *Magick-sphere*, as I may so term it, that has this power of conjuring down Souls into *Earthly Bodies*, the nearer the Centre, the virtue is the stronger; and therefore the Soul will never cease till she has slid into the very Matter that sent out those rays or subtile reek to allure her.

From whence it is easy to conceive that the Souls of Brutes also, though they be not able to exercise their *Perceptive* faculty out of a *Terrestrial* body, yet they may infallibly finde the way again into the world, as often as *Matter* is fitly prepared for generation. And this is one Hypothesis, and most intelligible to those that are pleased so much with the opinion of those large Sphears they conceive of *emissary Atomes*.

There is also another, which is the Power and Activity of the *Spirit of Nature* or *Inferiour Soul of the World*, who is as fit an Agent to transmit particular Souls, as she is to move the parts of Matter. But of this \* hereafter.

12. What has been said is enough for the present to illustrate the pretended obscurity and unconceivableness of this Mystery. So that I have fully made good all the four parts of my Answer to that Objection that would have supplanted the force of my strongest Arguments for the Soul's Immortality; and have clearly proved, That though this sequel did necessarily result from them, *That the Souls both of Men and Beasts did Præexist*, yet to unprejudiced reason there is no Absurdity nor Inconvenience at all in the Opinion. And therefore this Obstacle being removed, I shall the more chearfully proceed to the demonstrating of the Soul's *actual Separation* from the Body.

\* Book 3<sup>d</sup>  
ch. 13. sect. 9.



## CHAP. XV.

1. *What is meant by the Separation of the Soul, with a confutation of Regius, who would stop her in the dead Corps.* 2. *An Answer to those that profess themselves puzzled how the Soul can get out of the Body.* 3. *That there is a threefold Vital Congruity to be found in three several Subjects.* 4. *That this triple Congruity is also competible to one Subject, viz. the Soul of Man.* 5. *That upon this Hypothesis it is very intelligible how the Soul may leave the Body.* 6. *That her Union with the Aereal Vehicle may be very suddain, and as it were in a moment.* 7. *That the Soul is actually separate from the Body, is to be proved either by History or Reason. Examples of the former kinde out of Pliny, Herodotus, Ficinus.* 8. *Whether the Ecstasie of Witches prove an actual separation of the Soul from the Body.* 9. *That this real separation of the Soul in Ecstasie is very possible.* 10. *How the Soul may be loosned and leave the Body, and yet return thither again.* 11. *That though Reason and Will cannot in this life release the Soul from the Body, yet Passion may; and yet so that she may return again.* 12. *The peculiar power of Desire for this purpose.* 13. *Of Cardan's Ecstasies, and the Ointment of Witches, and what truth there may be in their confessions.*

1. **C**ONCERNING the actual and local Separation of the Soul from the Body, it is manifest that it is to be understood of this Terrestrial Body. For to be in such a separate state, as to be where no Body or Matter is, is to be out of the World: the whole Universe being so thick set with Matter or Body, that there is not to be found the least vacuity therein. The question therefore is only, whether upon death the Soul can pass from the Corps into some other place. *Henricus Regius* seems to arrest her there by that general law of Nature, termed the law of Immutability; whereby every thing is to continue in the same condition it once is in, till something else change it. But the application of this law is very grossly unjust in this case. For, as I have above intimated, the Union of the Soul with the Body is upon certain terms; neither is every piece of Matter fit for every Soul to unite with, as *Aristotle* of old has very solidly concluded. Wherefore that condition of the Matter being not kept, the Soul is no longer engaged to the Body. What he here says for the justifying of himself, is so arbitrary, so childish and ridiculous, that, according to the merit thereof, I shall utterly neglect it, and pass it by, not vouchsafing of it any Answer.

2. Others are much puzzled in their imagination, how the Soul can get out of the Body, being imprisoned and lockt up in so close a Castle. But these seem to forget both the Nature of the Soul, with the tenuity of her Vehicle, and also the Anatomy of the Body. For considering the nature of the Soul her self, and of Matter which is alike penetrable every where, the Soul can pass through solid Iron and Marble as well as through the soft Air and Æther; so that the thickness of the Body is no impediment to her. Besides, her Astral Vehicle

Vehicle is of that tenuity, that it self can as easily pass the smallest pores of the Body as the Light does Glass, or the Lightning the Scabbard of a Sword without tearing or scorching of it. And lastly, whether we look upon that principal seat of the *Plastick* power of the *Heart*, or that of *Perception*, the *Brain*; when a man dies, the Soul may collect her self, and the small residue of Spirits (that may haply serve her in the inchoation of her new Vehicle) either into the Heart, whence is an easy passage into the Lungs, and so out at the Mouth; or else into the Head, out of which there are more doors open then I will stand to number. These things are very easily imaginable, though as invisible as the Air, in whose element they are transacted.

3. But that they may still be more perfectly understood, I shall resume again the consideration of that Faculty in the *Plastick* part of the Soul, which we call *Vital Congruity*. Which, according to the number of Vehicles, we will define to be threefold, *Terrestrial*, *Aereal*, and *Aethereal* or *Celestial*. That these *Vital Congruities* are found, some in some kinde of Spirits and others in othersome, is very plain. For that the *Terrestrial* is in the Soul of Brutes and in our own is without controversie; as also that the *Aereal* in that kinde of Beings which the Ancients called *Δαίμονες* and lastly, that the *Heavenly* and *Aethereal* in those Spirits that Antiquity more properly called *Θεοί*, as being Inhabitants of the Heavens. For that there are such *Aereal* and *Aethereal Beings* that are analogous to *Terrestrial Animals*, if we compare the nature of God with the *Phænomena* of the world, it cannot prove less then a Demonstration.

For this Earth that is replenisht with living Creatures, nay put in all the Planets too that are in the world, and fancy them inhabited, they all joyned together bear not so great a proportion to the rest of the liquid Matter of the Universe (that is in a nearer capacity of being the Vehicle of Life) as a single Cumin-seed to the Globe of the Earth. But how ridiculous a thing would it be, that all the Earth beside being neglected, onely one piece thereof, no better then the rest, nor bigger then the smallest seed, should be inhabited? The same may be said also of the compass of the Aire; and therefore it is necessary to enlarge their Territories, and confidently to pronounce there are *Aethereal Animals*, as well as *Terrestrial* and *Aereal*.

4. It is plain therefore that these three *Congruities* are to be found in several Subjects; but that which makes most to our purpose, is to finde them in one, and that in the Soul of Man. And there will be an easy intimation thereof, if we consider the vast difference of those Faculties that we are sure are in her *Perceptive* part, and how they occasionally emerge, and how upon the laying asleep of one, others will spring up. Neither can there be any greater difference betwixt the highest and lowest of these *Vital congruities* in the *Plastick* part, then there is betwixt the highest and lowest of those Faculties that result from the *Perceptive*. For some Perceptions are the very same with those of *Beasts*; others little inferiour to those that belong to *Angels*, as we ordinarily call them; some perfectly brutish, others purely divine: why therefore may there



not reside so great a Latitude of capacities in the *Plastick* part of the Soul, as that she may have in her all those three *Vital Congruities*, whereby she may be able livingly to unite as well with the *Celestial* and *Aereal Body* as with this *Terrestrial* one? Nay, our nature being so free and multifarious as it is, it would seem a reproach to Providence, to deny this capacity of living in these several Vehicles; because that *Divine Nemesis* which is supposed to rule in the world would seem defective without this contrivance.

But without controversy, Eternal Wisdom and Justice has forecast that which is the best: and, unless we will say nothing at all, we having nothing to judge by but our own Faculties, we must say that the Forecast is according to what we, upon our most accurate search, do conceive to be the best. For there being no Envy in the Deity, as *Plato* somewhere has noted, it is not to be thought but that He has framed our Faculties so, that when we have rightly prepared our selves for the use of them, they will have a right correspondency with those things that are offered to them to contemplate in the world.

And truly if we had here time to consider, I do not doubt but it might be made to appear a very rational thing, that there should be such an *Amphibion* as the Soul of man, that had a capacity (as some Creatures have to live either in the Water or on the Earth) to change her Element, and after her abode here in this *Terrestrial Vehicle* amongst Men and Beasts, to ascend into the company of the *Aereal Genii*, in a Vehicle answerable to their nature.

5. Supposing then this triple capacity of *Vital Congruity* in the Soul of Man, the manner how she may leave this Body is very intelligible. For the Bodies fitness of temper to retain the Soul being lost in Death, the lower *Vital Congruity* in the Soul looseth its Object, and consequently its Operation. And therefore as the letting goe one thought in the *Perceptive part* of the Soul is the bringing up another; so the ceasing of one *Vital Congruity* is the wakening of another, if there be an Object, or Subject, ready to entertain it; as certainly there is, partly in the Body, but mainly without it. For there is a *vital Aire* that pervades all this lower world, which is continued with the life of all things, and is the chiefest Principle thereof. Whence *Theon* in his *Scholia* upon *Aratus* interprets that Hemistich,

——Τὸ γὰρ καὶ γένε· ἑσμεν,

in a secondary meaning as spoken of the *Aire*, which he calls ἡ Δία or ἡ Ζῆνα ἡ φυσικόν, *the natural Jupiter*, in whom, in an inferiour sense, we may be said to live, and move, and have our Being: for without *Aire*, neither Fishes, Fowls, nor Beasts can subsist, it administering the most immediate matter of life unto them, by feeding and refreshing their Animal Spirits.

Wherefore upon the cessation of the lowest *Vital Congruity*, that *Aereal* capacity awakening into Act, and finding so fit Matter every where to imploy her self upon, the Soul will not fail to leave the Body; either upon choice, by the power of her own Imagination and Will; or else (supposing the very worst that can happen) by a natural kinde of Attraction,

tion, or Transvection, she being her self, in that stound and confusion that accompanies Death, utterly unsensible of all things.

For the Aire without being more *wholesome* and *vital* then in the corrupt caverns of the dead Body, and yet there being a continuation thereof with that without; it is as easy to understand how (that Principle of joyning therewith in the *Plastick* part of the Soul being once excited) she will naturally glide out of the Body into the free Aire, as how the Fire will ascend upwards, or a Stone fall downwards: for neither are the motions of these merely Mechanical, but vital or Magical, that cannot be resolved into *mere Matter*, as I shall demonstrate in my Third Book.

Chap. 13.  
sect. 6.

6. And being once recovered into this vast Ocean of *Life*, and *sensible Spirit of the world*, so full of enlivening Balsame; it will be no wonder if the Soul suddainly regain the use of her *Perceptive* faculty, being, as it were in a moment, regenerate into a natural power of Life and Motion, by so happy a concurse of rightly-prepared Matter for her *Plastick* part vitally to unite withall. For groffer generations are performed in almost as inconsiderable a space of time; if those Histories be true, of extemporary Salads, sown and gathered not many hours before the meal they are eaten at: and of the suddain ingendring of Frogs upon the fall of rain, whole swarms whereof, that had no Being before, have appeared with perfect shape and liveliness in the space of half an houre, after some more unctuous droppings upon the dry ground; as I find not onely recited out of *Fallopins*, \* *Scaliger*, and others, but have been certainly my self informed of it by them that have been eye-witnesses thereof; as *Vaninus* also professes himself to have been by his friend *Johannes Ginochius*, who told him for a certain, that in the month of *July* he saw with his own eyes a drop of rain suddenly turned into a Frog. By such examples as these it is evident, that the reason why Life is so long a compleating in Terrestrial generations, is only the sluggishness of the Matter the *Plastick* power works upon. Wherefore a Soul once united with Aire, cannot miss of being able, in a manner in the twinckling of an eye, to exercise all *Perceptive functions* again, if there was ever any intercession of them in the astonishments of Death.

\* Scalig. de  
Subril. Exerc.  
323.

7. How the Soul may live and act separate from the Body, may be easily understood out of what has been spoken. But that she does so *de facto*, there are but two waies to prove it; the one by the testimony of *History*, the other by *Reason*. That of *History* is either of persons perfectly dead, or of those that have been subject to *Ecstasies*, or rather to that height thereof which is more properly called *απαρρησία*, when the Soul does really leave the Body, and yet return again. Of this latter sort is that Example that *Pliny* recites of *Hermotimus Clazomenius*, whose Soul would often quit her Body, and wander up and down; and after her return tell many true stories of what she had seen during the time of her disjunction. The same, *Maximus Tyrius* and \* *Herodotus* report of *Aristeus Proconnesius*. \* *Marsilius Ficinus* adjoyns to this rank that narration in *Aulus Gellius*, concerning one *Cornelius*, a Priest, who in an Ecstasie saw the Battel fought betwixt *Cæsar* and *Pompey* in *Thessalie*, his Body being then at *Padua*; and yet could, after his return to himself,

Histor. Natural.  
lib. 7. cap. 52.

\* Historiar.  
lib. 4.  
\* Theolog.  
Platonic. lib.  
13. cap. 2.  
A. Gell. Noct.  
Attic. lib. 15:  
cap. 18.



See my *Amidote*, Book 3.  
chap. 11. sect. 7.  
\* *Histor. Natural.* lib. 7.  
cap. 52.

punctually declare the Time, Order and Success of the Fight. That in *Wierus*, of the *Weasel* coming out of the Souldiers mouth when he was asleep, is a more plain example: which, if it were true, would make *Aristotus* his *Pigeon* not so much suspected of fabulosity as \* *Pliny* would have it. Several Relations there are in the world to this effect, that cannot but be loudly laughed at by them that think the Soul inseparable from the Body; and ordinarily they seem very ridiculous also to those that think it is separable, but as firmly believe that it is never, nor ever can be, separate but in Death.

See my *Antidote*, Book 3.  
chap. 11.  
sect. 2, 3.

8. *Bodinus* has a very great desire, notwithstanding it is so incredible to others, that the thing should be true; it being so evincing an Argument for the Soul's Immortality. And he thinks this Truth is evident from innumerable examples of the *Ecstasies* of Witches: which we must confess with him not to be natural; but that they amount to a perfect *ἀπαρρησία* or carrying away the Soul out of the Body, the lively sense of their meeting, and dancing, and adoring the Devil, and the mutual remembrance of the persons that meet one another there at such a time, will be no \* infallible *Demonstration* that they were there indeed, while their Bodies lay at home in Bed. Conformity of their Confessions concerning the same Conventicle is onely a *shrewd probability*, if it once could be made good that this leaving their Bodies were a thing possible.

\* See *Enthusiast.*  
*Triumphat.*  
sect. 5. ad 28.

For when they are out of them, they are much-what in the same condition that other *Spirits* are, and can imitate what shape they please; so that many of these Transformations into Wolves and Cats, may be as likely of the Soul having left thus the Body, as by the Devils possessing the Body and transfiguring it himself. And what these *airy* Cats or Wolves suffer, whether cuttings of their limbs, or breaking the Back, or any such like mischief, that the Witch in her Bed suffers the like, may very well arise from that *Magick Sympathy* that is seated in the Unity of the Spirit of the World, and the continuity of the subtile Matter dispersed throughout: the Universe in some sense being, as the *Stoicks* and *Platonists* define it, one vast entire *Animal*.

9. Now that this *real Separation of the Soul* may happen in some *Ecstasies* will be easily admitted, if we consider that the Soul in her own Nature is separable from the Body, as being a Substance really distinct therefrom; and that all Bodies are alike penetrable and passable to her, she being devoid of that corporeal property which they ordinarily call *ἀντιληπτότης*, and therefore can freely slide through any Matter whatsoever, without any *knocking* or *resistance*; and lastly, that she does not so properly impart Heat and Motion to the Body, as Organization: and therefore when the Body is well organized, and there be that due temper of the Blood, the Heart and Pulse will in some measure beat, and the Brain will be replenish'd with Spirits, and therewith the whole Body, though the Soul were out of it. In which case (saying that the *Spirit of Nature* cannot be excluded thence) it would be perfectly *Cartesius* his *Machina* without Sense, though seemingly as much alive as any animate Creature in a deep sleep. Whence it appears, that if the Soul could leave the Body, that she might doe it for a certain time without any detriment thereto,

thereto, that is, so long as it might well live without Repast. Which fully answers their fears who conceit that if the Soul was but once out of the Body, perfect Death must necessarily ensue, and all possible return thither be precluded.

10. But all the difficulty is to understand how the Soul may be loosned from the Body, while the Body is in a *fit* condition to retain her. That is a very great Difficulty indeed, and in a manner impossible for any power but what is supernatural. But it is not hard to conceive that this *vital fitness* in the Body may be changed, either by way of *natural Disease*, or by *Art*. For why may not some certain Fermentation in the Body so alter the Blood and Spirits, that the powers of the *Plastick* part of the Soul may cease to operate, as well as sometimes the *Perceptive* faculties do, as in *Catalepsies*, *Apoplexies*, and the like? Wherefore this passing of the Soul out of the Body in *Sleep*, or *Ecstasie*, may be sometime a certain Disease, as well as that of the *νυκτοβάται*, *those that walk in their sleep*.

Now if it should happen that some such distemper should arise in the Body as would very much change the *Vital Congruity* thereof for a time, and in this Paroxysm that other Disease of the *Noctambuli* should surprise the party; his Imagination driving him to walk to this or that place, his Soul may very easily be conceived in this loosned condition it lies in, to be able to leave the Body, and pass in the Aire, as other Inhabitants of that Element doe, and act the part of separate Spirits, and exercise such Functions of the *Perceptive* faculty as they do that are quite released from Terrestrial Matter. Onely here is the difference, That that damp in the Body that loosned the Union of the Soul being spent, the Soul, by that natural *Magick* I have more then once intimated, will certainly return to the Body, and unite with it again as firm as ever. But no man can when he pleases pass out of his Body thus, by the *Imperium* of his Will, no more then he can walk in his Sleep: For this capacity is pressed down more deep into the lower life of the Soul, whither neither the *Liberty of Will* nor *free Imagination* can reach.

11. *Passion* is more likely to take effect in this case then either of the other two Powers, the seat of Passions being originally in the Heart, which is the chief Fort of these lower Faculties; and therefore by their propinquity can more easily act upon the first Principles of Vital Union. The effect of these has been so great, that they have quite carried the Soul out of the Body, as appears in sundry Histories of that kinde. For both *Sophocles* and *Dionysius* the *Sicilian* Tyrant died suddainly upon the news of a Tragick Victory; as *Polycrita* also a Noble-Woman of the Isle of *Naxos*, the Poet *Philippides*, and *Diagoras* of *Rhodes*, upon the like excess of *Joy*. We might adde examples of sudden *Fear* and *Grief*, but it is needless.

It is a known and granted Truth, that *Passion* has so much power over the vital temper of the Body as to make it an unfit mansion for the Soul; from whence will necessarily follow her disunion from it. Now if *Passion* will so utterly change the Harmony of the Blood and Spirits, as quite to release the Soul from the Body by a perfect Death; why may it not

some



sometime act on this side that degree, and only bring a present *intemperies*, out of which the Body may recover, and consequently regain the Soul back again, by virtue of that *Mundane Sympathy* I have so often spoke of :

12. Now of all *Passions* whatever, excess of *Desire* is fittest for this more harmless and momentary ablegation of the Soul from the Body ; because the great strength thereof is so closely assisted with the imagination of departing to the place where the party would be, that upon disunion not amounting to perfect Death, the power of Fancy may carry the Soul to the place intended ; and being satisfied and returned, may re-kindle life in the Body to the same degree it had before it was infested by this excess of Desire. This is that, if any thing, that has made dying men visit their friends before their departure, at many miles distance, their Bodies still keeping their sick bed ; and those that have been well, give a visit to their sick friends, of whose health they have been over-desirous and solicitous. For this *Ecstasie* is really of the *Soul*, and not of the *Blood* or *Animal Spirits* ; neither of which have any *Sense* or *Perception* in them at all. And therefore into this Principle is to be resolved that Story which *Martinus Del-Rio* reports of a Lad who, through the strength of Imagination and Desire of seeing his Father, fell into an *Ecstasie* ; and after he came to himself, confidently affirmed he had seen him, and told infallible circumstances of his being present with him.

See Helmont,  
De magnetica  
vulnecrum cura-  
tione, Paragr.  
74, 75, 76.

13. That *Cardan* and others could fall into an *Ecstasie* when they pleased, by force of *Imagination* and *Desire* to fall into it, is recorded and believed by very grave and sober Writers : but whether they could ever doe it to a compleat ἀπαρρεσία, or local disjunction of the Soul from the Body, I know none that dare affirm ; such events being rather the chances of Nature and Complexion, as in the *Noctambuli*, then the effects of our Will. But we cannot assuredly conclude but that *Art* may bring into our own power and ordering that which natural causes put upon us sometimes without our leaves. But whether those *Oyntments* of Witches have any such effect, or whether those unclean Spirits they deal with, by their immediate presence in their Bodies, cannot for a time so suppress or alter their *Vital fitness* to such a degree as will loosen the Soul, I leave to more curious Inquisitors to search after. It is sufficient that I have demonstrated a very intelligible possibility of this actual separation without *Death* properly so called.

From whence the peremptory Confessions of Witches, and the agreement of the story which they tell in several, as well those that are there bodily, as they that leave their Bodies behind them, especially when at their return they bring something home with them, as a permanent sign of their being at the place, is ( though it may be all the delusion of their *Familiars* ) no contemptible probability of their being there indeed where they declare they have been. For these are the greatest evidences that can be had in humane affairs : And nothing, so much as the supposed Impossibility thereof, has deterred men from believing the thing to be true.

## CHAP. XVI.

1. That Souls departed communicate Dreams. 2. Examples of Apparitions of Souls deceased. 3. Of Apparitions in fields where pitched Battels have been fought; as also of those in Churchyards, and other vaporous places. 4. That the Spissitude of the Air may well contribute to the easiness of the appearing of Ghosts and Spectres. 5. A further proof thereof from sundry Examples. 6. Of Marsilius Ficinus his appearing after death. 7. With what sort of people such Examples as these avail little. 8. Reasons to perswade the unprejudiced that ordinarily those Apparitions that bear the shape and person of the deceased, are indeed the Souls of them.

1. **T**HE Examples of the other sort, viz. of the appearing of the Ghosts of men after death, are so numerous and frequent in all mens mouths, that it may seem superfluous to particularize in any. This appearing is either by *Dreams*, or *open Vision*. In *Dreams*, as that which hapned to *Avenzoar Albumaron* an *Arabian* Physician, to whom his lately-deceased friend suggested in his sleep a very soverain Medicine for his sore Eyes. Like to this is that in \* *Diodorus* concerning *Isis* Queen of *Egypt*, whom he reports to have communicated remedies to the *Egyptians* in their sleep after her death, as well as she did when she was alive. Of this kind is also that memorable story of \* *Posidonius* the *Stoick*, concerning two young men of *Arcadia*, who being come to *Megara*, and lying the one at a Victualler's, the other in an *Inne*; he in the *Inne* while he was asleep dream'd that his Fellow-traveller earnestly desired him to come and help him, as being assaulted by the Victualler, and in danger to be killed by him: But he, after he was perfectly awake, finding it but a Dream, neglected it. But fain asleep again, his murdered friend appeared to him the second time, beseeching him, that though he did not help him alive, yet he would see his Death revenged; telling him how the Victualler had cast his Body into a Dung-cart, and that if he would get up timely in the morning, and watch at the Town-gate, he might thereby discover the murder: which he did accordingly, and so saw Justice done on the Murderer. Nor does the first Dream make the second impertinent to our purpose: For as that might be from the strength of Imagination, and desire of help in the distressed *Arcadian*, impressed on the *Spirit of the World*, and so transmitted to his friend asleep (a condition fittest for such communications;) so it is plain that this after his Death must fail, if his Soul did either cease to be or to act. And therefore it is manifest that she both was and did act, and suggested this Dream in revenge of the Murder. Of which kinde there be infinite Examples, I mean of Murders discovered by Dreams, the Soul of the person murdered seeming to appear to some or other asleep, and to make his complaint to them.

But I will content my self onely to adde an Example of *Gratitude* to this of *Revenge*: As that of *Simonides*, who lighting by chance on a dead Body

See Marsil.  
Ficin. Theolog.  
Platon. lib. 16.  
cap. 5.  
\* Biblioth. Hi-  
storic. lib. 1.  
pag. 15.  
\* Marsil. Ficin.  
Theolog. Pla-  
ton. lib. 16.  
cap. 5.

Marsil. Ficin.  
Theolog. Pla-  
ton. lib. 16.  
cap. 5.



Body by the Sea side, and out of the sense of Humanity bestowing Burial upon it, was requited with a Dream that saved his life. For he was admonisht to desist from his Voiage he intended by Sea, which the Soul of the deceased told him would be so perillous, that it would hazard the lives of the Passengers. He believed the Vision, and abstaining, was safe; those others that went suffered Shipwreck.

2. We will adjoyn onely an Example or two of that other kind of *Visions*, which are ordinarily called the *Apparitions of the dead*. And such is that which *Pliny* relates at large in his Epistle to *Sura*, of an house haunted at *Athens*, and freed by *Athenodorus* the Philosopher, after the Body of that person that appeared to him was digged up, and interred with due solemnity. It is not a thing unlikely, that most houses that are haunted, are so chiefly from the Souls of the deceased; who have either been murdered, or some way injured, or have some hid treasure to discover, or the like. And persons are haunted for the like causes, as well as houses; as *Nero* was after the murdering of his Mother; *Otho* pull'd out of his bed in the night by the Ghost of *Galba*. Such instances are infinite: as also those wherein the Soul of ones friend, suppose Father, Mother, or Husband, have appeared to give them good counsel, and to instruct them of the Event of the greatest affairs of their life. The Ghosts also of deceased Lovers have been reported to adhere to their Paramours after they had left their Bodies; taking all opportunities to meet them in Solitude, whether by day or by night.

3. There be also other more fortuitous occurrsions of these deceased Spirits; of which one can give no account, unless it be, because they find themselves in a more easy capacity to appear. As haply it may be in Fields after great slaughters of Armies, and in publick Burial-places. Though some would ridiculously put off these *Apparitions*, by making them nothing but the reek or vapour of the Bodies of the dead, which they fancy will fall into the like stature and shape with the man it comes from: Which yet *Cardan* playes the fool in as well as *Vaninus* and \* others; as he does also in his account of those *Spectra* that appear so ordinarily in \* *Iseland*, where the Inhabitants meet their deceased friends in so lively an Image, that they salute them and embrace them for the same persons; not knowing of their death, unless by their suddain disappearing, or by after-information that they were then dead. This he imputes partly to the *Thickness* of the Aire, and partly to the foule food and gross spirits of the *Iselanders*; and yet implies, that their fancies are so strong, as to convert the thick vaporious Aire into the compleat shape of their absent and deceased acquaintance, and so perswade themselves that they see them, and talk with them; whenas it is nothing else but an Aiery Image made out by the power of their own Fancy from the ragged rudiments of these thick flying vapours, as men fancy shapes in the broken clouds. But certainly it had been better flatly to have denied the Narration, then to give so slight and unprobable reason of the *Phenomenon*. For neither do such visible vaporious consistences near humane stature move near the Earth; nor, if they did, could men be mistaken in an object so nigh at hand.

\* *Gaffarel*, his unheard of *Curios.* part. 2. chap. 5. See my *Antidote*, Book 3. chap. 16. sect. 2, 3. \* See *Cardan De Subtilitate*, lib. 18.

4. That the *Spissitude* of the Aire in that place may contribute something to the frequency of these *Spectra*, is rational enough. For it being more thick, it is the more easily reduced to a visible consistency: but must be shaped, not by the fancy of the Spectatour, (for that were a monstrous power) but by the Imagination of the Spirit that actuates its own Vehicle of that gross Aire. For the same reason also in other places these *Apparitions* haply appear oftner in the Night then in the Day, the Aire being more clammy and thick after the Sun has been some while down then before. To which also that custome of the *Lappians*, a people of *Scandia*, seems something to agree; who, as *Caspar Peucerus* relates, are very much haunted with Apparitions of their deceased friends. For which trouble they have no remedy but burying them under their Hearth. Which Ceremony can have no naturall influence upon these *Lemures*, unless they should hereby be engaged to keep in a warmer aire, and consequently more rarefied, then if they were interred elsewhere. Or rather because their Bodies will sooner putrefy by the warmth of the hearth; whenas otherwise the coldness of that Clime would permit them to be found a longer time, and consequently be fit for the Souls of the deceased to have recourse to, and replenish their Vehicle with such a *Cambium* or gluish moisture, as will make it far easier to be commanded into a *visible consistence*.

See *Magica de Spectris*, published by *Henningus Grossus*, lib. 1. sect. 140.

5. That this facilitates their condition of *appearing*, is evident from that known recourse these infestant Spirits have to their dead Bodies. As is notorious in the History of *Cuntius*, which I have set down at large in my *Antidote*, as also in that of the *Silesian* Shoo-maker and his Maid. To which you may adde what \* *Agrippa* writes out of the *Cretian* Annals, How there the *Catechanes*, that is the *Spirits* of the deceased Husbands, would be very troublesome to their Wives, and endeavour to lie with them, while they could have any recourse to their dead Bodies. Which mischief therefore was prevented by a Law, that if any Woman was thus infested, the Body of her Husband should be burnt, and his Heart struck through with a stake. Which also put a speedy end to those stirs and tragedies the Ghost of *Cuntius* and those others caused at *Pentsch* and *Breslaw* in *Silesia*.

Book 3. chap. 8. and 9.

\* *De occultis Philosoph.* l. 3. cap. 41.

The like disquietnesses are reported to have hapned in the year 1567. at *Trawtenaw* a city of *Bohemia*, by one *Stephanus Hubener*; who was to admiration grown rich, as *Cuntius* of *Pentsch*, and when he died, did as much mischief to his fellow-Citizens. For he would ordinarily appear in the very shape he was when he was alive, and such as he met, would salute them with so close embraces, that he caused many to fall sick and several to die by the unkind huggs he gave them. But burning his Body rid the Town of the perilous occurrences of this malicious Goblin.

See *Magica de Spectris*, *Henningus Grossus*, lib. 1. sect. 184.

All which Instances do prove not only the *appearing* of Souls after they have left this life, but also that some thickning Matter, (such as may be got either from Bodies alive, or lately dead, or as fresh as those that are but newly dead (as the Body of this *Hubener* was; though it had lyen 20 weeks in the Grave,) or lastly from thick vaporous Air,) may facilitate much their appearing, and so invite them to play tricks,

S f

when



when they can doe it at so cheap a rate ; though they have little or no end in doing them, but the pleasing of their own, either ludicrous, or boisterous and domineering, humour.

6. But of any private person that ever appeared upon design after his death, there is none did upon a more noble one then that eximious Platonist *Marsilius Ficinus* ; who, after a warm dispute of the Immortality of the Soul, having (as *Baronius* relates) made a solemn vow with his fellow-Platonist *Michael Mercatus*, that whether of them two died first should appear to his friend, and give him certain information of that Truth ; ( it being his fate to die first, and indeed not long after this mutual resolution ) was mindful of his promise when he had left the Body. For *Michael Mercatus* being very intent at his Studies betimes on a morning, heard an horse riding by with all speed, and observed that he stopped at his window ; and therewith heard the voice of his friend *Ficinus* crying out aloud, *O Michael, Michael, vera, vera sunt illa*. Whereupon he suddenly opened the window, and espying *Marsilius* on a white Steed, called after him ; but he vanish'd in his sight. He sent therefore presently to *Florence* to know how *Marsilius* did ; and understood that he died about that hour he called at his window, to assure him of his own and other mens Immortalities.

7. The Examples I have produced of the appearing of the Souls of men after death, considering how clearly I have demonstrated the separability of them from the Body, and their capacity of Vital Union with an *Aiery Vehicle*, cannot but have their due weight of Argument with them that are unprejudiced. But as for those that have their minds enveloped in the dark mist of Atheism, that lazy and Melancholick saying which has dropt from the careless pen of that uncertain Writer *Cardan*, *Orbis magnus est, & ævum longum, & error ac timor multum in hominibus possunt*, will prevail more with them then all the Stories the same Authour writes of *Apparitions*, or whatever any one else can adde unto them. And others that do admit of these things, preconceptions from Education, That the Soul when she departs this life is suddenly either twitched up into the *Cælum Empyreum*, or hurried down headlong towards the Centre of the Earth, makes the Apparitions of the Ghosts of men altogether incredible to them ; they alwaies substituting in their place some Angel or Devil which must represent their persons, themselves being not at leisure to act any such part.

8. But *Misconceit* and *Prejudice*, though it may hinder the force of an Argument with those that are in that manner entangled, yet *Reason* cannot but take place with them that are free. To whom I dare appeal whether ( considering the *Aëreal Vehicles* of Souls which are common to them with other *Genii*, so that whatever they are fancied to doe in their stead, they may perform themselves ; as also how congruous it is, that those persons that are most concerned, when it is in their power, should act in their own affairs, as in detecting the Murtherer, in disposing their estate, in rebuking injurious Executors, in visiting and counselling their Wives and Children, in forewarning them of such and such courses, with other matters of like sort ; to which you may adde the profession of the Spirit

Spirit thus appearing, of being the Soul of such an one, as also the similitude of person; and that all this adoe is in things very just and serious, unfit for a Devil with that care and kindness to promote, and as unfit for a good *Genius*, it being below so noble a nature to tell a Lie, especially when the affair may be as effectually transacted without it; ) I say, I dare appeal to any one, whether all these things put together and rightly weighed, the violence of prejudice not pulling down the balance, it will not be certainly carried for the present Cause; and whether any indifferent Judge ought not to conclude, if these Stories that are so frequent every where and in all Ages concerning the Ghosts of men appearing be but true, that it is true also that they are their Ghosts, and that therefore the Souls of men subsist and act after they have left these Earthly Bodies.

## CHAP. XVII.

1. *The preeminence of Arguments drawn from Reason above those from Story.* 2. *The first step toward a Demonstration of Reason that the Soul acts out of her Body, for that she is an Immaterial Substance separable therefrom.* 3. *The second, That the immediate Instruments for Sense; Motion, and Organization of the Body, are certain subtle and tenuous Spirits.* 4. *A comparison betwixt the Soul in the Body and the Aëreal Genii.* 5. *Of the nature of Dæmons from the account of Marcus the Eremita, and how the Soul is presently such, having once left this Body.* 6. *An Objection concerning the Souls of Brutes: to which is answered, First, by way of concession; 7. Secondly, by confuting the Arguments for the former concession.* 8. *That there is no rational doubt at all of the Humane Soul acting after death.* 9. *A further Argument of her activity out of this Body, from her conflicts with it while she is in it.* 10. *As also from the general hope and belief of all Nations, that they shall live after death.*

1. **B**UT we proceed now to what is less subject to the evasions and misinterpretations of either the *Profane* or *Superstitious*. For none but such as will profess themselves mere Brutes can cast off the Decrees and Conclusions of Philosophy and Reason; though they think that in things of this nature they may, with a great deal of applause and credit, refuse the testimony of other mens Senses, if not of their own: all *Apparitions* being with them nothing but the strong surprisals of *Melancholy* and *Imagination*. But they cannot with that ease nor credit silence the Deductions of Reason, by saying it is but a *Fallacy*, unless they can shew the *Sophisme*; which they cannot doe, where it is not.

2. To carry on therefore our present Argument in a rational way, and by degrees; we are first to consider, That (according as already has been clearly \* demonstrated) there is a Substance in us which is ordinarily called *the Soul*, really distinct from the Body, (for otherwise how can it

\* Chap. 2, 4, 5, 6.



be a Substance ? ) And therefore it is really and locally separable from the Body. Which is a very considerable step towards what we aim at.

3. In the next place we are to take notice, That the *immediate Instrument* of the Soul are those tenuious and Aëreal particles which they ordinarily call the \* *Spirits* ; that these are they by which the Soul hears, sees, feels, imagines, remembers, reasons, and by moving which, or at least directing their motion, she moves likewise the Body ; and by using them, or some subtile Matter like them, she either compleats, or at least contributes to, the Bodie's Organization. For that the Soul should be the *Vital Architect* of her own house, that close connexion and sure possession she is to have of it, distinct and secure from the invasion of any other particular Soul, seems no slight Argument. And yet that while she is exercising that Faculty she may have a more than ordinary Union or Implication with the *Spirit of Nature*, or the *Soul of the World*, so far forth as it is *Plastick*, seems not unreasonable : and therefore is asserted by *Plotinus* ; & may justly be suspected to be true, if we attend to the prodigious effects of the Mother's Imagination derived upon the Infant, which sometimes are so very great, that, unless she raised the *Spirit of Nature* into consent, they might well seem to exceed the power of any Cause. I shall abstain from producing any Examples till the proper place : in the meantime I hope I may be excused from any rashness in this assignation of the Cause of those many and various Signatures found in Nature, so plainly pointing at such a Principle in the World as I have intimated \* before.

\* Chap. 10.  
sect. 7.

4. But to return, and cast our eye upon the Subject in hand. It appears from the two precedent Conclusions, That the Soul considered as invested immediately with this *tenuious Matter* we speak of, which is her inward Vehicle, has very little more difference from the *Aëreal Genii*, than a man in a Prison from one that is free. The one can only see, and suck air through the Grates of the Prison, and must be annoyed with all the stench and unwholsome fumes of that sad habitation ; whereas the other may walk and take the fresh air, where he finds it most commodious and agreeable.

This difference there is betwixt the *Genii* and an *incorporated Soul*. The *Soul*, as a man fallen into a deep pit, ( who can have no better Water, nor Air, nor no longer enjoyment of the Sun, and his chearful light and warmth, then the measure and quality of the pit will permit him ) so she once immured in the Body cannot enjoy any better *Spirits* ( in which all her life and comfort consists ) then the constitution of the Body after such circuits of concoction can administer to her. But those *Genii* of the Aire, who possess their Vehicles upon no such hard terms, if themselves be not in fault, may by the power of their minds accommodate themselves with more pure and impolluted Matter, and such as will more easily conspire with the noblest and divinest functions of their Spirit.

In brief therefore, if we consider things aright, we cannot abstain from strongly surmising, that there is no more difference betwixt a Soul and an aëreal *Genius*, then there is betwixt a Sword in the scabbard and one out of it : and that a Soul is but a *Genius* in the Body, and a *Genius* a Soul out of the Body ; as the Ancients also have defined, giving the same name,

See Chap. 8.  
sect. 13.

as well as nature, promiscuously to them both, by calling them both *Δαίμονες*, as I have elsewhere noted.

5. This is very consonant to what \* *Michael Psellus* sets down; from the singular knowledge and experience of *Marcus* the Eremite, in these matters; who describes the nature of these *Δαίμονες*, as being throughout *Spirit* and *Aire*; whence they hear and see and feel in every part of their Body. Which he makes good by this reason, and wonders at the ignorance of men that do not take notice of it, viz. τὸ μὴ ἐπὶ τινὶ ὁσούῃ ἢ νεῦρον ἢ τὸ αἰστανόμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τέτοις ἐνυπάρχον πνεῦμα, that it is neither Bones, nor Nerves, nor any gross or visible part of the Body, or of any Organ thereof, whereby the Soul immediately exercises the functions of Sense; but that it is the Spirits that are her nearest and inmost instrument of these operations: Of which when the Body is deprived, there is found no Sense in it, though the gross Organs and parts are in their usual consistency, as we see in *Syncope*s and *Apoplexies*. Which plainly shews, that the immediate Vehicle of Life are the *Spirits*, and that the Soul's connexion with the Body is by these; as the most learned Physicians do conclude with one consent. Whence it will follow, that this *Vinculum* being broke, the Soul will be free from the Body, and will as naturally be carried out of the corrupt carcass that now has no harmony with the Soul, into that Element that is more congenerous to her, the vital *Aire*, as the Fire will mount upwards; as I have \* already noted. And so Principles of Life being fully kindled in this thinner Vehicle, she becomes as compleat for Sense and Action as any other Inhabitants of these *Aiery* regions.

\* See his *περὶ ἐνεργείας τῆς ψυχῆς* μόνων.

\* Chap. i. § 1. sect. 5.

6. There is onely one perverse Objection against this so easie and natural Conclusion, which is this; That by this manner of reasoning, the Souls of Brutes, especially those of the perfecter sort, will also not onely subsist, (for that difficulty is concocted pretty well already) but also live and enjoy themselves after death. To which I dare boldly answer, That it is a thousand times more reasonable that they do, then that the Souls of Men do not. Yet I will not confidently assert that they do, or do not; but will lightly examine each Hypothesis. And first, by way of feigned concession, we will say, They do; and take notice of the Reasons that may induce one to think so. Amongst which two prime ones are those involved in the Objection, That they do subsist after death; and, That the immediate instrument of their Vital Functions is their Spirits, as well as in Man. To which we may adde, That for the present we are fellow-inhabitants of one and the same Element, the Earth, subject to the same fate of Fire, Deluges and Earthquakes. That it is improbable that the vast space of *Aire* and *Æther*, that must be inhabited by living creatures, should have none but of one sort, that is the Angels or *Genii*, good or bad. For it would seem as great a solitude as if Men alone were the Inhabitants of the Earth, or Mermaids of the Sea. That the periods of *Vital Congruity*, wound up in the Nature of their Souls by that eternal Wisdome that is the Creatress of all things, may be shorter or longer, according as the property of their essence and relation to the Universe requires; and that so their Descents and Returns



may be accordingly swifter or slower. That it is more conformable to the Divine goodness to be so then otherwise, if their natures will permit it : And that their existence would be in vain, while they were deprived of vital operation when they may conveniently have it. That they would be no more capable of Salvation in the other state, then they are here of Conversion. That the intellectual Inhabitants of the Aire having also external and corporeal Sense, variety of Objects would doe as well there, as here amongst us on Earth. Besides that Histories seem to imply, as if there were such kind of Aëreal Animals amongst them, as Dogs, Horses, and the like. And therefore to be short, that the Souls of Brutes cease to be alive after they are separate from this Body, can have no other reason then *Immortality* the Mother of *Ignorance*, (that is, nothing but narrowness of spirit, out of over-much self-love, and contempt of other Creatures) to embolden us so confidently to adhere to so groundless a Conclusion.

7. This Position makes indeed a plausible shew, insomuch that if the Objection drove one to acknowledge it for Truth, he might seem to have very little reason to be ashamed of it. But this Controversy is not so easily decided. For though it be plain that the Souls of Beasts be Substances really separable from their Bodies ; yet if they have but one *Vital congruity*, namely the *Terrestrial* one, they cannot recover life in the Aire. But their having one or two, or more Vital congruities, wholly depends upon his wisdom and counsel that has made all things. Besides, the Souls of Brutes seem to have a more passive nature then to be able to manage or enjoy this escape of Death, that free & commanding Imagination belonging onely to us, as also Reminiscency. But Brutes have onely a passive Imagination, and bare Memory ; which failing them in all likelihood in the shipwreck of their Body, if they could live in the Aire, they would begin the World perfectly on a new score, which is little better then Death : so that they might in this sense be rightly deemed mortall. Our being Co-inhabitants of the same element, the Earth, proves nothing : for by the same reason, Worms and Fleas should live out of their Bodies, and Fishes should not, who notwithstanding, their shape, it may be, a little changed (for there is no necessity that these creatures in their Aëry Vehicles should be exactly like themselves in their Terrestrial ones) might act and live in the more moist tracts of the Aire.

As for the supposed solitude that would be in the Aire, it reaches not this matter. For in the lower Regions thereof, the various Objects of the Earth and Sea will serve the turn. The winding up of those several circuits of *Vital Congruity* may indeed pass for an ingenious invention, as of a thing possible in the Souls of Brutes : but, as the Schools say well, *A posse ad esse non valet consequentia*. As for that Argument from *Divine Goodness*, it not excluding his Wisdom, which attempts it self to the natures of things, and we not knowing the nature of the Souls of Brutes so perfectly as we do our own, we cannot so easily be assured from thence what will be in this case. A Musician strikes not all strings at once ; neither is it to be expected that every thing in Nature at every time should act : but when it is its turn, then touched upon it will give its sound ; in  
the

the interim it lies silent. And so it may be with the Souls of Brutes for a time, especially when the vital temper of Earth and Aire and Sea shall fail; yea and at other times too, if none but Intellectual Spirits be fit to manage *Æreal Vehicles*.

I confess indeed, that Salvation can no more belong to the Souls of Brutes than Conversion; but that is as true of the Souls of Plants, (if they have any distinct from the *Universal Spirit of Nature*) but yet it does not prove that the Souls of Vegetables shall live and act in Aiery Vehicles, after an Herb or Tree is dead and rotten here. To that of conveniency of variety of Objects for the Aiery Inhabitants I have answered already. And for the Apparitions of Horses, Doggs and the like, they may be the transformation of the *Ærial Genii* into these shapes: Which though it be a sign that they would not abhor from the use and society of such *Ærial Animals*, if they had them; yet they may the better want them, they being able so well themselves to supply their places.

We will briefly therefore conclude, that from the mere light of Reason it cannot be infallibly demonstrated, That the Souls of Brutes do not live after death, nor that it is any Incongruity in Nature to say they do. Which is sufficient to enervate the present Objection.

8. But for the life and activity of the Souls of Men out of this Body, all things goe on hand-smooth for it, without any check or stop. For we finding the *Ærial Genii* so exceeding near-a-kin to us in their Faculties, we being both *intellectual Creatures*, and both using the same immediate Instrument of Sense and Perception, to wit, *Ærial Spirits*, insomuch that we can scarce discover any other difference betwixt us then there is betwixt a man that is naked and one clad in gross thick cloathing; it is the most easy and natural inference that can be, to conclude, that when we are separate from the Body, and are invested only in Aire, that we shall be just like them, and have the same life and activity they have. For though a Brute fall short of this Priviledge, it ought to be no disheartning to us, because there is a greater cognation betwixt the *Intellectual Faculties* and the *Aiery* or *Æthereal Vehicle*, then there is betwixt such Vehicles and those more low and sensual powers common to us with Beasts. And we finde, in taking the fresh aire, that the more fine and pure our *Spirits* are, our thoughts become the more noble and divine, and the more purely intellectual.

Nor is the step greater upwards then downwards: For seeing that what in us is so *Divine* and *Angelical* may be united with the body of a *Brute*, (for such is this Earthly cloathing) why may not the Soul, notwithstanding her *Terrestrial Congruity* of life, (which upon new occasions may be easily conceived to surcease from acting) be united with the Vehicle of an *Angel*? So that there is no puzzle at all concerning the Soul of Man, but that immediately upon Death she may associate her self with those *Ærial Inhabitants*, the *Genii* or *Angels*.

9. Which we may still be the better assured of, if we consider how we have such Faculties in us as the Soul finds entangled and fettered, clouded and obscured by her fatal residence in this prison of the Body. Insomuch that, so far as it is lawful, she falls out with it for those incommoda-



tions that the most confirmed brutish health brings usually upon her. How her Will tuggs against the impurity of the Spirits that stir up bestial Passions, ( that are notwithstanding the height and flower of other Creatures enjoyments ) and how many times her whole life upon Earth is nothing else but a perpetual warfare against the results of her union with this lump of Earth that is so much like to other terrestrial Animals. Whence it is plain she finds her self in a wrong condition, and that she was created for a better and purer state; which she could not attain to, unless she lived out of the Body: which she does in some sort in *divine Ecstasies* and *Dreams*; in which case she making no use of the Bodies Organs, but of the purer Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain, she acts as it were by her self, and performs some preludious Exercises, conformable to those in her Aiery Vehicle.

10. Adde unto all this, that *the Immortality of the Soul* is the common, and therefore natural, hope and expectation of all Nations; there being very few so barbarous as not to hold it for a Truth: though, it may be, as in other things, they may be something ridiculous in the manner of expressing themselves about it; as that they shall retire after Death to such a Grove or Wood, or beyond such a Hill, or unto such an Island, such as was *Δρόμῳ Ἀχιλλέως*, the Island where *Achilles* his Ghost was conceived to wander, or the *Insula Fortunata*, the noted *Elysium* of the Ancients. And yet, it may be, if we should tell these of the *Cælum Empyreum*, and compute the height of it, and distance from the Earth, and how many solid Orbs must be glided through before a Soul can come thither; these simple Barbarians would think as odly of the *Scholastick* Opinion as we do of theirs: and it may be some more judicious and sagacious Wit will laugh at us both alike.

It is sufficient, that in the main all Nations in a manner are agreed that there is an *Immortality* to be *expected*, as well as that there is a *Deity* to be *worshipped*; though ignorance of circumstances makes Religion vary, even to Monstrosity, in many parts of the world. But both Religion, and the belief of the Reward of it, which is a blessed state after Death, being so generally acknowledged by all the Inhabitants of the Earth; it is a plain Argument that it is true according to the Light of Nature. And not onely because they believe so, but because they do so seriously either desire it, or are so horribly afraid of it, if they offend much against their Consciences: which Properties would not be in men so universally, if there were no Objects in Nature answering to these Faculties, as I have elsewhere argued in the like case.

## CHAP. XVIII.

1. *That the Faculties of our Souls, and the nature of the immediate Instrument of them, the Spirits, do so nearly symbolize with those of Dæmons, that it seems reasonable, if God did not on purpose hinder it, that they would not fail to act out of this earthly Body.* 2. *Or if they would, his Power and Wisdom could easily implant in their essence a double or triple Vital Congruity, to make all sure.* 3. *A further demonstration of the present Truth from the Veracity of God.* 4. *An Answer to an Objection against the foregoing Argument.* 5. *Another Demonstration from his Justice.* 6. *An Answer to an Objection.* 7. *An Answer to another Objection.* 8. *Another Argument from the Justice of God.* 9. *An Objection answered.* 10. *An invincible Demonstration of the Soul's Immortality from the Divine Goodness.* 11. *A more particular enforcement of that Argument, and who they are upon whom it will work least.* 12. *That the Noblest and most Vertuous Spirit is the most assurable of the Soul's Immortality.*

1. **B**UT finally, to make all sure, let us contemplate the Nature of God, who is the Author and Maker of all things, according to whose Goodness, Wisdom and Power all things were created, and are ever ordered; and let us take special notice how many steps towards this Immortality we now treat of are impressed upon the very nature of the Soul already; and then seriously consider, if it be possible that the Sovereign Deity should stop there, and goe no further, when there are so great reasons, if we understand any thing, that He perfect our expectations. For we have already clearly demonstrated, That the Soul of man is a Substance actually \* separable from the Body, and that all her Operations and Functions are immediately performed, not by those parts of the Body that are of an earthly and gross consistency, but by what is more Aërial or Æthereal, the Vital and \* Animal Spirits; which are very congenerous to the Vehicles of the Angels or Genii. Inasmuch that if the Divine power did but leave Nature to work of it self, it might seem very strange, considering those Divine and Intellectual Faculties in us, (as conformable to the essences or Souls of Angels as our Animal Spirits are to their Vehicles) if it would not be an immediate sequel of this Priviledge, that our Souls once separate from the Body should act and inform the Air they are in with like facility that other Genii do, there being so very little difference betwixt both their natures.

\* Chap. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.

\* Chap. 8, 9.

2. Or if one single Plastick power, in a Subject so near a kin to these Aërial people, will not necessarily suffice for both states, certainly it must be a very little addition that will help out: and how easy is it for that Eternal Wisdom to contrive a double or triple Vital Congruity, to wit, Aërial and Æthereal, as well as Terrestrial, in such an Essence, whose Faculties and Properties do so plainly symbolize with those purer Inhabitants of both the Æther and Air?

3. But



3. But this is not all we have to say. For if there be one thing more precious in the Deity than another, we shall have it all as a sure and infallible pledge of this present Truth, *That our Souls will not fail to prove Immortal*. And for my own part, I know nothing more precious in the Godhead than his *Veracity, Justice and Goodness*; and all these Three will assure us and secure us, that we shall sustain no loss or damage by our departure out of these Earthly Bodies, in either Life or Essence. For it were a very high reproach to that Attribute of God which we call his *Veracity*, he so plainly and universally promising to all the Nations of the World, where there is any Religion at all, a happy state after this life; if there should in reality be no such thing to be expected. For he does not onely connive at the Errour, if it be one, by not declaring himself against it, (as any upright person would, if another should take upon him, in his presence or hearing, to tell others that he intended to bestow such and such gifts and revenues upon them, when there was no such matter :) but he has, as a man may say, on set purpose indued men with extraordinary parts and powers, to set this Opinion on foot in the Earth; all *Prophets and Workers of Miracles* that have appeared in the world, having one way or other assured to Mankind this so weighty Truth. And the most *Noble and Vertuous* Spirits in all Ages have been the most prone to believe it. And this not onely out of a sense of their own Interest; but any one that ever had the happiness to experience these things may observe, That that Clearness and Purity of temper that most consists with the Love and admiration of God and Vertue, and all those divine Accomplishments that even those that never could attain to them give their highest approbation of, I say, that this more refined temper of Mind does of it self beget a wonderful proneness, if not a necessity, of presuming of the Truth of this Opinion we plead for. And therefore if it be not true, God has laid a train in Nature, that the most Vertuous and Pious men shall be the most sure to be deceived: Which is a contradiction to his Attribute of *Veracity*.

4. Nor can the strength of this Argument be evaded by replying, That God may deceive men for their good, as Parents do their Children; and therefore His *Wisdom* may contrive such a naturall Errour as this, to be serviceable for States and Politicks, to keep the people in awe, and so render them more faithfull and governable. I must confess that there does result from this divine Truth such an *Usefulness*, by the by, for the better holding together of Commonweals: But to think that this is the main use thereof, and that there is nothing more in it then so, is as Idiotical and Childish as to conclude, that because the Stars, those vast lights, doe some small offices for us by Night, that therefore that is all the meaning of them, and that they serve for nothing else.

Besides, there is no Father would tell a Lye to his Child, if he were furnisht with Truth as effectual for his purpose; and if he told any thing really good as well as desirable to his Child, to induce him to Obedience, if it lay in his power, he would be sure to perform his promise. But it is in the power of God to make good whatever he has propounded for reward; nor need he make use of any falshood in this matter.

Where-

Wherefore if he do, he has less *Veracity* than an ordinary honest man; which is *blasphemous*, and *contradictory* to the nature of the Deity.

5. Again upon point of *Justice*, God was engaged to contrive the Nature and Order of things so, that the Souls of Men may live after death, and that they may fare according to their behaviour here upon earth. For the Godhead, as the Philosopher calls him; is Νόμος ἰσχυρὸς, and does immutably and inevitably distribute Justice, both *Reward* & *Punishment*, in the world. But how difficult a thing it is to be good and to live according to *Virtue*, the common practice and complaint of all men do confess with one consent; and that it is exceeding hard to persuade any one to do that violence to their own natures, as to endeavour after a due degree and right sense of *Virtue* (for *Craft* and *Policy* are easy enough, and other things there are that, set against the contrary Vices, look like *Vertues*, but are not:) But to persuade to those that truly are, is, I say, exceeding hard, if not impossible, without the inculcation of this grand concernment, *the State of the Soul after Death*, and the *Reward* that will then follow a *Vertuous* life. Of which hopes if we be frustrated by the Soul's Mortality, we are defrauded of our *Reward*, and God of the honour of *Justice*.

6. Nor can the force of this Argument be enervated by either that high pretension of *Stoicism*, *That Virtue to it self is a sufficient reward*; or that the very hopes of this Immortality, it being accompanied with so much joy, tranquillity and contentment, will countervail all the pain and trouble of either acquiring, or keeping close to *Virtue* once acquired. For as for the first, It is one thing to talk high, and another thing to practise. And for my own part, I think in the main, that *Epicurus*, who placed the chiefest good in *Pleasure*, philosophized more solidly than the paradoxical *Stoicks*. For questionless that is that which all men ought to drive at, if they had the true notion of it, and knew wherein to place it, or could arrive to the purest and most warrantable sense of it. But there can be no *Pleasure*, (without a perfect Miracle) while our Spirits are disturbed and vitiated by sordid and contemptible Poverty, by Imprisonments, Sickneses, Tortures, ill Diet, and a number of such Adversities, that those that are the most exactly *Vertuous* have been in all Ages most lyable to. Besides the care and solicitude of perpetually standing upon their guard, the stings of Calumny and Defamation, and a continual vexation to see the baseness and vileness of mens tempers, and ugly oblique transactions of affairs in the world. Which inquietudes cannot be avoided by any other remedy but what is as ill as the disease, or worse, (it being altogether incompetent to a true *Heroical* tenour of mind,) I mean their *Stoical Apathy*; of which the best that can be said is, that it is a kind of constant and safe piece of sullenness, stating us onely in the condition of those that are said to have neither wonne nor lost: So poor a reward is persecuted and distressed *Virtue* of it self, without the hope of future Happiness.

7. But to say, the Hope thereof without Enjoyment is a sufficient compensation, is like that mockery *Plutarch* records of *Dionysius* towards a Fidler, whom he caused to play before him; promising him a reward;  
but



but when he demanded it of him for his pains, denied it him, or rather said it was paid already, putting him off with this jest, "Ὅσον χρόνον εὐφραίνεις ἑδὼν, τοσούτον ἔχαιρες ἐλπίζων, i. e. *So long as you pleased me with playing, so long you rejoiced your self with hoping after the reward; so that you are sufficiently paid already.* Which piece of injurious mirth may be passable in a ludicrous matter, and from a Tyrant, where height of Fortune makes proud and forgetful Mortality contemn their inferiours: But in a thing of this nature, that concerns not onely this transient life, but the sempiternal duration of the Soul, *Injustice* there is unspeakably grievous; and so much the more harsh and uncomely, if we consider that it is supposed to be committed, not by a frail earthly Potentate, (the height of whose Honours may make him regardless of smaller affairs and meaner persons,) but by the God of Heaven, who can with the like ease attend all things as he can any one thing, and who is perfectly and immutably just, not doing nor omitting any thing by changeable humours, as it happens in vain Men, but ever acting according to the transcendent Excellency and Holiness of his own Nature.

8. Neither is *Divine Justice* engaged onely to reward, but also to punish; which cannot be, unless the Souls of men subsist after Death. For there are questionless many thousands that have committed most enormous Villanies, persecuted the Good, taking away their possessions, liberties, or lives, adding sometimes most barbarous tortures and reproachful abuses; and in all this highly gratified their covetousness, ambition and revenge; nay, it may be the bestial ferocity of their own spirits, that have pleased themselves exceedingly to bring the truly religious into disgrace, and have laughed at all vertuous actions as the fruits of Ignorance and Folly; and yet for all this have died in peace on their beds, after their Lives have been as thick set with all sensual enjoyments of Honour, Riches and Pleasure, as their Story is with Frauds, Rapines, Murders, Sacriledges, and whatever crimes the impious boldness of lawless persons will venture on.

9. Such things as these happen proportionably through all the ranks and orders of men. Nor is it sufficient to reply that their own Consciences, as so many Furies, do lash them and scorch them in this life: For we speak of inveterate and successful wickedness, where that Principle is utterly laid asleep; or if it at any time wake and cry, the noise of the affairs of the world, and hurry of business, and continual visits of friends and flatterers, false instructions of covetous Priests or mercenary Philosophers (who for gain will impudently corrupt and pervert both the Light of Nature and Sense of Religion,) the sound and clatter of these, I say, will so possess the ear of the prosperously wicked, that the voice of Conscience can be no more heard in this continual tumult, then the vagient cries of the Infant *Jupiter* amidst the rude shuffles and dancings of the *Cretick Corybantes*, and the tinkling and clashing of their brazen Targets. And therefore if there be no Life hereafter, the worst of men have the greatest share of happiness, their passions and affections being so continually gratified, and that to the height, in those things that are so agreeable, and, rightly circumstantiated, allowable to humane Na-

ture:

ture: such as are the sweet reflexion on the success of our political management of the affairs of the World; the general tribute of Honour and respect for our Policy and Wit, and that ample testimony thereof, our acquisitions of Power or Riches; that great satisfaction of foiling and bearing down our Enemies, and obliging and making sure our more serviceable Friends; to which finally you may adde all the variety of Mirth and Pastime that flesh and blood can entertain it self with, from either *Musick, Wine, or Women.*

10. Thirdly and lastly, The Mortality of the Soul is not onely inconsistent with the *Veracity* and *Justice* of God, but also with his *Goodness*, the most sovereign and sacred Attribute in the Deity, and which alone is enough to demonstrate, *That the Soul of man cannot perish in Death.* For suppose that God had made no promise to us, either by any extraordinary Prophet, or by the suggestion of our own natural Faculties, that we shall be Immortal, and that there was neither Merit nor Demerit in this life, so that all plea from either the Divine *Veracity* or *Justice* were quite cut off; his *Goodness* alone (especially if we consider how capable the Soul is of after-subsistence) is a sufficient assurance that we shall not fail to live after Death. For how can that sovereign *Goodness*, assisted by an Omnipotent Knowledge, fail to contrive it so; it being so infinitely more conformable to His Transcendent Bounty to ordain thus then otherwise: that is to say, so soon as he created the World, to make it so compleat, as at once to bring into Being not onely all *Corporeal* Substance (according as all men confess he did) but also all Substances *Immaterial* or *Incorporeal*, and as many of them as can partake of Life, and of enjoyment of themselves and the Universe, to set them upon living and working in all places and Elements that their Nature is able to operate in; and therefore amongst other Beings of the Intellectual Order, to ordain that the Souls of men also, wherever they were, or ever should be, especially if it were not long of themselves, should have a power of Life and Motion, and that no other *Nemesis* should follow them then what they themselves lay the trains of; nor this to utter annihilation, but by way of chastisement or punishment: and that they being of so multifarious a nature, as to have such Faculties as are nearly a-kin to Brutes, as well as such as have so close an affinity with those of the *Aëreal Genii* and Celestial Angels, their *Vital Congruity* should be as multifarious, and themselves made capable of a living Union with either *Celestial, Aëreal, or Terrestrial* Vehicles; and that the leaving of one should be but the taking up of another, so long as the Elements continue in their natural temper, and as soon as the Laws of Generation will permit.

11. These, and a long series of other things consonant to these, represent themselves to their view that have the favour of beholding the more hidden treasures of *the Divine Benignity.* But they being more then the present occasion requires, I shall content my self with what precisely touches the matter in hand, which is, That the Soul of Man being capable to act after this life in an *Aëreal Vehicle*, as well as here in an *Earthly*; and it being *better* that she do live and act, then that she be idle and silent in death; and it depending merely upon the Will of God whether she



shall or no; He ordering the natures of things infallibly according to what is *best*, must of necessity ordain that the Souls of men live and act after death. This is an unavoidable Deduction of Reason to those that acknowledge the Being of God, and rightly relish that transcendent Attribute in the Divine Nature. For those that have a true sense thereof, can as hardly deny this Conclusion as the Existence of the Deity. Nor can they ever be persuaded, that He who is so *perfectly Good* in himself, and to whom they have so long adhered in faithful obedience and amorous devotion, has made them of such a nature, that when they hope most to enjoy him, they shall not be able to enjoy him at all, nor any thing else; as not being in a capacity to act but in an *Earthly* Body. But to those that be of a mere animal temper, that relish no love but that of themselves and their own interest, nor care for any but those that are serviceable to them and make for their profit, these being prone to judge of God according to the vileness of their own Spirit, will easily conceit, that God's care of us and tenderness over us is onely proportionable to the fruit he reaps by us; which is just none at all.

12. And therefore this Argument especially, and also the Two former, though they be undeniable Demonstrations in themselves, yet they requiring a due resentment of Morality, that is of *Veracity*, *Justice* and *Goodness*, in him that is to be persuaded by them; it will follow, that those whose Minds are most blinded and debased by Vice, will feel least the force of them; and the *Noblest* and most *generous Spirit* will be the *most firmly assured of the Immortality of the Soul*.

---

THE


---

# THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

## The Third Book.

### CHAP. I.

1. *Why the Author treats of the state of the Soul after Death, and in what Method.* 2. *Arguments to prove that the Soul is ever united vitally with some Matter or other.* 3. *Further Reasons to evince the same.* 4. *That the Soul is capable of an Aïery and Æthereal Body, as well as a Terrestrial.* 5. *That she ordinarily passes out of an Earthly into an Aëreal Vehicle first.* 6. *That in her Aïery Vehicle she is capable of Sense, Pleasure, and Pain.* 7. *That the main power of the Soul over her Aëreal Vehicle is the direction of Motion in the particles thereof.* 8. *That she may also adde or diminish Motion in her Æthereal.* 9. *How the purity of the Vehicle confers to the quickness of Sense and Knowledge.* 10. *Of the Soul's power of changing the temper of her Aëreal Vehicle ;* 11. *As also the shape thereof.* 12. *The plainness of the last Axiome.*

I.  E have, I hope, with undeniable evidence demonstrated the Immortality of the Soul to such as neither by their slowness of parts, nor any prejudice of Immortality, are made incompetent Judges of the truth of Demonstrations of this kind : so that I have already perfected my main Design. But my own curiosity, and the desire of gratifying others who love to entertain themselves with Speculations of this nature, do call me out something further ; if the very Dignity of the present Matter I am upon doth not justly require me, as will be best seen after the finishing thereof : which is concerning the State of the Soul after Death. Wherein though I may not haply be able to fix my foot so firmly as in the foregoing part of this Treatise, yet I will assert nothing but what shall be reasonable, though not demonstrable, and far preponderating to whatever shall be alledged to the contrary, and in such clear order and



Method, that if what I write be not worthy to convince, it shall not be able to deceive or entangle by perplexedness and obscurity; and therefore I shall offer to view at once the main Principles upon which I shall build the residue of my Discourse.

### AXIOME XXVII.

*The Soul separate from this Terrestrial Body is not released from all Vital Union with Matter.*

2. **T**His is the general Opinion of the *Platonists*. *Plotinus* indeed dissent, especially concerning the most divine Souls, as if they at last were perfectly unbared of all Matter, and had no union with any thing but God himself: which I look upon as a fancy proceeding from the same inequality of temper, that made him surmise that the most degenerate Souls did at last sleep in the bodies of Trees, and grew up merely into *Plantal life*. Such fictions as these of fancyfull men have much depraved the ancient *Cabbala* and sacred Doctrine which the *Platonists* themselves do profess to be *Στοιχειώδης*, a holy Tradition received from the mouth of God or Angels. But however *Plotinus* himself does not deny but till the Soul arrive to such an exceeding height of purification, that she acts in either an *Aiery* or *Celestial* Body.

But that she is never released so perfectly from all Matter, how pure soever and tenuious, her condition of operating here in this life is a greater presumption then can be fetcht from any thing else, that she ever is. For we find plainly that her most subtile and most Intellectual operations depend upon the *fitness of temper* in the *Spirits*; and that it is the *fineness* and *purity* of them that invites her and enables her to love and look after *Divine* and *Intellectual* Objects: Which kind of Motions if she could exert immediately by her own proper power and essence, what should hinder her but that, having a will, she should bring it to effect: which yet we find she cannot if the *Spirits* be *indisposed*. But, as I said, the Soul cannot be hindred by the undue temper of the *Spirits* in these Acts, if they be of that nature that they belong to the bare essence of the Soul quite prescinded from all Union with *Matter*. For then as to these Acts it is all one where the Soul is, that is, in *what Matter* she is (and she must be in some, because the Universe is every where thick-set with *Matter*) whether she be raised into the purest regions of the *Aire*, or plunged down into the foulest Receptacles of Earth or Water; for her *Intellectual* actings would be alike in both; this Conjunction in all likelihood engaging onely the *Plastick* and *Sensitive* powers of the Soul even when she is vitally united with *Matter*. What then is there imaginable in the *Body* that can hinder her in her nobler Operations?

Wherefore it is plain that the nature of the Soul is such, as that she cannot act but in dependence on *Matter*, and that her Operations are some way or other alwaies modified thereby. And therefore if the Soul act at all after death, (which we have demonstrated she does) it is evident that she is not released from all *vital union* with all kind of *Matter* what-

whatsoever : Which is not onely the Opinion of the *Platonists*, but of *Aristotle* also, as may be easily gathered out of what we have above cited out of him.

Book 2. ch. 14,  
sect. 435.

3. Besides, it seems a very wilde leap in nature, that the Soul of Man, from being so deeply and muddily immersed into Matter as to keep company with Beasts, by vitall union with gross flesh and bones, should so on a suddain be changed, that she should not adhere to any Matter whatsoever, but ascend into an *ἀνόητος* competible haply to none but God himself; unless there be such Creatures as the *Platonists* call *Nóes* or pure *Intellects*. This must seem to any indifferent man very harsh and incongruous, especially if we consider what noble Beings there are on this side the *Nóes* or *Nóes*, that all the Philosophers that ever treated of them acknowledge to be vitally united with either *Æreal* or *Æthereal* Vehicles. For of this condition are all the *Genii* or Angels.

It is sufficient therefore that the Soul never exceed the immateriality of those Orders of Beings; the lower sort whereof that they are vitally united to Vehicles of *Aire*, their ignorance in Nature seems manifestly to bewray. For it had been an easy thing, and more for their credit, to have informed their followers better in the Mysteries of Nature; but that themselves were ignorant of these things, which they could not but know, if they were not thus bound to their *Aiery* bodies. For then they were not engaged to move with the whole course of the *Aire*, but keeping themselves steddily, as being disunited from all Matter, they might in a moment have perceived both the *diurnal* and *annual motion* of the *Earth*, and so have saved the Credit of their followers, by communicating this Theory to them; the want of the knowledge whereof spoils their repute with them that understand the Systeme of the world better than themselves, for all they boast of their Philosophy, so as if it were the Dictate of the highest Angels.

### AXIOME XXVIII.

*There is a Triple Vital Congruity in the Soul, namely Æthereal, Æreal, and Terrestrial.*

4. **T**HAT this is the common Opinion of the *Platonists*, I have \* above intimated. That this Opinion is also true in it self, appears from the foregoing Axiome. Of the *Terrestrial Congruity* there can be no doubt; and as little can there be but that at least one of the other two is to be granted, else the Soul would be released from all *vital union with Matter* after Death. Wherefore she has a *Vital aptitude* at least to unite with *Aire* : But *Aire* is a common Receptacle of bad and good Spirits, ( as the *Earth* is of all sorts of men and beasts ) nay indeed rather of those that are in some sort or other bad, than of good, as it is upon Earth. But the Soul of Man is capable of very high refinements, even to a condition purely *Angelical*. Whence Reason will judge it fit, and all Antiquity has voted it, That the Souls of men arrived to such a due pitch of purification must at last obtain *Celestial Vehicles*.

\* Book 2. ch.  
14. sect. 12



## AXIOME XXIX.

*According to the usual custome of Nature, the Soul awakes orderly into these Vital Congruities, not passing from one Extreme to another without any stay in the middle.*

5. **T**HIS Truth, besides that at first sight it cannot but seem very reasonable, according to that known Aphorism, *Natura non facit saltum*; so if it be further examined, the solidity thereof will more fully appear. For considering how small degrees of purification the Souls of almost all men get in this life, even theirs who pass vulgarly for honest and good men; it will plainly follow that very few arrive to their *Athereal* Vehicle immediately upon quitting their *Terrestrial* Body; that being a privilege that has appertained to none but very Noble and *Heroical* Spirits indeed, of which History records but very few. But that there may be degrees of purity and excellency in the *Aëreal* Bodies, is a thing that is not to be denied, so that a just *Nemesis* will finde out every one after death.

## AXIOME XXX.

*The Soul in her Aëreal Vehicle is capable of Sense properly so called, and consequently of Pleasure and Pain.*

6. **T**HIS plainly appears from the 27 and 28 Axioms. For there is a necessity of the resulting of *Sense* from Vital Union of the Soul with any Body whatsoever: and we may remember that the immediate Instrument of *Sense*, even in this *Earthly* Body, are the *Spirits*: so that there can be no doubt of this Truth. And *Pleasure* and *Pain* being the proper modifications of *Sense*, and there being no Body but what is *passible*, it is evident that these *Vehicles of Aire* are subject to *Pain* as well as *Pleasure*, in this Region where ill things are to be met with as well as good.

## AXIOME XXXI.

*The Soul can neither impart to nor take away from the Matter of her Vehicle of Aire any considerable degree of Motion, but yet can direct the particles moved which way she pleases by the Imperium of her Will.*

7. **T**HE reasonableness of this Axiom may be evinced, partly out of the former; for considering the brushiness and angulosity of the parts of the *Air*, a more then ordinary Motion or compressive Rest may very well prove painful to the Soul, and dis-harmonious to her touch: and partly from what we may observe in our own Spirits in this Body, which we can onely direct, not give Motion to, nor diminish their Motion by our Imagination or Will, (for no man can imagine himself into Heat or Cold, the sure consequences of extraordinary Motion and Rest, by willing his Spirits to move faster or slower; but he may direct them

into

into the Organs of spontaneous Motion, and so by moving the grosser parts of the Body, by this direction he may spend them, and heat these parts in the expence of them; and this is all we can doe;) and partly from that Divine Providence that made all things, and measures out the Powers and Faculties of his Creatures according to his own Wisdome and Counsel, and therefore has bound that state of the Soul to streighter conditions, that is competible to the bad as well as to the good.

## AXIOME XXXII.

*Though the Soul can neither confer nor take away any considerable degree of Motion from the Matter of her Aiery Vehicle, yet nothing hinders but that she may doe both in her Æthereal.*

8. **T**HE reason hereof is, because the particles of her *Æthereal Vehicle* consist partly of smooth spherical Figures, and partly of tenuious Matter, so exceeding liquid that it will without any violence comply to any thing: whenas the *Aire*, as may be observed in Wind-Guns, has parts so stubborn and so stiff, that after they have been compressed to such a certain degree that the barrel of the Piece grows hot again, they have not lost their shapes nor virtue; but like a spring of Steel, liberty being given, they return to their natural posture with that violence, that they discharge a Bullet with equal force that Gun-powder does. Besides that the *Goodness* of that Deity on whom all Beings depend may be justly thought to have priviledged the *Æthereal Congruity of Life* (which awakes onely in perfectly-obedient Souls, such as may be trusted as thoroughly faithful to his Empire) with a larger power then the other, there being no incompetibleness in the Subject. For it is as easy a thing to conceive that God may endow a Soul with a power of moving or resting Matter, as of determining the motions thereof.

## AXIOME XXXIII.

*The purer the Vehicle is, the more quick and perfect are the Perceptive Faculties of the Soul.*

9. **T**HE truth of this we may in a manner experience in this life, where we find that the quickness of Hearing, Seeing, Tasting, Smelling, the nimbleness of Reminiscency, Reason, and all other *Perceptive Faculties*, are advanced or abated by the clearness, or foulness and dulness of the *Spirits* of our Body; and that Oblivion and Sottishness arise from their thickness and earthiness, or waterishness, or whatsoever other gross consistency of them: which distemper removed, and the Body being replenished with good Spirits in sufficient plenty and purity, the Mind recovers her activity again, remembers what she had forgot, and understands what she was before incapable of, sees and hears at a greater distance; and so of the rest.



## AXIOME XXXIV.

*The Soul has a marvellous power of not onely changing the temper of her Aiery Vehicle, but also of the external shape thereof.*

10. **T**HE truth of the first part of this Axiome appears from daily experience; for we may frequently observe how strangely the *Passions* of the Mind will work upon our Spirits in this state; how Wrath, and Grief, and Envy will alter the Body, to say nothing of other Affections. And assuredly the finer the Body is, the more mutable it is upon this account: so that the *Passions* of the Mind must needs have a very great influence upon the Soul's *Aëreal Vehicle*; which though they cannot change into any thing but Air, yet they may change this Air into qualifications as vastly different as *Vertue* is from *Vice*, *Sickness* from *Health*, *Pain* from *Pleasure*, *Light* from *Darkness*, and the *stink* of a *Gas* from the *Aromatick odours* of a flourishing *Paradise*.

11. The truth of the latter part is demonstrable from the latter part of the 31 Axiome. For supposing a power in the Soul of directing the motions of the particles of her fluid Vehicle, it must needs follow that she will also have a power of shaping it in some measure according to her own Will & Fancy. To which you may adde, as no contemptible pledge of this Truth, what is done in that kind by our Will and Fancy in this life: as, onely because I will and fancy the moving of my Mouth, Foot, or Fingers, I can move them, provided I have but Spirits to direct into this motion; and the whole Vehicle of the Soul is in a manner nothing else but Spirits. The *Signatures* also of the *Fœtus* in the Womb by the Desire and Imagination of the Mother is very serviceable for the evincing of this Truth: but I shall speak of it more fully in its place.

Chap. 5. sect.  
11, 12. ch. 6.

## AXIOME XXXV.

*It is rational to think, that as some Faculties are laid asleep in Death or after Death, so others may awake that are more sutable for that state.*

12. **T**HE truth of this Axiome appears from hence, That our Souls come not by chance, but are made by an All-wise God, who foreseeing all their states, has fitted the *Excitation* or *Consopition* of Powers and Faculties sutable to the present condition they are to be in.

## AXIOME XXXVI.

*Whether the Vital Congruity of the Soul expire, as whose period being quite unwound, or that of the Matter be defaced by any essential Dis-harmony, Vital Union immediately ceases.*

13. **T**HIS last Axiome is plain enough of it self at first sight, and the usefulness thereof may be glanced at in its due place.

These are the main Truths I shall recurre to, or at least suppose, in my following

following Disquisitions : others will be more seasonably delivered in the continuation of our Discourse.

## CHAP. II.

1. *Of the Dimensions of the Soul considered barely in her self.* 2. *Of the Figure of the Soul's Dimensions.* 3. *Of the Heterogeneity of her Essence.* 4. *That there is an Heterogeneity in her Plastick part distinct from the Perceptive.* 5. *Of the acting of this Plastick part in her framing of the Vehicle.* 6. *The excellency of Des-Cartes his Philosophy.* 7. *That the Vehicles of Ghosts have as much of solid corporeal Substance in them as the Bodies of Men.* 8. *The folly of the contrary Opinion evinced.* 9. *The advantage of the Soul, for matter of Body, in the other state, above this.*

1. **T**HAT we may now have a more clear and determinate apprehension of *the nature and condition of the Soul out of the Body*, let us first consider her a while, what she is in her own Essence, without any reference to any *Body* at all, and we shall find her a *Substance extended and indiscerpible*, as may be easily gathered out of what we have above written. And it is a seasonable Contemplation here (where we consider the Soul as having left this *Terrestrial Body*) that she hath as ample, if not more ample, *Dimensions* of her own, then are visible in the *Body* she has left. Which I think worth taking notice of, that it may stop the mouths of them that, not without reason, laugh at those unconceivable and ridiculous fancies of the Schools; that first rashly take away all *Extension* from *Spirits*, whether *Souls* or *Angels*, and then dispute how many of them booted and spurr'd may dance on a needles point at once. Fooleries much derogatory to the Truth, and that pinch our Perception into such an intolerable streightness and evanidness, that we cannot imagine any thing of our own Being; and if we do, are prone to fall into despair, or contempt of our selves, by fancying our selves such unconsiderable Motes of the Sun.

2. But as it is very manifest that *the Soul has Dimensions*, and yet not *infinite*, and therefore that she is necessarily bounded in some *Figure* or other; so it is very uncertain whether there be any *peculiar Figure* natural to her, answerable to *animal shape*, or whether she be of her self of either a *Round* or *Oval* figure, but does change her shape according as occasion requires. It is not material to define any thing in this Question more then thus, That when the Soul acts in *Terrestrial Matter*, her *Plastick* part is determined to the Organization of the *Body* into humane form; and in the *Aëreal* or *Æthereal*, that she is neither more nor less determined to any shape then the *Genii* or *Angels*; and that if their *Vehicles* are more naturally guided into one shape then another, that hers is in the same condition; so that in her visible *Vehicle* she will bear the ordinary form of *Angels*, such a countenance, and so clothed, as they.

Book 1. ch. 3,  
5, 8. Also Book  
2. chap. 1, 2.

3. Thus



Book 2. ch. 11.  
sect. 10, 11.

3. That which is more material, I think is more easie to be defined, and that is, whether the Soul be one *Homogeneous* Substance, or whether it be in some manner *Heterogeneous*. That the latter is in some measure true, is manifest from what we have elsewhere written, namely, That the *Perceptive* faculty reaches not throughout the whole Soul, but is confined to a certain part, which we called the *Centre* or *Eye of the Soul*, as also her *Perceptive part*; but all the rest *Plastick*. But here arises a further Scruple, whether there be not an *Heterogeneity* in the very *Plastick* part also of the Soul. The *Aristoteleans* seem to be confident there is not, and do affirm that if there were an Eye in the Toe, the Toe would see as well as the Head. Of which I very much doubt: For hence it would follow that some Creatures would have a glimmering Light all over, they being in a manner all over transparent, and some thin and clear Complexions might haply have the perception of Light betwixt the lower parts of their Fingers, which are in some good measure pellucid; and therefore Life and Spirits being continued from thence to the *Conarion*, as they are, or to the fourth Ventricle of the Brain, it would follow that the Soul would have a perception of some glimmerings of Light from thence, which were to see there as well as to feel.

4. Wherefore it seems more rational to admit an *Heterogeneity* in the *Plastick* part of the Soul also, and to acknowledge that every removal from the Seat of Common Sense, that is to say, every Circle that furrounds the *Centre of the Soul*, has not the same bounds of power, neither for number nor extent. But that as concerning the former, there is a gradual falling off from the first excellency, which is the *Perceptive* part of the Soul; the closest Circle to which is that part of the *Plastick* that is able to convey Objects of *Sight* as well as of *Touch* and *Hearing*, and what other Senses else there may be in the Soul. The next Circle is *Hearing* without *Seeing*, though not without *Touch*: for *Touch* spreads through all. But in its exterior region, which is excessively the greatest, it transmits the circumstantiated Perceptions of no Objects but those that are *Tactile*; but to others it is onely as a dead Medium, as the Circle of *Hearing* is but as a dead Medium to the Objects of *Sight*. So that if we would please our Imagination with *Ficinus*, in fancying the Soul as a Star, we shall doe it more perfectly if we look upon her in her Circles, as having an *Halo* about her: For the Soul to our *Reason* is no more *Homogeneous* then that Spectacle is to our *Sight*.

5. But if we look upon the Soul as ever propending to some personal shape, the direction of the *Plastick* rayes must then tend to a kind of Organization, so far as is conducent to the state the Soul is in, whether in an *Aiery* or *Aethereal* Vehicle. For that the *Plastick* power omits or changes as she is drawn forth by the nature of the Matter she acts upon, is discoverable in her Organization of our Bodies here. For in all likelihood the Soul in her self is as much of one sex as another; which makes her sometimes sign the *Matter* with both, but that very seldom: and therefore it is manifest that she omits one part of her *Plastick*

stick power, and makes use of the other in almost all efformations of the *Fœtus*.

Whence it is easie to conclude, that supposing her *Plastick* power naturally work the *Æthereal* or *Aëreal* Vehicle into any *animal* shape; it may put forth onely such strokes of the efformative virtue as are convenient and becoming the Angelical Nature.

But according to this Hypothesis haply all Objects of Sense will not arrive to the *Centre of the Soul* from every part of the Horizon; no not though this Organization were not natural, but merely arbitrary. But be the Soul conceived either bound up thus into *animal* form, or spread loose into any careless round shape, according as her rayes shall display themselves in her *Vehicle* of *Aire* or *Æther*, yet the *seat of sight* will be duely restrained, which is a consideration of no contemptible consequence.

6. This in general may suffice concerning the very Nature of the Soul it self, her *Extension* and *Heterogeneity*. I shall onely adde to this one Observable concerning her *Aiery* and *Æthereal Vehicle*, and then I shall descend to more particular disquisitions. Rash fancies and false deductions from misunderstood Experiments have made some very confident that there is a *Vacuum* in Nature, and that every Body by how much more light it is, so much less substance it has in it self. A thing very fond and irrational, at the first sight, to such as are but indifferently well versed in the incomparable Philosophy of *Renatus Des-Cartes*, whose dexterous wit and through insight into the nature and laws of *Matter* has so perfected the reasons of those *Phænomena* that *Democritus*, *Epicurus*, *Lucretius* and others have puzzled themselves about; that there seems nothing now wanting as concerning that way of Philosophizing, but patience and an unprejudiced judgment to peruse what he has writ.

7. According therefore to his Philosophy and the Truth; there is ever as much Matter or Body in one consistency as another; as for example, there is as much Matter in a Cup of *Aire* as in the same Cup filled with *Water*, and as much in this Cup of *Water* as if it were filled with *Lead* or *Quicksilver*. Which I take notice of here, that I may free the imagination of men from that ordinary and idiotick misapprehension which they entertain of *Spirits* that appear, as if they were as evanid and devoid of Substance as the very Shadows of our Bodies cast against a Wall, or our Images reflected from a River or Looking-glass; and therefore from this error have given them names accordingly, calling the Ghosts of men that present themselves to them, *Εἰδῶλα* and *Umbra*, *Images* and *Shades*. The which, the more visible they are, they think them the more substantial; fancying that the *Aire* is so condensed; that there is not onely more of it, but also that simply there is more Matter or Substance, when it appears thus visible, then there was in the same space before. And therefore they must needs conceit that Death reduces us to a pitiful thin pittance of Being, that our Substance is in a manner lost, and nothing but a tenuous reek remains; no more in proportion to us, then what a sweating horse leaves behind him as he gallops



gallops by in a frosty morning. Which certainly must be a very lamentable consideration to such as love this thick and plump Body they bear about with them, and are pleased to consider how many pounds they outweighed their Neighbour the last time they were put in the balance together.

8. But if a kinde of dubious Transparency will demonstrate the *deficiency* of Corporeal Substance, a Pillar of *Crystal* will have less thereof then one of *Tobacco-smoak*; which though it may be so doubtful and evanid an Object to the Eye, if we try it by the Hand, it will prove exceeding solid: as also these *Ghosts* that are said to appear in this manner have proved to them that have touched them, or have been touched by them. For it is a thing ridiculous and unworthy of a Philosopher; to judge the measure of *corporeal Matter* by what it seems to our *sight*; for so *Aire* would be nothing at all: or what it is to our *handling* or weighing of it; for so indeed a Cup of Quick-silver would seem to have infinitely more Matter in it then one fill'd with *Aire* onely, and a vessel of Water less when it is plung'd under the water in the River, then when it is carried in the *Aire*. But we are to remember, that let *Matter* be of what consistency it will, as thin and pure as the flame of a candle, there is not less of *corporeal Substance* therein then there is in the same dimensions of Silver, Lead, or Gold.

9. So that we need not bemoan the shrivell'd condition of the deceased, as if they were stript almost of all Substance corporeal, and were too thinly clad to enjoy themselves as to any Object of Sense. For they have no less Body then we our selves have, only this Body is far more active then ours, being more *spiritualized*, that is to say, having greater degrees of Motion communicated unto it; which the whole Matter of the world receives from some *Spiritual Being* or other, and therefore in this regard may be said the more to symbolize with that Immaterial Being, the more Motion is communicated to it: As it does also in that which is the effect of Motion, to wit the tenuity and subtilty of its particles, whereby it is enabled to imitate, in some sort, the proper priviledge of Spirits that pass through all Bodies whatsoever. And these Vehicles of the Soul, by reason of the tenuity of their parts, may well pass through such Matter as seems to us impervious, though it be not really so to them. For Matter reduced to such fluid subtilty of particles as are invisible, may well have entrance through Pores unperceptible.

Whence it is manifest that the Soul, speaking in a natural sense, loseth nothing by Death, but is a very considerable gainer thereby. For she does not onely possess as much Body as before, with as full and solid dimensions, but has that accession cast in, of having this Body more invigorated with Life and Motion then it was formerly. Which consideration I could not but take notice of, that I might thereby expunge that false conceit that adheres to most mens fancies, of that *evanid* and *starved* condition of the other state.

## CHAP. III.

1. That the natural abode of the Soul after death is the Air. 2. That she cannot quit the *Aëreal Regions* till the *Æthereal Congruity* of life be awakened in her. 3. That all Souls are not in the same Region of the *Aire*. 4. Cardan's conceit of placing all *Dæmons* in the upper Region. 5. The use of this conceit for the shewing the reason of their seldome appearing. 6. That this *Phænomenon* is salv'd by a more rational *Hypothesis*. 7. A further confutation of Cardan's Opinion. 8. More tending to the same scope. 9. The Original of Cardan's error concerning the remote operations of *Dæmons*. 10. An Objection how *Dæmons* and Souls separate can be in this lower Region, where Winds and Tempests are so frequent. 11. A preparation to an Answer from the consideration of the nature of the Winds. 12. Particular Answers to the Objection. 13. A further Answer from the nature of the Statick Faculty of the Soul. 14. Another from the suddain power of actuating her Vehicle. 15. What incômodations she suffers from haile, rain, &c.

1. **T**Hose more particular Enquiries we intend to fall upon, may be reduced to these few Heads: viz. *The place of the Soul's abode, Her Employment, and Her Moral condition after Death.* That the place of her abode is the *Aire*, is the constant opinion of the ancient Philosophers and natural Theologers, who do unanimously make that *Element* the Receptacle of Souls departed: which therefore they called *αἶθρς*, that is, *αἶδρς*, because men deceased are in a state of *invisibilty*, as the place they are confined to is an Element utterly *invisible* of its own nature, and is accloy'd also with caliginous mists, and enveloped by vicissitudes with the dark shadow of the Earth. The truth of this Opinion of theirs is plainly demonstrable from the 29 and 31 Axiomes. For Nature making no enormous jumps, it must needs follow, that Separate Souls must take their first station in the *Aire*, because that *Vital Congruity* that fits an *Aëreal Vehicle* does of order awaken immediately upon the quitting of the *Earthly Body*.

2. Wherefore the Soul being thus vitally united with a *Body* or *Vehicle* of *Aire*, it is impossible that she should drive out of those Regions: because her motions are only according to the capacity of her Vehicle; she being not able to alter the consistency thereof into any more subtiler or purer temper than the *Aire* will admit of, keeping still its own Species. Only she may *conspissate* the *Aire* by directing the motion thereof towards her, and so squeezing out a considerable part of the first and second Element may retain more *Aire* than ordinary: But she cannot command the Air from her so entirely, as to actuate these two Elements alone, or any considerable part of them, because the *Æthereal Congruity* of life is as yet wholly asleep; nor is it in the power of the Soul to awake it as she pleases: and therefore it would be Pain and Death to her to attempt the removal of the *Aëreal Matter* quite from her. Besides that it



would require such a force as would imply a contribution of motion to it, as well as direction of it, to make it able to bear against other parts of the Aire that love not to be streightned nor crouded: which though it may haply be done in some measure, yet that she may by this force of direction recover a whole *Vehicle* of *Aether*, seems excessively improbable, as is plain from the 3<sup>d</sup>. Axiome.

3. Wherefore it is necessary that the Soul departed this life should be somewhere in the *Aire*, though it be not at all necessary that they should inhabit all of them the *same Region* thereof. For as some Souls are *more purified* then others when they leave the Body, so a *more pure* degree of *Vital Congruity* will awake in them: whence by that Divine *Nemesis* that runs through all things, they will be naturally conveyed to such places and be associated to such company as is most congruous to their Nature; and will be as distinctly sorted by that Eternal Justice that God has so deeply ingrafted in the very essential contexture of the Universe, as humane Laws dispose of persons with us, sending some to Prisons, some to Pest-houses, and others to the *Prytaneum*.

4. It will therefore, in all likelihood, fall to some of their shares to be fatally fettered to this *lower Region of the Aire*, as I doubt not but many other Spirits are; though *Cardan* much pleases himself with a peculiar conceit of his own, as if the *supreme Region of the Aire* was the only habitation of all *Demons* or Spirits whatever, and that their descent to us is as rare as the diving of Men into the bottome of the Sea, and almost as difficult, this *thick Aire* we breath in being in a manner as unsutable to their tenuious consistencies as the *Water* is to us; in which we are fain to hold our breath, and consequently to make a very short stay in that Element.

Besides that he fancies the passage of the *Middle Region* tedious to them, by reason of its Coldness; which therefore he saith is as it were a fence betwixt us and them, as the Sea is betwixt the Fishes and us; whom though we exceed much in Wit and Industry, and have a great desire to catch them and kill them, yet we get very few into our hands in comparison of those that scape us: And so these *Demons*, though they bear us no good will, by bodily conflict they can hurt none of us (it being so difficult a thing to come at us) and very few of us by their Art and Industry.

For this fancyfull Philosopher will have them only attempt us as we do the Fishes, by Baits, and Nets, and Eel-spears, or such like Engines which we cast into the bottom of the Water: So, saith he, these *Aëreal Genii*, keeping their station above in the third Region of the Aire (as we do on the bank of the River, or in a Boat on the Sea, when we fish) by sending down *Dreams* and *Apparitions*, may entangle some men so, that by affrightments and disturbances of mind at last, though at this distance, they may work their ruine and destruction.

5. This Hypothesis, I suppose, he has framed to give an account why the appearing of the *Genii* is so seldome, and why so little hurt is done by them as there is. For an Answer would be ready, that this lower Aire is no Element for them to abide in: and that it is as foolishly argued by those that say there are no Spirits, because they are so seldome seen, as if the

the Fishes, upon a concession of Speech and Reason to their mute Tribe, should generally conclude, that there are no such Creatures as Men or Horses, because it happens so very seldome that they can see them; and should contemn and laugh at those Fishes that, having had the hap to meet with them, should say they have seen such Creatures, as if they were fanatick and lunatick, and not well in their wits, or else too much in them, and that they contrived such fictions for some political design.

6. Which Parable may hold good, though not upon the same grounds, only by substituting *difference of condition* for *distance of place*; and the similitude will prove as sound as before. For, for a *Spirit* to *condensate* his Vehicle to almost a Terrestrial grossness and Visibility, is as rare and uncouth as for Terrestrial animals to dive to the bottom of the Sea, and it's likely every jot as difficult: and so the reason as obvious why so few are seen, and the confident denial of their existence as rash and foolish, by them that have not seen them themselves. For it is as if the Fishes should contest amongst themselves about the existence of Men, and their diving into the Water, and whether there were any places haunted in the Sea; as those would be the most famous where they fish for Pearls, or that cause the most frequent Shipwrecks, or are most pleasant to swim in. And some notable occasion, mischance, or weighty design, such as occurre more rarely, must be reasonably conceived the only invitations to the *Genii* to expose themselves to our view.

7. That there is so little hurt done by them, need not be resolved into the *distance of their habitation*, but into the *Law of the Universe*, whose force penetrates through all Orders of Beings. Besides, it is too trivial and idiotick a conceit, and far below the pitch of a Philosopher, to think that *all* Aëreal Spirits are Haters of Mankind, so as to take delight merely in destroying them. For Men do not hate Fishes because they live in another Element different from theirs, but catch them merely in love to themselves, for gain and food; which the Aiery *Genii* cannot aim at in destroying of us. But to doe mischief merely for mischief's sake, is so excessive an Enormity, that some doubt whether it be competible to any *Intellectual Being*. And therefore *Cardan* ought to have proved that first: as also, if there be any so extremely degenerate, that there be many of them, or rather so many that they cannot be awed by the number of those that are less depraved. For we may observe that men amongst our selves that are sufficiently wicked, yet they abhor very much from those things that are grossly and causlessly destructive to either Man or Beast; and themselves would help to destroy, punish, or at least hinder the attempters of such wild and exorbitant outrages that have no pretence of Reason, but are a mere exercise of Cruelty and Vexation to other Creatures.

He also ought to have demonstrated, that all Mankind are not the *Peculium* of some Spirits or other, and that there are not invisible Governours of Nations, Cities, Families, and sometime of particular Men; and that at least a *Political Goodness*, such as serves for the safety of Persons and what belongs to them, is not exceedingly more prevalent even in these Kingdomes of the *Aire*, then *gross Injustice*. For all this may be on this side of the *Divine Life*: so that there is no feare of making these



*Æreal* Inhabitants over-perfect by this Supposition. In a word, he should have proved that *Political Order*, in the full exercise thereof, did not reach from *Heaven* to *Earth*, and pierce into the *Subterraneous Regions* also, if there be any *Intellectual Creatures* there. For this will suffice to give a reason that so little hurt is done, though all places be full of *Æreal Spirits*.

8. Adde unto all this, that though they may not be permitted to doe any gross evil themselves, and to kill men at pleasure without their consents, yet they may abet them in such wayes, or invite them to such courses, as will prove destructive to them: but, it may be, with no greater plot then we have when we set Doggs together by the eares, fight Cocks, bait Beares and Bulls, run Horses, and the like; where often, by our occasion, as being excited and animated by us, they pursue their own inclinations to the loss of their lives.

But though we do not care to kill a Dog or a Cock in this way; yet there are none so barbarous as to knock these Creatures on the head merely because they will doe so. So these worser kind of *Genii*, according as their tempers are, may haply follow some men prone to such or such vices, in which they may drive them in way of contest, or to please their own fancies, to the utmost they can doe in it; and, taking their parts, sport themselves in making one man overcome another in duelling, in drinking, in craft and undermining, in wenching, in getting riches, in clambering to honours; and so of the rest. Where it may be their pastime to try the Victory of that Person they have taken to; and if he perish by the hurry of their temptations and animations, it is a thing they intended no more, it may be, then he that sets his Cock into the pit desires his neck should be broke: but if it happen so, the sorrow is much alike in both cases.

Wherefore these Spirits may doe mischief enough in the world, in abetting men that act it, though haply they neither take pleasure in doing of it upon any other termes, nor if they did, are able to doe it, there being so many watchful eyes over them. For these *Æreal Legions* are as capable of *Political Honesty*, and may as deeply resent it, as the nations of the Earth do, and it may be more deeply.

9. But if these Creatures were removed so far off as *Cardan* would have them, I do not see how they could have any communion at all with us, to doe us either good or hurt. For that they are able to send *Apparitions* or *Dreams* at this distance, is it self but a Dream, occasioned from that first Errour in the *Aristotelean* Philosophy, that makes God and the Intelligences act from the heavenly sphears, and so to produce all these Effects of Nature below; such as can never be done but by a present *Nūmen* and *Spirit of Life* that pervades all things.

10. This conceit therefore of his shall be no hindrance to our concluding, That this *lower Region of the Aire* is also replenisht with *Demons*. Which if it be, it is not unlikely but that the *Impurer Souls* wander there also; though I have taken all this pains to bring still greater trouble upon my self. For it is obvious to object that which *Lucretius* has started of old, that this Region being so obnoxious to *Windes* and *Tempests*, the  
Souls

Souls will not be able to keep their *Vehicles of Aire* about them, but that they will be blown in pieces by the roughness of these storms. But we may be easily delivered of this solicitude, if we consider the nature of the *Winds*, the nature of these *Vehicles*, and the *Statick* power of the Soul. For to say they will make as good shift as the *Genii* here, is not fully satisfactory, because a man would also willingly understand how the *Genii* themselves are not liable to this inconvenience. My Answer therefore shall reach both.

11. That *Winds* are nothing else but Watery particles at their greatest agitation, *Cartesius* has very handsomely demonstrated in his *Meteors*: Which particles do not so much drive the Aire before them, as pass through it, as a flight of arrows and showers of haile or rain. One part of the Aire therefore is not driven from another; but it is as if one should conceive so many little pieces of haire twirling on their middle point as at quarter-staffe, and so passing through the Aire; which motion would pass free, without carrying the Aire along with it. This therefore being the nature of *Winde*, the Aire is not torn apieces thereby, though we finde the *impetus* of it moving against us, because it cannot penetrate our Bodies with that facility that it does the *Aire*.

12. But the *Vehicles* of the *Genii* and Souls deceased are much-what of the very nature of the *Aire*; whence it is plainly impossible that the *Winde* should have any other force on them then what it has on the rest of that Element; and therefore the least thing imaginable will hold all the parts together. Which is true also if the *Winde* did carry along the *Aire* with it: for then the *Vehicles* of the *Genii* would move along with the stream, suffering little or no violence at all, unless they would force themselves against it. Which they are not necessitated to doe, as indeed not so much as to come into it, or not at least to continue in it, but may take shelter, as other living Creatures doe, in houses, behind walls, in woods, dales, caverns, rocks and other obvious places; and that maturely enough, the change of Aire and prognostick of storms being more perceptible to them then to any terrestrial animal.

13. And yet they need not be so cautious to keep out of danger, they having a power to grapple with the greatest of it, which is their *Statick* faculty; which arises from the power of *directing the motion* of the particles of their Vehicle. For they having this power of *directing the motion* of these particles which way they please, by Axiome 31. it necessarily follows, that they can determinate their course inwards, or toward the Centre; by which direction they will be all kept close together, firm and tight: which ability I call the *Statick* power of the Soul. Which if it can direct the whole agitation of the particles of the Vehicle, as well those of the first and second Element as those of the Aire, and that partly towards the Centre, and partly in a countertendency against the storme, this force and firmness will be far above the strongest *Winds* that she can possibly meet with.

14. Wherefore the Soul's Vehicle is in no danger from the boisterousness of the *Winds*, and if it were, yet there is no fear of cessation of Life. For as the wind blows off one part of Aire, it brings on another which



may be immediately actuated by the presence of the Soul ; though there be no need to take refuge in so large an Hypothesis. And it is more probable that she is more peculiarly united to one part of the Aire then another, and that she dismisses her Vehicle but by degrees, as our Spirits leasurely pass away by insensible Perspiration.

15. We see how little the Soul's Vehicle can be incommodated by storms of *Winde*. And yet *Rain, Hail, Snow* and *Thunder* will incommodate her still less. For they pass as they do through other parts of the Aire, which close again immediately, and leave neither wound nor scarre behinde them. Wherefore all these *Meteors* in their Mediocrity may be a pleasure to her and refreshment ; and in their excess no long pain, nor in their highest rage any destruction of life at all. From whence we may safely conclude, that not only the *Upper Region*, but this *Lower* also, may be inhabited both by the *deceased Souls* of *Men* and by *Demons*.

#### C H A P. IV.

1. That the Soul once having quitted this Earthly Body becomes a Dæmon.
2. Of the External Senses of the Soul separate, their number and limits in the Vehicle.
3. Of Sight in a Vehicle organized and unorganized.
4. How Dæmons and separate Souls hear and see at a vast Distance : and whence it is that though they may so easily hear or see us, we may neither see nor hear them.
5. That they have Hearing as well as Sight.
6. Of the Touch, Smell, Taſt, and Nourishment of Dæmons.
7. The external employment that the Genii and Souls deceased may have out of the Body.
8. That the actions of Separate Souls, in reference to us, are most-what conformable to their life here on Earth.
9. What their Entertainments are in reference to themselves.
10. The distinction of Orders of Dæmons from the places they most frequent.

1. **T**HE next thing we are to enquire into is the Employment of the Soul after Death ; how she can entertain her self, and pass away the time, and that either in Solitude, in Company, or as she is a Political member of some Kingdome or Empire. Concerning all which in the general we may conclude, that it is with her as with the rest of the Aëreal Genii, ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ ἀποδυσσάμεν τὸ σῶμα δαιμόνιον ἔστί, for the Soul having once put off this Terrestrial Body becomes a Genius her self ; as Maximus Tyrius, Xenocrates, Philo and others expressly affirm. But we shall consider these things more particularly.

2. As for those Employments wherewith she may entertain her self in solitude, they are either Objects of the External Senses, or of the Inward Minde. Concerning the former whereof it is more easie to move Questions then satisfy them ; as Whether she have the same number of Senses she had in this life. That she is endued with Hearing, Sight and Touch, I think there can be no scruple, because these will fall to her share necessarily, whether her Vehicle be organized or not ; and that of Seeing and

Touch

*Touch* is the most uncontrovertible of all. For the sense of visible Objects being discovered to us by transmissiō of Motion through those Spherical particles that are continued along from the Object through the Aire to our very Organ of Sight (which sees merely by reason of these particles being vitally united with the Soul) the same particles pervading all the Soul's Vehicle, it is impossible but that she should see. But the Question is, whether she sees in every part thereof. To which I must answer, No : partly from what I have \* already declared concerning the *Heterogeneity* of her *Plastick part* ; and partly from a gross inconvenience that would follow this Supposition. For if we should grant that the Soul saw in every part of her Vehicle, every Object that is near would not only seem double, but centuple, or millecuple ; which would be a very ugly enormity and defacement of *Sight*. Wherefore we have, with very good reason, restrained the *Visive faculty* of the Soul in this state of *Separation*, as well as it was in the *Terrestrial Body*. \* Chap. 2.  
sect. 3, 4.

3. But this hinders nothing but that the Soul, when she lies in one *Homogeneous* orb of Aire, devoid of organization, may see round about her, behinde, before, above, beneath, and every way. But if she organize her Vehicle, *Sight* may haply be restrain'd, as in us who cannot see behinde us. Which Consideration we toucht upon \* before. \* Chap. 2.  
sect. 5.

4. It is plain therefore that these *Aëreal Spirits*, though we cannot see them, cannot miss of seeing us ; and that, it may be, from a mighty distance, if they can transform their Vehicle, or the Organ of Sight, into some such advantageous Figure as is wrought in Dioptrick Glasses. Which power will infinitely exceed the contracting and dilating of the pupil of our Eye, which yet is a weaker and more defectuous attempt towards so high a Priviledge as we speak of : which notwithstanding may seem very possible in *Spirits*, from 31 and 34 Axiomes. The same also may be said of their *Hearing*. For the same principle may enable them to shape themselves Organs for the receiving of *Sounds*, of greater art and excellency then the most accurate *Acoustick* we read of, or can excogitate.

Wherefore it is a very childish mistake to think, that because we neither see the shape nor hear the discourse of *Spirits*, that they neither hear nor see us. For soft Bodies are impressible by hard ones, but not on the contrary ; as melted Wax will receive the Signature of the Seal, but the Seal is not at all impressed upon by the Wax. And so a solid Body will stop the course of the Aire, but the Aire will not stop the course of a solid Body ; and every inconsiderable terrestrial consistency will reflect Light, but Light scarce moves any terrestrial Body out of its place, but is rebounded back by it. That therefore that is most tenuious and thin, is most passive, and therefore if it be once the Vehicle of Sense, is most sensible.

Whence it will follow, that the reflexion of Light from Objects being able to move our Organs, that are not so fine, they will more necessarily move those of the *Genii*, and at a greater distance. But their Bodies being of *diaphanous Aire*, it is impossible for us to see them, unless they will give themselves the trouble of reducing them to a more *terrestrial consistency*, whereby they may reflect light. Nor can we easily hear their



ordinary speech, partly because a very gentle motion of the Aire will act upon their Vehicles, and partly because they may haply use the finer and purer part of that Element in this exercise, which is not so fit to move our Sense. And therefore unless they will be heard *datâ operâ* (of which the Devil of *Mascon* is a notorious \* example) naturally that impress of the Air in their usual discourse can never strike *our* Organ.

5. And that we may not seem to say all this for nought; that they will have *Hearing* as well as *Seeing*, appears from what I have intimated \* above, that *this Faculty* is ranged near the Common *Sensorium* in the Vehicle, as well as that of *Sight*; and therefore the Vehicle being all Air, such percussions of it as cause the sense of Sound in us will necessarily doe the like in them; but more accurately, haply, if they organize their Vehicle for the purpose, which will answer to the arrection of the Ears of Animals, for the better taking in the Sound.

6. That they have the sense of *Touch* is inevitably true, else how could they feel resistance, which is necessary in the bearing of one Body against another, because they are impenetrable? And to speak freely my mind, it will be a very hard thing to disprove that they have not something analogical to *Smell* and *Tast*, which are very near a-kin to *Touch* properly so called. For *Fumes* and *Odours* passing so easily through the Air, will very naturally insinuate into their Vehicles also: which *Fumes*, if they be grosser and humectant, may raise that diversification of *Touch* which we Mortals call *Tasting*; if more subtile and dry, that which we call *Smelling*. Which if we should admit, we are within modest bounds as yet in comparison of others; as \* *Cardan*, who affirms downright that the *Aëreal Genii* are nourished, and that some of them get into the Bodies of Animals to batten themselves there in their Bloud and Spirits. Which is also averred by *Marcus* the *Mesopotamian Eremit* in \* *Psellus*, who tells us that the purer sort of the *Genii* are nourished by drawing in the Air, as our Spirits are in the Nerves and Arteries; and that other *Genii*, of a courser kinde, suck in moisture, not with the Mouth as we do, but as a Sponge does water. And \* *Moses Egyptius* writes concerning the *Zabii*, that they eat of the blood of their Sacrifice, because they thought it was the food of the *Demons* they worshipped, and that by eating thereof they were in a better capacity to communicate with them. Which things if they could be believed, that would be no such hard Probleme concerning the *Familiars* of Witches, why they *suck* them. But such curiosities, being not much to our purpose, I willingly omit.

7. The conclusion of what has been said is this, That it is certain that the *Genii*, and consequently the Souls of men departed, who *ipso facto* are of the same rank with them, have the sense of *Seeing*, *Hearing* and *Touching*, and not improbably of *Smelling* and *Tasting*. Which Faculties being granted, they need not be much at a loss how to spend their time, though it were but upon external Objects; all the furniture of Heaven and Earth being fairly exposed to their view. They see the same Sun and Moon that we do, behold the persons and converse of all men, and, if no special Law inhibit them, may pass from Town to Town, and from City to City, as *Hesiod* also intimates,

\* See *Antidote*,  
Book 3. chap. 3.  
sect. 8.

\* Chap. 2. sect. 4.

\* *De rerum va-  
riate*, lib. 16.  
cap. 93.

\* In his *ἑρμῆς  
ἐνεργίας δαι-  
μόνων*.

\* In his *More  
Nevochim*, part.  
3. cap. 46.

Ἡμεῖς ἐοσαμένοι πῶσαν φειτῶσιν ἐπ' αἰῶν.

There is nothing that we enjoy but they may have their fees out of it; fair Fields, large and inviolable Woods, pleasant Gardens, high and healthful Mountains, where the purest gusts of Air are to be met with, Crystal Rivers, mossy Springs, solemnity of Entertainments, Theatrick Pumps and Shews, publick and private Discourses, the exercises of Religion, whether in Temples, Families, or hidden Cells.

They may be also (and haply not uninterested) Spectators of the glorious and mischievous hazards of War, whether Sea-fights or Land-fights; besides those soft and silent, though sometimes no less dangerous, Combats in the Camps of *Cupid*; and a thousand more particularities that it would be too long to reckon up, where they haply are not mere Spectators but Abettors, as *Plutarch* writes: Like old men that are past Wrestling, Pitching the Barre, or playing at Cudgels themselves, yet will assist and abet the young men of the Parish at those Exercises. So the Souls of men departed, though they have put off with the Body the capacity of the ordinary functions of humane Life, yet they may assist and abet them, as pursuing some design in them; and that either for evil or good, according as they were affected themselves when they were in the Body.

8. In brief, whatever is the *Custom* and *Desire* of the Soul in this life, that sticks and adheres to her in that which is to come; and she will be sure, so farre as she is capable, either to act it, or to be at least a Spectator and Abettor of such kinde of actions.

— — — — — *Quæ gratia currum  
Armorumque fuit vivis, quæ cura nitentes  
Pascere equos, eadem sequitur tellure repostos.*

Which rightly understood is no poetical fiction, but a professed Truth in *Plato's* Philosophy. And *Maximus Tyrius* speaks expressly even of the better sort of Souls, who having left the body, and so becoming τὰς αὐτὰς χόρῳ καὶ νόμῳ δαίμονες ἀντ' ἀνθρώπων, i. e. being made ipso facto *Genii* in stead of men, that, beside the peculiar happiness they reap thereby to themselves, they are appointed by God, and have a mission from him, to be Overseers of humane affairs: but that every *Genius* does not perform every office, but as their natural Inclinations and Customes were in this life, they exercise the like in some manner in the other. And therefore he will have *Æsculapius* to practise Physick still, and *Hercules* to exercise his strength, *Amphilochus* to prophesy, *Castor* and *Pollux* to navigate, *Minos* to hear causes, and *Achilles* to war. Which opinion is as likely to hold true in Bad Souls as in Good; and then it will follow, that the Souls of the wicked make it their business to assist and abet the exercise of such Vices as themselves were most addicted to in this life, and to animate and tempt men to them. From whence it would follow, that they being thus by their separate state *Demons*, as has been said already, if they be also tempters to evil, they will very little differ from mere *Devils*.

*Dissert. 27. de  
Deo Socratis.*

9. But besides this employment in reference to us, they may entertain themselves with *Intellectual* Contemplations, whether Natural, Mathematical,



matical, or Metaphysical. For assuredly *Knowledge* is not so easy and cheap in this state of Separation, but that they may advance and improve themselves by exercise and Meditations. And they being in a capacity to forget by reason of desuetude, it will be a new pleasure to them to recall to minde their almost obliterate speculations. And for those that take more pleasure in *outward Sense* then in the operations of their *Understanding*; there being so much change in Nature, and so various qualifications of the Aire and these inferiour Elements, which must needs act upon their *Aëreal* Bodies to more or less gratification or dislike, this also will excuse them from being idle, and put them upon quest after such refreshments and delights as nature will afford the multifarious presages and desires of their flitting Vehicles.

10. Not but that they keep constant to some general inclination, which has divided these *Aëreal* wanderers into so many Orders or Tribes; the ancient Philosophers and Poets ( which are Philosophers of the ancientest standing of all ) having assigned places proper to each Order: the Sea, Rivers and Springs to one, Mountains and Groves to others, and so of the rest. Whence they imposed also those names of the *Nereides*, *Naiades*, *Oreades*, *Dryades*, and the like: to which you may adde the *Dii tutelares* of Cities and Countries, and those that love the warmth of Families and homely converse of Men, such as they styled *Lares familiares*. All which, and hundreds more, which there is no need to recite, though they be engaged ever in one natural propension, yet there being so great variety of occasions to gratify it more or less, their thoughts may be employed in purchasing and improving those delights that are most agreeable to their own nature. Which particularities to run over would be as infinite as useles.

These short intimations are sufficient to make us understand that the *Genii* and *Separate Souls* need want no *Employment*, no not in *Solitude*: for such must their stay also amongst us be esteemed, when they do not sensibly and personally converse with us.

## C H A P. V.

1. That the *Separate Soul* spends not all her time in *Solitude*. 2. That her converse with us seems more intelligible then that with the *Genii*.
3. How the *Genii* may be visible one to another, though they be to us invisible. 4. Of their approaches, and of the limits of their swiftness of motion: 5. And how they far exceed us in celerity. 6. Of the figure or shape of their Vehicles, and of their privacy, when they would be invisible. 7. That they cannot well converse in a mere simple Orbicular forme. 8. That they converse in *Humane* shape, at least the better sort of them. 9. Whether the shape they be in proceed merely from the Imperium of their Will and Fancy, or is regulated by a natural Character of the Plastick part of the Soul. 10. That the personal shape of a Soul or Genius is partly from the Will, and partly from the Plastick power.
11. That

11. That considering how the Soul organizes the *Fœtus* in the Womb, and moves our limbs at pleasure, it were a wonder if Spirits should not have such command over their Vehicles as is believed. 12. A further Argument from an excessive virtue some have given to Imagination.

I. **B**UT the *Separate* state of the Soul does not condemn her to this Solitude, but being admitted into the Order of the *Genii*, she is possessed of their Privileges, which is to converse personally with this *Aëreal* people, and also upon occasion with the Inhabitants of the Earth; though the latter with far more difficulty.

2. As for her converse with the *Aëreal Genii* and other Souls *Separate*, it must be in all reason concluded to be exceeding much more frequent than that with Men, and yet this latter is in some sort more intelligible; because it is certain she can see us, light being reflected from our *Opake* Bodies unto her Sense, and by conspissating her Vehicle she may make her self visible to us. But the Vehicles of the *Genii* and of *Souls* being in their natural consistence purely *Aëreal*, and Air being a transparent Body, it will transmit the light wholly; and so no reflexion being made from these *Aiery* Bodies, they can have no perception of one anothers presence, and therefore no society nor communion one with another.

3. This seems a shrewd Difficulty at the first view. But it is easily taken off, if we consider that *Aire* will admit of many degrees of *Rarefaction* and *Condensation*, and yet still appear unto us alike invisible, as one may observe in the *Weather-glass*. But it were more proper to propose in this case the Experiment of the *Wind-gun*, wherein the *Aire* is compressed to a great number of degrees of *Condensation* beyond its natural state; within the compass of many whereof there is no doubt, if not in the utmost, that the *Aire* does remain invisible to us. But there is no scruple to be made but that in the progress of these degrees of *Condensation* the *Aire*, if it were in a *Glass-barrel*, might become visible to the *Genii*, by reason of the tenderness and delicacy of their Senses, before it would be so to us.

Whence it follows, that the Vehicles of the *Genii* may have a consistency different from the *Aire*, and perceptible to them, that is to say; to one anothers sight, though it be as unperceptible to us as the rest of the *Aire* is. As, it may be, a man that has but bad eyes would not be able to distinguish Ice immersed in the Water from the Water it self by his sight, though he might by his Touch. Or if their Vehicles could be supposed purer and finer than the rest of the *Aire*, their presence might be perceptible by that means too. For this vaporous *Aire* having without question a confused reflexion of light in it, every way in some proportion like that in a Mist, or when the Sun shines waterishly and prognosticks rain; these repercussions of light being far more sensible to the *Genii* than to us, the lessening of them would be more sensible, and therefore the diminution of reflexion from their Vehicles would be sufficient to discover their presence one to another: and for the illustrating of this Hypothesis, the experiment of the *Weather-glass* is more proper.

But



But the other supposition I look upon as the more likely to be true ; and that as the *aquatil Animals* that live in the *Sea* have a consistency grosser then the Element they move in, so it is with these that live in the *Aire*, though there be nothing near so great a difference here as in that other Element.

4. It is plain therefore, that the Persons of the *Genii* and Separate Souls are visible one to another : But yet not at any distance, and therefore there is necessity of approaching to one another for mutual converse : which enforces us to say something of their *Local Motion*. Which is neither by Fins nor Wings, as in Fishes or Birds, who are fain to sustain themselves by these instruments from sinking to the bottome of either Element : but it is merely by the direction of the agitation of the particles of their Vehicle toward the place they aime at ; and in such a swiftness or leasureliness as best pleases themselves, and is competible to their natures. For they can goe no swifter then the whole summe of agitation of the particles of their Vehicle will carry so much Matter, nor indeed so swift ; for it implies that their Vehicles would be turned into an absolutely-hard Body, such as Brass or Iron, or whatever we find harder ; so that necessarily they would fall down to the Earth as dead as a Stone. Those therefore are but phantastick conceits that give such agility to Spirits, as if they could be here and there and every where at once, skip from one Pole of the World to another, and be on the Earth again in a moment : whenas in truth they can pass with no greater swiftness then the direction of such a part of the agitation of the particles of their Vehicles will permit, as may be spared from what is employed in keeping them within a tolerable compass of a due Aëreal fluidity.

5. And this alone will suffice to make them exceed us in activity and swiftness by many degrees. For their whole Vehicle is haply at least as thin and moveable as our *Animal Spirits*, which are very few in comparison of this luggage of an earthly Body that they are to drive along with them. But the *spiritual Bodies* of the *Genii* have nothing to drive along with them but themselves ; and therefore are more free and light, compared to us, then a mett'l'd Steed that has cast his Rider, compared with a Pack-horse loaden with a sack of Salt.

6. The next thing to be considered, touching the *mutual conversation* of these Aëreal *Genii*, is the *shape* they appear in one to another, of what *Figure* it is, and whether the Figure be *Natural*, or *Arbitrarious*, or *Mixt*. For that they must appear in *some Figure* or other is plain, in that their Vehicles are not of an infinite extension. It is the more general Opinion, that there is no particular Figure that belongs unto them naturally, unless it be that which of all Figures is most simple, and most easy to conform to, even by external helps, which is the equal compression of the Aire on every side of the Vehicle, by which means drops of Dew and Rain and pellets of Hail come so ordinarily into that shape. Which also will more handsomely accord with the nature of the Soul, supposing she consist of *Central* and *Radial* essence, as I have above described, and the Common *Sensorium* be placed in the midst. In this Figure may the Soul reside in the Aire, and haply melt her self, I mean her Vehicle,

Vehicle, into near so equal a liquidity with that part of that Element adjacent to her, that it may be in some measure like our retiring into secrecy from the sight of men, when we desire to be private by our selves.

7. But she may, if she will, and likely with far more ease, change this consistency of her *Aëreal* Body into such a degree of thickness, that there may be a dubious discovery of her, as in the glimpse of a Fish under the water, and may still make her self more visible to her fellow-*Genii*, though keeping yet this simple *Orbicular* form. But what converse there can be betwixt two such heaps of living Aire, I know not. They may indeed communicate their *Affections* one to another in such a way as is discovered in the *Eye*, wherein the *motions of the Spirits* do plainly indicate the *Passions of the Mind*: so that it may seem possible, in this simple Figure, to make known their joy or grief, peaceableness or wrath, love or dislike, by the modification of the motion of the Spirits of their Vehicle. But how there can well be entertained any *Intellectual* or *Rational* Conference, without any further organization of their *Aiery* Bodies, I profess my self at a loss to understand.

8. Wherefore the *Genii* and *Separate Souls*, whatever their *shape* be in private, appear in a more operose and articulate form when they are to converse with one another. For they can change their *Figure* in a manner as they please, by Axiome 34. Which power, I conceive, will be made use of not onely for service, but ornament and pulchritude. And the most unexceptionable Beauty, questionless, is that of *Man* in the best patterns (chuse what Sex you will) and far above the rest of Creatures; which is not our judgement onely, but His that made us. For certainly he would give to the *Principal of terrestrial Animals* the noblest form and shape; which though it be much obscured by our unfortunate Fall, yet questionless the defacement is not so great, but that we may have a near guess what it has been heretofore. It is most rational therefore to conclude, that the *Aëreal Genii* converse with one another in *Humane shape*, at least the better sort of them.

9. But the difficulty now is, whether that *Humane shape* that the Soul transforms her Vehicle into be simply the Effect of the *Imperium* of her *Will* over the Matter she actuates, or that her Will may be in some measure limited or circumscribed in its effect by a concomitant exertion of the *Plastick* power; so that what proceeds from the *Will* may be onely more general, that is, That the Soul's *Will* may onely command the Vehicle into an *Animal form*; but that it is the form or shape of a *Man*, may arise in a more natural way from the concomitant exertion of the *Plastick* virtue: I say, in a more easy and natural way; For vehemency of desire to alter the Figure into another representation may make the appearance resemble some other creature: But no forced thing can last long.

The more easy and natural shape therefore that, at least, the better *Genii* appear in, is *Humane*: which if it be granted, it may be as likely that such a determinate *Humane shape* may be more easy and natural than another, and that the Soul, when she *wills* to appear in personal Figure,



will transform her Vehicle into one constant likeness, unless she disguise her self on set purpose. That is, the *Plastick* power of every Soul, whether of Men, or of the other *Genii*, does naturally display it self into a different modification of the *Humane shape*, which is the proper Signature of every particular or individual person: which though it may be a little changed in Generation by virtue of the Imagination of the Parents, or quality of their seed, yet the Soul set free from that Body she got here, may exquisitely recover her ancient form again.

10. Not that the *Plastick* virtue, awakened by the *Imperium* of her *Will*, shall renew all the lineaments it did in this *Earthly Body* (for abundance of them are useless and to no purpose, which therefore, Providence so ordaining, will be silent in this *Aiery* figuration, and onely such operate as are fit for this separate state; and such are those as are requisite to perfect the visible feature of a Person, giving him all parts of either ornament or use for the pleasure of Rational converse;) nor that this *Efformative* power does determine the whole appearance alone (for these *Aëreal* Spirits appear variously clad, some like beautiful Virgins, others like valiant Warriours with their Helmets and Plumes of feathers, as *Philostratus* would make us believe *Achilles* did to *Apollonius*;) But there is a *mixt* action and effect, resulting partly from the freeness of the *Will* and *Imagination*, and partly from the natural propension of the *Plastick* virtue, to cast the Vehicle into such a personal shape.

11. Which Prerogative of the Soul, in having this power thus to shape her Vehicle at will, though it may seem very strange, because we do not see it done before our eyes, nor often think of such things; yet it is not much more wonderful then that she *organizes* the *Fœtus* in the womb, or that we can *move* the parts of our Body merely by our *Will* and *Imagination*. And that the *Aëreal* Spirits can doe these things, that they can thus shape their Vehicles, and transform themselves into several Appearances, I need bring no new instances thereof. Those Narrations I have recited in my *Third Book against Atheism* do sufficiently evince this Truth. And verily, considering the great power acknowledged in *Imagination* by all Philosophers, nothing would seem more strange, then that these *Aiery* Spirits should not have this command over their own Vehicles, to transform them as they please.

12. For there are some, and they of no small note, that attribute so wonderful effects to that Faculty armed with *Confidence* and *Belief* (to which *Passion Fear* may in some manner be referred, as being a strong belief of an imminent evil, and that it will surely take effect, as also vehement *Desire*, as being accompanied with no small measure of perswasion that we may obtain the thing desired, else *Desire* would not be so very active) I say, they attribute so wonderful force to *Imagination*, that they affirm that it will not onely alter a mans own Body, but act upon others, and that at a distance; that it will inflict diseases on the sound, and heal the sick; that it will cause Hail, Snows and Winds; that it will strike down an Horse or Camel, and cast their Riders into a ditch; that it will doe all the feats of Witchcraft, even to the making of Ghosts and Spirits appear, by transforming the adjacent Aire into the shape of a person

person that cannot onely be felt and seen, but heard to discourse, and that not onely by them whose *Imagination* created this airy *Spectrum*, but by other by-standers, whose *Fancy* contributed nothing to its existence. To such an extent as this have *Avicenna*, *Algazel*, *Paracelsus*, *Pomponatius*, *Vaninus* and others, exalted the power of humane *Imagination*: which if it were true, this transfiguration of the Vehicles of the separate Souls and *Genii* were but a trifle in comparison thereof.

## CHAP. VI.

1. More credible Instances of the Effects of Imagination. 2. A special and peculiar Instance in Signatures of the Fœtus. 3. That what Fienus grants, who has so cautiously bounded the power of Fancy, is sufficient for the present purpose. 4. Examples approved of by Fienus. 5. Certain Examples rejected by him, and yet approved of by Fernelius and Sennertus. 6. Three notorious Stories of the power of the Mother's Imagination on the Fœtus, out of Helmont. 7. A conjectural inference from those Stories, what influence The Spirit of Nature has in all Plastick operations. 8. A further confirmation of the Conjecture from Signatures on the Fœtus. 9. An application thereof to the transfiguration of the Vehicles of Dæmons.

1. **B**UT I shall contain my belief within more moderate bounds, that which the most sober Authors assent to being sufficient for our turn; and that is the power of *Imagination* on our own Bodies, or what is comprehended within our own, viz. the *Fetus* in the Womb of the Mother. For that *Imagination* will bring real and sensible effects to pass is plain, in that some have raised diseases in their own Bodies by too strongly imagining of them; by fancying bitter or sour things, have brought those real sapours into their mouths; at the remembring of some filthy Object, have fallen a vomiting; at the imagining of a Potion, have fallen a purging; and many such things of the like nature. Amongst which, that of prefixing to ones self what time in the morning we will wake, is no less admirable then any. Which alterations upon the Spirits for the production of such qualities is every jot as hard as the ranging them into new figures or postures.

But the hardest of all is, to make them so determinately active, as to change the shape of the Body, by sending out knobs like horns, as it hapned to *Cyppus*, of which *Agrippa* speaks in his *Occult. Philosoph.* Which I should not have repeated here, had I not been credibly informed of a later Example of the like effect of *Imagination*, though upon more fancy-full grounds. That *Fear* has killed some, and turned others gray, is to be referred to *Imagination* also: the latter of which examples is a sign that the *Plastick* power of the Soul has some influence also upon the very hairs: which will make it less marvellous that the Soul's Vehicle may be turned into the live effigies of a Man; not a hair, that is necessary to

Lib. 1. cap. 64.



the perfecting of his representation, being excluded, free *Imagination* succeeding or assisting the *Plastick* power in the other state.

2. But of all Examples, those of the *Signatures* of the *Fœtus* by the *Imagination of the Mother* come the nearest to our purpose. For we may easily conceive, that as the *Plastick* power in the *Fœtus* is directed or seduced by the force of the Mothers Fancy ; so the *Efformative* virtue in Souls separate and the *Genii* may be governed and directed or perverted by the force of their *Imagination*. And so much the more surely by how much the union is more betwixt the *Imagination* of the Soul and her own *Plastick* faculty, then betwixt her and the *Plastick* power of another Soul ; and the capacity of being changed, greater in the yielding *Aëreal* Vehicle, then in the grosser rudiments of the *Fœtus* in the Womb.

3. And yet the Effects of the force of the Mothers *Imagination* in the signing of the *Fœtus* is very wonderful, and almost beyond belief, to those that have not examined these things. But the more learned sort both of Physicians and Philosophers are agreed on the truth thereof, as *Empedocles*, *Aristotle*, *Pliny*, *Hippocrates*, *Galen*, and all the modern Physicians, being born down into assent by daily experience. For these *Signatures* of less extravagance and enormity are frequent enough, as the similitude of Cherries, Mulberries, the colour of Claret-wine spilt on a woman with child, with many such like instances. And if we stand but to what *Fienus* has defined in this matter, who has, I think, behaved himself as cautiously and modestly as may be, there will be enough granted to assure us of what we aim at. For he does acknowledge that the *Imagination* of the Mother may change the figure of the *Fœtus* so as to make it bear a resemblance, though not absolutely perfect, of an Ape, Pig, or Dog, or any such like Animal. The like he affirms of colours, hairs, and excrescencies of several sorts : that it may produce also what is very like or analogous to horns and hoofs, and that it may encrease the bigness and number of the parts of the Body.

Fien. de viri-  
bus Imaginati-  
onis, quæst. 22.

4. And though he does reject several of the Examples he has produced out of Authors, yet those which he admits for true are Indications plain enough, what we may expect in the Vehicle of a departed Soul or Demon. As that of the Hairy girl out of *Marcus Damascenus* ; that other out of *Guilielmus Paradinus*, of a Child whose skin and nails resembled those of a Bear ; and a third out of *Balduinus Ronsæus*, of one born with many excrescencies coloured and figured like those in a Turkey-cock ; and a fourth out of *Pareus*, of one who was born with an head like a Frog ; as lastly that out of *Avicenna*, of Chickens with Hawks heads. All which deviations of the *Plastick* power hapned from the force of *Imagination* in the Females, either in the time of Conception, or gestation of their young.

Fien. de viri-  
bus Imaginati-  
onis, quæst. 13.  
exempl. 5, 7,  
18, 19, 27. &  
quæst. 22.

5. But he scruples of giving assent to others, which yet are assented to by very learned Writers. As that of Black-moors being born of white Parents, and white Children of black, by the exposal of pictures representing an *Æthiopian* or European : which those two excellent Physicians, *Fernelius* and *Sennertus*, both agree to. He rejects also that out of *Cornelius Gemma*, of a Child that was born with his Forehead wounded

Fien. de viri-  
bus Imagin.  
quæst. 13.  
exempl. 14.

ded and running with blood, from the husbands threatening his wife, when she was big, with a drawn sword which he directed towards her Forehead. Which will not seem so incredible, if we consider what *Sennertus* records of his own knowledge, viz. That a Woman with child seeing a Butcher divide a Swines head with his Cleaver, brought forth her Child with its face cloven in the upper jaw, the palate, and upper lip to the very nose.

*Sennert. de vitiis  
ribus Imaginat.  
cap. 14.*

6. But the most notorious instances of this sort are those of *Helmont De injectis materialibus*. The one of a Taylor's wife at *Nechlin*, who standing at her door, and seeing a souldiers hand cut off in a quarrel, presently fell into labour, being struck with horror at the spectacle, and brought forth a child with one hand, the other arm bleeding without one, of which wound the infant died by the great expense of blood. Another woman, the wife of one *Marcus De Vogeler* Merchant of *Antwerp*, in the year 1602. seeing a souldier begging who had lost his right arm in *Ostend-siege*, which he shewed to the people still bloody, fell presently into labour, and brought forth a Daughter with one arm struck off, nothing left but a bloody stump to employ the Chirurgions skill: this woman married afterwards to one *Hoochcamer* Merchant of *Amsterdam*, and was yet alive in the year 1638. as *Helmont* writes. He adds a third example, of another Merchants wife which he knew, who hearing that on a morning there were thirteen men to be beheaded (this hapned at *Antwerp* in Duke *D'Alva* his time) she had the curiosity to see the execution. She getting therefore a place in the Chamber of a certain widow-woman, a friend of hers that dwelt in the market-place, beheld this Tragick spectacle; upon which she suddainly fell into labour, and brought forth a perfectly-formed infant, only the head was wanting, but the neck bloody as their bodies she beheld that had their heads cut off. And that which does still advance the wonder is, that the hand, arm, and head of these infants, were none of them to be found. From whence *Van Helmont* would infer a penetration of corporeal dimensions; but how groundlessly I will not dispute here.

*See Helmont.  
de Inject.  
Material. pa-  
ragr. 9.*

7. If these Stories he recites be true, as I must confess I do not well know how to deny them, he reporting them with so honest and credible circumstances; they are notable examples of the power of *Imagination*, and such as do not onely win belief to themselves, but also to others that *Fienus* would reject, not of this nature onely we are upon, of wounding the body of the Infant, but also of more exorbitant conformation of parts, of which we shall bring an instance or two anon.

In the mean time, while I more carefully contemplate this strange virtue and power of the Soul of the Mother, in which there is no such measure of purification or exaltedness, that it should be able to act such *miracles*, as I may call them, rather than *natural effects*; I cannot but be more then usually inclinable to think that the *Plastick* faculty of the Soul of the Infant, or whatever accessions there may be from the *Imagination* of the Mother, is not the adequate cause of the formation of the *Fetus*: a thing which *Plotinus* somewhere intimates by the bye, as I have \* already noted, viz. That the *Soul of the World*, or the *Spirit of Nature*, assists in

\* Book 2. chap.  
10. sect. 2.



this performance. Which if it be true, we have discovered a Cause proportionable to so prodigious an effect. For we may easily conceive that the deeply-impassioned Fancy of the Mother snatches away the *Spirit of Nature* into consent: which Spirit may rationally be acknowledged to have a hand in the efformation of all vital Beings in the World, and haply be the only Agent in forming of all manner of *Plants*.

In which kind whether she exert her power in any other Elements then *Earth* and *Water*, I will conclude no further, then that there may be a possibility thereof in the calmer Regions of *Aire* and *Aether*. To the right understanding of which conjecture, some light will offer it self from what we have said concerning the *Visibility* and *Consistency* of the *Aëreal Demons* in their occurrsions one with another.

8. But this is not the only Argument that would move one to think that this *Spirit of Nature* intermeddles with the Efformation of the *Fætus*. For those *Signatures* that are derived on the Infant from the Mothers fancy in the act of Conception cannot well be understood without this Hypothesis. For what can be the Subject of that Signature? Not the *Plastick* part of the Soul of the Mother; for that it is not the *Mothers Soul* that efforms the *Embryo*, as *Sennertus* ingeniously conjectures from the manner of the efformation of Birds, which is in their Eggs, distinct from the Hen, and they may as well be hatched without any Hen at all, a thing ordinarily practised in *Egypt*; nor the *Body* of the *Embryo*, for it has yet no Body; nor its *Soul*, for the Soul, if we believe *Aristotle*, is not yet present there. But the *Spirit of Nature* is present every where, which snatcht into consent by the force of the *Imagination* of the Mother, retains the Note, and will be sure to seal it on the Body of the Infant.

For what rude inchoations the *Soul of the World* has begun in the Matter of the *Fætus*, this *Signature* is comprehended in the whole design, and after compleated by the presence and operation of the particular *Soul of the Infant*, which co-operates conformably to the pattern of the Soul of the World, and insists in her footsteps; who having once begun any hint to an entire design, she is alike able to pursue it in any place, she being every where like, or rather the same to her self. For as our Soul being one, yet, upon the various temper of the Spirits, exerts her self into various imaginations and conceptions; so the Soul of the World, being the same perfectly every where, is engaged to exert her *Efformative* power every where alike, where the Matter is exactly the same.

Whence it had been no wonder, if those Chickens above-mentioned with Hawks heads had been hatched an hundred miles distant from the Hen, whose Imagination was disturbed in the act of Conception: because the *Soul of the World* had begun a rude draught, which it self would as necessarily pursue every where, as a *Geometrician* certainly knows how to draw a Circle that will fit three Points given.

9. This Opinion therefore of *Plotinus* is neither irrational nor unintelligible, That the *Soul of the World* interposes and insinuates into all generations of things, while the Matter is fluid and yielding. Which would induce a man to believe that she may not stand idle in the transfiguration of the Vehicles of the *Demons*, but assist their fancies and desires,

fires, and so help to cloath them and attire them according to their own pleasures: or it be may sometimes against their wills, as the unwieldiness of the Mothers Fancy forces upon her a Monstrous birth.

## CHAP. VII.

1. Three notable Examples of Signatures, rejected by Fienus: 2. And yet so farre allowed for possible, as will fit our design. 3. That Helmont's Cherry and Licetus his Crab-fish are shrewd arguments that the Soul of the World has to doe with all Efformations of both Animals and Plants. 4. An Example of a most exact and lively Signature out of Kircher: 5. With his judgement thereupon. 6. Another Example out of him of a Child with gray hairs. 7. An application of what has been said hitherto, concerning the Signatures of the Fœtus, to the transfiguration of the Aiery Vehicles of Separate Souls and Dæmons. 8. Of their personal transformation visible to us.

1. **T**Hose other Examples of the Signation of the Fœtus from the Mothers Fancy, which Fienus rejecteth, the one of them is out of Wierus, of a man that threatned his Wife when she was bigge with child, saying, she bore the Devil in her womb, and that he would kill him: whereupon, not long after, she brought forth a Child well shaped from the middle downwards, but upwards spotted with black and red spots, with eyes in its forehead, a mouth like a Satyre, ears like a Dog, and bended horns on its head like a Goat. The other out of Ludovicus Vives, of one who returning home in the disguise of a Devil, whose part he had acted on the Stage, and having to doe with his wife in that habit, saying he would beget a Devil on her, impregnated her with a Monster of a shape plainly diabolical. The third and most remarkable is out of Peramatus, of a Monster born at S. Laurence in the West-Indies, in the year 1573. the narration whereof was brought to the Duke of Medina Sidonia from very faithful hands. How there was a Child born there at that time, that besides the horrible deformity of its mouth, ears and nose, had two horns on the head, like those of young Goats, long hair on the body, a fleshy girdle about his middle, double, from whence hung a piece of flesh like a purse, and a bell of flesh in his left hand, like those the Indians use when they dance, white boots of flesh on his leggs, doubled down: In brief, the whole shape was horrid and diabolical, and conceived to proceed from some fright the Mother had taken from the antick dances of the Indians, amongst whom the Devil himself does not fail to appear sometimes.

2. These Narrations Fienus rejecteth, not as false, but as not being done by any natural power, or if they be, that the descriptions are something more lively then the truth. But in the mean time he does freely admit, that by the mere power of Imagination there might be such excrescencies as might represent those things that are there mentioned; though

Wierus de  
Præstig. Dæ-  
mon. lib. 4.  
c. 18.

Fienus de vi-  
ritus Imagi-  
nat. quæst. 15.  
exempl. 8.

Fienus, quæst.  
13. exempl. 9.

De viribus I-  
maginat. quæst.  
22.



those *diabolical* shapes could not have true horns, hoofs, tail, or any other part specifically distinct from the nature of Man. But so farre as he acknowledges is enough for our turn.

3. But *Fortunius Licetus* is more liberal in his grants, allowing not onely that the Births of women may be very exquisitely distorted in some of their parts into the likeness of those of Brutes, but that Chimærical imaginations in Dreams may also effect it, as well as Fancies or external Objects when they are awake. Of the latter sort whereof he produces an Example that will more then match our purpose, of a *Sicilian* matron, who by chance beholding a *Crab* in a Fishermans hand newly caught, and of a more then ordinary largeness, when she was brought to bed, brought forth a *Crab* (as well as a *Child*) perfectly like those that are ordinarily caught in the Sea. This was told him by a person of credit, who both knew the Woman, and saw the *Crab* she brought forth.

Licetus de  
Monstrorum  
causis & dif-  
ferentiis, lib. 2.  
cap. 66.

In his Demons  
Ideæ, parag. 37.  
De Magnética  
vulnerū curat.  
parag. 133.  
In his Vis  
Magnetica.  
In his Tractat.  
Animæ, parag.  
7. and else-  
where.

*Helmont's* Cherry he so often mentions, and how it was green, pale, yellow, and red, at the times of year other Cherries are, is something of this nature; that is to say, comes near to the perfect species of a *Cherry*, as this did of a *Crab*, the plantal life of a *Cherry* being in some measure in the one, as the life of an Animal was perfectly in the other. Which confirms what we said before, that strength of our *Desire* and *Imagination* may snatch into consent the *Spirit of Nature*, and make it act: which once having begun, leaves not off, if *Matter* will but serve for to work upon; and being the same in all places, acts the same upon the same *Matter*, in the same circumstances. For the *Root* and *Soul* of every *Vegetable* is the *Spirit of Nature*; in virtue whereof this *Cherry* flourisht and ripened, according to the seasons of the Country where the party was that bore that live Signature.

These two instances are very shrewd arguments that the *Soul of the World* has to doe with all Efformations of either *Plants* or *Animals*. For neither the Childs Soul nor the Mothers, in any likelihood, could frame that *Crab*, though the Mother might, by that strange power of *Desire* and *Imagination*, excite the *Spirit of the World*, that attempts upon any *Matter* that is fitted for generation, some way or other, to make something of it; and being determined by the fancy of the Woman, might sign the humid materials in her Womb with the image of her Minde.

4. Wherefore if *Ficinus* had considered from what potent causes *Signatures* may arise, he would not have been so scrupulous in believing that degree of exactness that some of them are reported to have: or if he had had the good hap to have met with so notable an example thereof, as *Kircher* professes himself to have met with. For he tells a story of a man that came to him for this very cause, to have his opinion what a certain strange *Signature*, which he had on his Arm from his birth, might portend; concerning which he had consulted both *Astrologers* and *Cabbalists*, who had promised great preferments, the one imputing it to the Influence of the Stars, the other to the favour of the *sealing Order* of Angels. But *Kircher* would not spend his judgement upon a mere verbal description thereof; though he had plainly enough told him, it was the

\* De Arte  
Magnetica,  
lib. 3. part. 7.  
cap. 7.

Pope

*Pope sitting on his Throne, with a Dragon under his feet, and an Angel putting a Crown on his head.*

Wherefore the man desirous to hear a further confirmation of these hopes ( he had conceived from the favourable conjectures of others ) by the suffrage of so learned a man, was willing in private to put off his doublet, and shew his Arm to *Kircher*: who having viewed it with all possible care, does profess that the *Signature* was so perfect, that it seemed rather the work of *Art* than of exorbitating *Nature*; and yet by certain observations he made, that he was well assured it was the work of *Nature*, and not of *Art*, though it was an artificial piece that *Nature* imitated, viz. the picture of Pope *Gregory* the thirteenth, who is sometimes drawn according as this *Signature* did lively represent, namely on a Throne, with a Dragon under his feet, leaning with one hand on his Seat, and bearing the other in that posture in which they give the Benediction, and an Angel removing a Curtain and reaching a Crown towards his head.

5. *Kircher* therefore leaving the superstitions and fooleries of the spurious *Cabbalists* and *Astrologers*, told him the truth, though nothing so pleasant as their lies and flatteries, viz. That this *Signature* was not impressed by any either influence of the Stars, or Seals of Angels, but that it was the effect of the *Imagination* of his Mother that bore him, who in some more then ordinary fit of affection towards this Pope, whose picture she beheld in some Chappel or other place of her devotion, and having some occasion to touch her Arm, printed that image on the Arm of her Child, as it ordinarily happens in such cases. Which doubtless was the true solution of the mystery.

6. The same \* Author writes, how he was invited by a friend to contemplate another strange miracle ( as he thought that did invite him to behold it ) that he might spend his judgement upon it. Which was nothing else but an exposed Infant of some fourteen days old, that was gray-hair'd, both head and eye-brows. Which his friend, an Apothecary, look'd upon as a grand Prodigy, till he was informed of the cause thereof: That the Mother that brought it forth, being married to an old man whose head was all white, the fear of being surprized in the act of Adultery by her snowy-headed husband made her imprint that colour on the Child she bore. Which Story I could not omit to recite, it witnessing to what an exact curiosity the power of *Fancy* will work for the fashioning and modifying the Matter, not missing so much as the very colours of the hair, as I have already noted something to that purpose.

7. To conclude therefore at length, and leave this luxuriant Theme. Whether it be the *Power of Imagination* carrying captive the *Spirit of Nature* into consent, or the *Soul of the Infant*, or both; it is evident that the Effects are notable, and sometimes very accurately answering the *Idea* of the Impregnate, derived upon the moist and ductil matter in the Womb: Which yet not being any thing so yielding as the soft Aire, nor the Soul of the Mother so much one with that of the Infant as the separate Soul is one with it self, nor so peculiarly united to the Body of the Infant as the Soul separate with her own Vehicle, nor having any nearer or more mysterious commerce with the *Spirit of Nature* then she has

\* Athanas.  
*Kircher. de  
arte Magnet.  
lib. 3. part. 7.  
cap. 7.*



has when her *Plastick* part, by the *Imperium* of her *Will* and *Imagination*, is to organize her Vehicle into a certain shape and form, which is a kind of a momentaneous Birth of the distinct Personality, of either a *Soul* *separate*, or any other *Dæmon*; it follows, that we may be very secure, that there is such a power in the *Genii* and *Separate Souls*, that they can with ease and accuracy transfigure themselves into shapes and forms agreeable to their own temper and nature.

8. All which I have meant hitherto in reference to their Visible congresses one with another. But they are sometimes visible to us also, under some Animal shape, which questionless is much more difficult to them than that other Visibility is. But this is also possible, though more unusual by far, as being more unnatural. For it is possible by Art to compress *Aire* so, as to reduce it to visible opacity, and has been done by some, and particularly by a friend of *Des-Cartes*, whom he mentions in his Letters as having made this Experiment; the *Aire* getting this opacity by squeezing the *Globuli* out of it. Which though the *Separate Souls* and *Spirits* may do by that directive faculty, Axiome 31, yet surely it would be very painful. For the first Element lying bare, if the *Aire* be not drawn exceeding close, it will cause an ungratefull heat; and if it be, as unnatural a cold; and so small a moment will make the first Element too much or too little, that it may, haply, be very hard, at least for these inferiour Spirits, to keep steddily in a due mean. And therefore, when they appear, it is not unlikely but that they soak their Vehicles in some vaporous or glutinous moisture or other, that they may become visible to us at a more easy rate.

## CHAP. VIII.

1. That the Better sort of *Genii* converse in Humane shape, the Baser sometimes in Bestial.
2. How they are disposed to turn themselves into several Bestial forms.
3. Of *Pfellus* his *ἀνγὰι πνεύμας*, or Igneous splendours of *Dæmons*, how they are made.
4. That the external Beauty of the *Genii* is according to the degree of the inward Vertue of their Minds.
5. That their *Aëreal* form need not be purely transparent, but more finely opake, and coloured.
6. That there is a distinction of Masculine and Feminine beauty in their personal figurations.

1. **A**FTER this Digression, of shewing the facility of the figuring of the Vehicles of the *Genii* into personal shape, I shall return again where we left; which was concerning the Society of these *Genii* and *Souls* *Separate*, and under what shape they converse one with another; which I have already defined to be *Humane*, especially in the Better sort of Spirits. And as for the *Worst* kind, I should think that they are likewise for the most part in Humane form, though disguised with ugly circumstances; but that they figure themselves also in *Bestial* appearances; it being so easie for them to transform their Vehicle into

into what shape they please, and to imitate the figures as dexterously as some *men* will the voices of brute beasts, whom we may hear sing like a Cuckow, crow like a Cock, bellow like a Cow and Calf, bark like a Dog, grunt and squeak like a Pig, and indeed imitate the cry of almost any Bird or Beast whatsoever. And as easie a matter is it for these lower *Genii* to resemble the shapes of all these Creatures, in which they also appear visibly oftentimes to them that entertain them, and sometimes to them that would willingly shun them.

2. Nor is it improbable, but the variety of their impurities may dispose them to turn themselves into one *brutish* shape rather than another; as envying, or admiring, or in some sort approving and liking the condition and properties of such and such *Beasts*: as *Theocritus* merrily sets out the Venereousness of the Goathead he describes,

Ὡς πάλ᾽ ὅκκ' ἐσπορῇ τὰς μηχανάδας οἷα βαλόντ',  
Τάκκ' ὀφθαλμῶς, ὅπῃ τράγ' αὐτὸς ἔγεντο.

As if he envied the happiness of the he-Goats, and wisht himself in their stead, in their acts of carnal Copulation. So according to the several *Bestial* properties that symbolize with the uncleanness and viciousness of the tempers of these *Demons*, they may have a propension to imitate their shape rather than others, and appear ugly, according to the manner and measure of their internal turpitudes.

3. As it is likely also that those *θεομίαι* or *ἀσχαί πυρώδεις*, those *Ignemons Splendours* *Pfellus* makes mention of, (as the end and scope of the nefarious ceremonies those wicked wretches, he describes, often used) were coloured according to the more or less feculency of the Vehicle of the *Demon* that did appear in this manner, viz. in no personal shape, but by exhibiting a light to the eyes of his abominable Spectatours and Adorers: which, I suppose, he stirred up within the limits of his own Vehicle; the power of his *Will* and *Imagination*, by Axiome 31, commanding the grosser particles of the Aire and terrestrial vapours, together with the *Globuli*, to give back every way, from one point to a certain compass, not great, and therefore the more easy to be done. Whence the first Element lyes bare in some considerable measure, whose activity cannot but lick into it some particles of the Vehicle that borders next thereto, and thereby exhibit, not a pure star-like light (which would be, if the first Element thus unbared, and in the midst of pure Aire, were it self unmixed with other Matter) but by the feculency of those parts that it abrades and converts into fewel, and the foulness of the ambient Vehicle through which it shines, exhibit a show red and fiery like the Horizontal Sun seen through a thick throng of vapours.

In his *πρὸς ἐνεργείας δαιμονίων*.

Which *Fiery splendour* may either onely slide down amongst them, and so pass by with the Motion of the *Demons* Vehicle, which *Pfellus* seems mainly to aime at; or else it may make some stay and discourse with them it approaches, according as I have heard some Narrations. The reason of which *lucid appearances* being so intelligible out of the Principles of *Cartesius* his Philosophy, we need not conceit that they are nothing but the prestigious delusions of *Fancy*, and no real Objects, as

*Pfellus*



*Pfellus* would have them ; it being no more uncompetible to a *Dæmon* to raise such a light in his Vehicle, and a purer then I have described, then to a wicked man to light a candle at a tinderbox.

4. But what we have said concerning the purity and impurity of this light, re-mindes me of what is of more sutable consequence to discourse of here, which is the *Splendour and Beauty of personal shape* in the *Better* sort of the *Genii*. Which assuredly is greater or lesser, according to the degrees of *Vertue and Moral affections* in them. For even in this Body, that is not so yielding to the powers of the Mind, a man may observe, that according as persons are better or worse inclined, the aire of their visage will alter much ; and that vicious courses, defacing the inward pulchritude of the Soul, do even change the outward countenance to an abhorred hue.

Which must therefore necessarily take place, in a far greater measure, in the other state ; where our outward form is wholly framed from the inward *Imperium* of our Mind : which by how much more pure it self is, it will exhibit the more irreprehensible pulchritude in the outward feature and fashion of the Body, both for proportion of parts, the spirit and aire of the Countenance, and the ornament of cloaths and attirings : there being an indissoluble connexion in the Soul of the Sense of these Three things together, *Vertue, Love, and Beauty* ; of all which she her self is the first Root, and especially in the *Separate* state, even of *outward Beauty* it self: whence the converse of the most Vertuous there must needs afford the highest pleasure and satisfaction ; not onely in point of rational communication, but in reference to external and personal complacency also. For if *Vertue and Vice* can be ever seen with outward eyes, it must be in these *Aëreal Vehicles*, which yield so to the Will and Idea of good and pure affections, that the Soul in a manner becomes perfectly transparent through them, discovering her lovely *Beauty* in all the efflorescencies thereof, to the ineffable enravishment of the beholder.

5. Not that I mean, that there is any necessity that their Vehicle should be as a Statue of fluid *Crystal* ; but that those Impresses of *Beauty and Ornament* will be so faithfully and lively represented, according to the dictates of her inward Sense and Imagination, that if we could see the Soul her self, we could know no more by her then she thus exhibits to our eye: which personal figuration in the extimate parts thereof, that represent the Body, Face and Vestments, may be attempered to so fine an opacity, that it may reflect the light in more perfect colours then it is from any earthly body, and yet the whole Vehicle be so devoid of weight, as it will necessarily keep its station in the Aire. Which we cannot wonder at, while we consider the hanging of the *Clouds* there, less *Aëreal* by far then this consistency we speak of: to say nothing of *Aëreal Apparitions* as high as the *Clouds*, and in the same colours and figures as are seen here below, and yet no reflexions of terrestrial Objects, as I have proved in my Third Book against Atheism.

6. The *exact Beauty* of the personal shapes and becoming habits of these Aiery Beings, the briefest and safest account thereof that Philosophy can give, is to refer to the description of such things in Poets : and then,

then, when we have perused what the height and elegance of their Fancy has penn'd down, to write under it, *An obscure Subindication of the transcendent pulchritude of the Aëreal Genii*, whether *Nymphs* or *Heroes*. For though there be neither Lust, nor difference of Sex amongst them (whence the kindest commotions of Mind will never be any thing else but an exercise of *Intellectual love*, whose Object is *Vertue* and *Beauty*;) yet it is not improbable but that there are some general strictures of discrimination of this Beauty into *Masculine* and *Feminine*: partly because the temper of their Vehicles may encline to this kind of pulchritude rather than that; and partly because several of these *Aëreal Spirits* have sustained the difference of Sex in this life, some of them here having been *Males*, others *Females*: and therefore their History being to be continued from their departure hence, they ought to retain some character, especially so general a one, of what they were here. And it is very harsh to conceit that *Aeneas* should meet with *Dido* in the other World in any other form than that of a *Woman*: whence a necessity of some slighter distinction of habits, and manner of wearing their hair, will follow. Which dress, as that of the *Masculine* mode, is easily fitted to them by the power of their *Will* and *Imagination*: as appears from that Story out of *Peramatus*, of the *Indian Monster* that was born with fleshy boots, girdle, purse, and other things that are no parts of a Man, but his cloathing or utensils; and this merely by the Fancy of his Mother, disturb'd and frighted, either in sleep or awake, with some such ugly appearance as that *Monster* resembled.

## CHAP. IX.

1. A general account of the mutual entertains of the Genii in the other World.
2. Of their Philosophical and Political Conferences.
3. Of their Religious Exercises.
4. Of the innocent Pastimes and Recreations of the Better sort of them.
5. A confirmation thereof from the Conventicles of Witches.
6. Whether the purer Dæmons have their times of repast or no.
7. Whence the Bad Genii have their food.
8. Of the food and feastings of the Better sort of Genii.

1. **W**E have now accurately enough defined in what form or garb the Aëreal Genii converse with one another. It remains we consider how they mutually entertain one another in passing away the time. Which is obvious enough to conceive, to those that are not led aside into that blind Labyrinth which the generality of men are kept in, of suspecting that no representation of the state of these Beings is true, that is, not so confounded and unintelligible that a man cannot think it sense, unless he wink with the inward eyes of his Minde, and command silence to all his Rational Faculties. But if he will but bethink himself, that the immediate Instrument of the Soul in this life is the *Spirits*, which are very congenerous to the body of *Angels*; and that all our *Passions* and *Conceptions*



are either suggested from them, or impress'd upon them ; he cannot much doubt but that all his Faculties of *Reason*, *Imagination* and *Affection*, for the general, will be in him in the other state as they were here in this : namely, that he will be capable of *Love*, of *Joy*, of *Grief*, of *Anger* ; that he will be able to *imagine*, to *discourse*, to *remember*, and the rest of such operations as were not proper to the Fabrick of this Earthly Body, which is the Officine of Death and Generation.

2. Hence it will follow, that the Souls of men deceased, and the rest of the *Aëreal Demons*, may administer much content to one another in mutual Conferences concerning the nature of things, whether *Moral*, *Natural*, or *Metaphysical*. For to think that the quitting the earthly Body entitles us to an *Omniscience*, is a Fable never enough to be laugh'd at. And *Socrates*, somewhere in *Plato*, presages, that he shall continue his old Trade when he comes into the other World ; convincing and confounding the idle and vain-glorious *Sophists* wherever he went. And by the same reason *Platonists*, *Aristoteleans*, *Stoicks*, *Epicureans*, and whatever other sects and humors are on the Earth, may in likelihood be met with there, so far as that estate will permit ; though they cannot doubt of all things we doubt of here. For these *Aëreal Spirits* know that themselves *are*, and that the Souls of men *subsist* and *act* after death, unless such as are too deeply tinctured with *Avenroism*. But they may doubt whether they will hold out for ever, or whether they will perish at the conflagration of the World, as the *Stoicks* would have them.

It may be also a great controversie amongst them, whether *Pythagoras's* or *Ptolemie's* Hypothesis be true concerning the Motion of the Earth ; and whether the Stars be so big as some define them. For these lower *Demons* have no better means then we to assure themselves of the truth or falshood of these Opinions. Besides the discourse of News, of the affairs as well of the *Earth as Aire*. For the *Aëreal Inhabitants* cannot be less active then the *Terrestrial*, nor less busie, either in the performance of some solemn exercises, or in carrying on designs party against party ; and that either more Private or more Publick ; the Events of which will fill the *Aëreal Regions* with a quick spreading fame of their Actions. To say nothing of prudential conjectures concerning future successes aforehand, and innumerable other entertains of Conference, which would be too long to reckon up, but bear a very near analogy to such as men pass away their time in here.

3. But of all *Pleasures*, there are none that are comparable to those that proceed from their joynt exercise of *Religion* and *Devotion*. For their Bodies surpassing ours so much in tenuity and purity, they must needs be a fitter soil for the *Divinest* thoughts to spring up in, and the most delicate and most enravishing affections towards their Maker. Which being heightned by *sacred Hymns* and *Songs*, sung with voices perfectly imitating the sweet passionate relishes of the sense of their devout Minds, must even melt their Souls into Divine Love, and make them swim with joy in God. But these kinds of Exercises being so highly rapturous and Ecstactical, transporting them beyond the ordinary limits of their Nature, cannot in Reason be thought to be exceeding frequent ; but as a solemn  
Repast,

Repast, after which they shall enjoy themselves better for a good space of time after.

4. Wherefore there be other Entertainments, which though they be of an inferiour nature to these, yet they far exceed the greatest pleasure and contentments of this present state. For the *Animal life* being as essential to the Soul as union with a Body, which she is never free from; it will follow that there be some fitting gratifications of it in the other World. And none greater can be imagined then *Sociableness* and *Personal complacency*, not onely in rational discourses, which is so agreeable to the Philosophical Ingeny, but innocent Pastimes, in which the *Musical* and *Amorous* propension may be also recreated. For these Three dispositions are the flowr of all the rest, as *Plotinus* has somewhere noted: And his reception into the other World is set out by *Apollo's* Oacle from some such like circumstances as these.

— — — Μεθ' ὁμήγευεν ἔρχεαι ἡδὴ  
 Δαίμονίλω ἐρατοῖσιν ἀναπνέουσ' αἵταις·  
 Ἐνδ' ἐνὶ μὲν φιλόπῃ, ἐνὶ δὲ ἡμέρῃ, ἄβροτος ἰδέσθαι  
 Εὐφροσύνης πλείων καὶ θαρῆς πληρέμευ· αἶψ' ἔν  
 Ἀμβροσίων ὀχετῶν δεόθεν· ὅθεν ἔστιν ἐρώτων  
 Πνίγματα καὶ γλυκερὰ ποιεῖ καὶ νύεμευ· αἰδήρ.

Of the meaning of which Verses that the Reader may not quite be deprived, I shall render their sense in this careless paraphrase:

Now the blest meetings thou arriv'st unto  
 Of th' Aairy Genii, where soft winds do blow,  
 Where Friendship, Love, and gentle sweet Desire  
 Fill their thrice-welcom guests with joys entire,  
 Ever supply'd from that immortal spring  
 Whose streams pure Nectar from great Fove do bring:  
 Whence kind Converse and amorous Eloquence  
 Warm their chaste minds into the highest sense  
 Of Heav'nly Love, whose mysteries they declare  
 'Midst the fresh breathings of the peaceful Aire.

And he holds on, naming the happy company the Soul of *Plotinus* was to associate with, viz. *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, and the purer Spirits of the Golden Age, and all such as made up the Chorus of immortal Love and Friendship.

These sing, and play, and dance together, reaping the lawful pleasures of the very *Animal life*, in a far higher degree then we are capable of in this World. For every thing here does as it were tast of the cask, and has some coarseness and foulness with it. The sweet motions of the Spirits in the passion of Love can very hardly be commanded off from too near bordering upon the shameful sense of Lust; the Fabrick of the *Terrestrial* Body almost necessitating them to that deviation. The tenderer Ear cannot but feel the rude thumpings of the wood, and gratings of the rosin, the hoarseness, or some harshness and untunableness or other, in the best consorts of Musical Instruments and Voices. The judicious Eye cannot but espy some considerable defect in either the proportion, colour, or the aire of the face, in the most fam'd and most admired beauties of



either Sex: to say nothing of the inconcinnity of their deportment and habits. But in that other state, where the Fancy consults with that First Exemplar of Beauty, *Intellectual Love* and *Vertue*, and the Body is wholly obedient to the imagination of the Mind, and will to every Punctilio yield to the impresses of that inward Pattern; nothing there can be found amiss, every touch and stroke of motion and Beauty being conveyed from so judicious a power through so delicate and depurate a Medium. Wherefore they cannot but enravish one anothers Souls, while they are mutual Spectators of the perfect pulchritude of one anothers persons & comely carriage, of their graceful dancing, their melodious singing and playing, with accents so sweet and soft, as if we should imagine the Aire here of it self to compose Lessons, and send forth Musical sounds without the help of any terrestrial Instrument. These, and such like Pastimes as these, are part of the Happiness of the Best sort of the Aëreal *Genii*.

5. Which the more certain knowledge of what is done amongst the inferiour *Demons* will further assure us of. For it is very probable that their Conventicles, into which Witches and Wizzards are admitted, are but a depraved adumbration of the friendly meetings of the superiour *Genii*. And what *Musick*, *Dancing* and *Feasting* there is in these, the free confession of those Wretches, or fortuitous detection of others, has made manifest to the World, *viz.* How *Humane* and *Angelical Beauty* is transformed there into *Bestial Deformity*, the chief in the company ordinarily appearing in the Figures of *Satyres*, *Apes*, *Goats*, or such like ugly Animals; how the comely deportments of Body, into ridiculous gesticulations, perverse postures and antic dances; and how innocuous love and pure friendship degenerates into the most brutish lust and abominable obscenity that can be imagined: of which I will adde nothing more, having spoke enough of this matter in the Appendix to my *Antidote*.

6. What is most material for the present, is to consider, whether as the *Musick* and *Dancing* of these lower and more deeply-lapsed *Demons* are a distorted imitation of what the higher and more pure *Demons* doe in their Regions; so their *Feasting* may not be a perverted resemblance of the others Banquetings also: that is to say, it is worth our enquiring into, whether they do not *eat* and *drink* as well as these. For the rich amongst us must have their repast as well as the poor, and Princes feed as well as Prisoners, though there be a great difference in their diet. And I must confess, there is no small difficulty in both, whence the good or bad *Genii* may have their food; though it be easy enough to conceive that they may feed and refresh their Vehicles.

For supposing they do vitally actuate some particular portion of the Aire that they drive along with them, which is of a certain extent, it is most natural to conceive, that partly by local motion, and partly by the activity of their thoughts, they set some particles of their Vehicles into a more then usual agitation, which being thus moved, scatter and perspire; and that so the Vehicle lessens in some measure, and therefore admits of a recruit: which must be either by fornial repast, or by drawing in the crude Aire onely, which haply may be enough; but it being so like it self alwaies, the pleasure will be more flat. Wherefore it is not improbable  
but

but that both may have their times of Refection, for pleasure at least, if not necessity; which will be the greater advantage for the *Good*, & the more exquisite misery for the *Bad*, they being punishable in this regard also.

7. But, as I said, the greatest difficulty is to give a rational account whence the *Bad Genii* have their food, in their execrable Feasts, so formally made up into dishes. That the materials of it is a *vaporous Aire*, appears as well from the faintness and emptiness of them that have been entertained at those Feasts, as from their forbidding the use of *Salt* at them, it having a virtue of dissolving of all aqueous substances, as well as hindering their congelation. But how the *Aire* is moulded up into that form and consistency, it is very hard to conceive: whether it be done by the mere power of Imagination upon their own Vehicles, first dabled in some humidities that are the fittest for their design, which they change into these forms of Viands, and then withdraw, when they have given them such a figure, colour, and consistency, with some small touch of such a sapour or tincture: or whether it be the privilege of these *Aëreal Creatures*, by a sharp Desire and keen Imagination, to pierce the *Spirit of Nature*, so as to awaken her activity, and engage her to the compleating in a moment, as it were, the full design of their own wishes, but in such matter as the Element they are in is capable of, which is this crude and vaporous Aire; whence their food must be very dilute and flashie, and rather a mockery than any solid satisfaction and pleasure.

8. But those Superiour *Demons*, which inhabit that part of the Aire that no storm nor tempest can reach, need be put to no such shifts, though they may be as able in them as the other. For in the tranquillity of those upper Regions, that *Promus-Conducus* of the *Universe*, the *Spirit of Nature*, may silently send forth whole Gardens and Orchards of most delectable fruits and flowers, of an equilibrious ponderosity to the parts of the *Aire* they grow in, to whose shape and colours the transparency of these Plants may adde a particular lustre, as we see it is in precious Stones. And the *Chymists* are never quiet till the heat of their Fancy have calcined and vitrified the Earth into a crystalline pellucidity, conceiting that it will be then a very fine thing indeed, and all that then grows out of it: which desirable Spectacle they may haply enjoy in a more perfect manner, whenever they are admitted into those *higher Regions* of the Aire.

For the very Soile then under them shall be transparent, in which they may trace the very Roots of the Trees of this *Superiour Paradise* with their eyes, and if it may not offend them, see this opake Earth through it, bounding their sight with such a white faint splendour as is discovered in the Moon, with that difference of brightness that will arise from the distinction of Land and Water; and if they will recreate their palats, may tast of such Fruits, as whose natural juice will vie with their noblest Extractions and Quintessences. For such certainly will they there find the blood of the Grape, the rubie-coloured Cherries, and Nectarines.

And if, for the compleating of the pleasantness of these habitations, that they may look less like a silent and dead solitude, they meet with Birds and Beasts of curious shapes and colours, the single accents of whose



voices are very grateful to the Ear, and the varying of their notes perfect Musical harmony; they would do very kindly to bring us word back of the certainty of these things, and make this more than a *Philosophical Conjecture*.

But that there may be *Food and Feasting* in those higher *Aëreal Regions*, is less doubted by the *Platonists*; which makes *Maximus Tyrius* call the Soul, when she has left the Body, *πνεῦμα αἰθέριον* and the above-cited Oracle of *Apollo* describes the Felicity of that Chorus of immortal Lovers he mentions there, from feasting together with the blessed *Genii*,

———“Ὅσοις νέαρ ἐν θαλίῃσιν  
Ἄϊέν εὐφροσύνησιν ἰαίνεται———

So that the *Nectar* and *Ambrosia* of the Poets may not be a mere fable. For the *Spirit of Nature*, which is the immediate Instrument of God, may enrich the fruits of these *Aëreal Paradises* with such liquors, as being received into the bodies of these purer *Dæmons*, and diffusing it self through their Vehicles, may cause such grateful motions analogical to our *tast*, and excite such a more than ordinary quickness in their minds, and benign cheerfulness, that it may far transcend the most delicate Refection that the greatest Epicures could ever invent upon Earth; and that without all satiety and burdensomeness, it filling them with nothing but Divine Love, Joy, and Devotion.

## C H A P. X.

1. *How hard it is to define any thing concerning the Aëreal or Æthereal Elysiums.* 2. *That there is Political Order and Laws amongst these Aiery Dæmons.* 3. *That this Chain of Government reaches down from the highest Æthereal Powers through the Aëreal to the very Inhabitants of the Earth.* 4. *The great security we live in thereby.* 5. *How easily detectible and punishable wicked Spirits are by those of their own Tribe.* 6. *Other reasons of the security we find our selves in from the gross infestations of evil Spirits.* 7. *What kind of punishments the Aëreal Officers inflict upon their Malefactors.*

1. **I** Might enlarge my self much on this Subject, by representing the many *Concamerations* of the *Aëreal* and *Æthereal Elysiums*, depicting them out in all the variety of their Ornaments: but there is no prudence of being lavish of ones pen in a matter so lubricous and Conjectural. Of the bare existence whereof we have no other ground, then that otherwise the greatest part of the Universe by infinite measure, and the most noble, would lye as it were uncultivate, like a desert of Sand, wherein a man can spie neither Plant nor living Creature. Which though it may seem as strange as if Nature should have restrained all the Varieties she would put forth to one contemptible Mole-hil, and have made all the rest of the Earth one Homogeneous surface of dry clay

clay or stone, on which not one sprig of Grass, much less any Flower or Tree, should grow, nor Bird nor Beast be found once to set their foot thereon: yet the *Spirits* of us *Mortals* being too pusillanimous to be able to grapple with such vast Objects, we must resolve to rest either ignorant, or Sceptical, in this matter.

2. And therefore let us consider what will more easily fall under our comprehension, and that is the *Polity* of the *Aiery Demons*. Concerning which, that in general there is such a thing among them, is the most assuredly true in it self, and of the most use to us to be perswaded of. To know their particular *Orders* and *Customs* is a more needless Curiosity. But that they do lye under the restraint of *Government*, is not onely the opinion of the *Pythagoreans* (who have even to the nicety of *Grammatical Criticisme* assigned distinct names to the Law that belongs to these Three distinct ranks of Beings, ἀνδραποιοί, δαίμονες and θεοί, calling the Law that belongs to the first Νόμος, the second Δίκη, and the third Θέμις) but it is also the easy and obvious suggestion of ordinary Reason, that it must needs be so, and especially amongst the *Aëreal Genii* in these lower Regions, they being a mixt rabble of good and bad, wise and foolish, in such a sense as we may say the Inhabitants of the Earth are so, and therefore they must naturally fall under a Government, and submit to Lawes, as well and for the same reasons as Men do. For otherwise they cannot tolerably subsist, nor enjoy what rights may some way or other appertain to them.

For the Souls of men deceased and the *Demons* being endued with corporeal Sense, by Axiome 30, and therefore capable of *Pleasure* and *Pain*, and consequently of both *Injury* and *Punishment*, it is manifest, that having the use of Reason, they cannot fail to mould themselves into some *Political* form or other; and so to be divided into Nations and Provinces, and to have their Officers of State, from the King on his Throne to the very lowest and most abhorred Executioners of Justice.

3. Which invisible Government is not circumscribed within the compass of the *Aiery* Regions, but takes hold also on the Inhabitants of the *Earth*, as the Government of Men does on several sorts of brute Beasts, and the *Aethereal* Powers also have a Right and Exercise of Rule over the *Aëreal*. Whence nothing can be committed in the World against the more indispensable Laws thereof, but a most severe and inevitable punishment will follow: every Nation, City, Family and Person, being in some manner the *Peculium*, and therefore in the tutelage, of some invisible Power or other, as I have above intimated.

Chap 3. Sect. 7.

4. And such Transgressions as are against those Laws without whose observance the Creation could not subsist, we may be assured are punished with Torture intolerable, and infinitely above any Pleasure imaginable the evil *Genii* can take in doing of those of their own Order, or us *Mortals*, any mischief. Whence it is manifest that we are as secure from their gross outrages (such as the firing of our houses, the stealing away our Jewels or more necessary Utensils, murdering our selves or children, destroying our cattel, corn, and other things of the like sort,) as if they were not *in rerum natura*. Unless they have some special permission



to act, or we our selves enable them by our rash and indiscreet tampering with them, or suffer from the malice of some person that is in league with them. For their greatest liberty of doing mischief is upon that account; which yet is very much limited, in that all these Actions must pass the consent of a visible person, not hard to be discovered in these unlawful practices, and easy to be punished by the Law of Men.

5. And the *Aëreal Genii* can with as much ease inflict punishment on one another, as we Mortals can apprehend, imprison, and punish such as transgress against our Laws. For though these *Dæmons* be invisible to us, yet they are not so to their own Tribe: nor can the activity and subtilty of the Bad over-master the Good Commonwealths-men there, that uphold the Laws better then they are amongst us. Nor may the various Transfiguration of their shapes conceal their persons, no more then the disguises that are used by fraudulent men. For they are as able to discern what is fictitious from what is true and natural amongst themselves, as we are amongst our selves. And every *Aëreal Spirit* being part of some *Political Subdivision*, upon any outrage committed, it will be an easy matter to hunt out the Malefactor; no *Dæmon* being able so to transfigure himself, but upon command he will be forced to appear in his natural and usual form, not daring to deny upon examination to what particular *Subdivision* he belongs. Whence the easy discovery of their miscarriages, and certainty of insupportable torment, will secure the World from all the disorder that some scrupulous wits suspect would arise from this kinde of Creatures, if they were in Being.

6. To which we may adde also, That what we have is useles to them, and that it is very hard to conceive that there are many Rational Beings so degenerate as to take pleasure in ill, when it is no good to themselves. That *Socrates* his Aphorism, Πᾶς ὁ μοχθρὸς ἀγαθεῖ, may be in no small measure true in the other World, as well as in this. That all that these evil Spirits desire, may be onely our lapse into as great a degree of Apostasy from God as themselves, and to be full partakers with them of their false Liberty; as debauched persons in this life love to make Profelytes, and to have respect from their Nurslings in wickedness. And several other Considerations there are that serve for the taking away this Panick fear of the incursions and molestations of these *Aëreal Inhabitants*, and might further silence the suspicious Atheist; which I willingly omit, having said more then enough of this Subject already.

7. If any be so curious, as to demand what kind of *Punishment* this *People of the Aire* inflict upon their Malefactors, I had rather refer them to the Fancies of *Cornelius Agrippa*, then be laugh'd at my self for venturing to descend to such particularities. Amongst other things he names their Incarceration, or confinement to most vile and squalid Habitations. His own words are very significant: *Accedunt etiam vilissimorum ac terribiliorum locorum habitacula, ubi Aetnei ignes, aquarum ingluviæ, fulgurum & tonitruorum concussus, terrarum voragines, ubi Regio lucis inops, nec radiorum Solis capax, ignaræque splendoris siderum, perpetuis tenebris & noctis specie caligat.* Whence he would make us believe, that

Chap. 3. sect.  
7, 8.

De occulta  
Philosophia,  
lib. 3. cap. 41.

the

the subterraneous caverns of the Earth are made use of for Dungeons for the wicked *Demons* to be punished in: as if the several *Volcano's*, such as *Aetna*, *Vesuvius*, *Hecla*, and many others, especially in *America*, were so many Prisons or houses of Correction for the unruly *Genii*.

That there is a *tedious restraint* upon them upon villanies committed, and that intolerable, is without all question; they being endued with *corporeal Sense*, and that more quick and passive then ours, and therefore more subject to the highest degrees of torment. So that not onely by incarcerating them, and keeping them in by a watch, in the caverns of burning Mountains, where the heat of those infernal Chambers and the steam of Brimstone cannot but excruciate them exceedingly; but also by commanding them into sundry other Hollows of the ground, noisome by several fumes and vapours, they may torture them in several fashions and degrees, fully proportionable to the greatest crime that is in their power to commit, and farre above what the cruellest Tyranny has inflicted here, either upon the guilty or innocent. But how these *Confinements* and *Torments* are inflicted on them, and by what *Degrees* and *Relaxations*, is a thing neither easy to determine, nor needful to understand.

Wherefore we will surcease from pursuing any further so unprofitable a Subject, and come to the Third general Head we mentioned, which is, *What the Moral condition of the Soul is when she has left this Body.*

## CHAP. XI.

1. *Three things to be considered before we come to the Moral condition of the Soul after Death: namely, her Memory of transactions in this Life.*
2. *The peculiar feature and individual Character of her Aëreal Vehicle.*
3. *The Retainment of the same Name.*
4. *How her ill deportment here lays the train of her Misery hereafter.*
5. *The unspeakable torments of Conscience worse then Death, and not to be avoided by dying.*
6. *Of the hideous tortures of external sense on them whose scaredness of Conscience may seem to make them incapable of her Lashes.*
7. *Of the state of the Souls of the more innocent and conscientious Pagans.*
8. *Of the natural accruments of After-happiness to the morally good in this life.*
9. *How the Soul enjoys her actings or sufferings in this Life for an indispensable Cause, when she has passed to the other.*
10. *That the reason is proportionably the same in things of less consequence.*
11. *What mischief men may create to themselves in the other world by their zealous mistakes in this.*
12. *That though there were no Memory after Death, yet the manner of our Life here may sow the seeds of the Soul's future happiness or misery.*

1. **F**OR the better solution of this Question, there is another first in nature to be decided; namely, *Whether the Soul remembers anything of this Life after Death.* For *Aristotle* and *Cardan* seem to deny it; but I do not remember any reasons in either that will make good



Chap. 11. sect.  
4, 5, 6.

\* In Dialog. 60.

good their Opinion. But that the contrary is true, appears from what we have already proved in my second Book, viz. *That the immediate seat of Memory is the Soul her self, and that all Representations with their circumstances are reserved in her, not in the Spirits,* (a thing which \* *Vaninus* himself cannot deny) *nor in any part of the Body.* And that the *Spirits* are onely a necessary Instrument whereby the Soul works; which while they are too cool and gross and waterish, Oblivion creeps upon her in that measure that the *Spirits* are thus distempered; but the disease being chased away, and the temper of the *Spirits* rectified, the Soul forthwith recovers the memory of what things she could not well command before, as being now in a better state of Activity. Whence, by the 33 Axiome, it will follow, that her *Memory* will be rather more perfect after Death, and *Conscience* more nimble to excuse or accuse her according to her Deeds here.

Chap. 9, 10.

2. It is not altogether beside the purpose to take notice also, That the natural and usual Figure of the Soul's *Aëreal Vehicle* bears a resemblance with the feature of the party in this life; it being most obvious for the *Plastick part* (at the command of the *Will* to put forth into personal shape) to fall as near to that in this life as the new state will permit. With which act the *Spirit of Nature* haply does concur, as in the figuration of the *Fœtus*; but with such limits as becomes the *Aëreal Congruity* of life, of which we have spoke already: as also how the proper Idea or Figure of every Soul (though it may deflect something by the power of the Parent's Imagination in the act of Conception, or Gestation, yet) may return more near to its peculiar semblance afterwards, and so be an unconcealable Note of *Individuality*.

3. We will adde to all this, the Retainment of the same Name which the deceased had here, unless there be some special reason to change it: so that their persons will be as punctually distinguished and circumscribed as any of ours in this life. All which things, as they are most probable in themselves that they will thus naturally fall out, so they are very convenient for administration of Justice and keeping of Order in the other State.

4. These things therefore premised, it will not be hard to conceive how the condition of the Soul after this life depends on her *Moral* deportment here. For *Memory* ceasing not, *Conscience* may very likely awake more furiously then ever; the Mind becoming a more clear Judge of evil Actions past then she could be in the *Flesh*, being now stript of all those circumstances and concurrences of things that kept her off from the opportunity of calling her self to account, or of perceiving the ugliness of her own ways. Besides, there being that communication betwixt the *Earth* and the *Aire*, that at least the fame of things will arrive to their cognoscence that have left this life; the after ill success of their wicked enterprises and unreasonable transactions may arm their tormenting Conscience with new whips and stings, when they shall either hear, or see with their eyes, what they have unjustly built up, to run with shame to ruine, and behold all their designs come to nought, and their fame blasted upon Earth.

5. This is the state of such Souls as are capable of a sense of dislike  
of

of their past-actions : and a man would think they need no other punishment then this, if he consider the mighty power of the Mind over her own Vehicle, and how vulnerable it is from her self. These *Passions* therefore of the Soul that follow an ill Conscience, must needs bring her Aiery body into intolerable distempers, worse then Death it self. Nor yet can she die if she would, neither by fire, nor sword, nor any means imaginable; no nor if she should fling her self into the flames of smoaking *Aetna*. For suppose she could keep her self so long there, as to indure that hideous pain of destroying the *vital Congruity* of her Vehicle by that sulphureous fire; she would be no sooner released, but she would catch life again in the Aire, and all the former troubles and vexations would return, besides the overplus of these pangs of Death. For *Memory* would return, and an ill Conscience would return, and all those busie Furies, those disordered Passions which follow it. And thus it would be, though the Soul should kill her self a thousand and a thousand times; she could but pain and punish her self, not destroy her self.

6. But if we could suppose some mens Consciences *seared* in the next state as well as this, ( for certainly there are that make it their business to obliterate all sense of difference of Good and Evil out of their minds; and hold it to be an high strain of wit ( though it be nothing else but a piece of bestial stupidity ) to think there is no such thing as *Vice* and *Vertue*, and that it is a principall part of perfection, to be so degenerate as to act according to this Principle without any remorse at all; ) these men may seem to have an excellent priviledge in the other world; they being thus armour-proof against all the fiery darts of that domestick Devil: As if the greatest security in the other life were, to have been compleatly wicked in this.

But it is not out of the reach of mere Reason and Philosophy to discover, that such bold and impudent wretches as have lost all *inward* sense of Good and Evil, may there against their wills feel a lash in the *outward*. For the Divine *Nemesis* is excluded out of no part of the Universe; and *Goodness* and *Justice*, which they condemn here, will be acquainted with them in that other state, whether they will or no. I speak of such course Spirits that can swallow down Murder, Perjury, Extortion, Adultery, Buggery, and the like gross crimes, without the least disgust, and think they have a right to satisfy their own Lust, though it be by never so great injury against their Neighbour. If these men should carry it with impunity, there were really no Providence, and themselves were the truest Prophets and faithfullest Instructors of mankind, divulging the choicest *Arcanum* they have to impart to them, namely, *That there is no God*.

But the case stands quite otherwise. For whether it be by the impurity of them they injure in this life, who may meet with them afterward, as \* *Cardan* by way of Objection suggests in his Treatise of this Subject; or whether by a general desertion by all of the other world that are able to protect, ( such Monsters as I describe being haply far less in proportion to the number of the other state, then these here are to this; ) they will be necessarily exposed to those grim and remorseless

*Officers*

\* De Immortalitate Anim.  
Object. 31.



*Officers of Justice*, who are as devoid of all sense of what is Good as those that they shall punish. So that their penalty shall be inflicted from such as are of the same Principles with themselves, who watch for such booties as these, and when they can catch them, dress them and adorn them according to the multifarious petulancy of their own unaccountable humours; and taking a special pride and pleasure in the making and seeing Creatures miserable, fall upon their prey with all eagerness and alacrity, as the hungry Lions on a condemned malefactor, but with more ferocity and insultation by far. For having more wit, and, if it be possible, less goodness than the Soul they thus assault, they satiate their lascivient cruelty with all manner of abuses and torments they can imagine, giving her onely so much respite as will serve to receive their new inventions with a fresher smart and more distinct pain. Neither can any Reason or Rhetorick prevail with them, no Expostulation, Petition or Submission. For to what purpose can it be, to expostulate about injury and violence with them whose deepest reach of wit is to understand this one main Principle, *That every ones Lust, when he can act with impunity, is the most sacred and sovereign Law?* Or what can either Petitions or Submissions doe with those who hold it the *most contemptible piece of fondness and silliness that is, to be intreated to recede from their own Interest?* And they acknowledging no such thing as *Vertue* and *Vice*, make it their onely interest to *please* themselves in what is agreeable to their own desires: and their main *pleasure* is, to excruciate and torture, in the most exquisite ways they can, as many as Opportunity delivers up to their power.

And thus we see how, in the other life, the proud conceited *Atheist* may at last feel the sad inconvenience of his own Practices and Principles. For even those that pleased themselves in helping him forward, while he was in this life, to that high pitch of wickedness, may haply take as much pleasure to see him punish'd by those *grim Executioners* in the other. Like that sportful cruelty (which some would appropriate to *Nero's* person) of causing the *Vestal* virgins to be ravish'd, and then putting them to death for being so.

7. But this Subject would be too tedious and too Tragical to insist on any longer. Let us cast our eyes therefore upon a more tolerable Object; and that is The state of the Soul that has, according to the best opportunity she had of knowledge, liv'd vertuously and conscientiously, in what part or Age of the world soever. For though this *Moral Innocency* amongst the *Pagans* will not amount to what our Religion calls *Salvation*; yet it cannot but be advantageous to them in the other state, according to the several degrees thereof; they being more or less *Happy* or *Miserable*, as they have been more or less *Vertuous* in this life. For we cannot imagine why God should be more harsh to them in the other world than in this, nothing having happened to them to alienate his affection but Death; which was not in their power to avoid, and looks more like a punishment than a fault: though it be neither to those that are well-meaning and conscientious, and not professed contemners of the wholesome suggestions of the Light of Nature, but are lovers of Humanity and Vertue. For to these it is onely an entrance into another life,

— *Ad amœna vireta*

*Fortunatorum nemorum, sedesque beatas.*

Which Truth I could not conceal, it being a great prejudice to *Divine Providence* to think otherwise. For to those that are free, her wayes will seem as unintelligible in overloading the simple with punishment, as in not rewarding the more perfectly righteous and illuminate. For from a fault in either they will be tempted to a misbelief of the whole, and hold no Providence at all.

8. Let there therefore be peculiar Priviledges of *Morality*, every where; to those that pass into the other State. For unless God make a stop on purpose, it will naturally follow, That *Memory after Death* suggesting nothing but what the *Conscience* allows of, much *Tranquillity of Minde* must result from thence, and a certain *Health and Beauty* of the *Aëreal Vehicle*; also better Company and Converse, and more pleasant Tracts and Régions to inhabit. For what *Plotinus* speaks of the extreme degrees, is also true of the *intermediate*, else Divine Justice would be very maimed. For a man, saith he, having once appropriated to himself a pravity of temper, and united with it, is known well what he is; and according to his nature is thrust forward to what he propends to, both here, and departed hence, and so shall be pulled by the drawings of Nature into a sutable place. But the Good man his Receptions and Communications shall be of another sort, by the drawing as it were of certain hidden strings transposed and pulled by Natures own fingers. So admirable is the power and order of the Universe, all things being carried on in a silent way of Justice, which none can avoid, and which the Wicked man has no perception nor understanding of, but is drawn, knowing nothing whither in the Universe he ought to be carried. But the Good man both knows and goes whither he ought, and discerns before he departs hence where he must inhabit, and is full of hopes that it shall be with the Gods. This large Paragraph of *Plotinus* is not without some small Truth in it, if rightly limited and understood; but seems not to reach at all the Circumstances and accruments of *Happiness* to the Soul in the other State, which will naturally follow her from her transactions in this life.

9. For certainly, according to the several degrees of *Benignity of Spirit*, and the desire of doing good to mankind in this life, and the more ample opportunities of doing it, the Felicity of the other World is redoubled upon them; there being so certain communication and intercourse betwixt both. And therefore they that act or suffer deeply in such Causes as God will maintain in the World, and are just and holy at the bottome, (and there are some Principles that are indispensably such; which Providence has countenanced both by Miracles, the suffrages of the Wisest men in all Ages, and the common voice of Nature;) those that have been the most Heroical Abettors and Promoters of these things in this life, will naturally receive the greater contentment of Minde after it, being conscious to themselves how seriously they have assisted what God will never desert, and that Truth is mighty, and must at last prevail; which they are better assured of out of the Body, then when they were in it.

*Ennead. 4. lib.  
4. cap. 45.*



10. Nor is this kinde of access of Happines to be confined onely to our furtherance of what is of the highest and most indispensable consideration here, but in proportion touches all transactions that proceed from a vertuous and good Principle, whereof there are several degrees: amongst which those may not be esteemed the meanest that refer to a *National* good. And therefore those that, out of a natural generosity of Spirit and successful fortitude in Warre, have delivered their Country from bondage, or have been so wise and understanding in Politicks, as to have contrived wholesome Laws for the greater happiness and comfort of the People; while such a Nation prospers and is in being, it cannot but be an accrument of Happiness to these so considerable Benefactors, unless we should imagine them less generous and good in the other World, where they have the advantage of being Better. And what I have said in this more notable instance, is in a degree true in things of smaller concernment, which would be infinite to rehearse. But whole Nations, with their Laws and Orders of Men, and Families may fail, and therefore these accessions be cut off: but he that laies out his pains in this life for the carrying on such designs as will take place so long as the World endures, and must have a compleat Triumph at last; such a one laies a train for an Everlasting advantage in the other World, which, in despite of all the tumblings and turnings of unsetled fortune, will be sure to take effect.

11. But this matter requires Judgement as well as Heat and Forwardness. For pragmatical Ignorance, though accompanied with some measure of Sincerity and well-meaning, may set a-foot such things in the World, or set upon record such either false, or impertinent and unseasonable, Principles, as being made ill use of, may very much prejudice the Cause one desires to promote; which will be a sad spectacle for them in the other State. For though their simplicity may be pardonable, yet they will not fail to finde the ill effect of their mistake upon themselves. As he that kills a friend in stead of an enemy, though he may satisfy his Conscience that rightly pleads his innocency; yet he cannot avoid the sense of shame and sorrow that naturally follows so mischievous an error.

12. Such accruencies as these there may be to our Enjoyments in the other World from the durable traces of our transactions in this, if we have any *Memory* of things after Death, as I have already demonstrated that we have. But if we had not, but *Aristotle's* and *Cardan's* Opinion were true, yet *Vertue* and *Piety* will not prove *onely* useful for this present state. Because according to our living here, we shall hereafter, by a hidden concatenation of Causes, be drawn to a condition answerable to the purity or impurity of our Souls in this life: that silent *Nemesis* that passes through the whole contexture of the Universe ever fatally contriving us into such a state as we our selves have fitted our selves for by our accustomary actions. Of so great consequence is it, while we have opportunity, to aspire to the Best things.

## CHAP. XII.

1. *What The Spirit of Nature is.* 2. *Experiments that argue its real Existence; such as that of two Strings tuned Unisons.* 3. *Sympathetick Cures and Tortures.* 4. *The Sympathy betwixt the Earthly and Astral Body.* 5. *Monstrous Births.* 6. *The Attraction of the Loadstone and Roundness of the Sun and Stars.*

1. **W**E had now quite finished our Discourse, did I not think it convenient to answer a double Expectation of the Reader. The one is touching *The Spirit of Nature*, the other the producing of *Objections* that may be made against our concluded Assertion of the Soul's Immortality. For as for the former, I can easily imagine he may well desire a more punctual account of that Principle I have had so often recourse to, then I have hitherto given, and will think it fit that I should somewhere more fully explain what I mean by the terms, and shew him my strongest grounds why I conceive there is any such Being in the World. To hold him therefore no longer in suspense, I shall doe both in this place. *The Spirit of Nature* therefore, according to that notion I have of it, is, *A substance incorporeal, but without Sense and Animadversion, pervading the whole Matter of the Universe, and exercising a Plastical power therein according to the sundry predispositions and occasions in the parts it works upon, raising such Phenomena in the World, by directing the parts of the Matter and their Motion, as cannot be resolved into mere Mechanical powers.* This rude Description may serve to convey to any one a conception determinate enough of the nature of the thing. And that it is not a mere Notion, but a real Being, besides what I have occasionally hinted already (and shall here again confirm by new instances) there are several other Considerations may perswade us.

2. The first whereof shall be concerning those Experiments of *Sympathetick Pains, Asswagements and Cures*; of which there are many Examples, approved by the most scrupulous Pretenders to sobriety and judgment, and of all which I cannot forbear to pronounce, that I suspect them to come to pass by some such power as makes Strings that be tuned *Unisons*, (though on several Instruments) the one being touched, the other to tremble and move very sensibly, and to cast off a straw or pin or any such small thing laid upon it. Which cannot be resolved into any *Mechanical* Principle, though some have ingeniously gone about it. For before they attempted to shew the reason, why that String that is not *Unison* to that which is struck should not leap and move, as it doth that is, they should have demonstrated, that by the mere *Vibration of the Aire* that which is *Unison* can be so moved; for if it could, these *Vibrations* would not faile to move other Bodies more movable by farre then the String it self that is thus moved. As for example, if one hung loose near the string that is struck a small thred of silk or an hair with some light thing at the end of it, they must needs receive those reciprocal Vibrations that are communicated to the *Unison* string at a far greater distance,



stance, if the mere motion of the material Aire caused the subfultation of the string tuned *Unison*: Which yet is contrary to experience.

Besides that, if it were the mere *Vibration of the Aire* that caused this tremor in the *Unison* string, the effect would not be considerable, unless both the strings lay well-nigh in the same Plane, and that the Vibration of the string that is struck be made in that Plane they both lie in. But let the string be struck so as to cut the Plane perpendicularly by its tremulous excursions, or let both the strings be in two several Planes at a good distance above one another, the event is much-what the same, though the Aire cannot rationally be conceived to *vibrate* backwards and forwards, otherwise then well-nigh in the very Planes wherein the strings are moved.

All which things do clearly shew, that pure *Corporeal* causes cannot produce this effect: and that therefore we must suppose, that *both* the strings are united with some one *Incorporeal* Being, which has a different *Unity* and *Activity* from *Matter*, but yet a *Sympathy* therewith; which affecting this *Immaterial* Being, makes it affect the *Matter* in the same manner in another place, where it does symbolize with that other in some predisposition or qualification, as these two strings do in being tuned *Unisons* to one another: and this, without sending any particles to the *Matter* it does thus act upon; as my thought of moving of my Toe being represented within my Brain, by the power of my Soul I can, without sending Spirits into my Toe, but onely by making use of them that are there, move my Toe as I please, by reason of that *Unity* and *Activity* that is peculiar to my Soul as a *Spiritual* substance that pervades my whole Body. Whence I would conclude also, that there is some such Principle as we call *The Spirit of Nature*, or *the inferiour Soul of the World*, into which such *Phænomena* as these are to be resolved.

3. And I account *Sympathetick* Cures, Pains and Asswagements to be such. As for example, when in the use of those *Magnetick* Remedies, as some call them, they can make the wound dolorously hot or chill at a great distance, or can put it into perfect ease, this is not by any agency of *emissary Atoms*. For these *hot Atoms* would cool sufficiently in their progress to the party through the frigid aire; and the *cold Atoms*, if they could be so active as to dispatch so far, would be warm enough by their journey in the Summer Sun. The inflammations also of the Cowes Udder by the boiling over of the milk into the fire, the scalding of mens entrails at a distance by the burning of their excrements, with other pranks of the like nature, these cannot be rationally resolved into the recourse of the Spirits of Men or Kine mingled with fiery Atoms, and so re-entering the parts thus affected, because the minuteness of those Atoms argues the suddainness of their extinction, as the smallest wires made red hot soonest cool.

To all which you may adde (if it will prove true) that notable example of the Wines working when the Vines are in the flower, and that this *Sympathetick* effect must be from the Vines of that Country from which they came: whence these exhalations of the Vineyards must spread as far as from *Spain* and the *Canaries* to *England*, and by the same reason must reach round about every way as far from the *Canaries*,

ries, besides their journey upwards into the Aire. So that there will be an Hemisphere of vineal Atoms of an incredible extent, unless they part themselves into trains, and march only to those places whither their Wines are carried. But what *corporeal* cause can guide them thither? Which question may be made of other *Phænomena* of the like nature; Whence again it will be necessary to establish the Principle I drive at, though the effects were caused by the transmission of Atoms.

4. The notablest examples of this *Mundane Sympathy* are in histories more uncertain and obscure, and such as, though I have been very credibly informed, yet, as I have already declared my self, I dare only avouch as possible, viz. the Souls of men leaving their Bodies, and appearing in shapes; suppose, of *Cats, Pigeons, Weasels*, and sometimes of *Men*; and that whatever hurt befalls them in these *Astral* bodies, as the *Paracelsians* love to call them, the same is inflicted upon their *Terrestrial* lying in the mean time in their beds or on the ground. As if their *Astral bodies* be scalded, wounded, have the back broke, the same certainly happens to their *Earthly bodies*.

See Book 2.  
chap. 15. sect.  
8, 9, 10.

Which things if they be true, in all likelihood they are to be resolved into this Principle we speak of, and that *The Spirit of Nature* is snatched into consent with the Imagination of the Souls in these *Astral bodies* or *Aiery Vehicles*. Which act of *imagining* must needs be strong in them; it being so set on and assisted by a quick and sharp pain and fright in these scaldings, woundings, and strokes on the back; some such thing happening here as in women with child, whose Fancies made keen by a suddain fear, have deprived their children of their arms, yea and of their heads too; as also appears by two remarkable stories Sr. *Kenelme Digby* relates in his witty and eloquent *Discourse of the Cure of Wounds by the powder of Sympathy*, besides what \* we have already recited out of *Helmont*.

\* Chap. 6.  
sect. 6.

5. Which effects I suppose to be beyond the power of any humane Fancy unassisted by some more forceable Agent; as also that prodigious birth he mentions of a woman of *Carcassona*, who by her overmuch sporting and pleasing her self with an *Ape*, while she was with Child, brought forth a Monster exactly of that shape. And if we should conclude with that learned Writer, that it was a real *Ape*, it is no more wonderful, nor so much, as that birth of a *Crab-fish* or *Lobster* we have above mentioned out of *Fortunius Licetus*; as we might also other more usual, though no less monstrous births for the wombs of women to bear. Of which the Soul of the Mother cannot be suspected to be the cause, she not so much as being the Efformer of her own *Fætus*, as that judicious Naturalist Dr. *Harvey* has determined. And if the Mother's Soul could be the Efformer of the *Fætus*, in all reason her *Plastick* power would be ever Particular and Specifick as the Soul it self is Particular.

What remains therefore but the *Universal Soul of the World* or *Spirit of Nature* that can doe these feats? who, *Vertumnus*-like, is ready to change his own Activity and the yielding Matter into any mode and shape indifferently as occasion engages him, and so to prepare an edifice, at least the more rude strokes and delineaments thereof, for any Specifick Soul whatsoever, and in any place where the Matter will yield to his operations. But the time of the arrival thither of the particular guest it is



intended for, though we cannot say how soon it is, yet we may be sure it is not later then a clear discovery of *Sensation* as well as *Vegetation* and *Organization* in the Matter.

6. The *Attraction* of the *Load-stone* seems to have some affinity with these instances of *Sympathy*. This mystery *Des-Cartes* has explained with admirable artifice as to the immediate Corporeal causes thereof, to wit, those wreathed particles which he makes to pass certain screw-pores in the *Load-stone* and *Iron*. But how the efformation of these particles is above the reach of the mere Mechanical powers in *Matter*, as also the exquisite direction of their motion, whereby they make their peculiar *Vortex* he describes about the Earth from Pole to Pole, and thread an incrustated Star, passing in a right line in so long a journey as the Diameter thereof without being swung to the sides; how these things, I say, are beyond the powers of *Matter*, I have fully enough declared and proved in a large Letter of mine to *V. C.* and therefore that I may not *actum agere*, shall forbear speaking any farther thereof in this place. To which you may adde, That mere corporeal motion in *Matter*, without any other guide, would never so much as produce a round *Sun* or *Star*, of which figure notwithstanding *Des-Cartes* acknowledges them to be. But my reasons why it cannot be effected by the simple Mechanical powers of *Matter*, I have particularly set down in my Letters to that excellent Philosopher.

Epist. ad V.C.  
sect. 5.

Epist. 3. ad R.  
Cartes.

### C H A P. XIII.

1. That the Descent of heavy Bodies argues the existence of The Spirit of Nature, because else they would either hang in the Aire as they are placed,
2. Or would be diverted from a perpendicular as they fall near a Plate of Metall set sloping.
3. That the endeavour of the Aether or Aire from the Centre to the Circumference is not the Cause of Gravity, against Mr. Hobbs.
4. A full confutation of Mr. Hobbs his Opinion.
5. An ocular Demonstration of the absurd consequence thereof.
6. An absolute Demonstration that Gravity cannot be the effect of mere Mechanical powers.
7. The Latitude of the operations of The Spirit of Nature, how large and where bounded.
8. The reason of its name.
9. Of Instinct, whether it be, and what it is.
10. The grand office of the Spirit of Nature in transmitting Souls into rightly-prepared Matter.


1. **A**ND a farther confirmation that I am not mistaken therein, is what we daily here experience upon Earth, which is the descending of heavy Bodies, as we call them. Concerning the motion whereof I agree with *Des-Cartes* in the assignation of the immediate corporeal cause, to wit, the *Aethereal* matter, which is so plentifully in the Air over it is in grosser Bodies; but withall do vehemently surmise, that there must be some *Immaterial* cause, such as we call *The Spirit of Nature* or *Inferiour Soul of the World*, that must direct the motions of the *Aethereal*

real particles to act upon these grosser Bodies to drive them towards the Earth. For that surplussage of Agitation of the *globular* particles of the *Æther* above what they spend in turning the Earth about, is carried every way indifferently, according to his own concession; by which motion the drops of liquors are formed into *round* figures, as he ingeniously concludes. From whence it is apparent, that a bullet of iron, silver or gold placed in the Aire is equally assaulted on all sides by the occurrence of these *Æthereal* particles, and therefore will be moved no more downwards then upwards, but hang in *æquilibrio*, as a piece of Cork rests on the water, where there is neither winde nor stream, but is equally plaid against by the particles of water on all sides.

Cartes. *Princip. Philos.*  
Part. 4. *Artic.*  
15, 16, 18,  
19, 20.

2. Nor is it imaginable how the occurrences of this *Æthereal* Element here against the surface of the Earth, being it is so fluid a Body, should make it endeavour to lift it self from the Earth at so great a distance as the middle Region of the Aire and further. Besides, that this is not the cause of the descent of heavy Bodies is manifest, because then a broad Plate of the most solid Metall and most perfectly polish'd, such as is able to reflect the *Æthereal* particles most efficaciously, being placed slooping, would change the course of the descent of things, and make them fall perpendicularly to it, and not to the Plane of the Horizon; as for example, not from A to B, but from A to C; which is against experience. For the heavy Body will alwaies fall down from A to B, though the recession of the *Æthereal* Matter must needs be from C to A according to this Hypothesis.


Cartes. *Princip. Philosoph.*  
part. 4. *Artic.*  
22, 23.



3. Nor can the endeavour of the Celestial Matter from the centre to the circumference take place here. For besides that *Des-Cartes*, the profoundest Master of Mechanicks, has declin'd that way himself (though Mr. \* *Hobbs* has taken it up,) it would follow, that near the Poles of the Earth there would be no descent of heavy Bodies at all, and in the very Clime we live in none perpendicular. To say nothing how this way will not salve the union of that great Water that adheres to the body of the Moon.

\* In his *Elements of Philos.*  
part. 4. Chap.  
30. *Artic.* 4.


4. But to make good what I said, by undeniable proof that heavy Bodies in the very Clime where we live will not descend perpendicularly to the Earth, if Mr. *Hobbs* his solution of the *Phænomenon* of Gravity be true; we shall evidently demonstrate both to the Eye and to Reason the proportion of their declination from a perpendicular in any Elevation of the Pole. In the Circle therefore A B D, let the *Æquator* be B D, and from the point C draw a line to E, parallel to B D: which line C E will cut the circle in F 60. degrees, suppose, from B. Imagine now a heavy Body at E; according to Mr. *Hobbs* his solution of the Probleme of Gravity,





it must fall towards the Earth in a line parallel to the *Aequator*, viz. in the line  $EF$ ; which, say  $I$ , declines from the line  $HF$  drawn perpendicular to the Horizon  $LK$  two third parts of a right angle, that is to say, 60. degrees. For the angle  $EFH$  is equal to  $GFR$ , which again is equal to the alternate angle  $BGF$ , which is two third parts of a right angle *ex thesi*. Whence it is plain that  $EF$  declines from a perpendicular no less then 60. degrees. By the same reason, if we had drawn the Scheme for the elevation of 50. which is more Southern then our Clime, we might demonstrate that the descent of heavy Bodies declines from a perpendicular to the Horizon 50 degrees, or  $\frac{5}{6}$  of a right angle, and so of the rest. From whence it will follow, that men cannot walk upright, but declining, in the elevation suppose of 60. degrees, as near to the ground as  $EF$  is to  $FL$ , and much nearer in the more remote parts of the North, as in *Norway*, *Russia*, *Frisland*, *Island*, *Scricfinnia*, *Greenland* and others; and there is proportionably the same reason in other Climes less Northern. So that Mr. *Hobbs* need not send us so farre off as to the Poles to make the experiment.

5. For if for example we drew a Scheme for the Parallel under which we live, suppose about 52. degrees of Elevation, we might represent truly to the eye in what posture men would walk at *London* or *Cambridge*, according to Mr. *Hobbs* his determination of the causes of *Gravity*. For it is plain from what has been above demonstrated, that the natural posture of their Bodies upon the Horizon  $LK$  would be in the line  $EF$ ,



out of which if they did force themselves towards the perpendicular  $HF$ , it would be much pain to them, neither could they place themselves in the line  $HF$ , without being born headlong to the ground, and laid flat upon the Horizon  $FK$ ; the force of the Aire or

whatever more subtile Elements therein pressing in lines parallel to  $EF$ , and therefore necessarily bearing down whatever is placed loose in the line  $HF$ , as is plain to any one at first sight.

But we finding no such thing in experience, it is evident that Mr. *Hobbs* his solution is false; nay I may say that he has not rendred so much as a possible cause of this so ordinary a *Phænomenon*. A thing truly much to be lamented in one who, upon pretence that all the Appearances in the Universe may be resolved into mere Corporeal causes, has with unparallel'd confidence, and not without some wit, derided and exploded all *Immaterial Substance* out of the World; whenas in the mean time he does not produce so much as possible Corporeal causes of the most ordinary effects in Nature. But to leave Mr. *Hobbs* to his own ways, and to return to *Des-Cartes*.

6. Adde unto all this, that if the motion of gross Bodies were according to mere Mechanical laws, a Bullet, suppose of Lead or Gold, cast up into the Aire, would never descend again, but would persist in a rectilinear motion. For it being far more solid then so much Aire and *Æther* put together as would fill its place, and being moved with no less swiftness then

then that wherewith the Earth is carried about in twenty four hours, it must needs break out in a straight line through the thin Aire, and never return again to the Earth, but get away as a *Comet* does out of a *Vortex*. And that *de facto* a Cannon-Bullet has been shot so high that it never fell back again upon the ground, *Des-Cartes* does admit of as a true experiment. Of which, for my own part, I can imagine no other unexceptionable reason, but that at a certain distance *The Spirit of Nature* in some regards leaves the motion of *Matter* to the pure laws of Mechanicks, but within other bounds checks it, whence it is that the Water does not swill out of the Moon.

7. Now if the pure Mechanick powers in *Matter* and Corporeal motion will not amount to so simple a *Phenomenon* as the falling of a stone to the Earth, how shall we hope they will be the adequate cause of sundry sorts of *Plants* and other things, that have farre more artifice and curiosity then the direct descent of a stone to the ground ?

Nor are we beaten back again by this discovery into that dotage of the confounded *Schools*, who have indued almost every different Object of our Senses with a distinct *Substantial form*, and then puzzle themselves with endless scrupulosities about the generation, corruption, and mixtion of them. For I affirm with *Des-Cartes*, that nothing affects our Senses but such Variations of *Matter* as are made by difference of Motion, Figure, Situation of parts, &c. but I dissent from him in this, in that I hold it is not mere and pure Mechanical motion that causes all these sensible Modifications in *Matter*, but that many times the immediate Director thereof is this *Spirit of Nature* (I speak of) one and the same every where, and acting alwaies alike upon like occasions, as a clear-minded man and of a solid judgement gives alwaies the same verdict in the same circumstances.

For this *Spirit of Nature* intermeddling with the efformation of the *Fœtus* of Animals (as I have \* already shewn more then once) where notwithstanding there seems not so much need, there being in them a more particular Agent for that purpose; 'tis exceeding rational that all *Plants* and *Flowers* of all sorts (in which we have no argument to prove there is any particular Souls) should be the effects of this *Universal Soul of the World*. Which Hypothesis, besides that it is most reasonable in it self, according to that ordinary Axiome, *Frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora*, is also very serviceable for the preventing many hard Problems about the *Divisibility* of the Souls of *Plants*, their *Transmutations* into other *Species*, the growing of *Slips*, and the like. For there is one Soul ready every where to pursue the advantages of prepared Matter. Which is the common and onely λόγος ἀπερμάτιστος of all *Plantal appearances*, or of whatever other *Phænomena* there be, greater or smaller, that exceed the pure Mechanical powers of *Matter*. We except onely *Men* and *Beasts*, who having all of them the capacity of some sort of enjoyments or other, it was fit they should have particular Souls for the multiplying of the sense of those enjoyments which the transcendent Wisdome of the Creatour has contrived.

8. I have now plainly enough set down what I mean by *The Spirit of Nature*,

\* Chap. 6. sect. 7, 8. chap. 7. sect. 3.



*Nature*, and sufficiently proved its existence. Out of what has been said may be easily conceived why I give it this name, it being a Principle that is of so great influence and activity in the *Nascency*, as I may so call it, and *Coalescency* of things : And this not onely in the production of *Plants*, with all other *Concretions* of an inferiour nature, and yet above the mere *Mechanical* lawes of *Matter* ; but also in respect of the *birth* of *Animals*, whereunto it is preparatory and assistent.

I know not whether I may entitle it also to the guidance of *Animals* in the chieftest of those actions which we usually impute to *natural Instinct*. Amongst which none so famous as the Birds making their Nests, and particularly the artificial structure of the Martins nests under the arches of Church-windows. In which there being so notable a design unknown to themselves, and so small a pleasure to present Sense, it looks as if they were actuated by another, inspired and carried away in a natural rapture by this *Spirit of Nature* to doe they know not what, though it be really a necessary provision and accommodation for laying their Eggs and hatching their young, in the efformation whereof this *Inferiour Soul of the World* is so rationally conceived to assist and intermeddle : and therefore may the better be supposed to over-power the Fancy, and make use of the members of the Birds to build these convenient Receptacles, as certain shops to lay up the Matter whereon she intends to work, namely the Eggs of these Birds whom she thus guides in making of their nests.

9. For that this building of their nests in such sort should not be from *natural Instinct*, but from acquired Art and observation, or from the instruction of the old ones, there is no reason or ground for any one to conceit. For in that their actions tend to so considerable a scope, that is no argument that they know it or ever consulted about it, no more then that *Ivy* or *Bindweed*, that winde about the next plant that can support them, cast up with themselves aforehand the either necessity or convenience of such close embraces. Nor does it at all follow, because the young ones might see the old ones make their nests before they begin to make theirs, that they do see them or take notice of them. Nay, who can produce any one example of the old one tutoring or teaching her young ones in this kind of Architecture ? or has spide the young one of her self to apply her mind to learn that art by observing what the old one does ? Wherefore a man may as well argue, yea much better, that the *Notes* of Birds are not by *Instinct*, but by learning and art, because they may have heard the old ones sing or whistle before them : whenas they will take up naturally of themselves such notes as belong to their kind, without hearing of the old ones at any time. So that it is not from any ground of Reason, but a mere vain and shallow surmise, to think that the Architecture of Birds in building their nests is not *natural Instinct*, but acquired *Art* and *Imitation*.

But on the other side, there are very plain and positive Reasons to convince us, that this Architecture of theirs is from *Instinct*, and no *acquired faculty*. And that first, because in general brute Animals are of such a nature as is devoid of that free and reflexive reason which is requisite to acquired Art and Consultation. For if they had any such principle,

principle, some of them would be able to speak. The want of which power is the only plausible presumption for *Des-Cartes* his conceit of their being mere *Machina's*. Which though it will not reach to so enormous a Paradox, yet it may justly exclude them from the participation of such a free Reason as will make them able for consultation and learning of Arts and Mysteries.

Secondly, The hatching of their eggs being by mere *Instinct*, & not out of any deliberate Knowledge, it is reasonable to think, that the making of their nests, which is but in order thereto, is mere *Instinct* also.

Thirdly, That which is specific is not acquired, but is by Nature or *Instinct*; but to make their nests thus or thus is specific to this or that kinde of Bird, even as their note is, and therefore is plainly natural.

Fourthly, The peculiar Indocility of those Birds that are the most ingenious Architects in building their nests is a plain indication that it is not *free Reason* but *Instinct* that guides them. And \* *Pliny* observes in the *Swallow*, how indocile she is, and yet how admirable in framing her little mansions of mudd.

\* *Histor. Natural. lib. 10. c. 45. & 33.*

Fifthly, That this Architecture is not a piece of learning derived from the old ones in succession, but the immediate effect of Nature, is further manifest, in that in all parts of the World the same kinde of Birds make the same kinde of nests, when it cannot be well supposed that they learned it from those in remote countries, whom the vastness of the Seas kept from mutual converse.

Sixthly and lastly, There is no man can well think or discourse of examples of natural Architecture, but the *Martin's Nest*, the *Combes of Bees*, the *Webs of Spiders* and the *Bags of Silk-worms* will one bring in another, as being wholly congenerous and of the same nature. Which makes \* *Plinie*, *Cardan* and *Nierembergius* joyn them in one Catalogue as examples of one suite, and may well induce us to conclude them of so near a-kin, as that if one be *natural Instinct*, all the rest must be so too. And our foregoing Argument is infinitely pressing in the three last Instances. For we may be sure that all the *Bees* in the world came not out of one Hive, and therefore could not derive their Architectonical skill from the same teachers, and yet they all make their *Combes* with the same artifice, as I may so call it, and with the same exactness of Geometry. And as for *Spiders*, it is evident that they are of the *τὰ αὐτομάτως γινόμενα*, as *Aristotle* phrases it, and are generated of mere sluttery and putrefaction. And yet these Insects so soon as they are bred, can set up shop and fall to their trade of weaving without any Teacher or Instructor.

\* *Plin. Histor. Natur. lib. 11. c. 10, 11, 22, 24. Cardan. de Subtil. lib. 14. Nieremberg. Histor. Natur. lib. 3. c. 28.*

But the noblest and most apposite instance is that last of the *Silk-worm*, who works so concealedly within her *folliculus* or little bag, as if she either envied the communication of her skill to her fellows, who of themselves are very dim-sighted, or ought him a shame that should be so injudiciously bold as to impute the *natural Instinct* of such like Animals to external observation and imitation. And yet there is a great affinity betwixt the *Nidifications* of *Birds* and these *Conglomerations* of the threads of the *Silk-worm*: not only in regard of the outward Figure of those clues of silk, as I may so call them, which are not unlike

the



the Nests of Birds, but also in regard of the end and designe of them both. Which is not the accommodating of the *Individual*, but a plot for the propagation of the *Species*. For that Insect we call the *Silk-worm* after she has run through multifarious changes and names, as, of \* *σώληξ, κέρμη, βομβύλις, χρυσάλις, νύμφη, νεώδαλος, ψυχή*, in this last title and change ends all with a plentiful provision for the continuation of the kinde. For when she has arrived to her third change, wherein she is called *βομβύλις*, from her mouth and with her fore-feet she works that *Folliculus* or clue of silk above named, building thus her own tombe, which yet is the wombe or cradle of her self when having passed the state of a *χρυσάλις* (wherein she does *ἀκνητίζειν*, as *Aristotle* speaks, and approaches near to the shape and nature of an egg) she emerges after to a nearer tendency toward her purposed animal delineaments, and is called *νύμφη*\* and after this acquiring a greater degree of life and motion is styled \* *νεώδαλος*, as if her dead body had caught vital fire again. In this state she does not lye loose, but sticks again to the cavity of the Clue, and grown to full maturity breaks through, and shews herself in the compleat forme of a Butterfly. To which pitch of perfection when they are arrived they enjoy but a very small time. For after three or four daies indulgence to the delightful usages of Venus, the Male immediately bids the world adieu; whom soon after the Female follows, but yet so as that she leaves behind her some hundreds of eggs, small like the grains of millet, as a numerous pledge and provision for the continuation of their kinde. How then according to this account can the old one ever teach the young ones their trade of spinning or weaving?

And yet the *Silk-worms Bag* is as great a piece of Artifice, and of as great designe, or rather the same as the *nests* of *Swallows* or *Martins*. The making of which notwithstanding *Aristotle* calls *μιμήματα τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ζωῆς*, *Imitations of humane Reason*; which they having not themselves, some Principle distinct from them must be their Guide in these performances: whence I have rightly concluded in my *Antidote*, That the *Nidification* of Birds as well as their *Incubation* is no obscure argument of a Divine Providence. Which I understand mainly of the *structure of their Nests*; though the choice of the places where they build them may not be merely from the lightness of their bodies and their assuefaction to Edifices, Trees, or Bushes, but partly from the dictate of that *Instinct* which suggests to them everywhere what is most for their safety, and makes them many times sagacious above our apprehension. As it appears in what *Pliny* writes concerning a kind of *Swallows* that use to build their nests near *Coptos* in *Aegypt*, who do either not make or forsake their nests many daies before, *si futurum est ut auctus amnis attingat*.

That there is such a thing therefore as *Instinct* in Brute Animals I think is very plain, that is to say, That there is an *Instigation* or *Impetus* in them to doe such things without counsel, deliberation, or acquired knowledge, as according to our reason and best consultation we cannot but approve to be fittest to be done. Which Principle in general *Scaliger* seems to parallel to Divine Inspiration. *Instinctus dicitur à Natura, sicut à Diis Afflatio*. But methinks it is most safely and most unexceptionably

\* i.e. *Vermis*,  
*Eruca*, *Bombyx*,  
*Aurelia*, *Nym-*  
*pha*, *Necydalus*,  
*Papilio*. See  
*Arist. Histor.*  
*Animal. lib.*  
5. c. 19.

\* *Anquod ex*  
*campe mortuū*  
*velut accendat*  
*ur? νέκυσ*  
*mortuus, δῶτα*  
*accendo, unde*  
*δαλδς initio.*  
*Martin.*

*Histor. Ani-*  
*mal. lib. 9.*  
*cap. 7.*

*Book 2. ch. 9.*  
*sect. 9.*

*Histor. Natu-*  
*ral. lib. 10.*  
c. 45.

*Exercit. 307.*  
n. 4.

tionably applied where the *Instinct* respects not so much the welfare of the *Individual* as the common good of this or that *Species*. For if there be any *Impulse* from an Extrinsic Principle upon any particular Animal, it is most sure to be then, when that Animal is transported from the pursuance of its own particular accommodation to serve a more publick end. For from whence can this motion be so well as from that which is not a particular Being, but such as in whose Essence the scope & purpose of the general good of the World and of all the *Species* therein is vitally comprized, and therefore binds all Particulars together by that common Essential Law, which is it self, occasionally impelling them to such actions and services (either above their Knowledge or against their particular Interests) as is most conducing to the Conservation of the Whole? And this is that which we have styled the *Spirit of Nature*, which goes through and assists all corporeal Beings, and is the *Vicarious power of God* (who is that Νόμος ὁ κοινός, as the Philosopher calls Him) upon the Universal Matter of the World. This suggests to the *Spider* the fancy of spinning and weaving her Web, and to the *Bee* of the framing of her Hony-combs, but especially to the *Silk-worm* of conglomerating her both funeral and natal Clue, and to the *Birds* of building their Nests and of their so diligent hatching of their Eggs. But I have insisted upon this Argument too long.

10. The most notable of those offices that can be assigned to *The Spirit of Nature*, and that suitably to his name, is the Translocation of the Souls of Beasts into such Matter as is most fitting for them, he being the common *Proxenet* or *Contractor* of all natural *Matches* and *Marriages* betwixt *Forms* and *Matter*, if we may also speak Metaphors as well as *Aristotle*, whose Aphorisme it is, that *Materia appetit formam ut semina virum*.

This *Spirit* therefore may have not onely the power of directing the motion of Matter at hand, but also of *transporting* of particular Souls and Spirits in their state of *Silence* and *Inactivity* to such Matter as they are in a fitness to catch life in again. Which *Transportation* or *Transmission* may very well be at immense distances, the effect of this *Sympathy* and *Coactivity* being so great in the *working of Wines*, as has been above noted, though a thing of less concernment, or, (which is a more unexceptionable instance) in conducting the *magnetick* particles from one Pole of the Earth to the other.

Whence, to conclude, we may look upon this *Spirit of Nature* as the great *Quartermaster-General* of Divine Providence, but able alone, without any under-Officers, to lodge every Soul according to her rank and merit whenever she leaves the Body: And would prove a very serviceable Hypothesis for those that fancy the *Præexistence* of humane Souls, to declare how they may be conveyed into Bodies here, be they at what distance they will before; and how Matter haply may be so fitted, that the best of them may be fetcht from the purest *Æthereal* Regions into an humane Body, without serving any long Apprentiship in the intermediate *Aire*: as also how the Souls of Brutes, though the Earth were made perfectly inept for the life of any Animal, need not lye for ever useless in the Universe.

A a a

But



But such Speculations as these are of so vast a comprehension and impenetrable obscurity, that I cannot have the confidence to dwell any longer thereon; especially they not touching so essentially our present designe, and being more fit to fill a volume themselves, than to be comprised within the narrow limits of my now almost-finish'd Discourse.

#### CHAP. XIV.

1. *Objections against the Soul's Immortality from her condition in Infancy, Old age, Sleep and Sicknesſes.* 2. *Other Objections taken from Experiments that ſeem to prove her Diſcerpibility.* 3. *As alſo from the ſeldome appearing of the Souls of the deceaſed;* 4. *And from our natural fear of Death.* 5. *A Subterfuge of the adverſe party, in ſuppoſing but one Soul common to all Creatures.* 6. *An Answer concerning the Littleneſſ of the Soul in Infancy:* 7. *As alſo concerning the weakneſſ of her Intellectuals then, and in Old age.* 8. *That Sleep does not at all argue the Soul's Mortality, but rather illuſtrate her Immortality.* 9. *An Answer to the Objection from Apoplexies and Catalepsies:* 10. *As alſo to that from Madneſſ.* 11. *That the various depravations of her Intellectual Faculties do no more argue her Mortality, then the worſer Modifications of Matter its natural Annihilability. And why God created Souls ſympathizing with Matter.*

I. **A**S for the *Objections* that are uſually made *againſt the Immortality of the Soul*; to propound them all, were both tedious and uſeleſs, there being ſcarce above one in twenty that can appear of any moment to but an indifferent Wit and Judgment. But the greateſt difficulties that can be urged I ſhall bring into play, that the Truth we do maintain may be the more fully cleared, and the more firmly believed. The moſt material *Objections* that I know *againſt the Soul's Immortality* are theſe five. The Firſt is from the conſideration of the condition of the Soul in *Infancy*, and *Old age*, as alſo in *Madneſſ*, *Sleep*, and *Apoplexies*. For if we do but obſerve the great difference of our Intellectual operations in *Infancy* and *Dotage* from what they are when we are in the prime of our years; and how that our Wit grows up by degrees, flouriſhes for a time, and at laſt decayes, keeping the ſame pace with the changes that Age and Years bring into our Body, which obſerves the ſame lawes that Flowers and Plants; what can we ſuſpect, but that the Soul of Man, which is ſo magnificently ſpoken of amongſt the learned, is nothing elſe but a Temperature of Body, and that it grows and ſpreads with it, both in bigneſs and virtues, and withers and dies as the Body does, or at leaſt that it does wholly depend on the Body in its Operations, and therefore that there is no ſenſe nor perception of any thing after death? And when the Soul has the beſt advantage of years, ſhe is not then exempted from thoſe Eclipſes of the powers of the Mind that proceed from *Sleep*, *Madneſſ*, *Apoplexies*, and other *Difeaſes* of that nature. All which ſhew her

her condition, whatever more exalted Wits surmise of her, that she is but a poor mortal and corporeal thing.

2. The Second Objection is taken from such Experiments as are thought to prove the Soul *divisible* in the grossest sense, that is to say, *discerpible* into pieces. And it seems a clear case in those more contemptible Animals which are called *Insects*, especially the *τά μακρά καὶ πολύποδα*, as *Aristotle* describes them, and doth acknowledge that being cut into pieces, each segment will have its motion and sense apart to it self. The most notable Instance of this kind is in the *Scolopendra*, whose parts *Aristotle* affirms to live a long time divided, and to run backwards and forwards; and therefore he will have it to look like many living Creatures growing together, rather than one single one, *Εοίκασι γὰρ τὰ ποιάυτα τῶν ζώων πολλοῖς ζώοις συμπεφυκόσι*. But yet he will not afford them the privilege of Plants, whose Slips will live and grow, being set in the Earth. But the instances that belong to this Objection ascend higher, for they pretend that the parts of perfect Animals will also live asunder.

*De Histor. Animal. lib. 4. c. 7.*

*Ibid.*

*De Juventute & Senect. c. 2.*

There are two main instances thereof. The one, that of the Eagle *Fromondus* mentions, whose Head being chopt off by an angry Clown, for quarrelling with his dog, the Body flew over the barn near the place of this rude execution. This was done at *Fromondus* his fathers house: nor is the story improbable, if we consider what ordinarily happens in Pigeons and Ducks, when their heads are cut off. The other instance is, of a Malefactor beheaded at *Antwerp*, whose Head when it had given some few jumps into the crowd, and a Dog fell a licking the blood, caught the Dogs eare in its teeth, and held it so fast, that he being frightened ran away with the mans head hanging at his eare, to the great astonishment and confusion of the people. This was told *Fromondus* by an eye-witness of the fact. From which two Examples they think may be safely inferred, that the Souls of Men, as well as of the more perfect kinde of Brutes, are also *discerpible*.

*Fromond. de Anima, lib. 1. cap. 4. artic. 13.*

That example in the same Authour out of *Josephus Acosta*, if true, yet is finally to this purpose. For the speaking of the sacrificed Captive, when his Heart was cut out, may be a further confirmation indeed that the Brain is the Seat of the Common Sense, but no argument of the *Divisibility* of the Soul, she remaining at that time entire in the Body, after the cutting out of the Heart, whose office it is to afford *Spirits*, which were not so far yet dissipated, but that they sufficed for that suddain operation of life.

*See Book 2. ch. 7. sect. 9.*

3. The Third Objection is from the seldome appearance of the Souls of the deceased. For if they can at all appear, why do they not oftner? if they never appear, it is a strong suspicion that they are not at all in Being.

4. The Fourth is from the Fear of Death, and an inward down-bearing sense in us at some times, that we are utterly mortal, and that there is nothing to be expected after this life.

5. The Fifth and last is rather a Subterfuge than an Objection, That there is but *One Common Soul* in all Men and Beasts, that operates according to the variety of Animals and Persons it does actuate and vivificate,



bearing a seeming particularity according to the particular pieces of Matter it informs, but is *One* in all; and that this particularity of Body being lost, this particular Man or Beast is lost, and so every living creature is properly and intirely mortal. These are the reallest and most pertinent *Objections* I could ever meet withall, or can excogitate, concerning the Soul's Immortality: to which I shall answer in order.

6. And to the First, which seems to be the shrewdest, I say, That neither the *Contractedness* of the Soul in *Infancy*, nor the *Weakness* of her Intellectual Operations either *then* or in *extreme Old age*, are sufficient proofs of her *Corporeity* or *Mortality*. For what wonder is it that the Soul, fallen into this low and fatal condition, where she must submit to the course of Nature, and the laws of other Animals that are generated here on Earth, should display her self by degrees, from smaller dimensions to the ordinary size of men; whenas this faculty of *contracting and dilating* of themselves is in the very essence and notion of all *Spirits*? as I have noted already. So she does but that leisurely and naturally now, being subjected to the laws of this terrestrial Fate, which she does, exempt from this condition, suddainly and freely: not growing by *Juxta-position* of parts, or *Intromission* of Matter, but enlarging of her self with the Body merely by the *dilatation* of her own Substance, which is one and the same alwaies.

7. As for the *Debility* of her Intellectuals in *Infancy* and *Old age*, this consideration has less force to evince her a *mere corporeal* essence then the former, and touches not our Principles at all, who have provided for the very worst surmise concerning the operations of the Mind, in acknowledging them, of my own accord, to depend very intimately on the temper and tenour of the Soul's immediate instrument, the *Spirits*; which being more torpid and watry in *Children* and *Old men*, must needs hinder her in such Operations as require another constitution of Spirits then is usually in *Age* and *Childhood*: though I will not profess my self absolutely confident, that the Soul cannot act without all dependence on Matter. But if it does not, which is most probable, it must needs follow, that its Operations will keep the laws of the Body it is united with. Whence it is demonstrable how necessary *Purity* and *Temperance* is to preserve and advance a mans Parts.

8. As for *Sleep*, which the dying Philosopher called *the Brother of Death*, I do not see how it argues the Soul's Mortality, more then a mans inability to wake again: but rather helps us to conceive, how that though the stounds and agonies of Death seem utterly to take away all the hopes of the Soul's living after them; yet upon a recovery of a quicker Vehicle of Aire, she may suddainly awake into fuller and fresher participation of life then before. But I may answer also, that *Sleep* being onely the ligation of the outward Senses, and the interception of motion from the external world, argues no more any radical defect of Life and Immortality in the Soul, then the having a mans Sight bounded within the walls of his chamber by Shuts does argue any blindness in the immured party; who haply is busie reading by candle-light, and that with ease, so small a print as would trouble an ordinary Sight to read it by day.

day. And that the Soul is not perpetually employed in *Sleep*, is very hard for any to demonstrate; we so often remembering our dreams merely by occasions, which if they had not occurred, we had never suspected we had dreamed that night.

9. Which Answer, as also the former, is applicable to *Apoplexies*, *Catalepsies*, and whatever other *Diseases* partake of their nature; and witness how nimble the Soul is to act upon the suppeditation of due Matter, and how *Life* and *Sense* and *Memory* and *Reason* and all return, upon return of the fitting temper of the Spirits, suitable to that *vital Congruity* that then is predominant in the Soul.

10. And as for *Madness*, there are no Apprehensions so frantick but are arguments of the *Soul's Immortality*, not as they are *frantick*, but as *Apprehensions*. For Matter cannot apprehend any thing, either wildly or soberly, as I have \* already sufficiently demonstrated. And it is as irrational for a man to conclude, that the depraved Operations of the Soul argue her Mortality, as that the worser tempers, or figures, or whatever more contemptible modifications there are of Matter, should argue its annihilation by the mere power of Nature; which no man that understands himself will ever admit.

\* Book 2. ch. 2;  
3, 4, 5, 6.

The Soul indeed is indued with several Faculties, and some of them very fatally passive, such as those are that have the nearest commerce with Matter, and are not so absolutely in her own power, but that her levity and mindlessness of the divine light may bring her into subjection to them; as all are, in too sad a sort, that are incarcerated in this *Terrestrial Body*, but some have better luck than other some in this wild and audacious ramble from a more secure state. Of which Apostasy if there be some that are made more Tragick examples than others of their stragling from their sovereign Happiness, it is but a merciful admonition of the danger we all have incur'd, by being where we are; and very few so well escaped, but that if they could examine their Desires, Designs, and Transactions here, by that Truth they were once masters of, they would very freely confess, that the mistakes and errors of their life are not inferior to, but of worse consequence than, those of natural Fools and Mad-men, whom all either hoot at for their folly, or else lament their misery. And questionless the Souls of Men, if they were once reduced to that sobriety they are capable of, would be as much *ashamed* of such *Desires* and *Notions* they are now wholly engaged in, as any mad-man, reduced to his right Senses, is of those freaks he played when he was out of his wits.

11. But the variety of degrees, or kinds of depravation in the Intellectual faculties of the Soul, her Substance being *Indiscernible*, cannot at all argue her *Mortality*, no more than the different modifications of Matter the *Annihilability* thereof, as I have already intimated. Nor need a man trouble himself how there should be such a \* Sympathy betwixt Body and Soul, when it is so demonstrable that there is. For it is sufficient to consider, that it is their immediate nature so to be by the will and ordinance of Him that has made all things. And that if Matter has no *Sense* nor *Cogitation* it self, as we have demonstrated it has not, it

\* See Book 2.  
chap. 10. sect. 9.



had been in vain, if God had not put forth into Being that Order of *Immaterial* Creatures which we call *Souls*, vitally unitable with the *Matter*: Which therefore, according to the several modifications thereof, will necessarily have a different effect upon the Soul, the Soul abiding still as unperishable as the *Matter* that is more mutable then *she*. For the *Matter* is *dissipable*, but *she* utterly *indiscernible*.

## CHAP. XV.

1. *An Answer to the experiment of the Scolopendra cut into pieces :*
2. *And to the flying of an headless Eagle over a barn, as also to that of the Malefactor's head biting a Dog by the eare.*
3. *A superaddition of a difficulty concerning Monsters born with two or more Heads and but one Body and Heart.*
4. *A solution of the difficulty.*
5. *An answer touching the seldome appearing of the Souls of the deceased :*
6. *As also concerning the fear of Death ;*
7. *And a down-bearing sense that sometimes so forcibly obtrudes upon us the belief of the Soul's Mortality.*
8. *Of the Tragical Pompe and dreadful Preludes of Death, with some corroborative Considerations against such sad spectacles.*
9. *That there is nothing really sad and miserable in the Universe, unless to the wicked and impious.*

1. **N**OR do those Instances in the second Objection prove any thing to the contrary, as if the Soul it self were *really divisible*. The most forcible Example is that of the *Scolopendra*, the motion of the *divided* parts being so quick and nimble, and so lasting. But it is easy to conceive, that the activity of the Spirits in the Mechanical conformation of the pieces of that Insect, till motion has dissipated them, will as necessarily make them run up and down, as Gunpowder in a squib will cause its motion. And therefore the Soul of the *Scolopendra* will be but in one of those Segments, and uncertain in which, but likely according as the Segments be made. For cut a Wasps head off from the Body, the Soul retires out of the Head into the Body, but cut her in the Waist, leaving the upper part of the Body to the Head, the Soul then retires into that forepart of the Wasp. And therefore it is no wonder that the Head being cut off, the Body of the Wasp will fly and flutter so long, the Soul being still in it, and haply conferring to the direction of the Spirits for motion, not out of Sense, but from custome or nature: as we walk not thinking of it, or play on the Lute though our minde be running on something else, as I have noted \* before. But when the Waist is left to the Head, it is less wonder, for then the Animal may not be destitute of sense and fancy, to conveigh the Spirits to move the wings.

2. The former case will fit that of the headless Eagle that flew over the Barn. But the mans Head that catch'd the Dog by the ear would have more difficulty in it (it not seeming so perfectly referrible to the latter case of the Wasp) did not we consider how hard the teeth will set in a swoon. As this Head therefore was gasping while the Dog was lick-

\* Book 2. ch.  
11. sect. 8.

ing the blood thereof, his ear chanced to dangle into the mouth of it, which closing together as the ear hung into it, pinched it so fast that it could not fall off.

Besides it is not altogether improbable, especially considering that some men die upwards, and some downwards, that the Soul may, as it happens, sometimes retire into the *Head*, and sometimes into the *Body*, in these decollations, according as they are more or less replenish'd with *Spirits*; and by the lusty jumping of this *Head*, it should seem it was very full of them. Many such things as these also may happen by the activity of the *Spirit of Nature*, who, it's like, may be as busie in the ruins of Animals, while the *Spirits* last, as it is in the fluid rudiments of them when they are generated. But the former Answers being sufficient, it is needless to enlarge our selves upon this new Theme.

3. To this second Objection might have been added such monstrous births, as seem to imply the *Perceptive part* of the Soul divided actually into two or more parts. For *Aristotle* seems expressly to affirm, that that monstrous birth that has two Hearts is two Animals, but that which has but one Heart is but one. From whence it will follow that there is but one Soul also in that one-hearted Monster, though it have two or more Heads; whence it is also evident, that the *Perceptive part* of that one Soul must be actually divided into two or more. This opinion of *Aristotle* *Sennertus* subscribes to, and therefore conceives that that monstrous child that was born at *Emmaus*, in *Theodosius* his time, with two Heads & two Hearts, was two persons; but that other born *Anno* 1531. with two Heads and but one Heart, who lived till he was a man, was but one person. Which he conceives appears the plainer, in that both the Heads professed their agreement perpetually to the same actions, in that they had the same appetite, the same hunger and thirst, spoke alike, had the same desire to lie with their wife, and of all other acts of exonerating nature. But for that other that had two Hearts, and was divided to the Navel, there was not this identity of affection and desire, but sometimes one would have a mind to a thing, and sometimes another; sometimes they would play with one another, and sometimes fight.

4. But I answer, and first to *Aristotle*'s authority, that he does not so confidently assert, that every Monster that has but one Heart is but one Animal. For his words run thus; *Ἐν τῷ ζῷον τὸ παραπῶδες ἢ πλείω συμπεφυκότα δεῖ νομίζειν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν, οἷον εἰ τοιοῦτόν τι ἔστιν ἡ καρδία μόνον, τὸ μὴ μίαν ἔχον καρδίαν ἐν ζῷον.* Where he onely speaks hypothetically, not peremptorily, that the Heart is that part where the first Principle of life is, and from which the rest of life in Soul or Body is to be derived. For indeed he makes it \* elsewhere the seat of Common Sense; but that it is a mistake we have \* already demonstrated, and himself seems not confident of his own Opinion; and therefore we may with the less offence decline it, and affirm (and that without all hesitancy) that a Monster is either one or more Animals according to the number of the Heads of it, and that there are as many distinct Souls as there are Heads in a monstrous Birth. But from the Heads downwards the Body being but one, and the Heart but one, that there must needs be a wonderful exact

*De generat. Animal. lib. 4. cap. 4.*

*Sennert. Epitom. Scient. Natural. lib. 6. cap. 1.*

*De generat. Animal. lib. 4. cap. 4.*

\* *De Juventute & Senect. c. 3.*  
\* *Book 2. ch. 7. sect. 8, 9.*



concord in the sense of affections in these Heads, they having their Blood and Spirits from one fountain, and one common seat of their passions and desires. But questionless whenever one Head winked, it could not then see by the eyes of the other; or if one had pricked one of these Heads, the other would not have felt it: though whatever was inflicted below, it is likely they both felt alike, both the Souls equally acting the Body of this Monster, but the Heads being actuated by them onely in several. Which is a sufficient Answer to *Sennertus*.

5. The weakness of the third Objection is manifest, in that it takes away the Existence of all Spirits, as well as the Souls of the deceased. Of whose being notwithstanding none can doubt that are not dotingly incredulous. We say therefore that the Souls of men, being in the same condition that other Spirits are, *appear sometimes*, though but *seldome*. The cause in both being, partly the difficulty of bringing their Vehicles to an unnatural consistency, and partly they having no occasion so to doe, and lastly it being not permitted to them to doe as they please, or to be where they have a minde to be.

6. As for the *Fear of Death*, and that *down-bearing sense* that sometimes so uncontroulably suggests to us that we are wholly mortal: To the first I answer, That it is a necessary result of our union with the Body, and if we should admit it one of the imperfections or infirmities we contract by being in this state, it were a solid Answer. And therefore this fear and presage of ill in Death is no argument that there is any ill in it, nor any more to be heeded then the predictions of any fanatical fellow that will pretend to propheticie. But besides this, it is fitting that there should be in us this fear and abhorrency, to make us keep this station Providence has plac'd us in; otherwise every little pet would invite us to pack our selves out of this World, and try our fortunes in the other, and so leave the Earth to be inhabited onely by Beasts, \* whenas it is to be ordered and cultivated by Men.

7. To the second I answer, That such peremptory conclusions are nothing but the impostures of Melancholy, or some other dull and fulsome distempers of blood that corrupt the Imagination; but that Fancy proves nothing, by Axiome 4. And that though the Soul enthroned in her *Aethereal Vehicle* be a very magnificent thing, full of Divine Love, Majesty and Tranquillity; yet in this present state she is in, clogg'd and accloy'd with the foulness and darkness of this *Terrestrial Body*, she is subject to many fears and jealousies, and other disturbing passions, whose Objects though but a mockery, yet are a real disquiet to her mind in this her Captivity and Imprisonment.

Which condition of hers is lively set out by that incomparable Poet and Platonist, in his *Aeneid*. where, comparing that more free and pure state of our Souls in their Celestial or Fiery Vehicles with their restraint in this Earthly Dungeon, he makes this short and true description of the whole matter.

*Ignens est illis vigor, & cælestis origo  
Seminibus; quantum non noxia corpora tardant,  
Terrenique hebetant artus, moribundâque membra:*

*Hinc*

\* See *Cabb. Philof. cap. 3. v. 20, 21, 22.*

*Æneid. 6.*

*Hinc metuunt, cupiuntque, dolent, gaudentque, nec auras  
Respiciunt, clausi tenebris & carcere cæco.*

To this sense,

*A fiery vigour from an heavenly source  
Is in these seeds, so far as the dull force  
Of noxious Bodies does not them retard,  
In heavy earth and dying limbs imbar'd.  
Hence, fool'd with fears, foul lusts, sharp grief, vain joy,  
In this dark Gaol they low and groveling lie,  
Nor with one glance of their oblivious mind  
Look back to that free Aire they left behind.*

This is the sad estate of the more deeply-lapsed Souls upon Earth ; who are so wholly mastered by the motions of the Body, that they are carried headlong into an assent to all the suggestions and imaginations that it so confidently obtrudes upon them ; of which that of our *Mortality* is not the weakest.

But such melancholy fancies, that would bear us down so peremptorily that we are utterly extinct in death, are no more argument thereof, then those of them that have been perswaded they were dead already, while they were alive ; and therefore would not eat, because they thought the dead never take any repast, till they were cheated into an appetite, by seeing some of their friends disguised in winding-sheets feed heartily at the table, whose example then they thought fit to follow, and so were kept alive.

8. I cannot but confess that the *Tragick pomp and preparation to dying*, that layes wast the operations of the Minde, putting her into fits of dotage or fury, making the very visage look ghastly and distracted, and at the best sadly pale and consumed, as if Life and Soul were even almost quite extinct, cannot but imprint strange impressions even upon the stoutest Mind, and raise suspicions that all is lost in so great a change. But the Knowing and Benign Spirit though he may flow in tears at so dismal a Spectacle, yet it does not at all suppress his hope and confidence of the Soul's safe passage into the other world ; and is no otherwise moved then the more passionate Spectatours of some cunningly-contrived Tragedy, where persons, whose either Vertue, or misfortunes, or both, have wonne the affection of the beholders, are at last seen wallowing in their blood, and after some horrid groans and gasps lye stretcht stark dead upon the stage : but being once drawn off, find themselves well and alive, and are ready to tast a cup of wine with their friends in the attiring room, to solace themselves really, after their fictitious pangs of death, and leave the easy-natur'd multitude to indulge to their soft passions for an evil that never befell them.

9. The *fear* and abhorrency therefore we have of *Death*, and the sorrow that accompanies it, is no argument but that we may live after it, and are but due affections for those that are to be spectatours of the great *Tragick-Comedy* of the World ; the whole plot whereof being contrived by Infinite Wisdome and Goodness, we cannot but surmise that the most sad representations are but a *shew*, but the delight *real* to such as are not wicked  
and



and impious ; and that what the ignorant call *Evil* in this Universe is but as the shadowy strokes in a fair picture, or the mournful notes in Musick, by which the Beauty of the one is more lively and express, and the Melody of the other more pleasing and melting.

## CHAP. XVI.

1. *That that which we properly are is both Sensitive and Intellectual.*
2. *What is the true Notion of a Soul being One.*
3. *That if there be but One Soul in the world, it is both Rational and Sensitive.*
4. *The most favourable representation of their Opinion that hold but One.*
5. *A Confutation of the foregoing representation.*
6. *A Reply to the Confutation.*
7. *An Answer to the Reply.*
8. *That the Soul of Man is not properly any Ray either of God or the Soul of the World.*
9. *And yet if she were so, it would be no prejudice to her Immortality: whence the folly of Pomponatius is noted.*
10. *A further animadversion upon Pomponatius his folly, in admitting a certain number of remote Intelligencies, and denying Particular Immaterial Substances in Men and Brutes.*

1. **A**S for the last Objection, or rather Subterfuge, of such as have no minde to finde their Souls immortal, pretending indeed they have none distinct from that *one Universal Soul* of the World, whereby notwithstanding they acknowledge that the Operations we are conscious to our selves of, of Reason and other Faculties, cannot be without one ; we shall easily discover either the falseness or unserviceableness of this conceit for their design, who would so fain sink out of Being after the mad freaks they have played in this Life. For it is manifestly true, that a Man is most properly that, whatever it is, that *animadvert*s in him ; for that is such an operation that no Being but himself can doe it for him. And that which *animadvert*s in us, does not onely perceive and take notice of its *Intellectual* and *Rational* operations, but of all *Sensations* whatsoever that we are conscious of, whether they terminate in our Body or on some outward Object. From whence it is plain, that *That which we are is both Sensitive and Intellectual.*

2. Now if we rightly consider what is comprehended in the true and usual Notion of the *Unity* of a Soul, it is very manifest that it mainly consists in this, that the *Animadversive* thereof is *but one*, and that there is no *Sensation* nor *Perception* of any kind in the Soul, but what is communicated to and perceived by the whole *Animadversive*.

3. Which things being premised, it necessarily follows, that if there be *but one Soul* in the World, that Soul is both *Rational* and *Sensitive*, and that there cannot be any Pain, Pleasure or Speculation, in *one mans* Soul, but the same would be in *all* ; nay that a man cannot lash a Dog, or spur a Horse, but himself would feel the smart of it : which is flatly against all experience, and therefore palpably false. Of this wilde Supposition I have spoken so fully in my *Poems*, that I need adde nothing here in this place, having sufficiently confuted it there.

4. But

4. But not to cut them so very short, let us imagine the most favourable contrivance of their Opinion we can, and conceit that though this *Soul of the World* be of it self every where alike, and that the *Animadversive* faculty is in it all in like vigour; yet it being engaged in severally-tempered Bodies, *Animadversion* is confin'd to that part of Matter onely which it actuates; and is stupid and unsensible of all other operations, whether Sensitive or Intellectual, that are transacted by her without, in other persons: a thing very hard to conceive, and quite repugnant to the Idea of the *Unity* of a Soul, not to be conscious to her self of her own perceptions. But let it pass for a possibility, and let us suppose that one part of the *Soul of the World* informs one man, and another another, or at least some vital Ray there; yet notwithstanding, this opinion will be incumbered with very harsh difficulties.

For if several parts of the *Soul of the World* inform several parts of the Matter, when a man changes his place, he either tears one part of the *Soul of the World* from another, or else changes Souls every step; and therefore it is a wonder that he changes not his Wits too, and loses his Memory. Unless they will say that every part of the *Soul of the World*, upon the application of a new Body, acts just so in it as that part acted which it left, if there be no change or alteration thereof: whence every part of the *Soul of the World* will have the self-same Thoughts, Errours, Truths, Remembrances, Pains, Pleasures, that the part had the Body newly left. So that a man shall always fancy it is himself, whereever he goes, though this self be nothing but the *Soul of the World* acting in such a particular Body, and retaining and renewing to her self the Memory of all Accidents, Impressions, Motions and Cogitations, she had the perception of in this particular piece of organized Matter. This is the most advantageous representation of this Opinion that can possibly be excogitated. But I leave it to those that love to amuse themselves in such Mysteries, to try if they can make any good sense of it.

5. And he that can fancy it as a thing possible, I would demand of him, upon this supposition, who *himself* is; and he cannot deny but that he is a Being *Perceptive* and *Animadversive*, which the *Body* is not, and therefore that himself is not the *Body*; wherefore he is that in him which is properly called *Soul*: But not its *Operations*, for the former reason; because they perceive nothing, but the Soul perceives them in exerting them: nor the *Faculties*, for they perceive not one anothers Operations; but that which is a mans *Self* perceives them all: Wherefore he must say he is the *Soul*; and there being but one Soul in the World, he must be forc'd to vaunt himself to be the *Soul of the World*. But this boasting must suddainly fall again, if he but consider that the *Soul of the World* will be every mans personal *Ipseity* as well as his; whence every one man will be all men, and all men but one Individual man: which is a perfect contradiction to all the Laws of *Metaphysics* and *Logick*.

6. But re-minded of these inconveniences, he will pronounce more cautiously, and affirm that he is not the *Soul of the World* at large, but onely so far forth as she expedites or exerts her self into the Sense and Remembrance of all those Notions or Impresses that happen to her  
whereever



whereever she is joyned with his Body ; but that so soon as this Body of his is dissipated and dissolved , that she will no longer raise any such determinate Thoughts or Senses that refer to that Union ; and that so the Memory of such Actions, Notions and Impressions, that were held together in relation to a particular Body, being lost and laid aside upon the failing of the Body to which they did refer, this *Ipseity* or *Personality*, which consisted mainly in this, does necessarily perish in death.

This certainly is that ( if they know their own meaning ) which many Libertines would have, who are afraid to meet themselves in the other World, for fear they should quarrel with themselves there for their transactions in this. And it is the handsomest Hypothesis that they can frame in favour of themselves, and far beyond that dull conceit, *That there is nothing but mere Matter in the World* ; which is infinitely more liable to confutation.

7. And yet this is too scant a covering to shelter them and secure them from the sad after-claps they may justly suspect in the other life. For first, it is necessary for them to confess that they have in this life as particular and proper sense of Torment, of Pleasure, of Peace, and Pangs of Conscience, and of other impressions, as if they had an individual Soul of their own distinct from that of the World, and from every ones else ; and that if there be any *Demons* or *Genii* , \* as certainly there are, that it is so with them too. We have also demonstrated, that all *Sense* and *Perception* is immediately excited in the Soul by the \* *Spirits* ; wherefore with what confidence can they promise themselves that the death of this earthly Body will quite obliterate all the tracts of their Being here on earth ? whenas the subtiler ruines thereof, in all likelihood, may determine the Thoughts of the *Soul of the World* to the same tenour as before, and draw from her the memory of all the Transactions of this life, and make her exercise her judgment upon them, and cause her to contrive the most vital exhalations of the Terrestrial Body into an Aëreal Vehicle, of like nature with the ferment of these material rudiments of life , saved out of the ruines of death.

For any slight touch is enough to engage her to perfect the whole Scene ; and so a man shall be represented to himself and others in the other state whether he will or no , and have as distinct a personal *Ipseity* there as he had in this life. Whence it is plain, that this false *Hypothesis*, *That we are nothing but the Soul of the World acting in our Bodies*, will not serve their turns at all that would have it so ; nor secure them from future danger, though it were admitted to be true. But I have demonstrated it false already, from the Notion of the *Unity* of a Soul.

Of the truth of which Demonstration we shal be the better assured, if we consider that the subtile Elements , which are the immediate conveyers of *Perceptions* in our Souls, are continued throughout in the *Soul of the World*, and insinuate into all living Creatures. So that the *Soul of the World* will be necessarily informed in every one, what she thinks or feels every where, if she be the onely Soul that actuates every Animal upon Earth. Whence the Sun , Stars and Planets would appear to us in that bigness they really are of, they being perceiv'd in that bigness by those parts

\* *Antidote* ,  
Book 3. ch. 3,  
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,  
10, &c.  
\* Book 2.  
chap. 8, 9.

parts of the *Soul of the World* that are at a convenient nearness to them.

8. That other conceit, of our Souls being a *Vital Ray of the Soul of the World*, may gain much countenance by expressions in ancient Authors that seem to favour the Opinion: as that of \* *Epictetus*, who saith that the Souls of men are *συναφείς τῇ δυνάμει, ἀπὸ αὐτῆς μέγιστα ἔσται καὶ ἀποσπασματώδεις*. And *Philo* calls the Minde of Man, *τὸ δέας ψυχῆς ἀποσπασματὶς ἐξελκυστὶς* and *Trismegist*, *ὁ νῦν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀπολετμημὸς τῆ ἐνομή*, τῆ δυνάμει, ἀλλ' ὡς περὶ ἡπλωμένον καὶ δυνάμει τὸ τῆ ἡλίου φῶς. All which expressions make the Soul of man a *Ray or Beam of the Soul of the World* or of *God*. But we are to take notice that they are but Metaphorical phrases, and that what is understood thereby, is, that there is an emanation of a secondary substance from the several parts of the Soul of the World, resembling the Rays of the Sun. Which way of conception, though it be more easy than the other, yet it has difficulties enough. For this *Vital Ray* must have some head from whence it is stretched, and so the Body would be like a Bird in a string, which would be drawn to a great length when one takes long voyages, suppose to the East or West Indies; which yet are nothing so long as our yearly sailing on the Earth from *Libra* to *Aries*. Or if you will not have it a *linear Ray*, but an *Orb* of particular life; every such particular *Orb* must be hugely vast, that the Body may not travel out of the reach of the Soul. Besides, this *Orb* will strike through other Bodies as well as its own, and its own be in several parts of it; which are such incongruities and inconcinnities as are very harsh and displeasing to our Rational faculties.

Wherefore that Notion is infinitely more neat and safe, that proportions the Soul to the dimensions of the Body, and makes her independent on any thing but the Will and Essence of her Creator; which being exactly the same every where, as also his Power is, her emanative support is exactly the same to what she had in the very first point of her production and station in the World. In which respect of dependence she may be said to be a *Ray* of Him, as the rest of the Creation also; but in no other sense that I know of, unless of likeness and similitude, she being the *Image of God*, as the *Rays of Light* are of the *Sun*.

9. But let every particular Soul be so many *Rays* of the *Soul of the World*, what gain they by this, whenas these *Rays* may be as capable of all the several congruities of life, as the Soul is in that sense we have described? and therefore *Personality*, *Memory* and *Conscience* will as surely return or continue in the other state, according to this Hypothesis, as the other more usual one. Which also discovers the great folly of *Pomponatius* (and of as many as are of the same leven with him) who indeed is so modest and judicious as not to deny *Apparitions*, but attributes all to the influence of the Stars; or rather the *Intelligencies* of the Celestial Orbs. For they giving life and animation to brute Animals, why may they not also, upon occasion, animate and actuate the Aire into shape and form, even to the making of them speak and discourse one shape with another? For so *Pomponatius* argues in his Book of the *Immortality of the Soul*, from *Aquinas* his concession, that Angels and Souls separate may figure the Aire into shape, and speak through it; *Quare igitur In-*

\* See Lips.  
Physiolog. Stoic.  
lib. 3. Dissert. 8.

De Immortalitate animæ,  
cap. 14.

De Immortalitate animæ, cap. 14.  
pag. 114. 115.



*telligentia moventes corpora cælestia hæc facere non possunt cum suis instrumentis quæ tot ac tanta possunt, quæ faciant Psittacos, Picos, Corvos & Merulas, loqui?* And a little after, he plainly reasons from the power the *Intelligencies* have of generating Animals, that it is not at all strange that they should raise such kinde of *Apparitions* as are recorded in History.

But if these *Celestial Intelligencies* be confined to their own Orbs, so as that no *secondary Essence* reach these inferiour Regions, it is impossible to conceive how they can actuate the Matter here below. But if there be any such *essential Emanations* from them, whereby they actuate the Matter into these living *Species* we see in the World, of Men and Brutes; nothing hinders but the same *Emanations* remaining, may actuate the Aire when this earthly fabrick fails, and retain the memory of things transacted in this life, and that still our *Personality* will be conserved as perfect and distinct as it was here.

10. But this conceit of *Pomponatius* is farre more foolish then theirs that make onely one *Anima Mundi* that passes through all the Matter of the World, and is present in every place, to doe all feats that there are to be done. But to acknowledge so many severall *Intellectual Beings* as there be fancied *Celestial Orbs*, and to scruple, or rather to seem confident, that there are not so many particular Souls as there be Men here on Earth, is nothing but Humour and Madnes. For it is as rational to acknowledge eight hundred thousand Myriads of *Intellectual* and *Immaterial Beings*, really distinct from one another, as eight; and an infinite number, as but one, that could not create the Matter of the World. For then two Substances, wholly independent on one another, would be granted, as also the Infinite parts of Matter that have no dependence one on the other.

Why may not there be therefore Infinite numbers of Spirits or Souls that have as little dependence one on another, as well as there should be eight *Intelligencies*? whenas the motions and operations of every Animal are a more certain argument of an *Immaterial Being* residing there, then the motions of the Heavens of any distinct *Intelligencies* in their Orbs, if they could be granted to have any: And it is no stranger a thing to conceive an Infinite multitude of *Immaterial*, as well as *Material, Essences*, independent on one another, then but two, namely the Matter and the Soul of the World. But if there be so excellent a Principle existent as can create Beings, as certainly there is; we are still the more assured that there are such multitudes of Spiritual Essences, surviving all the chances of this present life, as the most sober and knowing men in all Ages have professed there are.

## CHAP. XVII.

1. *That the Authour having safely conducted the Soul into her Aëreal condition through the dangers of Death, might well be excused from attending her any further.* 2. *What reasons urge him to consider what fates may befall her afterwards.* 3. *Three hazards the Soul runs after this life, whereby she may again become obnoxious to death, according to the opinion of some.* 4. *That the Aëreal Genii are mortal, confirmed by three testimonies.* 5. *The one from the Vision of Facius Cardanus, in which the Spirits that appeared to him profest themselves mortal.* 6. *The time they stayed with him, and the matters they disputed of.* 7. *What credit Hieronymus Cardanus gives to his Father's Vision.* 8. *The other testimony out of Plutarch, concerning the Death of the great God Pan.* 9. *The third and last of Hesiod, whose opinion Plutarch has polish'd and refined.* 10. *An Enumeration of the several Paradoxes contained in Facius Cardanus his Vision.* 11. *What must be the sense of the third Paradox, if those Aëreal Speculators spake as they thought.* 12. *Another Hypothesis to the same purpose.* 13. *The craft of these Dæmons, in shuffling in poisonous Error amongst solid Truths.* 14. *What makes the story of the death of Pan less to the present matter, with an addition of Demetrius his observations touching the Sacred Islands near Britain.* 15. *That Hesiod his opinion is the most unexceptionable, and that the harshness therein is but seeming, not real.* 16. *That the Æthereal Vehicle instates the Soul in a condition of perfect Immortality.* 17. *That there is no internal impediment to those that are Heroically good, but that they may attain an everlasting Happiness after Death.*

1. **W**E have now, maugre all the oppositions and Objections made to the contrary, safely conducted the Soul into the other state, and installed her into the same condition with the *Aëreal Genii*. I might be very well excused, if I took leave of her here; and committed her to that fortune that attends those of the Invisible World: it being more seasonable for them that are there, to meditate and prefigure in their mindes all futurities belonging to them; then for us that are on this side the passage. It is enough that I have demonstrated, that neither the Essence nor Operations of the Soul are extinct by Death; but that they either not intermit, or suddainly revive upon the recovery of her Aëry Body.

2. But seeing that those that take any pleasure at all in thinking of these things can seldom command the ranging of their thoughts within what compass they please, and that it is obvious for them to doubt whether the Soul can be secure of her permanency in life in the other world, (it implying no contradiction, That her *Vital Congruity*, appropriate to this or that Element, may either of it self expire, or that she may by some carelesness debilitate one *Congruity*, and awaken another, in some measure, and so make her self obnoxious to Fate;) we cannot



but think it in a manner necessary to extricate such difficulties as these, that we may not seem in this after-game to lose all we won in the former ; and make men suspect that the Soul is not at all Immortal, if her Immortality will not secure her against all future fates.

3. To which she seems liable upon three accounts. The one we have named already, and respects an intrinsecal Principle, the *Periodical terms* of her *Vital Congruity*, or else the Levity and Miscarriage of her own Will. Which obnoxiousness of hers is still more fully argued from what is affirmed of the *Aëreal Genii* ( whose companion and fellow-Citizen she is ) whom sundry Philosophers assert to be *Mortal*. The other two hazards she runs are from without, to wit, the *Conflagration of the World*, and the *Extinction of the Sun*.

4. That the *Aëreal Genii* are mortal, three main Testimonies are alledged for it. The Vision of *Facius Cardanus*, the Death of the great God *Pan*, in *Plutarch*, and the Opinion of *Hesiod*. I will set them all down fully, as I finde them, and then answer to them. The Vision of *Facius Cardanus* is punctually recited by his son *Hieronymus* in his *De Subtilitate*, in this manner.

5. That his Father *Facius Cardanus*, who confessed that he had the society of a familiar Spirit for about thirty years together, told him this following Story often when he was alive, and after his death he found the exact relation of it committed to writing, which was this. *The 13. day of August 1491. after I had done my holy things, at the 20. houre of the day, there appeared to me, after their usual manner, seven men cloathed in silk garments, with cloaks after the Greek mode, with purple stockins and crimson Cassocks, red and shining on their breasts ; nor were they all thus clad, but onely two of them who were the chief. On the ruddier and taller of these two other two waited, but the less and paler had three attendants ; so that they made up seven in all. They were about fourty years of age, but lookt as if they had not reacht thirty. When they were asked who they were, they answered that they were Homines Aërii, Aëreal Men, who are born and die as we ; but that their life is much longer then ours, as reaching to 300. years. Being asked concerning the Immortality of our Souls, they answered, Nihil quod cuique proprium esset superesse : That they were of a nearer affinity with the Divi then we ; but yet infinitely different from them : and that their happiness or misery as much transcended ours, as ours does the brute Beasts. That they knew all things that are hid, whether Monies or Books. And that the lowest sort of them were the Genii of the best and noblest men, as the basest men are the trainers up of the best sort of Dogs. That the tenuity of their Bodies was such, that they can doe us neither good nor hurt, saving in what they may be able to doe by Spectres and Terrours, and impartment of Knowledge. That they were both publick Professors in an Academy, and that he of the lesser stature had 300. disciples, the other 200. Cardan's Father further asking them why they would not reveal such treasures as they knew unto men ; they answered, that there was a special law against it, upon a very grievous penalty.*

6. These *Aëreal Inhabitants* staid at least three hours with *Facius Cardanus*, disputing and arguing of sundry things, amongst which one was The

Original

Original of the World. *The taller denied that God made the world ab æterno: the lesser affirmed that he so created it every moment, that if he should desist but one moment, it would perish. Whereupon he cited some things out of the Disputations of Avenroes, which Book was not yet extant, and named several other Treatises, part whereof are known, part not, which were all of Avenroes his writing, and withall did openly profess himself to be an Avenroist.*

7. The record of this Apparition Cardan found amongst his Fathers Papers, but seems unwilling to determine whether it be a true history or a Fable, but disputes against it in such a shuffling manner, as if he was perswaded it were true, and had a mind that others should think it so. I am sure he most-what steers his course in his Metaphysical adventures according to this *Cynosura*, which is no obscure indication of his assent and belief.

See Cardan.  
de rerum varie-  
tate, lib. 16.  
cap. 93.

8. That of the Death of the great God *Pan*, you may read in *Plutarch* in his *De defectu Oraculorum*; where *Philippus*, for the proof of the Mortality of *Demons*, recites a Story which he heard from one *Æmilianus* a Roman, and one that was remov'd far enough from all either stupidity or vanity: *How his Father Epitherses being shipt for Italy, in the evening, near the Echinades, the winde failed them; and their Ship being carried by an uncertain course upon the Island Paxæ, that most of the Passengers being waken, many of them drinking merrily after Supper, there was a voice suddainly heard from the Island, which called to Thamus by name, who was an Egyptian by birth, and the Pilot of the Ship: which the Passengers much wondred at, few of them having taken notice of the Pilots name before. He was twice called to before he gave any sign that he attended to the voice, but after giving expresse attention, a clear and distinct voice was heard from the Island, uttering these words, "Ὅταν γένηται τὸ Παλῶδες, ἀπαρτῆλον, ὅτι Πάν ὁ μέγας πέθικεν. The company was much astonisht at the hearing of the voice: and after much debate amongst themselves, Thamus resolved that, if the wind blew fair, he would sail by and say nothing; but if they were becalmed there, he would doe his Message: and therefore they being becalmed when they came to Palodes, neither winde nor tide carrying them on, Thamus looking out of the poop of the Ship toward the shore, delivered his Message, telling them that the great Pan was dead. Upon which was suddainly heard as it were a joynt groaning of a multitude together, mingled with a murmurous admiration.*

9. The opinion of *Hesiod* also is, that the *Genii* or *Demons* within a certain period of years do die; but he attributes a considerable Longevity to them, to wit of nine thousand seven hundred and twenty years, which is the utmost that any allow them, most men less. *Plutarch*, under the person of others, has polisht this Opinion into a more curious and distinct dress: for out of the mortality of the *Demons*, and the several ranks which *Hesiod* mentions of *Rational Beings*, viz. *θεοὶ, δαίμονες, ἥρωες*, and *ἄνθρωποι*, he has affixed a certain manner and law of their passing out of one state into another, making them to change their Elements as well as Dignities; *Ἐπεὶ οὖν*, saith he, *μεταβολῶ τοῖς τε σώμασιν ὁμοίως ποιεῖσι καὶ ψυχαῖς, ὡς περ ἐν γῆς ὕδωρ, ἐκ τῆς ὑδατὸς ἀτὴρ, ἐκ δ' αἰθέρος πῦρ, καὶ ἀπὸ πύρρου θάνατον ἔχουσιν.*

See Plutarch.  
de Oracul.  
defectu.



ὁραταί, ἢ εἰσὶν ἄνω φερομένης ἕως ἐκ μὲν ἀνθρώπων εἰς ἡρώων, ἐκ δ' ἡρώων εἰς δαίμονας αἱ βελτίστες ψυχαὶ τὴν μέταβολὴν λαμβάνουσιν, ἐκ δ' αἰμόνων ὀλίγα μὲν ἐπὶ χρόνῳ πολλῶ δὲ ἀρετῆς καθαρθεῖσαι παντάπασι θεότητι μαίεχον. But other, he saith, μὴ κρατῆσαι ἑαυτῶν, not having sufficient command of themselves, are again wrought down into humane Bodies, to live there an evānid and obscure life, ἀλαμπῇ καὶ ἀμυδρῇ ζῶν ἵχουσαι, as he phrases it.

10. These are the most notable Testimonies for the Mortality of Demons that I have met withall, and therefore the more worth our reviewing. That Vision of *Facius Cardanus*, if it be not a Fable, contains many Paradoxes.

As first, *That these Aëreal Genii are born at set times as well as we.* Not that any she-Demons are brought to bed of them, but that they seem to have a beginning of their Existence, from which they may be reckoned to have continued, some more years and some less. A thing unconceivable, unless we should imagine that there is still a lapse or descent of Souls out of the higher Regions of the Aire into these lower, or that these that leave these Earthly Bodies pass into the number of the Aiery Demons. As neither their death can so well be understood, unless we should fancy that their Souls pass into more pure Vehicles, or else descend into Terrestrial Bodies. For *Cardan* himself acknowledges they perish not; which also is agreeable with his Opinion of the Præexistence of our Souls.

*De verum varietate lib. 16. cap. 93.*

Secondly, *That these Aëreal Genii live but about 300. years,* which is against *Hesiod* and the greatest number of the *Platonists*, unless they should speak of that particular Order themselves were of; for it is likely there may be as much difference in their ages as there is in the ages of several kinds of Birds and Beasts.

Thirdly, *That our Souls are so farre mortal, as that there is nothing proper to us remaining after death.*

Fourthly, *That they were nearer allied to the Gods then we by farre, and that there was as much difference betwixt them and us, as there is betwixt us and Beasts.* Which they must understand then concerning the excellency of their Vehicles, and the natural activity of them, not the preeminency of their Intellectual Faculties. Or if they do, they must be understood of the better sort of those *Aëreal Spirits*. Or if they mean it of all their Orders, it may be a mistake out of pride: as those that are rich and powerful as well as speculative amongst us, take it for granted that they are more judicious and discerning then the poor and despicable, let them be never so wise.

Fifthly, *That they know all secret things, whether hidden Books or Monies:* which men might doe too, if they could stand by concealedly from them that hide them.

Sixthly, *That the lowest sort of them were the Genii of the Noblest men, as the baser sort of Men are the Keepers and Educators of the better kinde of Dogs and Horses.* This clause of the Vision also is inveloped with obscurity, they having not defined whether this meanness of condition of the Tutelar Genii be to be understood in a Political or Physical sense; whether

whether the meanness of rank and power, or of natural wit and sagacity; in which many times the Groom exceeds the young Gallant who assigns him to keep his Dogs and Horses.

Seventhly, *That such is the thinness and lightness of their Bodies, that they can doe neither good nor hurt thereby, though they may send strange Sights and Terrors, and communicate Knowledge*; which then must be chiefly of such things as belong to their Aëreal Region. For concerning matters in the Sea, the Fishes, if they could speak, might inform men better then they. And for their corporeal debility, it is uncertain whether they may not pretend it, to animate their Confabulators to a more secure converse, or whether the thing be really true in some kindes of them. For that it is not in all, may be evinced by that Narration that *Cardan* a little after recites out of *Erasmus*, of the Devil that carried a Witch into the Aire, and set her on the top of a Chimney, giving her a Pot, and bidding her turn the mouth downwards, which done the whole Town was fired, and burnt down within the space of an hour. This hapned *April* the 10. *Anno* 1533. The Towns name was *Schiltach*, eight German miles distant from *Friburg*. The Story is so well attested, and guarded with such unexceptionable circumstances; that though *Cardan* love to shew his wit in cavilling at most he recites, yet he finds nothing at all to quarrel at in this.

*De Subtil.  
lib. 19.*

Eighthly, *That there are Students and Professors of Philosophy in the Aëreal World, and are divided into Sects and Opinions there, as well as we are here*. Which cannot possibly be true, unless they set some value upon Knowledge, and are at an eager loss how to finde it, and are fain to hew out their way by arguing and reasoning as we do.

Ninthly and lastly, *That they are reduced under a Political Government, and are afraid of the infliction of punishment*.

11. These are the main matters comprehended in *Facius* his Vision, which how true they all are, would be too much trouble to determine. But one clause, which is the third, I cannot let pass, it so nearly concerning the present Subject, and seeming to intercept all hopes of the Soul's Immortality. To speak therefore to the summe of the whole business; we must either conceive these Aëreal Philosophers to instruct *Facius Cardanus* as well as they could, they being guilty of nothing but a forward pride, to offer themselves as dictating Oracles to that doubtful Exorcist (for his son *Cardan* acknowledges that his Father had a form of Conjurat[i]on that a Spaniard gave him at his death;) or else we must suppose them to take the liberty of equivocating, if not of downright lying.

*De Subtil.  
lib. 19.*

Now if they had a mind to inform *Facius Cardanus* of these things directly as they themselves thought of them, it being altogether unlikely but that there appeared to them, in their Aëreal Regions, such sights as represented the persons of men here deceased, it is impossible that they should think otherwise then as we have described their Opinion, in the fore-going Chapter; that hold there is but one Soul in the World, by which all living Creatures are actuated. Which, though but a mere possibility, if so much, yet some or other of these Aëreal Speculators may as



well hold to it as some do amongst us. For *Pomponatius* and others of the *Avenroists* are as ridiculously pertinacious as they.

And therefore these *Avenroistical Demons* answered punctually according to the Conclusions of their own School, *Nihil proprium cuiquam superesse post mortem*. For the Minde or Soul being a Substance common to all, and now disunited from those Terrestrial Bodies which it actuated in *Plato*, suppose, or *Socrates*, and these Bodies dead and dissipated, and onely the common Soul of the World surviving, there being nothing but this Soul and these Bodies to make up *Socrates* and *Plato*; they conclude it is a plain case, that nothing that is proper survives after death. And therefore, though they see the representation of *Socrates* and *Plato* in the other World, owning also their own personalities, with all the Actions they did, and accidents that befell them in this life; yet according to the sullen subtilties and curiosities of their School, they may think and profess, that to speak accurately and Philosophically it is none of them, there being no Substance proper to them remaining after death, but only the Soul of the World, renewing the thoughts to her self of what appertained to those parties in this life.

12. This is one Hypothesis consistent enough with the veracity of these *Demons*; but there is also another, not at all impossible, viz. That the Vehicles of the Souls of men departed are as invisible to this Order of the *Genii* that confabulated with *Facius Cardanus* as that Order is to us: and that therefore, though there be the appearances of the Ghosts of Men deceased to them as well as to us; yet it being but for a time, it moves them no more then our confirmed *Epicureans* in this world are moved thereby: especially it being prone for them to think that they are nothing but some ludicrous spectacles that the universal Soul of the World represents to her self and other Spectatours, when, and how long a time she pleases, and the vaporous reliques of the dead body administer occasion.

Now that the Vehicles of the Souls of men departed this life, after they are come to a settled condition, may be farre thinner and more invisible then those of the fore-named *Demons*, without committing any inconcinnity in Nature, may appear from hence: For the excellency of the inward Spirit is not alwaies according to the consistency of the Element with which it does incorporate; otherwise those Fishes that are of humane shape, and are at set times taken in the Indian Sea, should have an higher degree of Reason and Religion then we that live upon Earth, and have bodies made of that Element. Whence nothing hinders but that the Spirit of man may be more noble then the Spirit of some of the *Aëreal Demons*. And Nature not alwaies running in Arithmetical, but also in Geometrical Progression, one Remove in one may reach far above what is before it for the present in the other degrees of Progression. As a creeping worm is above a cad-worm, and any four-footed beasts above the birds, till they can use their leggs as well as they; but they are no sooner even with them, but they are straight far above them, and cannot onely goe, but fly. As a Peasant is above an imprison'd Prince, and has more command; but this Prince can be no sooner set free and become even

even with the Peasant in his liberty, but he is infinitely above him. And so it may be naturally with the Souls of men when they are freed from this prison of the Body, their steps being made in Geometrical Progression, as soon as they seem equal to that Order of *Demons* we speak of, they may mount far above them in tenuity and subtilty of Body, and so become invisable to them; and therefore leave them in a capacity of falsely surmising that they are not at all, because they cannot see them.

13. But if they thought that there is either some particular Ray of the Soul of the World, that belongs peculiarly (suppose) to *Socrates* or *Plato*, or that they had proper Souls really distinct, then it is evident that they did either equivocate or lye. Which their pride and scorn of mankind (they looking upon us but as Beasts in comparison of themselves) might easily permit; they making no more conscience to deceive us, then we do to put a dodge upon a dog, to make our selves merry. But if they had a design to winde us into some dangerous error, it is very likely that they would shuffle it in amongst many Truths, that those Truths being examined, and found solid at the bottome, we might not suspect any one of their dictates to be false. Wherefore this Vision being ill meant, the poison intended was, that of the Soul's Mortality; the dangerous falseness of which opinion was to be covered by the mixture of others that are true.

14. As for that Relation of *Amilianus*, which he heard from his Father *Epitherses*, it would come still more home to the purpose, if the conclusion of the Philologers at *Rome*, after *Thamus* had been sent for, and averred the truth thereof to *Tiberius Caesar*, could be thought authentick, namely, That this *Pan*, the news of whose death *Thamus* told to the *Demons* at *Palodes*, was the Son of *Mercury* and *Penelope*; for then 'tis plain that *Pan* was an humane Soul, and therefore concerns the present question more nearly. But this Narration being applicable to a more sacred and venerable Subject, it loses so much of its force and fitness for the present use. That which *Demetrius* adds, concerning certain Holy Islands near *Britain*, had been more fit in this regard. Whither when *Demetrius* came, suddainly upon his arrival there happened a great commotion of the air, mighty tempests and prodigious whirlwinds. After the ceasing whereof, the Inhabitants pronounced, "Ὅτι τῶν ἁρετιόρων πινὸς ἐκλήψις γέγονεν, That some of a nature more then humane was dead. Upon which *Plutarch*, according to his usual Rhetorick, descants after this manner, Ὡς γὰρ λύχιν ἀναπτόμεν φάναι δὴνὸν ἐδὲν ἐχθρὸν, σενύμεν δὲ πολλοῖς λυπηρὸς ἔστιν ἕως αἱ μεγάλαι ψυχαὶ τὰς μὲν ἀναλάμψης εὐμανεῖς καὶ ἀλύπεις ἔχουσιν, αἱ δὲ σέως αὐτῶν καὶ φθορὰι πολλὰς μὲν, ὡς τυττὶ, πνέματα καὶ ζῶα: πέπτει, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ λοιμυγὰς πάθειν ἄερα φαρμάττειν, i. e. As the lighting of a lamp brings no grievance with it, but the extinction of it is offensive to many; so great Souls, while they remain kindled into life, shine forth harmlesly and benignly, but their extinction or corruption often stirs up windes and tempests, as in this present example; and often infects the Aire with pestilentiall annoiances.

De Defectu  
Oraculorum;

15. But the last Testimony is the most unexceptionable, though the least pretending to be infallible, and seems to strike dead both waies. For  
whether



whether the Souls of men that goe out of these *Earthly* bodies be Vertuous or Vitious, they must die to their *Aëreal* Vehicles. Which seems a sad story at first sight, and as if *Righteousness* could not deliver from *Death*. But if it be more carefully perused, the terrour will be found onely to concern the *Wicked*. For the profoundest pitch of *Death* is the *Descent into this Terrestrial Body*, in which, besides that we necessarily forget whatever is past, we do for the present lead ἀλαμπὴ καὶ ἀμυδρὴν ζωὴν, a dark and obscure life, as *Plutarch* speaks, dragging this weight of *Earth* along with us, as Prisoners and Malefactours do their heavy shackles in their sordid and secluse confinements. But in our return back from this state, *Life* is naturally more large to them that are prepared to make good use of that advantage they have of their *Aiery Vehicle*. But if they be not masters of themselves in that state, they will be fatally remanded back to their former Prison in process of time; which is the most gross *Death* imaginable. But for the *Good* and *Vertuous* Souls, that after many Ages change their *Aëreal Vehicle* for an *Æthereal* one, that is no *Death* to them, but an higher ascent into *Life*. And a man may as well say of an Infant, that has left the dark Wombe of his Mother, that this change of his is *Death*, as that a *Genius* dies by leaving the gross *Aire*, and emerging into that Vehicle of *Light* which they ordinarily call *Æthereal* or *Celestial*.

16. There may be therefore, by Axiome 36, a dangerous relapse out of the *Aëreal Vehicle* into the *Terrestrial*, which is properly the *Death* of the Soul that is thus retrograde. But for those that ever reach the *Æthereal state*, the periods of *Life* there are infinite; and though they may have their *Perige's* as well as *Apoge's*, yet these Circuits being of so vast a compass, and their *Perige's* so rare and short, and their return as certain to their former *Apsis* as that of the *Celestial Bodies*, and their *Æthereal* sense never leaving them in their lowest touches towards the *Earth*; it is manifest that they have arrived to that *Life* that is justly styled *Eternal*.

17. Whence it is plain, that *Perseverance in Vertue*, if no external *Fate* hinder, will carry Man to an *Immortal life*. But whether those that be thus *Heroically good*, be so by discipline and endeavour, or θεῶν πρὸς ἡμῶν, by a special favour and irresistible design of God, is not to be disputed in this place; though it be at large discussed somewhere in the Dialogues of *Plato*. But in the mean time we will not doubt to conclude, that there is no *Internal impediment* to those that are highly and *Heroically vertuous*, but that, in process of time, they may arrive to an everlasting security of *Life* and *Happiness*, after they have left this *Earthly Body*.

## CHAP. XVIII.

1. The Conflagration of the World *an Opinion of the Stoicks.* 2. *Two ways of destroying the World the Ancients have taken notice of, and especially that by Fire.* 3. *That the Conflagration of the World, so far as it respects us, is to be understood onely of the burning of the Earth.* 4. *That the Ends of the Stoicks Conflagration are competible onely to the Earth's burning.* 5. *An acknowledgement that the Earth may be burnt, though the proof thereof be impertinent to this place.* 6. *That the Conflagration thereof will prove very fatal to the Souls of Wicked men and Dæmons.* 7. *Five several Opinions concerning their state after the Conflagration; whereof the first is, That they are quite destroy'd by Fire.* 8. *The second, That they are annihilated by a special act of Omnipotency.* 9. *The third, That they lye senseless in an eternal Death.* 10. *The fourth, That they are in a perpetual furious and painful Dream.* 11. *The fifth and last, That they will revive again, and that the Earth and Aire will be inhabited by them.* 12. *That this last seems to be fram'd from the fictitious παλιγγενεσία of the Stoicks, who were very sorry Metaphysicians, and as ill Naturalists.* 13. *An Animadversion upon a self-contradicting sentence of Seneca.* 14. *The unintelligibleness of the state of the Souls of the Wicked after the Conflagration.* 15. *That the Æthereal Inhabitants will be safe. And what will then become of Good men and Dæmons on the Earth and in the Aire. And how they cannot be delivered but by a supernatural power.*

1. **A**S for the External impediments, we shall now examine them, and see of what force they will be, and whether they be at all. The former of which is *The Conflagration of the World.* Which is an ancient Opinion, believed and entertain'd, not only by Religions, but by Philosophers also, the *Stoicks* especially, who affirm that the Souls of Men do subsist indeed after Death, but cannot continue any longer in Being then to the *Conflagration of the World.* But it is not so much material what they thought, as to consider what is the condition indeed of the Souls of Men and *Dæmons* after that sad Fate.

2. Those that will not have the World eternal, have found out two ways to destroy it, *ἑδαπώσῃ* or *καυρώσῃ*, by *Water* or by *Fire.* Which, they say, does as naturally happen in a vast Period of Time, which they call *Annus Magnus*, as Winter and Summer doe in our ordinary year. *Inundatio non secus quàm Hyems, quàm Æstas lege Mundi venit.* But for this *ἑδαπώσις*, it not being so famous, nor so frequently spoken of, nor so destructive, nor so likely to end the World as the other way, nor belonging so properly to our enquiry, we shall let it pass. The general prognostick is concerning *Fire* now, not onely of the *Stoicks*, as *Zeno*, *Cleanthes*, *Chrysippus*, *Seneca*; but of several also of different Sects, as *Heraclitus*, *Epicurus*, *Cicero*, *Pliny*, *Aristocles*, *Numenius*, and sundry others.

Seneca apud  
Lipl. Physilog.  
Stoic. lib. 2.  
Dissert. 21.

3. But



Lipf. Physiolog.  
Stoic. lib. 2.  
Dissert. 22.

3. But though there be so great and unanimous consent that *the World shall be burnt*, yet they do not express themselves all alike in the business. *Seneca's* vote is the most madly explicate of any, making the very Stars run and dash one against another, and so set all on fire. But *Posidonius* and *Panetius* had more wit, who did not hold that ἐκπύρωσις τῆς οἰκουμένης which the other *Stoicks* did. For the destroying of the *Aethereal* Regions by *Fire* is as foolish a fancy as the sentencing of the *Eele* to be drown'd, because the matter of the *Aether* is too fine and subtile for *Fire* to rage in, it being indeed nothing but a pure Light or *Fire* it self. And yet this *Aethereal* Matter is infinitely the greatest portion of the *World*. Wherefore the *World* cannot be said properly to be lyable to the destruction of *Fire* from any natural causes, as the *Stoicks* would have it. Which is demonstratively true upon *Des-Cartes* his Principles, who makes *Fire* nothing but the motion of certain little particles of Matter, and holds that there is no more motion at one time in the *World* then at another; because one part of the Matter cannot impress any agitation upon another, but it must lose so much it self. This hideous noise therefore of the *Conflagration of the World* must be restrain'd to the firing of the *Earth* onely, so farre as it concerns us. For there is nothing else combustible in the *Universe* but the *Earth*, and other *Planets*, and what *Vapours* and *Exhalations* arise from them.

Lipf. Physiolog.  
Stoicor. lib. 2.  
Dissert. 22.

4. This *Conflagration* therefore that *Philosophers*, *Poets*, *Sibyls*, and all have fill'd the *World* with the fame of, is nothing but the burning of the *Earth*. And the ends the *Stoicks* pretend of their ἐκπύρωσις may be competible to it, but not to the burning of the *Heavens* or *Aether* at all; as any but meanly skilled in *Philosophy* cannot but acknowledge. For their nature is so simple that they cannot corrupt, and therefore want no renovation, as the *Earth* does. Nor do the *Inhabitants* of those *Heavenly* Regions defile themselves with any vice; or if they do, they sink from their material station as well as moral, and fall towards these terrestrial dreggs. And therefore that part of the happy ἀνθρώπων Seneca speaks of, *Omne animal ex integro generabitur, dabiturque terris homo inscius scelerum, & melioribus auspiciis natus*, will take no place with those *Aethereal* Creatures.

5. We are willing then to be born down, by this common and loud cry of *Fire* that must burn the *World*, into an acknowledgment that the *Earth* may within a certain Period of time be burnt, with all those things that are upon it or near it. But what concurse of natural causes may contribute to this dismal spectacle, is not proper for me to dispute, especially in this place. I shall onely take a view of what sad effects this *Conflagration* may have upon the *Souls* of *Demons* and *Men*. For that those that have recovered their *Aethereal* Vehicles are exempt from this fate, is evident; the remoteness of their habitation securing them from both the rage and noisomeness of these sulphureous flames.

6. The most certain and most destructive execution that this *Fire* will doe, must be upon the unrecovered *Souls* of *Wicked Men* and *Demons*; those that are so deeply sunk and drown'd εἰς γέρεον, that the very consistency

consistency of their Vehicles does imprison them within the confines of this thick caliginous Aire. These Souls or Spirits therefore that have so inextricably entangled themselves in the Fate of this lower World, giving up all their Senses to the momentary pleasures of the most luxurious Principle, which is the very seat of Death, these, in the Mystical Philosophy of the Ancients, are the *Nymphs*, to whom though they allot a long Series of years, yet they do not exempt them from mortality and fate. And *Demetrius* in *Plutarch* pronounces expressly out of *Hesiod*, that their Life will be terminated with the *Conflagration* of the World, from what the Poet intimates *Enigmatically*, *Καὶ ὁ λόγος ὅλος ἡνίχθαι δοκεῖ τῷ Ἡσίοδῳ πρὸς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν, ὅτι πῦρ κατακλέπει τοὺς ὕδατας εἰς τὰς Νύμφας,*

— Αἱ τ' ἄλσα καλὰ νέμονται

Καὶ πηγὰς ποταμῶν καὶ πείσεα ποιήεντα.

7. But to leave these Poetical Riddles, and take a more serious and distinct view of the condition of the Soul after the *Conflagration* of the Earth; we shall finde five several sorts of Opinions concerning it. The first hold, *That this unmerciful heat and fire will at last destroy and consume the Soul as well as the Body.* But this seems to me impossible, that any created Substance should utterly destroy another Substance, so as to reduce it to nothing. For no part of *Matter*, acting the most furiously upon another part thereof, does effect that. It can onely attenuate, dissipate and disperse the parts, and make them invisible. But the Substance of the Soul is *indissipable* and *indiscerpible*, and therefore remains entire, whatever becomes of the Body or Vehicle.

8. The second Opinion is, *That after long and tedious torture in these flames, the Soul by a special act of Omnipotency is annihilated.* But, methinks, this is to put Providence too much to her shifts, as if God were so brought to a plunge in his creating a Creature of it self Immortal, that he must be fain to *uncreate* it again, that is to say, to *annihilate* it. Besides that that Divine *Nemesis* that lies within the compass of Philosophy, never supposes any such forcible eruptions of the Deity into extraordinary effects, but that all things are brought about by a wise and infallible or inevitable train of secondary Causes, whether natural or free Agents.

9. The third therefore, to avoid these absurdities, denies both *absorption by Fire* and *annihilation*; but conceives, *That tediousness and extremity of pain makes the Soul at last, of her self, shrink from all commerce with Matter*; the immediate Principle of Union, which we call *Vital Congruity*, consisting of a certain modification of the Body or Vehicle as well as of the Soul, which being spoiled and lost, and the Soul thereby quite loosned from all sympathy with Body or Matter, *she becomes perfectly dead, and senseless to all things*, by Axiome 36, and, as they say, *will so remain for ever.* But this seems not so rational; for, as *Aristotle* somewhere has it, *Ἐκαστον, ἃ ἔστιν ἐνέργεια, ἔστιν ἕνεκα τῆς ἐργασίας.* Wherefore so many entire Immaterial Substances would be continued in Being to all Eternity to no end nor purpose, notwithstanding they may be made use of, and actuate Matter again as well as ever.

10. A fourth sort therefore of Speculators there is, who conceive



that after this solution of the Souls or Spirits of *Wicked Men* and *Demons* from their Vehicles; *That their pain is continued to them even in that separate state, they falling into an unquiet sleep, full of furious tormenting Dreams, that act as fiercely upon their Spirits as the external Fire did upon their Bodies.* But others except against this Opinion as a very uncertain Conjecture, it supposing that which to them seems not so sound, *viz.* That the Soul can act when it has lost all vital Union with the Matter; which seems repugnant with that so intimate and essential aptitude it has to be united therewith. And the Dreams of the Soul in the Body are not transacted without the help of the Animal Spirits in the Brain, they usually symbolizing with their temper. Whence they conclude, that there is no certain ground to establish this Opinion upon.

11. The last therefore, to make all sure, that there may be no inconvenience in admitting that the Souls or Spirits as well of *evil Demons* as *wicked Men*, disjoyned from their Vehicles by the force of that fatal *Conflagration*, may subsist, have excogitated an odde and unexpected Hypothesis, *That when this firing of the World has done due execution upon that unfortunate Crue, and tedious and direful torture has wearied their afflicted Ghosts into an utter recess from all Matter, and thereby into a profound sleep or death; that after a long Series of years, when not onely the fury of the Fire is utterly slaked, but that vast Atmosphere of smoak and vapours, which was sent up during the time of the Earths Conflagration, has returned back in copious showres of rain (which will again make Seas and Rivers, will binde and consolidate the ground, and, falling exceeding plentifully all over, make the soil pleasant and fruitful, and the Aire cool and wholsome) that Nature recovering thus to her advantage, and becoming youthful again, and full of genital salt and moisture, the Souls of all living Creatures belonging to these lower Regions of the Earth and Aire will awaken orderly in their proper places: The Seas and Rivers will be again replenished with Fish; the Earth will send forth all manner of Fowls, four-footed Beasts, and creeping things; and the Souls of Men also shall then catch life from the more pure and balsamick parts of the Earth, and be clothed again in terrestrial Bodies; and lastly, the Aëreal Genii, that Element becoming again wholsome and vital, shall, in due order and time, awaken and revive in the cool rorid Aire.* Which Expergefaction into life is accompanied, say they, with propensions answerable to those resolutions they made with themselves in those fiery torments, and with which they fell into their long sleep.

12. But the whole Hypothesis seems to be framed out of that dream of the *Stoicks*, concerning the *ἀποκατάστασις* or *παλιγγενεσία* of the World after the *ἀνάστασις* or *ἐκπόρευσις* thereof. As if that of *Seneca* belonged to this case, *Epist. 36. Mors, quam pertimescimus ac recusamus, intermittit vitam, non eripit. Veniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponet dies, quem multi recusarent, nisi oblitos reduceret.* But how courly the *Stoicks* Philosophize when they are once turned out of their rode-way of moral Sentences, any one but moderately skilled in Nature and Metaphysicks may easily discern. For what Errors can be more gross then those that they entertain of *God*, of the *Soul*, and of the *Stars*? they making the two former Corporeal Substances, and feeding the latter with the Vapours of the Earth;

Earth; affirming that the Sun sips up the water of the great Ocean to quench his thirst, but that the Moon drinks off the lesser Rivers and Brooks; which is as true as that the As drunk up the Moon. Such conceits are more fit for *Anacreon* in a drunken fit to stumble upon, who to invite his Companions to tipples, composed that Catch,

Πίνε δάλασσα δ' αὔρας,

Ὅ δ' ἥλιος δάλασσαν,

then for to be either found out or owned by a serious and sober Philosopher. And yet *Seneca* mightily triumphs in this notion of foddering the Stars with the thick foggs of the Earth, and declares his opinion with no mean strains of eloquence: but I loving solid sense better then fine words, shall not take the pains to recite them.

13. At what a pitch his Understanding was set, may be easily discerned by my last quotation, wherein there seems a palpable contradiction. *Veniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponet dies, quem multi recusarent, nisi oblitos reduceret.* If *nos*, how *oblitos*? If *oblitos*, how *nos*? For we are not we, unless we remember that we are so. And if mad-men may be said, and that truly, to be besides themselves, or not to be themselves, because they have lost their wits; certainly they will be far from being themselves that have quite lost the Memory of themselves, but must be as if they had never been before. As *Lucretius* has excellently well declared himself;

*Nec, si materiam nostram conlegerit atas*

*Post obitum, rursumque redegerit ut sita nunc est,*

*Atque iterum nobis fuerint data lumina vita,*

*Pertineat quicquam tamen ad nos id quoque factum,*

*Interrupta semel cum sit retinentia nostri.*

*De rerum natura, lib. 3.*

Where the Poet seems industriously to explode all the hopes of any benefit of this *Stoical παλιγγενεσία*, and to profess that he is as if he had never been, that cannot remember he has ever been before. From whence it would follow, that though the Souls of men should revive after the *Conflagration* of the World, yet they have not escaped a perpetual and permanent death.

14. We see therefore how desperately undemonstrable the condition of the Soul is after the *Conflagration* of the Earth, all these five Opinions being accompanied with so much lubricity and uncertainty. And therefore they are to be looked upon rather as some Night-landskap to feed our amused Melancholy, then a clear and distinct draught of comprehensible Truth to inform our Judgment.

15. All that we can be assured of is, That those Souls that have obtained their *Aethereal Vehicles* are out of the reach of that sad fate that follows this *Conflagration*; and That the wicked Souls of Men and Demons will be involved in it. But there are a middle sort betwixt these, concerning whom not only curiosity but good will would make a man solicitous. For it is possible, that the *Conflagration* of the World may surprise many thousands of Souls, that neither the course of Time, nor Nature, nor any higher Principle has wrought up into an *Aethereal Congruity* of life, but yet may be very holy, innocent and vertuous.



Which we may easily believe, if we consider that these very *Earthly Bodies* are not so great impediments to the goodness and sincerity of the Mind, but that many, even in this life, have given great examples thereof. Nor can that *Aëreal* state be less capable of, nor well be without, the *good Genii*, no more then the Earth without *good men*, who are the most immediate Ministers of the Goodness and Justice of God. But exemption from certain fates in the world is not alwaies entailed upon *Innocency*, but most ordinarily upon *natural power*. And therefore there may be numbers of the *good Genii*, and of very holy and innocuous Spirits of men departed, the consistency of whose Vehicles may be such, that they can no more quit these *Aëreal* Regions, then we can fly into them, that have heavy bodies, without wings. To say nothing of those vertuous and pious men that may haply be then found alive, and so be liable to be overtaken by this storm of Fire.

Undoubtedly, unless there appear, before the approach of this fate, some visible *Zeus σωτήρ* or *Jupiter Sospitator*, as the heathens would call him, they must necessarily be involved in the ruine of the wicked. Which would be a great eye-sore in that exact and irreprehensible frame of Providence, that all men promise to themselves who acknowledge That there is a God. Wherefore according to the light of Reason, there must be some Supernatural means to rescue those innocuous and benign Spirits out of this common calamity. But to describe the manner of it here how it must be done, would be to entitle natural Light and Philosophy to greater abilities then they are guilty of; and therefore that Subject must be reserved for its proper place.

## CHAP. XIX.

1. *That the Extinction of the Sun is no Panick feare, but may be rationally suspected from the Records of History and grounds of Natural Philosophy.*
2. *The sad Influence of this Extinction upon Man and Beast, and all the Aëreal Dæmons imprison'd within their several Atmospheres in our Vortex,*
3. *That it will doe little or no damage to the Aethereal Inhabitants in reference to heat or warmth.*
4. *Nor will they find much want of his light.*
5. *And if they did, they may pass out of one Vortex into another, by the Priviledge of their Aethereal Vehicles;*
6. *And that without any labour or toile, and as maturely as they please.*
7. *The vast incomprehensibleness of the tracts and compasses of the waies of Providence.*
8. *A short Recapitulation of the whole Discourse.*
9. *An Explication of the Persians two Principles of Light and Darknes, which they called Θεός and Δαίμων, and when and where the Principle of Light gets the full victory.*
10. *That Philosophy, or something more sacred then Philosophy, is the onely Guide to a true Αποδείξις.*

1. **T**HE last danger that threatens the *Separate Soul* is the *Extinction of the Sun*; which though it may seem a mere *Panick* fear at first sight, yet if the matter be examined, there will appear no contemptible reasons that may induce men to suspect that it may at last fall

fall out, there having been, at certain times, such near offers in Nature towards this sad accident already. *Pliny*, though he instances but in one example, yet speaks of it as a thing that several times comes to pass. *Fiunt*, saith he, *prodigiosi & longiores Solis defectus, qualis occiso Dictatore Cesare, & Antoniano bello, totius anni pallore continuo*. The like happened in *Justinian's* time, as *Cedrenus* writes; when, for a whole year together, the Sun was of a very dim and dusky hue, as if he had been in a perpetuall Eclipse. And in the time of *Irene* the Empress it was so dark for seventeen dayes together, that the ships lost their way on the sea, and were ready to run against one another, as *Theophanes* relates. But the late accurate discovery of the Spots of the Sun by *Shiner*, and the appearing & disappearing of fixt Stars, & the excursions of Comets into the remoter parts of our *Vortex*, as also the very intrinsecal contexture of that admirable Philosophy of *Des-Cartes*, do argue it more then possible that, after some vast periods of time, the Sun may be so inextricably enveloped by the *Macula* that he is never free from, that he may quite lose his light.

Natural.  
Hijlor. lib. 2.  
cap. 30.

2. The Preambles of which *Extinction* will be very hideous, and intolerable to all the Inhabitants of the Planets in our *Vortex*, if the Planets have then any Inhabitants at all. For this defect of light and heat coming on by degrees, must needs weary out poor mortals with heavy languishments, both for want of the comfort of the usual warmth of the Sun; whereby the Bodies of men are recreated, and also by reason of his inability to ripen the fruits of the Soil; whence necessarily must follow Famine, Plagues, Sickneesses, and at length an utter devastation and destruction of both *Man* and *Beasts*.

Nor can the *Aëreal Demons* scape free, but that the *vital tye* to their Vehicles necessarily confining them to their several *Atmospheres*, they will be inevitably imprisoned in more then *Cimmerian* darkness. For the *Extinction of the Sun* will put out the light of all their *Moons*, and nothing but Ice, and Frost, and flakes of Snow, and thick mists, as palpable as that of *Egypt*, will possess the Regions of their habitation. Of which sad spectacle though those twinkling eyes of heaven, the Stars, might be compassionate spectators; yet they cannot send out one ray of light to succour or visit them, their tender and remote beams not being able to pierce, much less to dissipate, the clammy and stiff consistency of that long and fatal Night.

3. Wherefore calling our mind off from so dismal a sight, let us place it upon a more hopeful Object; and consider the condition of those Souls that have arrived to their *Æthereal Vehicle*, and see how far this fate can take hold of them. And it is plain at first sight, that they are out of the reach of this misty dungeon, as being already mounted into the secure mansions of the purer *Æther*.

The worst that can be imagined of them is, that they may finde themselves in a condition something like that of ours when we walk out in a clear, starlight, frosty night, which to them that are sound is rather a pleasure then offence. And if we can bear it with some delight in these Earthly Bodies, whose parts will grow hard and stiff for want of due heat, it can prove nothing else but a new modification of actual pleasure



to those *Æthereal Inhabitants* whose bodies are not conſtituted as ours, but are themſelves a kinde of *agile light and fire*.

All that can be conceived is, that the ſpherical particles of their Vehicles may ſtand a little more cloſely and firmly together then uſual, whence the triangular intervalls being more ſtraight, the ſubtleſt element will move ſomething more quick in them, which will raiſe a ſenſe of greater vigour and alacrity then uſual. So little formidable is this fate to them in this regard.

4. But their light, you'l ſay, will be obſcured, *the Sun being put out*, whoſe ſhining ſeems to concern the *Gods* as well as *Men*, as *Homer* would intimate,

Ἦενυθ' ἴν' ἀθανάτοισι φάος φέρη' ἢ δὲ βροτοῖσι.

But I anſwer, that that of *Homer* is chiefly to be underſtood of the *Æthereal Demons*, not the *Æthereal Deities*, who can turn themſelves into a pure actual Light when they pleaſe. So that there is no fear but that their perſonal converſe will be as chearful and diſtinct as before, white letters being as legible upon black paper as black upon white. But this is to ſuppoſe them in the dark, which they are not, but in a more ſoft and mild light, which is but a change of pleaſure, as it is to ſee the Moon ſhine fair into a room after the putting out of the Candle. And certainly the contribution of the light of the Stars is more to their quick and tender Senſes, then the cleareſt Moon-ſhine night is to ours; though we ſhould ſuppoſe them no nearer any Star then we are. But ſuch great changes as theſe may have their conveniences for ſuch as Providence will favour, as well as their inconveniences. And the *Extinction of our Sun* may be the Augmentation of Light in ſome Star of a neighbouring *Vortex*. Which though it may not be able to pierce thoſe *Cimmerian Priſons* I ſpoke of before, yet it may give ſufficient light to theſe *Spirits* that are free. Beſides that the Diſcription and ſpoil of our *Vortex*, that will then happen, will neceſſarily bring us very much nearer the Centre of ſome other, whoſe Star will adminiſter ſufficient light to the *Æthereal Genii*, though it be too weak to relieve the *Æthereal*.

And that ſo remote a diſtance from theſe central Luminaries of the *Vortices* is conſiſtent with the perfecteſt happineſs; we may diſcern partly, in that the Celeſtial Matter above *Saturn*, till the very marge of the *Vortex*, is more ſtrongly agitated then that betwixt him and the Sun, and therefore has leſs need of the Sun's beams to conſerve its agility and liquidity; and partly, in that thoſe huge vaſt Regions of *Æther* would be loſt, and in vain in a manner, if they were not frequented by *Æthereal Inhabitants*; which in all reaſon and likelihood are of the nobleſt kind, according to the nature of their Element. And therefore all the *Æthereal People* may retire thither upon ſuch an exigency as this, and there reſt ſecure in joy and happineſs, in theſe true *Intermundia Decorum* which *Epicurus* dream'd of.

5. Which we may eaſily admit, if we conſider the grand Priviledges of the *Æthereal Vehicle*, wherein ſo great a power of the Soul is awakened, that ſhe can moderate the motion of the particles thereof as ſhe pleaſes, by adding or diminifhing the degrees of agitation, Axiome 32. where-  
by

by she is also able to temper the solidity thereof, and, according to this contemperation of her Vehicle, to ascend or descend in the *Vortex* as she lifts her self, and that with a great variety of swiftness, according to her own pleasure. By the improvement of which Priviledge she may also, if she please, pass from one *Vortex* into another, and receive the warmth of a new *Vesta*, so that no fate imaginable shall be ever able to lay hold upon her.

6. Nor will this be any more labour to her then sailing down the stream. For she, having once fitted the agitation and solidity of her *Vehicle* for her Celestial voiage, will be as naturally carried whither she is bound, as a stone goes downward, or the fire upward. So that there is no fear of any lassitude, no more then by being rowed in a Boat, or carried in a Sedan. For the Celestial Matter that environs her Vehicle works her upward or downward, toward the Centre or from the Centre of a *Vortex*, at its own proper pains and charges. Lastly, such is the tenuity and subtilty of the Senses of the *Æthereal* Inhabitants, that their prevision and sagacity must be, beyond all conceit, above that of ours; besides that there will be warnings and premonitions of this future disaster, both many, and those very visible and continued, before the Sun shall fail so far as that they shall at all be concerned in his decay; so that the least blast of misfortune shall never be able to blow upon them, nor the least evil imaginable overtake them.

7. This is a small glance at the Mysteries of Providence, whose fetches are so large, and Circuits so immense, that they may very well seem utterly incomprehensible to the *Incredulous* and *Idiots*, who are exceeding prone to think that all things will ever be as they are, and desire they should be so: though it be as rude and irrational, as if one that comes into a *Ball*, and is taken much with the first Dance he sees, would have none danced but that, or have them move no further one from another then they did when he first came into the room; whenas they are to trace nearer one another, or further off, according to the measures of the Musick, and the law of the Dance they are in. And the whole Matter of the Universe, and all the parts thereof, are ever upon Motion, and in such a Dance, as whose traces backwards and forwards take a vast compass; and what seems to have made the longest stand, must again move, according to the modulations and accents of that Musick, that is indeed out of the hearing of the acuteest ears, but yet perceptible by the purest Minds and the sharpest Wits. The truth whereof none would dare to oppose, if the breath of the gainsayer could but tell its own story, and declare through how many *Stars* and *Vortices* it has been strained, before the particles thereof met, to be abused to the framing of so rash a contradiction.

8. We have now finisht our whole *Discourse*, the summary result whereof is this; *That there is an Incorporeal Substance, and that in Man, which we call his Soul. That this Soul of his subsists and acts after the death of his Body, and that usually first in an Aëreal Vehicle, as other Demons do; wherein she is not quite exempt from fate, but is then perfect and secure when she has obtain'd her Æthereal one, she being then out of the reach*



of that evil Principle, whose dominion is commensurable with misery and death. Which power the *Persian Magi* termed *Arimanius*, and resembled him to *Darkness*, as the other good Principle, which they called *Oromazes*, to *Light*, styling one by the name of Δαίμων, the other by the name of Θεός.

9. Of which there can be no other meaning that will prove allowable, but an adumbration of those two grand parts of Providence, the one working in the *Demoniacal*, the other in the *Divine Orders*. Betwixt which natures there is perpetually more or less strife and contest, both inwardly and outwardly. But if *Theopompus* his prophecy be true in *Plutarch*, who was initiated into these *Arcana*, the power of the *Benign Principle* will get the upper hand at last, Τέλ.Θ. ὃ ἀπολείπειται τ' αἶδω, &c. At length *Hades* or *Arimanius* will be left in the lurch, who so strongly holds us captive, καὶ τὲς μὲν ἀνθρώποις εὐδαιμόνας ἔσεσθαι, μήτε τροφῆς δεομένους, μήτε σκιάν ποιῶντας, and men shall then be perfectly happy, needing no food, nor casting any shadow. For what shadow can that Body cast that is a pure and transparent light, such as the *Ethereal Vehicle* is? And therefore that Oracle is then fulfilled, when the Soul has ascended into that condition we have already described, in which alone it is out of the reach of *Fate* and *Mortality*.

10. This is the true Ἀποθέωσις, to speak according to the *Persian Language*, with whose empty title Emperours and great Potentates of the Earth have been ambitious to adorn their memory after death; but is so high a Privilege of the Soul of Man, that mere *Political* vertues, as *Plotinus* calls them, can never advance her to that pitch of Happiness. Either Philosophy, or something more sacred then Philosophy, must be her Guide to so transcendent a condition. And not being curious to dispute, whether the *Pythagoreans* ever arrived to it by living according to the precepts of their Master, I shall notwithstanding with confidence averre, that what they aimed at, is the sublimest felicity our nature is capable of, and being the utmost Discovery this *Treatise* could pretend to, I shall conclude all with a *Distich* of theirs (which I have elsewhere taken notice of upon like occasion) it comprehending the furthest scope, not onely of their Philosophy, but of this present Discourse.

Ἦν δ' ἀπολείψας σῶμα ἐς αἰθέρ' ἐλεύθερον ἔλθης,  
Ἔσσεαι ἀθάνατος, διὸς ἀμβροτός, ἔνετι θνήσκος.

To this sense,

Who after death once reach th' *Ethereal Plain*,  
Are straight made Gods, and never die again.

Plutarch. de  
Iside & Os-  
ride.

# The CONTENTS of the several Chapters contained in this Treatise.

## The P R E F A C E.

1. **T**HE Title of the Discourse how it is to be understood. fol. 1
2. The Author's submission of his whole Treatise to the infallible Rule of Sacred Writ. 2
3. A plain and compendious Demonstration that Matter consists of parts indiscernible. 3
4. An Answer to an Objection touching his Demonstration against the Sun's superintendency over the affairs of the Earth. 4
5. A confirmation of M<sup>r</sup> Hobbs his Opinion, That Perception is really one with Corporeal Motion and Re-action, if there be nothing but Matter in the World. 5
6. An Apologie for the Vehicles of Dæmons and Souls separate. 6
7. As also for his so punctually describing the State of the other life, and so curiously defining the nature of a particular Spirit. 7
8. That his Elysiums he describes are not at all Sensual, but Divine. 8
9. That he has not made the State of the wicked too easy for them in the other world. *ibid.*
10. That it is not one Universal Soul that bears, sees and reasons in every man, demonstrated from the Acts of Memory. 9
11. Of the Spirit of Nature; that it is no obscure Principle, nor unseasonably introduced. 11
12. That he has absolutely demonstrated the Existence thereof. 12
13. That the admission of that Principle need be no hinderance to the progress of Mechanick Philosophy. *ibid.*
14. The great pleasure of that study to pious and rational persons. 13
15. Of what concernment it would be if Des-Cartes were generally read in all

the Universities of Christendome. *ibid.*  
16. An excuse of the prolixity of his Preface from his earnest desire of gratifying the publick, without the least offence to any rational or ingenuous Spirit. *ibid.*

## Book I.

CHAP. I. 1. **T**HE Usefulness of the present Speculation for the understanding of Providence; and the management of our lives for our greatest Happiness; 2. For the moderate bearing the death and disasters of our Friends; 3. For the begetting true Magnanimity in us, 4. and Peace and Tranquillity of Mind. 5. That so weighty a Theory is not to be handled perfunctorily. 15

CHAP. II. 1. That the Soul's Immortality is demonstrable, by the Authors method, to all but mere Scepticks. 2. An Illustration of his First Axiom. 3. A confirmation and example of the Second. 4. An explication of the Third. 5. An explication and proof of the Fourth. 6. A proof of the Fifth. 7. Of the Sixth. 8. An example of the Seventh. 9. A confirmation of the truth of the Eighth. 10. A demonstration and example of the Ninth. 11. Penetrability the immediate Property of Incorporeal Substance. 12. As also Indiscernibility. 13. A proof and illustration of the Tenth Axiome. 16

CHAP. III. 1. The general Notions of Body and Spirit. 2. That the Notion of Spirit is altogether as intelligible as that of Body. 3. Whether there be any Substance of a mixt nature, betwixt Body and Spirit. 21

CHAP. IV. 1. That the Notions of the several kinds of Immaterial Beings have



# The CONTENTS.

have no Inconsistency nor Incongruity in them. 2. That the Nature of God is as intelligible as the Nature of any Being whatsoever. 3. The true Notion of his Ubiquity, and how intelligible it is. 4. Of the Union of the Divine Essence. 5. Of his Power of Creation.

23

CHAP. V. 1. The Definition belonging to all Finite and Created Spirits. 2. Of Indiscernibility, a Symbolical representation thereof. 3. An Objection answered against that representation.

24

CHAP. VI. 1. Axiomes that tend to the demonstrating how the Centre or First point of the Primary Substance of a Spirit may be Indiscernible. 2. Several others that demonstrate how the Secondary Substance of a Spirit may be Indiscernible. 3. An application of these Principles. 4. Of the union of the Secondary Substance considered transversely. 5. That the Notion of a Spirit has less difficulty then that of Matter. 6. An answer to an Objection from the Rational faculty. 7. Answers to Objections suggested from Fancy. 8. A more compendious satisfaction concerning the Notion of a Spirit.

26

CHAP. VII. 1. Of the Self-motion of a Spirit. 2. Of Self-penetration. 3. Of Self-contraction and dilatation. 4. The power of penetrating of Matter. 5. The power of moving, 6. And of altering the Matter.

31

CHAP. VIII. 1. Four main Species of Spirits. 2. How they are to be defined. 3. The definition of a Seminal Form; 4. Of the Soul of a Brute; 5. Of the Soul of a Man. 6. The difference betwixt the Soul of an Angel and an Humane Soul. 7. The definition of an Angelical Soul. 8. Of the Platonic Nôes and 'Evâdes. 9. That Des-Cartes his Demonstration of the Existence of the Humane Soul does at least conclude the possibility of a Spirit.

34

CHAP. IX. 1. That it is of no small consequence to have proved the Possibility

of the Existence of a Spirit. 2. The necessity of examining of M<sup>r</sup> Hobbs his Reasons to the contrary. 3. The first Excerption out of M<sup>r</sup> Hobbs. 4. The second Excerption. 5. The third. 6. The fourth. 7. The fifth. 8. The sixth. 9. The seventh. 10. The eighth and last Excerption.

36

CHAP. X. 1. An Answer to the first Excerption. 2. To the second. 3. An Answer to the third. 4. To the fourth Excerption. 5. An Answer to the fifth. 6. To the sixth. 7. To the seventh. 8. An Answer to the eighth and last. 9. A brief Recapitulation of what has been said hitherto.

39

CHAP. XI. 1. Three grounds to prove the Existence of an Immaterial Substance, whereof the first is fetcht from the Nature of God. 2. The second from the Phenomenon of Motion in the World. 3. That the Matter is not Self-movable. 4. An Objection that the Matter may be part Self-moved, part not. 5. The first Answer to the Objection. 6. The second Answer. 7. Other Evasions answered. 8. The last Evasion of all answered. 9. The Conclusion, That no Matter is Self-moved, but that a certain quantity of motion was impressed upon it at its first Creation by God.

44

CHAP. XII. 1. That the Order and Nature of things in the Universe argue an Essence Spiritual or Incorporeal. 2. The Evasion of this Argument. 3. A preparation out of M<sup>r</sup> Hobbs to answer the Evasion. 4. The first Answer. 5. The second Answer. 6. M<sup>r</sup> Hobbs his mistake, of making the Ignorance of Second Causes the onely Seed of Religion.

48

CHAP. XIII. 1. The last proof of Incorporeal Substances, from Apparitions. 2. The first Evasion of the force of such Arguings. 3. An Answer to that Evasion. 4. The second Evasion. 5. The first kind of the second Evasion. 6. A description out of Virgil of that Genius that suggests the dictates of the Epicurean Philosophy.

7. The

# The CONTENTS.

7. *The more full and refined sense of that Philosophy now-a-days.* 8. *The great efficacy of the Stars (which they suppose to consist of nothing but Motion and Matter) for production of all manner of Creatures in the world.* 50

CHAP. XIV. 1. *That the Splendor of the Celestial Bodies proves no Fore-sight nor Sovereignty that they have over us.* 2. *That the Stars can have no knowledge of us, Mathematically demonstrated.* 3. *The same Conclusion again demonstrated more familiarly.* 4. *That the Stars cannot communicate Thoughts, neither with the Sun nor with one another.* 5. *That the Sun has no knowledge of our affairs.* 6. *Principles laid down for the inferring that Conclusion.* 7. *A demonstration that he cannot see us.* 8. *That he can have no other kind of knowledge of us, nor of the frame of any Animal on Earth.* 9. *That though the Sun had the knowledge of the right frame of an Animal, he could not transmit it into Terrestrial matter.* 10. *An Answer to that Instance of the Signature of the Fœtus.* 11, 12. *Further Answers thereto.* 13. *A short Inception of the confident Exploders of Incorporal Substance out of the world.* 53.

*swer thereto.* 13. *A second Answer.* 14. *A third Answer, wherein is mainly contained a confirmation of the first Answer to the second Evasion.* 15. *The plainness of the sixth Axiome.* 16. *The proof of the seventh.* 58

CHAP. II. 1. *That if Matter be capable of Sense, Inanimate things are so too: And of M<sup>r</sup> Hobbs his wavering in that point.* 2. *An Enumeration of several Faculties in us that Matter is utterly incapable of.* 3. *That Matter in no kind of Temperature is capable of Sense.* 4. *That no one point of Matter can be the Common Sensorium.* 5. *Nor a multitude of such Points receiving singly the entire image of the Object.* 6. *Nor yet receiving part part, and the whole the whole.* 7. *That Memory is incompatible to Matter.* 8. *That the Matter is incapable of the notes of some circumstances of the Object which we remembred.* 9. *That Matter cannot be the Seat of Second Notions.* 10. *M<sup>r</sup> Hobbs his Evasion of the foregoing Demonstration clearly confuted.* 11. *That the Freedom of our Will evinces that there is a Substance in us distinct from Matter.* 12. *That M<sup>r</sup> Hobbs therefore acknowledges all our actions necessary.* 65

## Book II.

CHAP. I. 1. **A**N addition of more Axioms for the demonstrating that there is a Spirit or Immaterial Substance in Man. 2. *The Truth of the first of these Axiomes confirmed from the testimony of M<sup>r</sup> Hobbs, as well as demonstrated in the Preface.* 3, 4. *That Demonstration further cleared and evinced by answering a certain Evasion.* 5. *The proof of the second Axiome.* 6. *The proof of the third.* 7. *The confirmation of the fourth from the testimony of M<sup>r</sup> Hobbs, as also from Reason.* 8. *An explication and proof of the fifth.* 9. *A further proof of the Truth thereof.* 10. *An Answer to an Evasion.* 11. *Another Evasion answered.* 12. *A further management of this first An-*

CHAP. III. 1. *M<sup>r</sup> Hobbs his Arguments whereby he would prove all our actions necessitated. His first Argument.* 2. *His second Argument.* 3. *His third Argument.* 4. *His fourth Argument.* 5. *What must be the meaning of these words, Nothing taketh beginning from it self, in the first Argument of M<sup>r</sup> Hobbs.* 6. *A fuller and more determinate explication of the foregoing words; whose sense is evidently convinced to be, That no Essence of it self can vary its modification.* 7. *That this is only said by M<sup>r</sup> Hobbs, not proved, and a full confutation of his Assertion.* 8. *M<sup>r</sup> Hobbs imposed upon by his own Sophistry.* 9. *That one part of this first Argument of his is groundless; the other sophistical.* 10. *The plain proposal of his Argument, whence appears more fully the Weakness and sophistry thereof.* 11. *An Answer.*



## The CONTENTS.

*Answer to his second Argument.*

12. *An Answer to the third.* 13. *An Answer to a difficulty concerning the Truth and Falshood of future Propositions.* 14. *An Answer to M<sup>r</sup> Hobbs his fourth Argument, which, though slighted by himself, is the strongest of them all.* 15. *The difficulty of reconciling Free-will with Divine Prescience and Prophecies.* 16. *That the faculty of Free-will is seldome put in use.* 17. *That the use of it is properly in Moral conflict.* 18. *That the Soul is not invincible there neither.* 19. *That Divine decrees either finde fit Instruments or make them.* 20. *That the more exact We make Divine Prescience, even to the comprehension of any thing that implies no contradiction in it self to be comprehended, the more clear it is that mans Will may be sometimes free.* 21. *Which is sufficient to make good my last Argument against M<sup>r</sup> Hobbs.* 70

CHAP. IV. 1. *An Enumeration of sundry Opinions concerning the Seat of Common Sense.* 2. *Upon supposition that We are nothing but mere Matter, That the whole Body cannot be the Common Sensorium;* 3. *Nor the Orifice of the Stomack;* 4. *Nor the Heart;* 5. *Nor the Brain;* 6. *Nor the Membranes;* 7. *Nor the Septum lucidum;* 8. *Nor Regius his small and perfectly-solid Particle* 9. *The probability of the Conarion being the common Seat of Sense.* 77

CHAP. V. 1. *How Perception of external Objects, Spontaneous Motion, Memory and Imagination, are pretended to be performed by the Conarion, Spirits and Muscles, without a Soul.* 2. *That the Conarion, devoid of a Soul, cannot be the Common Percipient, demonstrated out of Des-Cartes himself.* 3. *That the Conarion, with the Spirits and organization of the Parts of the Body, is not a sufficient Principle of Spontaneous motion, without a Soul.* 4. *A description of the use of the Valvulæ in the Nerves of the Muscles for spontaneous motion.* 5. *The insufficiency of this contrivance for that purpose.* 6. *A further demon-*

*stration of the insufficiency thereof, from whence is clearly evinced that Brutes have Souls.* 7. *That Memory cannot be saved the way above described;* 8. *Nor Imagination.* 9. *A Distribution out of Des-Cartes of the Functions in us, some appertaining to the Body, and others to the Soul.* 10. *The Author's Observations thereupon.* 80

CHAP. VI. 1. *That no part of the Spinal Marrow can be the Common Sensorium without a Soul in the Body.* 2. *That the Animal Spirits are more likely to be that Common Percipient.* 3. *But yet it is demonstrable they are not:* 4. *As not being so much as capable of Sensation;* 5. *Nor of directing Motion into the Muscles;* 6. *Much less of Imagination and rational Invention;* 7. *Nor of Memory.* 8. *An Answer to an Evasion.* 9. *The Author's reason, why he has confuted so particularly all the suppositions of the Seat of Common Sense, when few of them have been asserted with the exclusion of a Soul.* 85

CHAP. VII. 1. *His Enquiry after the Seat of Common Sense, upon supposition there is a Soul in the Body.* 2. *That there is some particular Part in the Body that is the Seat of Common Sense.* 3. *A general division of their Opinions concerning the place of Common Sense.* 4. *That of those that place it out of the Head there are two sorts.* 5. *The Invalidity of Helmont's reasons whereby he would prove the Orifice of the Stomack to be the principal Seat of the Soul.* 6. *An Answer to Helmont's stories for that purpose.* 7. *A further confutation out of his own concessions.* 8. *M<sup>r</sup> Hobbs his Opinion confuted, that makes the Heart the Seat of Common Sense.* 9. *A further confutation thereof from Experience.* 10. *That the Common Sense is seated somewhere in the Head.* 11. *A caution for the choice of the particular place thereof.* 12. *That the whole Brain is not it;* 13. *Nor Regius his small solid Particle;* 14. *Nor any external Membrane of the Brain, nor the Septum Lucidum.* 15. *The three most likely places.*

## The CONTENTS.

places. 16. *Objections against Cartesianus his Opinion concerning the Conation answered.* 17. *That the Conation is not the Seat of Common Sense;* 18. *Nor that part of the Spinal Marrow Where the Nerves are conceived to concur, but the Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain.* 88

CHAP. VIII. 1. *The first reason of his Opinion, the convenient Situation of these Spirits.* 2. *The second, that the Spirits are the immediate instrument of the Soul in all her functions.* 3. *The proof of the second Reason from the general authority of Philosophers, and particularly of Hippocrates;* 4. *From our Sympathizing With the changes of the Aire;* 5. *From the celerity of Motion and Cogitation;* 6. *From what is observed generally in the Generation of things;* 7. *From Regius his experiment of a Snail in a glass;* 8. *From the running round of Images in a Vertigo;* 9. *From the constitution of the Eye, and motion of the Spirits there;* 10. *From the dependency of the actions of the Soul upon the Body, whether in Meditation or corporeal Motion;* 11. *From the recovery of Motion and Sense into a stupefied part;* 12. *And lastly, from what is observed in swooning fits, of paleness and sharpness of visage, &c.* 13. *The inference from all this, That the Spirits in the fourth Ventricle are the Seat of Common Sense, and that the main use of the Brain and Nerves is to preserve the Spirits.* 94

CHAP. IX. 1. *Several Objections against Animal Spirits.* 2. *An Answer to the first Objection touching the Porosity of the Nerves.* 3. *To the second and third, from the Extravasation of the Spirits and pituitous Excrements found in the Brain.* 4. *To the fourth, fetcht from the incredible swiftness of motion in the Spirits.* 5. *To the last, from Ligation.* 6. *Undeniable Demonstrations that there are Animal Spirits in the Ventricles of the Brain.* 99

CHAP. X. 1. *That the Soul is not confined to the Common Sensorium.* 2. *The*

*first Argument from the Plastick power of the Soul.* 3. *Which is confirmed from the gradual dignity of the Soul's Faculties, of which this Plastick is the lowest;* 4. *External Sensation the next;* 5. *After that, Imagination, and then Reason.* 6. *The second Argument from Passions and Sympathies in Animals.* 7. *An illustration of the manner of natural Magick.* 8. *The third Argument from the Perception of Pain in the exterior parts of the Body.* 9. *The fourth and last from the nature of Sight.* 101

CHAP. XI. 1. *That neither the Soul without the Spirits, nor the Spirits without the presence of the Soul in the Organ, are sufficient causes of Sensation.* 2. *A brief declaration how Sensation is made.* 3. *How Imagination.* 4. *Of Reason and Memory, and whether there be any Marks in the Brain.* 5. *That the Spirits are the immediate Instrument of the Soul in Memory also, and how Memory arises;* 6. *As also Forgetfulness.* 7. *How Spontaneous Motion is performed.* 8. *How we walk, sing, and play, though thinking of something else.* 9. *That though the Spirits be not alike fine every where, yet the Sensiferous Impression will pass to the Common Sensorium.* 10. *That there is an Heterogeneity in the very Soul her self; and what it is in her we call the Root, the Centre, and the Eye; and what the Rayes and Branches.* 11. *That the sober and allowable Distribution of her into Parts, is into Perceptive and Plastick.* 106

CHAP. XII. 1. *An Answer to an Objection, That our Arguments will as well prove the Immortality of the Souls of Brutes as of Men.* 2. *Another Objection inferring the Præexistence of Brutes Souls, and consequently of ours.* 3. *The first Answer to the Objection.* 4. *The second Answer consisting of four parts.* 5. *First, That the Hypothesis of Præexistence is more agreeable to Reason than any other Hypothesis.* 6. *And not onely so, but that it is very solid in it self.* 7. *That the Wisdome and Goodness of God argue the*  
D d truth



## The CONTENTS.

truth thereof. 8. *As also the face of Providence in the World.* 9. *The second part of the second Answer, That the Præexistence of the Soul has the suffrage of all Philosophers in all Ages, that held it Incorporeal.* 10. *That the Gymnosophists of Egypt, the Indian Brachmans, the Persian Magi, and all the learned of the Jews were of this Opinion.* 11. *A Catalogue of particular famous persons that held the same.* 12. *That Aristotle was also of the same mind.* 13. *Another more clear place in Aristotle to this purpose, with Sennertus his Interpretation.* 14. *An Answer to an Evasion of that Interpretation.* 15. *The last and clearest place of all out of Aristotle's Writings.* 110

CHAP. XIII. 1. *The third part of the second Answer, That the forgetting of the former state is no good Argument against the Soul's Præexistence.* 2. *What are the chief causes of Forgetfulness.* 3. *That they all conspire, and that in the highest degree, to destroy the memory of the other state.* 4. *That Mischances and Diseases have quite taken away the Memory of things here in this life.* 5. *That it is impossible for the Soul to remember her former condition without a Miracle.* 6. *The fourth part of the second Answer, That the entrance of a Præexistent Soul into a Body is as intelligible as either Creation or Translation.* 116

CHAP. XIV. 1. *The knowledge of the difference of Vehicles, and the Soul's Union with them, necessary for the understanding how she enters into this Earthly Body.* 2. *That though the Name of Vehicle be not in Aristotle, yet the Thing is there.* 3. *A clearing of Aristotle's notion of the Vehicle, out of the Philosophy of Des-Cartes.* 4. *A full interpretation of his Text.* 5. *That Aristotle makes only two Vehicles, Terrestrial and Æthereal; which is more than sufficient to prove the Soul's Oblivion of her former state.* 6. *That the ordinary Vehicle of the Soul after death is Aire.* 7. *The duration of the Soul in her several Vehicles.* 8. *That*

*the Union of the Soul with her Vehicle does not consist in Mechanical Congruity, but Vital.* 9. *In what Vital congruity of the Matter consists.* 10. *In what Vital congruity of the Soul consists, and how it changing, the Soul may be free from her Airey Vehicle, without violent precipitation out of it.* 11. *Of the manner of the Descent of Souls into Earthly Bodies.* 12. *That there is so little absurdity in the Præexistence of Souls, that the concession thereof can be but a very small prejudice to our Demonstrations of her Immortality.* 118

CHAP. XV. 1. *What is meant by the Separation of the Soul, with a confutation of Regius, who would stop her in the dead Corps.* 2. *An Answer to those that profess themselves puzzled how the Soul can get out of the Body.* 3. *That there is a threefold Vital Congruity to be found in three several Subjects.* 4. *That this triple Congruity is also competent to one Subject, viz. the Soul of Man.* 5. *That upon this Hypothesis it is very intelligible how the Soul may leave the Body.* 6. *That her Union with the Ææreal Vehicle may be very suddain, and as it were in a moment.* 7. *That the Soul is actually separate from the Body, is to be proved either by History or Reason. Examples of the former kinde out of Pliny, Herodotus, Ficinus.* 8. *Whether the Ecstasie of Witches prove an actual separation of the Soul from the Body.* 9. *That this real separation of the Soul in Ecstasie is very possible.* 10. *How the Soul may be loosned and leave the Body, and yet return thither again.* 11. *That though Reason and Will cannot in this life release the Soul from the Body, yet Passion may; and yet so that she may return again.* 12. *The peculiar power of Desire for this purpose.* 13. *Of Cardan's Ecstasies, and the Ointment of Witches, and what truth there may be in their confessions.* 122

CHAP. XVI. 1. *That Souls departed communicate Dreams.* 2. *Examples of Apparitions of Souls deceased.* 2. *Of Apparitions*

## The CONTENTS.

*Apparitions in fields where pitcht Battels have been fought; as also of those in Church-yards, and other vaporous places. 4. That the Spissitude of the Aire may well contribute to the easiness of the appearing of Ghosts and Spectres. 5. A further proof thereof from sundry examples. 6. Of Marsilius Ficinus his appearing after death. 7. With What sort of people such Examples as these avail little. 8. Reasons to perswade the unprejudiced that ordinarily those Apparitions that bear the shape and person of the deceased, are indeed the Souls of them.*

129

CHAP. XVII. 1. *The preeminence of Arguments drawn from Reason above those from Story. 2. The first step towards a Demonstration of Reason that the Soul acts out of her Body, for that she is an Immaterial Substance separable therefrom. 3. The second, That the immediate Instruments for Sense, Motion, and Organization of the Body, are certain subtle and tenuous Spirits. 4. A comparison betwixt the Soul in the Body and the Aëreal Genii. 5. Of the nature of Demons from the account of Marcus the Eremit, and how the Soul is presently such, having once left this Body. 6. An Objection concerning the Souls of Brutes: to which is answered, First, by way of concession; 7. Secondly, by confuting the Arguments for the former concession. 8. That there is no rational doubt at all of the Humane Soul acting after death. 9. A further Argument of her activity out of this Body, from her conflicts with it while she is in it. 10. As also from the general hope and belief of all Nations, that they shall live after death.*

133

CHAP. XVIII. 1. *That the Faculties of our Souls, and the nature of the immediate Instrument of them, the Spirits, do so nearly symbolize with those of Demons, that it seems reasonable, if God did not on purpose hinder it, that they would not fail to act out of this earthly Body. 2. Or if they would, his Power and Wisdom could easily implant in their essence a double or*

*triple Vital Congruity, to make all sure. 3. A further demonstration of the present Truth from the Veracity of God. 4. An Answer to an Objection against the foregoing Argument. 5. Another Demonstration from his Justice. 6. An Answer to an Objection. 7. An Answer to another Objection. 8. Another Argument from the Justice of God. 9. An Objection answered. 10. An invincible Demonstration of the Soul's Immortality from the Divine Goodness. 11. A more particular enforcement of that Argument, and who they are upon whom it will work least. 12. That the Noblest and most Vertuous Spirit is the most assurable of the Soul's Immortality.*

139

## BOOK III.

CHAP. I. 1. **W**HY the Author treats of the state of the Soul after Death, and in what Method. 2. Arguments to prove that the Soul is ever united vitally with some Matter or other. 3. Further Reasons to evince the same. 4. That the Soul is capable of an Aiery and Æthereal Body, as well as a Terrestrial. 5. That she ordinarily passes out of an Earthly into an Aëreal Vehicle first. 6. That in her Aiery Vehicle she is capable of Sense, Pleasure, and Pain. 7. That the main power of the Soul over her Aëreal Vehicle is the direction of Motion in the particles thereof. 8. That she may also add or diminish Motion in her Æthereal. 9. How the purity of the Vehicle confers to the quickness of Sense and Knowledge. 10. Of the Soul's power of changing the temper of her Aëreal Vehicle; 11. As also the shape thereof. 12. The plainness of the last Axiome.

145

CHAP. II. 1. *Of the Dimensions of the Soul considered barely in her self. 2. Of the Figure of the Soul's Dimensions. 3. Of the Heterogeneity of her Essence. 4. That there is an Heterogeneity in her Plastick part distinct from the Perceptive. 5. Of the acting*



## The CONTENTS.

of this Plastick part in her framing of the Vehicle. 6. The excellency of Des-Cartes his Philosophy. 7. That the Vehicles of Ghosts have as much of solid corporeal Substance in them as the Bodies of Men. 8. The folly of the contrary Opinion evinced. 9. The advantage of the Soul, for matter of Body, in the other state, above this.

151

CHAP. III. 1. That the natural abode of the Soul after death is the Aire. 2. That she cannot quit the Aëreal Regions till the Æthereal Congruity of life be awakened in her. 3. That all Souls are not in the same Region of the Aire. 4. Cardan's conceit of placing all Dæmons in the upper Region. 5. The use of this conceit for the shewing the reason of their seldome appearing. 6. That this Phenomenon is salv'd by a more rational Hypothesis. 7. A further confutation of Cardan's Opinion. 8. More tending to the same scope. 9. The Original of Cardan's error concerning the remote operations of Dæmons. 10. An Objection how Dæmons and Souls separate can be in this lower Region, where Winds and Tempests are so frequent. 11. A preparation to an Answer from the consideration of the nature of the Winds. 12. Particular Answers to the Objection. 13. A farther Answer from the nature of the Statick Faculty of the Soul. 14. Another from the suddain power of actuating her Vehicle. 15. What incommutations she suffers from hail, rain, &c.

155

CHAP. IV. 1. That the Soul once having quitted this Earthly Body becomes a Dæmon. 2. Of the External Senses of the Soul separate, their number and limits in the Vehicle. 3. Of Sight in a Vehicle organized and un-organized. 4. How Dæmons and separate Souls hear and see at a vast Distance: and whence it is that though they may so easily hear or see us, we may neither see nor hear them. 5. That they have Hearing as well as Sight. 6. Of the Touch, Smell, Taste, and Nourishment of Dæmons. 7. The external employ-

ment that the Genii and Souls deceased may have out of the Body. 8. That the actions of Separate Souls, in reference to us, are most-what conformable to their life here on Earth. 9. What their Entertainments are in reference to themselves. 10. The distinction of Orders of Dæmons from the places they most frequent.

160

CHAP. V. 1. That the Separate Soul spends not all her time in Solitude. 2. That her converse with us seems more intelligible then that with the Genii. 3. How the Genii may be visible one to another, though they be to us invisible. 4. Of their approaches, and of the limits of their swiftness of motion: 5. And how they farre exceed us in celerity. 6. Of the figure or shape of their Vehicles, and of their privacy, when they would be invisible. 7. That they cannot well converse in a mere simple Orbicular form. 8. That they converse in Humane shape, at least the better sort of them. 9. Whether the shape they be in proceed merely from the Imperium of their Will and Fancy, or is regulated by a natural Character of the Plastick part of the Soul. 10. That the personal shape of a Soul or Genius is partly from the Will, and partly from the Plastick power. 11. That considering how the Soul organizes the Fœtus in the Womb, and moves our limbs at pleasure, it were a wonder if Spirits should not have such command over their Vehicles as is believed. 12. A further Argument from an excessive virtue some have given to Imagination.

164

CHAP. VI. 1. More credible Instances of the effects of Imagination. 2. A special and peculiar Instance in Signatures of the Fœtus. 3. That what Fienus grants, who has so cautiously bounded the power of Fancy, is sufficient for the present purpose. 4. Examples approved of by Fienus. 5. Certain Examples rejected by him, and yet approved of by Fernelius and Sennertus. 6. Three notorious Stories of the power of the Mother's Imagination on the Fœtus, out of Helmont. 7. A conjectural inference

2

169

173

176

Q.

179

184

187

Ddd 3

ture



## The C O N T E N T S.

ture is. 2. Experiments that argue its real Existence; such as that of two Strings tuned Unisons. 3. Sympathetick Cares and Tortures. 4. The Sympathy betwixt the Earthly and Astral Body. 5. Monstrous Births. 6. The Attraction of the Loadstone and Roundness of the Sun and Stars. 193

CHAP. XIII. 1. That the Descent of heavy Bodies argues the existence of The Spirit of Nature, because else they would either hang in the Aire as they are placed, 2. Or would be diverted from a perpendicular as they fall near a Plate of Metall set sloping. 3. That the endeavour of the Æther or Aire from the Centre to the Circumference is not the cause of Gravity, against M<sup>r</sup> Hobbs. 4. A full confutation of M<sup>r</sup> Hobbs his Opinion. 5. An ocular Demonstration of the absurd consequence thereof. 6. An absolute Demonstration that Gravity cannot be the effect of mere Mechanical powers. 7. The Latitude of the operations of The Spirit of Nature, how large, and where bounded. 8. The reason of its name. 9. Of Instinct, whether it be, and what it is. 10. The grand office of the Spirit of Nature in transmitting Souls into rightly-prepared Matter. 196

CHAP. XIV. 1. Objections against the Soul's Immortality from her condition in Infancy, Old age, Sleep and Sicknesses. 2. Other Objections taken from Experiments that seem to prove her Discernibility. 3. As also from the seldome appearing of the Souls of the deceased; 4. And from our natural fear of Death. 5. A Subterfuge of the adverse party, in supposing but one Soul common to all Creatures. 6. An Answer concerning the Littleness of the Soul in Infancy: 7. As also concerning the weakness of her Intellectuals then, and in Old age. 8. That Sleep does not at all argue the Soul's Mortality, but rather illustrate her Immortality. 9. An Answer to the Objection from Apoplexies and Catalepsies: 10. As also to that from Madness. 11. That the various depravations of her Intellectual Faculties do no more

argue her Mortality, then the worse Modifications of Matter its natural Annihilability. And why God created Souls sympathizing with Matter. 204

CHAP. XV. 1. An Answer to the experiment of the Scolopendra cut into pieces: 2. And to the flying of an headless Eagle over a barn, as also to that of the Malefactor's head biting a Dog by the eare. 3. A superaddition of a difficulty concerning Monsters born with two or more Heads, and but one Body and Heart. 4. A solution of the difficulty. 5. An answer touching the seldome appearing of the Souls of the deceased: 6. As also concerning the fear of Death; 7. And a down-bearing sense that sometimes so forcibly intrudes upon us the belief of the Soul's Mortality. 8. Of the Tragical Pomp and dreadful Preludes of Death, with some corroborative Considerations against such sad spectacles. 9. That there is nothing really sad and miserable in the Universe, unless to the wicked and impious. 208

CHAP. XVI. 1. That that which we properly are is both Sensitive and Intellectual. 2. What is the true notion of a Soul being One. 3. That if there be but One Soul in the World, it is both Rational and Sensitive. 4. The most favourable representation of their Opinion that hold but One. 5. A Confutation of the foregoing representation. 6. A Reply to the Confutation. 7. An Answer to the Reply. 8. That the Soul of Man is not properly any Ray either of God or the Soul of the World. 9. And yet if she were so, it would be no prejudice to her Immortality: Whence the folly of Pomponatius is noted. 10. A further animadversion upon Pomponatius his folly, in admitting a certain number of remote Intelligencies, and denying Particular Immaterial Substances in Men and Brutes. 212

CHAP. XVII. 1. That the Author having safely conducted the Soul into her Aëreal condition through the dangers of Death, might well be excused from attending her any further. 2. What reasons

## The CONTENTS.

reasons urge him to consider what fates may befall her afterwards. 3. Three hazards the Soul runs after this life, whereby she may again become obnoxious to death, according to the opinion of some. 4. That the Aëreal Genii are mortal, confirmed by three testimonies. 5. The one from the Vision of Facius Cardanus, in which the Spirits that appeared to him profess themselves mortal. 6. The time they stayed with him, and the matters they disputed of. 7. What credit Hieronymus Cardanus gives to his Father's Vision. 8. The other testimony out of Plutarch, concerning the Death of the great God Pan. 9. The third and last of Hesiod, whose opinion Plutarch has polish'd and refined. 10. An Enumeration of the several Paradoxes contained in Facius Cardanus his Vision. 11. What must be the sense of the third Paradox, if those Aëreal Speculators spake as they thought. 12. Another Hypothesis to the same purpose. 13. The craft of these Dæmons, in stuffing in poisonous Error amongst solid Truths. 14. What makes the story of the death of Pan less to the present matter, with an addition of Demetrius his observations touching the Sacred Islands near Britain. 15. That Hesiod his opinion is the most unexceptionable, and that the harshness therein is but seeming, not real. 16. That the Æthereal Vehicle instates the Soul in a condition of perfect Immortality. 17. That there is no internal impediment to those that are Heroically good, but that they may attain an everlasting happiness after Death.

217

CHAP. XVIII. 1. The Conflagration of the World an Opinion of the Stoicks. 2. Two ways of destroying the World the Ancients have taken notice of, and especially that by Fire. 3. That the Conflagration of the World, so farre as it respects us, is to be understood onely of the burning of the Earth. 4. That the Ends of the Stoicks Conflagration are compatible onely to the Earth's burning. 5. An acknowledgement that the Earth may be burnt, though the proof thereof be impertinent to this place. 6. That the Conflagration thereof will prove very fatal to the Souls of Wicked

Men and Dæmons. 7. Five several Opinions concerning their state after the Conflagration; whereof the first is, That they are quite destroy'd by Fire. 8. The second, That they are annihilated by a special act of Omnipotency. 9. The third, That they lie senseless in an eternal Death. 10. The fourth, That they are in a perpetual furious and painful Dream. 11. The fifth and last, That they will revive again, and that the Earth and Aire will be inhabited by them. 12. That this last seems to be fram'd from the fictitious *παλιγενεσία* of the Stoicks, who were very sorry Metaphysicians, and as ill Naturalists. 13. An Animadversion upon a self-contradicting sentence of Seneca. 14. The unintelligibleness of the state of the Souls of the Wicked after the Conflagration. 15. That the Æthereal Inhabitants will be safe. And what will then become of Good men and Dæmons on the Earth and in the Aire. And how they cannot be delivered but by a supernatural power. 225

CHAP. XIX. 1. That the Extinction of the Sun is no Panick fear, but may be rationally suspected from the Records of History and grounds of Natural Philosophy. 2. The sad Influence of this Extinction upon Man and Beast, and all the Aëreal Dæmons imprison'd within their several Atmospheres in our Vortex. 3. That it will doe little or no damage to the Æthereal Inhabitants in reference to heat or warmth. 4. Nor will they find much want of his light. 5. And if they did, they may pass out of one Vortex into another, by the Priviledge of their Æthereal Vehicles; 6. And that without any labour or toil, and as maturely as they please. 7. The vast incomprehensibleness of the tracts and compasses of the waies of Providence. 8. A short Recapitulation of the whole Discourse. 9. An Explication of the Persians two Principles of Light and Darknes, which they called *Οὐδός* and *Δαίμων*, and when and where the Principle of Light gets the full victory. 10. That Philosophy, or something more sacred then Philosophy, is the onely Guide to a true *Ἀποθεώσις*. 230

Conjectura





*Conjectura Cabbalistica.*  
OR,  
A CONJECTURAL ESSAY  
OF  
Interpreting the mind of *Moses*, in the  
Three first Chapters of *Genesis*,  
according to a Threefold

C A B B A L A:

Viz. { *Literal,*  
      { *Philosophical,*  
      { *Mystical, or, Divinely Moral.*

---

By HENRY MORE, D.D.  
Fellow of *Christ's College* in *Cambridge*.

---

EXOD. 34.

*And when Aaron and all the people of Israel saw Moses, behold, the skin of his face shone, and they were afraid to come nigh him.*

*Wherefore Moses, while he spake unto them, put a veil on his face.*

MATTH. 10.

*There is nothing covered, that shall not be revealed; and hid, that shall not be known.*

*What I tell you in darkness, speak you in light; and what you hear in the ear, that preach you on the house-tops.*

---

L O N D O N,

Printed by *James Fleisher*, for *William Morden* Book-seller in *Cambridge*;

M D C L X I I.



THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

LIBRARY

500 EAST 57TH STREET

CHICAGO

RECEIVED

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

LIBRARY

500 EAST 57TH STREET

CHICAGO

RECEIVED

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

500 EAST 57TH STREET

CHICAGO

RECEIVED

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

LIBRARY

500 EAST 57TH STREET

CHICAGO

RECEIVED

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

LIBRARY

500 EAST 57TH STREET

CHICAGO

T O

The eminently Learned and truly Religious  
D<sup>r</sup> C U D W O R T H, Master of *Christ's Col-*  
*ledge*, and Hebrew Professor in the Uni-  
versity of *Cambridge*.

S I R,

C Concerning the choice of the *subject matter* of my present pains, I have, I think, spoke enough in the ensuing *Preface*. Concerning the choice of my *Patron*, I shall say no more, then that the sole inducement thereto was his singular *Learning* and *Piety*. The former of which is so conspicuous to the world, that it is universally acknowledged of all; and for the latter, there is none that can be ignorant thereof, who has ever had the happiness, though but in a smaller measure, of his more free and intimate converse. As for my own part, I cannot but publicly profess, I never met with any yet so truly and becomingly religious, where the right knowledge of God and Christ bears the enlightened mind so even, that it is as far removed from *Superstition* as *Irreligion* it self. And my present Labours cannot finde better welcome or more judicious acceptance with any then with such as these. For such free and unprejudiced spirits will neither antiquate Truth for the oldness of the Notion, nor slight her for looking young, or bearing the face of Novelty. Besides, there are none that can be better assured of the sincerity and efficacy of my present Design. For as many as are born of the *Spirit*, and are not mere sons of the *Letter*, know very well how much the more inward and mysterious meaning of the Text makes for the reverence of the Holy Scripture and advantage of Godliness; whenas the urging of the bare *literal* sense has either made or confirmed many an *Atheist*. And assuredly those men see very little in the affairs of Religion, that do not plainly discover that it is the *Atheist's* highest interest, to have it taken for granted, that there is no *spiritual* meaning, either in *Scripture* or *Sacrament*, that extends further  
then



then the mere Grammatical sense in the one, or the sensible, gross, external performance in the other. As for example, That to be *regenerated*, and become a *true and real Christian*, is nothing else but to receive the *outward Baptism* of visible water: and, that the *Mosaical Philosophy* concerning God and the nature of things, is none other then that which most obviously offers it self in the mere *letter of Moses*. Which if the *Atheist* could have fully granted to him on all sides, and get but this in also to the bargain, That there is no knowledge of God but what *Moses* his Text set on foot in the world, or what is *Traditional*; he cannot but think, That Religion in this dress is so empty, exceptionable and contemptible, that it is but just with as many as are not mere fools to look upon it as some *melancholick conceit*, or *cunning fiction*, brought into the world to awe the simpler sort, but behind the *hangings* to be freely *laughed at* and derided by those that are more wise: and that it were an easie thing in a short time to raze the memory of it out of the minds of men, it having so little root in the humane faculties. Which for my own part I think as hopeful, as that posterity will be born without Eyes and Ears, and lose the use of Speech. For I think the knowledge of God and a sense of Religion is as natural and essential to mankind, as any other Property in them whatsoever; and that the generations of men shall as soon become utterly irrational, as plainly irreligious. Which, I think, my *Treatise against Atheism* will make good to any one that with care and judgment will peruse it.

Nor does it at all follow, because a Truth is delivered by way of *Tradition*, that it is unconcludable by *Reason*. For I do not know any one *Theorem* in all *Natural Philosophy* that has more sufficient reasons for it then the *Motion of the Earth*, which notwithstanding is part of the *Philosophick Cabbala* or *Tradition of Moses*, as I shall plainly shew in its due place. So likewise for the *Praeexistence of the Soul*, which seems to have been part of the same *Tradition*, it is abundantly consentaneous to *Reason*. And as we can give a genuine account of all those seeming irregularities of motion in the Planets, supposing they and the Earth move round about the Sun; so we may open the Causes of all those astonishing *Paradoxes of Providence* from this  
other

other *Hypothesis*, and shew that there is nothing here unsutable to the precious *Attributes of God*, if we could place the Eye of our Understanding in that Centre of all free motions, that *steady eternal Good*; and were not our selves carried aloof off from him, amongst other wandring Planets, (as *S. Jude* calls them) that at several distances play about him, and yet all of them in some measure or other, not onely pretending to him, but, whether they pretend or not, really receiving something from him. For of this *First* is all, both *Wisdom*, *Pleasure*, and *Power*. But it is enough to have but hinted these things briefly and ænigmatically, the wrath and ignorance of all Ages receiving the most generous Truths with the greatest offence.

But for my own part, I know no reason but that all well-willers to Truth and Godlinesse should heartily thank me for my present *Cabbalistical Enterprize*, I having so plainly therein vindicated the holy Mystery of the *Trinity* from being (as a very bold Sect would have it) a mere *Pagan* invention. For it is plainly shown here that it is from *Moses* originally, not from *Pythagoras* or *Plato*. And seeing that *Christ* is nothing but *Moses* unveiled, I think it was a special act of Providence that this hidden *Cabbala* came so seasonably to the knowledge of the *Gentiles*, that it might afore-hand fit them for the easier entertainment of the whole Mystery of Christianity, when in the fulness of time it should be more clearly revealed unto the world.

Besides this, we have also shown, That, according to *Moses* his *Philosophy*, the Soul is secure both from *death* and from *sleep after death*; which those drowsie *Nodders* over the Letter of the Scripture have very oscitantly collected, and yet as boldly afterwards maintained, pretending that the contrary is more *Platonical* then *Christian* or *Scriptural*.

Wherefore my design being so pious as it proves, I could doe nothing more fit then to make choice of so true a lover of Piety as your self for a Patron of my present Labours. Especially you being so well able to doe the most proper office of a Patron; to defend the Truth that is presented to you in them, and to make up out of your rich Treasury of Learning what our Penury could not reach to, or Inadvertency may have



---

*The Epistle Dedicatory.*

---

omitted. And truly, if I may not hope this from you, I know not whence to expect it. For I do not know where to meet with any so universally and fully accomplished in all parts of Learning as your self, as well in the *Oriental Tongues and History*, as in all the choicest kindes of *Philosophy*: any one of which *Acquisitions* is enough to fill, if not to swell, an ordinary man with great conceit and pride; whenas it is your sole privilege to have them all, and yet not to take upon you, nor to be any thing more imperious, or censorious of others, then they ought to be that know the least.

These were the true Considerations that directed me in the Dedication of this Book; which if you accordingly please to take into your favourable Patronage, and accept as a Monument or Remembrance of our mutual Friendship, you shall much oblige

*Your affectionate friend and servant,*

H. M O R E.

---

THE

# THE PREFACE

to the READER.

1. What is meant by the term *Cabbala*, and how warrantably the *Literal* Exposition of the Text may be so called.
2. That dispensable speculations are best propounded in a *Sceptical* manner.
3. A clear description of the nature and dignity of *Reason*, and what the Divine *Logos* is.
4. The general probabilities of the truth of this present *Cabbala*.
5. The design of the Author in publishing of it.

READER,

I. **I** Present thee here with a triple interpretation of the Three first Chapters of Genesis, which in my Title-page I have termed a *Threefold Cabbala*; concerning which, for thy better direction and satisfaction, I hold it not amiss to speak some few things by way of Preface, such as thou thy self in all likelihood wouldst be forward to ask of me. As, why, for example, I call this interpretation of mine a *Cabbala*, and from whom I received it; what may be the probabilities of the truth of it; and what my purpose is in publishing of it.

To the First I answer, That the Jewish *Cabbala* is conceived to be a Traditional doctrine or exposition of the *Pentateuch*, which Moses received from the mouth of God while he was on the Mount with him. And this Sense or Interpretation of the Law or *Pentateuch*, as it is a Doctrine received by Moses first, and then from him by Joshua, and from Joshua by the Seventy Elders, and so on, was called *Cabbala* from קַבַּל *kibbel*, to receive: But as it was delivered as well as received, it was also called *Massora*, which signifies a Tradition; though this latter more properly respects that Critical and Grammatical skill of the Learned among the Jews, and therefore was profitable for the explaining the *Literal* sense as well as that more *Mysterious* meaning of the Text where it was intended. Whence without any boldness or abuse of the word I may call the *Literal* interpretation which I have light upon, *Cabbala*, as well as the *Philosophical* or *Moral*; the *Literal* sense it self being not so plain and determinate, but that it may seem to require some Traditional Doctrine or Exposition to settle it, as well as those other senses that are more *Mystical*.

And therefore I thought fit to call this *Threefold* interpretation that I have hit upon, *Cabbala's*, as if I had indeed light upon the true *Cabbala* of Moses in all the three senses of the Text, such as might have become his own mouth to have uttered for the instruction of a willing and well-prepared Disciple. And therefore for the greater comeliness and solemnity of the matter, I bring in Moses speaking his own minde in all the Three several Expositions.

2. And yet I call the whole Interpretation but a *Conjecture*, having no desire to seem more definitively wise then others can bear or approve of. For



though in such things as are Necessary and Essential to the Happiness of a man, as the belief that there is a God, and the like, it is not sufficient for a man only to bring undeniable Reasons for what he would prove, but also to profess plainly and dogmatically that himself gives full assent to the Conclusion he hath demonstrated; so that those that do not so well understand the power of Reason, may notwithstanding thereby be encouraged to be of the same Faith with them that do, it being of so great consequence to them to believe the thing propounded: Yet I conceive that Speculative and Dispensable Truths a man not only may, but ought rather to propound them Sceptically to the world, there being more prudence and modesty in offering the strongest Arguments he can without dogmatizing at all, or seeming to dote upon the Conclusion, or more earnestly to affect the winning of Proselytes to his own opinion. For where the force of the Arguments is perceived, Assent will naturally follow according to the proportion of the discovery of the force of the Arguments. And an assent to opinions merely Speculative, without the Reasons of them, is neither any pleasure nor accomplishment of a rational creature.

3. To your Second demand I answer, That though I call this Interpretation of mine Cabbala, yet I must confesse I received it neither from Man nor Angel. Nor came it to me by Divine Inspiration, unlesse you will be so wise as to call the seasonable suggestions of that Divine Life and Sense that vigorously resides in the Rational Spirit of free and well-meaning Christians, by the name of Inspiration. But such Inspiration as this is no distracter from, but an accomplisher and an enlarger of the humane faculties. And I may adde, that this is the great mystery of Christianity that we are called to partake of, viz. The perfecting of the Humane nature by participation of the Divine. Which cannot be understood so properly of this grosse flesh and External senses, as of the Inward humanity, viz. our Intellect, Reason, and Fancie. But to exclude the use of Reason in the search of Divine truth is no dictate of the Spirit, but of headstrong Melancholy and blinde Enthusiasme, that religious Phrensie men run into, by lying passive for the reception of such Impresses as have no proportion with their Faculties. Which mistake and irregularity if they can once away with, they put themselves in a posture of promiscuously admitting any thing, and so in due time of growing either moped or mad, and under pretence of being highly Christians, ( the right Mystery whereof they understand not ) of working themselves lower then the lowest of men.

But for mine own part, Reason seems to me to be so far from being any contemptible Principle in man, that it must be acknowledged in some sort to be in God himself. For what is the Divine Wisdome but that steady comprehension of the Ideas of all things, with their mutual respects one to another, congruities and incongruities, dependences and independences? which respects do necessarily arise from the natures of the Ideas themselves; both which the Divine Intellect looks through at once, discerning thus the order and coherence of all things. And what is this but Ratio stabilis, a kinde of steady and immovable Reason discovering the connexion of all things at once? But that in us is Ratio mobilis, or Reason in evolution, we being able to apprehend things only in a successive manner one after another. But so

so many as we can comprehend at a time, while we plainly perceive and carefully view their Ideas, we know how well they fit, or how much they disagree one with another, and so prove or disprove one thing by another: which is really a participation of that Divine Reason in God, and is a true and faithful Principle in man, when it is perfected and polished by the Holy Spirit; but before, very earthly and obscure, especially in Spiritual things.

But now seeing the Logos, or steady comprehensive Wisdom of God, in which all Ideas and their respects are contained, is but universal stable Reason, how can there be any pretence of being so highly inspired as to be blown above Reason it self, unlesse men will fancy themselves wiser then God, or their Understandings above the natures and reasons of things themselves?

Wherefore to frame a brief Answer to your Second demand; I say, this threefold Cabbala you enquire after is the dictate of the free Reason of my Minde, heedfully considering the written Text of Moses, and carefully canvassing the Expositions of such Interpreters as are ordinarily to be had upon him. And I know nothing to the contrary, but that I have been so successful as to have light upon the old true Cabbala indeed.

4. Of which in the Third place I will set down some general Probabilities, referring you for the rest to the Defence of the Cabbala's themselves, and the Introduction thereunto.

And first, that the Literal Cabbala is true, it is no contemptible Argument, in that it is carried on so evenly and consistently one part with another, every thing also being represented so accommodately to the capacity of the people, and so advantageously for the keeping of their minds in the fear of God and obedience to his Law; as shall be particularly shown in the Defence of that Cabbala. So that according to the sense of this Literal Cabbala, Moses is discovered to be a man of the highest Political accomplishments and true and warrantable Prudence that may be.

Nor is he to fall short in Philosophy; And therefore the Philosophical Cabbala contains the Noblest Truths, as well Theological as Natural, that the Minde of man can entertain her self with: Insomuch that Moses seems to have been aforehand, and prevented the subtlest and abstrusest Inventions of the choicest Philosophers that ever appeared after him to this very day. And further presumption of the truth of this Philosophical Cabbala is, that the grand mysteries therein contained are most what the same that those two eximious Philosophers, Pythagoras and Plato, brought out of Egypt and the parts of Asia into Europe. And it is generally acknowledged by Christians, that they both had their Philosophy from Moses. And Numenius the Platonist speaks out plainly concerning his Master; What is Plato but Moses Atticus? And for Pythagoras, it is a thing incredible that he and his followers should make such a deal of doe with the mystery of Numbers, had he not been favoured with a sight of Moses his Creation of the World in six daies, and had the Philosophick Cabbala thereof communicated to him, which mainly consists in Numbers, as I shall in the Defence of this Cabbala more particularly declare.



Iamblich. de  
vita Pythag.  
cap. 28, & 29.

Aristot. de  
Cælo, lib. 2.  
cap. 13.

*And the Pythagoreans Oath swearing by him that taught them the mystery of the Tetractys, or the number Four, what a ridiculous thing had it been if it had been in reference merely to dry numbers? But it is exceeding probable that under that mystery of Four, Pythagoras was first himself taught the meaning of the fourth day's work in the Creation, and after delivered it to his disciples. In which Cabbala of the fourth day Pythagoras was instructed, amongst other things, that the Earth was a Planet, and moved about the Sun: and it is notoriously well known that this was ever the opinion of the Pythagoreans, and so in all likelihood a part of the Philosophick Cabbala of Moses. Which you will more fully understand in my Defence thereof.*

*In brief, all those Conclusions that are comprised in the Philosophick Cabbala, they being such as may best become that sublime and comprehensive Understanding of Moses, and being also so plainly answerable to the Phænomena of Nature and Attributes of God, as well as continuedly agreeable without any force or distortion to the Historical Text; this, I conceive, is no small probability that this Cabbala is true: For what can be the Properties of the true Philosophick Cabbala of Moses, if these be not which I have named?*

*Now for the Moral Cabbala, it bears its own evidence with it all the way, representing Moses as well experienced in all Godliness and Honesty, as he was skilful in Politicks and Philosophy.*

*5. And the edifying Usefulness of this Mystical or Moral Cabbala, to answer to your Last demand, was no small invitation amongst the rest to publish this present Exposition. For Moral and Spiritual Truth that so nearly concerns us being so strangely and unexpectedly, and yet so fitly and appositely, represented in this History of Moses, it will in all likelihood make the more forcible impresse upon the Minde, and more powerfully carry away our Affections toward what is good and warrantable, pre-instructing us with delight concerning the true way to Vertue and Godliness.*

*Nor are the Philosophick nor Literal Cabbala's destitute of their honest uses. For in the former, to the amazement of the mere Naturalist, (who commonly conceits that pious men and Patrons of Religion have no ornaments of Minde but scrupulosities about Vertue, and Melancholick fancies concerning a Deity) Moses is found to have been Master of the most sublime and generous Speculations that are in all Natural Philosophy: Besides that he places the Soul of Man many degrees out of the reach of fate and mortality. And by the latter there is a very charitable provision made for them that are so prone to expect rigid Precepts of Philosophy in Moses his outward Text. For this Literal Cabbala will steer them from that toil of endeavouring to make the bare Letter speak consonantly to the true frame of Nature; which while they attempt with more zeal than knowledge, they both disgrace themselves, and wrong Moses. For there are unalterable and indeleble Ideas and Notions in the Minde of Man, into which when we are awakened, and apply to the known course and order of Nature, we can no more forsake the use of them than we can the use of our own Eyes, nor misbelieve their dictates more, or so much, as we may those of our outward Senses. Wherefore to men recovered into a due command of their Reason, and well-*

well-skill'd in the contemplation and experience of the nature of things, to propound to them such kinde of Mosaical Philosophy as the boldnesse and superstition of some has adventured to doe for want of a right Literal Cabbala to guide them, is, as much as in them lies, to hazard the making not only of Moses but of Religion it self contemptible and ridiculous.

Whence it is apparant enough, I think, to what good purpose it is thus carefully to distinguish betwixt the Literal and Philosophick Cabbala, and so plainly and fully to set out the sense of either, apart by themselves, that there may hereafter be no confusion or mistake. For beside that the discovering of these weighty Truths and high, but irrefutable, Paradoxes in Moses his Text, does assert Religion, and vindicate her from that vile imputation of Ignorance in Philosophy and the knowledge of things; it does also justifie those more noble results of free Reason and Philosophy from that vulgar suspicion of Impiety and Irreligion.



# THE L I T E R A L C A B B A L A.

## C H A P. I.

2. *The Earth at first a deep miry Abyſſe, covered over with Waters, over which was a fierce Wind, and through all Darkneſs.* 3. *Day made at first without a Sun.* 6. *The Earth a floor, the Heavens a transparent Canopy, or strong Tent over it, to keep off the Upper waters or blew conspicuous Sea from drowning the World.* 8. *Why this Tent or Canopy was not said to be good.* 9. *The Lower waters commanded into one place.* 11. *Herbs, Flowers, and Fruits of Trees, before either Sun or Seasons of the year to ripen them.* 14. *The Sun created and added to the Day, as a peculiar Ornament thereof, as the Moon and Stars to the Night.* 20. *The Creation of Fish and Fowl.* 24. *The Creation of Beasts and creeping things.* 27. *Man created in the very shape and figure of God, but yet so, that there were made females as well as males.* 28. *How Man came to be Lord over the rest of living creatures.* 30. *How it came to passe that Man feeds on the better sort of the fruits of the Earth, and the Beasts on the worse.*

I.



E are to recount to you in this Book the Generations and Genealogies of the Patriarchs from *Adam* to *Noah*, from *Noah* to *Abraham*, from *Abraham* to *Joseph*; and to continue the History to our own times. But it will not be amisse first to inform you concerning the Creation of the World, and the Original and Beginning of things; how God made Heaven and Earth, and all the garnishings of them, before he made Man.

2. But the Earth at first was but a rude and desolate heap, devoid of Herbs, Flowers and Trees, and all living creatures, being nothing but a deep miry Abyſſe, covered all over with Waters; and there was a very fierce and strong Wind that blew upon the Waters: And (what made it still more horrid and comfortless) there was as yet no Light, but all was invloped with thick Darkneſſe, and bore the face of a pitchy black and wet tempestuous Night.

3. But God let not his work lie long in this sad condition, but commanded Light to appear, and the Morning brake out upon the face of the Abyſs, and wheel'd about from East to West, being clearest in the middle

middle of its course about Noon ; and then abating of its brightnesse towards the West, at last quite disappear'd ; after such sort as you may often observe the day-light to break forth in the East, and ripen to greater clearnesse, but at last to leave the skie in the West, no Sun appearing all the while.

4. And God saw the Light, (for it is a thing very visible ) that it was good, and so separated the Darknesse from the Light, that they could not both of them be upon the face of the Earth together, but had their vicissitudes, and took their turns one after another.

5. And he called the return of the light *Day*, and the return of darknes he called *Night* : and the evening and the morning made up the *First* natural day.

6. Now after God had made this *Basis* or floor of this greater edifice of the World, the *Earth*, he sets upon the higher parts of the fabrick. He commands therefore that there should be a hollow *Expansion*, firm and transparent, which by its strength should bear up against the Waters which are above, and keep them from falling upon the Earth in excess.

7. And so it became a Partition betwixt the Upper and the Lower waters ; so that by virtue of this hollow *Firmament*, man might live safe from the violence of such destructive inundations, as one sheltred in a well-pitch'd Tent from storms of rain. For the danger of these Waters is apparent to the eye, this ceruleous or blew-coloured Sea, that overspreads the diaphanous *Firmament*, being easily discern'd through the body thereof ; and there are very frequent and copious showers of rain descend from above, whenas there is no water espied ascending up thither ; wherefore it must all come from that upper Sea, if we do but appeal to our outward sense.

8. Now therefore this diaphanous Canopy or firmly-stretched Tent over the whole pavement of the Earth, though I cannot say properly that God saw it was good, ( it being indeed of a nature invisible ) yet the use of it shews it to be exceeding good and necessary. And God called the whole capacity of this hollow *Firmament*, *Heaven*. And the evening and the morning made up the *Second* natural day.

9. And now so sure a Defence being made against the inundation of the Upper waters, that they might not fall upon the Earth, God betook himself the next day to order the Lower waters, that as yet were spread over the whole face thereof : at his command therefore the Waters fled into one place, and the dry land did appear.

10. And God called the dry land *Earth* ; and the gathering together of the Waters he called *Sea* : and I may now properly say, that God saw that it was good, for the *Sea* and the *Land* are things visible enough, and fit objects of our sight.

11. And forthwith before he made either Sun, Moon, or Stars, did God command the earth to bring forth Grasse, Herbs and Flowers, in their full beauty, and Fruit-trees yielding delicious fruit, though there had as yet been no vicissitude of Spring, Summer, or Autumn, nor any approach of the Sun to ripen and concoct the fruit of those Trees.

Whence



Whence you may easily discern the foolishnesse of the idolatrous Nations, that dote so much on Second causes as that they forget the First, ascribing that to the Sun and Moon that was caus'd at first by the immediate command of God.

12. For at his command it was, before there was either Sun or Moon in the Firmament, that the Earth brought forth Grasse, and Herb yielding seed after his kind, and the Tree yielding fruit, whose seed was in it self, after his kinde; so that the several sorts of Plants might by this means be conserv'd upon the Earth. And God saw that it was good.

13. And the evening and the morning made up the *Third* natural day.

14. There have three days past without a Sun, as well as three nights without either Moon or Stars; as you your selves may haply have observ'd some number of Moonless and Starlesse nights, as well as of Sunlesse days, to have succeeded one another: And so it might have been alwaies, had not God said, Let there be Lights within the Firmament of Heaven, to make a difference betwixt Day and Night, and to be peculiar garnishings of either. Let them be also for signes of weather, for seasons of the year, and also for periods of days, months, and years.

15. Moreover, let them be as Lights hung up within the hollow roof or Firmament of Heaven, to give light to men walking upon the pavement of the Earth: and it was so.

16. And God made two great Lights: the greater one, the most glorious and Princely object we can see by day, to be as it were the Governour and Monarch of the Day; the lesser, the most resplendent and illustrious sight we can cast our eyes on by night, to be Governesse and Queen of the Night. And he made, though for their smalnesse they be not so considerable, the Stars also.

17. And he placed them all in the Firmament of Heaven, to give light upon the Earth:

18. And to shew their preeminence for external lustre above whatever else appears by either day or night, and to be peculiar garnishings or ornaments to make a notable difference betwixt the light and the darknesse, the superaddition of the Sun to adorn the day, and to invigorate the light thereof, the Moon and the Stars to garnish the night, and to mitigate the dulnesse and darknesse thereof. And God saw that it was good.

19. And the evening and the morning was the *Fourth* natural day.

20. After this, God commanded the Waters to bring forth Fish and Fowl, which they did in abundance; and the Fowl flew above the Earth in the open Firmament of Heaven.

21. And God created great Whales also as well as other Fishes, that move in the waters: and God saw that it was good.

22. And God blessed them, saying, Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the waters in the Seas, and let the Fowl multiply on the Earth.

23. And the evening and the morning made up the *Fifth* natural day.

24. Then God commanded the Earth to bring forth all creeping things

things and four-footed Beasts, as before he commanded the Waters to send forth Fish and Fowl : and it was so.

25. And when God had made the Beast of the Earth after his kind, and cattel and every creeping thing after his kinde, he saw that it was good.

26. And coming at last to his highest Master-piece, Man, he encouraged himself, saying, Go to, let us now make Man ; and I will make him after the same image and shape that I bear my self ; and he shall have dominion over the Fish of the Sea, and over the Fowls of the Air, and over the Cattel, and over all the Earth, and over every Creeping thing that creepeth upon the Earth.

27. So God created *Man* in his own shape and figure, with an upright stature, with legs, hands, arms, with a face and mouth, to speak and command, as God himself hath : I say, in the image of God did he thus create him. But mistake me not, whereas you conceive of God as masculine and more perfect, yet you must not understand me as if God made mankind so exactly after his own image, that he made none but males ; for I tell you, he made females as well as males, as you shall hear more particularly hereafter.

28. And having made them thus male and female, he bad them make use of the distinction of sexes that he had given them ; and blessing them, God said unto them, Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the Earth with your off-spring, and be lords thereof, and have dominion also over the Fish of the Sea, and over the Fowls of the Air, as well as over Beasts and cattel, and every creeping thing that moves upon the Earth.

29. And God said, Behold, I give you every frugiferous Herb which is upon the face of the Earth, such as the Straw-berry, the several sorts of Corn, as Rye, Wheat, and Rice, as also the delicious fruits of Trees ; to you they shall be for meat.

30. But for the Beasts of the Earth, and the Fowls of the Air, and for every living thing that creepeth upon the Earth, the worser kind of Herbs and ordinary Grasse I have assign'd for them. And so it came to passe that mankind are made lords and possessors of the choicest fruits of the Earth, and the Beasts of the field are to be contented with baser Herbage and the common Grasse.

31. And God viewed all the Works that he had made, and behold, they were exceeding good : and the evening and the morning was the *Sixth* natural day.



## CHAP. II.

3. *The Original of the Jewish Sabbaths, from God's resting himself from his Six days labours.* 5. *Herbs and Plants before either Rain, Gardning, or Husbandry; and the reason why it was so.* 7. *Adam made of the dust of the ground, and his Soul breathed in at his nostrils.* 8. *The Planting of Paradise.* 9. *A wonderful Tree there, that would continue youth, and make a man immortal upon earth: Another strange Tree, viz. the Tree of knowledge of Good and Evil.* 11. *The Rivers of Paradise, Phasis, Gihon, Tigris, Euphrates.* 18. *The high Commendation of Matrimony.* 19. *Adam gives names to all kind of creatures except Fishes.* 21. *Woman is made of a rib of Adam, a deep sleep falling upon him, his Minde then also being in a trance.* 24. *The first Institution of Marriage.*

1. **T**HUS the Heavens and the Earth were finisht, and all the Creatures wherewith they were garnisht and replenisht.

2. And God having within *Six* days perfected all his work, on the *Seventh* day he rested himself.

3. And so made the *Seventh* day an holy day, a Festival of rest, because himself then first rested from his works. Whence you plainly see the reason and original of your *Sabbaths*.

4. These are the generations of the Heavens and of the Earth, which I have so compendiously recounted to you, as they were created in the days that the Lord made Heaven and Earth, and the several garnishings of them.

5. But there are some things that I would a little more fully touch upon, and give you notice of, to the praise of God and the manifesting of his Power unto you. As that the Herbs and Plants of the field did not come up of their own accords out of the Earth, before God made them; but that God created them before there were any seeds of any such thing in the Earth, and before there was any rain, or men to use gardning or husbandry for the procuring their growth: So that hereafter you may have the more firm Faith in God for the blessings and fruits of the Earth, when the ordinary course of Nature shall threaten dearth and scarcity for want of rain and seasonable showers.

6. For there had been no Showers when God caused the Plants and Herbs of the field to spring up out of the Earth; onely, as I told you at the first of all, there was a mighty torrent of water, that rose every where above the Earth, and cover'd the universal face of the ground, which yet God afterward by his Almighty power commanded so into certain bounds, that the residue of the Earth was mere dry land.

7. And that you farther may understand how the Power of God is exalted above the course of Natural causes, God taking of the dust of this dry ground, wrought it with his hands into such a temper, that it was matter fit to make the Body of a Man: which when he first had fram'd, was as yet but like a senselesse statue, till coming near unto it with his mouth, he

he breath'd into the nostrils thereof the breath of life; as you may observe to this day, that men breath through their nostrils, though their mouths be clos'd. And thus Man became a living creature, and his name was called *Adam*, because he was made of the Earth.

8. But I should have told you first more at large, how the Lord God planted a Garden Eastward of *Judea* in the Countrey of *Eden*, about *Mesopotamia*, where afterwards he put the man *Adam*, whom he after this wife had form'd.

9. And the description of this Garden is this: Out of the ground made the Lord God to grow every Tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food. But amongst these several sorts of Trees, there were two of singular notice that stood planted in the midst of the Garden; the one of which had fruit of that wonderful virtue, as to continue youth and strength, and to make a man immortal upon earth, wherefore it was call'd *the Tree of Life*. There was also another Tree planted there, of whose fruit if a man ate it had this strange effect, that it would make a man know the difference betwixt good and evil: for the Lord God had so ordain'd, that if *Adam* touched the forbidden fruit thereof, he should by his disobedience feel the sense of evil as well as good; wherefore by way of Anticipation it was called *the Tree of knowledge of Good and Evil*.

10. And there was a River went out of *Eden* to water the Garden, and from thence it was parted, and became into four heads.

11. The name of the first was *Phasis*, or *Phasi-Tigris*, which compasses the whole Land of the *Chaulateans*, where there is Gold.

12. And the Gold of that Land is excellent: there is also found *Bdelium* and the *Onyx-stone*.

13. And the name of the second River is *Gihon*; the same is it that compasseth the whole Land of the *Arabian-Ethiopia*.

14. And the name of the third River is *Tigris*; that is that which goeth towards the East of *Assyria*. And the fourth River is *Euphrates*.

15. And the Lord God took the man *Adam* by the hand, and led him into the Garden of *Eden*, and laid commands upon him to dress it, and look to it, and to keep things handsome and in order in it, and that it should not be any wise spoil'd or misus'd by incursions or careless ramblings of the heedless beasts.

16. And the Lord God recommended unto *Adam* all the Trees of the Garden for very wholesome and delightful food, bidding him freely eat thereof.

17. Only he excepted *the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil*, which he strictly charg'd him to forbear; for if he ever tasted thereof, he should assuredly die.

18. But to the high commendation of Matrimony be it spoken, though God had placed *Adam* in so delightful a Paradise, yet his happiness was but maimed and imperfect till he had the society of a Woman: For the Lord God said, It is not good that man should be alone, I will make him an help meet for him.

19. Now out of the ground the Lord God had form'd every Beast of



the field, and every Fowl of the air, and these brought he unto *Adam*, to see what he would call them; and whatsoever *Adam* called every living creature, that was the name thereof.

20. And *Adam* gave names to all Cattel, and to the Fowls of the aire, and to every Beast of the field: but he could not so kindly take acquaintance with any of these, or so fully enjoy their society; but there was still some considerable matter wanting to make up *Adam's* full felicity, and there was a meet help to be found out for him.

21. Wherefore the Lord God caus'd a deep sleep to fall upon *Adam*; and lo, as he slept upon the ground, he fell into a dream, how God had put his hand into his side, and pulled out one of his ribs, closing up the flesh in stead thereof:

22. And how the rib which the Lord God had taken from him was made into a Woman; and how God when he had thus made her, took her by the hand, and brought her unto him. And he had no sooner awakened, but he found his dream to be true, for God stood by him with the Woman in his hand which he had brought.

23. Wherefore *Adam* being pre-advertised by the vision, was presently able to pronounce, This is now bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh: What are the rest of the Creatures to this? And he bestowed upon her also a fitting name, calling her *Woman*, because she was taken out of *Man*.

24. And the Lord God said, Thou hast spoken well, *Adam*: And for this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave unto his wife, and they two shall be one flesh: so strict and sacred a tie is the band of Wedlock.

25. And they were both naked, *Adam* and his Wife, and were not ashamed: but how the shame of being seen naked came into the world, I shall declare unto you hereafter.

### CHAP. III.

1. *A subtle Serpent in Paradise, indued with both Reason and the power of Speech, deceives the Woman.* 2. *The Dialogue betwixt the Woman and the Serpent.* 7. *How the shame of nakedness came into the world.* 8. *God walks in the Garden, and calls to Adam.* 10. *The Dialogue betwixt Adam and God.* 14. *The reason why Serpents want feet, and creep upon the ground.* 15. *The reason of the Antipathy betwixt Men and Serpents.* 16. *As also of Womens pangs in child-bearing, and of their being bound in subjection to their Husbands.* 18. *Also of the barrenness of the Earth, and of mans toil and drudgery.* 21. *God teacheth Adam and Eve the use of leathern clothing.* 24. *Paradise haunted with Apparitions: Adam frighted from daring to taste of the Tree of Life, whence his posterity became mortal to this very day.*

1. **A**ND truly it cannot but be very obvious for you to consider often with your selves, not onely how this Shame of Nakedness came into the world, but the toil and drudgery of Tillage and Husbandry; the grievous pangs of Child-bearing; and lastly, what is most terrible of all, Death it self: Of all which, as of some other things also, I shall give you such plain and intelligible reasons, that your own hearts could not wish more plain and more intelligible. To what an happy condition *Adam* was created you have already heard; How he was plac'd by God in a Garden of delight, where all his Senses were gratified with the most pleasing Objects imaginable; his Eyes with the beauty of trees and flowers, and various delightful forms of living creatures; his Ears with the sweet musical accents of the canorous birds; his Smell with the fragrant odours of Aromatick herbs; his Taste with variety of delicious fruit; and his Touch with the soft breathings of the Aire in the flowry alleys of this ever-springing Paradise. Adde unto all this that pleasure of pleasures, the delectable conversation of his beautiful Bride, the enjoyments of whose love neither created care to himself, nor pangs of childe-bearing to her: for all the functions of life were performed with ease and delight; and there had been no need for man to sweat for the provision of his family, for in this Garden of *Eden* there was a perpetual Spring, and the vigour of the soil prevented mans industry; and youth and jollity had never left the bodies of *Adam* and his posterity, because old age and death were perpetually to be kept off by that sovereign virtue of *the Tree of Life*. And I know, as you heartily could wish this state might have ever continued to *Adam* and his seed; so you eagerly expect to hear the reason why he was depriv'd of it: and in short it is this, *His disobedience to a Commandement which God had given him*; the circumstances whereof I shall declare unto you, as followeth.

Amongst those several living creatures which were in Paradise, there was *the Serpent* also, whom you know to this very day to be full of subtilty; and therefore you will less wonder, if when he was in his perfection he had not onely the use of *Reason*, but the power of *Speech*. It was therefore this Serpent that was the first occasion of all this mischief to *Adam* and his posterity; for he cunningly came unto the Woman, and said unto her, Is it so indeed, that God has commanded you that you shall not eat of \* any of the Trees of the Garden?

\* See *Paul. Phag.*

2. And the Woman answered unto the Serpent, You are mistaken; God hath not forbid us to eat of all the fruit of the Trees of the Garden.

3. But indeed of the fruit of the Tree in the midst of the Garden God hath strictly charged us, Ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die.

4. But the Serpent said unto the Woman, Tush, I warrant you this is only but to terrifie you, and abridge you of that liberty and happiness you are capable of; you shall not so certainly die.

5. But God knows the virtue of that Tree full well, that so soon as you eat thereof your eyes shall be opened, and you shall become as Gods, knowing good and evil.

F f f 2

6. And



6. And when the Woman saw that the Tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eye, and a Tree to be desired to make one wife; she took of the fruit and did eat, and gave also to her Husband with her, and he did eat.

7. And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew they were naked, and were ashamed; and therefore they sewed fig-leaves together, and made themselves aprons to cover their parts of shame.

8. And the Lord God came into the Garden toward the cool of the evening, and walking in the Garden, call'd for *Adam*: But *Adam* had no sooner heard his voice, but he and his wife ran away into the thickest of the trees of the Garden, to hide themselves from his presence.

9. But the Lord God called unto *Adam* the second time, and said unto him, *Adam*, where art thou?

10. Then *Adam* was forc'd to make answer, and said, I heard thy voice in the Garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked, and so I hid my self.

11. Then God said unto him, Who hath made thee so wise, that thou shouldst know that thou art naked, or wantest any covering? Hast thou eaten of the forbidden fruit?

12. And *Adam* excus'd himself, saying, The woman whom thou recommendedst to me for a meet help, she gave me of the fruit, and I did eat.

13. And the Lord God said unto the Woman, What is this that thou hast done? And the Woman excus'd her self, saying, The Serpent beguiled me, and I did eat.

14. Then the Lord God gave sentence upon all three: and to the Serpent he said, Because thou hast done this, thou art cursed above all cattel, and above every beast of the field: and whereas hitherto thou hast been able to bear thy body aloft, and go upright, thou shalt henceforth creep upon thy belly, like a worm, and dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life.

15. And there shall be a perpetual Antipathy betwixt not only the woman and thee, but betwixt her seed and thy seed: For universal mankind shall abhor thee, and hate all the cursed generations that come of thee. They indeed shall busily lie in wait to sting mens feet, which their skill in Herbs however shall be able to cure; but they shall knock all Serpents on the head, and kill them without pity or remorse, deservedly using thy seed as their deadly enemy.

16. And the doom of the Woman was, Her sorrow and pangs in child-bearing, and her subjection to her Husband. Which law of subjection is generally observed in the Nations of the world unto this very day.

17. And the doom of *Adam* was, the toil of Husbandry upon barren ground.

18. For the Earth was cursed for his sake, which is the reason that it brings forth thorns and thistles and other weeds, that Husband-men could wish would not cumber the ground, upon which they bestow their toilsome labour.

19. Thus

19. Thus in the sweat of his face was *Adam* to eat his bread, till he return to the dust out of which he was taken.

20. And *Adam* called his wife *Eve*, because she was the Mother of all men that ever were born into the World, and lived upon the face of the Earth.

21. And the generations of men were clothed at first with the skins of wilde beasts, the use of which God taught *Adam* and *Eve* in Paradise.

22. And when they were thus accoutred for their journey, and armed for greater hardship, God turns them both out: and the Lord God said concerning *Adam*, deriding him for his disobedience, Behold, *Adam* is become as one of us, to know good and evil: Let us look to him now, lest he put his hand to the *Tree of Life*, and so make himself immortal.

23. Therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the Garden of *Eden*, to till the ground, from whence he was taken.


24. So he drove out *Adam*, and his Wife was forced to follow him: For there was no longer staying in Paradise, because the place was terribly haunted with Spirits, and fearful Apparitions appeared at the entrance thereof, winged men with fiery flaming swords in their hands brandished every way, so that *Adam* durst never adventure to go back to taste of the fruit of the *Tree of Life*: whence it is that mankinde hath continued mortal to this very day.



# T H E P H I L O S O P H I C K C A B B A L A .

## C H A P. I.

1. The World of Life or Forms, *and the Potentiality of the visible Universe created by the Tri-une God, and referr'd to a Monad or Unite.*  
 6. The Universal immense Matter of the visible World created out of nothing, and referr'd to the number Two. 7. Why it was not said of this matter that it was good. 9. The ordering of an Earth or Planet for making it conveniently habitable, referr'd to the number Three. 14. The immense Æthereal matter, or Heaven, contriv'd into Suns or Planets, as well Primary as Secondary, viz. as well Earths as Moons, and referr'd to the number Four. 20. The replenishing of an Earth with Fish and Fowl, referr'd to the number Five. 24. The Creation of Beasts and Cattel, but more chiefly of Man himself, referr'd to the number Six.

I.  UR design being to set out the more conspicuous parts of the external Creation, before we descend to the Genealogies and Successions of Mankind; there are two notable Objects present themselves to our Understanding, which we must first take notice of, as having an universal influence upon all that follows: and these I do Symbolically decypher, the one by the name of *Heaven and Light*; for I mean the same thing by both these terms; the other by the name of *Earth*. By *Heaven or Light* you are to understand *The whole comprehension of Intellectual Spirits*, Souls of men and beasts, and the Seminal forms of all things, which you may call, if you please, *The World of Life*. By *Earth* you are to understand the *Potentiality or Capability of the Existence of the outward Creation*: This Possibility being exhibited to our minds as the result of the Omnipotence of God, without whom nothing would be, and is indeed the utmost shadow and darkest projection thereof, wherein also is involved the *Impossibility and Incommensurability* of things.

The *Tri-une* God therefore by his Eternal Wisdome first created this Symbolical *Heaven and Earth*.

2. And this *Earth* was nothing but Solitude and Emptiness, and it was a deep bottomless Capacity of being whatever God thought good to make out of it, that implied no contradiction to be made. And there being

being a possibility of creating things after sundry and manifold manners, nothing was yet determined, but this vast Capability of things was unsettled, fluid; and of it self undeterminable as *Water*: But the *Spirit of God*, who was the *Vehicle* of the *Eternal Wisdom* and of the *Super-essential Goodness*, by a swift fore-cast of Counsel and Discourse of Reason truly Divine, such as at once strikes through all things, and discerns what is best to be done, having hover'd awhile over all the Capacities of this fluid Possibility, forthwith settled upon what was the most perfect and exact.

3. Wherefore the intire Deity by an *inward Word*, which is nothing but *Wisdom* and *Power*, edg'd with *actual Will*, with more ease then we can present any *Notion* or *Idea* to our own minds, exhibited really to their own view the whole Creation of Spiritual Substances, such as Angels are in their inward natures, the Souls of men, and other Animals, and the Seminal Forms of all things; so that all those, as many as ever were to be of them, did really and actually exist without any dependency on corporeal Matter.

4. And God approved of, and pleased himself in all this as good: but yet though in design there was a settlement of the *fluid darkness* or *obscure Possibility* of the outward Creation, yet it remained as yet but a *dark Possibility*. And a notorious distinction indeed there was betwixt this *Actual spiritual Creation* and the *dim Possibility* of the material or outward world.

5. Inasmuch that the one might very well be called *Day*, and the other *Night*: because the *Night* does deface and obliterate all the distinct figures and colours of things; but the *Day* exhibits them all orderly and clearly to our sight. Thus therefore was the *Immaterial Creature* perfectly finish'd, being an *inexhaustible Treasure of Light and Form*, for the garnishing and consummating the material world, to afford a *Morning* or *Active principle* to every *Passive* one in the future parts of the corporeal Creation. But in this *First day's work*, as we will call it, the *Morning* and *Evening* are purely *Metaphysical*: for the *Active* and *Passive* principles here are not two distinct *Substances*, the one *Material*, the other *Spiritual*; but the *Passive* principle is *Matter* merely *Metaphysical*, and indeed no *real* or *actual* entity; and, as hath been already said, is quite divided from the *Light* or *Spiritual substance*, not belonging to it, but to the outward world, whose shadowy possibility it is. But be they how they will, this *Passive* and *Active* principle are the *First day's work*: A *Monad* or *Unit* being so fit a Symbole of the *Immaterial nature*.

6. And God thought again, and invigorating his thought with his Will and Power, created an immense deal of real and corporeal *Matter*, a Substance which you must conceive to lie betwixt the foresaid *fluid Possibility of Natural things* and the Region of *Seminal Forms*; not that these things are distinguish'd Locally, but according to a more intellectual Order.

7. And the Thought of God arm'd with his Omnipotent Will took effect, and this immensely-diffused *Matter* was made. But he was not very forward to say it was good, or to please himself much in it; because he



foresaw what mischief straying Souls, if they were not very cautious, might bring to themselves by sinking themselves too deep therein. Besides it was little worth, till greater polishings were bestowed upon it, and his Wisdom had contrived it to fitting uses, being nothing as yet but a boundlesse Ocean of rude divisible Matter.

8. Wherefore *this Matter* was actuated and agitated forthwith in the very creation thereof by that hand that made it, and was guided and moderated by some *Universal Spirit*, yet part of the *World of Life*, whence it became very subtile and *Æthereal*; so that *this Matter* was rightly called *Heaven*: and the Union of the *Passive* and *Active* Principle in the Creation of this Material Heaven is the *Second* day's work, and the *Binarie* denotes the nature thereof.

9. I shall also declare unto you how God orders a real *material Earth* (which is alwaies environed with that *Æthereal Matter* which is called *Heaven*) for the making it pleasant and delightful for both man and beast when once it is made. But for the *very making* of the *Earth*, it is to be referred to the following day. For the Stars and Planets belong to that number; and as a primary Planet in respect of its reflexion of light is rightly called a *Planet*, so in respect of its habitableness it is as rightly termed an *Earth*. These Earths therefore God orders in such sort, that they neither want Water to lie upon them, nor be covered over with Water, though they be environed round with the fluid Air, in which also is that *Æther* or *Heaven*, and under which the Waters would have overspread the face of the Earth, had not his Providence gathered them into one Place:

10. And thereby made partly dry Land, and partly Sea, Rivers, and Springs, for those conveniences which are obvious for every one to conceive.

11. He adorns the ground also with Grasse, Herbs and Flowers; and hath made a wise provision of Seed, that they bring forth, for the perpetuation of such useful commodities upon the face of the earth.

12. For indeed these things are very good and necessary both for man and beast.

13. Therefore God prepared the Matter of the Earth so, as that there was a *Vital Congruity* of the parts thereof with sundry sorts of Seminal Forms of Trees, Herbs, and choicest kinds of Flowers; and so the Body of the Earth drew in sundry principles of *Plantal Life* from the *World of Life*, that is at hand everywhere: and the *Passive* and *Active* Principle thus put together made up the *Third* day's work, and the *Ternary* denotes the nature thereof.

14. The *Ternary* had allotted to it the garnishing of an Earth with Trees, Flowers and Herbs, after the distinction of *Land* and *Sea*: as the *Quinary* hath allotted to it the replenishing of an Earth with Fish and Fowl; the *Senary* with Man and Beast. But this *Fourth Day* comprehends the garnishing of the body of the *whole World*, viz. that vast and immense *Æthereal* matter which is called the *fluid Heaven*, with infinite numbers of sundry sorts of Lights, Suns and Planets, which God's Wisdom and Power, by union of fit and active principles drawn from

from *the World of Life*, made of this *Æthereal* matter; whose usefulness is plain in Nature, that they are all of them for Prognostick signs, and seasons, and days, and years. (Which implies that there are Planets every where through the whole Heavens allotted to the Suns.)

15. As also for administring of light to all the inhabitants of the world; that the Planets may receive light from their fountains of light, and reflect light one to another.

16. And there are Two sorts of these Lights that all the inhabitants of the world must acknowledge great every where, consulting with the outward sight, from their proper stations. And the dominion of the greater of these kinde of Lights is conspicuous by day, the dominion of the lesser by night: the former we ordinarily call a *Sun*, the other a *Moon*; which *Moon* is truly a *Planet* and opaque, but reflecting light very plentifully to the beholders sight, and yet is but a *secondary* or lesser kind of *Planet*: but he made the *Primary* and more eminent *Planets* also, and such an one is *this Earth* we live upon.

17. And God placed all these sorts of Lights in the thin and liquid Heaven, that they might reflect their rayes one upon another, and shine upon the inhabitants of the World, dwelling on their respective Earths:

18. And that their beauty and resplendency might be conspicuous to the beholders of them, whether by day or by night; which is mainly to be understood of the Suns, that supply also the place of Stars at a far distance, but whose chief office it is to make vicissitudes of day and night on their respective Earths or Planets. And the Universal dark *Æther* being thus adorn'd with the goodly and glorious furniture of those several kinds of Lights, God approved of it as good.

19. And the union of the *Passive* and *Active* principle was the *Fourth* day's work, and the number denotes the nature thereof.

20. And now you have heard of a verdant Earth, and a bounded Sea, and Lights to shine through the Aire and Water, and to gratifie the eyes of all living creatures, whereby they may see one another, and be able to seek their food, you may seasonably expect the mention of sundry Animals proper to their Elements. Wherefore God by his *Inward Word* and *Power* prepared the Matter in the waters, and near the waters, with several *Vital congruities*, so that it drew in sundry Souls from *the World of Life*, which actuating the parts of the Matter, caus'd great plenty of Fish to swim in the Waters, and Fowls to flye above the earth in the open Aire.

21. And after this manner he created great Whales also, as well as the lesser kinds of Fishes; and he approved of them all as good.

22. And the blessing of his *Inward Word* or *Wisdom*e was upon them for their multiplication; for according to the preparation of the Matter, the *Plastical Power* of the Souls that descend from *the World of Life* did faithfully and effectually work those wise contrivances of *Male* and *Female*, they being once rightly united with the Matter, so that by this means the Fish filled the Waters in the Seas, and the Fowls multiplied upon the Earth.

23. And the union of the *Passive* and *Active* principle was the  
Fifth



*Fifth* day's work; and the *Quinary* denotes the nature thereof.

24. And God persisted farther in the Creation of living creatures, and by espousing new Souls from *the World of Life* to the more Mediterranean parts of the Matter, created land-serpents, cattel, and the beasts of the field.

25. And when he had thus made them, he approved of them for good.

26. Then God reflecting upon his own Nature, and viewing himself, consulting with the *Super-essential Goodness*, the *Eternal Intellect*, and *unextinguishable Love-flame of his Omnipotent Spirit*, concluded to make a far higher kind of living creature then was as yet brought into the world: He made therefore *Man* in his own Image, after his own Likeness. For after he had prepared the Matter fit for so noble a guest as an humane Soul, *the World of Life* was forced to let go what the rightly-prepared Matter so justly called for: and Man appeared upon the stage of the Earth, Lord of all living creatures. For it was just that he that bears the Image of the invisible God should be Supreme Monarch of this visible World. And what can be more like God then the Soul of man, that is so Free, so Rational, and so Intellectual as it is? And he is not the less like him now he is united to the Terrestrial body, his Soul or Spirit possessing and striking through a compendious collection of all kind of Corporeal matter, and managing it with his understanding free to think of other things, even as God vivifies and actuates the whole world, being yet wholly free to contemplate himself. Wherefore God gave Man dominion over the Fowls of the aire, the Fish of the sea, and the Beasts of the earth: for it is reasonable the worser should be in subserviency to the better.

27. Thus God created Man in his own Image, he consisting of an Intellectual Soul, and a Terrestrial Body actuated thereby. Wherefore mankind became Male and Female, as other terrestrial animals are.

28. And the benediction of the Divine Wisdom for the propagation of their kinde was manifest in the contrivance of the parts that were framed for that purpose: And as they grew in multitudes they lorded it over the Earth, and over-mastered by their power and policy the Beasts of the field, and fed themselves with Fish and Fowl, and what else pleased them and made for their content; for all was given to them by right of their Creation.

29. And that nothing might be wanting to their delight, behold also Divine Providence hath prepared for their palate all precious and pleasant Herbs for sallads, and made them banquets of the most delicate fruit of the fruit-bearing trees.

30. But for the courser Grasse and worser kinde of Herbs, they are intended for the worser and baser kinde of creatures: Wherefore it is free for Man to seek out his own, and make use of it.

31. And God considering every thing that he had made, approved of it as very good: and the union of the *Passive* and *Active* principle was the *Sixth* day's work; and the *Senary* denotes the nature thereof.

## C H A P. II.

2. *God's full and absolute Rest from creating any thing of anew, adumbrated by the number Seven.* 4. *Suns and Planets not only the furniture but effects of the Æthereal Matter or Heaven.* 6. *The manner of Man and other Animals rising out of the Earth by the power of God in Nature.* 8. *How it was with Adam before he descended into flesh, and became a Terrestrial Animal.* 10. *That the four Cardinal Vertues were in Adam in his Æthereal or Paradisiacal condition.* 17. *Adam in Paradise forbidden to taste or relish his own Will under pain of descending into the Region of Death.* 18. *The Masculine and Feminine faculties in Adam.* 20. *The great Pleasure and Solace of the Feminine faculties.* 21. *The Masculine faculties laid asleep, the Feminine appear and act, viz. the grateful sense of the Life of the Vehicle.* 25. *That this sense and joy of the Life of the Vehicle is in it self without either blame or shame.*

1. **T**HUS the Heavens and the Earth were finish'd, and all the garnishings of them, such as are Trees, Flowers, and Herbs; Suns, Moons, and Stars; Fishes, Fowls, and Beasts of the field; and the chiefeft of all, Man himself.

2. Wherefore God having thus compleated his work in the *Senary*, comprehending the whole Creation in *Six* orders of things, he ceased from ever creating any thing more, either in this outward Material world, or in the world of Life: But his Creative Power retiring into himself, he enjoyed his own *eternal Rest*, which is his immutable and indefatigable Nature, that with ease oversees all the whole Compass of Beings, and continues *Essence, Life and Activity* to them; and the better rectifies the worse, and all are guided by his Eternal Word and Spirit; but no new Substance hath been ever created since the *Six* days production of things, nor shall ever be hereafter.

3. For this *Seventh day* God hath made an *Eternal Holy-day*, or *Festival of Rest* to himself, wherein he will only please himself, to behold the exquisite Order and Motion and right Nature of things; his *Wisdom, Justice and Mercy* unavoidably insinuating themselves, according to the set frame of the World, into all the parts of the Creation, he having *Ministers of his Goodness and Wrath* prepared everywhere: So that himself need but to look on, and see the Effects of that *Nemesis* that is necessarily interwoven in the nature of the things themselves which he hath made. This therefore is that *Sabbath* or *Festival of Rest* which God himself is said to celebrate in the *Seventh day*; and indeed the number declares the nature thereof.

4. And now to open my minde more fully and plainly unto you, I must tell you, That those things which before I term'd the *Garnishings* of the Heaven and of the Earth, they are not only so, but the *Generations* of them: I say, *Plants and Animals* were the Generations, Effects and Productions of the *Earth*, the *Seminal Forms* and *Souls* of *Animals* insinuating



nuating themselves into the prepared Matter thereof; and *Suns, Planets,* or *Earths*, were the Generations or productions of the *Heavens*, vigour and motion being imparted from the *World of Life* to the immense body of the Universe: so that what I before called mere *Carnishings*, are indeed the *Productions* or *Generations* of the *Heavens* and of the *Earth* so soon as they were made; though I do not take upon me to define the Time wherein God made the *Heavens* and the *Earth*: For he might doe it at once by his absolute Omnipotency; or he might, when he had created all Substance as well material as immaterial, let them act one upon the other so, and in such periods of time, as the nature of the production of the things themselves requir'd.

5. But it was for pious purposes that I cast the Creation into that order of *Six* dayes, and for the more firmly rooting in the hearts of the people this grand and useful Truth, *That the Omnipotency of God is such; that he can act above and contrary to Natural causes*, that I mention'd Herbs and Plants of the field, before I take notice of either rain, or man to exercise Gardning and Husbandry: For indeed, according to my former narration, there had been no such kinde of rain as ordinarily now-a-days waters the labours of the Husbandman.

6. But yet there went up a moist Vapour from the Earth, which being matur'd and concocted by the *Spirit of the world*, which is very active in the Heavens or Air, became a precious *balmy liquor* and fit *vehicle of Life*, which descending down in some sort like dewy showers upon the face of the Earth, moistned the ground; so that the warmth of the Sun gently playing upon the surface thereof, prepared matter variously for sundry sorts, not only of Seminal forms of *Plants*, but Souls of *Animals* also.

7. And *Man* himself rose out of the Earth after this manner; the dust thereof being rightly prepar'd and attemper'd by these unctuous showers and balmy droppings of Heaven. For God had so contriv'd by his Infinite Wisdome, that Matter thus or thus prepar'd should by a *Vital congruity* attract proportional Forms from the *World of Life*, which is everywhere nigh at hand, and does very throngly inequitate the moist and unctuous Aire. Wherefore after this manner was the *Aëreal* or *Æthereal Adam* conveyed into an Earthly body, having his most conspicuous residence in the Head or Brain: And thus *Adam* became the Soul of a *Terrestrial living Creature*.

8. But how it is with *Adam* before he descends into this lower condition of life, I shall declare unto you in the *Ænigmatical* narration that follows, which is this; That the Lord God had planted a Garden Eastward in *Eden*, where he had put the Man, which afterward he formed into a *Terrestrial Animal*: For *Adam* was first wholly *Æthereal*, and placed in Paradise, that is, in an happy and joyful condition of the Spirit; for he was placed under the invigorating beams of the *Divine Intellect*, and the Sun of Righteousnesse then shone fairly upon him.

9. And his Soul was as the ground which God hath blest, and so brought forth every pleasant Tree, and every goodly Plant of her heavenly Fathers own planting; for the holy Spirit of Life had enriched the soil, that it brought forth all manner of pleasant and profitable fruits:

And

And the *Tree of Life* was in the midst of this Garden of mans Soul, to wit, the *Essential Will of God*, which is the true root of Regeneration: but so high a pitch *Adam* as yet had not reach'd unto; and the fruit of this Tree in this *Æthereal* state of the Soul had been *Immortality* or *Life everlasting*: And the *Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil* was there also, viz. *His own Will*.

10. And there was a very pleasant River that water'd this Garden, distinguishable into four streams, which are the four Cardinal Vertues, which are in several degrees in the Soul, according to the several degrees of the purity of her *Vehicle*.

11. And the name of the first is *Pison*, which is *Prudence* and Experience in things that are comely to be done: For the Soul of man is never idle, neither in this world, nor in any state else, but hath some Province to make good, and is to promote his interest whose she is. For what greater gratification can there be of a good Soul, then to be a dispenser of some portion of that Universal good that God lets out upon the world? And there can be no external conversation nor society of persons, be they *Terrestrial*, *Aëreal*, or *Æthereal*, but forthwith it implies an Use of *Prudence*: Wherefore *Prudence* is an inseparable Accomplishment of the Soul: So that *Pison* is rightly deemed one of the Rivers even of that Celestial Paradise. And this is that *Wisdom* which God himself doth shew to the Soul by communication of the divine Light; for it is said to compass the Land of *Havilah*.

12. Where also idle and useles Speculations are not regarded, as is plainly declared by the pure and approved *Gold*, *Bdellium*, and *Onyx*, the Commodities thereof.

13. And the name of the second River is *Gihon*, which is *Justice*, as is intimated from the fame of the *Æthiopians*, whose Land it is said to compass, as also from the notation of the name thereof.

14. And the name of the third River is *Hiddekel*, which is *Fortitude*, that like a rapid stream bears all down before it, and stoutly resists all the powers of darkness, running forcibly against *Assyria*, which is situated Westward of it. And the fourth River is *Perath*, which is *Temperance*, the nourisher and cherisher of all the plants of Paradise; whereas *Intemperance*, or too much addicting the Mind to the pleasure of the *Vehicle*, or *Life of the Matter*, be it in what state soever, drowns and choaks those sacred Vegetables. As the Earth, you know, was not at all fruitful till the Waters were removed into one place, and the dry land appeared, whenas before it was drowned and slocken with overmuch moisture.

15. In this Paradise thus described had the Lord God placed Man to dress it, and to keep it in such good order as he found it.

16. And the Divine Word or Light in man charged him, saying, Of every Tree of Paradise thou mayest freely eat. For all things here are wholesome as well as pleasant, if thou hast a right care of thy self, and beest obedient to my Commands.

17. But of the luscious and poisonous fruit of the *Tree of Knowledge of good and evil*, that is, of *thine own Will*, thou shalt not by any means eat: For at what time thou eatest thereof, thy Soul shall contract that



languor, debility and unsettledness, that in process of time thou shalt slide into the earth, and be buried in humane flesh, and become an inhabitant of the *Region of mortality and death*.

18. Hitherto I have not taken much notice in the *Aethereal Adam* of any other Faculties but such as carried him upwards towards Vertue and the *holy Intellect*. And indeed this is the more *perfect* and *masculine Adam*, which consists in pure subtile Intellectual Knowledge. But we will now inform you of another Faculty of the Soul of man, which though it seem inferiour, yet is far from being contemptible, it being both good for himself, and convenient for the terrestrial world: For this makes him in a capacity of being the Head of all the living creatures in the earth, as that Faculty indeed is the mother of all mankind.

19. Those higher and more Intellectual accomplishments, I must confesse, made *Adam* very wise and of a quick perception. For he knew very well the natures of the Beasts of the field and Fowls of the air: I mean not only of the visible and terrestrial creatures, but also of the fallen and unfallen Angels, or good and bad *Genii*; and was able to judge aright of them, according to the principles they consisted of and the properties they had.

20. And his Reason and Understanding was not mistaken, but he pronounced aright in all. But however, he could take no such pleasure in the external Creation of God and his various works, without having some Principle of life, congruously joyning with and joyfully actuating the like Matter themselves consisted of: Wherefore God indued the Soul of Man with a Faculty of being united with vital joy and complacency to the Matter, as well as of aspiring to an Union with God himself, whose Divine Essence is too highly disproportioned to our poor substances. But the Divine Life is communicable in some sort to both Soul and Body, whether it be *Aethereal*, or of grosser consistence: and those wonderful grateful pleasures that we feel are nothing but the kindly motions of the Soul's *Vehicle*; from whence Divine joyes themselves are by a kinde of reflexion strengthened and advanced. Of so great consequence is that Vital principle that joyns the Soul to the Matter of the Universe.

21. Wherefore God, to gratifie *Adam*, made him not indefatigable in his aspirings towards Intellectual things; but Lassitude of Contemplation and of Affectation of Immateriality, (he being not able to receive those things as they are, but according to his poor capacity, which is very small in respect of the object it is exercis'd about) brought upon him remissnesse and drowinesse to such like exercises, till by degrees he fell into a more \* profound sleep. At what time Divine Providence having laid the plot aforehand, that lower Vivificative principle of his Soul did grow so strong, and did so vigorously and with such exultant sympathy and joy actuate his *Vehicle*, that in virtue of his Integrity, which he yet retain'd, this became more dear to him, and of greater contentment then any thing he yet had experience of.

22. I say, when Divine Providence had so lively and warmly stirr'd up this new sense of his *Vehicle* in him,

23. He

\* See *Philo  
Leg. Allegor.  
lib. 3.*

23. He straightway acknowledg'd that all the sense and knowledge of any thing he had hitherto was more lifelesse and evanid, and seemed lesse congruous and grateful unto him, and more estranged from his nature: but this was so agreeable and consentaneous to his Soul, that he looked upon it as a necessary part of himself, and called it after his own name.

24. And he thought thus within himself, For this cause will any one leave his over-tedious *aspires*, to unite with the *Eternal Intellect and Universal Soul of the World*, the immenseness of whose excellencies are too highly rais'd for us to continue long in their embracements; and will cleave to the joyous and chearful *life of his Vehicle*, and account this living *Vehicle* and his Soul one Person.

25. Thus *Adam* with his *new-wedded Joy* stood naked before God, but was not as yet at all ashamed, by reason of his Innocency and Simplicity; for *Adam* neither in his Reason nor Affection as yet had transgressed in any thing.

## CHAP. III.

1. *Satan tempts Adam, taking advantage upon the Invigoration of the Life of his Vehicle.* 2. *The Dialogue betwixt Adam and Satan.* 6. *The Masculine faculties in Adam, swayed by the Feminine, assent to sin against God.* 7. *Adam excuses the use of that wilde Liberty he gave himself, discerning the Plastick Power somewhat awakened in him.* 8. *A dispute betwixt Adam and the Divine Light, arraigning him at the Tribunal of his own Conscience.* 14. *Satan stricken down into the lower Regions of the Aire.* 15. *A Prophecy of the Incarnation of the Soul of the Messias, and of his Triumph over the head and highest Powers of the rebellious Angels.* 16. *A decree of God to sowre and disturb all the pleasures and contentments of the Terrestrial Life.* 20. *Adam again excuses his Fall, from the usefulness of his Presence and Government upon Earth.* 21. *Adam is fully incorporated into Flesh, and appears in the true shape of a Terrestrial Animal.* 24. *That Immortality is incompetible to the Earthly Adam, nor can his Soul reach it, till she return into her Æthereal Vehicle.*

1. **N**OW the *Life of the Vehicle* being so highly invigorated in *Adam*, by the remission of exercise in his more subtile and immaterial Faculties, he was fit with all alacrity and chearfulnesse to pursue any game set before him; and wanted nothing but fair external opportunity to call him out into action. Which one of the evil *Genii* or fain Angels observed, who had no small skill in doing mischief, having in all likelihood practised the same villany upon some of his own Orders, and was the very Ring-leader of rebellion against God and the Divine Light: For he was more perversely subtile then all the rest of the evil *Genii* or Beasts of the field, which God had made Angels; but their Be-



stiality they contracted by their own Rebellion. For every thing that hath Sense and Understanding, and wants the Divine Life in it, in the judgment of all wise and good men is truly a Beast. This *old Serpent* therefore, the subtlest of all the *Beasts of the field*, cunningly assaulted *Adam* with such conference as would surely please his *Feminine* part, which was now so invigorated with life, that the best news to her would be the tidings of a Commission to doe any thing. Wherefore the *Serpent* said to the *feminized Adam*, Why are you so demure? and what makes you so bound up in spirit? Is it so indeed that God has confined you, taken away your Liberty, and forbidden you all things that you may take pleasure in?

2. And *Adam* answered him, saying, No; we are not forbidden any thing that the *Divine Life* in us approves as good and pleasant.

3. We are only forbidden to feed on *our own Will*, and to seek pleasures apart and without the approbation of the Will of God. For if our own Will get head in us, we shall assuredly descend into the *Region of Mortality*, and be cast into a state of Death.

4. But the *Serpent* said unto *Adam*, Tush, this is but a *Panick* fear in you, *Adam*; you shall not so surely die as you conceit.

5. The only matter is this; God indeed loves to keep his creatures in awe, and to hold them in from ranging too far and reaching too high: but he knows very well, that if you take but your liberty with us, and satiate your selves freely with your own Will, your eyes will be wonderfully opened, and you will meet with a world of variety of experiments in things, so that you will grow abundantly wise, and, like Gods, know all things whatsoever, whether good or evil.

6. Now the *Feminine* part in *Adam* was so tickled with this Doctrine of the *old Deceiver*, that the *Concupiscible* began to be so immoderate as to resolve to doe any thing that may promote pleasure and experience in things, and snatch'd away with it *Adam's* Will and Reason by his heedlessness and inadvertency. So that *Adam* was wholly set upon doing things at randome, according as the various toyings and titillations of the lascivient *Life of the Vehicle* suggested to him, no longer consulting with the Voice of God, or taking any farther aim by the Inlet of the Divine Light.

7. And when he had tired himself with a rabble of toyes and unfruitful or unsatisfactory devices, rising from the multifarious workings of the *Particles* of his *Vehicle*, at last the eyes of his faculties were opened, and they perceived how naked they were; he having neither the covering of the Heavenly Nature, nor as yet of the Terrestrial Body. Only they sewed fig-leaves together, and made some pretences of excuse, from the vigour of the *Plantal Life* that now in a thinner manner might manifest itself in *Adam*, and predispose him for a more perfect exercise of his *Plastick Power*, when the prepared Matter of the Earth shall drink him in.

8. In the mean time the Voice of God, or the Divine Wisdome, spake to them in the cool of the day, when the hurry of this mad Career had well flaked. But *Adam* now with his wife was grown so out of order, and so much estranged from the *Life of God*, that they hid themselves at  
the

the sensible approach thereof, as wilde beasts run away into the Wood at the sight of a man.

9. But the *divine Light* in the Conscience of *Adam* pursued him, and upbraided unto him the case he was in.

10. And *Adam* acknowledged within himself how naked he was, having no power, nor ornaments, nor abilities of his own, and yet that he had lost his obedience and dependence upon God: Wherefore he was ashamed, and hid himself at the approach of the divine Light manifesting it self unto him to the reprehension and rebuke of him.

11. And the divine Light charg'd all this misery and confusion that had thus overtaken him upon the eating of the forbidden fruit, *the luscious Dictates of his own Will*.

12. But *Adam* again excus'd himself within himself, that it was the vigour and impetuosity of that *Life in the Vehicle*, which God himself implanted in it, whereby he miscarried: the woman that God had given him.

13. And the *divine Light* spake in *Adam* concerning the woman, What work hath she made here? But the woman in *Adam* excused herself; for she was beguiled by that grand Deceiver the *Serpent*. In this confusion of mind was *Adam* by forsaking the *divine Light*, and letting his own Will get head against it. For it so changed the nature of his *Vehicle*, that (whereas he might have continued in an *Angelical* and *Æthereal* condition, and his *Feminine* part been brought into perfect obedience to the *divine Light*, and had joyes multiplied upon the whole man beyond all expresseion and imagination for ever) he now sunk more and more towards a mortal and terrestrial estate, himself not being unsensible thereof; as you shall hear, when I have told you the doom of the Eternal God concerning the *Serpent* and him.

14. Things therefore having been carried on in this wise, the Eternal Lord God decreed thus with himself concerning the *Serpent* and *Adam*; That this *old Serpent*, the Prince of the rebellious Angels, should be more accursed then all the rest; and (whereas he lorded it aloft in the higher parts of the Aire, and could glide in the very *Æthereal* Region, amongst the innocent and unsaln Souls of men and the good Angels, before) that he should now sweep the dust with his belly, being cast lower towards the surface of the Earth.

15. And that there should be a general enmity and abhorrency betwixt this *old Serpent*, as also all of his fellow-rebels, and betwixt *Mankind*. And that in proceſſe of time the ever-faithful and obedient Soul of the *Messias* should take a Body, and should trample over the power of the *Devil*, very notoriously here upon Earth, and after his death should be constituted Prince of all the *Angelical* Orders whatever in Heaven.

16. And concerning *Adam*, the Eternal Lord God decreed that he should descend down to be an Inhabitant of the Earth, and that he should not there indulge to himself the pleasures of the body, without the concomitants of pain and sorrow; and that his *Feminine* part, his Affections, should be under the chastisement and correction of his Reason.



17. That he should have a wearisome and toilsome travail in this world,

18. The Earth bringing forth thorns and thistles, though he must subsist by the Corn of the field.

19. Wherefore in the sweat of his brows he should eat his bread, till he returned unto the ground, of which his Terrestrial body is made. This was the Counsel of God concerning *Adam* and the *Serpent*.

20. Now, as I was a telling you, *Adam* though he was sinking apace into those lower functions of life, yet his Minde was not as yet grown so fully stupid, but he had the knowledge of his own condition, and added to all his former Apologies, that the *Feminine* part in him, though it had seduced him, yet there was some use of this miscarriage, for the Earth would hence be inhabited by *Intellectual Animals*: wherefore he call'd the *Life of his Vehicle*, *EVE*, because she is indeed the Mother of all the generations of men that live upon the Earth.

21. At last the *Plastick Power* being fully awakened, *Adam's* Soul descended into the prepared Matter of the Earth, and in due processe of time *Adam* appear'd cloth'd in the skin of beasts; that is, he became a down-right *Terrestrial Animal*, and a mortal creature upon Earth.

22. For the Eternal God had so decreed, and his Wisdom, Mercy and Justice did but (if I may so speak) play and sport together in the businesse. And the rather, because *Adam* had but precipitated himself into that condition which in due time might have fallen to his share by course: for it is fitting there should be some such Head among the living creatures of the earth as a *Terrestrial Adam*, but to live always here were his disadvantage.

23. Wherefore when God remov'd him from that higher condition,

24. He made sure he should not be Immortal, nor is he in any capacity of reaching unto the fruit of the *Tree of Life*, without passing through the condition of being re-invested with a *fiery Vehicle*, and becoming a pure and defecate *Aethereal Spirit*: Then he may be admitted to taste the fruit of the *Tree of Life* and Immortality, and so live for ever.

# T H E M O R A L C A B B A L A.

## C H A P. I.

1. *Man a Microcosm or Little World, in whom there are two Principles, Spirit and Flesh.* 2. *The Earthly or Fleshly Nature appears first.* 4. *The Light of Conscience unlistned to.* 6. *The Spirit of Savoury and Affectionate discernment betwixt good and evil.* 10. *The inordinate desires of the flesh driven aside and limited.* 11. *Hereupon the plants of Righteousness bear fruit and flourish.* 16. *The hearty and sincere Love of God and a mans neighbour is as the Sun in the Soul of man: Notionality and Opinions the weak and faint Light of the dispersed Stars.* 18. *Those that walk in sincere Love, walk in the Day: They that are guided by Notionality, travel in the Night.* 22. *The Natural Concupiscible brings forth by the command of God, and is corrected by Devotion.* 24. *The Irascible also brings forth.* 26. *Christ, the Image of God is created, being a perfect Ruler over all the motions of the Irascible and Concupiscible.* 29. *The food of the Divine Life.* 30. *The food of the Animal Life.* 31. *The Divine Wisdome approves of whatsoever is simply natural, as good.*

1.



E shall set before you in this History of *Genesis* several eminent Examples of good and perfect men, such as *Abel*, *Seth*, *Enoch*, *Abraham*, and the like: Wherefore we thought fit, though *Ænigmatically*, and in a dark Parable, to shadow out in general the manner of progress to this divine Perfection; looking upon Man as a *Microcosm* or a *Little World*, who if he hold out the whole progress of the Spiritual Creation, the process thereof will be figuratively understood as follows. Wherefore first of all, I say, That by the will of God every man living on the face of the Earth hath these two Principles in him, *Heaven* and *Earth*, *Divinity* and *Animality*, *Spirit* and *Flesh*.

2. But that which is *Animal* or *Natural* operates first, the *Spiritual* or *Heavenly Life* lying for a while closed up at rest in its own Principle. During which time, and indeed some while afterwards too, the *Animal* or *Fleshly Life* domineers in darkness & deformity; the mighty tempestuous



Passions of the flesh contending and struggling over that *Abyss of unsatiable Desire*, which has no bottome, and which in this case carries the Mind to nothing but emptiness and unprofitableness.

3. But by the will of God it is, that afterwards the Day-light appears, though not in so vigorous measure, out of the *Heavenly or Spiritual Principle*.

4. And Conscience being thus enlightned, offers her self a guide to a better condition: and God has fram'd the nature of man so, that he cannot but say that this Light is good, and distinguish betwixt the dark tumultuous motions of the Flesh and it;

5. And say, that there is as true a difference as betwixt the natural Day and Night. And thus *Ignorance* and *Enquiry* was the *First day's* progress.

6. But though there be this Principle of Light set up in the Conscience of Man, and he cannot say any thing against it, but that it is good and true, yet has he not presently so lively and savoury a relish in his distinction betwixt the *evil* and the *good*: For the *evil* as yet wholly holds his Affections, though his Fancy and Reason be touch'd a little with the Theoretical apprehensions of what is *good*; wherefore by the will of God the *Heavenly Principle* (though it be in it self invisible and undiscernible) in due time becomes a *Spirit of savoury and affectionate discernment betwixt the evil and the good*; betwixt the pure waters that flow from the *holy Spirit*, and the muddy & tumultuous suggestions of the *Flesh*.

7. And thus is Man enabled in a living manner to distinguish betwixt the *Earthly* and *Heavenly* life.

8. For the *Heavenly Principle* is now made to him a *Spirit of savoury discernment*; and being taught by God after this manner, he will not fail to pronounce, That this Principle, whereby he has so quick and lively a sense of what is *good* and *evil*, is *Heavenly* indeed: And thus *Ignorance* and *Enquiry* is made the *Second day's* progress.

9. Now the sweetnesse of the *Upper waters* being so well relisht by man, he has a great nauseating against the *Lower feculent waters* of the unbounded desires of the *flesh*: so that God adding power to his will, the inordinate desires of the flesh are driven within set limits, and he has a command over himself to become more stayed and steady.

10. And this steadinesse and command he gets over himself, he is taught by the Divine Principle in him to compare to the *Earth* or *dry land* for safeness and stability; but the desires of the flesh he looks upon as a dangerous and turbulent *Sea*. Wherefore the bounding of them thus, and arriving to a state of command over a mans self, and freedome from such colluctations and collisions as are found in the working Seas, the Divine Nature in him could not but approve as good.

11. For so it comes to passe, by the will of God and according to the nature of things, that this state of *Sobriety* in man (he being in so good a measure rid of the boisterousnesse of evil Concupiscence) gives him leisure so to cultivate his Minde with principles of Vertue and Honesty, that he is as a fruitful field whom the Lord hath blessed,

12. Sending forth out of himself sundry sorts of fruit-bearing trees, herbs,

herbs, and flowers; that is, various kinds of good works, to the praise of God and the help of his neighbour: and God and his own Conscience witnesse to him that this is good.

13. And thus *Ignorance* and *Enquiry* is made the *Third* day's progresse.

14. Now when God has proceeded so far in the *Spiritual* Creation, as to raise the *Heavenly* Principle in man to that power and efficacy that it takes hold on his Affections, and brings forth laudable works of Righteousnesse, he thereupon adds a very eminent accession of Light and Strength, setting before his eyes sundry sorts of Luminaries in the *Heavenly* or *Intellectual* Nature, whereby he may be able more notoriously to distinguish betwixt the *Day* and the *Night*; that is, betwixt the condition of a truly illuminated Soul, and one that is as yet much benighted in ignorance and estranged from the true knowledge of God. For, according to the difference of these Lights, it is signified to a man in what condition himself or others are in, whether it be indeed *Day* or *Night* with them, *Summer* or *Winter*, *Spring-time* or *Harvest*, or what period or progresse they have made in the Divine Life.

15. And though there be so great a difference betwixt these Lights, yet the meanest are better then mere darknesse, and serve in some measure or other to give light to the Earthly man.

16. But among these many Lights which God makes to appear to man, there are two more eminent by far then the rest. The greater of which two has his dominion by day, and is a faithful guide to those which walk in the day, that is, that work the works of Righteousnesse. And this greater Light is but one, but does, being added, mightily invigorate the former day-light man walked by, and it is a more full appearance of the *Sun of Righteousnesse*; which is an hearty and sincere *Love of God and a mans neighbour*. The lesser of these two great Lights has dominion by night, and is a rule to those whose inward mindes are held as yet too strongly in the works of darknesse; and it is a Principle weak, and variable as the Moon, and is called *Inconstancy of Life and Knowledge*. There are also an abundance of other *little Lights* thickly dispersed over the whole Understanding of man, as the Stars in the Firmament, which you may call *Notionality*, or *Multiplicity of ineffectual Opinions*.

17. But the worst of all these are better then down-right Sensuality and Brutishnesse, and therefore God may well be said to set them up in the *Heavenly* part of man, his Understanding, to give what light they are able to his *Earthly* parts, his corrupt and inordinate Affections.

18. And as the *Sun of Righteousnesse*, that is, the hearty and sincere *Love of God and a mans neighbour*, by his single light and warmth with chearfulnesse and safety guides them that are in the day: so that more *uneven* and *changeable Principle*, and the *numerous Lights of Notionality*, may conduct them, as well as they are able, that are benighted in darknesse: And (what is most of all considerable) a man by the wide difference of these latter Lights from that of the Day, may discern when himself or another is benighted in the state of unrighteousnesse. For *multifarious Notionality* and *Inconstancy of life and knowledge* are certain signs that a man is in the night: But the sticking to this one single, but vigorous and  
effectual,



effectual, Light, of the hearty and sincere *Love of God and a mans neighbour*, is a sign that a man walks in the day. And he that is arrived to this condition plainly discerns, in the Light of God, that all this is very good.

19. And thus *Ignorance* and *Enquiry* is made the *Fourth* day's progress.

20. And now so noble, so warm and so vigorous a Principle or Light as the *Sun of Righteousness* being set up in the *Heavenly* part of the Soul of man, the unskilful may unwarily expect that the next news will be, that even the Seas themselves are dried up with the heat thereof, that is, that the *Concupiscible* in man is quite destroyed: But God doth appoint far otherwise; for the Waters bring forth abundance of Fish, as well as Fowl innumerable.

21. Thoughts therefore of natural delights do swim to and fro in the *Concupiscible* of man, and the fervent love he bears to God causes not a many faint ineffectual notions, but an abundance of holy affectionate meditations and *winged Ejaculations* that fly up heaven-ward, which returning back again, and falling upon the numerous fry of natural *Concupiscence*, help to lessen their numbers, as those Fowls that frequent the waters devour the Fish thereof. And God and good men do see nothing but good in all this.

22. Wherefore God multiplies the Thoughts of natural delight in the lower *Concupiscible*, as well as he does those Heavenly thoughts and holy meditations, that the entire Humanity might be filled with all the degrees of good it is capable of; and that the *Divine Life* might have something to order and overcome.

23. And thus *Ignorance* and *Enquiry* made the *Fifth* day's progress.

24. Nor does God only cause the Waters to bring forth, but the dry Land also, several living creatures after their kind, and makes the *Irascible* fruitful as well as the *Concupiscible*.

25. For God saw that they were both good, and that they were a fit subject for the *Heavenly Man* to exercise his Rule and Dominion over.

26. For God multiplies strength as well as occasions to employ it upon. And the *Divine Life* that hath been, under the several degrees of the advancement thereof, so variously represented in the *Five* fore-going progresses, God at last works up to the height, and being compleat in all things, styles it by the name of *his own Image*; the *Divine Life* arrived to this pitch being the right Image of him indeed. Thus it is therefore, that at last God in our nature fully manifests the *true and perfect Man*, whereby we our selves become good and perfect, who does not only see and affect what is good, but has full power to effect it in all things: For he has full dominion over the Fish of the sea, can rule and guide the Fowls of the aire, and with ease command the Beasts of the field, and whatever moveth upon the earth.

27. Thus God creates Man in his own Image, making him as powerful a Commander in his *Little World*, over all the Thoughts and Motions of the *Concupiscible* and *Irascible*, as himself is over the Natural frame of the Universe or greater World. And this Image is *Male and Female*, consisting of a *clear and free Understanding* and *divine Affection*,  
which

which are now arriv'd to that height, that no lower Life is able to rebel against them, and to bring them under.

28. For God blesses them and makes them fruitful, and multiplies their noble off-spring in so great and wonderful a measure, that they replenish the cultivated nature of man with such an abundance of real *Truth* and *Equity*, that there is no *living Figure*, *Imagination*, or *Motion* of the *Iracible* or *Concupiscible*, no extravagant or ignorant *Irregularity* in *Religious meditations* and *devotions*, but they are presently moderated and rectified. For the whole Territories of the Humane Nature are every where so well peopled with the several beautiful shapes or *Ideas* of *Truth* and *Goodness* the glorious off-spring of the *Heavenly Adam*, *Christ*, that no *Animal figure* can offer to move or wagge amiss, but it meets with a proper Corrector and Re-composer of its motions.

29. And the Divine Life in man being thus perfected, he is therewith instructed by God, what is his food, as *Divine*; and what is the food of the *Animal Life* in him; viz. the most vertuous, most truly pious and divine Actions he has given to the *Heavenly Adam* to feed upon, fulfilling the Will of God in all things, which is more pleasant then the choicest fallads or the most delicate fruit the taste can relish.

30. Nor is the *Animal Life* quite to be starved and pined, but regulated and kept in subjection; and therefore they are to have their worser sort of Herbs to feed on, that is, *Natural Actions* consentaneous to the Principle from whence they flow; that that Principle may also enjoy it self in the liberty of prosecuting what its nature prompts it unto. And thus the sundry Modifications of the *Iracible* and *Concupiscible*, as also the various *Figurations* of *Religious Melancholy* and *Natural Devotions*, (which are the Fishes, Beasts and Fowls in the *Animal Nature* of Man) are permitted to feed and refresh themselves in those lower kinds of Operations they incline us to; provided all be approved and rightly regulated by the *Heavenly Adam*.

31. For the Divine Wisdom in Man sees and approves all things which God hath created in us to be very good in their kinde. And thus *Ignorance* and *Enquiry* was the *Sixth day's* progresse.

## CHAP. II.

3. *The true Sabbatisme of the Sons of God.* 5. *A Description of men taught by God.* 7. *The mysterie of that Adam that comes by Water and the Spirit.* 9. *Obedience the Tree of Life: Disobedience the Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil.* 10. *The Rivers of Paradise, the four Cardinal Vertues in the Soul of man.* 17. *The Life of Righteousness lost by Disobedience.* 19. *The mere Contemplative and Spiritual Man sees the motions of the Animal Life, and rigidly enough censures them.* 21. *That it is incomperible to Man perpetually to dwell in Spiritual Contemplations.* 22. *That upon the slaking of those, the kindly Joy of the Life of the Body springs out, which is our Eve.* 23. *That this*



*this kindly Joy of the Body is more grateful to Man in Innocency then any thing.* 25. *Nor is man mistaken in his judgement thereof.*

1. **T**HUS the Heavenly and Earthly Nature in Man were finish'd, and fully replenish'd with all the garnishings belonging to them.

2. So the Divine Wisdom in the Humane Nature celebrated her *Sabbath*, having now wrought through the toil of all the *Six* dayes travel.

3. And the Divine Wisdom looked upon this *Seventh day* as blessed and sacred; a day of Righteousness, Rest and Joy in the Holy Ghost.

4. These were the Generations or Pullulations of the *Heavenly* and *Earthly* Nature, of the *Divine* and *Animal Life* in Man, when God created them.

5. I mean those fruitful Plants and pleasant and useful Herbs which he himself planted: For I have describ'd unto you the condition of a Man taught of God, and instructed and cherish'd up by his inward Light, where there is no external Doctrine to distil as the rain, nor outward Gardener to intermeddle in God's Husbandry.

6. Only there is a *Fountain of Water*, which is *Repentance* from dead works, and bubbles up in the *Earthly Adam*, so as universally to wash all the ground.

7. And thus the nature of Man being prepar'd for further Accomplishments, God shapes him into his own *Image*, which is *Righteousness* and *true Holiness*, and breaths into him the *Spirit of Life*: And this is that *Adam* which is born of *Water and the Spirit*.

8. Hitherto I have shew'd unto you how mankind is rais'd up from one degree of Spiritual Light and Righteousness unto another, till we come at last to that full Command and Perfection in the *Divine Life*, that a man may be said in some sort thus to have attain'd to the Kingdom of Heaven, or found a Paradise upon Earth. The Narration that follows shall instruct you and forewarn you of those evil courses whereby man loses that measure of Paradisiacal happiness God estates him in, even while he is in this world. I say therefore, that the Lord God planted a Garden Eastward in *Eden*, and there he put the Man whom he had made; that is, Man living under the Intellectual rayes of the Spirit, and being guided by the morning Light of the Sun of Righteousness, is led into a very pleasant and sweet Contentment of minde, and the testimony of a good Conscience is his great delight.

9. And that the sundry Germinations and Springings up of the works of Righteousness in him are a delectable Paradise to him, pleasing both the sight and taste of that measure of Divine Life that is manifest in him. But of all the Plants that grow in him, there is none of so sovereign virtue as that in the midst of this Garden, to wit, the *Tree of Life*, which is, a *Sincere Obedience to the Will of God*: nor any that bears so lecherous and poisonous fruit as the *Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil*, which is *Disobedience to the Will of God, as it is manifested in Man*. For the pleasure of the Soul consists in conforming her self faithfully to what she is perswaded in her own Conscience is the Will of God, whatever others would insinuate to the contrary.

10. And

10. And all the fruit-bearing Trees of Righteousness are watered by these four Rivers, which winde along this Garden of Pleasure, which indeed are the *four Cardinal Vertues*.

11. The name of the first is *Pison*, which is *Prudence*; not the suggestions of fleshly Craft and over-reaching Subtily, but the Indications of the Spirit or divine Intellect, what is fit and profitable and decorous to be done.

12. Here is well tried and certain approved *Experience*, healthful Industry, and Alacrity to honest Labour.

13. And the name of the second River is *Gihon*, which is *Justice*.

14. And the name of the third River is *Hiddekel*, which is *Fortitude*; and the fourth River is *Euphrates*, which is *Temperance*.

15. This is the Paradise where the Lord God had placed the Man, that he might further cultivate it and improve it.

16. And the Divine Light manifested in the Man encourag'd the Man to eat of the fruits of Paradise freely, and to delight himself in all manner of holy Understanding and Righteousness.

17. But withall he bade him have a special care how he resist *his own Will* or *Power* in any thing, but that he should be obedient to the manifest Will of God in things great and small; or else assuredly he would lose the life he now lived, and become dead to all Righteousness and Truth. So the man had a special care, and his Soul wrought wholly towards Heavenly and Divine things, and heeded nothing but these, his more noble and *Masculine* Faculties being after a manner solely set on work, but the Natural Life (in which notwithstanding, if it were rightly guided, there is no sin) being almost quite forgot and disregarded.

18. But the Wisdom of God saw that it was not good for the Soul of man, that the *Masculine* Powers thereof should thus operate alone, but that all the Faculties of Life should be set afloat, that the whole humane Nature might be accomplisht with the Divine.

19. Now the Powers of the Soul working so wholly upwards towards Divine things, the several Modifications or Figurations of the *Animal Life* (which God, acting in the frame of the humane Nature, represented to the Man, whence he had occasion to view them and judge of them) by the quick Understanding of Man were indeed easily discern'd what they were, and he had a determinate apprehension of every particular Figuration of the *Animal Life*,

20. And did censure them, or pronounce of them, though truly, yet rigidly enough and severely; but as yet was not in a capacity of taking any delight in them, there was not any of them fit for his turn to please himself in.

21. Wherefore Divine Providence brought it so to passe, for the good of the Man, and that he might more vigorously and fully be enrich'd with delight, that the operations of the *Masculine* Faculties of the Soul were for a while well flaked and consopited; during which time the Faculties themselves were something lessened or weakned, yet in such a due measure and proportion, that, considering the future  
H h h advantage



advantage that was expected, that was not miss'd that was taken away, but all as handsome and compleat as before.

22. For what was thus abated in the *Masculine Faculties*, was compensated abundantly in exhibiting to the Man the grateful sense of the *Feminine*: for there was no way but this to *Create the Woman*, which is to elicit that *kindly-flowring joy or harmlesse delight of the Natural Life and health of the Body*; which once exhibited and joyned with Simplicity and Innocency of Spirit, is the greatest part of that Paradise a man is capable of upon Earth.

23. And the actuating of the Matter being the most proper and essential operation of a Soul, man presently acknowledg'd this *kindly-flowring joy of the Body* of nearer cognation and affinity with himself then any thing else he ever had yet experience of, and he loved it as his own life.

24. And the Man was so mightily taken with his new Spouse, which is, *The kindly Joy of the Life of the Body*, that he concluded with himself, that any one may with a safe Conscience forgoe those more earnest attempts towards the knowledge of the Eternal God that created him, as also the performance of those more scrupulous injunctions of his Mother the Church, so far forth as they are incompetible with the *Health and Joy of the Life of his natural Body*, and might in such a case rather cleave to his Spouse, and become one with her; provided he still lived in obedience to the indispensable Precepts of that Superiour Light and Power that begot him.

25. Nor had *Adam's* Reason or Affection transgressed at all in this; concluding nothing but what the *Divine Wisdome and Equity* would approve as true. Wherefore *Adam* and his wife as yet sought no corners, nor covering-places to shelter them from the Divine Light; but having done nothing amisse, appeared naked in the presence of it without any shame or blushing.

### CHAP. III.

1. *Adam is tempted by inordinate pleasure from the springing up of the Joy of the invigorated Life of his Body.*
2. *A dialogue or dispute in the Minde of Adam betwixt The inordinate Desire of Pleasure and The natural Joy of the Body.*
6. *The Will of Adam is drawn away to assent to Inordinate Pleasure.*
8. *Adam having transgressed, is impatient of the Presence of the divine Light.*
10. *A long conflict of Conscience, or dispute betwixt Adam's earthly minde and the divine Light, examining him, and setting before him both his present and future condition, if he persisted in rebellion.*
20. *He adheres to the Joy of his Body without reason or measure, notwithstanding all the castigations and monitions of the divine Light.*
21. *The divine Light takes leave of Adam therefore for the present, with deserved scorn and reproach.*
22. *The doom of the Eternal God concerning laps'd Man, that will not suffer them to settle in wickednesse, according to their own depraved wills and desires.*

1. **B**UT so it came to passe that *the Life of the Body* being thus invigorated in Man, straightway the slyest and subtlest of all the *Animal Figurations*, the *Serpent*, which is *the inordinate Desire of Pleasure*, craftily insinuated it self into the *Feminine* part of *Adam*, viz. *The kindly Joy of the Body*; and thus assaulting Man, whisper'd such suggestions as these unto him. What a rigid and severe thing is this businesse of Religion, and the Law of God, as they call it, that deprives a man of all manner of Pleasure, and cuts him short of all the contentments of Life?

2. But the *Womanish* part in *Adam*, to wit, *The natural and kindly Joy of the Body*, could witnesse against this, and answered, We may delight our selves with the operations of all the Faculties both of Soul and Body, which God and Nature have bestow'd upon us.

3. Only we are to take heed of Disobedience, and of promiscuously following *our own Will*; but we are ever to consult with the Will of God, and the Divine Light manifested in our Understandings, and so doe all things orderly and measurably: For if we transgresse against this, we shall die the death, and lose the Life of Vertue and Righteousnesse, which now is awake in us.

4. But the *Serpent*, which is *the inordinate desire of Pleasure*, befooled *Adam*, through the frailty of his *Womanish Faculties*, and made him believe he should not die; but with safety might serve the free dictates of Pleasure, or his own Will, and the Will of God; that *Flesh* and *Spirit* might both rule in him, and be no such prejudice the one to the other:

5. But that his skill and experience in things will be more enlarg'd, and so come nearer to Divine Perfection indeed, and imitate that fullnesse of Wisdome which is in God, who knows all things whatsoever, whether good or evil.

6. This crafty suggestion so insinuated it self into *Adam's Feminine Faculties*, that his fleshly *Concupiscence* began to be so strong that it carried the assent of his Will away with it, and the whole Man became a lawlesse and unruly Creature. For it seem'd a very pleasant thing at first sight to put in execution whatever our own Lusts suggest unto us without controll; and very desirable to try all Conclusions to gain experience and knowledge of things. But this brought in nothing but *the Wisdome of the flesh*, and made *Adam* earthly-minded.

7. But he had not rambled very far in these dissolute courses, but his eyes were opened, and he saw the difference, how naked now he was, and bare of all strength and power to divine and holy things; and began to meditate with himself some slight pretences for his notorious folly and disobedience.

8. For the Voice of the Divine Light had come unto him in the cool of the day, when the fury and heat of his inordinate passions was something flaked: But *Adam* could not endure the presence of it, but hid himself from it, meditating what he should answer by way of Apology or Excuse.

9. But the Divine Light persisted, and came up closer to him, and



upbraided unto him, that he was grown so wilde and estranged from her self, demanding of him in what condition he was, and wherefore he fled.

10. Then *Adam* ingenuously confessed that he found himself in such a pitiful poor naked condition, that he was ashamed to appear in the Presence of the Divine Light; and that was the reason he hid himself from it, because it would so manifestly upbraid to him his Nakednesse and Deformity.

11. And the Divine Light farther examined him, how he fell into this sensible beggerly nakednesse he was in, charging the sad event upon his Disobedience, that he had fed upon and taken a surfeit of the fruit of his own Will.

12. But *Adam* excused his Rational faculties, and said, They did but follow the natural Dictate of the *Joy of the Body*, the *Woman* that God himself bestowed upon him for an help and delight.

13. But the Divine Light again blamed *Adam*, that he kept his *Feminine faculties* in no better order nor subjection, that they should so boldly and overcomingly dictate to him such things as are not fit. To which he had nothing to say, but that the subtil *Serpent*, the *inordinate Desire of Pleasure*, had beguiled both his Faculties, as well *Masculine* as *Feminine*, his Will and Affection was quite carried away therewith.

14. Then the Divine Light began to chastise the *Serpent*, in the hearing of *Adam*, pronouncing of it, that it was more accursed then all the *Animal Figurations* beside; and that it crept basely upon the belly, tempting to Riot and Vnery, and relishing nothing but earth and dirt. This will always be the guise of it so long as it lives in a man.

15. But might I once descend so far into the Man as to take possession of his *Feminine faculties*, I would set the *Natural Joy of the Body* at Defiance with the *Serpent*; and though the subtilty of the *Serpent* may a little wound and disorder the *Woman* for a while, yet her warrantable and free operations, she being actuated by divine vigour, should afterward quite destroy and extinguish the *Seed of the Serpent*, to wit, the *Operations of the inordinate desire of Pleasure*.

16. And she added farther in the hearing of *Adam* concerning the *Woman*, as she thus stood dis-joyn'd from the *heavenly Life*, and was not obedient to right Reason, that, by a divine *Nemesis*, she should conceive with sorrow, and bring forth Vanity; and that her Husband, the *Earthly-minded Adam*, should tyrannize over her, and weary her out, and foil her: So that the *kindly Joy of the Health and Life of the Body* should be much depraved, or made faint and languid, by the unbridled humours and impetuous Luxury and Intemperance of the *Earthly-minded Adam*.

17. And to *Adam* he said, who had become so *Earthly-minded* by listening to the Voice of his *deceived Woman*, and so acting disobediently to the Will of God, That his Flesh or Earth was accursed for his sake, with labour and toil should he reap the fruits thereof all the while he continued in this *Earthly-mindednesse*.

18. *Cares* also and *Anxieties* shall it bring forth unto him, and his Thoughts shall be as bate as those of the Beasts in the field; he shall ruminate of nothing but what is Earthly and Sensual.

19. With

19. With sweat and anguish should he labour to satisfie his hunger and insatiableness, till he returned to the Principle out of which he was taken: for the *Earthly-mindedness* came from this *animated Earth, the Body*; and is to shrink up again into its own Principle, and to perish.

20. After all these Castigations and Premonitions of the Divine Light, *Adam* was not sufficiently awakened to the sense of what was good, but his Minde was straightway taken up again with the delights of the flesh, and dearly embracing the *Joy of his Body*, for all she was grown so inordinate, called her *My Life*, professing she was the nourcing Mother and chief comfort of all men living, and none could subsist without her.

21. Then the Divine Wisdom put hairy coats made of the skins of wilde beasts upon *Adam* and his *Wife*, and deservedly reproached them, saying, Now get you gone for a couple of Brutes. And *Adam* would have very gladly escaped so, if he might, and set up his rest for ever in the bestial Nature.

22. But the Eternal God of heaven, whose Providence reaches to all things, and whose Mercy is over all his works, looking upon *Adam*, perceived in what a pitiful ridiculous case he was; who seeking to be like unto God for knowledge and freedome, made himself no better then a Beast, and could willingly have lived for ever in that baser kind of nature. Wherefore the Eternal Lord God, in compassion to *Adam*, designed the contrary; and deriding his boldness and curiosity that made him transgress, Behold, sayes he, *Adam* is become like one of us, knowing Good and Evil; and can of himself enlarge his pleasure, and create new Paradises of his own, which forsooth must have also their *Tree of Life* or *Immortality*: and *Adam* would for ever live in this foolish state he hath plac'd himself in.

23. But the Eternal Lord God would not suffer *Adam* to take up his rest in the Bestial delight, which he had chosen, but drove him out of this *false Paradise* which he would have made to himself, and set him to cultivate his *fleshy members*, out of which his *Earthly-mindedness* was taken.

24. I say, he forcibly drove out *Adam* from this *Paradise of Luxury*; nor could he settle perpetually in the brutish Life, because the *Cherubim* with the flaming sword that turned every way beat him off; that is, the *Manly Faculties* of *Reason* and *Conscience* met him ever and anon in his brutish purposes, and convinced him so of his folly, that he could not set up his rest for ever in this bestial condition.





THE  
D E F E N C E  
Of the Threefold  
C A B B A L A.

---

Philo Jud.

Ἀπαρτὶ τῆ νομοθεσίαν εὐκρίνεναι ζώον· καὶ σῶμα μὲν ἔχον πᾶς ῥητὰς διατάξεις,  
ψυχὴν δὲ τὴν ἀναποκείμενον. τῇ λέξεισιν ἀόρατον νοῦν.

That is,

That the whole Law of *Moses* is like to a living Creature, whose Body is the Literal sense ; but the Soul the more inward and hidden meaning, covered under the sense of the Letter.

R. MOSES ÆGYPT.

*Non omnia secundum literam intelligenda & accipienda esse quæ dicuntur in Opere Bereschith seu Creationis, sicut vulgus hominum existimat. Sensus enim illorum literales vel gignunt pravas opiniones de natura Dei Opt. Max. vel certè fundamenta Legis evertunt, Hæresinque aliquam introducunt.*

---



L O N D O N,

Printed by *James Fleisher*, for *William Morden* Book-seller in *Cambridge*,

MDC LXII.





# THE PREFACE

to the READER.

READER,

**T**HE Cabbala's thou hast read being in all likelihood so strange and unexpected, especially the Philosophical, that the Deitence it self, which should cure and cease thy amazement, may not occasion in any passage thereof any further scruple or offence, I thought fit a while to interrupt thee, that whatever I conjecture may lesse satisfy, may afore-hand be strengthened by this short Preface.

And for my own part, I cannot presage what may be in any shew of Reason alledged by any man, unlesse it be, The unusual Mysterie of Numbers; The using of the Authority of the Heathen in Explication of Scripture; The adding also of Miracles done by them for the further confirming their Authority; and lastly, The Strangeness of the Philosophical Conclusions themselves.

Now for the Mysterie of Numbers, that this ancient Philosophy of Moses should be wrapped up in it, will not seem improbable, if we consider that the Cabbala of the Creation was conserved in the hands of Abraham, and his family, who was famous for Mathematicks, (of which Arithmetick is a necessary part) first amongst the Chaldeans, and that after he taught the \* Egyptians the same Arts, as Historians write. Besides Prophetical and Enigmatical writings, that it is usual with them to hide their Secrets, as under the allusions of Names and Etymologies, so also under the adumbrations of Numbers, it is so notoriously known, and that in the very Scriptures themselves, that it needs no proof; I will instance but in that one eminent example of the number of the Beast 666.

\* Τὴν τε Ἀγίαν  
ἐκκλησίαν αὐτοῖς  
χαρίσεται, ὅ  
τι αὐτοὶ ἐστὶν  
νομίαν παρα-  
δείσου. Josph.  
Antiquit. Jui-  
daic. lib. 1.  
cap. 9.

As for citing the Heathen Writers so frequently; you are to consider that they are the Wisest and the most Vertuous of them, and either such as the Fathers say had their Philosophy from Moses and the Prophets, as Pythagoras and Plato, or else the Disciples or Friends of these Philosophers. And therefore I thought it very proper to use their Testimony in a thing that they seem'd to be so fit witnesses of for the main, as having receiv'd the Cabbala from the ancient Prophets; Though I will not deny but they have mingled their own fooleries with it, either out of the wantonnesse of their Fancy, or mistake of Judgement: Such as are the Transmigration of Humane Souls into Brutes; An utter abstinence from Flesh; Too severe reproaches against the Pleasures of the Body; Vilification of Marriage, and the like: which is no more Argument against the main drift of the Cabbala, then unwarrantable superstitious Opinions and Practises of some deceived Churches are against the solid grounds of Christianity.

Again, I do not alledge Philosophers alone, but, as occasion requires, Fathers, and (which I conceive as valid in this case) the Jewish Rabbins, who,



who, in things where prejudice need not blinde them, I should think as fit as any to confirm a Cabbalistical sense, especially if there be a general consent of them, and that they do not write their private fancy, but the minde of their whole Church.

Now if any shall take offence at Pythagoras his Scholars, swearing, as is conceived, by their Master that taught them the mystery of the Tetractys, (as you shall understand more at large in the Explication of the Fourth day's work) I must profess that I myself am not a little offended with it. But that high reverence they bore to Pythagoras, as it is a sign of Vanity, and some kind of Superstition in them; so is it also no lesse an Argument of a stupendious measure of Knowledge and Sanctity in Pythagoras himself, that he should extort from them so great Honour, and that his Memory should be so sacred to them. Which profound Knowledge and Sanctity he having got by conversing with the Jewish Prophets, it ultimately tends to the renown of that Church, and consequently to the Christian, which inherits those holy Oracles which were first peculiar to the Jews.

But what the followers of Pythagoras transgressed in is no more to be imputed to him, than the Superstitions exhibited to the Virgin Mary can be laid to her charge. Besides, it may be a \* question whether in that Pythagorick Oath, Οὐ μὲν τὸν, &c. they did not swear by God the first Author of the Cabbala, and that mysterious Explication of the Tetractys, that is, indeed, of all knowledge Divine and Natural, who first gave it to Adam, and then revived or confirmed it again to Moses. Or if it must be understood of Pythagoras, why may it not be look'd upon as a civil Oath, or Affe-  
 severation, such as Joseph's swearing by the Life of Pharaoh, and Noblemen by their Honours? neither of which notwithstanding for my own part I can allow, or assure my self that they are merely Civil, but touch upon Religion, or rather Idolatrous Superstition.

As for the Miracles Pythagoras did, though I do not believe all that are recorded of him are true, yet those that I have recited I hold probable enough, they being not unbecoming the worth of the Person: but those that suppose the Transmigration of Humane Souls into the Bodies of Beasts, I look upon as Fables; and his \* whispering into the ear of an Oxe to forbear to eat Beans, as a loud Ly. But it seems very consonant unto Divine Providence, that Pythagoras having got the knowledge of the holy Cabbala, which God imparted to Adam and Moses, he should countenance it before the Nations by enabling him to doe Miracles. For so those noble and ancient Truths were more firmly radicated amongst the Philosophers of Greece, and happily preserved to this very day.

Nor can his being \* carried in the Air make him suspected to be a mere Magician or Conjuror, sith the holy Prophets and Apostles themselves have been transported after that manner; as \* Habakkuk from Jewry to Babylon, and \* Philip, after he had baptiz'd the Eunuch, from betwixt Gaza and Jerusalem to Azotus. But for my own part, I think working of Miracles is one of the least Perfections of a Man, and is nothing at all to the Happiness of him that does them, or rather seems to do them: For if they be Miracles, he does them not, but some other Power or Person distinct from him. And yet here Magicians and Witches are greatly delighted in that this

## Power

\*See Append. to  
the Defence of  
the Philosoph.  
Cab. c. 2. sect. 3.

\* Iamblich. de  
vita Pythag.  
cap. 13.

\* Iamblich. de  
vita Pythag.  
cap. 28.

\* Histor. Bel.  
& Dracon.

\* Act. 8. v. 39,



Power is in some sort attributed to themselves, and that they are admired of the people, as is manifest in Simon Magus. But thus to lord it and domineer in the Attribute of Power with the Prince of the Air, what is it but mere Pride, the most irrational and provoking Vice that is? And with what grosse folly is it here conjoyn'd, they priding and pleasing themselves in that they sometimes doe that, or rather suffer that, which Herons and wilde-Geese, and every ordinary Fowl can doe of it self; that is, mount aloft and glide through the fleeting Air? But Holy and Good men know that the greatest Sweet and Perfection of a Vertuous Soul is the kindly accomplishment of her own Nature in true Wisdom and divine Love. And if any thing miraculous happen to them, or be done by them, it is, that that worth and knowledge that is in them may be taken notice of, and that God thereby may be glorified, whose witnesses they are. But no other accession of Happinesse accrues to them from this, but that hereby they may be in a better capacity of making others happy: which I confesse I conceive here Pythagoras his case.

And that men may not indulge too much to their own Melancholy and Fancy, which they ordinarily call Inspiration; if they be so great Lights to the World as they pretend, and so high that they will not condescend to the examination of humane Reason, it were desirable that such persons would keep in their heat to concoct the crudities of their own Conceptions, till the warrant of a Miracle call them out; and so they might more rightfully challenge an attention from the people, as being authorised from above to tell us something we knew not before, nor can so well know as believe, the main Argument being not Reason, but Miracle.

Lastly, for the Strangeness of the Philosophical Conclusions themselves, It were the strangest thing of all, if at first sight they did not seem very Paradoxical and strange: Else why should they be hid and conceal'd from the Vulgar, but that they did transcend their capacity, and were overmuch disproportioned to their belief? But in the behalf of these Cabbalistical Conclusions I will only note thus much, That they are such, that supposing them true, (which I shall no longer assert, then till such time as some able Philosopher or Theologer shall convince me of their falshood) there is nothing of any grand consideration in Theology or Nature that will not easily be extricated by this Hypothesis, an eminent part whereof is the Motion of the Earth and the Præexistence of Souls. The evidence of the former of which Truths is such, that it has wone the assent of the most famous Mathematicians of our later Ages; and the reasonableness of the latter is no lesse: there having never been any Philosopher that held the Soul of Man immortal, but he held that it did also præexist.

But Religion not being curious to expose the full view of Truth to the people, but only what was most necessary to keep them in the fear of a Deity and obedience to the Law, contented her self with what merely concerned the state of the Soul after the dissolution of the Body, concealing whatever was conceivable concerning her condition before. Now, I say, it is a pretty privilege of Falshood, (if this Hypothesis be false) and very remarkable, that it should better suite with the Attributes of God, the visible Events of Providence, the Phenomena of Nature, the Reason of Man, and the  
holy



holy Text it self, where men acknowledge a mysterious Cabbala, then that which by all means must be accounted true, viz. That there is no such Motion of the Earth about the Sun, nor any Præexistence of Humane Souls.

Reader, I have done what lies on my part, that thou maist peruse this Defence of mine without any rub or stumbling; let me now request but one thing which thou art bound to grant, which is, That thou read my Defence without Prejudice, and that all along as thou goest, thou make not thy recourse to the customary conceits of thy Fancy, but consult with thy free Reason, τὸ δὲ σύνδεσ γινώσκοντες, as Aristotle speaks in his *Metaphysics*: For Custom is another Nature; and therefore those conceits that are accustomed and familiar, we unawares appeal to, as if they were indeed the natural Light of the Minde and her first Common Notions. And he gives an Instance not altogether unsuitable to our present purpose; Ἡλίωτι ἰσχυρὸν ἔχει τὸ σύνδεσ οἱ νόμοι δηλοῦν, ἐν οἷς τὰ μυθώδη καὶ παιδαριώδη μέγιστον ἔχει τὸ γινώσκον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔχει τὸ ἔδω. The Philosopher may be as bold as he pleases with the Ritual laws and Religious stories of the Heathens, but I do not know that he ever was acquainted with the Law of Moses. But I think I may speak it not without due Reverence, that there is something of Aristotle's saying Analogically true in the very History of the Creation, and that the first impressions of the Literal Text, which is so plainly accommodated to the capacity of mere children and Idiots, by reason of custom have so strongly rooted themselves in the minds of some, that they take that sense to be more true than the true meaning of the Text indeed. Which is plain in no meaner a person than one of the Fathers, namely, Lactantius; who looking upon the world as a Tent, according to the description in the Literal Cabbala, did very stoutly and confidently deny Antipodes. So much did a customary Fancy prevail over the free use of his Reason.

Thus much for better caution I thought fit to preface. The rest the Introduction to the Defence, and the very frame and nature of the Defence it self, I hope will make good to the judicious and ingenuous Reader.


THE

Aristot. *Meta-*  
*phys. lib. 2.*  
*cap. 3.*

Lact. *lib. 3.*  
*Divin. Instit.*  
*cap. 24.*  
See also *Plat.*  
*Acoft. Histor.*  
*Ind. lib. 1.*

# THE INTRODUCTION TO The Defence.

1. Diodorus his mistake concerning Moses, and other Law-givers that have professed themselves to have received their Laws from either God or some good Angel. 2. Reasons why Moses began his History with the Creation of the World. 3. The Sun and Moon the same with the Egyptians Osiris and Isis, and how they came to be worshipped for Gods. 4. The Apotheosis of mortal men, such as Bacchus and Ceres, how it first came into the world. 5. That the Letter of the Scripture speaks ordinarily in Philosophical things according to the sense and imagination of the Vulgar. 6. That there is a Philosophical sense that lies hid in the Letter of the Three first Chapters of Genesis. 7. That there is a Moral or Mystical sense not only in these three Chapters, but in several other places of the Scripture.

- I.  OT to stay you with too tedious a Prologue to the matter in hand concerning the Author of this Book of *Genesis*, to wit, *Moses*; I shall look upon him mainly in reference to that publick induement in which at the very first sight he will appear admirable, viz. as a *Politician* or a *Law-giver*. In which

his skill was so great, that even in the judgment of Heathen Writers he had the preeminence above all the rest. *Diodorus* has placed him in the head of his Catalogue of the most famous Law-givers, under the name of *Μωϋσῆς*, if \* *Justin Martyr* be not mistaken; or if he be, at least he bears them company that are reputed the best, reserv'd for the last and most notable Instance of those that entituled their Laws divine, and made themselves Spokes-men betwixt God and the People. This *Mæves* is said to receive his Laws from *Mercury*, as *Minos* from *Jupiter*, *Lycurgus* from *Apollo*, *Zathraustes* from his ἀγαθὸς δαίμων; his good Genius, *Zamolxis* from *Vesta*, and *Moses* from *Iao*, that is, *Jehovah*. πᾶσα δὲ τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις Μωϋσὴν τὸ ἰαὼ ὁππᾶν αὐτὸν δέον. But he speaks like a mere Historian in the business. Περσποϊκῶς αὐτῷ is the word which he boldly abuses to the diminution of all their Authorities promiscuously. For he says they feigned they received Laws from these Deities; and adds the

\* Μωϋσῶν ἀρ-  
δεα καὶ τῇ  
ψυχῇ μέγαν,  
καὶ τὸ βίω i-  
κνώτατον.

Justin. Mart.  
Protrept. ad  
Græcos.

Which is in  
*Diodorus*,

Μωϋσῶν ἀρ-  
δεα καὶ τῇ  
ψυχῇ μέγαν,  
καὶ τὸ βίω κοι-  
νώτατον.

Diodor. Si-  
cul. Biblio-  
tæc. Histo-  
lib. 1. p. 59.



reason of it too, but like an arrant States-man or an incredulous Philosopher, εἴτε δαυμασὴν καὶ δαίαν ὅλως ἐννοίαν κρίναντας ἢ μέλλουζ ὠφελήσιν ἀνθρώπων πλῆθος· εἴτε καὶ πρὸς ἢ ὑπεροχῇ καὶ δυνάμει τῷ εὐρεῖν λεγομένων τὰς νόμους, ἀποβλέψαντα ἢ ὄχλον, μάλλον ὑπακούσειν, ἀγαλαβόντας. Whether it be, sayes he, that they judged it an admirable and plainly divine project that redounded unto the profit of a multitude; or whether they conceived that hereby the people looking upon the greatnesse and supereminence of their Law-givers, would be more obedient to their Laws. That saying in the Schools is not so trivial as true, *Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis*, Every thing is as it is taken, or at least appears to be so. The tincture of our own Natures stains the appearance of all Objects. So that I wonder not that *Diodorus Siculus*, a man of a mere Political Spirit, (as it is very plain how near History and Policy are a-kin) should count the receiving of Laws from some Deity rather a piece of prudential fraud and political forgery than reality and truth.

But to leave *Diodorus* to his *Ethnicisme* and *Incredulity*; as for us that ought to believe Scripture, if we will not gain-say the Authority of the Greek Text, we shall not only be fully perswaded of *Moses* his receiving of Laws from God's own mouth, but have some hints to believe that something Analogical to it may have come to passe in other Law-givers. *Dent. 32.* Οτε διεμέριζεν ὁ Ὑψιστος Ἰσθνα, &c. When the most High divided the Nations, when he separated the sons of Adam, he set the bounds of the Nations according to the number of the Angels of God; but Jacob was the portion of *Jehovah*, that is, *Iao*, &c. So that it is not improbable but that as the great Angel of the Covenant, (he whom *Philo* calls τῶν ἀγγέλων πρεσβύτατον, ἢ ἀρχάγγελον, λόγον, ἀρχὴν, ὄνομα θεῷ, that is, the Eldest of the Angels, the Archangel, the Word, the Beginning, the Name of God, which is *Jehovah*) I say, that as he gave Laws to his charge, so the Tutelar Angels of other Nations might be the Instructors of those that they rais'd up to be Law-givers to their charge: Though in proceſſe of time the Nations that were at first under the Government of good Angels, by their lewdnesse and disobedience might make themselves obnoxious to the power and delusion of those ἀπατεῶνες δαίμονες, as they are called, *deceitful and tyrannical Devils*. But this is but a digression; That which I would briefly have intimated is this, That *Moses*, the great Law-giver of the Jews, was a man instructed of God himself to Prudence and true Policy. And therefore I make account, if we will but with diligence search, we may surely finde the foot-steps of unsophisticate Policy in all the passages of the whole *Pentateuch*.

2. And here in the very entrance it will offer it self unto our view: Where *Moses* shews himself such as that noble Spirit of *Plato* desires all Governors of Commonwealths should be, who has in his Epistle to *Dion* and his friends foretold, that mankind will never cease to be miserable, till such time as either true and right Philosophers rule in the Commonwealth, or those that do rule apply themselves to true and sound Philosophy. And what is *Moses* his *Bereshith* but a fair invitation thereto; it comprehending at least the whole fabrick of Nature and conspicuous furniture of the visible world: As if he dare appeal unto the whole Assembly of

of God's Creation, to the Voice of the great Universe, if what he propounds to his people over whom God hath set him, be not righteous and true; and that by acting according to his Precepts, they would but approve themselves *Cosmopolita's, true Citizens of the world, and Loyal Subjects to God and Nature*. It is *Philo's* interpretation upon the place; which how true it is in *Moses* veiled, I will not here dispute: that it is most true in *Moses* unveiled, Christ our Lord, is true without all dispute and controversie. But to return to *Moses*.

Another reason no lesse considerable, why that holy and wise Law-giver, *Moses*, should begin with the Creation of the world, is this; The Laws and Ordinances which he gave to the *Israelites* were given by him as *θεομαρτύρια*, as *Statutes received from God*. And therefore the great argument and incitement to Obedience should lie in this first and highest Law-giver, God himself, the great *Jehovah*, whose *Wisdom*, *Power* and *Goodness* could not better be set out then by ascribing the Creation of the whole visible world unto him. So that for his *Power* he might be feared, admired for his *Wisdom*, and finally, for his *Goodness* be loved, adored and Deified: That as he was truly in himself the most High God, so he should be acknowledged of the people to be so.

For certainly there is nothing that doth so win away, nay, ravish or carry captive, the minds of poor mankind, as *Bounty* and *Munificence*; all men loving themselves most affectionately, and most of all the meanest and basest spirits, whose Souls are so far from being a little rais'd and releas'd from themselves, that they do impotently and impetuously cleave and cling to their dear carcasses. Hence have they, out of the strong relish and savour of the pleasures and conveniencies thereof, made no scruple of honouring them for Gods who have by their industry, or by good luck, produced any thing that might conduce for the improvement of the happiness and comfort of the Body.

3. From hence it is that the *Sun* and *Moon* have been accounted for the two prime Deities by Idolatrous Antiquity, viz. from that sensible good they conferred upon hungry mankind: The one watering as it were the Earth by her humid influence; the other ripening the fruit of the ground by his warm rayes, and opening daily all the hid treasures of the visible world by his glorious approach; pleasing the sight with the variety of Natures objects, and chearing the whole body by his comfortable heat. To these, as to the most conspicuous Benefactors to mankind, was the name *Θεός* given, *καὶ ὁ Διός*, because they observed that these conceived Deities were in perpetual motion.

These two are the *Ægyptians Osiris* and *Isis*, and *Five* more are added to them as very sensible Benefactors, but subordinate to these two, and Dependents on them. And in plain speech they are these, *Fire, Spirit, Humidity, Siccity, and Aire*, but in their divine Titles, *Vulcan, Jupiter, Oceanus, Ceres, and Minerva*. These are the *οἱ αἰδίοις γένεον ἔχοντες θεοί*, as \* *Diodorus* speaks.

4. But after these mortal men were canonized for immortal Deities, *Διὶ καὶ οὐρανῷ καὶ γαίῃ ἀνθρώπων ἐνεργασίαν*, for their prudence and benefaction; as you may see at large in *Diodorus Siculus*. I will name but

\* *Bibliotheca  
Histor. lib. 2,  
pag. 8.*



two for instance, *Bacchus* and *Ceres*, the one the Inventor of *Corn*, the other of *Wine* and *Beer*. So that all may be resolved into that brutish Aphorism,

Τὸ γὰρ πλεονεκτήειν ἐν τῷ σώματι θεόν.

That which could please or pleasure degenerate mankind in the Body, (they having lost the Image of God in their Souls, and become mere Brutes after a manner) that must be their God.

Wherefore it was necessary for *Moses*, having to deal with such Terrestrial Spirits, Sons of Sense and Corporeity, to propose to them *Jehovah* as Maker of this Sensible and Corporeal world, that whatever sweet they suck out of the varieties thereof, they may attribute to him, as the first Fountain and Author, without whom neither they nor any thing else had been; that thereby they might be stirred up to praise his Name, and accomplish his Will revealed by his servant *Moses* unto them. And this was true and sound Prudence, aiming at nothing but the Glory of God, and the Good of the poor ignorant people.

5. And from the same Head springs the manner of his delivering of the Creation; that is, accommodately to the apprehension of the meanest: not speaking of things according to their *very Essence* and *real Nature*, but according to their *Appearances to us*: not starting of high and intricate Questions; and concluding them by subtile Arguments, but familiarly and condescendingly setting out the Creation, according to the most easie and obvious conceits they themselves had of those things they saw in the world; omitting even those grosser things that lay hid in the bowels of the Earth, as Metalls and Minerals, and the like, as well as those things that fall not at all under Sense, as those immaterial Substances, Angels or Intelligences. Thus fitly has the Wisdom and Goodness of God accommodated the outward *Cortex* of the Scripture to the most narrow and slow apprehension of the Vulgar.

Nor doth it therefore follow that the Narration must not be true, because it is according to the *appearance* of things to Sense and obvious Fancie; for there is also a *Truth of Appearance*, according to which Scripture most-what speaks in *Philosophical* matters.

And this Position is the main Key, as I conceive, and I hope shall hereafter plainly prove, whereby *Moses* his *Bereshith* may according to the Outward and *Literal* sense be understood without any difficulty or clashing one part against another.

First therefore, I say, that it is a thing confessed by the Learned *Hebrews*, who make it a Rule for the understanding of many places of Scripture, \* *Loquitur lex juxta linguam humanam*, That the Law speaks according to the language of the sons of men.

\*R. Maimonid.  
More Nevoch.  
part. I. cap. 26.

And secondly, (which will come more home to the purpose) I shall instance in some places that of necessity are to be thus understood.

*Gen. 19. 23. The Sun was risen upon the Earth when Lot entred into Zoar*; which implies that it was before *under the Earth*, which is true onely according to *Sense* and *vulgar Fancie*.

*Deuteronom. 30. v. 4. קצה השמים* or *ἀκρον τῆς γῆς*, implies that the Earth is bounded at certain places, as if there were truly an *Hercules Pillar*

or

or *Non plus ultra* : As it is manifest to them that understand but the natural signification of קצה and ἄκρον; for those words plainly import the Earth bounded by the blew Heavens, and the Heavens bounded by the *Horizon* of the Earth, they touching one another mutually: which is true only to *Sense* and in *appearance*, as any man, that is not a mere Idiot, will confess.

*Ecclesiastic. 27. v. 12. The discourse of a godly man is always with wisdom, but a fool changeth as the Moon.* That is to be understood according to *Sense* and *Appearance* : For if a fool changeth no more then the Moon doth really, he is a wise and excellently accomplished man; *Semper idem*, though to the sight of the Vulgar different. For at least an Hemisphere of the Moon is always enlightned, and even then most when she least appears unto us.

Hitherto may be referred also that, *2 Chron. 4. 2. Also he made a molten Sea ten cubits from brim to brim, round in compass, and five cubits the height thereof, and a line of thirty cubits did compass it round about.* A thing plainly impossible, that the Diameter should be ten cubits and the Circumference but thirty. But it pleaseth the Spirit of God here to speak according to the common use and opinion of men, and not according to the subtilty of *Archimedes* his demonstration.

Again *Psalms 19. In them hath he set a Tabernacle for the Sun, which as a Bridegroom cometh out of his chamber, and rejoiceth as a strong man to run his race.* This, as Mr. *John Calvin* observes, is spoken according to the rude apprehension of the Vulgar, whom *David* should in vain have endeavoured to teach the mysteries of *Astronomy* : And therefore he makes no mention of the course of the Sun in the nocturnal Hemisphere.

Adde to these *Joshua 10. v. 12. Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon, and thou Moon in the Valley of Ajalon*; where it is manifest that *Joshua* speaks not according to the *Astronomical truth* of the thing, but according to *Sense* and *Appearance*. For suppose the Sun placed, and the Moon, at the best advantage you can, so that they leave not their natural course; they were so far from being one over *Ajalon*, and the other over *Gibeon*, that they were in very truth many hundreds of miles distant from them. And if the Sun and Moon were on the other side of the *Equator*, the distance might amount to thousands.

Lastly, ( and then which nothing is more considerable, ) The Letter of the Scripture bounds the Extent of the World no higher then the *Clouds*, or thereabout; as is very apparent,

First, because the *Clouds* are made the place of God's abode; whence we are to suppose them plac'd with the highest. There he lives, and runs, and rides, and walks. *He came walking upon the wings of the wind*, in the 104 *Psalms*. *Who layeth the beams of his chambers in the waters, who maketh the clouds his chariot, and walketh on the wings of the wind: Laieth the beams of His chambers in the waters, to wit, the Upper waters, which are the Clouds.* The Almighty's lodgings therefore according to the letter are placed in the *Clouds*.

Thereabout also is his field for exercise and war, *Deut. 33. 26. There is none like to the God of Jeshurun, who rideth upon the Heavens for thy help*



help in his excellency on the sky, that is, upon the *Upper clouds*, as Buxtorf interprets it; and indeed what can שחקים properly signifie above, but *Clouds*? for below it signifies *pulvis tenuissimus, small dust*; and the *Clouds* are as it were the dust of heaven. Vatablus also interprets that place of God's riding on the *Clouds*. And this agrees well with that of *Nahum*, chap. 1. v. 3. *The Lord hath his way in the whirlwind, and the clouds are the dust of his feet*. Here he is running as swift as a whirlwind, and raiseth a dust of clouds about him.

You shall find him riding again, *Psalms* 68. 4. and that in triumph; but yet but on the *Clouds*; (sutable to that in *Deut.*) *Sing unto God, sing praises unto his Name, extoll Him that rideth upon the Heavens by his name FAH; and rejoyce before Him*. That rideth upon the *Heavens*; the Hebrew is לרוכב בערבות, which I would be bold, with *Aben Ezra's* leave, to translate, *that rideth upon the Clouds*: for clouds cause darkness, and the root from whence ערבות comes is ערב, which signifies *obtenebrari; obscurari*. But for the ground of this Rabbies interpretation, to wit, *Upon the heavens*, it is taken out of the 33 verse of the 68 *Psalms*, *To him that rideth upon the Heavens of heavens of old*. But if we read on there, we shall find that those *Heavens of heavens*, in all probability, reach no higher then the *Clouds*: For let's read the whole verse together, *To him that rideth upon the Heavens of heavens that were of old; Lo, he doth send out his voice, and that a mighty voice: what's that but Thunder?* and whence is *Thunder* but out of the *Clouds*? and where then doth God ride but on the *Clouds*? The following verse makes all plain: *Ascribe ye strength unto God; His excellency is over Israel, and his strength is in the clouds*: which doth notably confirm, that the Extent of the *Heavens*, according to the letter of *Moses* and *David* too, are but about the height of the clouds. For here the Heaven of heavens is the seat of *Thunder*, and God's strength and power is said to be in the *Clouds*. Nor doth this expression of this height, to wit, *the Heaven of heavens of old*; imply any distance higher. For sith all the Firmament from the lower to the upper waters is called *Heaven*; it is not a whit unreasonable that the highest part of this Heaven or Firmament be called the Heaven of *Heavens*. And this is my first Argument that the Heaven or Firmament's Extent is but from the Sea to the *Clouds*, according to the outward phrase of Scripture, namely because God is seated no higher.

My second Argument is taken from the adjoining the *Heavens* with the *Clouds* exegetically, one with another, for the setting out of that which is exceeding high, as high as we can express. And this the Psalmist doth often. *Psalms* 36. 5. *Thy mercy, O Lord, is in the Heavens, and thy faithfulness reacheth unto the Clouds*. And *Psalms* 57. 10. *For thy mercy is great unto the Heavens, and thy truth unto the Clouds*. And *Psalms* 108. 4. *For thy mercy is great above the Heavens, and thy truth reacheth above the Clouds*. Where *Heaven* and *Clouds* set off one and the same height, that which is exceeding high, the mercy and truth of God.

My last Argument is from the Psalmist's placing the Sun בשחק in the clouds, or in the cloudy heaven. For the word must so signifie, as I did above prove, both from Testimony, and might also from the Etymon  
of

of the word. For שחך signifies *comminuere, contundere, to beat to dust*: and what are *Clouds* but the *dust* of heaven, as I may so speak: *Psalms 89. v. 36, 37. His seed shall endure for ever, and his throne as the Sun before me: It shall be established for ever as the Moon, and as the faithful witness שחך in heaven*: that is, in the sky, the place where the *Clouds* are. The drawing down therefore of the *Sun*, that faithful witness in heaven, so low as the *Clouds*, implies that the *Letter* of the *Scripture* takes no notice of any considerable part of the *Firmament* above the *Clouds*, it terminating its expressions alwayes at that *Extent*. And this sutes very well with *Moses* his calling the *Sun* and the *Moon* the *great Lights*, and making nothing as it were of the *Starres*; as is manifest out of the 16 verse of the first of *Genesis*, *And God made two great Lights, the greater light to rule the day, and the lesse to rule the night; He made the Starres also*. But they come as cast into the bargain, as not so considerable, when-as indeed a *Star* of the first magnitude is (according to the calculation of the *Astronomers*) twenty thousand times bigger then the *Earth*, and the *Earth* five and fourty times bigger then the *Moon*; so that one *Star* of the first magnitude will prove about nine hundred thousand times bigger then the *Moon*. Which notwithstanding, according to the *Letter* of *Moses*, is one of the *two great Lights*, the sole *Empresse* of the night.

But here the *Letter* of *Moses* is very consistent with it self: For sith that the *Extent* of heaven is not acknowledged any higher then the *Clouds*, or thereabout, wherein, as I shewed you, the *Sun* is, and consequently the *Moon*, and it will not be more harsh to make the *Stars* stoop so low too, (nay, they must indeed of necessity all of them be so low, they having no where else to be higher, according to the usual phrase of *Scripture*;) the appearances of them all to our sight will sufficiently set out their proportions one to another, and the *Sun* and the *Moon* (according to this *Hypothesis*) will prove the *two great Lights*, and the *Stars* but scatter'd sky-pebbles. Wherefore from all this harmony and correspondency of things I think I may safely conclude, *That the Extent of the Firmament, according to Moses, is but the distance from the Sea to the Clouds, or thereabouts*, as well as it is to our sight, which cannot discern any intervall of altitudes betwixt the *Clouds* and the *Moon*, the *Moon* and the *Sun*, and lastly betwixt the *Sun* and the *fixed Stars*.

I might adjoyn to these *Proofs* the *Suffrages* of many *Fathers* and *Modern Divines*, as *Chrysostome, Ambrose, Augustine, Bernard, Aquinas*, and the rest. But it is already manifest enough *That the Scripture speaks not according to the exact curiosity of Truth, describing things κατ' ἀποσκευαν, according to the very Nature and Essence of them; but κατ' ἐμφανιν, according to their appearance in Sense and the vulgar opinion.*

6. The Second Rule that I would set down is this, That there is a various Intertexture of *Theosophical* and *Philosophical Truths*, many *Physical* and *Metaphysical Theorems* hinted to us ever and anon, through those words that at first sight seem to bear but an ordinary gross sense; I mean especially in these Three first Chapters of *Genesis*. And a man will be the better assured of the truth of this Position, if he do but consider, That the *Literal Text* of *Moses* that sets out the *Creation of the*



world, and offers reasons of sundry notable *Phænomena* of Nature, bears altogether a most palpable compliance with the mere rude and ignorant conceits of the Vulgar. Wherefore the Argument of these Three Chapters being so *Philosophical* as it is, it seems unworthy of that knowing Spirit of *Moses*, or of Religion it self, that he should not contrive under the external contexture of this Narration some very singular and choice Theorems of *Natural Philosophy* and *Metaphysics*, which his pious and learned successors should be able by some secret Traditionary Doctrine or *Cabbala* to apply to his outward Text.

For what an excellent provision is this for such of the people, whose pregnancy of parts and wit might make them rest unsatisfied, as well in the *Moral Allegory* (into which they are first to be initiated) as in the *outward Letter* it self; and also their due *obedience*, *humility*, and *integrity* of life, make them fit to receive some more secret *Philosophick Cabbala* from the mouth of the knowing Priest? The strange unexpected richness of the Sense whereof, and highness of Notion suddenly shining forth by removing aside of the veil, might strike the Soul of the honest Jew with unexpressible pleasure and amazement, and fill his heart with joy and thankfulness to God for the good tidings therein contained, and conciliate greater reverence then ever to *Moses* and to Religion.

Wherefore such a *Philosophick Cabbala* as this being so convenient and desirable, and men in all Ages having professed their expectation of solid and severe Philosophy in this *Story of the Creation* by their several attempts thereupon, it seems to me abundantly probable that *Moses* and his successors were furnished with some such like *Cabbala*: which I am still the more easily induced to believe, from that credible fame, that *Pythagoras* and *Plato* had their Philosophy from *Moses* his Text; which it would not so easily have suggested unto them, had they had no assistance from either *Jewish* or *Egyptian* Prophet or Priest to expound it.

7. The Third and last Rule that I would lay down is this, That Natural Things, Persons, Motions and Actions, declared or spoken of in Scripture, admit of also many times a Mystical, Moral or Allegorical sense. This is worth the proving, it concerning our Souls more nearly then the other. I know this *Spiritual sense* is as great a fear to some faint and unbelieving hearts as a *Spectre* or *Night-spirit*. But it is a thing acknowledged by the most wise, most pious, and most rational of the *Jewish* Doctors. I will instance in one who is *ad instar omnium*, \* *Moses Egyptius*, who compares the divine Oracles to *Apples of Gold in Pictures of Silver*. For that the outward Nitor is very comely as Silver curiously cut through and wrought; but the inward Spiritual or Mystical sense is the Gold more precious and more beautiful, that glisters through those Cuttings and Artificial Carvings in the Letter.

I will endeavour to prove this point by sundry passages in Scripture: *Psalms 25*. סֵד יְהוָה לִירְאָיו וּבְרִיתוֹ לְהוֹדִיעֵם. The easie and genuine sense of these words is, *The Secret of the Lord is for them that fear him, and his Covenant is to make them know it*, viz. *his Secret*; which implies That the Myserie of God lies not bare to false and adulterous eyes, but is hid and wrapped up in decent coverings from the sight of Vulgar and Car-

nal

Iamblich, de  
vita Pythag.  
cap. 3.

\* In his Preface to his  
More Nevochim.

nal men: That his *Secrets* are, as *Aristotle* answered to *Alexander* concerning his ἐν δυνάμει ἑρμηνεύματα, or *Acroamatical Writings*, that they were ἐκδεδωμένα καὶ μὴ ἐκδεδωμένα, published and not published. And our Saviour himself, though all Goodness, was not so prodigal of his Pearls as to cast them to Swine; to them that were without he spake *Parables*. And upon the same Principles certainly it is not a whit unreasonable to conceive *Moses* to write *Types* and *Allegories*. And we have sufficient ground to think so from that of the Apostle *1 Cor.* ch. 10. where when he hath in short reckoned up some of the main passages that befell the *Israelites* in their Journey from *Egypt* to *Canaan*, (which yet no man that hath any faith or the fear of God before his eyes will deny to be a real History) he closes with this expression, *All these things being Types befell them, but were written for our instruction, on whom the ends of the world are come.* So *Galat.* ch. 4. The History of *Abraham's* having two sons, *Ishmael* and *Isaak*, the one of the bond-woman, the other of the free, viz. *Agar* and *Sara*, the same Apostle there speaks out, *that they are an Allegory*, ver. 24.

A. Gell. Noct.  
Attic. lib. 2d.  
cap. 5.

See Mystery of  
Godliness,  
Book 9. ch. 7.

I might adde many other passages to this purpose, but I will only raise one Consideration concerning many Histories of the Old Testament, and then conclude. If so be the Spirit of God meant not something more by them then the mere History, I mean some useful and Spiritual Truth involved in them, they will be so far from stirring us up to Piety, that they may prove ill Precedents for falseness and injurious dealings.

For what an easie thing is it for a man to fancy himself an *Israelite*, and then to circumvent his honest neighbours under the notion of *Egyptians*? But we will not confine our selves to this one solitary Instance. What is *Jacob* but a *Supplanter*, a Deceiver, and that of his own brother? For taking advantage of his present necessity, he forced him to sell his birth-right for a messe of pottage. What a notorious piece of fraud is that of *Rebecca*, that while industrious *Esau* is ranging the Woods and Mountains to fulfill his father's command and please his aged appetite, she should substitute *Jacob* with his both counterfeit Hands and Venison, to carry away the blessing intended by the good old man for his officious elder son *Esau*? *Jacob's* rods of Poplar, an ill example to servants to defraud their masters; and *Rachel's* stealing *Laban's Teraphim*, and concealing them with a falshood, how warrantable an act it was, let her own husband give sentence; *With whomsoever*

Gen. 31. 32.

thou findest thy Gods, let him not live. I might be infinite in this point; I will only adde one example of Womans perfidious cruelty, as it will seem at first sight, and so conclude. *Sisera* Captain of *Jabin's* host being worsted by *Israel*, fled on his feet to the Tent of *Jael*, the wife of *Heber* the *Kenite*, who was in league and confederacy with *Jabin*. This *Jael* was in shew so courteous as to meet *Sisera*, and invite him into her Tent, saying, *Turn in, my Lord, turn in to me, fear not. And when he had turned in unto her into the Tent, she covered him with a mantle. And he said unto her, Give me, I pray thee, a little water to drink: And she opened a bottle of Milk,*

Judg. 4. 22.

and



*and gave him drink, and covered him.* In short, he trusted her with his life, and gave himself to her protection, and she suddenly so soon as he fell asleep drove a nail with an hammer into his temples, and betrayed his Corps to the will of his enemies. An act certainly that the Spirit of God would not have approved, much less applauded so much, but in reference to the Myserie that lies under it.

My three Rules for the interpreting of Scripture I have, I hope, by this time sufficiently established, by way of a more general preparation to the Defence of my threefold *Cabbala*. I shall now apply myself to a more particular clearing and confirming the several passages therein.

---

THE

---

THE  
D E F E N C E  
O F  
The Literal Cabbala.

C H A P. I.

1. *The genuine sense of In the beginning. The difference of ברא, עשה, קנה neglected by the Seventy, who translate ברא only ἐποίησαν. 2. The ground of their mistake discovered, who conceive Moses to intimate that the Matter is uncreated. That רוח אלהים is no more then ventus magnus. 4, 5. That the first darkness was not properly Night. 6. Why the Seventy translate רקיע Firmamentum, and that it is in allusion to a firmly-pitched Tent. 11. That the sensible Effects of the Sun invited the Heathen to Idolatry, and that their Oracles taught them to call him by the name of Jao. 14. That the Prophet Jeremy divides the day from the Sun, speaking according to the vulgar capacity. 15. The reason why the Stars appear on this side the upper ceruleous Sea. 27. The Opinion of the Anthropomorphites, and of what great consequence it is for the Vulgar to imagine God in the shape of a Man. Aristophanes his story in Plato of Men and Womens growing together at first, as if they made both but one Animal.*



THE first Rule that I laid down in my *Introduction to the Defence of my Threefold Cabbala* I need not here again repeat, but desire the Reader only to carry it in minde, and it will warrant the easie and familiar sense that I shall settle upon *Moses* his Text in the *Literal* meaning thereof. Unto which if I adde also reasons from the pious prudence of this holy Law-giver, shewing how every passage makes for greater *Faith* in God, and more affectionate *Obedience* to his Law, there will be nothing wanting, I think, (though I shall sometimes cast in some notable advantages also from *Critical Learning*) that may gain belief to the truth of the Interpretation.

*Vers. 1.* In this first verse I put no other sense of *In the beginning*, then that it denotes to us the order of the History. Which is also the opinion of *Maimonides*, who deriving ראשית from ראש signifying the *Head*, rightly observes the Analogy; that as the *Head* is the forefront of a living

*Introducti.  
sect. 5.*

*More Nevochi;  
part. 2. cap. 30.*



a living creature, so ראשית signifies that which is placed first in any thing else: and that thus the Creation of the world is the Head or Forepart of the History that *Moses* intends to set down.

Wherefore *Moses* having in his minde (as is plain from the Title of this Book, *Genesis*, as well as the matter therein contained) to write an History and Genealogy from the Beginning of the World to his own time, it is very easie and obvious to conceive, that in reference to what he should after adde, he said, *In the beginning*; as if the whole frame of his thoughts lay thus. First of all, God made the Heavens and the Earth, with all that they contain, the Sun, Moon, and Stars, the Day and Night, the Plants, and living creatures that were in the Air, Water, and on the Earth; and after all these he made *Adam*, and *Adam* begot *Cain* and *Abel*, and so on in the full continuance of the History and Genealogies.

And this sense I conceive is more easie and natural then that of *Austin*, *Ambrose* and *Basil*, who will have *In the Beginning* to signifie *In the Beginning of Time*, or *In the Beginning of the World*. And yet I thought it not amiss to name also these, that the Reader may take his choice.

Manass. Ben  
Israel de Crea-  
tione, Problem.  
4 sect. 5.

God made Heaven and Earth. *Maimonides* and *Manasseh Ben Israel* observe these three words used in Scripture, when *Creation of the world* is attributed to God, viz. קנה, עשה, ברא; and that ברא signifies the production of things out of nothing, which is the Schools Notion of Creation; עשה is the making up a thing perfect and compleat, according to its own kinde and properties; קנה intimates the dominion and right possession that God has of all things thus created or made. But though ברא according to the mind of the Learned *Jews* signifies *Creation* properly so called; yet the *Seventy* observe no such Criticisme, but translate it ἐποίησαν, which is no more then made. And vulgar men are not at leisure to distinguish so subtilly. Wherefore this latter sense I receive as the vulgar *Literal* sense, the other as *Philosophical*. And where I use the word *Creation* in this *Literal Cabbala*, I understand but that common and general Notion of Making a thing, be it with what circumstances it will.

Neither do I translate אלהים in the plural number, the *Trinity*; because, as *Vatablus* observes out of the *Hebrew Doctors*, that when the inferiour speaks of his superiour, he speaks of him in the Plural Number. So *Esay* 19. 4. *Tradam Egyptum in manum dominorum duri*; and *Exod.* 22. 10. *Et accipiet domini ejus*, for *dominus*. The Text therefore necessarily requiring no such sense, and the mysterie being so abstruse, it is rightly left out in this *Literal Cabbala*.

*Vers. 2.* In the first verse there was a summary Proposal of the whole Creation in those two main parts of it, *Heaven* and *Earth*. Now he begins the particular prosecution of each day's work. But it is not needful for him here again to inculcate the making of the Earth: For it is the last word he spake in his general Proposal, and therefore it had been harsh or needless to have repeated it presently again. And that's the reason why before the making of the Earth there is not prefixed, *And the Lord said, Let there be an Earth*. Which I conceive has imposed upon the ignorance and inconsiderateness of some, so as to make them believe that this confused muddy heap which is called the Earth was an *Eternal First Matter*,

*Matter*, independent of God, and never created by him : Which, if a man appeal to his own Faculties, is impossible, as I shall again intimate when I come to the *Philosophick Cabbala*.

The sense therefore is, That the *Earth* was made first, which was covered with *Water*, and on the *Water* was the *Wind*, and in all this a thick *Darkness*. And God was in this dark, windy and wet Night. So that this Globe of *Earth*, and *Water*, and *Wind*, was but one dark Tempest and Sea-storm, a Night of Confusion and tumultuous Agitation. For רוח אלהים is not in the *Letter* any thing more then *Ventus ingens*, *A great and mighty wind* ; as the *Cedars of God*, and *Mountains of God*, are tall *Cedars*, *great Mountains*, and so in Analogy, the *Wind of God*, a great *Wind*.

*Vers. 3.* But in the midst of this tempestuous darkness, God intending to fall to his work, doth as it were light his Lamp, or set up himself a Candle and Lanthorne in this dark Shop. And whatever hitherto hath been mentioned, are words that strike the Fancy and Sense strongly, and are of easie perception to the rude people, whom every dark and stormy Night may well re-mind of the sad face of things till God commanded the comfortable Day to spring forth, the sole Author of Light, that so pleases the eyes and cheers the spirits of Man.

And that *Day-light* is a thing independent of the *Sun*, as well as the *Night* of the *Stars*, is a conceit wondrous sutable to the imaginations of the Vulgar, as I have my self found out by conversing with them. They are also prone to think, unlesse there be a sensible Wind stirring, that there is nothing betwixt the Earth and the Clouds, but that it is a mere vacuity. Wherefore I have not translated רוח אלהים the *Air*, as *Maimonides* somewhere does, but a *mighty wind*, for that the rude people are sensible of, and making the first deformed face of things so dismal and tempestuous, it will cause them to remember the first Morning light with more thankfulness and devotion.

*Vers. 4.* For it is a thing very visible. See what is said upon the eighth verse.

*Vers. 5.* By *Evening* and *Morning* is meant the *Artificial Day* and the *Artificial Night*, by a Synecdoche, as *Castellio* in his Notes tells us. Therefore this Artificial Day and Night put together make one Νυχθημερον, or *Natural Day*. And the Evening is put before the Morning, Night before Day, because *Darkness* is before *Light*. But that *Primitive darkness* was not properly *Night* : For *Night* is μία μεγάλην σιά, as *Aristotle* describes it, *one great Shadow* cast from the Earth, which implies *Light* of one side thereof. And therefore *Night* properly so called could not be before *Light*. But the illiterate people trouble themselves with no such curiosities, nor easily conceive any such difference betwixt that determinate *Conical shadow* of the Earth, which is *Night*, and that infinite *Primitive Darkness*, that had no bounds before there was any *Light*. And therefore that same *Darkness* prefixed to an Artificial Day makes up one *Natural Day* to them : Which *Hesiod* also swallows down without chewing, whether following his own fancy, or this Text of *Moses*; I know not.



Νυκτὸς δ' αὐτ' αἰθρὰ τε καὶ ἡμέρα ὄξεζόνοντο.

That is,

*But of the Night both Day and Skie were born.*

*Vers. 6. This Basis or Floor.* That the *Earth* seems like a round *Floor*, plain and running out so every way as to joyn with the bottome of the *Heavens*, I have in my *Introduction* hinted to you already; and that it is look'd upon as such in the phrase of Scripture, accommodating it self to our outward Senses and vulgar conceit. Upon this *Floor* stands the hollow *Firmament*, as a *Tent* pitched upon the ground; which is the very expression of the Prophet *Esay*, describing the Power of God, *That stretcheth out the Heavens like a Curtain, and spreadeth them out as a Tent to dwell in.* And the word רָקִיעַ, which is usually rendred *Firmament*, signifies *diduction*, *expansion*, or *spreading out*. But how the Seventy come to interpret it στέρωμα *Firmamentum*, Fuller in his *Miscellanies* gives a very ingenious reason, and such as makes very much to our purpose. *Nam cælum seu רָקִיעַ* (saith he) *quandoquidem Tentorio sapissime in Sacris literis assimilatur, πῶς πωδῶν dicitur, quatenus expanditur. Sic enim expandi solent Tentoria, cum alligatis ad paxillos in terram depactos funibus distenduntur, atque hoc etiam pacto firmantur. Itaque רָקִיעַ immensum quoddam, ut ita dicam, πῶς πω, ideòque στέρωμα non ineptè appelletur.* The sense of which in brief is nothing but this, *That the Seventy translate רָקִיעַ στέρωμα, that is, Firmamentum, because the Heavens are spread out like a well-fastned and firmly-pitched Tent.* And I adde also, that they are so *stiffly stretched*, that they will strongly bear against the weight of the *Upper waters*; so that they are not able to break them down, and therewith to drown the world. Which conceit as it is easie and agreeable with the Fancy of the people, so it is so far from doing them any hurt, that it will make them more sensible of the Divine Power and Providence, who thus by main force keeps off a Sea of water that hangs over their heads, which they discern through the transparent *Firmament*, (for it looks blew as other Seas do,) and would rush at once upon them and drown them, did not the Power of God and the strength of the *Firmament* hold it off.

*Vers. 7.* See what hath been already said upon the sixth verse. I will only here adde, That the nearness of these *Upper waters* makes them still the more formidable, and so they are greater spurs to devotion: For as they are brought so near as to touch the Earth at the bottome, so outward Sense still being Judge, they are to be within a small distance of the Clouds at the top. And that these *Upper waters* are no higher then so, it is manifest from other passages in Scripture that place the habitation of God but amongst the Clouds, who yet is called *the most High*; *Psalms 104.3. Deut. 33.26. Nahum 1.3. Psalm 68. 4.* But of this I have treated so fully in my *Introduction*, that I hold it needless to adde any thing more.

*Vers. 8.* I cannot say properly that God saw it was good. In the whole story of the Three first Chapters, it is evident that God is represented in the person of a Man, speaking with a mouth, and seeing with eyes. Hence it is that, the *Firmament* being of it self *invisible*, *Moses* omits the saying,

Introduc.  
sect. 5.

Esay 40. 22.

Lib. 1. cap. 7.

sect. 5.

saying, that *God saw it was good* : For the nature of the Eye is only to see things visible.

Some say, God made *Hell* the second day, and that that is the reason it was not recorded, that *he saw it was good*. But if he did not approve of it as good, why did he make it? However that can be none of the *Literal* sense, and so impertinent to this present *Cabbala*.

*Vers. 10. And I may now properly say, &c.* See what hath been said already upon verse the eighth.

*Vers. 11. Whence you may easily discern, &c.* This Observation is *Philo* the *Jew's*, which you may read at large in his *περί Κοσμοποιίας*. And it was very fit for *Moses*, who in his Law, which he received from God, does so much insist upon *Temporal* blessings and eating of the good things of the Land, as a reward of their obedience, to lay down such Principles as should beget a firm belief of the absolute power of God over Nature; That he could give them rain, and fruitful seasons, and a plentiful year when he pleased; whenas he could cause the Earth to bring forth without rain, or any thing else to further her births, as he did at the first Creation. The Meditation whereof might well cause such an holy resolution as that in the Prophet *Habakkuk*, *Although the fig-tree shall not blossom, neither fruit be in the Vines, the labour of the Olive fail, and the fields yield no meat; yet I will rejoyce in the Lord, I will joy in the God of my salvation.* But that prudent and pious caution of *Moses* against Idolatry, how requisite it was, is plain if we consider that the power of the Sun is so manifest, and his operation so sensible upon the Earth for the production of things below, especially of Plants, that he hath generally drawn aside the rude and simple Heathen to idolize him for a God: And their nimble Oracles have snatched away the sacred Name of the God of *Israel*, the true God, to bestow upon him, calling him *Jao*, Saturn. lib. 1. cap. 18. which is *Jehovah*; as is plain from that *Clarian* Oracle in *Macrobius*,

Φεῖξο ἢ πάντων ὑπαιὸν θεὸν ἔμμεν' Ἰαῶ,  
Χείμαλι μὲν τ' Αἰδῶ, Δία δ' εἰαρό. ἀρχομένοιο,  
Ἥλιον ὃ θέρος, μέλοπάρῃ δ' ἄλγρον' Ἰαῶ.

Which I have translated thus in my Poems :

*That Heavenly Power which Iao hight,  
The high'st of all the Gods thou maist declare,  
In Spring nam'd Zeus, in Summer Helios bright,  
In Autumn call'd Jao, Aides in brumal night.*

*These names do plainly denotate the Sun,  
In Spring call'd Zeus from life or kindly heat;  
In Winter, 'cause the day's so quickly done,  
He Aides hight, he is not long in sight;  
In Summer, 'cause he strongly doth us smite  
With his hot darts, then Helios we him name,  
From Eloim or Eloah so hight;  
In Autumn Jao, Jehovah is the same.  
So is the word deprav'd by an uncertain fame.*



This Oracle *Cornelius Labeo* interprets of *Bacchus*, which is the same with the *Sun*, who is the God of the Vintage, and is here described according to the four Quarters of the year.

And so *Virgil*, Heathen-like, attributes to the *Sun* and *Moon*, under the name of *Bacchus* and *Ceres*, that great blessing of Corn and Grain.

— *Vestro si numine Tellus*  
*Chaoniam pingui glandem mutavit aristâ.*

If by your providence the Earth has born  
For course *Chaonian* Acorns full-ear'd Corn.

scd. 4. But of this I have said so much in my *Introduction*, that I need adde nothing more.

*Vers. 12.* See *vers. 11.*

Jer. 15. 9. *Vers. 14.* See *vers. 3.* I have there shewn how easily the Fancie of rude people admit of days without a Sun. To whose capacities the Prophet *Jeremy* accommodating his speech, *Her Sun*, sayes he, *is gone down while it was yet day.* How can it be *day* when the Sun is down, unless the day be independent of the Sun, according to the Fancie of the rude and illiterate? Which is wonderfully consonant to the outward letter of *Moses*, that speaks not of the Sun as the cause of the Day, but as a badge of distinction from the Night, though he does admit that it does increase the light thereof.

*Vers. 15.* *In the hollow roof, &c.* Though the ceruleous upper Sea seems so near us, as I have already signified, yet the Lights of Heaven seem something on this side it, as white will stand off drawn upon a darker colour; as you may see in the describing solid Figures on a blew slate, they will more easily rise to your eye then black upon white: so that the people may very well, consulting with their sight, imagine the *Firmament* to be betwixt the Lights of Heaven and the upper Waters or that blew Sea they look upon, not on this side, nor properly betwixt the Lights or Stars.

*Vers. 16.* *Two great Lights, &c.* This is in counter-distinction to the Stars, which indeed seem much less to our sight then the *Sun* or *Moon*; whenas notwithstanding many Stars, according to Astronomers computation, are bigger then the Sun, all far bigger then the Moon. So that it is plain the Scripture speaks sometimes according to the appearance of things to our sight, not according to their absolute affections and properties. And he that will not here yield this for a truth, is, I think, justly to be suspected of more Ignorance then Religion, and of more Superstition then Reason.

*For their smalnesse, &c.* The Stars indeed seem very small to our sight, and therefore *Moses* seems to cast them in but by the by, complying therein with the ignorance of the unlearned. But *Astronomers*, who have made it their business to understand their magnitudes, they that make the most frugal computation concerning the bigger Stars, pronounce them no less then sixty eight times bigger then the Earth, others much more.

*Vers. 18.* *To be peculiar garnishings.* See *vers. 14.*

*Vers. 20.* *Fish and Fowl.* I suppose the mention of the *Fowl* is made here with the *Fish*, by reason that the greatest and more eminent sorts of that

that kinde of creature most of all frequent the waters, as Swans, Geese, Ducks, Herons, and the like.

*Vers. 27. In his own shape.* It was the opinion of the *Anthropomorphites*, That God had all the parts of a Man, and that we are in this sense made according to his Image : Which though it be an opinion in it self, if not rightly understood, vain and ridiculous ; yet theirs seem little better to me that imagine God a *Finite* Being, and take care to place him out of the stink of this terrestrial Globe, that he may sit *καθὰς ἐν καθάρῳ χώρῳ*, and so confine him to Heaven, as *Aristotle* seems to doe, if he be the Author of that Book *De Mundo* : For it is a contradiction to the very *Idea* of God to be *Finite*, and consequently to have *Figure* or *Parts*. But it is so difficult a thing for the rude multitude to venture at a Notion of a Being *Immaterial* and *Infinite*, that it seems their advantage to conceive of God as of some all-powerful Person, that can doe whatever he pleaseth, can make Heavens and Earths, and bestow his blessings in what measure and manner he lists ; and ( what is chief of all ) if need be, can personally appear to them, can chide them, and rebuke them, and, if they be obstinate, doe horrible vengeance upon them. This, I say, will more strongly strike the inward Sense and Imagination of the vulgar than *Omnipotency* placed in a *Thin, Subtile, Invisible, Immaterial* Being, of which they can have no perception at all nor any tolerable conceit.

Wherefore it being requisite for the ignorant, to be permitted to have some Finite and Figurative apprehension of God, what can be more fit then the Shape of a Man in the highest excellencies that it is capable of, for *Beauty, Strength, and Bignesse*? And the Prophet *Esay* seems to speak of God after this Notion, *God sits upon the circle of the Earth. and the inhabitants thereof are as Grasshoppers* ; intimating that men to God bear as little proportion as Grasshoppers to a man when he sits on the grasse amongst them. And now there being this necessity of permitting the people some such like apprehensions as this concerning God, ( and it is true Prudence and pious Policy to comply with their weakness for their good ) there were the most strict injunctions laid upon them against *Idolatry* and worshipping of Images that might be.

But if any one will say this was the next way to bring them into *Idolatry*, to let them entertain a conceit of God as in Humane shape ; I say, it is not any more then by acknowledging Man to be God, as our Religion does, in Christ. Nay, I adde moreover, that Christ is the true *Deus Figuratus* : and for his sake was it the more easily permitted unto the *Jews* to think of God in the shape of a Man.

And that there ought to be such a thing as *Christ*, that is, *God in Humane shape*, I think it most reasonable, that he may apparently visit the Earth, and to their very outward senses confound the Atheist and misbeliever at the last day. As he witnesseth of himself, *The Father judges none, but he hath given all Judgment unto the Son* : And that *No man can see the Father but as he is united unto the Son*. For the Eternal God is *Immaterial* and *Invisible* to our outward Senses ; but he hath thought good to treat with us, both in mercy and judgment, by a *Mediator* and *Vicergerent*, that partakes of our nature as well as his own. Wherefore it is



not at all absurd for *Moses* to suffer the *Jews* to conceive of God as in a corporeal and humane shape, since all men shall be judged by God in that shape at the last day.

*He made Females as well as Males.* That Story in *Plato* his *Symposion*, how men and women grew together at first till God cut them asunder, is a very probable argument that the Philosopher had seen or heard something of this *Mosaical* History. But that it was his opinion it was so, I see no probability at all: For the story is told by that ridiculous Comedian *Aristophanes*, with whom I conceive he is in some sort quit, for abusing his good old Friend and Tutor *Socrates*, whom he brought in upon the stage ἀερόλατοντα, treading the Air in a basket, to make him a laughing-stock to all *Athens*.

The Text is indeed capable of such a sense; but there being no reason to put that sense upon it, neither being a thing so accommodate to the capacity and conceit of the vulgar, I thought it not fit to admit it, no not so much as into this *Literal Cabbala*.

*Vers. 29. Frugiferous.* *Castellio* translates it so, *Herbas frugiferas*, which must be such like Herbs as I have named, *Strawberries, Wheat, Rice*, and the like.

## CHAP. II.

7. The notation of *Ψυχὴ* answerable to the breathing of *Adam's* Soul into his nostrils. 8. The exact situation of *Paradise*. That *Gihon* is part of *Euphrates*; *Pison*, *Phasis*, or *Phasi-tigris*. That the *Madianites* are called *Æthiopians*. That *Paradise* was seated about *Mesopotamia*, argued by six Reasons. That it was more particularly seated where now *Apamia* stands in *Ptolemie's* Maps. 18. The Prudence of *Moses* in the commendation of *Matrimony*. 19. Why *Adam* is not recorded to have given names to the *Fishes*. 24. *Abraham Ben Ezra's* conceit of the names of *Adam* and *Eve* as they are called *אדם* and *חווה*. 25. *Moses* his wife *Anthypophora* concerning the natural shame of nakedness.

**I**N the four first verses all is so clear and plain, that there is no need of any further Explication or Defence, saving that you may take notice that in the second verse, where I write *Within six days*, the *Seventies* Translation will warrant it, who render it τῇ ἑκτῇ, on the sixth day.

*Vers. 5.* See what hath been said on the eleventh verse of the first Chapter.

*Vers. 6. A mighty Torrent of Water.* For the *Seventy* render *נָחַל*, *πηγὴ*, *Fons*, *Aquila*, ἐκφυγμός, *Eruptio*. And the ordinary Eruption of Springs out of the ground may be a popular assurance, that that Water that covered the face of the Earth first broke out from thence, but was after driven into one place by the power of God, that there might be dry Land; and is imply'd here to be so very dry, that the Omnipotence

tence of God might be the more manifest in making of *Adam* out of this dry Dust.

But this scope might be more compendiously reached though ~~the~~ were rendred *Vapor*; (as most do render it) if the Negative in the foregoing verse might be repeated  $\delta\epsilon\iota\kappa\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$  *noivē*, as R. *Schadiah* reads it, *Nec quicquam erat qui coleret terram, nec vapor ascendebat*, &c. To which sense R. D. K. gives his suffrage right willingly. See P. *Fagius* upon the place.

*Vers. 7. The dust.* The Hebrew word signifies so, and I make no mention of any moistning of it with water; for God is here set out acting according to his absolute Power and Omnipotency: And it is as easie to make men of dry dust as hard stones; and yet *God is able even of stones to raise up children unto Abraham.* *Math. 3. 9.*

*Blew into the nostrils.* Breathing is so palpable an effect of life, that the ancient rude *Greeks* also gave the Soul its name from that operation, calling it  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  from  $\psi\upsilon\chi\omega$  to breathe or to blow.

*Vers. 8. Eastward of Judea.* For so Interpreters expound *Eastward* in Scripture, in reference to *Judea*.

To prevent any further trouble in making good the sense I have put upon the following verses concerning *Paradise*, I shall here at once set down what I finde most probable concerning the situation thereof, out of *Vatablus* and *Cornelius à Lapide*, adding also somewhat out of *Dionysius* the Geographical Poet. In general therefore we are led by the four Rivers to the right situation of *Paradise*. And *Gihon*, saith *Vatablus*, est tractus inferior *Euphratis* illabens in sinum *Persicum*, is a lower tract or stream of *Euphrates* that slides into the *Persian Gulph*. *Pison* is *Phasis* or *Phasi-tigris*, that runs through *Havilah*, a region near *Persis*; so that *Pison* is a branch of *Tigris*, as *Gihon* is of *Euphrates*. Thus *Vatablus*. And that *Gihon* may have his *Aethiopia*, *Cornelius à Lapide* notes, that the *Madianites*, and others near the *Persian Gulph*, are called *Aethiopians*; and therefore he concludes first at large, that *Paradise* was seated about *Mesopotamia* and *Armenia*, from these Reasons following.

First, Because these Regions are called *Eastern* in Scripture, (which, as I have said, is to be understood always in reference to *Judea*) according to the rule of Expositors. And the Lord is said to have planted this Garden of *Paradise Eastward*.

Secondly, Because Man being cast out of *Paradise*, these Regions were inhabited first, both before the Flood, (for *Cain* is said to inhabite *Eden*, *Gen. 4. 16.*) and also after the Flood, as being nearer *Paradise*, and more fertile, *Gen. 8. 4.* also *11. 2.*

Thirdly, *Paradise* was in *Eden*, but *Eden* was near *Haran*; *Ezek. 27. 23.* *Haran*, and *Canneh*, and *Eden*: but *Haran* was about *Mesopotamia*, being a City of *Parthia* where *Crassus* was slain; Authors call it *Charra*.

Fourthly, *Paradise* is where *Euphrates* and *Tigris* are. And these are in *Mesopotamia* and *Armenia*. They denominate *Mesopotamia*, it lying betwixt them.



Ὅσα δ' Εὐφράτης καὶ Τίγρις ἐνδοδιχαῖα,  
 Τῷδε Μεσποταμίᾳ μέσσω ποταμῶν ἐρέουσιν.

That is,

*The land 'twixt Tigris and Euphrates stream,  
 All this Mesopotamia they name.*

Fifthly, Because these Regions are most fruitful and pleasant. And that *Adam* was made not far from thence, is not improbable from the excellency of that place, as well for the goodliness of the men that it breeds, as the fertility of the soil.

Τοῖν ὅτ' αἰὲν ἄριστος πέλει, ἐν μὲν ἀέξῃ  
 Ποίην, ἐν δὲ νομῶν εὐανδρίας, ἐν δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν  
 Φύτλιν, καλλίστῳ τε καὶ ἀθανάτοισιν ὀμφίλῳ.

That is,

*So excellent is that Soil for Herbage green,  
 For flowry Meads, and such fair goodly Men,  
 As if the off-spring of the Gods th' had been.*

As the same Geographer writes.

Sixthly, and lastly, There is yet a further probability alledged, that *Paradise* was about *Mesopotamia*, that Countrey being not far distant from *Judea*. For it is the Tradition of the Fathers, that *Adam* when he was ejected out of *Paradise*, having travelled over some parts of the world, came at last to *Judea*, and there died; and was buried in a Mount, which his posterity, because the head of the first Man was laid there, called *Mount Calvary*, where *Christ* was crucified for the expiation of the sin of *Adam*, the first transgressor. If the story be not true, it is pity but it should be, it hath so venerable assertors, as *Cyprian*, *Athanasius*, *Basil*, *Origen*, and others of the Fathers, as *Cornelius* affirms.

But now for the more exact situation of *Paradise*, the same Author ventures to place it at the very meeting of *Tigris* and *Euphrates*, where the City of *Apamia* now stands in *Ptolemie's* Maps, eighty degrees *Longitude*, and some thirty four degrees and thirty scruples *Latitude*.

Thus have we according to the *Letter* found *Paradise* which *Adam* lost; but if we find no better one in the *Philosophick* and *Moral Cabbala*, we shall but have our labour for our travel.

*Vers. 9. That stood planted in the midst of the Garden.* For in this verse the *Tree of Life* is planted in the midst of the Garden, and in the third Chapter the third verse the *Tree of the knowledge of good and evil* is placed there also.

*For the Lord God had so ordained.* Expositors seem not to suspect any hurt in the *Tree* it self, but that the fruit thereof was naturally good, only God interdicted it to try the goodness of *Adam*. So that this Law that prohibited *Adam* the eating of the fruit, was merely *Thetical* or *Positive*, not *Indispensable* and *Natural*.

*Vers. 10. From thence it was parted.* This is the cause that *Paradise* is conceived to have been situated where *Apamia* stands, as I have above intimated.

*Vers.*

*Vers. 11. Phasis.* See verse 8.

*Chaulateans.* The affinity of Name is apparent betwixt *Havilah* and *Chaulateans*, whom *Strabo* places in *Arabia* near *Mesopotamia*.

*Vers. 13. Arabian Æthiopia.* See verse 8.

*Vers. 17.* See verse 9.

*Vers. 18. High commendations of Matrimony.* *Moses* plainly recommends to the Jews the use of *Matrimony*, and does after a manner encourage them to that condition; which he does like a right Law-giver and Father of the people. For *in the multitude of people is the King's honour, but in the want of people is the destruction of the Prince*, as *Solomon* speaks, *Prov. 14.* Besides, there was no small policy in religiously commending that to them, that most would be carried fast enough to on their own accords. For those Laws are best liked that sute with the pleasure of the people, and they will have a better conceit of the Law-giver for it.

*Vers. 19. These brought he unto Adam.* viz. the *Beasts* and *Fowls*; but there is no mention of the *Fishes*, they being not fitted to journey in the same Element. It had been over-harsh and affected to have either brought the *Fishes* from the Sea, or to have carried *Adam* to the Shore, to appoint names to all the *Fishes* flocking thither to him. But after he might have opportunity to give them names, as they came occasionally to his view.

*Vers. 20.* See verse 18.

*Vers. 21. Fell into a dream.* For the Seventy have Ἐπέβαλεν ὁ Θεὸς ἐκστασιν ἐπὶ τὸ Ἀδάμ, *God cast Adam into an ecstasie*; and in that ecstasie he might very well see what God did all the while he slept.

*Vers. 23.* See verse 21, and 24.

*Vers. 24. So strict and sacred a Tye, &c.* That's the scope of the Story: To beget a very fast and indissoluble affection betwixt man and wife, that they should look upon one another as one and the same person. And in this has *Moses* wisely provided for the happiness of his people in instilling such a Principle into them, as is the root of all Oeconomical order, delight and contentment; while the husband looks upon his wife as on himself in the Feminine gender, and she on her husband as on herself in the Masculine. For Grammarians can discern no other difference then so betwixt וְאִשָּׁה and וְאִשָּׁה *Vir* and *Virissa*. But *R. Abraham Ben Ezra* has found a mysterie in these names more then Grammatical. For in וְאִשָּׁה and וְאִשָּׁה, sayes he, is the contracted name of *Jehovah* contained, viz. יהי, for there is י and ה. So long therefore as the married couple live in God's fear and mutual love, God is with them as well as in their names: But if they cast God off by disobedience, and make not good what they owe one to the other, then is their condition what their names denotate to them, the name of God being taken out, viz. וְאִשָּׁה and וְאִשָּׁה; the fire of discord and contention here, and the eternal fire of Hell hereafter. This is the conceit of that pious and witty Rabbi.

*Vers. 25. And were not ashamed.* Matrimony and the knowledge of women being so effectually recommended unto the *Jewes* in the foregoing story, the wisdom of *Moses* did foresee that it would be obvious for the people to think with themselves, how so good and commendable



a thing should have so much shame and diffidency hovering about it. For there is a general bashfulness in men and women in these matters, and they ever desire to transact these affairs in secret out of the sight of others. Wherefore *Moses* to satisfy their curiosity, continues his History further, and gives the reason of this shame in the following Chapter.

## CHAP. III.

1. *How much it saves the credit of our first Parents, that the Serpent was found the prime Author of the Transgression. That according to S. Basil all the living creatures of Paradise could speak: undeniable reasons that the Serpent could, according to the Literal Cabbala.* 9. *The opinion of the Anthropomorphites true, according to the Literal Cabbala.* 14. *That the Serpent went upright before the Fall, was the opinion of S. Basil.* 16. *A story of the easie delivery of a certain poor woman of Liguria.* 19. *That the general calamities that lie upon mankind came by the transgression of a Positive Law, how well accommodate it is to the scope of Moses.* 23. *That Paradise was not the whole Earth.* 24. *The Apparitions in Paradise called by Theodoret Μορμολύχεια.*

**I**N this third Chapter there are causes laid down of some of the most notable and most concerning accidents in Nature: As of the hard travail and toil upon the sons of men, to get themselves a livelihood; Of the Antipathy betwixt Men and Serpents; Of the incumbrance of the ground with troublesome weeds; Of the shame of Veneries; Of the pangs of childe-bearing; and of Death it self. Of all these *Moses* his wisdom held fit to give an account accommodately to the capacity of the people. For these fall into that grand Question in Philosophy, *πότεν τὰ κακά;* whence sprung up Evil? which has exercised the wits of all Ages to this very day. And every fool is able to make the Question, but few men so wise as to be either able to give, or fit to receive a sufficient Answer to it, according to the depth of the matter it self.

But it was very necessary for *Moses* to hold on in his History, and to communicate to them those plain and intelligible Causes of the Evils that ever lay before their eyes; he having so fully asserted God the Creator of Heaven and Earth, and Contriver of all things that we see: Adding also that the *Laws* that he propounded to them were delivered to him from God, and that all prosperity and happiness would accompany them, if they observed the same; That they should eat the good things of the Land, and live a long and healthful age.

Now it was easie for the people, though they were but rude and newly taken from making Bricks for *Pharaoh* in *Agypt*, to think thus with themselves; If God made all things, how is it that they are no better then they are? Why do our wives bring forth their children with pain? Why are we obnoxious to be stung with Serpents? Why may not God give us an endless life, as well as a long life? and the like. To which *Moses* in general

general answers, (to the great advantage of the people, and for the faster binding them to the *Laws* he delivered them from God,) That it was *Disobedience to God's will* that brought all this mischief into the world; which is most certainly true. But by what particular circumstances it is set out, you may here read in this third Chapter.

*Vers. 1. The Serpent also.* It had been too harsh and boistrous, and too grossly redounding to the dishonour of our first Parents *Adam* and *Eve*, if they had immediately done violence to so express a command of God, and shown themselves professed rebels against him: And their posterity would have been scarce able to have remembered them without cursings and bitterness, for being so bold and apert Authors of so much misery to them. But so it came to pass, that it was not of themselves, but by the subtilty of the *Serpent*, that they were deceived into disobedience, being overshot by his false suggestions. So that their mistake may be looked upon with pardon and pity, and our selves are fairly admonished to take heed that we forfeit not the rest.

*But the power of Speech.* I cannot be so large in my belief as *S. Basil*, who affirms, That all living creatures in Paradise could speak, and understand one another. But according to the *Literal Cabbala*, I think it is manifest that the *Serpent* could; and that it was not the *Devil* in the *Serpent*, as some Interpreters would have it. For, why should the *Serpent* be cursed for the *Devil's* sake? And beside, the whole business is attributed to the cunning and subtilty of the *Serpent*, as doing it by the power of his own nature. Therefore this were to confound two *Cabbala's* into one, to talk thus of the *Serpent* and the *Devil* at once.

*Not eat of any of the Trees.* So *Chrysostome*, *Rupertus*, and *S. Augustine*; as if the cunning *Serpent* had made use of that damnable Maxime, *Calumniare fortiter, aliquid adharebit*: So at first he layes his charge high against God, as if he would debarre them of necessary food and starve them, that at last he might gain so much, at least that he did unnecessarily abridge them of what made mightily for their pleasure and perfection.

*Vers. 4. See verse 1.*

*Vers. 7. And the eyes of them both were opened.* Some gather from hence, that *Adam* and *Eve* were blinde till they tasted of the forbidden fruit; Which is so foolish a glosse, that none but a blinde man could ever have stumbled upon it: For the greatest pleasure of Paradise had been lost, if they had wanted their sight. Therefore, as grosse as it is, that can be no part of any *Literal Cabbala*, it having nothing at all of probability in it: It is not λόγος πιδανός.

*Vers. 9. God's walking in the Garden, his calling after Adam,* his pronouncing the doom upon him, his wife, and the *Serpent*, and sundry passages before, do again and again inculcate the opinion of the *Anthropomorphites*, that God has an humane shape; which I have already acknowledged to be the meaning of the *Literal Cabbala*.

*Vers. 13. Here the first Original of Mischief is resolved into the Serpent,* whereby *Adam* and *Eve's* credits are something saved, and the root of misery to mankind is plainly discovered.

*Vers. 14. Creep upon thy belly.* It is plain according to the *Letter*, that



that the *Serpent* went upright ; which is the opinion also of *S. Basil* ; else his doom signifies nothing, if he crept upon his belly before.

*Vers. 15. Perpetual Antipathy.* See verse 1.

*Vers. 16. Her sorrows and pangs in childe-bearing.* See verse 1. But these pains are much increased to Women by their luxury and rotten delicateness, that weakens Nature and enfeebles the Spirits, so that they can endure nothing, whenas those that are used to hardship and labor scape better. There is a notorious instance of it in a woman of *Liguria*, who (as *Diodorus Siculus* writes) being hard at work in the field, was overtaken with that other labour. But she went but aside awhile, and disburthening her self, with a quick dispatch, laid her childe as gainly as she could in some fresh leaves and grass, and came immediately again to her task, and would not have desisted from her work, but that he that hired her, in commiseration to the infant, paid her the whole days wages to be shut of her: As if Providence had absolved her from the curse of *Eve*, she voluntarily undergoing so much of *Adam's*, which was sweating in the field.

*Vers. 18.* See verse 1.

*Vers. 19.* Observe the great Wisdome of *Moses* ; The Statutes and Ordinances which he deliver'd unto the people, they being most of them not φύσει, but δέσει, not natural and intrinsically good, but positive and dispensable in themselves ; here according to this History, all those grand evils of toil and labour upon a barren ground, of pains in child-bed, and of death it self, are imputed to the transgression of a Law that was but merely Positive : whereby the Law-giver does handsomely engage the people with all care and diligence to observe all the ceremonies and ordinances he gave them from God ; the whole posterity of *Adam* finding the mischief of the breaking but that one Positive Law in Paradise, the eating of the fruit of such a Tree that was forbidden : Whenas otherwise Positive Laws of themselves would have been very subject to be slighted and neglected.

*Vers. 20. Called his wife Eve.* חַוָּה signifies life.

*Vers. 21. The use of which God taught.* The two great comforts and necessities of life are Food and Clothing. Wherefore it was fit to record this passage also to indear the peoples mindes to God, and increase their devotion and thankfulness to him, who was so particularly and circumstantially the Author of those great supports of life.

*Vers. 23. Forth from the Garden of Eden.* That shews plainly that Paradise was not the whole Earth, as some would have it : For he was brought into Paradise by God, and now he is driven out again ; but he was not driven out of the world.

*Vers. 24. Haunted with Spirits.* This phrase is very significant of the nature of the thing it is to express, and fitly sets out the condition of Paradise, when *Adam* was driven out of it, and could no more return thither by reason of those Spirits that had visibly taken possession of the way thereunto, and of the place. Nor am I alone in this Exposition, *Theodoret* and *Procopius* bearing me company, who call these Apparitions at the entrance of Paradise *πνευματώδεις*, and *Spectra terribili formâ*. And I think that this may very well go for the Literal sense of this verse, the Existence of Spirits and Apparitions being acknowledged in all Nations, be they never so rude or slow-witted.

THE

T H E  
D E F E N C E  
O F  
The Philosophick Cabbala.

C H A P. I.

1. *Why Heaven and Light are both made Symbols of the same thing, viz. The World of Life. That ברא אלהים intimate a Trinity. That ראשית is a Title of the Eternal Wisdome, the Son of God, who is called also קדם, Ἀρχὴ and Ἀνατολή, and Λόγος. as well in Philo as the New Testament. That רוח אלהים is the Holy Ghost.* 2. *The fit agreement of Plato's Triad with the Trinity of the present Cabbala.* 5. *The Pythagorick names or nature of a Monad or Unite applied to the First day's work.* 6. *What are the Upper waters: and that Souls that descend εἰς γέενον are the Naiades or water-Nymphs in Porphyrius.* 8. *That Matter of it self is unmoveable. R. Bechai his notation of שמיים very happily explained out of Des-Cartes his Philosophy. That Universal Matter is the Second day's Creation, fully made good by the names and property of the number Two.* 13. *The nature of the Third day's work set off by the number Three.* 16. *That the most learned do agree that the Creation was perfected at once. The notation of כיכב strangely agreeing with the most notorious Conclusions of the Cartesian Philosophy.* 19. *That the Corporeal world was universally erected into Form and Motion on the Fourth day, is most notably confirmed by the Titles and Propertie of the number Four. The true meaning of the Pythagorick Oath, wherein they swore by him that taught them the mysterie of the Tetractys. That the Tetractys was a Symbole of the whole Philosophick Cabbala, that lay couched under the Text of Moses.* 20. *Why Fish and Fowl created in the same day.* 23. *Why living creatures were said to be made in the Fifth and Sixth days.* 31. *And why the whole Creation was comprehended within the number Six.*



Have plainly and faithfully set forth the meaning of *Moses* his Text, according to the *Literal Cabbala*, and made his incomparable Policy and pious Prudence manifest to all the world. For whether he had this History of *Adam* and *Eve* and of the *Creation* immediately from God on the Mount, or whether it was a very ancient Tradition long before in the Eastern parts, as some *Rabbins* will have it, but approved of by God in the Mount; *Moses* certainly could not have begun



his *Pentateuch* with any thing more proper and more material to his scope and purpose then this. And it is nothing but the ignorance of the *Atheist* that can make him look upon it as contemptible, it being in it self as highly removed above contempt, as true Prudence and Staiedness is above Madnesse and Folly.

And yet I confesse, I think there is still a greater depth and richness of Wisdome in it, then has been hitherto opened in this *Literal Cabbala*, and such as shall represent *Moses* as profoundly seen in *Philosophy* and *divine Morality*, as he is in *Politicks*: And against which the *Atheist* shall have nothing at all to alledge, unlesse ignorance and confidence furnish his brain with impertinent Arguments.

For he shall not hear *Moses* in this *Philosophick Cabbala* either tasking God to his *Six* days labour, or bounding the world at the Clouds, or making the Moon bigger then the Stars, or numbring days without Suns, or bringing in a Serpent talking with a Woman, or any such like passages, which the *Atheists* misunderstanding and perversenessse makes them take offence at; But they shall finde him more large and more free then any, and laying down such Conclusions as the wisest *Naturalists* and *Theosophers* in all Ages have looked upon as the choicest and most precious. Such, I say, are those in the *Philosophick Cabbala* you have read; and I am now come to defend it, and make it good, that it is indeed the meaning of *Moses* his Text. And one great Key for the understanding of it in this first Chapter, will be those *Pythagorical* Mysteries of *Numbers*, as I have intimated already in my *Preface*.

Sect. 4.

*Vers. 1. I mean the same thing by both.* And there is good reason there should be meant the same thing by both. For, besides that those actual conspicuous Lights are in Heaven, viz. the Sun and Stars; Heaven or the *Ethereal Matter* has in it all over the Principles of *Light*, which are the round *Particles*, and that very fine and subtile Matter that lies in the intervalls of the round *Particles*. He that is but a little acquainted with the *French* Philosophy, understands the business plainly. And in the expounding of *Moses*, I think I may lay down this for a safe Principle, That there is no considerable Truth in *Nature* or *Divinity* that *Moses* was ignorant of; and so if it be found agreeable to his Text, I may very well attribute it to him. At least the *Divine Wisdome* wherewith *Moses* was inspired prevents all the inventions of Men.

But now that I understand this *Heaven* and *Earth* in the First verse, as things distinct from *Heaven* and *Earth* afterwards mentioned, I am not alone in it, but have the authority of *Philo*, who expounds not this *Heaven* and *Earth* of the visible and tangible *Heaven* and *Earth* which are mentioned in the Second and Third day, but of an *Heaven* and *Earth* quite different from them: As also the suffrage of *S. Augustine*, who understands likewise by *Heaven* and *Light* one and the same thing, to wit, the *Angels*; and by *Earth* the *First Matter*: which is something like the sense of this present *Cabbala*, only for his *Physical* Matter, we set down a *Metaphysical* one, that other belonging most properly to the Second day; and for *Angels* we have *The World of Life*, which comprehends not *Angels* only, but all *Substantial Forms* and *Spirits* whatever.

And

And that *Heaven* or *Light* should be Symboles of *The World of Life* or *Form*, it is no wonder: For you may finde a sufficient reason in the *Cabbala* it self, at the fifth verse of this present Chapter, and *Plotinus* assimilates *Form* to *Light*, ὁ γὰρ λόγος φῶς, for *Form* is *Light*.

And lastly, in the second verse of this same Chapter, there be plain Reasons also laid down, why the mere *Possibility* of the outward Creation is called the *Earth*, according to the description of the *Earth* in the second verse of the first Chapter of *Moses* his Text: unto which you may further adde, that as the *Earth* is looked upon as the *Basis* of the World, so the *Possibility* of the outward Creation is in some sense the *Basis* thereof.

*The Tri-une Godhead.* The Hebrew words ברא אלהים do handsomely intimate a plurality and singularity, the *Noun* being in the *Plural*, the *Verb* in the *Singular* Number. Whence I conceive there may be very well here included the *Mysterie* of the *Trinity* and *Unity* of the Godhead, or πῶς θεῶν. And *Vatablus* himself, though he shuffles with his Grammatical Notions here, yet he does apertly acknowledge Three Persons in one God, at the twenty sixth verse of this Chapter. And that this was the Philosophick *Cabbala* of *Moses* and the Learned and Pious of the *Jews*, it is no small argument, because the Notion of the *Trinity* is so much insisted upon by the *Platonists* and *Pythagoreans*, whom all acknowledge (and I think I shall make it more plain then ever) to have got their Philosophy from *Moses*.

*By his Eternal Wisdome.* *Ambrose*, *Basil* and *Origen* interpret *In Principio*, to be as much as *In Filio*; and *Colossians* the first, there the Apostle speaking of the Son of God, he saith, that he is the *First-born* of every creature, and that by him were all things created that are in *Heaven*, and that are in *Earth*: and that he is before all things, and by him all things consist. This is the *Wisdome* of God, or the *Idea* according to which he framed all things: And therefore must be before all things the *Beginning* of the *Creatures* of God. And very answerable to this of the Apostle are those two Attributes *Philo* gives to the same subject, calling him πρῶτόγενος θεῶ λόγος; The *First-born* Word of God, or The *First-born* Form of God, and ἀρχὴ the *Beginning*. He calls him also simply Λόγος, which is, The *Word*, *Form*, *Reason*, or *Wisdome*. And one of the *Chaldee Paraphrasts* also interprets *In Principio*, *In Sapientia*. And this agrees exceedingly well with that of *Solomon*, יהוה קנני ראשית דרכי, The Lord possessed me, ראשית דרכי *Principium via sua*, that is, *operum suorum*, as *Vatablus* expounds it, and the Text makes it good; קדם מפעליו מאז *Oriens operum suorum ab antiquo*, The *Sun-rise* of his works of old. For there is no necessity of making of ראשית and קדם *Adverbs*, they are *Substantives*. And here *Wisdome* is called ראשית and קדם the *Principle* and *Morning* of the Works of God; not by way of diminution, but as supposing the *East* and the *Morning* to be the womb of *Light*, from whence springs all *Light* and *Form*, and *Form* is *Light*, as I told you before out of *Plotinus*.

And this Notion of קדם suites well with that passage in *Trismegist*, In his *Kóρη* where *Hermes* speaks thus; Ἐγὼ δὲ ἀνατολῆς γενομένης, τοῖς πάντα βλέ- Kόρη.



πρῶτον ὁφθαλμοῖς τὰ τὴ ἀνάλογῃς θεωρήσας, &c. where ἀνάλογῃς, which is the same with קדק, must signifie the *Divine Intellect*, the *bright Morning-Star*, the *Wisdom of God*: To which *Wisdom*, called in the eighth of the *Proverbs* ראשית and קדק the *Beginning and Morning* of his Works, is ascribed the *Creation* of the world by *Solomon*, as you may there see at large. I will only adde, that what the *Hebrew Text* here in *Genesis* calls ראשית, the *Chaldee* calls קדמין, which is all one with קדק. Wherefore ראשית is the *Essential Wisdom of God*, not an *habit* or *property*, but a *Substance* that is *Wisdom*. For true *Wisdom* is *Substance*, ἡ ἀληθινὴ σοφία ἐστὶν, καὶ ἡ ἀληθινὴ ἐστὶν σοφία. it is the same that *Plotinus* speaks. Whence he is called in the *Apocalyps*, ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος, which is but a *Periphrasis* of *Jehovah*, *Essence*, or ἐστὶν, which name יהוה contains the future, present, and time past in it, in ו and ה, as *Zanchius* observes. This is the second *Hypostasis* in the *holy Trinity*, the *Logos*, which was in the beginning of the world with God. *All things were made by him, and without him was nothing made that was made*, *John* 1.

*First created this.* I cannot impute it to any reason at all, but to the slownesse of Fancy, and heavy unwieldinesse of Melancholy, or the load of Bloud and Flesh, that makes men imagine that *Creation* is incompetentible even to God himself; whenas I think I have no lesse then demonstrated in my *Antidote against Atheism*, That it is impossible but God should have the power of *Creation*, or else he would not be God. But because our Will and Minde can create no Substance distinct from our selves, we foolishly conceit, measuring the Power of God by our own, that he cannot create any Substance distinct from himself: Which is but a weak Conclusion fallen from our own dulnesse and inadvertency.

*Vers. 2. Solitude and Emptinesse.* The very word signifies so in the Original, as *Vatablus* will tell you. Which being *abstract terms* (as the Schools call them) do very fittingly agree with the Notion we have put upon this *Symbolical Earth*, affirming it no real actual Subject, either spiritual or corporeal, that may be said to be *void* and *empty*; but to be *Vacuity* and *Emptinesse* it self, onely joyned with a capacity of being something. It is, as I have often intimated, the *Ens Potentiale* of the whole outward Creation.

*But the Spirit of God.* Not a great Wind, but the *Holy Ghost*. This is the Interpretation general of the Fathers. And it is a sign that it is according to the true *Mosaical Cabbala*, it being so consonant to *Plato's* School, which School I suspect now has more of that *Cabbala* then the *Jews* themselves have at this day.

*Having hovered a while.* The word in the Original is מרחפת, which signifies a hovering or brooding over a thing as a Bird does over her nest or on her young ones. Hence it is not unlikely is *Aristophanes* his Egge.

Τίτλη πρώτιστον ἐπὶ τὸν ὕμνον ὑπὸ μελανόπτερον ὄν.

To this sense,

*Under the wind below in darksome shade,  
There the black-winged Night her first Egge laid.*

And

And this manner of brooding thus is an Embleme of dearest affection; and who knows but that from this Text the Poets took occasion of feigning that ancient *Cupid* the Father of all the Gods, the *Creator* of all things and *Maker* of Mankind? For so he is described by *Hesiod* and *Orpheus*, and here in this place of *Aristophanes*, from whence I took the fore-cited verse.

*Simmius Rhodius* describes this ancient *Love* in verses which represent a pair of wings. I will not say according to this conceit of *Aristophanes* his *Esge*, which they should brood and hatch. But the longest Quill of one of them writes thus,

Λεῦσέ με τὸν γῆς τε βαθυτέρον ἄνακτ', ἀμφοῖδ' αὖ τὰν ἄλ' αἰ' ἐδράσαντα·

To this sense,

*I am the King of the deep-bosom'd Earth,  
My strength gave to the Sea both bounds and birth.*

This Spirit of God then, or the Divine Love which was from everlasting, will prove the Third divine *Hypostasis*. The first was אלהים, which signifies *Strength*, and a word rather common to the whole *Trinity*. But *Jehovah*, as the *Rabbins* observe, is a name of God as he is merciful and gracious, which may be answerable to *Plato* his Τάχαδιν but that name is also communicated to *Christ*, as we have already acknowledged. The second is חכמה, which is *Wisdom*, as has been prov'd out of the *Proverbs*, and answers to the *Platonical* Νῦς. The third we have now light upon, which must be *Love*, and it has a lucky coincidence also with the third *Hypostasis* in the *Platonick Triad*, Ψυχὴ, whom *Plotinus* calls ἀερίαν Ἀποδίττω, the *Celestial Venus*. And to this after a more immediate manner is the *Creation* of the world ascribed by that Philosopher, as also by *Plato*; as here in *Moses* the Spirit of God is said to lie close brooding upon the humid Matter for the actual Production of this outward world.

*Ennead. 3. lib. 6. also Ennead. 4. lib. 4. cap. 9.*

*Vers. 3. Exist independently of Corporeal Matter.* That which exists first, it is plain is independent of what follows, and *Philo* makes all *Immaterial* Beings to be created in this first day: Whence the Souls of Men are removed far from all fear of fate and mortality, which is the grand Tenent of *Plato's* School.

*Vers. 5. Matter merely Metaphysical.* See *Hyle* in my *Interpretation* general at the end of my *Poems*; where you shall find that I have settled the same Notion I make use of here, though I had no design then of expounding *Moses*.

*Monad or Unite.* The fitnessse of the number to the nature of every daies work you shall observe to be wonderful. Whence we may well conclude, that it was ordered so on purpose, and that in all probability *Pythagoras* was acquainted with this *Cabbala*: And that that was the reason the *Pythagoreans* made such a deal of doe with *Numbers*, putting other conceits upon them then any other *Arithmeticians* do: and that therefore if such *Theorems* as the *Pythagoreans* held be found futable and compliable with *Moses* his Text, it is a shrewd presumption that that is the right *Philosophick Cabbala* thereof.

*Philo* makes this First day spent in the Creation of *Immaterial* and



Nicomach.  
Gerasen. in  
Phot. Biblio-  
theca.

*Spiritual Beings*, of the *Intellectual World*, taking it in a large sense, or the *Mundus Vite*, as *Ficinus* calls it, *The World of Life and Forms*. And the *Pythagoreans* call an *Unite* Ἐἷς Θ., *Form*, and Ζῶν, *Life*. They call it also Ζανὸς πύργος Θ., or the *Tower of Jupiter*, giving also the same name to a *Point* or *Centre*, by which they understand the *Vital formative Centre* of things, the *Rationes Seminales*: and they call an *Unite* also λόγος Θ. σπερματικός, which is *Seminal Form*. But a very short and sufficient account of *Philo's* pronouncing that *Spiritual Substances* are the *First day's work* is, That as an *Unite* is *indivisible* in *Numbers*, so is the nature of *Spirits* *indivisible*; you cannot make two of one of them, as you may make of one piece of *Corporeal Matter* two, by actual division or severing them one piece from another. Wherefore what was truly and properly created the first day, was *Immaterial*, *Indivisible*, and *Independent* of the *Matter*, from the highest *Angel* to the meanest *Seminal Form*.

And for the *Potentiality* of the outward *Creation*, sith it is not so properly any real Being, it can breed no difficulty; but whatever it is, it is referable sith enough to *Incorporeal* things, it being no *Object* of *Sense*, but of *Intellect*, and being also *impassible* and *undiminshable*, and so in a sort *indivisible*. For the *Power* of *God* being *undiminshable*, the *Possibility* of the *Creature* must be also *undiminshable*, it being an adequate consequence of his *Power*. Wherefore this *Potentiality* being ever *One*, it is rightly referred to the *First day*. And in respect of this the *Pythagoreans* call an *Unite* ὕλη, as well as the *Binary*, as also ἀλαμπία, and σκόλωδία which names plainly glance at the dark *Potentiality* of things, set out by *Moses* in the *First day's Creation*.

Nicomach.  
Gerasen. Arith-  
met. Theolog.  
in Phot. Biblio-  
th. n. 137.

\* Concerning  
the production  
of this Cor-  
poreal Matter,  
see *Plotinus*  
*Ennead. 4. lib.*  
*3. cap. 9.* See  
also my *Trea-*  
*rise of Immor-*  
*tal. Book 3.*  
*ch. 16. sect. 8.*

*Vers. 6. Created an immense deal, &c.* He \* creates now *Corporeal Matter* (as before *The World of Life*) out of nothing. Which *Universal Matter* may well be called רִקְיָה, for *extension* is very proper to *Corporeal Matter*. *Castellio* translates it *Liquidum*, and this *Universal Matter* is most-what *fluid* still all over the world, but at first it was *fluid* universally.

*Betwixt the aforesaid fluid Possibility, &c.* But here it may be you'll enquire, how this *Corporeal Matter* shall be conceived to be betwixt the *waters above* and these *underneath*. For what can be the *waters above*? *Maimonides* requires no such continued *Analogy* in the hidden sense of *Scripture*, as you may see in his *Preface* to his *Moré Nevochim*. But I need not fly to that general refuge. For methinks that the *Seminal Forms* that descend through the *Matter*, and so reach the *Possibility* of the parts of the outward *Creation*, and make them spring up into act, are not unlike the drops of rain that descend through the *Heaven* or *Air*, and make the *Earth* fruitful. Besides, the *Seminal Forms* of things lie round, as I may so speak, and contracted at first, but spread when they bring any part of the *Possibility* of the outward *Creation* into act, as drops of rain spread when they are fallen to the ground. So that the *Analogy* is palpable enough, though it may seem too elaborate and curious. We may adde to all this concerning the *Naiades* or *Water-Nymphs*, that the *Ancients* understood by them τὰς εἰς γένεσιν ἁγίστους ψυχὰς κοινῶς ἀπάσας, *All manner of Souls that descend into the Matter and Generation.*

Where-

Wherefore the watry Powers (as *Porphyrus* also calls these *Nymphs*) it is not at all harsh to conceive, that they may be here indigitated by the name of the *Upper Waters*. See *Porphyrus* in his *De Antrō Nympharum*.

According to which sense is that expression also in *Synesius's* Hymns; Hymn. 3.

Διβὰς ἐραπία	An Heavenly drop I fell
Κέχυμαι κτ' ἄς	Spilt on this lowly ground:
Παγὰ με δίδυ	Thy Flitting Vagabond
Ὅθεν ἐξεχύθη	Restore unto that Well
Φυγὰς ἀλῆτις.	Whence first she did redound.

Which shews plainly enough that there is that which may be called *Water* above the material Heavens.

*Demetrius* also in *Plutarch* makes the Souls involved in generation to be so many *Water-Nymphs*. And it is not a mere Metaphor, but aims also at a Physical truth, namely at the moisture of the Vehicles of such Souls or Spiritual Powers as are engaged in *Generation*. Wherefore all those Immaterial Beings, whether that Universal Spirit of Nature or the Souls of Men and Brutes, as they are endued or invested with such a genital moisture in their framing of any visible fabrick out of Matter here below (into which they descended by virtue of the vital adhesion of this Humidity) are more then Metaphorically called *Water*, as the Angels and other Spirits created the First day are more then Symbolically called *Heaven* and *Light*, as I have noted in its \* due place.

See Immortal.  
Book 3, chap.  
18. sect. 6.

And upon account of this genital moisture that these Spiritual Essences are involved in when they frame any Terrestrial Contexture, I conceive that excellent Platonist *Virgil* makes that Description of the task or exercise of the *Water-Nymphs* in the River *Peneus*.

\* See the Appendix to the  
Defence, ch. 7.  
sect. 8.

*Cyrenen circum Milesia velleræ Nymphæ  
Carpebant hyali saturæ fucata colore.  
Inter quas curam Clymène narrabat inanem  
Vulcani; Martisque dolos & dulcia furta;  
Atque Chao densos Divûm numerabat amores;  
Carminè quo captæ fûsis dum mollia pensa  
Devolvunt, &c.*

By which passages certainly that knowing Poet understands nothing else but this, namely, That the spinning and weaving of the first contexture of things is in a certain primordial or genital moisture, in which these Spiritual Powers the *Water-Nymphs* work; whom therefore he brings in teasing and spinning and singing of Love-songs, and the hidden and stolen Veneries of the Gods, (that is, of those parts of the celestial Creation that descend εἰς γένεσιν) under the waters of the River *Peneus*.

To conclude therefore, it is very easie and fit that, as the Angels and the Souls of men unsunk into generation, and also all those Spiritual Beings created in the first Day, are, in reference to their inmost Vehicles, called *Heaven* and *Light*; so likewise to conceive that all Souls as they descend εἰς γένεσιν, and all Spiritual Powers as they apply to Terrestrial Formation, in which this genital Moisture is required, are in like analogy called the *Upper Waters* in this second Day's work, as Man



in respect of his outward Body was called *Adam*, that is to say, *Earth*.  
*Vers. 7. What mischief straying Souls.* The frequent complaints that that noble Spirit in *Pythagoreans* and *Platonists* makes against the incumbrances and disadvantages of the *Body* make this *Cabbala* very probable. And it is something like our Divines fancying *Hell* to be created this day.

*Vers. 8. Actuated and agitated.* This is consonant to *Plato's* School, who makes the *Matter* unmovable of it self; which is most reasonable. For if it were of its own nature movable, nothing for a moment would hold together, but dissolve it self into infinitely little Particles; whence it is manifest that there must be something besides the *Matter*, either to binde it or to move it: So that the Creation of *Immaterial Beings* is in that respect also necessary.

*Rightly called Heaven.* I mean  $\text{אֶשׁ וָמַי}$ . For this agitation of the *Matter* brought it to *Des-Cartes* his second Principle, which is the true *Aether*, or rather  $\text{אֶשׁ וָמַי}$ . For it is liquid as *Water*, and yet has in it the fierce Principle of *Fire*, which is the first Element and most subtile of all. The thing is at first sight understood by *Cartesians*, who will easily admit of that Notation of the *Rabbins* in the word  $\text{אֶשׁ וָמַי}$ , as being from  $\text{אֶשׁ}$  *Fire* and  $\text{וָמַי}$  *Water*. For so *R. Bechai*, *The Heavens*, sayes he, were created from the beginning, and are called  $\text{אֶשׁ וָמַי}$ , because they are  $\text{אֶשׁ}$  and  $\text{וָמַי}$  *Fire and Water*; which no Philosophy makes good so well as the *Cartesian*. For the round Particles, like *Water*, (though they be not of the same Figure) flake the fierceness of the first Principle, which is the purest *Fire*. And yet this *Fire* in some measure alway lies within the Triangular Intervalls of the round Particles, as that Philosophy declares at large.

*And the Binary.* How fitly again doth the number agree with the nature of the work of this day, which is the Creation of *Corporeal Matter*? And the *Pythagoreans* call the number *Two* ὕλη *Matter*. *Simplicius* upon *Aristotle's* *Physicks*, speaking of the *Pythagoreans*, Εἰκότως ἐν μὲν τὸ εἶδ' ὁ ἔλεγον, ὡς ὀρίζον ὅπερ ἀν' ἀκαταλάβῃ καὶ περατῶν· δύο δ' ἢ ὕλην, ὡς ἀόριστον, καὶ ὅγκον καὶ διατρέσει' αἰτίαν. They might well, sayes he, call *One*, *Form*, as defining and terminating to certain shape and property whatever it takes hold of: And *Two* they might well call *Matter*, it being undeterminate, and the cause of *Eigness* and *Divisibility*. And they have very copiously heaped upon the number *Two* such appellations as are most proper to *Corporeal Matter*, as ἄσχημάτις, ἀόριστος, ἀπειρος, *Unfigured, Undetermined, Unlimited*. For such is *Matter* of it self, till *Form* take hold of it. It is called also Πῶς, from the fluidity of the *Matter*; Ἀσπῖα, Ἀσπῖα, because it affords substance to the *Heavens* and *Starres*; Νεῖκος, Μόρος, Θάνατος, *Contention, Fate, and Death*, for these are the consequences of the *Soul's* being joyned with *Corporeal Matter*; Κίνησις, Γένεσις, Φύσις, Διαίρεσις, *Motion, Generation, and Division*, which are Properties plainly appertaining to *Bodies*. They call this number also ὑπομονή, because it is the ὑποκείμενον, the *Subject* that endures and undergoes all the changes and alterations the active *Forms* put upon it. Wherefore it is plain that the *Pythagoreans* understood *Corporeal Matter* by the number

*Two,*

*Two*, which no man can deny but that it is a very fit Symbole of *Division*, that eminent Property of *Matter*.

But we might cast in a further reason of the  $\square\Delta\Psi$  being created the second day: for the *Celestial Matter* does consist of two plainly distinguishable parts, to wit, the *First Element*, and the *Second*, or the *Materia subtilissima* and the *round Particles*, as I have already intimated out of *Des-Cartes* his Philosophy.

*Vers. 9. It is referred to the following day.* You are to understand that these *Six numbers* or *days* do not signify any *order of time*, but the *nature of the things* that were said to be made in them. But for any thing in *Moses* his *Philosophick Cabbala*, all might be made at once, or in such periods of time as is most suitable to the nature of the things themselves. What is said upon this ninth verse, will be better understood, and with more full satisfaction, when we come to the fourth day's work.

*Vers. 13. And the Ternary denotes.* In this third day were the *Waters* commanded into one place, the *Earth* adorned with all manner of *Plants*, *Paradise* and all the pleasure and plenty of it created, wherein the *Serpent* beguiled *Eve*, and so forth. What can therefore be more likely then that the *Pythagoreans* use their *Numbers* as certain remembrancers of the particular passages of this History of the Creation; whenas they call the number *Three*, Τρίτων and Θαλασσεύχης, i.e. *Triton* and *Lord of the Sea*; which is in reference to God's commanding the *Water* into one place, and making thereof a *Sea*: They call also the *Ternary* τριὰς ἀμείνων, and ὁφίων. The former intimates the *plenty of Paradise*, the latter relates to the *Serpent* there. But now besides this we shall find the *Ternary* very significant of the nature of this day's work. For first, the *Earth* consists of the *third Element* in the *Cartesian* Philosophy, (for the truth of that Philosophy will force it self in whether I will or no,) and then again there are three grand parts of this *third Element* necessary to make an *Earth* habitable, the *dry Land*, the *Sea*, (whence are *Springs* and *Rivers*) and the *Air*; and lastly, there are in *Vegetables*, which is the main work of this day, three eminent properties, according to *Aristotle*, viz. *Nutrition*, *Accretion*, *Generation*; and also, if you consider their duration, there be these three Cardinal points of it, *Ortus*, *Acme*, *Interitus*. You may cast in also that *Minerals*, which belong to this day as well as *Plants*, that both *Plants* and they, and in general all *Terrestrial Bodies*, have the *three Chymical Principles* in them, *Sal*, *Sulphur* and *Mercury*. And finally, which is of no small consequence, that the motion of the *Earth* is *triple*, namely that upon its *Axis*, that of the *Centre* round about the *Sun*, and that which arises from the inclination of the *Axis* and its site parallel to it self, whereby is described that *oblique Circle* on the *Earth* which we call the *Ecliptick*.

Nicomachi.  
Gerasen. Ar-  
rithmet. Theo-  
log. lib. 1.

*Vers. 16. Such as is the Earth we live upon.* As the *Matter* of the *Universe* came out in the second day, so the contriving of *this Matter* into *Suns* and *Planets* is contained in this fourth day, the *Earth* her self not excepted, though according to the *Letter* she is made in the first day, and as she is the *Nurse* of *Plants*, said to be uncovered in the third; yet as she is a receptacle of *Light*, and shines with borrowed raies like the *Moon*



Moon and other Planets, she may well be referred to this Fourth day's Creation.

\* De Creatione  
Problem. 1.

Nor will this at all seem bold or harsh, if we consider that the most learned have already agreed that all the whole Creation was made at once. As for example, the most rational of all the Jewish Doctors, *R. Moses Egyptius*, *Philo Judæus*, *Procopius Gazæus*, *Cardinal Cajetane*, *S. Augustine*, and the Schools of *Hillel* and *Samai*, as \* *Manasseh Ben Israel* writes. So that that leisurely order of days is thus quite taken away, and all the scruples that may rise from that *Hypothesis*.

Wherefore I say, the *Earth* as one of the *primary Planets* was created this fourth day. And I translate הַכּוֹכָבִים *Primary Planets*. *Primary*, because of הַ Emphatical; and *Planets*, because the very notation of their name implies their nature: for כִּכָּב is plainly from כִּי *Ustio* or *burning*, and כָּב *extinction*; *Nouns* made from כִּוָּה and כָּבָה, as תִּוִּי and אֵב from תִּוָּה and אֵבָה, according to unexceptionable Analogy. And the *Earth*, as also the rest of the *Planets*, their nature is such, as if they had once been burning and shining Suns, but their light and heat being extinguished, they afterwards became opaque Planets. This conclusion seems here plainly to be contained in *Moses*, but is at large demonstrated in *Des-Cartes* his Philosophy. Nor is this Notation of כִּכָּב enervated by alledging that the word is ordinarily used to signify the *fixed Stars* as well as the *Planets*: For I do not deny but that in a vulgar Notion it may be competent to them also. For the *fixed Stars*, according to the imagination of the rude people, may be said to be lighted up and extinguished so often as they appear and disappear; for they measure all by obvious sense and fancy, and may well look upon them as so many Candles set up by divine Providence in the Night, but by Day frugally put out, for wasting. And I remember *Theodore*t, in his *ἡ περὶ Περσέας*, has so glibly swallowed down the Notion, that he uses it as a special argument of Providence, that they can burn thus with their heads downwards, and not presently swell out and be extinguished, as our ordinary Candles are. Wherefore the word כִּכָּב may very well be attributed to all the Stars, as well *Fixed* as *Planets*; but to the *Fixed* onely upon vulgar seeming grounds, to the *Planets* upon true and natural. And we may be sure that that is that which *Moses* would aim at, and lay stresse upon in his *Philosophick Cabbala*.

Wherefore in brief, הַ Emphatical in הַכּוֹכָבִים contains a double *Emphasis*, intimating those true כִּכָּבִים or *Planets*, and then the most eminent amongst those truly so termed. Nor is it at all strange that so abstruse Conclusions of Philosophy should be lodged in this *Mosaical* Text: For, as I have elsewhere intimated, *Moses* has been aforehand with *Cartesius*. The ancient Patriarchs having had wit, and by reason of their long lives leisure enough, to invent as curious and subtle Theorems in Philosophy as ever any of their posterity could hit upon, besides what they might have had by Tradition from *Adam*. And if we finde the *Earth* a *Planet*, it must be acknowledged forthwith that it runs about the Sun; which is pure *Pythagorisme* again, and a shrewd presumption that he was taught that mysterie by this *Mosaical Cabbala*. But that the *Earth* is a *Planet*, besides

besides the Notation we have already insisted upon, the necessity of being created in this fourth day amongst the other Planets is a further Argument. For there is no mention of its Creation in any day else, according to this Philosophick Cabbala.

*Vers. 17. Inhabitants of the World.* The Hebrew is עוֹרְהָאָרֶץ. And I have made bold to interpret עוֹרְהָאָרֶץ not of this one Individual Earth, but of the whole Species; and therefore I render it *the World* at large. As אָדָם, in the twenty seventh of this Chapter, is not an Individual Man, but Mankind in general. *Kai en tois doxais peri tou Adamu en physiologhi Moussis ta peri tō andrapō phusews. Origen. contr. Cels. l. 4.* Which is an excellent Key for the opening the whole Mystery of the Creation. And so ver. 16. הַמְאֹרִים, viz. הַמְאֹרִים הַגְּדוֹלִים and הַמְאֹרִים הַקְּטָנִים, are interpreted after the same manner, rendring them *the greater sort of Lights, and the lesser sort of Lights.* So that no \* Grammatical violence is done to the Text of *Moses* all this time.

\* See H. Gror. Apocalypf. cap. 13. v. 15. where he produceth near twenty examples of the like sense of this Article 7 and the Greek δ.

*Vers. 19. And the number denotes.* This fourth day's Creation is the contrivance of *Matter* into *Suns* and *Planets*, or into *Suns, Moons, and Earths.* For the *Aethereal Vortices* were then set a going, and the *Corporeal* world had got into an useful order and shape. And the ordering and framing of the *Corporeal* world may very well be said to be transacted in the number *Four*; *Four* being the first *body* in numbers an *Equilateral Pyramid*, which Figure also is a right Symbole of *Light*, the raies entring the eye in a *Pyramidal* form. And *Lights* now are set up in all the vast Region of the *Aethereal Matter*, which is *Heaven*.

The *Pythagoreans* also call this number \* σῶμα, and \* ὁσμος, *Body*, and *the World*, intimating the Creation of the *Corporeal* world therein. And further, signifying in what excellent proportion and harmony the world was made, they call this number *Four*, \* Ἀρμονία, and Βαρυχασμὸν ἀνείργων, *Harmony*, and *the Stirrer up of divine Fury and Ecstasie*; insinuating that all things are so sweetly and fittingly ordered in the world, that the several motions thereof are as a comely Dance, or ravishing Musick, and are able to carry away a contemplative Soul into Rapture and Ecstasie upon a clear view and attentive Animadversion of the Order and Oeconomy of the Universe.

\* Philopon. in lib. 1. Metaphys.  
\* Plutarch. de Iside & Osiride.  
\* Nicomach. Gerasen. Arith. Theolog. lib. 1.

And *Philo*, who does much *Pythagorize* in his Exposition of *Moses*, observes, That this number *Four* contains the most perfect proportions in Musical Symphonies, viz. *Diateffaron, Diapente, Diapason, and Disdiapason*: Τῆς μὲν διατετάρτης ὁ λόγος ὅτι τέλει, &c. For the proportion of *Diateffaron* is as *Four* to *Three*, of *Diapente* as *Three* to *Two*, of *Diapason* as *Two* to *One*, or *Four* to *Two*, of *Disdiapason* as *Four* to *One*.

In his Cosmopœia Mosiaca.

We might cast in also the consideration of that divine *Nemesis* which God has placed in the frame and nature of the Universal Creation, as he is a Distributer to every one according to his works. From whence himself is also called *Nemesis* by *Aristotle*, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν παντί διανεμήσεως, *Because he every where distributes what is due to every one.* This is in ordinary language *Justice*, and both *Philo* and *Plotinus* out of the *Pythagoreans* affirm, that the number *Four* is a Symbole of *Justice*. All which makes towards what I drive at, that the whole Creation is concerned

Aristor. de Mundo.

Phil. Cosmopœia Mosiaca.



concerned in this number *Four*, which is called the *Fourth day*.

And for further eviſtion, we may yet adde, that as *all numbers* are contained in *Four* virtually, (by *all numbers* is meant *Ten*, for when we come to *Ten* we go back again) ſo the root and foundation of all the Corporeal Creation is laid in this *fourth day's* work, wherein *Suns*, *Earths* and *Moons* are made, and the ever-whirling *Vortices*. For, as *Philo* obſerves, *Pythagorean-like*, *Ten* (which they call alſo *ἑσπερος*, *ἑσπερος*, and *παντέλεια*, the *World*, *Heaven*, and *All-perfectneſſe*) is made by the ſcattering of the parts of *Four*, thus, 1, 2, 3, 4. Put theſe together now, and they are *Ten*, *παντέλεια*, τὸ πᾶν, *The Universe*. And this was ſuch a Secret amongſt *Pythagoras* his diſciples, that it was a ſolemn Oath with them to ſwear by him that delivered to them the myſterie of the *Tetractys*, *Tetrad*, or number *Four*.

Nicomach. Ge-  
raſen. *Arithmet.*  
*Theolog. lib. 2.*

Sext. Empiric.  
*adverſus Ma-  
themetic. lib. 4.*

Οὐ μὲν τὸν ἡμετέραν ψυχᾷ ὡς δὲ ὄντα πᾶσι,  
Πατρὶν ἀεὶ αὖτε φύσιν ῥιζώματι ἔχουσιν.

By him that did to us diſcloſe  
The *Tetrad's* myſterie,  
Where *Natures Fount* that ever flows  
And hidden root doth lie.

Thus they ſwore by *Pythagoras*, aſis conceived, who taught them this myſterious tradition. And had it not been a right worſhipfull myſterie, think you, indeed, and worthy of the ſolemnity of Religion and of an Oath, to underſtand that 1, 2, 3, 4. make *Ten*; and that *Ten* is *All*? which rude mankind told firſt upon their fingers, and *Arithmeticians* diſcover it by calling them *Digits* at this very day.

There is no likelihood that ſo wiſe a man as *Pythagoras* was, ſhould lay any ſtreſs upon ſuch trifles, or that his Scholars ſhould be ſuch fools as to be taken with them. But it is well known that the *Pythagoreans* held the *Motion of the Earth about the Sun*, which is plainly implied according to the *Philosophick Cabbala* of this *Fourth day's* work. So much of his Secrets got out to common knowledge and fame. But it is very highly probable, that he had the whole *Philosophick Cabbala* of the Creation opened to him by ſome knowing *Prieſt* or *Philosopher* (as we now call them) in the Oriental parts, that under *this myſterie of Numbers* ſet out to him the choiceſt and moſt precious Concluſions in *Natural Philoſophy*, interpreting, as I conceive, the Text of *Moses* in ſome ſuch way as I have light upon, and making all thoſe generous and ample Concluſions good by Demonſtration and Reaſon. And ſo *Pythagoras* being well furniſhed with the knowledge of things, was willing to impart them to thoſe whoſe piety and capacity was fit to receive them; not laying aſide that outward form of *Numbers*, which they were firſt conveyed to himſelf in. But ſuch *Arithmetical* nugacities as are ordinarily recorded for his, in dry Numbers, to have been the riches of the Wiſdome of ſo famous a *Philosopher*, is a thing beyond all credit or probability.

Wherefore I conceive that the choiceſt and moſt precious Treasures of knowledge being laid open in the *Cabbala* of the *Fourth day*, from thence  
it

it was that so much Solemnity and Religion was put upon that Number, which he called his *Tetractys*; which seems to have been of two kinds, the one, the single number *Four*; the \* other, *Thirty six*, made of the *four* first *Masculine* numbers, and the *four* first *Feminine*, viz. of 1, 3, 5, 7. and of 2, 4, 6, 8. wherein you see that the former and more simple *Tetractys* is still included and made use of; for *Four* here takes place again in the Assignment of the *Masculine* and *Feminine* Numbers. Whence I further conceive that under the number of this more complex *Tetrad*, which contains also the other in it, he taught his disciples the mysterie of the whole Creation, opening to them the nature of all things, as well *Spiritual* as *Corporeal*. Ο γὰρ ἀριθμὸς ἀειθρὸς τὸ τρυπητὸν ἔχει καὶ παθητικὸν, ὁ δὲ ἀειτλὸς τὸ ἀτρυπητὸν καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ δεξιόχειρον. Διὸ ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς ὀνομαζέσθαι, ὁ δὲ ἀπείρων, as a certain Author writes; For an even Number carries along with it divisibility, and passibility; but an odde Number, indivisibility, impassibility, and activity: wherefore that is called *Feminine*, this *Masculine*.

\* Plutarch. de  
Isid. & Osi-  
ride.

Anonym. in  
Prolem. Tetra-  
bibl. lib. 1.

Wherefore the putting together of the four first *Masculine* Numbers to the four first *Feminine* is the \* joyning of the *Active* & *Passive* Principles together, matching the parts of the Matter with congruous Forms from the *World of life*. So that I conceive the *Tetractys* was a Symbôle of the whole Systeme of *Pythagoras* his Philosophy, which we may very justly suspect to be the same with the *Mosaical Cabbala*. And the root of this *Tetractys* is *Six*, which again hits upon *Moses*, and re-mindes us of the *Six days work* of the Creation.

\* A Descrip-  
tion of this  
conjunction  
see in Plotinus,  
Enncad. 5. lib.  
1. cap. 2. also  
Enncad. 4. lib.  
3. cap. 10.

*Vers. 20. Fish and Fowl are made in the same day.* And here *Moses* does plainly play the Philosopher in joyning them together; for there is more affinity betwixt them then is easily discerned by the heedlesse vulgar: for besides that *Fowls* frequent the waters very much, many kindes of them I mean, these Elements themselves of *Air* and *Water*, for their thinnesse and liquidity, are very like one another. Besides, the finnes of *Fishes* and the wings of *Birds*, the feathers of one and the scales of the other, are very Analogical. They are both also destitute of *Uterers* properly so called, of *Dugges* also and of *Milk*, and are *Oviparous*. Further, their motions are mainly alike, the *Fishes* as it were flying in the *Water*, and the *Fowls* swimming in the *Air*, according to that of the Poet concerning *Dadalus*, when he had made himself wings,

*Insuetum per iter gelidas enavit ad Arctos.*

Cast in this also, that as some *Fowls* dive and swim under water, so some *Fishes* fly above the water in the air for a considerable space, till their finnes begin to be something stiffe and dry.

Euseb. Nig-  
remberg. Histor.  
Natural. lib.  
11. cap. 35.

*Vers. 23. And the Quinary denotes.* Philo does not here omit that obvious consideration of the *Five senses* in *Animals*. But it is a strange coincidence, if it was not intended, that living creatures should be said to be made in the *Fifth* and *Sixth* day, those Numbers according to the *Pythagorical mysterie* being so fitly significant of the nature of them. For *Five* is acknowledged by them to be *Male* and *Female*, consisting of *Three* and *Two*, the two first *Masculine* and *Feminine* numbers: It is also an Emblem of *Generation*, for the number *Five* drawn into *Five* brings about *Five* again, as you see in *Five times Five*, which is *Twenty Five*. So



an Eagle ingendring with an Eagle brings forth an Eagle, and a Dolphin ingendring with a Dolphin, a Dolphin; and so in the rest. Whence the *Pythagoreans* call this number *Five*, *Cytherea*, that is, *Venus*, and  $\Gamma\alpha\mu\omega$ . *Marriage*; and in *Birds* it is evident that they chuse their mates. Concerning the number *Six* I shall speak in its proper place.

*Vers. 26. That it is so free, so rational.* That the Image of God consists in this rather than in the dominion over the creature, I take to be the right sense, and more *Philosophical*, the other more *Political*; and *Philo* interprets it after that manner we have made choice of, which is also more sutable to *Platonism* and *Pythagorism*, the best *Cabbala* that I know of *Moses* his Text.

*Vers. 27. Male and Female.* It is a wonder, sayes *Grotius*, to see how the Explications of the *Rabbins* upon this place and those passages in *Plato's Symposium* agree one with another, which notwithstanding from whatsoever they proceeded, I make no question, saies he, but they are false and vain: And I must confesse I am fully of the same opinion. But this strange agreement betwixt *Aristophanes* his Narration, in the forenamed *Symposium*, and the comments of the *Rabbins* upon this Text, is no small argument that *Plato* had some knowledge of *Moses*, which may well adde the greater authority and credit to this our *Cabbala*. But it was the wisdom of *Plato* to own the true *Cabbala* himself; but such unwarrantable Fancies as might rise from the Text, to cast upon such a ridiculous shallow companion as *Aristophanes*; it was good enough for him to utter in that *Clubbe of Wits*, that *Philosophick Symposium* of *Plato*.

*Vers. 28. They lorded it.* The Seventy have it  $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\nu\pi\delta\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\epsilon$ , which is to domineer with an high hand, *Matth. 20*.

*Vers. 31. And the Senary denotes.* The *Senary* or the number *Six* has a double reference, the one to this particular day's work, the other to the whole Creation. For the particular day's work, it is the Creation of fundry sorts of *Land-Animals*, divided into *Male* and *Female*. And the number *Six* is made up of *Male* and *Female*. For *Two* into *Three* is *Six*. The conceit is *Philo's*; and hence the *Pythagoreans* called this Number,  $\Gamma\alpha\mu\omega$ , *Matrimony*, as *Clemens* also observes, adding moreover that they did it in reference to the *Creation of the World*, set down by *Moses*. This number also, in the same sort that the number *Five*, is a fit Embleme of *Procreation*. For *Six* drawn into *Six* makes *Thirty Six*. The conceit is *Plutarch's* in his *De Ei apud Delphos*, though he speak it of an inferiour kind of Generation: But methinks it is most proper to *Animals*. Here is something also that respects *Man* particularly, the choicest result of this *Sixth* day's labour. The number of the brutish Nature was *Five*, according to *Philo*; but here is an *Unite* superadded in *Man*, *Reason* reaching out to the knowledge of a God. And this *Unite* added to the former *Five*, makes *Six*.

But now for the reference that *Six* bears to the whole Creation, that the *Pythagoreans* did conceive it was significant thereof, appears by the Titles they have given it. For they call it  $\Delta\iota\alpha\phi\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma\ \tau\tilde{\epsilon}\ \pi\alpha\nu\tau\tilde{\omega}\varsigma$ ,  $\text{Ἄκμων}$ ,  $\text{Κόσμος}$ , *The articulate and compleat efformation of the Universe, the Anvil, and the World*. I suppose they call it *the Anvil* from that indefatigable

Nicomach.  
Gerasen. A-  
rithmet. Theo-  
log. lib. 2.  
Plutarch. De  
Ei apud Del-  
phos.

Clem. Alex-  
andrin. Stro-  
mat. lib. 6.

Nicomach.  
Gerasen. A-  
rithmet. Theo-  
log. lib. 2.

gable shaping out of new Forms and Figures upon the Matter of the Universe, by virtue of the Active Principle that ever busies it self everywhere. But how the *Senary* should Emblematize the World, you shall understand thus: The World is *self-compleat*, filled and perfected by its own parts; so is the *Senarius*, which has no denominated part but a *Sixth*, *Third*, and *Second*, viz. 1, 2, 3. which put together make *Six*; and *Euclide* defines a perfect Number from this property, Τέλειος ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὅστις ὁ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μέρεσιν ἴσος ὢν, *A perfect Number is that which is equall to its parts*. Wherefore this number sets out the perfection of the World, and you know God in the close of all saw that *all that he made was very good*. Then again the World is Ἄρρεν καὶ Ὀῦλον, *Mas and Fæmina*, that is, it consists of an *Active* and *Passive* Principle, the one brought down into the other from the *World of life*; and the *Senary* is made by the drawing of the first *Masculine* Number into the first *Feminine*, for *Three* into *Two* is *Six*.

Element. Geom. lib. 7. defin. 22.

Clem. Alexandr. Stromat. lib. 6.

Nicomach. Gerasen. Arith. Theolog. lib. 2.

Thus you see continuedly, *That the property of the Number sets off the nature of the work of every day*, according to those mysteries that the *Pythagoreans* have observed in them; and besides this, *That the Numbers have ordinarily got Names answerable to each day's work*; which, as I have often intimated, is a very high probability that the *Pythagoreans* had a *Cabbala* referring to *Moses* his Text and the History of the Creation. And *Philo*, though not in so punctual a way, has offered at the opening of the mind of *Moses* by this Key. But I hope I have made it so plain, that it will not hereafter be scrupled, but that this is the genuine way of interpreting the *Philosophick* meaning of the *Mosaical Text* in this first Chapter of *Genesis*.

## CHAP. II.

3. *The number Seven a fit Symbole of the Sabbath or Rest of God.* 7. *Of Adam's rising out of the ground, as other creatures did.* 11. *That Pison is from פיש or פוש, and denotes Prudence. The mystical meaning of Havilah.* 13. *That Gihon is the same that Nilus, Sihor, or Siris, and that Pison is Ganges. The Justice of the Æthiopians. That Gihon is from גון, and denotes that Vertue.* 14. *As Hiddekel denotes Fortitude.* 17. *That those expressions of the Soul's sleep, and death in the Body, so frequent amongst the Platonists, were borrowed from the Mosaical Cabbala.* 19. *Fallen Angels assimilated to the Beasts of the field. The meaning of those Platonical phrases πλεορροεῖν, πλεοφυεῖν, ἢ ἄρ' πλεῶν δαυθολή, τὸ τ' ψυχῆς πλεῶμα, and the like. That Θεοὶ in Platonism is the same that אלהים in Moses, that signifies Angels as well as God.* 22. *That there are Three Principles in Man, according to Plato's School, Νῦς, Ψυχὴ, εἰδωλον Ψυχῆς, and that this last is Eve.*



**I**N this second Chapter, *Moses*, having spoke of the *Sabbath*, returns to a more particular Declaration of the Creation of *Adam*, which is referable to the *Sixth* day's work: Then he falls upon that mysterious story of *Paradise*, which runs out into the next Chapter.

*Vers. 3. And the number declares the nature.* The *Hebdomad* or *Septenary* is a fit Symbole of God, as he is considered having finished these Six days Creation. For then, as this *Cabbala* intimates, he creates nothing further. And therefore his condition is then very fitly set out by the number *Seven*. All numbers within the *Decad* are cast into three ranks, as \* *Philo* observes. Οἱ μὲν ἄρσενος, ὁ ἄρσενος: οἱ δὲ ἄρσενος, ὁ ἄρσενος: οἱ δὲ ἀρσενος, ὁ ἄρσενος. Some beget, but are not begotten; others are begotten, but do not beget; the last both beget and are begotten. The number *Seven* is only excepted, that is neither begotten, nor begets any number, which is a perfect Embleme of God celebrating this *Sabbath*: For he now creates nothing of anew, as himself is uncreatable. So that the creating and infusing of Souls as occasion should offer, is quite contrary to this *Mosaical Cabbala*. But the *Cabbala* is very consonant to it self, which declares that all Souls were created at once in the First day, and will in these following Chapters declare also the manner of their falling into the Body.

\* In his *Cosmopœia* *Mosaic*.

*Vers. 4. Productions of the Heavens.* The Original hath it תולדות השמים. Here the *Suns* and *Planets* are plainly said to be generated by the *Heavens* or *Ethereal Matter*, which is again wonderfully consonant to the *Cartesian Philosophy*; but after what manner *Planets* and *Stars* are thus generated, you may see there at large. It cannot but be acknowledged that there was a fathomelesse depth of *Wisdom* in *Moses*, whose skill in *Philosophy* thus plainly prevents the subtlest and most capacious reaches of all the wits of the world that ever wrote after him.

*Take upon me to define.* That no set time is understood by the *Six* days Creation, hath been witnessed already out of approved Authors; and the present *Cabbala* plainly confirms it, shewing that the mysterie of numbers is meant, not the order or succession of days.

*Vers. 6. Like dewy showers of Rain.* *Vatablus* plainly interprets the place of *Rain*. But I conceive it better interpreted of something Analogical to the common *Rain* that now descends upon the *Earth*, which is lesse oily a great deal, and not so full of vitall vigour and principles of life.

*Vers. 7. And Man himself rose out of the Earth.* That God should shape *Earth* with his own hands, like a *Statuary*, into the figure of a *Man*, and then blow breath into the nostrils of it, and so make it become alive, is not likely to be the *Philosophick Cabbala*, it being more palpably accommodated to vulgar conceit. But mention of *Rain* immediately before the making of *Man*, may very well insinuate such preparations of the ground to have some causal concurrence for his production. And if it be at all credible that other living creatures rose out of the *Earth* in this manner, it is as likely that *Man* did so likewise; for the same words are used concerning them both: for the Text of *Moses*, ver. 19. sayes, That out of the ground

ground God formed every Beast of the Field, and every Fowl of the Air, as it sayes in the seventh verse, that he formed Man of the dust of the ground. Whence Euripides the Tragedian (one that Socrates lov'd and respected much for his great knowledge and vertue, and would of his own accord be a Spectator of his Tragedies, whenas they could scarce force him to see other Playes, as *Ælian* writes) this Euripides, I say, pronouncing of the first generation of men and the rest of living creatures, affirmed that they were born all after the same manner, and that they rose out of the Earth. And that Euripides was tinctured with the same doctrines that were in Pythagoras, and Plato's School, both the friendship betwixt him and Socrates, as also the Γνωμαί or Moral and Philosophick sentences in his Tragedies, are no inconsiderable arguments. And, as I have already intimated, the best Philosophick Cabbala of Moses that is, I suspect to be in their Philosophy, I mean of Plato and Pythagoras.

Eurip. *Menalipp.* See *Diodor. Sic. Bibliorhec. Histor. lib. 1.*  
*Ælian. Var. Histor. lib. 2. cap. 13.*

Vers. 8. Where he had put the Man. For there is no *Praterpluperfect Tense* in the Hebrew, and therefore, as Vatablus observes, if the sense require, the *Praterperfect Tense* stands for it.

Wholly *Aethereal*. For that's the pure Heavenly and undefiled Vehicle of the Soul, according to Platonism.

Beams of the Divine Intellect. I have already more at large shewed how the Son of God or the Divine Intellect is set out by the similitude of the Sun-rising or East, which I may again here further confirm out of Philo, Τέτον μὲν γὰρ περιούσιον ὕδιν ὃ τῷ ὄντων ἀνέτηλε πατήρ, In his πρὸ Συγχύσεως ἀγαλέκτων. So that the placing of Paradise under the Sun-rise, signifies the condition of a Soul irrigated by the rayes of the Divine Intellect, which she is most capable of in her *Aethereal Vehicle*. But that the Souls of men were from the beginning of the world, is the general opinion of the Learned Jews, as well as of the Pythagoreans and Platonists, and therefore a very warrantable Hypothesis in the Philosophick Cabbala. Nay, I may further adde that it is the Opinion of Origen, that Plato's Διὸς κῆρυξ, Jovis Hortus, is but an imitation of this History of Paradise, and that Porus his being deceived by Penia answers to Adam's his being beguiled by the Serpent. See Origen against Celsus, lib. 4.

Vers. 9. The Essential Will of God. By the Essential Will of God is understood the Will of God becoming Life and Essence to the Soul of Man; whereby is signified a more through union betwixt the Divine and humane nature, such as is in them that are firmly regenerated and radicated in what is good. Philo makes the Tree of Life to be εὐσέβεια; that is, Piety or Religion; but the best Religion and Piety is to be of one will with God: see John 1.12.

Vers. 10. The Four Cardinal Vertues. It is \* Philo's Exposition upon the place; and then the River it self to be ἡ ἀρχὴν ἀγαθότητα, that general goodness distinguishable into these four heads of Vertue.

\* In his *Leg. Allegor. lib. 1.*

Vers. 11. Is Pison. From פיש or פיש to spread and diffuse it self, to multiply and abound. This is Wisdom or Prudence, called Pison; partly; because it diffuses it self into all our actions, and regulates the exercise of the other Three Vertues; and partly, because Wisdom and Truth fills and encreases, and spreads out every day more then other. For Truth is



very fruitful, and there are ever new occasions that adde experience of things,

Γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος.

According to our English Proverb, *The older the wiser.*

*In the Land of Havilah.* From הוּי and הָא or הָלָא, *Deus indicavit, God hath shown it.*

*Vers. 12. Pure Gold, &c.* An easie Embleme of *tried Experience*, the mother of true *Wisdom* and *Prudence*. And the virtue of *Bdellium* is not unproper for diseases that arise from *Phlegmatick laziness*; and the very name and nature of the *Onyx* stone also points out the signification of it: Though there be no necessity, as I have told you already out of *Maimonides*, to give an account in this manner of every particular passage in an *Allegory* or *Parable*: wherefore if any man think me too curious, they may omit these expositions, and let them go for nought.

*Vers. 13. River is Gihon.* According to the History or Letter we have made *Pison*, *Phasis*, and *Gihon* a branch of *Euphrates*. But the ancient Fathers, *Epiphanius*, *Augustine*, *Ambrose*, *Hieronymus*, *Theodoret*, *Damasceus*, and several others make *Pison* *Ganges*, and *Gihon* *Nilus*. And they have no contemptible arguments for it: For first, *Ferem. 2. 18. Sihor* is a River of *Egypt*, which is not questioned to be any other then *Nilus*, and its *Etymon* seems to bewray the truth of it, from הַשׁוּ denigrari, from the muddy blackness of the River. And *Nilus* is notorious for this quality, and therefore has its denomination thence in the Greek, *quasi νεῖα ἰλὺς*, according to which is that of *Dionysius*,

Οὐ γάρ τις ποταμῶν ἐναλίγκιος ἐπλετο Νείλῳ,  
Οὐτ' ἰλὺν βόγειν, ἔτε χθονὸς ὀλβον αἰεζῶν.

That is,

*For there's no River can compare with Nile,  
For casting mud, and fattening the soil.*

But now to recite the very words of the Prophet, *What hast thou to doe with the way of Egypt, to drink the waters of Sihor?* the Latine has it, *ut bibas aquam turbidam*; this is *Nilus*: But the Seventy translate it πρὶν ὕδωρ Γινῶν, *To drink the water of Gihon*; which is the name of this very River of Paradise: And the *Abyssines* also even to this day call *Nilus* by the name of *Guion*. Adde unto this, that *Gihon* runs in *Aethiopia*, so does *Nilus*, and is *Siris* as it runs through *Aethiopia*, which is from *Sihor* it is likely; and then the Greek termination makes it *Sioris*, after by contraction *Siris*.

Σίρις ὡς Αἰθίοπων κυλήσκει, οἱ δ' Συλῶνς  
Ἐνναέται σρεφδέντι μετ' ἔρομα Νείλον ἔδεντο.

That is,

*The Aethiopian him Siris calls,  
Syene Nilus, when by her he crawls.*

As the same Author writes in his Geographical Poems. And that *Pison* is *Ganges* has also its probabilities. *Ganges* being in *India*, a Countrey famous for Gold and precious Stones. Besides, the notation of the name agrees with the nature of the River, *Pison* being from פִּסַּן *multiplicare*; and there is no lesse a number then Ten, and those great Rivers, that exo-  
nerate

nerate themselves into *Ganges*: as there must be a conflux of *multifarious Experience* to fill up and compleat that vertue of *Wisdom* or *Prudence*. So that we shall see that the four Rivers of *Paradise* have got such names as are most advantageous and favourable to the mysterious sense of the story.

Wherefore regardlesse here of all *Geographical* scrupulosities, we will say that *Gihon* is *Nilus* or *Siris*, the River of the *Aethiopians*, that is, of the *Just*, and the Vertue is here determinately set off from the subject wherein it doth reside: For by the fame of the *Justice* and Innocency of the *Aethiopians*, we are assured which of the Cardinal Vertues is meant by *Gihon*. And the ancient fame of their Honesty and Uprightnesse was such, that *Homer* has made it their Epithet, calling them ἀνέμους Ἀιθιοπῆας, *The blamelesse Aethiopians*; adding further, that *Jupiter* used to banquet with them, he being so much taken with the integrity of their conversation. And *Dionysius* calls them Θεοδίας Ἀιθιοπῆας, *The divine or Deiforme Aethiopians*: and they were so styled διὰ δικαιοσύνην, *by reason of their Justice*, as *Eustathius* comments upon the place. *Herodotus* also speaking of them, says, they are very goodly men, and much civilized, and of a very long life, which is the reward of Righteousnesse. So that by the place where *Gihon* runs, it is plainly signified to us what Cardinal Vertue is to be understood thereby.

*Notation of the name thereof.* The name *Gihon*, as you have seen, fairly incites us to acknowledge it a River of *Aethiopia*. The notation thereof does very suitably agree with the nature of *Justice*, for it is from πνερumpere. And Justice is ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν, *Bonum alienum*, as the Philosopher notes; not confined within a mans self, but *breaks out* rather upon others, bestowing upon every one what is their due.

*Vers. 14. Is Hiddekel.* The word is compounded, sayes *Vatablus*, from two words that signifie *velox* and *rapidum*; and this vertue, like a *swift and rapid stream*, bears down all before it, as you have it in the *Cabbala*.

*And stoutly resists.* \* *Philo* uses here the word ἀνισταῖν, *to resist*, which he takes occasion for from the *Seventies* κατὰναντὶ Ἀσσυρίων, which he interprets *against the Assyrians*. The Hebrew has it, *Eastward of Assyria*, and therefore *Assyria* is situated Westward of it. Now the *West* is that quarter of the world where the Sun bidding us adieu, leaves us to darkness; whence Ζέφυρος, the *West wind*, in *Eustathius*, has its name from Ζός and ἔρ, the *wind that blows from the dark Quarter*. *Assyria* therefore is that false state of seeming *Happiness* and power of wickednesse, which is called the *Kingdome of darknesse*. And this is the most noble object of *Fortitude*, to destroy or resist the power of this kingdom within our selves. Which is the force and power of the suggestions of the *Body*, which may well be signified by the *Occident*, as well as the *Intellect* by the *Orient*; the Evening also in the foregoing chapter denoting the corporeal or Material Principle all along.

*Perath.* From פרת *Fruetificavit.*

*Vers. 17. In processe of time, &c.* This is according to the minde of the *Pythagoreans* and *Origen*. And that *Pythagoras* had the favour of

\* In his *Leg. Allegor. lib. xi.*



having the *Mosaical Cabbala* communicated to him by some knowing Priest of the Jewes, or some holy man or other, I think I have continued in the former Chapter made it exceeding probable.

*The Region of mortality and death.* Nothing is more frequent with the *Platonists* then the calling of the *Body* a \* *Sepulchre*, and *this life* we live here upon Earth, either *sleep* or *death*. Which expressions are so futable with this *Cabbala*, and the *Cabbala* with the Text of *Moses*, that mentions the *death* and *sleep* of *Adam*, that it is a shrewd presumption that these Phrases and Notions came first from thence. And *Philo* acknowledges that *Heraclitus*, that mysterious and abstruse Philosopher, (whom *Porphyrus* also has cited to the same purpose, in his *De antro Nympharum*) has even hit upon the very meaning that *Moses* intends in this *death* of *Adam*, in that famous saying of his, Ζῶμεν τ' ἐκείνων θάνατον, τεθνήσκουμεν δ' ἐκείνων βίον, *We live their death*, (to wit, of the Souls out of the body) but we are dead to their life. And *Euripides*, that friend of *Socrates*, and fellow-traveller of *Plato's*, in his *Tragedies* speaks much to the same purpose:

\* Τῇ δ' ψυχῇ  
δεσμὸς τὸ  
σῶμα καὶ τὰ φέρος,  
καὶ ὁ κόσμος αὖ-  
τῇ σπῆλαιον  
καὶ ἄντρον. *Plon.*  
*Ennead. 4.*  
*lib. 8. cap. 3.*

*Phil. Leg. Ake-*  
*gor. lib. 1.*

*Clem. Alexan.*  
*Stromat. lib. 3.*

Τίς οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἔστι κατὰ θάνατον,  
τὸ κατὰ θάνατον δ' ζῆν;

*Who knows whether to live, be not to die; and to die, to live?* So that the Philosophick sense concerning *Adam's* death must be this; That he shall be dead to the *Aethereal life* he lived before, while he is restrained to the *Terrestrial*, and that whenas he might have lived for ever in the *Aethereal Life*, he shall in a shorter time assuredly die to the *Terrestrial*: That the sons of men cannot escape either the certainty or speed of death.

*Vers. 18. Both good for himself, &c.* For the words of the Text do not confine it to *Adam's* conveniency alone, but speak at large without any restraint, in this present verse. Wherefore there being a double convenience, it was more explicite to mention both in the *Cabbala*.

*Vers. 19. Fallen and unfallen Angels.* The fallen *Angels* are here assimilated to the *Beasts of the Field*, the unfallen to the *Fowls of the Air*. How fitly the fallen *Spirits* are reckoned amongst the *Beasts of the Field*, you shall understand more fully in the following Chapter. In the mean time you may take notice that the *Platonists*, indeed *Plato* himself in his *Phaedrus*, makes the Soul of Man, before it falls into this *Terrestrial Region*, a winged Creature: And that such phrases as these, πτερόρρυν and πτεροφύειν, ἢ τ' πτερόν ἀποβολή, and δ' ψυχῆς πτέρωμα, and the like, are proper expressions of that School. And *Plato* does very plainly define what he means by these *wings of the Soul*, (and there is the same reason of all other *Spirits* whatsoever) after this manner, Πέφυκεν ἡ πτερὰ δύναμις δ' ἐμβρυϊδὲς ἀγειν ἄνω, μετωρρίζου ἐπὶ τ' ὀρεινὰ γὰρ οὐραῖ· *That the nature of the wing of the Soul is such, as to be able to carry upward that which otherwise would sluge downwards, and to bear it aloft and place it there where we may have more sensible communion with God and his holy Angels.* For so Θεοὶ in the plural number is most futable translated in such passages as these, and most congruously to the thing it self and the truth of Christianity. And it may well seem the lesse strange that Θεοὶ should signifie *Angels* in the Greek Philosophers,

phers, especially such as have been acquainted with *Moses*, whenas with him מלאכים signifies so too, *viz. Angels* as well as *God*. Wherefore to conclude, The losse of that Principle that keeps us in this divine condition is the *losing of our wings*; which fallen Angels have done, and therefore they may be very well assimilated to *Terrestrial Beasts*.

*Vers. 20. A faculty of being united, &c.* This vital aptitude in the Soul of being united with corporeal Matter being so essential to her and proper, the invigorating the exercise of that Faculty cannot but be very grateful and acceptable to her, and a very considerable share of her happinesse. Else what means the *Resurrection of the dead* or *Bodies* in the other world? which yet is an Article of the Christian Faith.

*Vers. 22. This new sense of his Vehicle.* There be Three Principles in Man according to the *Platonists*, Νῦς, Ψυχὴ, εἰδωλον Ψυχῆς. The first is *Intellect*, *Spirit*, or *divine Light*; the second the *Soul her self*, which is *Adam the Man*, *Animus cujusque is est quisque*, the *Soul of every man that is the Man*; the third is the *Image of the Soul*, which is her *vital Energie upon the Body*, wherewith she does enliven it; and if that life be in good tune and due vigour, it is a very grateful sense to the Soul, whether in this Body, or in a more thin Vehicle. This *Ficinus* makes our *Eve*. This is the *Feminine Faculty* in the Soul of Man, which awakes then easiliest into act, when the Soul to *Intellectuals* falls asleep.

*Vers. 24. Over-tedious aspires.* Τὰ ἀνδρώπινα φρονεῖν ἀνδρωποῦ ὄντα; is a vulgar Monition reprehended by *Aristotle* in his \* *Ethicks*. But it is a great point of wisdom for all that, and mainly necessary, to know the true Laws and Bounds of humane happinesse, that the heat of Melancholy drive not men up beyond what is competible to humane nature, and the reach of all the Faculties thereof; as well as to beware that the too favoury relish of the pleasures of the flesh or *Animal Life* keep them not down many thousand degrees below what they are capable of. But the man that truly fears God will be delivered from them both. What I have spoken, is directed more properly to the Soul in the flesh, but may Analogically be understood of a Soul in any *Vehicle*, for they are peccable in them all.

\* *Ethic. ad Nicomach. lib. 10. cap. 7.*

*Vers. 25. Stood naked before God.* *Adam* was as truly clothed in *Corporeity* now as ever after; for the *Aether* is as true a *Body* as the *Earth*: But the meaning is, *Adam* had a sense of the divine Presence, very feelingly assured in his own minde, that his whole Being lay naked and bare before God, and that nothing could be hid from his sight, which pierced also to the very thoughts and inward frame of his Spirit. But yet though *Adam* stood thus *naked* before him, notwithstanding he found no want of any covering to hide himself from that presentifick sense of him, nor indeed felt himself as naked in that notion of nakednesse. For that sense of *nakedness*; and want of further covering and sheltring from the divine Presence; arose from his disobedience and rebellion against the commands of God; which as yet he had not fallen into.

*Not at all ashamed.* Shame is φόβος δίκαιος φόβος, the fear of just reprehension, as *Gellius* out of the Philosophers defines it. But *Adam* having not acted any thing yet at randome, after the swing of his own Will, he had

*Not. Attic. lib. 19. cap. 6.*



had done nothing that the divine Light would reprehend him for. He had not yet become obnoxious to any sentence from his own condemning Conscience; for he kept himself hitherto within the bounds of that divine Law written in his Soul, and had attempted nothing against the Will of God. So that there being no *sin*, there could not as yet be any *shame* in Adam.

## CHAP. III.

1. *The Serpent* 'Οφιωνεύς in Pherecydes Syrus. אִיִּים, שְׂעִירִים, אַחִים, and לִילִית, names of Spirits haunting Fields and desolate places. The right Notation of שְׂעִירִים. 13. That Satan upon his tempting Adam was cast down lower towards the Earth, with all his Accomplices. 15. Plato's Prophecie of Christ. The reasonableness of Divine Providence in exalting Christ above the highest Angels. 20. That Adam's descension into his Terrestrial Body was a kind of Death. 22. How incongruous it is to the Divine Goodness, Sarcastically to insult over frail Man fallen into Tragical misery. 24. That it is a great mercy of God that we are not immortal upon Earth. That Δαίμων, Ψυχὴ, and Ἀγγελος, are all one.

THE first verse. *This old Serpent therefore.*

In Pherecydes Syrus, Pythagoras his Master, there is mention of one 'Οφιωνεύς, *Princeps mali*, as Grotius cites him on this place, which is a further argument of Pythagoras his being acquainted with this Mosaical Philosophy; and that according to the Philosophick Cabbala, it was an evil Spirit, not a natural Serpent, that supplanted Adam, and brought such mischief upon mankind.

*The Beasts of the Field.* But now that these evil Spirits should be reckoned as *Beasts of the field*, besides what reason is given in the Cabbala it self, we may adde further, that the haunt of these unclean spirits is in solitudes and waste fields and desolate places, as is evident in the Prophet *Esay* his description of the desolation of *Babylon*, where he saith it shall be a place for the אִיִּים and שְׂעִירִים, the *Fauni* and *Sylvani*, as Castellio translates it, or ὄνονένταυροι and Δαιμόνια, as the *Seventy*: And these *Onocentauri* in Hesychius are δαίμονων πένθη καὶ σκούρον τῇ ὀφθαλμῷ, *A kinde of Spirit that frequents the woods, and is of a dark colour.* There is mention made also by the Prophet (in the same description) of the שְׂעִירִים and אַחִים and of לִילִית, all which Expositors interpret of *Spirits*. For שְׂעִירִים are interpreted by the *Seventy* Δαιμόνια, by Castellio *Satyri*; אַחִים Castellio renders *Fauni*, the *Seventy* ἤχους *Clamores, Strepitus*; Grotius suspects they wrote ἤχιμ. Out of both you may guesse that they were such a kinde of Spirit as causes a noise and a stir in those desolate places, according to that of *Lucretius*,

*Hac loca capripedes Satyros Nymphasque tenere  
Finitimi fingunt, & Faunos esse loquuntur;*

*Quorum noctivago strepitu ludôque jocanti  
Affirmant vulgò taciturna silentia rumpi.*

To this sense,

*These are the places where the Nymphs do wonne,  
The Fawns and Satyres with their cloven feet,  
Whose noise and shouts and laughs loud do run  
Through the still Aire, and wake the silent Night.*

But the Poet seems to put it off with this conceit, that it is only the Shepherds that are merry with their Lasses. But no man can glosse upon this Text after that manner: For the Prophet says, *No shepherd shall pitch his fold there, nor shall any man pass through it for ever.* The last strange creature in these direful solitudes is לילית, which Interpreters ordinarily translate *Lamia*, a *Witch*; and for mine own part, I give so much credit to sundry stories that I have read and heard, that I should rather interpret those noises in the *Night*, which *Lucretius* speaks of, to be the Conventicles of *Witches* and *Devils*, then the merriment of *Shepherds* and their *Shepherdesses* re-echoed from rocks & hills, themselves in the mean time unseen in the midst of their Musick and mirth. But the *Jews* understand by לילית a *she-devil*, an enemy to women in childe-bed; whence it is that they write on the walls of the room where the woman lies in, ארם חור, חוץ לילית, Adam, Eve, out of doors *Lilith*.

Esay 13. 20.

And what I have alledged already, I conceive is authority enough to countenance the sense of the *Cabbala*, that supposes *evil Spirits* to be reckoned among, or to be Analogical to, the *Beasts of the field*.

But something may be added yet further, *Matth. 12. 43.* There our Saviour Christ plainly allows of this doctrine, that *evil Spirits* have their haunts in the wide fields and deserts, which *Grotius* observes to be the opinion of the *Jewes*, and that שדים, *Damones*, have their name for that reason, from שדה *Ager*, the *Field*; for if it were from שדר, it would be rather שרם then שדים, *Shiddim* then *Shedhim*, as Grammatical Analogy requires.

*Vers. 2. And Adam answered him.* Though the *Serpent* here be look'd upon as a distant person from *Adam*, and externally accosting him, yet it is not at all incongruous to make *Eve* merely an *Internal Faculty* of him. For as she is said to proceed from him, so she is said still to be one with him: which is wonderfully agreeable with the *Faculties of the Soul*; for though they be from the *Soul*, yet they are really one with her, as they that understand any thing in *Philosophy* will easily admit.

*Vers. 5. Know all things.* Πάντες ἀνθρώποις ἔστιν εἶδέναι ὁρμήν φύσει, *All men have a natural desire of knowledge.* It is an *Aphorism* in *Aristotle*. *Metaphys. l. 1.* And this desire is most strong in those whose spirits are most thin and subtle. And therefore this bait could not but be much taking with *Adam* in his thinner Vehicle. But whatever is natural to the *Soul*, unlesse it be regulated and bounded with the divine Light, will prove her mischief and bane, whether in this lower state, or what state soever the *Soul* is placed in.

*Vers. 7. Neither the covering of the Heavenly nature.* For *Adam* by the indulging to every careless suggestion, at last destroyed and spoiled the



the pure frame of his *Aethereal* or *Heavenly Vehicle*, and wrought himself into a dislike of the fordid ruines and distempered reliques of it; and in some measure awakening that lower *Plantal life*, which yet had not come near enough the *Terrestrial Matter*, and with which he was as yet unclothed, found himself naked of what he presaged would very fitly sute with him, and ease the trouble of his present condition. See 2 Cor. ch. 5. v. 1, 2, 3, 4.

*Vers. 8. That they hid themselves.* They hate the Light, because their deeds are evil. This is true of all rebellious spirits, be they in what *Vehicle* they will.

*Vers. 9. Pursued him. Præstantiorem Anima facultatem esse ducem hominis atque Daemonem,* It is *Ficinus* his out of *Timæus*, viz. *That the best Faculty that the Soul is any thing awaked to, is her guide and good Genius.* But if we be rebellious to it, it is our *Damon* in the worse sence, and we are afraid of it, and cannot endure the sight of it.

*Vers. 10. No power nor ornaments.* For he found that though he could spoil and disorder his *Vehicle*, it was not in his power so easily to bring it in order again.

*Vers. 12. It was the vigour and impetnosity.* There is some kinde of offer towards a real excuse in *Adam*; but it is manifest that he cannot clear himself from sin, because it was in his power to have regulated the motions of the *Life of his Vehicle* according to the rule of the divine Light in him.

*Vers. 13. What work has she made here?* *Adam* touched in some sort with the conviction of the divine Light, bemoans that sad *Catastrophe*, which the *vigorous life of the Vehicle* had occasioned: But then he again excuses himself from the deceivableness of that Facultie, especially it being wrought upon by so cunning and powerful an Assailant as the old *Serpent the Devil*.

*Imagination for ever.* That is, לעולם, εἰς τὸ αἰῶνα.

*The Eternal God.* It being a thing acknowledged, that God both *speaks in a man*, as in other *Intellectual* creatures, by his divine Light residing there, and that he also *speaks in himself*, concerning things or persons; which *Speeches* are nothing else but his *Decrees*: It is not at all harsh, in the reading of *Moses*, to understand the *speakings of God* according as the circumstances of the Matter naturally imply; nor to bring God in as a third Person, in corporeal and visible shape, unlesse there were an exigency that did extort it from us. For his *inward word*, whereby he either creates or decrees any thing that shall come to passe, as also that divine Light whereby he does instruct those Souls that receive him, Philosophy will easilier admit of these for the *speakings of God*, then any audible articulate voice pronounced by him in humane shape, unlesse it were by *Christ* himself; for otherwise in all likelihood it is but a message by some Angel.

*Vers. 14. The Prince of the rebellious Angels.* For the mighty shall be mightily tormented; and the nature of the thing also implies it, because disgrace, adversity, and being trampled on, is far more painful & vexatious to those that have been in great place then to those of a more inferiour rank.

rank. From whence naturally this *Chieftain of the Devils*, as Mr. Mede calls him, will be struck more deeply with the curse then any of the rest of his *Accomplices*.

*In the higher parts of the Air, &c.* This is very consonant to the opinion of the ancient Fathers, whether you understand it of *Satan* himself, or of the whole Kingdome of those rebellious Spirits. And it is no more absurd, that for a time the bad went amongst the good in the *Ethereal Region*, then it is now that there are good Spirits amongst the bad in this lower Air. But after that villany *Satan* committed upon *Adam*, he was commanded \* down lower, and the fear of the *Lord of Hosts* so changed his *Vehicle* and flaked his fire, that he sunk towards the Earth, and at last was fain to lick the dust of the ground. See Mr. Mede in his Discourse upon 2 Pet. 2. 4.

*Vers. 15. Messias should take a Body.* That the Soul of the *Messias*, and all Souls else, did preexist, is the opinion of the *Jewes*; and that admitted, there is no difficulty in the *Cabbala*. *Plato*, whether from this passage alone, or whether it was that he was instructed out of <sup>a</sup> other places also of the holy Writ, (if what <sup>b</sup> *Ficinus* writes is true) seems to have had some knowledge and presage of the coming of *Christ*; in that being asked how long men should attend to his writings, he answered, till some more holy and divine Person appear in the world, whom all should follow.

*Notoriously here upon Earth.* As it came to passe in his casting out Devils, and silencing Oracles, or making them cry out

Ὅμοι ἢ τελεπόδων

*Christ* bruises the head of *Satan* by destroying his kingdome and sovereignty, and by being so highly exalted above all Powers whatsoever. And it is a very great and precious mystery, That dear *Compassion* of our fellow-creatures, and faithful and fast *Obedience* to the Will of God, (which were so eminently and transcendently in *Christ*) should be lifted above all *Power* and *Knowledge* whatsoever in those higher Orders of Angels. For none of them that were as they should be would take offence at it, but be glad of it. But those that were proud; or valued *Power* and *Knowledge* before *Goodnesse* and *Obedience*, it was but a just affront to them, and a fit rebuke of their *Pride*.

But now how does *Satan* bruise the heel of *Christ*? Thus; He falls upon the rear, the lowest part of those that profess Christianity, Hypocrites and ignorant Souls, such as he often makes *Witches* of; but the Church Triumphant is secure, and the sincere part of the Church Militant. So Mr. Mede upon the place.

*Vers. 16. The Concomitance of Pain and Sorrow.* And it is the common complaint of all Mortals, that they that speed the best have the experience of a vicissitude of *Sorrow* as well as *Foy*. And the very frame of our Bodies, as well as the accidents of Fortune, are such, that to indulge to Pleasure is but to lay the seed of Sorrow or Sadnesse by *Diseases*, *Satiety*, or *Melancholy*: Besides many spinosities and cutting passages that often happen unawares in the conversation of those from whom we expect the greatest solace and content. To say nothing of the assaults

\* *Damones* ἐκ τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἦσαν ἀτακτοὶ ὡς εἶπε ὁ θεὸς διὰ τὴν ἑρесь των Συρων, quorum princeps dictus sit Ophioneus, i. e. Serpentinus. See Corin. 2. 14.

<sup>a</sup> See Clem. Alex. Ὁ Πλάτων μονονυχὶς ὡς ἐφίσεύων τὴν σωτηρίαν οἰκονομίαν ἐν τοῖς βίβ. καὶ ἱστορίαις. Ὁ δὲ φησὶν. Οὕτω δὲ διακείμενος ὁ δίκαιος μαρτυροῦντας, σεβαστέας, δεδούσας, καὶ πάντας καὶ πατρὶν ἀνασκυδύλιδας.

*Stromat. lib. 6.* as if *Plato* had had some intimations of the sufferings of the *Messias*, out of *Esay 53.*

<sup>b</sup> *Marfil. Ficinus de vita Platon.*



of a mans own Minde, and pricking of Conscience, which ordinarily disturb those that follow after the pleasures of the Body. *Lucretius*, though an *Atheist*, will fully witnesse to the truth of all this in his fourth book *De rerum Natura*, where you may read upon this Subject at large.

*Vers. 18. Thorns and Thistles.* *Moses* instances in one kinde of life, *Husbandry*, but there is the same reason in all.

—————*Nil sine magno*  
*Vita labore dedit mortalibus*—————  
*Life nothing gratis unto men doth give ;*  
*But with great labour and sad toil we live.*

\* In Phryxo  
Traged.

*Vers. 20. Euripides* the friend of *Socrates*, and a favourer of the *Pythagorean* Philosophy, writes somewhere in his \* Tragedies, as I have already told you, to this sense ; *Who knows, says he, whether to live, be to die ; and whether, again, to die, be not to live ?* Which question is very agreeable to this present *Cabbala* : for *Adam* is here as it were dying to that better world and condition of life he was in ; and like as one here upon Earth on his death-bed, prophesies many times, and professes what he presages concerning his own state to come, that he shall be with God, that he shall be in Heaven amongst the holy Angels and the Saints departed, and the like : so *Adam* here utters his Apologetical Prophecie, that this change of his and departure from this present state, though it may prove ill enough for himself, yet it has its use and convenience, and that it is better for the *Universe* ; for he shall live upon Earth, and be a ruler there amongst the *Terrestrial* creatures, and help to order and govern that part of the world.

*The Life of his Vehicle, EVE.* For *EVE* signifies *Life*, that life which the Soul derives to what *Vehicle* or *Body* soever she actuates and possesses.

\* Corniel. à  
Lapide in Gen.  
c. 3.

*Vers. 21. Skin of Beasts.* This *Origen* understands of *Adam's* being incorporated and clothed with humane flesh and skin. \* *Ridiculum enim est dicere*, saith he, *quod Deus fuerit Adami coriarius & pellium sutor.* And no man will much wonder at the confidence of this Pious and Learned Father, if he do but consider, that the *Præ-existency* of Souls before they come into the Body is generally held by all the Learned of the *Jews*, and so in all likelihood was a part of this *Philosophick Cabbala*. And how fitly things fall in together, and agree with the very Text of *Moses*, let any man judge. *Origen* prefers the significancy of this passage before the *Platonick* *μεροπύσις* his words are remarkable and worth the citing. Καὶ ὁ ἐκβαλλόμενος ὃ ἐκ τοῦ Παραδείσου ἀνδρωπῶν καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα, τὰς δερματίνους ἡμφιεσμένους χιτῶνας (ὥς διὰ τὴν παράβασιν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἐποίησε τοῖς ἀμαρτήσασιν ὁ Θεός) ἀπορρήτιον παρὰ τὴν μυστικὴν ἐχὼ λόγον, ὑπὲρ τῆς καὶ Πλάτωνα, καὶ Ψυχῆς μεροπύσεως καὶ δεῦρον φερομένης, ἕως ἀνσερεῖ πνέουσαν λαβήσας. i. e. *Man his being cast out of Paradise together with his wife, and clothed with coats of skin, (which by reason of the transgression of men God has made for those that have sinned) has a certain hidden and mystical meaning above that Platonical one, of the Soul's casting her wings, and falling headlong hither, till she lay hold of some body of a more grosse*

*gross consistency.* See *Origen. Cont. Cels. lib. 4.* This is answerable to that in *Cornelius*, which I think he has out of *Epiphanius*.

*Vers. 22. But play and sport.* This I conceive a far better *Decorum*, then to make God *Sarcastically* to jeer at *Adam*, and triumph over him in so great and universal a mischief, as some make it, and destitute of any concomitant convenience; especially there being a principle in *Adam* that was so easily deceivable, which surely has something of the nature of an excuse in it. But to jeer at a man that through his own weakness and the over-reaching subtilty of his adversary has fallen into some dreadful and Tragical evil and misery, is a thing so far from becoming God, that it utterly misbeseems any good man.

*Vers. 24. He made sure he should not be immortal.* For it is our advantage, as *Rupertus* upon the place hath observed out of *Plotinus*: *Miseriordia Dei fuisse, quod hominem fecerit mortalem, nè perpetuis cruciaretur hujus vite erumnis*; That it is the mercy of God that he made man mortal, that he might not always be tormented with the miseries and sorrows of this present life.

Passing through the condition of being re-invested with his fiery Vehicle. The following words explain the meaning of the *Cabbala*; it is according to the sense of that *Plato* amongst the Poets, (as *Severus* called him) *Virgil*, in the sixth Book of his *Aeneids*:

*Donc longa dies perfecto temporis orbe  
Concretam exemit labem, purumque reliquit  
Æthereum sensum, atque anræ simplicis ignem.*

To this sense,  
Till that long day at last be come about  
That wasted has all filth and foul desire,  
And leaves the Soul Æthereal throughout,  
Bathing her senses in pure liquid Fire.

Which we shall yet back very fittingly with the two last Golden Verses, as they are called, of the *Pythagoreans*, who adde *Immortality* to this *Æthereal* condition:

Ἦν δ' ἀπολείψας σῶμα ἐς αἰδέρ' ἐλδύτερον ἔλθης,  
Ἔοσεαι ἀθάνατον, θεὸς ἄμβροστον, ἐνέπι δυνήσῃς.

Rid of this body, if the Æther free  
You reach, henceforth Immortal you shall be.

The Greek has it, you shall be an *Immortal God*, which *Hierocles* interprets, *you shall imitate the Deity in this, in becoming Immortal.* And *Plutarch*, in his *Defect of Oracles*, drives on this *Apotheosis*, according to the order of the Elements, *Earth refined to Water, Water to Air, Air to Fire*: So man to become of a *Terrestrial Animal* one of the *Heroes*, of an *Heros* a *Demon* or good *Genius*, of a *Genius* a *God*, which he calls μέλαχρᾶν θεότητος, to partake of Divinity; which is no more then to become one of the ἄγγελοι, or *Immortal Angels*, who are *instar flammæ*, as the Hebrew Doctors declare in *Bereishith Rabbah*. They are according to their *Vehicles* a *versatile fire*, turning themselves *Proteus*-like into any shape. Which are the very words of *Maimonides* upon the place.

R. Maimonid.  
More Nevoch.  
part. 1. cap. 49.



In his *De confusione linguarum.*

Phil. lib. de Somniis.

Phil. lib. de Gigantibus.


And *Philo Judæus*, Ἐν τῇ κτ' ἡ ἀέρα ψυχῶν ἀσωμάτων ἱερῶτάων χορός· *For there is, saith he, in the Air a most holy company of unbodied Souls :* and presently he adjoyns, Ἀγγέλους γὰρ τὰς ψυχὰς ταύτας εἶωθε καλεῖν ὁ θεοπρωδὸς λόγος, *and these Souls the Holy Writ uses to call Angels.* And in another place he speaking of the more pure Souls, calls them, Ὑπάρχουσιν τῷ πανηγυμένῳ, ὥσπερ μεγάλῃ βασιλείῃς ὁφθαλμοὺς καὶ ὦτα, ἀφορώσας πάντῃ καὶ ἀκρόσας, i. e. *The Officers of the Generalissimo of the World, that are as the Eyes and Ears of the great King, seeing and hearing all things :* and then he addes, ταύτας δαίμονας μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι φιλόσοφοι, ὁ δὲ ἱερός λόγος ἀγγέλους εἶωθε καλεῖν· *These, other Philosophers call the Genii, but the Scripture Angels.* And in another place he says, that Ψυχὴ, Δαίμων, Ἀγγελος, that a *Soul, Genius, and Angel, are three words that signifie but one and the same thing.* As *Xenocrates* also made Ψυχὴ and Δαίμων all one, adding that he was εὐδαίμων, *happy*, that had συνεσταίαν ψυχῇ, a *vertuous Soul.* Wherefore not to weary my Reader nor my self with overmuch Philology, we conclude, that the meaning of *Moses* in this last verse is this, That *Adam* is here condemned to a mortal, flitting and impermanent state, till he reach his *Aethereal* or pure fiery *Vehicle*, and become, as our Saviour *Christ* speaks, ἱσάνγελος, *as one of the Angels.* This, I say, is the condition of mankind, according to the *Philosophick Cabbala* of *Moses*.

A N

A N  
APPENDIX to the DEFENCE  
O F  
The Philosophick Cabbala.

C H A P. I.

1. *The strength of the Philosophick Cabbala argued from the nature of the Truths therein contain'd.* 2. *The dignity of Pythagoras.* 3. *That he was acquainted with the Mosaick Philosophy.* 4. *Pythagoras his Miracles.* 5. *Of Plato, that he was acquainted with the Jewish Learning; and what miraculous of him.* 6. *Of Plotinus, his retorting of Olympius his Magical practice against him upon himself; his great esteem of Origen.* 7. *The folly of men in their adhering to some private judgment more then to Fathers, Churches, Workers of Miracles, and to Reason it self.* 8. *The Cartesian Philosophy a restauration of the Physical part of the Mosaick, and of Des-Cartes his being inspired.*

1.  E T us now take a general view of this whole Cabbala, and more summarily consider the strength thereof: which we may refer to these three heads, viz. *The nature of the Truths contained in it; The dignity of those Persons that have owned them in foregoing Ages; and lastly, The invalidity of the most considerable Objections that can be made against it.*

As for the *Truths themselves*, First, They are such as may well become so holy and worthy a person as *Moses*, if he would Philosophize; they being very precious and choice Truths, and very highly removed above the conceit of the vulgar, and so the more likely to have been delivered to him, or to *Adam* first; by God for a special myserie.

Secondly, They are such, that the more they are examined, the more irrefutable they will be found; no *Hypothesis* that was ever yet propounded to men, so exquisitely well agreeing with the *Phænomena* of Nature, the *Attributes* of God, the *Passages* of Providence, and the *rational Faculties* of our own Minds.

Thirdly, There is a continued futableness and applicability to the Text of *Moses* all along, without any force or violence done to Grammar or Criticisme.



Fourthly and lastly, There is a great usefulness, if not necessity, at least of some of them, they being such substantial Props of Religion, and so great encouragements to a sedulous purification of our Mindes, and study of true Piety.

2. Now for the *dignity of the Persons*, such as were *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, and *Plotinus*, it will be argued from the constant fame of that high degree of Vertue and Righteousness, and devout Love of the Deity that is every where acknowledged in them, besides whatsoever *miraculous* has happened to them, or been performed by them.

See Iamblich.  
de vita Pythag.  
cap. 1.

And as for *Pythagoras*, if you consult his Life in *Iamblichus*, he was held in so great admiration by those in his time, that he was thought by some to be the son of *Apollo*, whom he begot of *Parthenis* his known mother: and of this opinion was *Epimenides*, *Eudoxus*, and *Xenocrates*. Which conceit *Iamblichus* does soberly and earnestly reject; but afterwards acknowledges, that his looks and speeches did so wonderfully carry away the minds of all that conversed with him, that they could not withhold from affirming that he was *θεῶ παῖς*, *the off-spring of God*. Which is not to be taken in our strict Theological sense, but according to the mode of the ancient *Greeks*, who looked upon men heroically and eminently good and vertuous, to be *divine Souls* and of a celestial extract. And *Aristotle* takes notice particularly of the *Lacedemonians*, that they termed such as were *σφόδρα ἀγαθοί*, *very good*, *σεύς ἀνδρας*, i. e. *δεύς ἀνδρας*, *divine men*. According to which sense he interprets that verse in *Homer* concerning *Hector*,

Ethic. Nicomach. lib. 7.  
cap. 3.

— ἔδ' ἐξ ἑωκτῆ  
'Ανδρός γε θνητῷ παῖς ἔμμεναι, ἄλλα δεῖο.

But to return to him of whom we were speaking before. This eminency of his acknowledged amongst the Heathen, will seem more credible, if we but consider the advantage of his conversation with the wisest men then upon Earth; to wit, the *Jewish Priests* and *Prophets*, who had their knowledge from God, as *Pythagoras* had from them. From whence I conceive that of *Iamblichus* to be true which he writes concerning *Pythagoras* his Philosophy; That it is *φιλοσοφία ἐν θεῶν ᾠχῇ δοθεῖσα τὸ καὶ ἀρχαῖς*, *a Philosophy that at first was delivered by God or his holy Angels*.

3. But that *Pythagoras* was acquainted with the *Mosaical* or *Jewish* Philosophy, there is ample Testimony of it in Writers; as of *Aristobulus* an *Egyptian Jew* in *Clemens Alexandrinus*, and *Iosephus* against *Appion*. *S. Ambrose* adds, that he was a *Jew* himself. *Clemens* calls him *ἡ εβραίων φιλόσοφος*, *the Hebrew Philosopher*. I might cast hither the suffrages of *Iustin Martyr*, *Iohannes Philoponus*, *Theodoret*, *Hermippus* in *Origen* against *Celsus*, *Porphyrius*, and *Clemens* again, who writes, that it was a common fame that *Pythagoras* was a disciple of the Prophet *Ezekiel*. And though he gives no belief to the report, yet that Learned Antiquary Mr. *Selden* seems inclinable enough to think it true, in his first Book *De Jure Naturali juxta Hebraeos*; where you may peruse more fully the citations of the forenamed Authors. Besides all these, *Iamblichus* also affirms that he lived at *Sidon*, his native Countrey, where he fell

De vita Pythag.  
cap. 3.

fell acquainted with the Prophets, and Successors of one *Mochus* the *Physiologer* or *Natural Philosopher*. Σωβέβαλε τοῖς Μώχῃ τῷ φυσιολόγῃ περὶ φήταις ἀπογόνοις. Which, as Mr. *Selden* judiciously conjectures, is to be read, τοῖς Μωσῆϊ τῷ φυσιολόγῃ περὶ φήταις ἀπογόνοις, *with the Prophets that succeeded Moses the Philosopher*. See also *Minucius Felix* in his *Octavius*.

Wherefore it is very plain that *Pythagoras* had his *Philosophy* from *Moses*. And that *Philosophy* which to this very day is acknowledged to be his, we seeing that it is so fitly applicable to the Text all the way, what greater argument can there be desired to prove that it is the true *Philosophick Cabbala* thereof?

4. But there is yet another Argument to prove further the likelihood of his conversing with the Prophets, which will also further set out the *dignity of his person*; and that is the *Miracles* that are recorded of him. For it should seem *Pythagoras* was not only initiated into the *Mosaical Theory*, but had arrived also to the power of *working Miracles*, as *Moses* and the succeeding Prophets did; and very strange Facts are recorded both in *Porphyrius* and *Iamblichus*: As that *Pythagoras*, when he was going over a River with several of his companions (*Iamblichus* calls the River *Nessus*, *Porphyrius* *Caucasus*) that he speaking to the River, the River answered him again with an audible and clear voice, Χαῖρε, Πυθαγόρα, *Salve, Pythagora*: That he shewed his thigh to *Abaris* the Priest, and that he affirmed that it glistened like Gold, and thence pronounced that he was *Apollo*: That he was known to converse with his friends at *Metapontium* and *Tauromenium*, (the one a Town in *Italy*, the other in *Sicily*, and many days journey distant) in one and the same day. To these, and many others which I willingly omit, I shall only adde his predictions of Earthquakes; or rather (because that may seem more natural) his present flaking of Plagues in Cities, his silencing of violent Windes and Tempests, his calming the rage of Seas and Rivers, and the like. Which skill *Empedocles*, *Epimenides*, and *Abaris* having got from him, they grew so famous, that *Empedocles* was surnamed *Alexanemus*; *Epimenides*, *Cathartes*; and *Abaris*, *Æthrobates*; from the power they had in suppressing of storms and winds, in freeing of Cities from the plague, and in walking aloft in the Air. Which skill enabled *Pythagoras* to visit his friends after that manner at *Metapontium* and *Tauromenium* in one and the same day.

See *Iamblich. de vita Pythag. cap. 28.*

5. And now I have said thus much of *Pythagoras*, (and might say a great deal more) there will be lesse need to insist upon *Plato* and *Plotinus*, their *Philosophy* being the same that *Pythagoras's* was, and so alike applicable to *Moses* his Text. *Plato's* exemplarity of life and virtue, together with his high knowledge in the more sacred mysteries of God, and the state of the Soul of man in this world and that other, deservedly got to himself the title of *Divine*, ὁ θεῖος Πλάτων.

But as for *Miracles*, I know none he did; though something highly miraculous happened, if that same at *Athens* was true, that *Spensippus*, *Clearchus* and *Anaxilides* report to have been, concerning his birth; which is, that *Aristo* his reputed father, when he would forcibly have

*Diogen. Laert. in vita Platon.*



had to doe with *Periétione*, she being indeed exceeding fair and beautiful, fell short of his purpose, and surceasing from his attempt, that he saw *Apollo* in a Vision, and so abstained from meddling with his wife till she brought forth her son *Aristocles*, who after was called *Plato*. But that is far more credible which is reported concerning the commending of him to his Tutor *Socrates*, who the day before he came, dreamed that he had a young *Swan* in his lap, which putting forth feathers apace, of a sudden flew up into the Air, and sung very sweetly. Wherefore the next day when *Plato* was brought to him by his father, *πατρὶς, εἰπεῖν, εἰ ὄρνις*, he presently said, *this is the bird*, and so willingly received him for his Pupil.

See Clem. Alex-  
andrin. Strom-  
mat. lib. 1.

Orig. contra  
Cels. lib. 6.

But for his acquaintance with the *Mosaical* Learning, as it is more credible in it self, so I have also better proof; as *Aristobulus* the Jew in *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *S. Ambrose*, *Hermippus* in *Josephus* against *Appion*, and lastly, *Numenius* the *Platonist*, who ingenuously confesses, *Τὶ γὰρ ἐστὶ Πλάτων ἢ Μωϋσῆς Ἀττικίζων*; what is *Plato* but *Moses* in *Greek*? as I have elsewhere alledged. See also *Origen* against *Celsus*.

6. As for *Plotinus*, that which *Porphyrus* records of him falls little short of a *Miracle*, as being able by the Majesty of his own Minde, as his enemy *Olympius* confessed, to retort that Magick upon him which he practised against *Plotinus*; and that sedately sitting amongst his friends, he would tell them, *Now Olympius his body is gathered like a purse, and his limmes beat one against another*. And though he was not instructed by the Jewish Priests and Prophets, yet he was a familiar friend of that hearty and devout Christian and Learned Father of the Church, *Origen*; whose authority I would also cast in, together with the whole consent of the *Learned* amongst the *Jewes*. For there is nothing strange in the *Metaphysical* part of this *Cabbala*, but what they have constantly affirmed to be true.

7. But the unmannerly Superstition of many is such, that they will give more to an accustomed Opinion, which they have either taken up of themselves, or has been conveyed unto them by the confidence of some private *Theologer*, then to the Authority of either *Fathers*, *Churches*, *Workers of Miracles*, or, what is best of all, the *most solid Reasons* that can be propounded; which if they were capable of, they could not take any offence at my admittance of the *Cartesian* Philosophy into this present *Cabbala*. The Principles and the more notorious Conclusions thereof offering themselves so freely and unaffectedly, and so aptly and fittingly taking their place in the Text, that I knew not how with Judgment and Conscience to keep them out.

8. For I cannot but surmise, That he has happily and unexpectedly light upon that which will prove a true Restauration of that part of the *Mosaical* Philosophy which is ordinarily called *Natural*, and in which *Pythagoras* may be justly deemed to have had no small insight. Which in all probability he attained unto by his converse with the successors of that *Sidonian Mochus* above mentioned: which *Casaubon* conceives rather to be *Μόχ* (for how easily *σ* is lost out of *χ* any one may see) and suspects it to be a *Tyrian* Name, and that in his own tongue he was called

משה *Mosche*, which is ordinarily *Moses*: which falls in again with Mr. *Selden's* opinion, and is a further confirmation of his conjecture. And what a kinde of natural Philosophy this *Moschus* imparted to his followers, \* *Vossius* has expressly noted out of *Strabo*, who makes mention of one *Moschus* a *Sidonian*, who lived in the Ages before the *Trojan Warre*, and was the first Authour of the *Atomick* Philosophy, or of that Philosophy that gives an account of the *Phænomena* from the figure and motion of Particles. Whence there must be no small affinity betwixt this ancient *Moschical* or rather *Mosaical* Physiologie and the *Cartesian* Philosophy; which has so often and so naturally born a part in this Philosophick *Cabbala*.

\* In his *De Historicis Græcis*, lib. 3. *Strab. lib. 16.*

And that the *Natural* Philosophy of *Pythagoras* was *Atomical*, is further to be evinced from what we finde in *Diogenes Laertius* concerning *Democritus*. For what a noise his Atoms have made in the World cannot be unknown to any. But as *Diogenes* writes out of *Thrasylus*, *Democritus* was so great an Admirer and Imitatour of *Pythagoras*, and seems so to have taken all that he has from him, that a man would think he had been his Scholar or Auditour, but that Chronologie will not admit thereof. But though he was not a Disciple of *Pythagoras* himself, yer, as *Glaucus Rheginus* writes, he was a Hearer of one of the *Pythagoreans*; and *Apollodorus Cyzicenus* reports that he had a very intimate familiarity with *Philolaus*. In the Catalogue of his Books also which he wrote, one was stiled *Pythagoras*, and another *Tritogenia*, a mysticall terme amongst the *Pythagoreans*. And when *Plato* would have burnt *Democritus* his Writings, they were two *Pythagoreans*, *Amyclas* and *Clinias*, that dissuaded him from executing what he had designed, certainly out of an honest, though mistaken, zeal. Which things I think are a ground of an invincible suspition that the *Physical* part of *Pythagoras* his Philosophy is *Atomical*. And that he held the motion of the Earth is already famous. The rest let us consider out of the *Dogmata* of *Democritus*, and see how all together sute with those of *Cartesius*.

*Pythagoras* must also have held, if *Democritus* had all his Philosophy from his Writings or Traditions, That there are infinite Worlds, and that they are generable and corruptible, but that the Matter is unperishable. That there are infinite numbers of Atomes or Particles, different in magnitude and figure; φέρεσθαι δ' ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ διέμεναι, and that they are moved in the Universe after the manner of Vortices. For that is the proper signification of Δίνη, namely *Vortex*. Καὶ ἔτι πάντα συγκρίματα γεννᾶν πῦρ, ὕδωρ, ἀέρα, γῆν. And that by the rotation of these Vortices of Particles is generated Fire, πῦρ, (which is the peculiar expression of the Sun with the *Pythagoreans*, as I have noted in its due place) and then afterwards Earth, Water, Aire: As is said more expressly, τὸν τε ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην ἐκ τοιούτων διῶν καὶ ὤψεων ὄγκων συγκρίεσθαι, That the Coalition and Composition of the Sun and Moon was the result of these Δίνας or Ὀγκοὶ ὤψεες, these immense and vastly-rowling Vortices. And lastly, πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην γενέσθαι, ἢ διὸς αἰτίας ἔσσι τὴν ἀνάγκην πάντων, ἢ ἀνάγκην λέγει· that is to say, That all things are made not without a Mechanical Necessity, this Vorticall Motion being the cause of the generation



generation of all things. Which *Democritus* calles 'Ανάγκη. And it may be for this cause also the *Pythagoreans* called the *Decad*, that is, the World, 'Ανάγκη.

Which last Assertions of *Democritus*, as they are very easy and natural in such a sense as *Cartesius* has declared the nature of the *Vortices* and the consequences thereof; so are they very false, idle and insignificant according to any other meaning.

Wherefore the *Cartesian* Philosophy being in a manner the same with that of *Democritus*, and that of *Democritus* the same with the Physiologi- cal part of *Pythagoras* his Philosophy, and *Pythagoras* his Philosophy the same with the *Sidonian*, as also the *Sidonian* with the *Mosaical*; it will necessarily follow that the *Mosaical* Philosophy in the Physiological part thereof is the same with the *Cartesian*. And how fitly the *Cartesian* Philosophy sutes with *Moses* his text I have again and again taken notice.

9. And that *Des-Cartes* may bear up in some likely Equipage with the forenamed noble and divine Spirits; though the unskillfulnesse in men commonly acknowledge more of Supernatural assistance in hot unsettled Fancies and perplexed Melancholy then in the calm and distinct use of Reason; yet for mine own part, (but not without submission to better Judgements) I should look upon *Des-Cartes* as a man more truly inspired in the knowledge of Nature then any that have professed themselves so this sixteen hundred years; and being even ravished with admiration of his transcendent *Mechanical* inventions, for the salving the *Phænomena* in the world, I should not stick to compare him with *Bezabiel* and *Aholiab*, those skilful and cunning workers of the Tabernacle, who, as *Moses* testifies, were filled with the Spirit of God, and they were of an excellent understanding to find out all manner of curious works.

Exod. 35. 32.

Nor is it any more argument that *Des-Cartes* was not inspired, because he did not say he was, then that others are inspired, because they say they are; which to me is no argument at all. But the suppression of what so happened would argue much more sobriety and modesty; whenas the profession of it with sober men would be suspected of some spice of melancholy and distraction, especially in Natural Philosophy, where the grand pleasure is the evidence and exercise of Reason, not a bare belief, or, as in other cases, an ineffable sense of life, in respect whereof there is no true Christian but he is inspired.

## C H A P. II.

1. An Enumeration of Objections against the Philosophick Cabbala.
2. The Objection from the Inadequatenesse of the Pythagorick Numbers to the Six days Creation, answered.
3. That Tetractys in the Pythagorick Oath is neither the four Elements, nor Mens, Anima, Opinio, Corpus, nor yet the Tetragrammaton.
4. That the exquisite fitnessse of the Pythagorick Numbers to the Days of the Creation argue his Philosophy the same with the Mosaical.
5. That the Mystical use of Numbers

bers through the whole Denary is Judaical as well as Pythagorical.  
 6. And that neither the Jews nor Pythagoreans confine themselves to Ten: Whence this Objection from Inadequatenesse is found very invalid.

I. **A**ND thus we have briefly considered the nature of the *Truths* comprised in the *Philosophick Cabbala*, as also the quality of those *Persons* that have owned them in foregoing Ages. Now for the *Objections*: These seven certainly are the most considerable, if not the only, Allegations that can be made against it: namely,

First, That as well the *Pythagorick* Numbers as Names are inadequate to the Six daies Creation.

Secondly, That the *Pythagorick* Philosophy does not answer justly to the *Judaick Cabbala* in the chief strokes thereof, the *Jewish* Writers making no mention of the *Motion of the Earth*.

Thirdly, That the Interpretation of the First day's Creation is Heterogeneous to all the rest, it alone being Symbolical. Where three additional Queries are also proposed concerning the *Metaphysical Hyle* created on the First Day.

Fourthly, That the Order of the *Cabbala* is preposterous in placing the *Earth* before the *Sun*.

Fifthly, That the works of the Fifth and Sixth Day are too vulgar and trivial to be the Matter of a *Philosophick Cabbala*.

Sixthly, That there is an unwarrantable *ύπερβολία* committed in our Interpretation of *Paradise*, we supposing it planted before *Adam* was made out of the Earth.

Seventhly and lastly, That our Interpretation of the *Cherubim and flaming Sword* is harsh, in that we make that a means of *Adam's* regaining *Paradise* that seems to keep him out.

2. But to these I shall fully answer in order. And first to the first part of the First, which would insinuate that, because the *Pythagoreans* continued their *Numeral* Mysteries through the whole *Denarius*, whenas yet notwithstanding the *Dayes* of the Creation are but *Six*, therefore the *Six* dayes Creation is not at all concerned in the Mystery of their *Numbers*: To this I answer, That their continuing their Mysteries of *Numbers* through the whole *Denarius* is no prejudice to our Cause. For whether we suppose the *Hieroglyphicks* of *Numbers* to have been in use before the *Cabbala* of *Moses*, and that the first Authour thereof took so many of them as were for his turn; (as he that writes a sentence, takes no more letters of the Alphabet then serves his purpose) or whether the first Authour of the *Cabbala* began these *Numeral Hieroglyphicks*, and thereupon the Mysteries of *Numbers* were afterward enlarged to smaller designs: neither *Hypothesis* makes any thing against our Interpretation. For will it follow, because *Moses* made *Hieroglyphical* Notes of *Six* Numbers only, to be the remembrances of the natures of such and such *Phenomena* of the World, that therefore they that partake of that *Cabbala* shall never make use of their Phansy to enlarge these *Numeral* Mysteries and Resemblances to other matters; no not when in process of time they had lost the first end and scope of these  
*Hierogly-*



*Hieroglyphicks*, and through ignorance and oblivion knew not what was the primitive occasion of them?

Wherefore that these *Numeral* Mysteries were stretch'd further than the *Six* dayes Creation, can be no argument against the *Philosophick Cabala*: especially if you consider that these *Six* Numbers are so exquisitely significative of every day's work, and that there can be no tolerable sense of the *Pythagorick Tetraëty*s but by supposing it the *Hieroglyphick* of the *Fourth* Day's Creation, which is intended a compendious comprehension of, or engagement into, the whole *Philosophick Cabbala*. Whose Conclusions are so exceeding weighty and venerable, that they may seem worthy of that Religion of an *Oath* above mentioned; where, (as \* *Meursius* plainly proves) *Pythagoras* is sworn by, or at least he that first imparted the Tradition of the *Tetraëty*s.

\* Denar. Pythagoric. cap. 6.

3. Which if it were but the knowledge of the number of the *Four* Elements, *Fire, Water, Earth, and Aire*; or of the similitude that *Mens, Anima, Opinio, Corpus*, bear to the *Four* first numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4. (which yet is inept or dilute enough in all but the last, if we would severely examine things; and if it were exact, were but a trifle: as also the things themselves ranged together to make up the *Tetraëty*s are but forcedly produced, as not being all of one nature, but some Substances, other Accidents) I say, these pretended Mysteries are of so petty consideration, that it is impossible that they should have conciliated so great veneration to the first Imparter of them, as that the *Mystæ* should religiously swear by him in their serious Converse.

Nor yet can it be the swearing by the *Tetragrammaton* or the name of *Jehovah*. For *Tetraëty*s, as well as *Tetras* (which is promiscuously put for it, and likely had been the onely Appellation but for the verse sake) does not signifie a *Name of four letters*, but simply the Number *Four*. And that it is a *Number*, not a *Name*, all the rest of the Numbers of the *Pythagorick* Denary will bear witness, as also the constant Interpretation of Writers, as you may see in *Meursius*. \* Besides that, Οὐ μὰ τὴν τετρακτύον is false Greek, and Οὐ μὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν ὡς δ' οὖσαν τέτρακτύον false verse. So little reason is there to dream of any other Interpretation than what we have given, namely, that it is the swearing by him that imparted by way of *Tradition* (for so ὡς δ' οὖσα implies) so excellent a piece of Knowledge as is comprised in the interpretation of the *Fourth* day's Creation, of which the *Tetraëty*s was the Symbol, and necessary Remembrancer; it not being applicable to that Day in the most notorious property thereof, but as that day is conceiv'd to comprehend the Creation of all as to the more general strokes of the Universe, whereby is necessarily imply'd that the *Planets* must be so many *Earths*, with the rest of those noble Conclusions of Philosophy that depend thereon. Which was the sense of *Pythagoras* his School, as plainly appears out of \* *Aristotle* in his *De Cælo*; where he sayes, the *Pythagoreans* assert that the *Fire*, that is the *Sun*, is in the midst of the World, τὸ δ' ὅ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἐστὶν, and that the *Earth* is one of the *Starres*: he means *Planets*. And that they made the *Planets* also *Earths*, appears from what he addes, Ἐπὶ δ' ἐναντίαν ἀλλήν πάλυτῃ καὶ ἀσθενάζουσι γῆν, ἢ ἀντίχθονα ὄνομα καλοῦσιν, Moreover

\* See Selden de Diis Syris Syntagm. 2. cap. 1.

\* De Cæl. lib. 2. cap. 13.

Moreover they make another Earth, which they call Antichthon, opposite to this of ours. Which questionlesse was nothing else but our overthwart neighbour-Planet or Earth, the Moon. For so she is called by the Ancients, \* *Terra Aetherea*, as in \* *Plutarch* γῆ ἀλυμπία, and this hither part of her Ἀλίκηδων and Περσεφόνη, as the other Ἠλύσιον πεδίον\* tract of time having sophisticated this most solid Philosophy with superstitious conceits. But this is enough to discover *Pythagoras* his opinion concerning the Planets, that he looked upon them as so many Earths.

\* *Macrob. in Somn. Scip. lib. 1. c. 11.*  
\* *Plutarch. De facie in Orbe Lunæ.*

The *Tetractys* therefore is put for the *Cabbala* of this *Fourth Day's* work, which being fully and methodically explained, and the *Mystæ* finding their natures so perfected and their mindes so illuminated thereby, might well extort from them such a veneration as would religiously induce them to swear by the first Authour thereof. As it is said that *Pythagoras* himself did use the forme: and I could charitably believe of all the Primitive *Pythagoreans* that they swore in the same sense that *Pythagoras* did, namely, by the First Communicatour of so high and stupendious a piece of Wisdome; which (as I have noted out of *Iamblichus*) is said to be Θεοπαράδοτον, delivered first from God himself: Which will make this Swearing of theirs irreprehensible and blamelesse.

See *Johan. Meurs. Denar. Pythagoric. cap. 6.*

4. There being therefore this exquisite fitness and appositenesse in the application of these *Pythagorick* Numbers, (though we make not use of them all) to the Six days work of the Creation, it is a Demonstration that *Pythagoras* his Philosophy was the same in a manner with the ancient *Cabbala* of the *Jewes* touching the frame of the World.

5. Besides, there are not so few Numbers of the *Pythagorick* Denary employed in the present Mystery as is pretended. For the number *Seven* I have demonstrated to be very significant of the *Seventh Day's* Rest: And the Number *Ten* emerges out of the *Tetractys*, as has been above noted. So that *Eight* Numbers of the *Denary* are plainly demonstrated to belong naturally to the *Judaick Cabbala*. And that the ancient wisdome of the *Jewes* made a mysterious use of the number *Eight* in their Religion, to me seems very plain, in that *Circumcision* was appointed on the *eighth* day. Which number being the first Cube, is a fit *Hieroglyphick* of the Stability of that Covenant made with the *Jews* in *Circumcision*; and the *Pythagoreans* call the *Octonary* ὀσπάλδα, which signifies that *Security* which is by *Covenant*. And but that I might seem over-solicitous in a matter not so considerable, I think it would not be hard to produce places of Holy Writ whence the number \* *Nine* may be justly thought not to be devoid of a *Mysticall* meaning. So little pretense is there to pronounce that the Symbolical use of the first *Ten* Numbers is onely *Pythagorical*, and does not concern the *Judaick Cabbala*.

\* See also *Philo Jud. Περὶ τῆς εἰς τὸ ὡσεύαυτε μάλιστα σωδὲν.*

6. To all which you may adde; That neither the *Pythagoreans* themselves, nor the holy Pen-men, confine the *Mystical* use of *Numbers* to the first *Ten*, but expatiate both of them into other more compound Numbers. From whence is further evidence how causeless and invalid that *Allegation* is against the truth of the *Philosophick Cabbala*, concluded from that admirable fitness and congruity of the *Numbers* that are the Symbols of each *Day's* Creation; namely, That there are more *mystical*



*Numbers then those that are applied thereunto:* As if, whenas there are severall Mystickall Numbers that far exceed the number of Seven dayes, they should all be applied to these Seven; or that, because they are unapplicable, therefore those that are so manifestly applicable were not rightly applied.

And thus I hope I have fully satisfied the first part of this first Objection concerning the *Numbers* themselves. Which, I think, if duly considered, are alone (by reason of their fittest, and the significancy of their natures and properties) sufficient to assure us of that part of the *Philosophick Cabbala* which is comprised in the first chapter of *Genesis*: And in which there is also a Prelibation of those illustrious Truths which are more fully and circumstantially delivered in the second and third. Which shews that the whole Philosophy of *Pythagoras* is of one piece, and from one fountain, the ancient *Cabbala* of *Moses*.

## CHAP. III.

1. *The Invalidity of the Objection from the Inadequateness of the Pythagorick Names of Numbers, the reason of the accumulation of them being so easily discoverable.*
2. *That the genuine Pythagorick Names are discernible from the spurious, as the sincere Doctrines of Christianity are from after-Corruptions.*
3. *Ten more Names added that are significative of the nature of Mundus vitæ in the First Day's Creation.*
4. *Ten others significative of the Metaphysical Hyle created on that day.*
5. *Ἀμύξια and Σηφρα παρδῆς* &c. how accurately significative of what is in this First Day's Creation.
6. *A plain account of those Pythagorick Names of an Unite that make nothing to the First Day's work.*
7. *Six more names of the Binary significative of the Second Day's work, with an account of such as are impertinent thereto.*
8. *An account of the impertinent Names of the Ternary.*
9. *Of Θέτις, Ἀργυρόμετρα and Κεχλαίτις. The fit significancy of Λοξίας in reference to the Third Day's work.*
10. *The Notations of ארץ, שמש and כוכב, how Philosophical they are, and how significative of the grand Physical Truths of the Pythagorick or Judaick Cabbala.*

1. **N**OW as for Answer to the second part of this First Objection, concerning the *Names of the Numbers* I make use of, viz. That though those I have produced be fit enough for my purpose, yet those I have concealed may be either impertinent and insignificant, or indeed inconsistent with those I have produced; for mine own part, I am not at all affraid to be called to so strict an account, and do not doubt but that I shall be gainer upon the whole Compute. For I foresee that the issue will be this, That I shall have occasion to bring a greater number of Names to confirm the truth I aime at then I have yet made use of; and find my self not unprepared to give a reason of their forging of those that make nothing to our *Cabbala*. For what I said of the finding of  
 Mysteries

Mysteries in new Numbers upon the occasion of having those that appertain to the *Creation* communicated unto them, the same I here repeat concerning the giving of new Names to those First Numbers; by phantasing they will set out this or that in either *Morality*, *Nature*, or *Metaphysics*.

Which Impertinencies certainly would grow the fastest, as I said before; when the first scope and use of these Names were hid in Oblivion. For then having no *Cynosura* to guide them, they would be blown upon every small and trivial Resemblance that this or that Number might have with this or that Object, according as the aire of their lightly-working Phansy carried them, and their desire of making the sapless Mysteries of Numbers to arise to some bulk of superstitious Knowledge. Τῷ γὰρ ἀπαξ ὑπὲρ τὸ μέτρον ὄργῃ ἐδέεισεν. For they having once lost the measure of their trading thus in the names of Numbers, their Accumulations would be infinite.

2. But it has fared much-what in this matter as it has with the sober Truths of Christian Religion, to which though there have been added innumerable humane Inventions, yet amongst these there have been conserved the grand Truths of Christianity it self discoverable by the Testimony of Holy Writ: so though there have been many *Impertinent Names* of the first *Seven Numbers* invented by ignorant and superstitious *Pythagorists*, yet they have also retained the true and useful, which is likewise discoverable by the application of them to the Text of *Moses*; according either to the *Philosophick* sense or external phrase thereof: As is eminently plain in the *First Day's* work. Where truly I think I shall finde more Names pertinent to the work of that Day then impertinent, notwithstanding that their Ignorance has accumulated so many.

3. For whereas there are near Fifty Names of a *Monad* or *Unite*; above half of them are not insignificant of the nature of those things that are comprized in the *First Day's* work. For to the Names pertinent to what we call there *Mundus vita* (which comprehends all the *Immaterial Creation*) besides Ζωὴ, Εἶδῃ, Ζανὸς πύργῃ, Λόγῃ περιμειλίτης, which we have noted already, you may adde also Νῆς, Μορφῶ, Γονῇ, Οὐσία, Ἀἴλιον ἀληθείας, Ἀπλόω παρὰ δόγμα, Νῦν, Μνημοσύνη, Περμηνεύς, Ἀρρενόδηλος.

Νῆς, because all *Immaterial Beings* are νοητὰ, *Intelligible*, not *Sensible*. Μορφῶ, because they are such as give *Forme* to the *Matter*. Γονῇ, because all *Generation* is chiefly from this Principle, and *Matter* can gender nothing of it self, (they are the words of \* *Plotinus*: Μόνον γὰρ τὸ εἶδῃ γίνεσθαι, ἢ ὃ ἐπέτα φύσις ἄγονῃ. Which was the reason, says he, why the Ancients brought in *Mercury* τὸ τ' γενέσθαι ὄργανον. αἱ ἔχοντα πρὸς ἐργασίαν, τ' γεννώμενα ὃ ἐν αἰδήσει δηλούντες εἶναι τ' νοητὸν λόγον.) Οὐσία, because *Immaterial Beings* are the truest Substance, according as the *Platonists* do rightly contend: And so Ἀἴλιον ἀληθείας, for the same reason. Ἀπλόω παρὰ δόγμα. Παρὰ δόγμα, to the same purpose that εἶδῃ and μορφῶ. Ἀπλόω, because *Immaterial Beings* are devoid of Composition. Νῦν, because *Intellectual life* is at once, *vices temporum nesciens*, in uno semper quod adest consistens aeternus, \* as *Macrobius* speaks. Μνημοσύνη, if it be not

\* Plotin. Ennead. 3. lib. 6: c. 19.

\* In Soran. Scipion. lib. 1. cap. 6.



pedantickly popp't in as the name of the mother of the Muses, whose names are also scattered through the *Pythagorick Denary*, I should suspect the reason of that appellation to be, because the highest and deepest seat of *Memory* is in that in us which is *Immaterial*. Περμνηθεὺς, because the Soul invested with her igneous Spirits, *Prometheus*-like, enlivens this statue of clay the Body. And lastly, Ἀρρενόδηλος, because all the *Immaterial Orders* have radically in them that division of Faculties into *Masculine* and *Feminine*, as is expressed more at large concerning *Adam*.

4. And to that which is that fluid undeterminate Capacity of things, that dark *Abyss* which compendiously we may call the *Metaphysical Hyle*, or the *Possibility of Creatures in the Outward World*, besides what Names we have produced already, as Ὑλη, Ἀλαμπία, Σηλωδία, you may adde also Χάθη, Σύγχυσις, Σύγκρασις, Πρωτόν, Πανδοχός. All which denote the Confusion, Undeterminatenesse and promiscuous Capacity of this *Metaphysical Hyle*, or mere *Potentiality of the external Creature*. But then for that dark *Abyss* mentioned in that *First Day's Creation*, what is more significant thereof then these termes of Χάσμα, Τάρταρος, Σπύξ, Βέραθρον; which are so apposite to the Text that nothing can be more, and utterly unlikely to have been the Appellations of an *Unite*, unless in reference thereunto. Adde to Σπύξ also Λήθη, because when things are resolved into this *First Day's* state, they are overwhelmed with Oblivion; the Souls of Men and Angels being then in silence, and so thoroughly drenched in the Lake of *Lethe*, that they can never remember any more what is past.

5. There are yet two very significant Terms behind, Ἀμιξία and Σπφρά παρδένθη, which exactly set out the condition of the *First day's Creation*. For those *Immaterial Beings* thus considered, that is to say, as not united with Matter, what is more significative of their state then Σπφρά παρδένθη, arid and rigid Virginitie; or then Ἀμιξία, according to that phrase in *Hesiod*, φιλόπῃ μὴ μῆναι; And besides, the *Unmixedness* of the *Active* and *Passive Principle* proper to this Day is notoriously signify'd by the Name Ἀμιξία, as you may see in the \* *Cabbala* it self. So that to those seven apposite Names we contented our selves with before, we have gained at least twenty as apposite by this Examination.

6. But for those that make not for our turn, the account of them is very easy. For after the *Pythagoreans* had lost the knowledge of the true scope of giving Names to those Numbers, which was for remembrances of the nature of those things which are said to be created in those several Daies; they then excogitated Appellations without any aime, from any similitude whatsoever betwixt the Number and the things it might represent. As for example, Because there is but *one God*, therefore they called an *Unite* Θεός, Ζῶς, Ἐυαίβεα, and it may be Εὐδαιμονία. And then in *Natural things*, because there is but *one Sun*, therefore they called a *Monad* Ἡλιός, Πυράλιος, and Ἀπόλλων, and because Ἀπόλλων, therefore Λόγιος. And in *Morals*, because Love and Good-will consists in a kind of *Unity of affections*, they call an *Unite* Φίλος, Φιλία, Ἔρως, Ομόνοια.

\* *Philos. Cabbal.*  
chap. 1. v. 5.

Ὁμόνοια. And because there is Unity in *Artificial* Order, they call it Τάξις συμφωνίας, Ναῦς, Ἄρμα. And why they should call it Ἀτλας and Ἀξων, I cannot better imagine then because the Poles that are said to bear up the world, on which it hangs and turns, are two Points, that is, two fixt *Unites*. But why they call it Ἴσον, Μέσον, Μέτριον, is very plain. Ἴσον, because those things that are equal have *one* quantity: Μέσον and Μέτριον, because that which is exactly in the *middle*, or exquisitely *moderate*, is but *One*. But what an insipid and unsatisfactory Arguteness there is in such Conceptions as these, and how unworthy of so profound a Philosopher as *Pythagoras*, to whom the \* Senate of *Rome* erected a Statue as to the wisest man of all *Greece*, let any one judge.

\* 1 lin. *Histor.*  
*Natural. lib. 34.*  
cap. 6.

7. As for the Names of the *Binarie*, I have already reckoned up above a dozen that are very significant of the nature of the work of the *Second Day*. To those whereof that signifie most dismally you may adde further Τόλμα, Τλημοσύνη, Δύη, Διχομασία, Ἐπίς, Ἀγνοία. To Πέα also would be referred (saying that it seems but a rash and superstitious heaping up *Synonyma's* by the latter unskilful *Pythagorists*) Δινδυμήνη, Διομάπαρ, Φρυγία, Ἑσώ. By all which tearms is meant nothing else but *Cybele* or *Vesta*, but how \* *Unpythagorically*, any one may discern that has but taken notice that *Vesta* is the *Sun* in true *Pythagorisme*.

\* See Chap. 8:  
sect. 6.

The rest of the Appellations are such senseless fooleries, that it is tedious to recite them; but yet I will give you more then a taste of them; that you may see with what pitiful trifles the *Pseudo Pythagorists* entertained themselves when they had lost the true meaning of their *Cabbala*. For as before it was a fine thing with them to call the *Monad* by the name of Ἀπόλλων, or the *Sun*; so now for no better reason, I think, then that they did so, they will call the *Binary* Ἀπτεμύς, Ἴσις, Δημήτρα, Ἐλδουσία, Δικτύνα, Ἥρα, all which may signify no more then the *Moon*, which is the *Second* great light in Heaven. So because any Agreement or kinde Affection supposes two parties, they call the *Binary* Πηγή τῆς συμφωνίας, Ἐρατώ, Ἀρμονία, Ἀφροδίτη, Διώνη, Κυδέρεια, Κοινωνία, and Γάμ@. where Γάμ@, and as many words else as found that way, is very forcedly and unskilfully thrust in. Because the conjunction of the two *Unites* in the *Binary* is either the conjunction of two *Masculines*, as some would have the *Unite* to be, (and then certainly no *Pythagoreans*, unless the successours of that \* *Pythagoras* that *Nero* was married to, will call the *Binary* Γάμ@) or else it is the conjunction of two *Hermaphrodites*, which is as ridiculous. For \* *Macrobius* declares, according to the sense of the *Ancients*, that an *Unite* is *Viro-fæmina*. *Unum autem, quod μονάς, id est, Unitas, dicitur, & Mas idem & Fæmina est, par idem atque impar, ipse non numerus, sed fons & origo numerorum*. Of which \* *Aristotle* also affirms the like, Τὸ ὃ ἐν δὴ ὅξ ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι τέτων, καὶ γὰρ ἄρσιν εἶναι καὶ θηλείων καὶ δ' ἀριθμὸν ἐκ τῶ ἐνός. Which discovers their folly in calling the *Ternary* also Γάμ@. For it is the marriage of a Female with an *Hermaphrodite*, and of a number with what is not a number. *Fungentur jam gryphes equis*. So plain is it that the Appellation of Ἀφροδίτη and Γάμ@ are the peculiar Titles of the *Quinary* and *Senary*, as they have a

\* See *Tacit.*  
*Annal. lib. 15.*  
sect. 37.

\* In *Somn. Scipion. lib. 1.*  
cap. 6.

\* *Metaphys.*  
l. 1. c. 5.



special congruity also to the *Fifth* and *Sixth* day's work. But let us not be so strict, but admit an *Unite* to be rather *Masculine*; the *Binary* will be still excluded from the Title of Γάμῳ, and the *Ternary*'s Title admitted but with difficulty, as Male and Female amongst Plants, which more exquisitely fits the nature of the *Third* day's work.

Furthermore, Because the *Binary* is made by adding an *Unite* to an *Unite*, it is called Αὔξινσις, Σύνθεσις, Ἐπίθεσις. And because Dijudication implies a *Duality* in the Object, it is called Διάκρισις. And for that Opinion has a vergency *two* ways at once, it is styled Δόξα and Demonstration *two* main parts, the Premisses and Conclusion, it is term'd Ἐπισήμῃ. And lastly, because *two* is divided into *two* equal parts, it is named Δίωκη. Such petty speculations did the pretended *Pythagorists* fall into when they once had lost the sight of that Mark that the Mystery of Numbers aimed at in the *Binary*.

8. Let us dip also a little further into the *Ternary*, where we shall bring up the like slight stuff. The most tolerable are those names of *Moral* consideration, as Μῆτις, Εὐβελία, Φρόνησις, with which the *Ternary* is adorned; because he that would advise well, must cast his eye upon things *past*, *present*, and *to come*. Also Φιλία, Εἰρήνη, Ὁμόνοια, the *union* of parties being made by some *Third* thing or person. It is also called Εὐσέβεια, I suppose from the frequent use of the number *Three* in Religious Rites. The terms Τρίσταιμῳ and Τριῶν πλάτῳ are of *Mathematical* consideration, as are Τρίσταιμῳ and Πρώτων μῦκῳ in the *Binary*; but have no greater plot upon us in either place, then to advertise us that the *Binary* is representative of two *Mathematical* Points, and of the first and shortest Line; the *Ternary* of three Points, and of the first and simplest Figure, which is the *Triangle*. Notions certainly whereby the Mind of man is gayly edifi'd and deliciously fed: and yet what follows is more vile and trivial. For the *Ternary* is called Κερνία, because *Saturn* had *three* Sons, *Jupiter*, *Neptune*, and *Pluto*; and Ἀΐδας, because *Pluto* was the *third*: Λατώ and Ἐχέτω, because *Latona* was the Mother of *Hecata* who had three Titles, *Luna*, *Diana*, and *Proserpina*: Χαερία, because there are three Graces, *Aglaiā*, *Thalia*, *Euphrosyne*: Διοσκορία, from the three *Dioscuri*, *Trittopatreus*, *Ebuleus*, *Dionysius*: Φορμία and Γοργονία, because *Phorcus* was the Father of the *Gorgons* which were three, *Medusa*, *Sthenio*, *Euryale*. Of such pitiful trash was the *Ternary* made the Repository by the *Pseudo-Pythagorists*, who knew not the ancient *Cabbala*.

9. Who also finding Θυασωῆχῳ upon record in the Titles of the *Ternary*, put in Θέτις, and Ἀγυόπεζα, I believe it should be Ἀργυρόπεζα, which is an Epithet of *Thetis* in *Homer*; and *Ovid* takes notice of the beauty of *Thetis*'s feet in that Pentameter,

*Et Thetidis quales vix reor esse pedes.*

They added also Ναέτις and Κραῖταις, I think aiming at the same sense. Nor can they have any sense at all but in reference to the *Third* day's work, where there was made distinction of *Land* and *Sea*, and consequently of *Rivers*.

But though there has been so much trash hitherto, yet there is one Name

Name behind that will compensate our pains of raking in this dunghill : And that is *Δοξίας*, which, considering the weightiness of its signification, and its easie reference to the oblique Motion of the Earth, (upon which depends the garnishing thereof with Plants and Flowers) and that \* *Pythagoras* is said to have first observed the obliquity of this Motion, I can willingly admit to be an ancient & authentick Title of the *Ternary*.

\* Plutarch. de  
Placitis Philos.  
lib. 2. cap. 12.

10. And it will not be unseasonable to take notice that the very \* Notation of the word *ארץ* countenances our conjecture, it being derived, as the ancient *Hebrews* have observed, from *רץ* *currere*; certainly by reason of her constant course about the Sun, not because the Heavens run about her. Which we may be the better assured of, if we consider also the Notation of *שמש*, which is most likely to be from *ש* *isānai* or *σηλίζειν*, (as the *Seventy* often render it) and *ש* *πῦρ* \* as the *Pythagoreans* ordinarily call the Sun *ῥ* *πῦρ*, as you may see in \* *Aristotle*, *Ἐν π* *δ* *τῷ μέσῳ πῦρ εἶναι φασιν*, and \* *Plutarch*, *Κατὰ μέσον ῥ ἡσυχίῳ πῦρ ἰδρύσθαι νομίζουσιν, καὶ τῷ π* *ῥ* *ἑστίαν καλεῖσθαι*. So that his *ῥ ἰδρύσθαι πῦρ*, *First Fire*, does exactly answer to *שמש* that has the same signification, as all the *Suns* are acknowledged to be *Stelle Fixæ*.

\* See *Paulus*  
*Fagius* upon  
the Text.

\* De Cælo, l. 2:  
cap. 13.  
\* In vita  
Numæ.

And in that this *fixt Fire* is called by the *Pythagoreans* *ἑστία*, is a further discovery from whence they had their Notion, namely from the *Hebrews*, who call *Fire* *ש* *אש*, and the *Chaldees* *אש* *אש*, which is in a manner the very word *ἑστία* or *Vesta*. Nor was it needful to retain the whole word *שמש*, *ש* *אש* in *ἑστία* having by its transplantation into the Greek tongue got a strong affinity with *ἡσυχία*, the same with *ש* *חם* in *Hebrew*; so that it alone bears fully the same sense that *שמש*: and the best Words are but the *Remembrancers* of the nature of Things.

But none such Philosophical ones as these of *ארץ* and *שמש*, I may adde also *כוכב*, the easy and genuine Notations of them setting out the hidden natures of the things they belong to, with that exact *opposition* they have one to another: that of *ארץ* implying the *Earth's* Motion, that of *שמש* implying the *Sun's* fixedness, that of *כוכב* implying the Extinction of Light or Fire in all the *Planets*, that of *שמש* implying the innate Light and Heat in all the *Suns* or *fix'd Stars*. The wonderful Congruity of the Philosophical Notations of which three words (to say nothing of *שמים*) cannot but gain further belief both to the Notations themselves, and also to the truth of the Physical part of the *Cabbala*. Nor is *שמים* of less Philosophical consideration, though it were admitted to be from *שמה* *excelsum esse*, and not from *ש* *אש* and *מים*. For then its being of the duall number would insinuate the same thing as before, namely the two *Cartesian* Elements or parts that Heaven does consist of, according as is observed in other words that denote things consisting of two parts, as *אבנים*, *כירים*, *משפתיים* and the like: and also the two kinds of Heaven, the one created the first day, the other on the second: As *מים* likewise does denote two kinds of Water, that from the Clouds, and that in the Sea, Rivers and Wells; but in a more Philosophical sense, the Waters *visible* and *invisible*; and then the *Invisible*, *Stygian* or *Celestial*, meaning by *Celestial* that part of the *Mundus vita* that descends *εἰς γήινον*.



## CHAP. IV.

1. *Four Names more of the Tetrad that are Pertinent.* 2. *An account of those that are Impertinent.* 3. *That such Trifles either Numeral or Nominal could not win that reverence from Pythagoras, as to induce him to swear by the first Imparter of the Tetractys.* 4. *Γάμ* & a Name proper to the Quinary and Senary, and how the Binary and Ternary came by that Title. 5. *Two more Pertinent names of the Quinary, with an account of the Impertinent ones.* 6. *That if the nature of Numbers, and not of Things, had been intended by the Tetractys, the Pentad had rather merited the Religion of an Oath.* 7. *The Impertinent Names of the Senary.* 8. *Names thereof referable to Γάμ & and Κόσμ &.* 9. *Six other Names of the Senary most fitly interpretable from the Text of Moses.* 10. *Eight Names of the Septenary referring to the same Text.* 11. *Of the Impertinent Names of the Septenary, and why that Number is called Pallas, and why Apollo ἐβδομαγνή.*

1. **W**E come now to the *Quaternary*, of which, besides what we have noted already, there are four more Titles not altogether inept or insignificant, as *Ἐξαμ*, *Φύσις*, *Αἰόλα*, *Κλεῖς* & *φύσεως*.

*Ἐξαμ*, because the distinct and articulate fitting out the parts of the Universe was on the *Fourth Day*. *Φύσις*, as denoting the Universal comprehension of Nature. *Αἰόλα*, as intimating the variety of Objects in the Universe discoverable by the Lights of Heaven, which are the *Fourth Day's* work, and which are themselves a most eminent part of that variety: whence is *αἰόλα Νύξ* in *Sophocles*, by reason of her being so variegated with Stars. And lastly, the *Tetractys* is called *Κλεῖς* & *φύσεως*, because the expounding the *Fourth day's* work is indeed the *Key* of the choicest secrets of *Nature*; or rather an *Inlet* to the truest and most concerning knowledge of *Universal Nature*, as well *Metaphysical* as *Physical*. Whence the *Tetrad* is not only said to be *φυσικῶν ἀποπελεσμέτων πηγὴ*, but (if I mistake not *Photius* his meaning) *πολύθε* & also, or rather *πάνθε* &, being full of *Immaterial Beings* every where, *Demons*, or *Angels*, or call them what you will; but the Greeks called them ordinarily *θεοί*.

2. But as these Names that have been here and elsewhere produced are *pertinent* to the purpose, so there are those that be as *impertinent*. For I find the ignorance of Posterity to have abused the *Tetrad*, as religiously as it was admired by the knowing *Pythagoreans*, to be a Receptacle of superstitious and uselefs toys. As for example, Because *Mercury* was born on the fourth day of the moneth, it was called *Ἑρμῆς*, *Μαιάδης*, *Σῶκ* & as also because *Hercules* was then born, *Ἡρακλῆς*, *Ἀλκυωνάτι*, *Ἐπανδρ* &, *Ἀρρενυργός*, *Ἀθήλυπ* &. Because *Bacchus* was twice born, and the *Tetrad* generated of two (for two into two is *Four*,) therefore the *Tetrad* is called *Διόνυσ* &, *Βασιαρδύς*, *Διμήτωρ*, *Θηλύμορφ* &, and also *Διόσκορ* &, it may be in reference both to *Hercules* and *Bacchus*. And lastly,

lastly, because Fire has a Pyramidal form, and *Four* makes the *πυρὰν σῶμα* which is a Pyramid, one *Unite* laid on the other three, (from which form of an heap it is also called *Σωρείπας*) they style the *Tetrad* *Ἡρὰιτος*.

3. But what pitiful trading would there have been for *Pythagoras*, if these be the riches of that *Tetractys* which he had so great esteem for, that he swore religiously by him that was the first Imparter of it? Will this answer that big report made by \* *Plutarch*, *Ἡ ὁ καλεμένη τετρακτύς μέγιστος ἦν ὅρκος, ὡς περὶ ὕληται, καὶ κόσμος ὠνόμασαι.* (He speaks there of the compound *Tetractys*, but the Oath was indifferent to both.) *The Tetractys so called was a grand Oath, as is famed, and was named Κόσμος, The World.* And certainly it was that clear and pleasant prospect into the Order and Nature of the *Systeme* of the *World* arising out of the conjunction of the *Active* and *Passive* Principle, and then running out to all Objects, as well *Metaphysical* as *Physical*, which were declared in the opening of the *Fourth* day's Creation; this, I say, certainly was that *Tetractys* which is called *Κόσμος* or the *Universe*, (that is, the *Cabbala* of the genuine and satisfactory knowledge thereof,) by the first communicatour of which *Mystery* both *Pythagoras* himself and the succeeding *Pythagoreans* so religiously swore. But those other Toyes and Niceties that are merely *Numeral*, it is utterly incredible that the imparting of them should ever extort any considerable esteem at all from so wise a man as *Pythagoras* was voted by all men.

\* In his de  
Iside & Osiride.

4. Concerning the Titles of the *Quinary*, those that we have already taken notice of are the most renowned in Authours, as you may see in the copious citations of \* *Meursius*, and so apposite to the work of the day, that nothing can be more. As for the *Binary* and *Ternary*'s being called *Ἀφροδίτη* and *Γάμος*, as they are not so applicable to the dayes, not competible to the nature of those numbers, as I have \* above demonstrated; so they fall proportionably short in testimony of the Ancients, and certainly were the Additions of some idle and dry Pretenders to *Pythagorism* in after-Ages: as was also the adventuring to call the *Quinary* *Ἀνδρογυνία*, when *Ἀφροδίτη* had been more proper, if they had known the first scope of these Names.

\* Denar. Pythagor. cap. 7.

\* Ch. 3. sect. 7.

5. To those few titles of the *Quinary* which we have produced, there may be two added more, I think, not impertinent; the one *Φύσις* as it signifies *παῖς αἰδοῖα*, the other *ἀπό τῆς ἐλαχίστης τῆς ζωῆς*, alluding to the Five senses, which the *Pythagoreans* would easily acknowledge the meanest and most evanid part of that Life that is perceptive.

But there are several other Names of the *Quinary* impertinent, I must confess, to the Fifth day's work, though it may not be altogether impertinent to take notice of them, that no fraud be suspected in concealing them. They are designed for the Notes of either *Physical* or *Mathematical* observation. The *Physical* discover how little Authentick they are; in running upon a supposition that is so *Unpythagorical*, namely, that there are four Elements, which compages the motion of the Earth naturally breaks a-pieces. But yet upon this *Aristotelean* conceit, that there are four, they will have the *Ather* a Fifth, and from thence call the *Quinary* *Νέμεσις*, as distributing the World into these Five Orders; *Earth, Water, Air,*



*Aire, Fire, Ether.* And in reference to this *Fifth* call the *Quinary* Παλλας, and Ἀζυξ, as being a virgin-Element, and not mingling with the generations of things here below: also Ἀμβροσιον, because it is the Region of Immortality; and Ἀκρεων, because flesh and blood cannot inhabit there; and Ἀπλαντον, because the Bodies of the Inhabitants are æquilibrium to the Region, and do not sink by any ponderosity; and lastly Ζανος πύργον, because though *Jupiter* fills all things, yet his highest dwelling is the *Ether*: Which yet is again very *Unpythagorically* spoken, for Ζανος πύργον is the *Sun*, not the *Ether*, when Physically interpreted, the same that Διὸς φυλακή in \* *Aristotle*.

\* De cælo, l. 2.

cap. 13.

\* See chap. 5.  
sect. 2. where the  
Decad is called  
Θέσος.

As for the *Mathematical* Names, Δίκησις, Ἀμίδεον, Διδυμαία, Καρδιάς, Κυκλιον, Ἀξων ἐδραία, all these six have but the intimation of this one sorry business, that *Five* divides *Ten* into two equal parts, as the Diameter does a Circle, as Justice decides equally, and as the Heart is in the midst of the body. Admirable profound Notions! The names that follow are more considerable, as namely, Ἀνία, Ὀρδιάς, Δίκη, Πρόνοια. All which refer to *Five*, as it is the *Hypotenusa* of the first *Orthogonal* Triangle, that has its sides including the right Angle, rationally: For it is called Ὀρδιάς, as subtending the right Angle; Ἀνία, as whose power is insuperable by the powers of both the sides; Δίκη, as equalizing its power to the powers of both the sides; \* τὸ γὰρ ἴσον δίχμον and lastly, Πρόνοια, because there is such a Project and Contrivance in bringing the same thing about so exactly by means that seemed so different, and so unlikely to produce the same effect.

\* Arist. Ethic.  
lib 5. c. 6.

\* Diogen. La-  
ert. in Vita Py-  
thagoræ.

6. For this Invention in Geometry *Pythagoras* is said to have \* sacrificed an Hecatomb to the Muses; and this in Numbers, which might haply be mother to that in Geometry, does so far surpass the mere Numeral Mysteries of the *Tetractys*, that if the *Tetractys* had had no further reach than those dry Niceties, *Pythagoras* his Scholars would surely have chosen rather to have sworn by him as the teacher of the *Pentad*, than of the *Tetrad*. So well ascertained are we from every side that it was not the nature and mystérie of *Numbers*, but of *Things*, that was comprehended in the *Pythagorick Tetractys*.

7. Of the Titles that belong to the *Senary*, the most dry and impertinent are Ἀμφιγίτη, Ἀγχιδίτη, and Μεσδυς. the *Senary* being called \* Ἀμφιγίτη, ὡς ἀμφὶς ἑαυτῆς δύο πρέχουσα γιγιδάσ and Ἀγχιδίτη, as being the next Number to the *Quinary* called Δίτη and lastly, \* Μεσδυς, as being equidistant from 10. and 2. Six exceeding two as much as ten does six.

\* Johan. Meurs.  
Denar. Pythag.  
cap. 8.

\* Clem. Alex.  
strom. lib. 6.

Those of Physical consideration are Διχονία and Ἡμῶν παντός, they both referring to the Signs of the Zodiack. The first both to those six in the Night and those other six in the Day; (For six ever rise by Night, and six by Day.) The latter to the Division of the World into two Halfs, (by the cutting of the Horizon,) Six Signs perpetually adhering to either Half thereof.

Those that referre to Pagan Superstition are Ἐκταβέλης, Τριδίν, Τριμφοον, which all have reference to *Trivia*, as being born on the sixth day of the moneth.

8. As for those Names of Ἀφροδίτη, Ζυγήα, Φιλίωσις, Φιλητοσία, Ζυγή-  
τις, Γαμηλία, they are all referrable to Γάμος, which we have already  
taken notice of in our Defence of the *Cabbala*. To which you may also  
referre Λάχεσις, the Spinner on of Life from the birth. To Κόσμος also  
you may referre Ἀλήθεια, Ἀρμονία, and Πανάρχεια \* the two former, as  
respecting God's general approbation of all that he had made as *conso-*  
*nant* to his *Minde* and *Will*; and the last, as implying a Perfection and  
Self-sufficiency in the World to subsist by virtue of those powers and  
parts God had framed it of.

Nicomach. Ge-  
rasen. *Arithme-  
tic. Theolog.*  
*lib. 2.*

9. The Titles that follow are more particular, and cannot well be made sense of, most of them, without reference to *Moses's* text. Such are Ἀρχὴ, Ἀνδρῶν καὶ θήλειων, Εἶδ' & εἶδ' & ψυχοποιός, Τῆς ζωτικῆς ἕξεως ἐμποιή-  
κων, and Ὑγιαία. For why should *Six* be called Ἀρχὴ, but that *Adam's* Dominion over the Creature is mentioned in the Sixth Day? Ἀνδρῶν καὶ θήλειων also answers *verbatim* to *Male and Female created he them*. And what sense can there be that *Six* is called Εἶδ' & εἶδ' &, but that *Adam* on the Sixth Day was created the Image of the Likeness of God? *Let us make man in our Image after our Likeness*. Whence \* *Clemens* and \* *Philo* also call him εἰκὼν εἰκόν &. And why should it be called ψυχοποιός and Τῆς ζωτικῆς ἕξεως ποιητικὴν, but that the Creation of man was on the Sixth Day, and so described by *Moses*, as that *Adam* being but a statue of Earth, an Image of clay at first, God *breathed into him the breath of life*, καὶ ἐγένετο ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν; And haply in this respect also the *Senary* may be called Εἶδ' & εἶδ' &, the Soul being the very Form of that Form or Image of Earth that God had made. And lastly, it is extremely probable that Ὑγιαία refers also to the sound constitution *Adam* was made in, Health being before Diseases, according to that Song in *Maximus Tyrius*,

\* Clem. Alex.  
Strom. lib. 5.  
\* In his Cosmo-  
pæia Mosaica.

Ἑγεία παρθεσία μακάρεων, &c.

And futable to that in the Book of Wisdome, *For God created all things that they might have their being, and the Generations of the World were healthfull, &c.* Thus plain is it from these Instances that *Pythagoras* his *Mysteries of Numbers* had relation to *Moses* his Text.

Wild. 1. 14.

10. As for the *Septenary*, we produced no names of it, which Omission we will now supply. For some of them seem very apposite and naturally referable to the *Mosaick Doctrine*. As Ουλομέλεια, Τελεσφόρος, Ἀδράσεια, Τύχη. For the *Septenary* may well be called Ουλομέλεια and Τελεσφόρος, because it is said that on the *Seventh* day God ended his work, all things being then entire and perfect. It is also fitly called Ἀδράσεια, παρὰ τὴν μὴ δρᾶν, à non agendo, because God rested on the *Seventh* Day from all his work. Or if Ἀδράσεια signify the same that Νέμεσις, the sense will be, that God sitting still and creating nothing any further, yet there is such a law of things in the very Creation it self, that what by *Free Agents* and what by *Natural* no man shall escape Punishment; which is intimated by Ἀδράσεια, deriving the word παρὰ τὴν μὴ διδράσκειν, à non fugiendo. Τύχη also has some affinity with this Notion, it being a result from God's resting on the *Seventh* Day.

See *Cab. Phil.* ch. 2. v. 2, 3.

But there are also other Names, as Σεπ̃αῖς, Φυλακῖτις, Καιρός, Ὁνειρώ.

The



\* See Cabb.  
Philosoph. c. 2.  
v. 3.

The first of which is rather a *Pythagorick* Notation of the number Ἑπτὰς, then a new Name, and signifies *Cultus Septenarii*, from σάβην or σεβάζην which answers to, *God blessed the Seventh Day, and sanctified it*. And from God's so strictly commanding the people φυλάξαι τὸ σάββατον, it is not improbable the *Septenary* may be called φυλακίτις or else from φύλακες, *Vigiles*, Watchmen or \* *Angels*, into whose hands the Government of the World is committed in this Sabbathism of God. And lastly, it is called Καρὸς, καὶ ἔξοχόν, the Seventh day being so sanctified a season or opportunity cut out of the whole summe of time, to employ our thoughts on the best things, and meditate on the Wisdome of God. Which kind of celebrating this holy Rest and Repose if they called Ὀνδρῶ, it is because such divine Speculations are most clear when there is the strictest ligation of the Senses of the Body, analogical to that in Sleep. But it is more likely to referre particularly to *Joseph's* explication of *Pharaoh's* dreams of the *Seven Kine* and of the *Seven ears of Corn*, the History of that Nation, whose Philosophy was so sacred to them, not seeming unworthy of their memory.

II. As for those Names of Ἀυδὴ and Φωνή, the reason is very trivial, from the Seven Vowels in the Greek Alphabet. Κρίσις respects the Critical Days in diseases; and Κέρας Ἀμαλθείας is attributed to the *Septenary* in which the *Universe* is said to be perfected, in such a sense as it was to the *Ternary* in respect of the fulness and well-furnishedness of the Earth.

The other Appellations are such as belong to either *Pallas* or *Apollo*, both of which signify the same thing, that is to say, *Wisdome*: And I cannot assure any one that *Apollo's* being called ἑβδομηχενός and the *Septenary Pallas* had not its true and primeval occasion from this *Cabbala* of *Moses*; the divinest Wisdome owing its original to Rest and Vacancy from worldly Employments, from which God commands his people to cease on the Seventh day. So that the more we consider those Names of the *Pythagorick* Numbers that can answer to the Days of the Creation, the greater fitness we find in them and applicability to *Moses* his Text.

## CHAP. V.

1. The trivial Names of the Denary. 2. Nine significant Names of the Denary relating to the Universe or the Fourth Day's work. 3. Aaron's Vestments an emblem of the Universe; 4. And an Indication of the Divinity of Christ. 5. Three more names, Ἡλιός, Φάνης, and Σφαῖρα, and in what regard given to the Denary. 6. The Decad, or rather the Tetractys, called Κλαδῶχος, because the mystery of the Creation is chiefly locked up in the Fourth day. 7. As also because of its punctual and express significancy of the nature of that Day's creation. 8. Why it was called Κλαδῶχος ἢ φύσις. 9. Why the Decad or Denary called Κλαδῶχος. 10. And why Πίσις with a fuller inference of the true ground why the Tetractys was mentioned in the *Pythagorick* Oath; rather than the Pentad or any other Number.

WE





ἀπὸ δαυμόνια. So evident is it that all those Names respect the *whole Universe* in all the Lineaments thereof.

3. But there is something so sacred in those *Sibylline* verses, that I cannot let them passe without further Observation. Which though it may seem somewhat digressive, is not altogether impertinent to our present purpose. For I do not question but the *Sibyl* in this description alludes to the Sacerdotal Vestments of *Aaron*, whom *Philo* makes a Type or Figure of the only-begotten Son of God, whom he calls ὁ πρῶτόγονος θεῦ, and ὁ θεῶν λόγος, and \* makes him the eternal high Priest of this vast Temple the Universe, styles him εἰκόνα τῷ ὄντι, the Image of *Jehova*, and the maker of the World. Λόγος δὲ ἔστιν ἐκὼν θεῦ δι' ἧς σύμπας ὁ κόσμος ἐδημιουργεῖτο. And yet in a complex sense he makes the \* Universe also the Son of God. For after a particular description of the meaning of the Vestments of *Aaron* and his Priestly Ornaments, where he will have the two precious stones on his shoulders to signify the two Hemispheres (each of them having six names of the Tribes, as the Hemispheres six Signes apiece so divided by the cutting of the Horizon;) the twelve stones in the Breast-Plate to signify the twelve Signes in the Zodiack, and their being ranged into four *Ternaries*, to denote the four Seasons of the Yeare; his blew Robe to emblemize the Air, the Flower-work at the hemme thereof the Earth, Ποῖσκοι the *Pomegranats* (in allusion to πέω fluo) the Water, and the \* Bells the harmonious mixture of Water and Earth for generation: he finally adds this reason of the Attire, \* Ὅπως ἐν ταῖς ἱερουργίαις συλλειτουργῇ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος ἀπὸς, That the whole World might supplicate together with the high Priest. To which he immediately subjoyns, For it is most fit for him that supplicates the Father, καὶ ὁ υἱὸν ἐπαγγέλλει πρὸς δευραπίαν γεννηνικότ, as if the Universe were the Son of God. Which saying is unsound, unless he, whom he elsewhere calls πρῶτόγονος θεῦ, and the *Divine Logos*, be taken in to make the conception entire.

For thus will it appear that the *Divine Logos* is the true high Priest indeed, whose Induments are (according to those verses of the *Sibyl*) all the parts of the Universe; and that *Aaron* was but a Figure of Him; and that Εἰμὶ εἰ ἐγὼ ὁ ἐὼν, answers to the sculpture of the four letters in the golden plate upon the forefront of *Aaron's* mitre, which *Philo* sayes was ὄνομα τῷ ὄντι, upon which the *Sibyl's* ὁ ἐὼν reflects, and whereby was understood *Jehova Filius*: that ἐξ αὐτὸν ἐνδεδυμαιν refers to his blew Robe; which is not the *Aire*, but so much of the *Heaven* as lyes betwixt the Sun and any Planet or Earth in the same *Vortex*; as those \* ποῖσκοι are not the *Water*, but the whole *Globe of Earth and Water*, which is every where at the lowest parts or hemme of this blew Garment of the eternal *Aaron*. Which *Pomegranates* fitly represent the *Seminal fulness* of the Earth, the mother of all things: and in that they are many, they intimate the *plurality* of *Earths* or *Planets* in their respective *Vortices*. Nor does the scarlet interwoven in the Ephod and Breast-plate signify the Element of Fire, as *Philo* would insinuate; but the texture of scarlet and purple with gold and white filk, of which the Ephod and Breast-plate did consist, denotes the vehement *Heat* and refulgent *Light* of the Sun; which is the *Pythagoreans* τὸ πῦρ ἐν μέσῳ ἰδρυμένον,

as

\* See *Phil. Jud. De Somniti.*

\* See *Phil. De Monarchia.*

\* In his *De vita Moysis.*

\* In his *De Monarchia.*

\* *Pomegranates*

*Phil. de vita Moysis.*

as the Ephod and Breast-plate have their place in the middle of the Body, which is the Region of the Heart, the Sun of the lesser world. And lastly, the *Tunica Ocellata*, or *Stole of Eye-work*, as I may so call it, that reached farther then the blew Robe (even as far as could be) it is apparent that it denoted the Starry Heaven; the *Starrs* being fitly compared to *Eyes*, as *Plato* has elegantly compared them in that known Distich of his,

Ἀστέρας εἰσαθρεῖς ἀστὴρ ἐμὸς, &c.

And though γαῖα in the *Sibyl* be called στήριγμα πιδῶν, yet in that it is said πᾶσι σῶμα κεχύδεται, it implies the loose flowing of it, as of those Pomegranates at the hemme of the Sacerdotal Robe. Nor can the Air be said πᾶσι δραπεῖν πᾶντι (which certainly is here as much πανταχῇ) and that so joyntly with the *Chorus* of the Planets, but it must imply the mobility and plurality of Earths; which therefore gives light to the former verse. But that there is a golden Bell and a Pomegranate, a golden Bell and a Pomegranate, nò better sense can be made then what *Philo* has given in \* another place; Τῶν δ' ἁρμονίῳ καὶ συμφωνίᾳ ἐσυνήχθησαν τῶν ἡρώδων οἱ κώδωνες ἐμφαίνουσιν, *The Bells import the Harmony, Symphony and Consonancy of the parts of the Universe*. For which reason the *Pythagoreans* called the *Tetractys* Ἀρμονία. And that ridiculous fame of \* *Pythagoras* his Musick of the Sphears was questionless nothing but the misreflected Echo of the sound of these golden Bells hanging on *Aaron's* Robe. For *Pythagoras* held no Sphears at all, but speaking the mystical language of the *Jewish* Philosophy, was misunderstood; as he was also in the mystery of Numbers, the world conceiting generally of him that he made them the Principles of all things, whenas he understood them only as the *Symboles* of things. But \* *Aristotle* encounters the opinion as seriously held by him, but with as good sport to the intelligent By-standers as if they should see one fiercely run his lance against a suit of armour, mistaking it for a man of Warr. But this onely by the bye: we will return to the business in hand.

Exod. 28. 34.

\* Phil. de Monarchia.

\* Macrobi. Somn. Scipior. lib. 2. c. 1.

\* Metaphys. lib. 13. c. 3. 4. 5, 6.

4. That πᾶς ὁ κόσμος συλλειτουργῇ, which I above cited out of *Philo*, is to be understood complexly, taking in also the *Eternal Logos*, is plain out of a parallel place, where *Philo* again describing the Sacerdotal Vestments, speaks as before; Τῶτον δὲ πρόπον ὁ ἀρχιερεὺς ἀνακοσμηθεὶς ἐλλεῖ πρὸς τὰς ἱερουργίας, ἵν' ὅταν εἰσὶν αἱ δὺχάς ποιησόμεθα, σωφείρηται πᾶς ὁ κόσμος αὐτῷ· wherein yet in the conclusion he does expressly comprehend τὸ σύμπαν σωέχοντα καὶ διοικῶντα λόγον· and immediately addes, For it is necessary for him that would supplicate the father of the World, ἡρακλήτω χρηδῶν πελοῖάτω καὶ ἀρελλῶ ὑπὸ, πρὸς τὴν ἀμνηστειαν ἀμαρτημάτων καὶ χορηγίας ἀφδονωμάτων ἀγαθῶν. Whence it is no wonder that the *Decad*, which is the symbol of the Universe, is by the *Pythagoreans* called Θεός· which is the present and more particular scope I aimed at.

Phil. de vit. Mos.

But that which is most admirable to consider is, with what exquisite reason the *Eternal Logos*, which was the Framer of the World, and is, as it were, invested in his own work, is supposed the true *High Priest* according to this Type of *Aaron*. For who so fit and effectual Interces-



\* See chap. 8.  
sect. 7, 8.

for with the Father for the faults and offences of the World as he that made it, and in whose breast is contained the Platform thereof, who understands so thoroughly the necessity of the occurrence sometime of such things or passages as are not so holy and perfect as were desirable, and can out of the perfect knowledge of the nature of things, distinctly plead the unavoidableness of sundry ill emergencies from that \* *Incompossibility* and *Incommensurability* that is inexpugnably lodged up in the perverse and unreclaimable *Hyle*?

Besides, presenting himself in his Sacerdotal vestments, which is the *Compages* and harmonious fitting of all the parts of the *Universe*, he does thereby also in a special manner plead for the particular miscarriages in some few, whenas the rest of the parts of the Creation are so healthful and lovely, and those that are out of frame are no more then the passing of a discord in good Musick, which makes the next Note come off more sweetly. As if he should alledge to his Father, that taking one thing with another, and considering under one view all the ends and Periods of things, all are in a sort allowable and good, and that those parts that seem most dark and dismal, it is the prerogative of the *Sovereign Goodness* to bring light out of them, and that to whom much is forgiven his love will be also much.

Baruch 3. v. 35,  
36, 37.

Such an high Priest as this I doubt not but *Aaron* did typifie in his Sacerdotal Habilitments. Which is a special confirmation of the Divinity of our blessed Saviour. *This is our God, and there shall none other be accounted of in comparison of him. He hath found out all the waies of Knowledge, and has given it to Jacob his servant, and Israel his beloved. Afterward did he shew himself upon Earth, and conversed with men: Preludiously in the Cloud and in the Bush, but fully and completely in his being incarnate of the blessed Virgin. And Aaron also bore the figure of both his natures: of his Divine nature in his Priestly vestments, which could signify no clothing but that of God; of his humane nature in his own person, Aaron being but a mere man.*

\* See Levit. 21.  
v. 10, 11, 12.

And yet because he was to sustain the person of him that was truly God, the Lord *Jesus*, there were some \* injunctions, or rather Privileges, put upon him which supposed him in a manner elevated above the nature of man. Upon consideration whereof *Philo* breaks out into such expressions as are the most significative of the condition of Christ the *θεάνθρωπος*, and true high Priest, as any can be uttered. \* *Βάλεται γὰρ ὁ νόμος τὸ ἀρχιερεῖα μέζον μεμειγῶτα φύσεως ἢ καὶ ἀνθρώπου, ἐγγύτερον προσόντα τῷ θεῷ, μετέωρον, εἰ δεῖ παλιπρὸς λέγειν, ἀμφοῖν· ἵνα δια μέσου πρὸς ἀνθρώποις μὴ ἰλασθῶνται θεὸν, θεὸς δὲ πᾶς χάριτας ἀνθρώποις ὑποδιακόνῃ πρὶν χρῶμεν ὁρέγῃ καὶ χορηγῇ* that is to say, *The Law will have the high Priest to partake of a nature greater then humane, approaching nearer to the Divine, or (to speak exactly) to be the Confine of both; that men might propitiate God by a Mediatour partaking of both natures, and God by using his Ministry may reach forth the supplies of his Grace unto men.* So clearly is the Divinity of Christ prefigured in the Law of *Moses*.

\* Phil. de  
Monarch.

Which weighty Considerations may make this seeming Digression more

more pardonable. For it is not a mere Digression, but an Exposition of what I had alledged for the proof of the meaning of Θεός, one of the Names of the *Decad* that respect the *integral* or more *Universal* Lineaments of the World.

5. But Ἡλιος, and Φάνης, and Σφαῖρα may very well more particularly glance at the *Lights* made on the *Fourth* day; which are not without the whirling of the round *Vortices*, which is insinuated by Σφαῖρα. And lastly, Κλειδῶχος, (which was also the name of the *Tetrad*) Κλειδῶχος and Πίσις, I conceive that they all of them respect rather the *Tradition* of the *Tetractys*, or the Opening the Mystery of the Creation by the unfolding the properties of that Number applicable to the *Fourth* Day's work, as it is conceived to be the more *general* Delineation of the Universe, then that they were meant of the things themselves said to be created on the *Fourth* Day. But that the *Fourth* Day is comprehensive of the *whole* Creation, those names of the *Decad* (which is the immediate power of the *Tetrad*) do plainly import, they all of them in a manner tending that way, and are drily and ridiculously imposed upon the Number without such reference. For why should the *Decad* be called Ἡλιος, Φάνης, Εἰσαγγελία, Ἀνάγκη, Αἰών, &c. but that it refers to the Law and Order of the *Universe*, and the furnishing of it with Suns and Planets? And though the *Decad*, it being the Comprehension of all simple Numbers, may be a Symbol of the *Universe*, and upon that account be called Οὐρανός, Κόσμος, Τὸ πᾶν, Παντέλεια, and also Σφαῖρα, and by reason of the ἀνακύκλωσις, the *Revolution* in numbring from *Ten* to *Ten* again, and so *in infinitum*, as is obvious to observe: yet if there were no further drift or more serious reference to something else, the mere assimilation of this Number *Ten* to the *World* or a *Sphere* were a very juiceless and trivial thing.

6. In brief therefore, the *Cabbala* of the *Decad* or *Tetractys*, for they are all one, as \* *Athenagoras* has observed, is called Κλειδῶχος or *Key-bearer*, First, because it was the Exposition of that part of the *Mosaick* Creation which was the *closest* locked up. For although that upon the mere granting a Philosophick sense of the Text, and that the *First* day's Creation is onely of *Immaterial* Beings, (as the *Monad* naturally implies) it will necessarily follow that the *Earth* is not said to be created at all, unless it can find place in the *Fourth* day: and that moreover the Text also does universally pronounce of the *Lights* that were made, That they were to be for *signs* and for *seasons* and for *days* and *years*; which is very hardly good sense, taken distributively, because these ends and offices will be coincident in some; nor can be taken by way of enumeration of offices or properties belonging to every one of the *Lights* of Heaven, unless there be Planets or Earths about all the *Suns*, which we usually call *Fix'd* stars: Yet these things are so faintly and obscurely insinuated, and that distributive sense, though more harsh and inept, is so far possible, that the work of the *Fourth* day, unless we be admonished to the contrary by some knowing *Mythagorus*, will notwithstanding all this seem onely a particular creation of the *Lights* of Heaven as such, and in such a sense as is vulgarly conceived. And therefore for want of such an expressness in the meaning

\* Μέγιστος ὁ  
ἀειθμὸς ὁ δὲ  
κατὰ τὸ  
Πυθαγορείου  
ὁ τελευτῶν τε  
ὦν, &c. *Ap-  
log. pro Chris-  
tianiis.*



of this day's Creation as is in the others, the Mystery thereof may well be look'd upon as sealed and locked up from vulgar sight, and thereby the most concerning things in the whole *Cabbala*. Whence also the *Cabbala* of the *Tetraëty*s, or the Traditional Explication of the *Fourth* day's work, must be acknowledged to be rightly styled  $\text{Κλειδῶχος}$ , as being the *Key-bearer* or *Opener* of the most concealed Mysteries of the Creation.

7. And then secondly, The *Tetraëty*s in reference to the nature of the number it self and the property thereof ( though it be but a toy, and such as *Lucian* might justly deride, if there were no further usefulness in it ) may well be called  $\text{Κλειδῶχος}$ , in that it is so elegantly and expressly significative of the *Cabbala* of the *Fourth* day's Creation. And indeed the Analogy here betwixt the Sign and the thing signified is admirable: For as the *Fourth* day's Creation in external shew is but part of the Creation allotted to the *Fourth* day, as other parts to other days, but in a more recondite meaning is indeed the fashioning and ordering the whole *Universe*, framing of it into *Suns*, *Planets* and *Vortices*; so the *Tetraëty*s or *Four*, the Symbol hereof, is at first view but one certain number, part of the *Decad*, but in the hidden power comprehended therein is the whole *Decad*, 1, 2, 3, 4. put together making up *Ten*.

To which you may adde, That as the work of the *Fourth* day seems at first view to be onely the *making of Lights*, whose rayes are receiv'd in *Pyramidal* forme, whenas it was indeed the *framing of the World*, and contriving it into so many round *Vortices*: so the *Tetrad* or *Tetraëty*s in its apert nature is onely the *First Pyramid* ( for *Four* is so in numbers ) but in its more abstruse Power is a *Sphere*, as was noted \* above.

\* Sect. 3.

And lastly, As the *Fourth* day's Creation seems only to respect the visible and material World according to the external sense, but does necessarily imply an Immaterial Principle ordering the matter into that frame of things: so the *Tetrad* is only *Feminine* in its open or exterior nature, but in its parts whereby it grows into a *Decad* is both *Masculine* and *Feminine*, as well 1 as 3 ( as *Zaratas* would have it ) being *Masculine*, and 2 and 4 *Feminine*: As in the more compound *Tetraëty*s 36 there are four *Masculine* numbers, 1, 3, 5, 7, and four *Feminine*, 2, 4, 6, 8. Which, as in the former consideration, intimates the necessity of conjoining the *Active* and *Passive* principle in the *Fourth* day's Work, that is, in the *Fabrick of the Universe*. But in that the composition of these parts fall into *thirty six*, which is a *circular* Number in an easier sense than *Ten*, there may be intimated thereby that the whole Six daies Creation is comprised together in the *Fourth*, and that the framing of the World is by *circumgyration* of the *Aethereal Matter* into repeated *Vortices*. But this compound *Tetraëty*s belongs not to this present inquisition. The Analogy betwixt the Simple *Tetrad* and the *Fourth* Day's Creation in the Philosophick sense is so exquisitely expresse, that I think it is apparent by this time why it has gain'd the Title of  $\text{Κλειδῶχος}$  amongst the *Pythagoreans*, its very property so fitly opening the right meaning of the Work of the *Fourth* Day.

8. And that it was called  $\text{Κλειδῶχος}$  ἡ φύσις, implies also that it was

was intended chiefly and more immediately for an universal *Natural Cabbala*, the grand Theorems of *Nature* being comprised there, as *Metaphysical Theorems* in the *First Day's Work* and in the two following Chapters. Out of which considerations the reason is evident of all those Names given to the *Denarius* which signifie the *Universal Law* or *Compages of Nature*, which must be cast upon the *Fourth Day*, there being no *Tenth Day* of Creation for them to be cast upon. And *Ten* is the *Tetractys* as well as the *Tetrad* it self. \* As *Thirty Six* is called the *Tetractys* as well as the *Four* first masculine Numbers and four first feminine out of which it results.

\* Plutarch. de  
Iside & Os-  
ride.

9. That the *Decad* should be also called \*  $\text{Κλαδύχθ}$ , the reason is very easie and natural, if referred to the *Fourth Day's Cabbala*. For taking hold of that root or stock, as I may call it, we have also hold of the branches. For the *Cabbala* of the *Tetractys* will naturally shoot out into the consideration of the first, second, third, and of the fifth, sixth and seventh Daies; the nature of the World not being rightly understood without reaching into them also, which are as it were the  $\text{Κλάδοι}$ , the Sprigs or Branches on this side and that side of the *Cabbala* of the *Fourth Day*.

\* See Johan.  
Meurs. Denar.  
Pythagor. c. 12.

10. And for that third and last Name,  $\text{Πίστις}$ , it is a further argument that the Names of the *Decad* refer to the *Fourth Day*: it intimating that the *Decad* is also that very *Tetractys* by whose Inventer and Communicatour *Pythagoras* and his Followers were said to swear, in that the *Decad* is called  $\text{Πίστις}$ , as well as the *Tetractys*  $\text{Ὀρκός}$ , and  $\text{Πίστις}$  is that assurance which is given by Oath. For  $\text{πιστύνειν ὅτι τι δένειναι}$  is as much as *to swear* in the phrase of the *Greek Language*. So strangely and easily do things come about every where, and naturally fall in together to one joynt confirmation of the truth of the *Philosophick Cabbala*, and so manifest is it what special reason *Pythagoras* had to mention the *Tetrad* rather than the *Pentad*, or any other number, in that form of swearing by Him that first imparted the *Cabbala*. For if the Mystery had ended in the numbers themselves, and had not been the Symbols and Repositories of some real knowledge of things *Natural* or *Divine*, the *Pentad* had deserved that celebrity of an Oath better than the *Tetractys*; as I was \* above intimating.

\* Ch. 4. sc. 6.

To conclude therefore in general concerning the *Pythagorick Names* of Numbers, I dare appeal to any one if I have not got an hundred times more ground then I have lost by being called to this strict account, and if there has not been made a large accession of very pertinent Names to those I had before produced, as also a plain discovery how those came in amongst the *Pythagorick Titles* that are nothing pertinent to our present *Cabbala*. Which so punctual account cannot but give ample satisfaction to all such as know when to be satisfied.



## CHAP. VI.

1. *The Second Objection, from the Unsutableness of the Pythagorick Philosophy to the Judaick Cabbala, which makes no mention of the Motion of the Earth; with the first Answer thereto.* 2. *A second Answer, wherein is shown how easy, if not necessary, it was, that the Motion of the Earth should be lost out of the Judaick Cabbala.* 3. *But that there is notwithstanding that in the Jewish Cabbala which will necessarily inferre the Motion of the Earth.* 4. *That the Ancient Wise men of the Fewes did hold the Motion of the Earth, as appears from Pythagoras his having drawn his doctrine from that Fountain.* 5. *That Numa Pompilius was descended from the Fewes.* 6. *And that the Temple he built to Vesta is a Demonstration he held the Earth's Motion.*

1. **T**HE Second Objection against our *Cabbala* is that taken from the Maimedness of that Doctrine which I pretend to be *Judaical* or *Mosaical*, which should consist of these two main parts, *The Motion of the Earth* with those things that are necessarily involved therein, and the *Præexistence of the Soul*; the former whereof, say they, is not to be met withall in the Jewish writings. To which I answer,

First, That it is on this side the Generosity of my Design, merely to apply to *Moses* his Text such Truths as remain amongst the Writings of the *Fewes*, and may be supposed Reliques of the ancient *Cabbala*; but that the high scope I drove at was, by the method I have taken, to recover to their cognoscence that noble part of their *Cabbala* which was lost, and yet which *Pythagoras* once had from their forefathers, as is abundantly testified by the suffrages of Historians. And truly this *Physical* part of the *Cabbala* which I have applied, fits so well and sticks so close to *Moses* his Text, not onely as to the things themselves, but also by virtue of the consideration of the Names and Properties of the *Pythagorick* Numbers, that by this Artifice, as by cramps of Iron, both parts of the *Cabbala* are held so firmly together in one, that it is made apparent to any indifferent eye, that the whole *Cabbala* is of one structure and piece, and belongs all to the Text of *Moses*.

2. And then again in the second place, I demand what is the *Physical* part of the Jewish *Cabbala* if this be not (for they will not deny but that *Moses* does Philosophize in this first Chapter of *Genesis*) or what so great and so true Theorems can they apply as I have applied to his Text? If they will answer there were indeed such, and so fitly applicable, but they are lost; I say, in that the *Physical* part was lost, it is a shrewd presumption, even from thence, that this is it which we have recovered, no *Cabbala* being so likely to be lost as this, it being a harder thing to communicate to one the *Pythagorick systeme of the World* then the *Præexistence of the Soul*; as appears in that it was a piece of Philosophy too big for the Capacity of \* *Aristotle* himself, who though he could name the opinion, and refer it to the *Pythagoreans*, yet he could not close with it. For the prejudice of Sense is great against it, and then the Philosophick and Mathe-

\* *De Cælo*, l. 2.  
cap 13. *Meteorolog.* lib. 1.  
cap 6.

Mathematical preparations more voluminous by far than what is requisite for the receiving of the doctrine of the Souls *Præexistence*. Whence it is, that though *Platonism* be derived from *Pythagorism*, yet it has left out the Theory of the *Earth's Motion*; nay the *Pythagoreans* themselves had in time lost it, as it appears in \* *Timæus Locrus*, *Apollonius Tyanæus*, and in some of the Titles the *Pythagoreans* have given to their Numbers.

And yet fewer *Jews* would be found capable of receiving this part of the *Cabbala*, then *Pagans*; it being necessary for them that they be furnished not only with what preparations were required in the other, but also with a special hardiness of enduring to see the *Cortex* of the *Mosaick* letter as it were to break in pieces, to render up this recondite kernel for them to feed upon: whenas they might be taught the *Præexistence* of the *Soul* with little or no violence to the outward Letter of *Moses*, that is to say, to the Literal Sense of it. Wherefore in that the *Motion of the Earth* has been lost, and appears not in the remains of the Jewish *Cabbala*, this can be no argument against its having once been part thereof.

3. But thirdly, Though the *structure* of this Theorem be lost amongst them, yet the foundation is not, which is a fair evidence that the Edifice once stood there. And this foundation is to be seen not only in their language it self, which I have \* noted above, but also in their Writings, as that in *Gemara*, *Non orbes, sed in cælo liquido moveri sidera, vetustissima Hebræorum sententia est, ut* \* *nos docet Gemara ad initium Geneseos*. But those most Ancient of the *Hebrews*, unless they were very short-witted, as certainly the nearer successors of *Moses* were not, but excellent Philosophers, *Moses* himself without all question being such, they could not possibly hold the Heavens liquid, but withall might hold the motion of the *Earth*, nor they nor *Pythagoras* hold the *Earth's* motion without holding the *Ethereal Vortices*, as I have plainly demonstrated in my \* Letter to V. C.

4. And fourthly and lastly, That they did expressly hold the motion of the *Earth*, is in my apprehension sufficiently evinced already by what I have produced to prove that *Pythagoras* was either a *Jew* himself, or at least received his Doctrine from the *Jews*. Of which truth the *Præexistence of the Soul* and the *Triunity in the Godhead*, which *Pythagoras* taught, are no obscure indications. For it is plain out of the Book *Jetsirah*, that the *Jews* hold the *Triunity of the Godhead* as well as the *Soul's Præexistence*. Wherefore in all likelihood he drew his \* *Physical* Philosophy from the same fountain from which he did his *Metaphysical*. But this Physiologick part of the *Cabbala* being neither so usefull nor obligatory as to matters of Religion, nor so easily received nor grasped by reason of the vast excursions in that Theory, or if grasped, hard to be held by any long succession of men; (whose minds are most engaged in their personal interest, whether in reference to this world or that which is to come;) it is no wonder, as I have already noted, that time wore it off, or let it sink and lost it, there being so few that were found fit, or that thought themselves concerned to receive it.

5. But nevertheless (which is the main thing I intended to answer in this

\* Γε. δ' ἐν μέ-  
σῳ ἰδρυμένη,  
ἐστὶν ὁ ἐὼν, ὅ-  
πως τε ὁρῶντας  
καὶ ἡμέρας γί-  
νεται. Tim.  
Locr. De A-  
nima Mun-  
di.

\* Ch. 3. sect. 10.

\* See Grot. in  
Decalog.

\* Epistol. ad  
V. C. sect. 7.

\* See chap. i.  
sect. 8.



this last place) though the fame of this part of the *Cabbala* be in a manner extinct amongst the Jews, yet that it was once the hidden Doctrine of the learned of that Nation, seems to me sufficiently credible from what *Plutarch* writes of *Numa Pompilius*. For his so strictly prohibiting the use of Images in Divine worship is very apparently *Mosaical*. As also that Principle of his, Οὐ κελῶς φορεῖσθαι τὰ ἀπὸρρήτα ἐν ἀψυχοῖς γράμμασιν, *That inanimate Books are no fit bearers of secret Mysteries*, shews that he was taught *Cabbalistically* by orall Tradition: and it is a thing confessed that there was a secret Tradition of more recondite learning amongst the *Jews*.

And *Numa's* Instructor is said to be not a *Græcian*, but βάρβαρος τις βελτίων Πυθαγόρου, some *Barbarian* greater and better then *Pythagoras* himself; and where, I pray you, was such an one to be found, unless descended from the *Jews*? But another fame, I must confess, there is, that he was taught by *Pythagoras*; but not by him of *Samos*, for he was some Ages after, but by one *Pythagoras* who was a *Lacedemonian*, as *Numa* himself was. For the *Sabines* were a Colonie of the *Lacedemonians*, as \* *Plutarch* affirms.

\* In vita

*Numæ.*

1 Macc. ch. 12.

v. 21.

Jos. Antiquit.

Judaic. lib. 13.

cap. 11.

And to come home to the point, the *Lacedemonians* themselves were descended from the *Jews*, as appears both from the first Book of *Maccabees* and from *Josephus*. For *Arens* King of the *Lacedemonians* in his Letter to *Onias* the high Priest does expressly affirm that it was found in writing, That the *Lacedemonians* and *Jews* were brethren, and that they were of the Stock of *Abraham*. And the Letter of *Jonathan* the high Priest acknowledges the Kindred, and that they found it so in their Records; and addes further, that they remember the *Lacedemonians* in their Sacrifices and in their Prayers, as it becometh brethren.

6. Well, be it so then, will you say, and it seems exceeding probable from all these circumstances, that *Numa* was both descended from the *Jews*, and imbued with the Jewish Religion and learning. What's this to the purpose? or how does it prove the Motion of the Earth once to have been part of the *Judaical* Tradition or *Cabbala*? Only thus much; That *Numa* did so religiously resent the truth of the Theoreme, that knowing there was no such august Temple of God as the Universe it self, and that to all the Inhabitants thereof it cannot but appear round from every prospect, and that in the midst there must be an ever-shining Fire, I mean a Sun; in Imitation hereof he built a round Temple, which was called the Temple of *Vesta*, concerning which *Plutarch* speaks very plainly and apertly; Νεμῆς δ' λέγει, καὶ τὸ τ' Ἑστίας ἱερὸν ἐγκύκλιον περιβαλέσθαι τῇ ἀσπίδι περὶ φρεσὶν, ἀπαιμμένον. ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖμα τ' ἡγεῖται ὥς Ἑστίας ἔστι, ἀλλὰ τῇ σύμπαντι ἡσέμε, ἔμειον οἱ Πυθαγορεῖοι τὸ πῦρ ἰδρυσθαι νομίζουσι, καὶ τῷ τὸ Ἑστίας κελῶσι καὶ Μονάδα. Τὴν δ' γῆν ἐπὶ ἀκίνητον, ἔτε ἐν μέσῳ τ' περιφορᾷ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ κύκλῳ περὶ τὸ πῦρ αἰωρεμένην, ἔτε τῇ πμωλῶτων ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτων τῇ ἡσέμε μεγάλων ὑπάρχειν. *That Numa is reported to have built a round Temple of Vesta for the custody of a Fire in the midst thereof that was never to go out: not imitating herein the figure of the Earth, as if she was the Vesta, but of the Universe; in the midst whereof the Pythagoreans placed the Fire, and called it Vesta or Monas, and reckoned*

*Plutarch, in  
vita Numa.*

reckoned the Earth neither immovcable, nor in the midst of the Mundane Compasse, but that it is carried about the Fire or Sun, and is none of the first and chief Elements of the World. What can be more plain then these Testimonies? But I leave it to every mans judgement to infer with what measure of confidence he thinks good.

## CHAP. VII.

1. The Third Objection, taken from the Heterogeneousness of the Exposition of the First Day's Creation to all the rest, it alone being Symbolical.
2. The Answer to the Objection. 3. That the Description of the Earth in the First Day intimates a Symbolical sense thereof; And how there is the same Idea in vulgar phansyes of Light or Day and of Heaven.
4. That Heaven in the First Day signifies the Immaterial Orders of Beings, expressly proved out of Origen. 5. The same further confirmed out of Parmenides the disciple of Diochætes the Pythagorean, whom it is probable to have been acquainted with the Text of Moses. 6. That the Jewish Rabbins also give their suffrage thereto. 7. Testimony of Scripture that the Creation of Angels and of the Souls of men is signified by the Light created in the First day. 8. That Heaven and Light understood of the Mundus Vitæ do not signifie merely Symbolically. 9. A further consideration evincing the same Conclusion. 10. That whether Heaven and Light signifie Symbolically or no, the First Day's work will not be so heterogeneous to the rest, an Evening and Morning being fetched from thence to every Day's Creation. 11. That the Metaphysical Hyle in the First day's creation is not called Earth merely Symbolically, a thing not hard to prove, but needless.

1. **T**HE Third Objection is against our Exposition of the First Day's work. For they urge, that it is very *Heterogeneous* and strangely different from the Interpretations of all the rest of the Days, where the things mentioned are not *Symbolical*, but are properly what they are said to be: But *Heaven* and *Earth* and *Light* are not so in the First Day's Creation, but the *Symbols* of something else. Which makes the *Cabbala* go off but harshly, it seeming not all of one piece.

2. But I answer; The question is not whether the Interpretation may seem harsh to a nice and squeamish phansy, but whether it be true: which I think I have produced no mean proofs for already, & must further remind you how many there be that interpreting the story of *Adam* and *Eve* in *Paradise* literally, do notwithstanding not think it harsh to expound that of the *Serpent* symbolically. But there was also a necessity of speaking of the Creation of *Immaterial* Beings in a *Symbolical* way, *Moses* having a design not to mention any thing hard or subtle in the mere letter of the Text, as is acknowledged by all Interpreters. Neither could there be a *Philosophical* as well as a *Literal Cabbala* without taking this liberty; which ought to be freely granted, no uncertainty or obscurity arising therefrom;



therefrom, by reason of the *Cabbala* of *Numbers* belonging to the *Six Days Creation*. For that trite Aphorisme of the *Pythagoreans*,

— — — — — Ἀεὶ θμῶ δ' ἑ π' πάντ' ἐπέοικε,

is here fully verified, and was, I suspect, chiefly understood at first of the *Six Days Works*, *That all things were like to, or bore a resemblance of, the Number to which they referred*. Whence we may be assured that *Immateriality* was the work of the *First Day*, a *Monad* or *Unit* being so express a signification of the nature thereof.

3. And that the *Earth* might not break that sense of the *Cabbala*, the description is such as does very naturally favour the *Philosophical* meaning, the Text calling it \* *Vacuity* or *Emptiness* it self, as I have already noted. Nor is it at all harsh that *Heaven* and *Light* are made *Symbols* of the same thing, not only for those Reasons I have already alledged, which verge more near upon Philosophy, (of which the chiefest is, that *Heaven* or *Aether* is the very body of *Light*, or *Light* it self when duly moved) but also from that notion or Phantasme that naturally arises from the Letter it self according to the vulgar apprehension of things, who certainly have the same *Idea* in their minde of that *illuminated Concave* which is *Heaven*, that they have of *Day* distinct from the *Sun*. And there was no visible *Concave* at first but that of *Day*, there being then neither *Moon* nor *Starrs* to inlighten the *Night*.

And that this conceit of ours is sound, appears further in that *Jupiter* and *Diespiter* are the self-same *Numen* amongst the Heathen. And yet *Jupiter*, that is, *Jovis Pater*, Father *Jovis*, is the *convex Heaven*. Τὸν πάντα κύκλον τῷ ἑαυτοῦ Δία καλέουσιν, \* *Herodotus* speaks it of the *Persians*. And *Dies Pater*, that is, Father *Dies* (for, as \* *Varro* has interpreted it, it is the Nominative case, as in *Marspiter*, *Neptunuspater*, *Fanuspater*) what can it be but this *illuminated Concavity* or *Convexity* which is called *Day*, a distinct *Numen* amongst the Heathen as well as *Night*, who made the notorious *Phænomena* of Nature so many Deities; and *Macrobius* expressly, *Cretenses Δία τ' ἡμέραν vocant & Jovem Salii, in carmine, Lucetium?* whence *Dijovis* in all likelihood is the same that *Diespiter*. But we will not dwell upon these toys. It was sufficient to have noted that Οὐρανός and Ἡμέρα are all one in the Heathen Theologie with Ζεύς, and therefore all one with one another. It is now more material to consider that without any light at all there can be no discernment of any thing, and that therefore *Heaven* must be vulgarly conceived under the notion of this *luminous Concavity*, which for the lightfulness thereof is called *Day*, and for its height and hollownesse (for *Cælum* is as much as Κόλρον hollow) is termed *Heaven*, and that they are one joynt Object, especially in the *First Day's Creation*, *Heaven* being no where discoverable but in this newly-created *Day*, whose joynt appearances made up but one and the same *Luminous Concave*, as I intimated before.

Whence the literal sense of the *First Day's work*, as it is the Symbole or Representation of the *Philosophical*, is very easy and natural if you take it thus; namely, That first it is summarily said, *God created Heaven*, (that is, this *Luminous Concave*) and the *Earth*. But this *Earth* was nothing but

\* See *Varabius* upon the place. *Theodotion* also renders it *Emptiness*, and *Nothing*.

\* *Hist. lib. 1. cap. 131.*  
\* *De lingua Latin. lib. 4.*

but Emptiness and Vacuity, and darkness was on the face of the Abyſſe, &c. describing thus, First, the condition of the *Earth* more punctually, which is the first part of this day's Creation; but then after that coming to the other part, he tells us how *God commanded the Light to be made*, that is, this *luminous Concave*, Heaven, (for they are in *Idea* really the same, as I have said, and therefore the words *Light* and *Heaven* but *Synonyma's* here) and how *he called this Light or Cœlum luminosum, Day, &c.* Which structure and sense of things considered, it cannot but take away all scruple and conceit of any harshness in making *Heaven* and *Light* symbols of the same thing, namely, of that which the *Platonists* call *Mundus vitæ*, or the *World of Life*, and *Forme*.

Nor can it be objected that this *Literal* sense is incoherent with the *Literal Cabbala* we have framed already, where the *Heaven* is made on the *Second* day, and therefore cannot be literally made in the *First*. For I mean here by the *Literal* sense, not that continued popular sense or *Literal Cabbala*; for that is not supposed the Basis of the *Philosophical* (For these three distinct *Cabbala's* have no intended either agreement or disagreement one with another, as having no mutual reference at all; but grow out of the *Letter* which is common to all three, as three several sorts of Flowers out of one bed of Earth in a Garden.) But by the *Literal* sense here I understand such a sense as may be made out of the letter qualified and prepared by a skilful hand for a fit and unforced exhibiting any part of either the *Literal*, peculiarly so called, or else of the *Philosophical* or *Moral Cabbala*; whether this preparation be made by Grammar and Criticisme, or else by Phantasmatical or real and true Notion. For the *Letter*, as I said, is common to all three *Cabbala's*, but is to be prepared and fitted in each, not to a sense congruous to the series of things in either of the other two, but of those things in one and the same *Cabbala*. Which is a Principle that there is no man, that well considers, but must acknowledge both rational and necessary.

4. But now, that we have given the right sense of the first Day's Creation in our *Philosophical Cabbala*, besides what we have produced already, appears further out of \* *Clemens Alexandrinus* and *Origen*; who comparing the *Second* Day's work with the *First* write thus; Καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ πρώτῃ αὐτίκῃ ἐποίησεν ἑρῶν ἀόρατον, καὶ γὰρ ἀήλιν, καὶ φῶς οὐκ ἔον· ἐν δὲ τῇ δευτέρῃ τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρῃ ἐποίησεν ἑρῶν δῆμιον. Which interpretation \* *Origen* follows exactly, *Cum antea*, saith he, *Deus cœlum fecisset, nunc firmamentum facit, id est, corporeum cœlum. Fecit enim cœlum prius, de quo dicit, Cœlum mihi sedes est.* And a little after; *Cum enim ea quæ facturus erat Deus ex spiritu constarent & corpore, ista de causa in principio & ante omnia cœlum dicitur factum, id est, omnis Spiritalis substantia, super quam velut in throno quodam & sede Deus requiescit.* This therefore is that *Mundus vitæ* which is the highest Throne of God. Which the *Pythagoreans* also call Ζανὸς πύργος, the Tower of *Jupiter*, it being his highest habitation, and is also termed his Δημιουργικὴ φρενᾶ, the external framing of the World in all the parts of it being immediately or instrumentally performed by it, as the *Fœtus* is in the wombe.

5. According to which sense is that of *Parmenides*, That there are but

\* Strom. lib. 5.

\* Homil. in cap. 1. Genesios.



two Principles,  $\pi\upsilon\rho$  &  $\gamma\eta$ , which in *Hebrew* would be  $\text{אֶתֶר וָאֵר}$ , *Lux & Terra*, or (which I have shewn to be the same,) *Cælum & Terra*; and addes further,  $\text{Καὶ ὁ μὲν δημιουργὸς πᾶξιν ἔχθρ, ὃ δ' ὕλης}$ . Which does so exquisitely answer to the \* Text of *Moses* in the Philosophical sense, that it will be hard to doubt but that he had these two Principles from thence, the one *Active* or *Demiurgical*, the other *Passive* or *Material*. The one symbolically called  $\pi\upsilon\rho$ ,  $\text{אֶתֶר}$ , *Lux* or *Aether*; the other  $\gamma\eta$ , which is  $\text{אֵר}$ , *Terra*; *Heaven* and *Earth*. And for that Riddle which \* *Laertius* addes further,  $\text{Γένεσιν τε ἀνθρώπων ὅξ ἡλίω πῶτον γινώσκω, αὐτὸν δ' ὑπάρχον τὸ διεργόν & τὸ ψυχρόν}$ , I leave to the ingenious to unriddle from  $\text{וַיְבָרֶךְ וַיִּבְרָךְ}$ , and the *Hebraism* of the \* article  $\text{וְ}$  which I have noted, and then to judge in how right a sent of things we have been in the pursuit of the meaning of the *Physical* part of the Philosophick *Cabbala*, and whether *Pythagoras* did not understand things the same way. For this *Parmenides* was a *Pythagorean*, as having been an Intimate of one *Diocrates* a follower of *Pythagoras*: Which *Diocrates*, as *Sotion* writes, was indeed poor, but a singularly-honest and good man; for which reason *Parmenides* adhered so close to him for his society while he lived, and had so great an honour for him, that he built an  $\text{Ἡεῶν}$ , or *Chapel*, to him when he was dead.

All which Circumstances may justly make a man suspect that this *Diocrates* was acquainted with the *Jewish Learning* & the very letter of *Moses*, (as \* *Pherecydes Syrus* is also said to have gotten  $\text{τὰ Φοινίκων ἀπόκρυφα βιβλία}$ , that is, the secret Books of the *Phœnicians* or \* *Hebrews*) or, if you will, with the *Literal* and *Philosophical Cabbala*. From whence *Parmenides* might take occasion of making that Distribution of Philosophy into such as is accurately and intellectually true, and such as is according to the Appearance of things to the Vulgar.  $\text{Διοσώ τε ἔῃ ἢ φιλοσοφίαν, ὃ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν, ὃ δ' κατ' δόξαν}$ . The latter of which, were it not in some such respect as I have intimated, would not have been taken notice of by *Parmenides* for any piece of wisdom or Philosophy at all. And that  $\text{δόξα}$  will signifie external Appearance, is plain in that \* *Epicurus* divides that which appears *ab extra* into  $\text{ἐνέργεια}$  and  $\text{δόξα}$ , and *Democritus* in *Laertius* has defined,  $\text{ἀρχαὶς ἔῃ ἢ ὅλων ἀτόμους καὶ κενόν· τὰ δ' ἄλλα πᾶντα νενομίσθαι, δόξαίεσθαι}$  that is as much as to say,  $\text{φαίνεσθαι}$ , to be *φανόμμενα*, or *externall appearances*.

To this  $\pi\upsilon\rho$  &  $\gamma\eta$  of *Parmenides* exactly answers that Couple of Principles amongst the *Pythagoreans*,  $\text{φῶς & σκότος}$ , which plainly point at the *Light* and *Darkness* in the beginning of *Genesis*; the *Pythagoreans* rendring  $\text{אֶתֶר φῶς}$ , *Parmenides*;  $\pi\upsilon\rho$ , and the one calling the *Hyle*  $\gamma\eta$ , the other  $\text{σκότος}$ , but both reflecting on the Text, where *Hyle* is denoted by both those characters. And that *Parmenides* meant not this sensible Earth is plain out of \* *Aristotle*, who saies that *Parmenides* ranked his first Principle *Fire*,  $\text{κατὰ τὸ ὄν, δάπερον δ' κατὰ τὸ μὴ ὄν}$ , such as *Plotinus* describes *Hyle* to be: and *Theodotion* renders  $\text{וַיְבָרֶךְ וַיִּבְרָךְ}$   $\text{κένωμα καὶ ἐδέν}$ . But I have run out too far, let us return to *Origen*.

6. Consonant to that Interpretation of *Origen* is that general Doctrine of the Jewish Rabbins, *Solum gloria Dei creatum esse ante creationem Mundi*,

\* See the two following Chapters, particularly ch. 9. sect. 4.

\* *In vita Parmenidis*.

\* Upon vers. 17. chap. 1. *Cabbal. Philosoph.*

\* See Hecsch. Illustr. in Pherecydes.

\* *Judaam enim ad Palaestinam, Samaritaniam & Galileam ad Phœniciam apud Historicos pertinere.*

Steph. See also Ortel. Geogr. sacr. tab. 1.

\* Sext. Empiric. advers. Mathematicum. lib. 7.

\* *Metaphys. l. 1. cap. 5.*

*Mundi*, as you may see in \* *Maimonides*. But that that which is the *Throne* of God should be called *Heaven*, is no wonder, nothing being more ordinary then the placing of his *Throne* there. Wherefore, according to the general consent of the Rabbins, there was an *Heaven* made before the Creation of the outward World. And when, I pray you, then should it be made, if not in the first day? or what can be His throne that is said to sit upon the Cherubims, but the Angelical Orders? And that the *Cabbalists* expound the Creation of Heaven to be the Creation of Angels, \* *Menasseh Ben Israel* assures us, and alledges the *Targum* upon *Job*, and *Moses Egyptius* to the same purpose.

\* *More Nevoch.*  
part. 2. cap. 26.

\* *De Creat.*  
*Probl.* 25.  
sect. 5.

7. But not only *Origen*, *Alexandrinus*, and the Jewish Writers put in their suffrage for our Interpretation, but, if I be not mistaken, the very Scripture it<sup>e</sup> self, nay I may say God himself personally in the Scripture. *Job* 38. *Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the Earth? declare, if thou hast understanding. When the Morning-Stars sang together, and all the Sons of God shouted for Joy?* Where what is meant by the *Morning-Stars*, he must be blinde that cannot discern from the following *Exegesis*, namely the *Sons of God*, which is as much as the *Angels*; who are called *Morning-Stars* Symbolically, and in allusion to the *First Day's* Creation, namely the creation of *Light*, which was the *Morning of the World* and the Birth of *Spiritual* and *Angelical* Beings. And therefore again, v. 19, 21, concerning this *First Day's* creation of *Light*, he asketh *Job* another like question; *Where is the way where Light dwelleth? and as for darkness, where is the place thereof?* alluding certainly to the *Light* and *Darkness* mentioned in the *First Day*. For thereupon he demands further, *Know'st thou that thou wast then generated or made, and that the number of thy Dayes is great?* So the learned of the Jews read it, and do out of this Text confidently conclude their *Praexistence of Souls*. Which if they do rightly, no question but their Creation is involved in the creation of *Light* in the *First Day's* Work. From these Testimonies I think it is plain enough, that by the Creation of *Heaven* or *Light* is understood, as *Origen* has ventured to affirm, the Creation of all *Spiritual* substances.

8. But further, to come nearer to the Objection, I do not conceive it necessary to acknowledg that *Heaven* and *Light* do signify merely *Symbolically*, but that the Things created the *First day* may be called most truly and properly by those Names, though they were first given to the Material *Heaven* and Visible *Light*: as the words *Spiritus*, *Anima*, and *Ψυχή*, were terms first given to that which is material, meaning thereby a *wast of Aire*, *Wind*, or *breath*, but now signify, and that properly and truly, the first of them any *Immaterial substance*, the two latter the *Soul of man* which is *Spiritual* and *Immaterial*. And so it may be with *Heaven* and *Light*, that which is conceived of *Heaven* belonging more truly and eminently to the *Mundus Vita* then to the Material *Heaven* it self. \* For the generations of sublunary things, their Fates and Periods, that vital Influence, and the Measurings of time, I do not doubt but all are more truly, more primarily and properly attributed to the *World of Life*, in which are all the *Seminal Forms* of things, then they are to the corporeal *Heaven*; & do hugely suspect, though I will not affirm, that the *Lights* of

\* See *Psycho-*  
*zoia* Cant. 1.  
Stanz. 41, 42,  
43, 44, 45, 46,  
47.



Heaven themselves would not be what they seem to us, let the *Matter* be never so subtil & soundly agitated, were they not actuated also by the *Spirit of Nature*, & became in some sort *Vital* thereby : insomuch that I conceive *Spirit* to be a further illumination of *Light* it self, as when the Soul acts in the eye. Besides, considering the promanation and intertexture of the Rayes of *Light*, that which is said thereof is more eminently and perfectly true in the nature of every particular Spirit (as I have \* elsewhere shown at large) then in *Light* it self. That apprehension also that *Heaven* is the highest part of the Creation, is not severely and Philosophically true in the material Heaven, it being every where and the Earth it self a Planet: but it is irrefragably true of this *Heaven* that was created the *First* day; which is also the inaccessible *Light* where He dwells unto whom the eye of no mortall can reach.

9. Besides all which, There being such a constant and necessary union betwixt the *Aethereal* or *Heavenly* Matter and the *Mundus Vita* in all the parts thereof wherever they act, in this regard also it is plain that the terming the *First* day's work *Heaven* and *Light* is not merely *Symbolical*, but reaches the very nature & property of the things: according as *Virgil* does seriously Philosophize in those expressions touching the Souls of men,

*Ignem est ollis vigor, & cælestis origo  
Seminibus; quantum non noxia corpora tardant,  
Terrenique hebetant artus, moribundaque membra.*

Whereby he would insinuate that there is an *igneous*, *luminous*, or *Aethereal* Vehicle alwaies intimately adhering to the Soul, though it be much flaked and damped with the gross and crude moisture of the Body during this Earthly Peregrination.

10. And lastly, whether we phansy *Heaven* or *Light* to signifie symbolically or no, there will not be that *Heterogeneity* and difference from other Day's Creations as is conceited; this *Lightsome* Heaven or *Heavenly* *Light* being symbolically called the *Morning* of each Day's Creation, as the Material part or *Passive Principle* is styled the *Evening*. Which *Morning* is alwaies a parcel of that *full Day* which was first created, and is castigated and mitigated by its conjunction with the *dark Matter* into a moderate *Matutine Splendour*, as those several parts of the Matter thus and thus modified, answering to the several Capacities of that *dark Emptiness* and *Vacuity* (which was the *Midnight* opposite to that *full Day*) being raised to an *actual Materiality*, may go for the *Evening-Twilight* of every Day's Creation: the *Possibility* of this *external* and *material* Creation being the *μεσσηριον* betwixt the *Mundus vita* or *Full day*, and that *Metaphysical Hyle* or *Midnight*, so soon as once its parts have but *material existence*, or exist as to their Matter; as the *Dusk* of the *Evening* is the *μεσσηριον* betwixt *Day* and *Night*.

11. And now if we would be so toyishly, or rather tediously, curious, we might also goe about to prove that the *Earth* mentioned in the *First* day's Creation, which is nothing but that *Metaphysical Hyle*, ought not to be thought to be so much symbolically as truly and properly so called, the most peculiar Attributes of the *Earth* being only true in it. For the *Earth* strictly and philosophically considered is neither the lowest of the  
Creation,

\* *Immortal.*  
Book 1. ch. 5,  
and 6.

Æncid. l. 6.

Creation, nor immovable ; but this *Metaphysical Earth* is both, as is manifest at first sight, it being the lowest degree and shadow of Being ; and not only immovable, but undiminishable and unimpairable, as I have already noted. But this is a subject not worth the polishing, the main work of the *First* day being the creating of *Heaven* or *Light* ; and the description of the *Earth* there being such as does easily enough assure the *Philosophick* sense to any that are not over-scrupulous ; of which more in the following chapter : and lastly, it being a matter of no such great consequence whether *Earth* and *Heaven* and *Light* signify Symbolically or no ; seeing that let their signification be what it will, it is, in such sort as I have described, carried down to the work of every day, whereby the whole piece becomes sufficiently homogeneal.

## CHAP. VIII.

1. That Hyle or first Matter is mere Possibility of Being, according to Aristotle.
2. That the same is but Empty Space or Capacity of Body, according to Plato and Plotinus ; and how fitly the Description of Hyle in them agrees with Moses his *Terraninis & vacua*.
3. What in Plotinus his description answers to *Abyss, Darkness, and Waters* in Moses.
4. That Plotinus seems to make Hyle a mere Non-Entity.
5. But that his more express Opinion is, that it is the Potentiality of Corporeal Beings, and Entity in reversion.
6. How this Hyle may be said to be created.
7. Why Moses would take notice of so lank and evanid a business as this Hyle seems to be, in his Six Days Creation.
8. That Impossibility is involved in the notion of the Mosaick Hyle, with a special reason why the Pythagoreans might call the Decad' *Ἀνάγκη*.

1. **B**UT now for those Three additional Quære's touching this *Metaphysical Hyle* ; The first of them is concerning the Name thereof, why I would adventure to give so substantial a name as *Hyle* ; which is as much as to say, *Matter*, to that which I acknowledge to have no Being but a *Metaphysical* one, and that such a *Metaphysical* one as is not truly any Being, but a mere Capacity thereof. But I answer, That I have rather surnamed the *Hyle* of the Ancients *Metaphysical*, then transplanted the name of *Hyle* to a mere *Metaphysical* Entity. For so far as I can find, they usually allow their *Hyle* no more Entity then I have allotted to it in my description thereof ; namely, That it is the Capacity only of the existence of the Corporeal or Sensible World, but it self is neither Substance nor any thing else actually. λέγω δ' ὕλην ἢ καὶ αὐτὴν μῆτε πῶς, μῆτε πούτις, μῆτε ἄλλο μηδὲν λέγεται οἷς ὤρεται ὁ οὐκ. It is Aristotle's Definition of Matter in his \* *Metaphysicks*. And again not far after, τὸ δυνάμει ὂν καὶ μὴ ὂν, τὸ τὸ εἶναι ἢ ὂν ἐκείνου ὕλη, The Possibility of being and not being, that is the Hyle or Matter in every thing.

2. And Plato, in his *Timæus*, casting things into Three ranks, makes one kind to be, τὸ κτ' ταύτῃ ἔχον εἶδος, which is intelligible, ingenerable and

\* Lib. 6. cap. 3.  
 & 7.



incorruptible, invisible and immovable: The second kind is what has some resemblance of this, and bears the same name with it, but is sensible, corruptible, and movable: The third he makes τὸ τὴν χώρας, *Place or Space* (*Plutarch* interprets it διάστημα) φθορὰν ἐπεσσοδεχομένην, ἔδραν δὲ παρέχον ὅσα ἔχῃ γένεσιν πᾶσιν, αὐτὸ δὲ μετ' ἀναιδνησίας ἀπτόν, λογισμῷ πνιγνὸς μόνος πᾶσιν. This is his description of *Matter*, as both *Plutarch* and also *Plotinus* supposes. But it is a very suspicious business that he means no more then *empty Space* by it; which he calls χώρα, and which is very hard to conceive what it is, but makes it also the seat and foundation of all generable things, and accordingly \* *Plotinus* calls it ἐκβάστα. Which answers exactly to *Terra inanis & vacua* in *Moses*, *Stability* and *Emptiness* being thus comprised in one.

\* *Ennead*. 6. lib.  
1. cap. 28.

*Plotinus* insisting upon this notion of χώρα, makes *Matter* such to the Bodies of the world as an *empty room* is to our Senses; and affirms that it is impassible, Οἷον ἐν οἴκῳ πρὸς αὐτῷ ἀλλήλους παύσιντων ὁ οἶκος ἀπαθὴς καὶ ὁ ἐν αὐτῷ ἄνθρωπος, as when men strike one another in the same room, neither the room nor the aire therein is concerned in their strokes. Answerably to which notion he calls *Matter* ἑδωλον καὶ φάντασμα ὄγκου, the shadow and phantasm of bulk; and adds further, that it is τὸ ἀντερεῖδον μὴ ἔχον, a thing that has no resistency. For τὸ ἀντερεῖδον μὴ ἔχον answers to what he speaks to the same purpose in his \* sixth *Ennead*, Οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁρατὴς τὸ ἀντιτυπὲς αὐτῇ δὲ δόξασι. And therefore in his \* second *Ennead* he styles *Matter* ὄγκου ἐπιτηδεύουσα, only a preparation or Capacity of bulk, as appears in that he calls it also κενὸν ὄγκον, an empty bulk, and in the eighth Chapter flatly denies that it has either rarity or density or magnitude.

\* *Ennead*. 3. lib.  
6. cap. 9.

Lib. 6. cap. 7.

\* Lib. 1. cap. 28.

\* Lib. 4. cap. 11.

\* Lib. 6. cap. 14.  
15.

\* *Ennead*. 2. lib.  
4. cap. 8.

\* Lib. 4. cap. 9.  
\* Lib. 6. cap. 6.

And further expressing the desolate condition of the *Matter* in his \* third *Ennead*, he calls it τὴν ἀειπεσσομένην πένιαν, and τὴν πάντων ἐρημίαν, an ever-craving penury and universal desolateness, whose want is rather mocked then supplied: the *Forms* it seems to receive being like the Echoes in hollow solitudes, not imbibed, but rebounded, nothing sticking of what it participates, but being as a Looking-glass, which rather reflects then receives images. Which is consonant to what \* elsewhere he writes, Δεῖ δὲ αὐτῷ μὴ σύνθετον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῆς φύσει, ἕνω γὰρ πάντων ἐρημία. That the nature of Hyle must not be compound, but simple and one, that it may be void of all: which shews how fitly it is ranged in the First day's work. Besides that he plainly declares, Ὅτι ἡ ὕλη ἐν τῇ ἰσότητι ἀσωμάτων, That Hyle or Matter is in the rank of Incorporeals, both in his \* second and \* third *Ennead*.

Such plentiful expressions are there in *Plotinus* that answer to *Moses* his וְהוּא רֵקֵם, which signifies Vacuity and Emptiness, or κενωμα καὶ ἐδρὰ, according to *Theodotion*. We have already intimated that Hyle is called ἐκβάστα and ἔδρα, which answer to the Stability of the Earth, the first Appellation of the *Mosaic Hyle*. And *Plotinus* is very express in that similitude of the Echo to which he compares the *Forms* which the *Matter* is said to receive: \* Ἀλλ' ἔμεινεν ἡ αὐτὴ ἡ ὕλη ἐδρὰ δεξαμένη, ἀλλ' ὅπως αὐτὴ πρὸς ὁδόν, ὡς ἔδρα ἀπαυθυμένη. In which words he compares the *Matter* to a fixed seat against which the *Forms* do as it were hit, but do not sink in, so that he will have the *Matter* to remain as before, unchanged and unmovable.

\* *Ennead*. 3. lib.  
6. cap. 14.

movable. Accordingly as he also expresses himself in the eleventh Chapter, That the *Matter* has neither more nor less by the access or recess of *Forms*,  $\mu\eta\delta\epsilon\ \delta\ \delta\ \epsilon\lambda\alpha\rho\chi\eta\varsigma\ \lambda\omega$ . Which word  $\mu\eta\delta\epsilon$  he often uses in setting out the steddiness and immutableness of the *Matter*, in that sense that *Plato* uses it speaking of the stability of the *Earth*,  $\text{Μένει δ' ἐξία ἐν θεῶν οἴκῳ μόνη}$ . So that these flitting *Forms* and *Matter* are as the Generations of men and the *Earth*, *One generation goeth and another cometh, but the Earth standeth fast for ever.*

Eccles. i. 4.

3. That also sutes very well with the third Appellation of the *Mosaick Hyle* (namely *Abyffe*) which *Plotinus* has in his \* second *Ennead*.  $\text{Τὸ δ' βᾶθος ἐκείνου ἢ ὕλη, διὸ ἐ σκολεῖν ἅπαντα}$ , That the Profundity of everything (he calls it the  $\text{τὸ ἔχρατον}$  \* elsewhere) is the *Matter*; and therefore is ever dark. Which *Darkness* is a fourth Property of the *Mosaick Matter*, and on which *Plotinus* insists pretty copiously in this \* second *Ennead*, and contends we can have no other notion of it, it being  $\text{οἷον ὁφθαλμῷ τὸ σκοτεινόν}$ , as darkness is to the Eye: and that the Soul can no otherwise see it ἢ ὡς ἀχρημοσύνην ἐ ὡς ἀχρησιαν ἢ ὡς ἀλαμπές. And a little after,  $\text{Τῆτο νοεῖ ἀμυδρῶς ἀμυδρὸν, καὶ σκοτεινῶς σκοτεινόν, καὶ νοεῖ ὃ νοεῖται}$ , as a man sees darkness. And lastly, that he may not seem not to have touched, at least, every part of the *Mosaick* description of the *First Matter*, what *Moses* may mean by the mobility of the Waters *Plotinus* has expressed by  $\text{τὸ ἀόριστον}$ , or ἡ ἀορισία, the *Indefiniteness* or *Undeterminateness* of *Matter*.

\* Lib. 4. c. 5.

\* Ennead. i. lib. 8. cap. 7.

\* Lib. 4. c. 16.

4. And truly I think what we have produced hitherto bids fair for a proof that he means no substantialler a Being by *Matter* then what may well be called *Metaphysical*. But he speaks broader, and yet more compendiously, in his \* third *Ennead*, where (as \* *Clemens* also says *Plato* styles the *Matter*) he calls it  $\text{τὸ ἀληθινῶς μὴ ὂν}$ , That which is truly *Non-Entity*: and a little after further describing it,  $\text{ὅτι τὸ ὂν ἐν φαντασίᾳ ὅτι ὂν ἔστι}$ , Whose Entity being but in imagination is no Being: And in chapter the thirteenth he declares, That if *Matter* would keep herself what she is,  $\text{ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν μὴ μόνον τῶν ὄντων ἀδεκτον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ τι μέρημα αὐτῶν. καὶ τέτοιον ἀμεινον εἰς οἰκίωσιν εἶναι}$ , she must necessarily be unreceptive of all Entities: nay, if there be but the least shadow of them, she must not share therein, that she may conserve to herself her own property.

\* Lib. 6. cap. 7.

\* Strom. lib. 5.

5. But the Philosopher is so severe in such expressions, that he seems to strip *Matter* more naked then she really ought to be. But he is more moderate in others, where he will permit her to be the Possibility of the outward & sensible World, and only argues her to be no Entity, because she is only this Possibility. As in *Ennead* the \* sixth,  $\text{Εἰ γὰρ δυάμεις ἔστιν ὁ μέλλει ἔσεσθαι, ἐκείνο δ' μὴ ἐστία, ἐδ' ἂν αὐτὴ ἐστία}$ , For if that be only Potentiality which is to come, and that which is to come no Essence or Substance; *Matter*, which is but Potentiality, is no Substance or Essence. And in *Ennead* the \* second he will allow *Matter* to be Essence in Reversion.  $\text{Τὸ εἶναι αὐτῇ μόνον τὸ μέλλον ἐπαγγελόμενον}$ , The Being of *Matter* is only an expected or promised Being, or, as I said, a Being in reversion. And toward the end of the Chapter he concludes,  $\text{Εἴπερ ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὸ εἶναι, δεῖ αὐτὸ ἐνεργεῖν μὴ εἶναι, ἵνα ἐκβεβηκὸς ὧ ἀληθῶς εἶναι ἐν τῷ μὴ εἶναι ἐχρητὸ εἶναι}$ . And in the close of all,  $\text{Εἴπερ ἄρα δεῖ ἀνώλεθρον τὴν ὕλην περιεῖν, ὕλην αὐτὴν}$

\* Lib. i. cap. 27.

\* Lib. 5. cap. 5.



δεῖ πρεῖν, τέλει, δυνάμει λέγειν αὐτὴν εἶναι μόνον ἢ αὐτὴ ὅτι ὄν. The sense of both which sentences is but this, That the *Essence* of *Matter* excludes real *Existence*, and consists only in *Capacity* or *Possibility of Being*. Whence it is manifest, That this *Platonical Hyle* which I have applied to the *First Day's* Creation may rightly be called *Metaphysical*, or, if you will, that which has but the most evanid *Metaphysical* Entity be called *Hyle*, which was the thing aimed at.

6. But now there is a more dangerous Quære that emerges out of the Answer to the former, namely, How this mere *Capacity* or *Possibility* of corporeal and sensible Beings can be said to be created. For this *Possibility* and *Capacity* seems to be of it self, and to need no Creation. But I answer, That *Creation* is nothing else but an *Emanation* of the Creature from God, as \* *Aquinas* has determined; and I say, that this *Possibility* and *Capacity* of things is the utmost *Projection* or *Emanation* from the *Divine* Existence, and would not be without Him. For if He were not, every thing else would be impossible to be. Therefore this *Possibility* depending on Him, and being not a mere nothing according to the *Metaphysicians*, who allow *Ens in potentia* to be truly *Ens* as well as *Ens actu*, it is rightly said to be *created* by Him. And if *Creation* be *ex nihilo*, this is much more eminently so then any, that which is below it being the most absolute *Non-ens* that is conceivable; which is, as I said, *Impossibility*, which would be the state of all things were there not a God.

7. The third and last Quære is, why *Moses* should take notice of so blank and evanid a business as this mere *Possibility* of the external Creation. For what good is there to consider that the *Possibility* of an House or Statue is before the *Masons* and *Statuaries* making of them? But I answer, The reason is not the same, there being an infinite difference betwixt the whole Universe and an House or Statue, and betwixt God and a Mason or Statuary. And therefore in such vast things as God and the Universe every minute consideration will be great: and we see that humane understanding has ever thought it so. For mens minds have been much puzzled and plunged in the diving down to the lowest and last ground of all things, which they call *Hyle*, and have commonly defined it such as I have described it, a mere *Potentiality*.

Besides, is that a contemptible Notion or Speculation, to consider that the very *Possibility of other Beings* is from God; and that it is impossible for any thing to be without Him? For as it is an Aphorism most true, so is it also very closely connex with Piety and Religion; and such a Philosophy we are to expect from so holy a man as *Moses*.

And lastly, when we say, This *Hyle* is the *Potentiality* or *Capacity* of things, it involves also in it *Incompossibility*, as being a *finite* Capacity or Possibility. And therefore from hence there will be a necessary sequel of such things as are accounted evil in the World. For such a *Capacity* or *Possibility* as is but *finite* dwells next door to *Necessity*, the Mother of Mischief, as is intimated in the *Pythagorick* verses, though upon another occasion,

—Δυνάμει γὰρ ἀνάγκης ἐγγύδι ταίς.

\* *Aquinas* in  
1. qu. 45.

Nor can I make any allowable sense of \* *Plato's* Ἀνάγκη πολλὰ πρὸ θεῶν \* *Plutarch. de Anima Præ-creatione.* of his *Necessity that does refractorily and untemperately resist and oppose God*, but this *Impossibility* of the Creation. But in that he calls it ἀπακλόν ψυχὴν & κακοποιόν, and ψυχὴν ἐναντίαν & ἀντίπαλον τῇ ἀγαθουργῳ, is either a ranting piece of Rhetorick, or rather Poetry, or else a gross mistake of *Moses* his Text (for that he was acquainted with it I have intimated before) he interpreting אלהים in such a sense as the *Literal Cabbala* has expressed it, which he conceived to be the effect of this ψυχὴ ἀπακλὸν & κακοποιὸν which he imagined.

8. But the face of the *First Matter* in *Moses* is horrid and dismal enough without any such freakish conceits fetch'd from the misunderstanding of the *Literal Cabbala*, to make it bewray its own guilt and accessoriness to those evils that happen in the World. And being no other then such as has been hitherto described out of *Plotinus*, *Plotinus* himself does notwithstanding lamentably complain of the mischiefs arising out of it, in his Περὶ τοῦ πᾶτος, & πόθεν τὰ κακά, where he defines this *Hyle* to be κακὴ οὐσία, and τὸ παρωπτον κακόν, *The essence of Evil*, and the *First or Original Evil*; and giving a reason of what evil there is in the World, he writes thus, Μεμυγμένη γὰρ ἐν δὴ ἡ τῷδε τοῦ κόσμου φύσις ἐκ τε νῦν & ἀνάγκης, & ὅσα παρὰ θεῦ εἰς αὐτὸν ἦκη ἀγαθὰ, τὰ δὲ κακὰ ἐκ τῆ ἀρχαίας φύσεως τῆ \* ὕλης λεγομένης. *That the world is mixt of Intellect and Necessity, and that those things that come from God are good, but the evils are from that antique Nature which is called Hyle.* But it is, I must confess, pretty humourously spoken of him to call this *Hyle* antique, unless it be merely in reference to particular vanishing shows in the World: For the World it self is as antique as this *Hyle* according to his own doctrine elsewhere. As in his fifth \* *Ennead*, where he makes the Universe a necessary Emanation of God, and the natural Image of the *Eternal Intellect*: and thence inferres, Πᾶσα δὲ φύσις ἐκὼν ἔστιν ὅσον ἂν τὸ ἀρχέτυπον μένη. And in \* another place, Ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔστιν ὁ Κόσμος, & ὅσα ἐκ λογισμῦ γενόμενα, ἀλλὰ φύσεως ἀμείνονος γεννώσης κατὰ φύσιν ὁμοίον ἑαυτῇ. And in the foregoing chapter to this Citation he says the very same thing, Γέγονε δὲ ὁ Κόσμος ὃς λογισμῷ τῷδε εἶναι, ἀλλὰ δὲ δούλεως φύσεως ἀνάγκη, *That the World was not made by consultation and reason that it ought to be so, but by the immediate Necessity of the emanation of an After-Nature.* Which Conclusions of *Plotinus* if they be true, I should think this as eminent a reason as any why the *Pythagoreans* called the *Decad*, which is their Symbol of the Universe, Ἀνάγκη, that is, *Necessity*.

But I the more willingly made this excursion, because it makes for the more easy understanding of what I was a going to adde for the further proving that *Plotinus* makes *Hyle* the Root of all evils. In the first \* *Ennead*, as before, Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐν ὃ μόνον τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀνάγκη τῇ ἐκβάσει, τῇ παρ' αὐτοῦ ὑποστάσει, ἢ, εἰ ἔτιω τις ἐδέλθῃ λέγειν, τῇ αἰεὶ ὑποστάσει & δυνάμει, τὸ ἔχον, & μεθ' ὃ ὅσα ἦν ἐπὶ γενέσθαι ὅπου, τῷ τῷδε τὸ κακόν. Ἐξ ἀνάγκης δὲ τῷδε τὸ μὲν τὸ παρωπτον, ὡς & τὸ ἔχον. τῷ τῷδε ἡ ὕλη μὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ ἔχοντι αὐτῷ, & αὐτὴ ἡ ἀνάγκη τῷ κακῷ. *For since that the Sovereign Goodness is not alone, it must needs be that, by an Egression, or gradual Subsidiency or Descent or Distance from it, the Extreme, and after which it was im-*

*Ennead. i. lib. 8. cap. 7.*

\* See *Psychologia Cant. i. Stanz. 9, 44, 45.*

\* *Lib. 9. cap. 12.*

\* *Ennead. 5. lib. 2. c. 3.*

\* *Lib. 3. cap. 7.*

*possible*



possible there should be any thing, that this must be the Evil. And of necessity there is something after the First, so that there must be an Extreme. And this is Hyle or Matter, having nothing of the First, and this is the Necessity of Evil: namely so far forth as this Hyle has nothing of the First, nor is capable thereof. Which is as much as to say, that the *Impossibility* or *Incommensurability* in the lowest creation of things (and such is this Corporeal World) is this *Ἀνάγκη*, this *Necessity of Evil*. That there would be an *Impossibility* of all things if there were no God, but there is now an *Impossibility* or *Incommensurability* in these lower things notwithstanding that there is one: as it is impossible that the edge of a Knife and the back should be alike strong.

Which considerations of this *Metaphysical Hyle* are not so trivial, nay are rather so weighty, that they may very well be thought worthy of *Moses* his distinctly taking notice of them in that squallid and horrid hew he sets out this *Hyle* or *First Matter* in, in the First Day's Creation, and for these reasons, his having made it part of the First Day's work. For it is such a truth as deserves a serious meditation; nor can it misbecome a Philosopher to speculate the First grounds of those effects for which all-foreseeing Providence has so expressly fitted the generality of mankind, in furnishing them for the reception of such odd and cross occurrences with those high and histrionical Passions of *Laughter* and *Weeping*. So plain is it that our making this *Metaphysical Hyle* to be signified by the *void and formless Earth* enveloped with waters and darkness, is a sound and unexceptionable Interpretation.

## C H A P. IX.

1. *A new Supposition concerning Hyle, as if it were an actual material Substance, and how applicable Moses his description is thereunto.* 2. *How it can be referred to the First Day's Creation, of which an Unite is the character.* 3. *How it will be found to be the Interior Waters in the Philosophical sense.* 4. *What coagulated the Monadical consistence of this Physical Hyle into a capacity of becoming Æther or the Second Day's work.* 5. *That the supposition of this Physical Hyle is very passable, if of Monadical consistence; otherwise intolerable.*

1. **B**UT if it will be an ease to any mans mind to have a more plump and perceptible Object couched under this name *Hyle*, the Text peradventure is not altogether incapable of it. For suppose we should make this *Hyle* real and actual Matter, consisting of those perfect *Parvitudes* (which I have \* elsewhere described) actually divided one from another, and equally charged with so much motion or thereabout as is now conserved in the World; the attributes of that *Hyle* described in *Moses* will agree very well thereto.

For first, it will be *ἰδρα* and \* *ὑποβάδρα* a ground and seat for Forms: and being thus a Sustentacle or Foundation, be fitly represented by the term

\* *Immortal.*  
Book 1. ch. 6.  
also *Pref. sect. 3.*

\* *Plotin. Ennead. 6. lib. 1.*  
c. 28.

term *Earth*. As also it will be such a *BzD* or *Profundity* as the name *Abyss* may well reflect upon, it being the *deepest* or *lowest* of the real Creation. Then for *Vacuity* and *Emptiness*, this *Hyle* is utterly empty of all sensible Forms (and we suppose it as yet not joyn'd with any Substantial ones) and is not so much as *thin* or *thick* to the touch, because not perceptible at all, and is truly that τὸ μετ' ἀναδυσίας ἀπλόν which

\* Chap. 8.  
sect. 2.

\* *Plato* ventured at, it being indeed tangible in it self, but not so to the touch of man or Angel, by reason of the infinite subtilty of the consistency thereof. And must needs be therefore as a *void Solitude* and *empty Space*, a mere *Vacuum* as to the search of any created sense; which roving up and down could finde no crassitude any where but what these perfect *Parvities* have, which are so infinitely subtile that no Touch can perceive them, so that all will seem as absolutely *empty* and *void*.

And thirdly, this *vast Solitude* will be as *dark* as *Pitch*, insomuch that

if the Sun were where it is now, and the rest of the *Vortex* were of this consistency of *Matter* I describe, it would be as black as *Midnight*, as I could easily demonstrate.

And lastly, for the *Fluidity* or *Waterishness* of it, it is infinitely more *Water*, that is to say, more *fluid* then *Water* it self; and if *Thales* his opinion had any truth in it, it must be found here. But \* *Aristotle* seems to make this the Philosophy of far ancients Sages, Such, saith he, as made *Oceanus* and *Tethys* the fathers of Generation, τὴ γένεσιν πατέρας, (for so he speaks) and taught that *Water*, namely *Styx*, was the Oath of the Gods. Τιμώτατον δὲ τὸ προσεχέτατον, ὅρκος ὃ τιμώτατον ἔστιν. And certainly such a *Water* as this *Hyle* is which I have described, which the Sun cannot so enlighten as to be seen through it, or any light from the Sun, must be a *Stygian* water indeed: and it is here observable that the *Pythagoreans* called the *Monad Styx*. So fitly does the nature of this *Physical Hyle* thus described agree with those Attributes in *Moses* his Text.

\* Metaphysic.  
lib. 1. c. p. 3.

2. But how will you be able, will you say, to make it sute with the character of the Day, namely with an *Unite* or *Monad*, and so carry things down into the *Second Day's* work so as you do in your *Metaphysical Hyle*, which you make the *Waters under the Firmament*, and that *Firmament* the vastly-extended matter, which is properly *divisible*, and therefore denoted by the *Binary*, and being framed into an *Ethereal* consistency is called *Heaven*, which environs every *Earth*, as lying next to the *Physical* waters thereof, which are every where to be gathered together into one place, &c?

I must confess, that the nature of the *Physical Matter* being *divisible*, and the *Binary* so expresse a note thereof, and the *Metaphysical* ἐν πᾷ ἀπλοῦ καὶ ἀσώματον, as \* *Plotinus* has described it, I could not withhold but conclude, That the *Metaphysical Hyle* belonged to the *First* day, and the *Physical* to the *Second*. Which is a very sober and safe Interpretation, as appears from what has been said. But I shall hold on, and try how tolerable the other will prove.

Chap. 8. sect. 2.  
\* Ennead. 2.  
lib. 4. cap. 8.

I say therefore, That this *Physical Hyle*, as I have described it, is also ἐν πᾷ ἀπλοῦ καὶ ἀσώματον, in a very considerable sense. It is *one* and *simple*, that is to say, exactly *uniform* every where, and *indivisible* into any parts



parts that are of a *different* nature; whereas the *Firmament* in the Second Day is distinguishable into the *First* and *Second* Element. And then again, as to any sense it is as good as *incorporeal*, being only ἀπὸν μὲτ' ἀναδυσίας, as *Plato* has phrased it to our hands, and therefore may well be ranged amongst incorporeal Beings. But besides, it consisting of actual *perfect Parvities* and of nothing else, which are so many *Physical Monads*, and utterly *indivisible* in themselves, as the incorporeal Beings created the First day are, but separable, as they likewise are, one from another; it may unforcedly be referred to the *First* day's work.

3. But now as touching the *Waters under the Firmament*; This *Physical Hyle* thus considered with all that ἀόρισία and *fluid Undeterminatenesse* of the Possibility of corporeal Creatures which is necessarily inherent in it, will be fitly and expressly enough those *inferiour Waters*. And the הַרְקִיעַ or הַשָּׁמַיִם the *Firmament* or *Heaven*, will be an Order of Being betwixt this *Physical Hyle* (wherein is comprised the abovesaid Possibility of things and *Indeterminateness*) and those *Immaterial Beings* that descend εἰς γένεσιν, and are noted by the name of *Superiour Waters* or *Waters above the Firmament*. For this thin Primordial Water consisting of mere *Physical Monads* was before the *Firmament*, and filled all. Out of this, and in order next above it, was the *Heaven* or *Firmament*, or, as the *Greeks* call it, *Aether*; and next above this *Aether*, and which was created before it, is that part of the *World of Life* that descends into *generation*. This is the Order of things; and it is easily intelligible, you will say, that the *Aether* is a *middle Term* betwixt those two *Extremes*, the *Physical Hyle* and the *World of Life*.

4. But you will farther demand how this *Primordial Water*, this *Hyle* consisting of mere *Physical Monads*, should ever coagulate or cruddle into that consistency of the *Aether*, which is made up of the *globular* particles and of that thinner Element, but both much grosser than the first consistency of the Matter. But to this I have nothing to answer, but that that which in the efformation of Animals coagulates the first humid Matter there into such organized consistency of several degrees and uses, the same also coagulated this primordial consistency of the Matter of the World into such different degrees of crassitude as was fit to produce those two Elements of which the *Aether* does consist: and that though the World be a *Machina*, yet the *Mechanick* or *Artificer* is not Matter, but some other Principle in the *World of Life*.

Wherefore the *Monadical* consistency of the Matter being lost in the production of the *Aether*, and it expressly falling also into two distinct principles, which *Cartesius* has judiciously taken notice of, the Creation of this *Aether* or *Heaven* does naturally come under the character of the *Binary*, and is fittingly placed in the *Second* Day.

Nor is it needful to adde how all things will now go on orderly as before, and how this *Aether* will environ the *Physical* or *Sensible* waters that cover the Earths, in which joynt the *Literal* and *Philosophical Cabbala* easily fall in together, as they do in the Fifth and Sixth Day's Creation. Nor does it belong to this place to consider, how after the *Stygian* Darknes of these *Primordial Waters*, the Matter being coagulated, as was abovesaid,

said, and set upon *Vortical* Motion, *Light* dawned out in infinite parts of the World, and the whole Heavens at last glistered bright with innumerable Suns or Stars, this speculation appertaining altogether to the *Fourth* Day's Work.

5. In the interim, it is plain that this new Interpretation is very passable: and though the Authority of *Plotinus* and the *Platonists* bear strong toward the first, whose suffrage may justly seem the more considerable, they being of the succession in the Philosophick *Cabbala*; yet that venerable Father of the Church, *S<sup>t</sup> Austine*, favours this second, and *Plato* himself calling *Matter* ἐμπυρῆον ὁ μὲν πρῶτος, seems to insinuate that it is more then *Metaphysical*; as also *Plutarch* his affirming that both *Plato* and *Aristotle* make the *Matter* σωματικὴν. But if this *Physical Hyle* be not conceived to have been of a *Monadical* consistence at first, this Interpretation which upon that *Hypothesis* is so plausible, or rather unexceptionable, will without it be found intolerable. For this *Hyle* will then be necessarily devolved to the *Binary*, or else the *Pythagorick* Numbers will signify nothing at all. But admitting it to have been of such a consistence at first, all things will follow smoothly and easily, and either Exposition prove fit and rational to any indifferent judgment; but which to prefer I leave to the liberty of the peruser. And yet I cannot abstain from casting in thus much in the behalf of this latter, That *Generation* is out of that which is more liquid then what is generated; and that there is nothing more liquid then the Heavens, unless this *Primordial* Water of *Monadical* consistence, this ancient *Styx*, the solemn Oath of the Gods, as you heard out of *Aristotle*.

## CHAP. X.

1. *The Fourth Objection*, taken from the preposterous placing the Suns in the *Fourth* Day and the Earths in the *Third*. 2. *The Answers*; First, That the inflexible Order of those Six mystical Numbers of the Creation was intended only as a Repository for memory and concealment, not for a book of accurately-digested Method. 3. Secondly, That the Method is not so reprehensible as is pretended, the Earth rightly following the *Æther* (which is the *Second* day's work) as the immediate effect thereof; 4. As does the garnishing of the Earth also (as the first assured effect of the conjunction of the Active Principle with the *Æther* in the *Second* Day) but rightly precedes the *Fourth* day's work, as the End or Object thereof. 5. That it was not needful, nor it may be possible, that one and the same series of Text should bear a threefold sense with the same exactness of order in things belonging to each of them.

1. **T**HE Fourth Objection is, That the Order of those things comprised in the Six days creation, according to the Philosophick *Cabbala*, is harsh and preposterous; the work of the Fourth day being more naturally to be placed in the Third, Suns being before  

R r r
Planets,



Planets, and Planets before there can be Earths to be garnished with Rivers, Plants and Flowers. And therefore according to the Priority of Nature the Creation of *Suns* and *Planets* should have been placed before the garnishing of the *Earth* with Sea, Rivers and Plants.

2. But I answer, That the Objection is made upon this mistake, as if the external *Cortex* of the Text of *Moses* in this order of the Six daies Creation were a Covering of limber silk, not a Cabinet made of hard Materials, and so figured and framed that every part cannot be alike capable of receiving of every thing into it. Wherefore the rule of placing things must be the Cabinet it self, not *our* desire or phancy that would place them. Just so the case stands in this *mystical Repository* made up of the six first Numbers, whose natures are *immutable* and *inflexible*, and their order not to be *transposed* or *inverted*. And therefore those noble Truths of Philosophy that are to be couched or concealed under them, are to be laid in such as are *most significative* of them, and in *such order* as the Numbers themselves stand. From whence it was necessary that the garnishing of the Earth should precede the adorning of the Universe with Suns and Planets, because the Number *Three* precedes the Number *Four*; and these were the *fittest Numeral Boxes*, as I may so speak, for the receiving those great Truths hid in the Third and Fourth day's Creation into this mysterious Cabinet: which is only the *Repository of memory* and *mystical concealment*, not a Book of natural and accurately-digested Method; but yet not the less serviceable for the occasional imparting these Mysteries to them that were thought worthy of them: which could not be without fuller Converse, wherein all things would be orderly and methodically unfolded.

3. And this Answer I hold so substantial, that I account it superfluous to adde any thing more, though I might also contend that the order of the things themselves is not so unnatural as is pretended. For the *Second* day's work is the *Aether* or *Heaven*, which consists of the *first* and *second* Element of *Des-Cartes*, whose *third* Element, which yet is the effect of the *first*, is all that of which the Earths consist. In what a natural order therefore does the consideration of the *Earth* succeed that of the *Firmament* or *Heaven* as the effect thereof, and so take place in the *Third* Day? For though, by reason of some circumstance, as namely of the gathering together of the subtiler part of the *Aether* by the recession of the *Vortex* into the form of a Sun, the Earth may be look'd upon as the Third from the *Aether* in order of production, and for this cause the *Ternary* be fitly called *Τετράων* in *Pythagoras* his School; yet it is also really an immediate product of that subtle principle in the *Aether*, and which is as much *Aether* as the other Principle therein. Wherefore the placing the *Earth* immediately after the *Aether* is, in this respect, according to natural Order, and may pass for tolerable Method.

4. The Garnishing also thereof with Land and Sea, Trees, Grasse and Flowers, is the first assured effect of that *Active Principle* united with Matter, mentioned in the *Second* Day's work. So that the *Earth* with its vegetative Garnishings does orderly enough succeed the Making of the *Heaven* or *Aether*, but needs not be said to be created the *Third* day, because

cause an *Earth* and *Primary Planet* being all one, it is comprised in the Creation of the Fourth. Wherefore the *Earths* with their furniture succeed the *Second Day's* creation as an *Effect* thereof, but precede the *Fourth Day's* Creation, as being an *Object* of those things that are there said to be created. For the Sun, Moon and Stars are made to shine upon the Earth, and send down their influences thereon for the seasonable resuscitations of the Seminal Powers of Plants and Herbs. So that the *Earth* seems to be the *Finis Cui* of the Creation of the *Luminaries* of Heaven as *Luminaries*, and therefore according to the *Priority of Nature* rightly enough precedes, whether as the *Final Cause* or *Object* of their Influence: As both the *Furniture* of the *Earths* and the *Luminaries* of *Heaven* precede in order, as *Objects* of the Senses of Man and other Animals that are said to be created on the *Fifth* and *Sixth* daies:

And thus the Order of the whole *Six* days Creation in the Philosophical sense is natural enough and Logically coherent, though not everywhere under the notion of *Causality*, nor this *Causality* every where that of the *Efficient*.

5. And it had been a needless Miracle, and it may be impossible, to contrive one and the same Text to answer in accurate Order to the popular Appearances of things, to the severity of Philosophick Truth, and the Moral Allegory at once. With all which this Text of *Moses* is charged, & does to admiration make good the design as to all considerable intents & purposes: but an exact concatenation of the Series of things throughout is more then ought to be expected, no such Accuracy being industriously intended, but only that the *Order* of Numbers according to their *significancy* should be a *Repository* of *Notes* and *Remembrances*; but the management of the *Cabbala* it self, (that is, of the ancient Philosophy of the *Jewes*;) left to the skill of the *Mystagogus*, when he was consulted, who would not fail to declare all things in a due and natural Method.

## CHAP. XI.

1. *The Fifth Objection answered, concerning the pretended Trivialness of the Fifth Day's Work:*
2. *As also of the work of the Sixth day.*
3. *An Answer to the Sixth Objection, against that Τεεολογια implied in our Interpretation of Paradise; First, in reference to Grammar and Criticism:*
4. *Secondly, in reference to the nature of things themselves.*
5. *An Answer to the Last Objection, made against the interpreting the Cherubim and Flaming Sword to be a state that Adam must pass through or into, before he can become immortal.*
6. *That there was a necessity of so punctually and continuedly fitting a Philosophical sense to Moses his Text, because of the Interruption of the Tradition of the Mosaick Philosophy.*



1. **A**S for the pretended *Trivialness* of the *Fifth* and *Sixth* Day's work ; I think it is apparent from what we have noted on the *Fifth* Day, that *Moses* his ranging of *Fish* and *Fowl* together is a consideration not *vulgar* and *trivial*, but *Philosophical*. And his *Distinctly* allotting them a *Morning* and *Evening*, that is, an *Active* and *Passive* principle, is the pointing at a Truth very weighry, and useful for the giving a timely stop to that dangerous mistake of making mere *Matter* capable of sense and cogitation ; which would be a great prejudice to the belief of the Existence of humane Souls themselves.

2. And for the *Sixth* day's work, there is yet less reason for such a Detraction. For, first, he is Philosophically judicious in reckoning *Man* amongst the *Mediterraneous Animals*, because the conformation of their inward parts especially is nearer one another then to either that of *Birds* or *Fishes* : And the external similitude of *Mankind* with *Apes* (whose *species* are many) is so near also, and goes off so by degrees to those that are more throughly *Quadrupedal*, that it is evident that men and they are held together naturally in one subordinate rank and *Series*. And then again, that is of very great moment, there being this nearness and affinity in outward and inward conformation of parts betwixt *Men* and *Beasts*, especially some kind of *Apes*, so distinctly and expressly to declare that *Man* notwithstanding is of a condition *highly raised* above them, and of a nature *plainly Divine*, being in respect of his Soul the Image and Likeness of God ; and ( which is remarkable ) not less such for her actuating this Terrestrial body as God does the World : as is insinuated in the *Cabbala* it self, and is so weighty a Philosophical truth, that it is not fit for every mans consideration.

Nor is the mention of their multiplication, which refers to the contrivance of the genital Organs in all Creatures, both in the *Fifth* and *Sixth* day, as also of the provision of food, low and trivial, but noble speculations, and the grand pledges of a Divine Providence. So widely are they mistaken that think thus meanly of what is mentioned in the *Fifth* and *Sixth* day's Creation.

3. The Sixth Objection is against our going back in our Exposition of the eighth verse of the second *Chapter*, and fetching things higher then from the Efformation of *Adam* out of the ground ; whenas, according to the order of the Narration, *after Adam* was made, God planted him a Garden to solace himself in, &c. But I answer, that I have done no violence to *Grammar* at all in this my Exposition that seems thus preposterous. For *Vatablus* himself reads it, *Plantaverat autem Deus*, &c. And I only adjoyn, & *posuerat illic hominem quem formavit*, for his & *posuit quem formaverat* : For the *Preterimperfect*, *Preterperfect*, and *Preterpluperfect* Tenses are expressed all alike in the Hebrew. And that I have in the *Cabbala* inserted *postea* [which *afterward* he formed into a terrestrial Animal] both the mention immediately preceding of that kind of Efformation and the propriety of the word יצר warrants me to it. For this *Terrestrial* efformation of *Adam* was *after* the planting of *Paradise*, according to the wiser sort of them that understand the Text only literally,

rally, who acknowledge that *Paradise* was made on the *Third Day*, when God caused the Trees to germinate out of the Earth. And therefore it is not harsh to take the same liberty in our *Philosophick Cabbala*.

4. But now if we respect the *things themselves*, and the strict *Philosophical* sense of them, the order of the Narration according to our Exposition is admirably natural and easie: this History of *Paradise* and *Adam's* fall from that Happiness being immediately subjoyned to the repetition of his *Terrestrial Efformation*, as containing the cause and reason why so noble a Creature as Man should ever appear in this *Terrestrial* body, whereby he is ranked amongst Brutes. It insinuates therefore that it was not so at first with him, but that God had placed him in a more Heavenly condition, and that by the temptation of the Devil he fell from that state, and sinking by degrees was at last absorpt into *Terrestrial* generation, and was clad in the *skins of Beasts*.

And there are of the Jews that interpret this very *Paradise* of a state before the World was created, reckoning it amongst the *seven things* that were created before the World. From whence it does plainly follow, that if *Adam* was placed in this *Paradise*, he was before he appeared in an *Earthly Body*. Which is expressly the Opinion of the Jews, as appears from what \* *Menasseh Ben Israel* cites out of *Gemara Haguiga*: \* *De Creat. 4*  
*In cælo Empyreo esse domicilia vite, & pacis, & animarum justorum & Probl. 15.*  
*Spirituum, atque etiam animarum istarum que in Mundum ventura sunt. sect. 5.*  
 And out of *Berehith Rabba* he saith, That the wise men of his Nation interpret that of the Psalms, *Post & ante me formasti*, of the creating *Adam*, *Psalm. 139. 4.*  
 that is, mankind, *first* in the *First* day, and *after* in the *Sixth*.

*Adam* was therefore created amongst the *Angelical Orders* part of the *First Day's* Creation, when God made *Heaven* or *Light*. All which Intellectual Orders of Beings then created are called *Heaven* and *Light*, because, as I have intimated \* before, their first and immediate vestment or Vehicle is *lucid* or *Aethereal*, in which they stood Probationers. And it would be no less then a Demonstration that this was their first state, if after the discussion of the darkness of the *Chaos*, speaking *Physically*, all the World was either light or diaphanous, I mean either *Suns* or *Ether*; as it would naturally be, if the Original of all Planets were the *Incrustation* of Stars or *Suns*. But this is an Excursion so wilde or so wide, that I am awakened, as it were with a fright, out of this *Reverie* or *Dream*. \* *Chap. 7.*  
*sect. 8.*

5. The seventh and last Objection is against our interpreting the *Cherubim* and *flaming sword* (in the close of our *Cabbala*) to be a State that *Adam* or *Terrestrial Mankind* is to enter into, before they can be repossessed of the *celestial Paradise* and become capable of *Eternal Life*; whenas the Text seems to import that the *Cherubim* and *flaming sword* are not to let in, but to keep out *Adam* out of *Paradise*.

But to this I answer, That after God had driven *Adam* out of *Eden* to till the ground *לָקַח אֲדָם מִן הָאֲדָמָה* *from whence* the *Terrestrial Adam* is taken, or, if you will, *was taken*, according as was mentioned before, (for the Argument of the Narration was the *Terrestrial Adam*, what he had been and how he came to fall) after, I say, that *Adam* was turned out of *Paradise*, and that he became *Terrestrial* and *Mortal*, God (according to the



Text) is only said to place *Cherubims* and a flaming sword to keep the way of the Tree of Life. Which does not imply an utter prohibition of all passage, but a condition thereof, namely, that there is no passage but through this *Fiery Guard*. And it is as proper for a Porter or Guard to let in as to keep out. So little incongruity is there in the sense we have given in that respect.

And that these *Fiery flaming Cherubims* are an Hieroglyphick of a certain State that the *Terrestrial* man must passe into, before he can come to the enjoyment of a blessed Immortality, this is no private conceit of mine, but has the suffrage of no less then Five several Interpreters on the place; namely, *S<sup>t</sup> Ambrose*, *Origen*, *Lactantius*, *Basil*, and *Rupertus*, as *Cornelius à Lapide* affirms: who sayes, it is the joynt Opinion of them all, grounded upon this Text, to weet, That there is a Fire set before the entrance into Heaven, which all Souls must passe, *S<sup>t</sup> Peter* and *S<sup>t</sup> Paul* not excepted, that they may be tried and purged thereby, if there be any impurity in them. So warrantable is it to make these *Fiery Cherubims* an Emblem of some state or condition of the Soul, that must fit it for the tasting of the *Fruit* of the Tree of Immortality. But the phancying of this to be the passing through an *external* flame or Fire, I must confess I think has too much of the *Μυσθῶδες* and *Παυδαειῶδες* in it to be admitted for the sense of the Philosophick *Cabbala*.

Wherefore I interpreted it of the *Fiery* or *Aethereal Vehicle*, or of the condition of the *flaming Cherubims*, namely, That we cannot attain to the state of Immortality before we passe into this order of Beings, and become like unto them.

Whereas therefore it is said that these *Flaming Cherubims* keep the way to the Tree of Life, being placed before the Garden of *Eden*, it is but in such a sense as when *Hesiod* sayes,

Τὴν δ' αἰετὸν ἰδὲ πύλιν θεοὶ πομπὰ ἐπιδειν ἔεικλον,

That God has made Labour the porter of the Gate of Vertue; and in such as *Virgil* places Grief, and Care, and Sickness, and Old Age at the entrance of *Orcus*,

Vestibulum ante ipsum primisque in faucibus Orci

Luctus & ultrices posuere cubilia Curae, &c.

Of which certainly there is no other sense in either place, then that by being *laborious* a man shall attain unto *Vertue*, and no otherwaies; and that by being overcharged with *Care*, *Grief*, *Sickness*, or *Old age*, a man shall be sent packing into the state of the dead. So *Spencer*, to omit several other instances in him, in making those two grave personages, *Humilta* and *Ignaro*, the one the Porter of the House of Holiness, the other of the Castle of *Dneffa*, can understand nothing else thereby but this, That he that would enter into the House of Holiness must be like *Humilta*, an humble man; and he that can conscienciously passe into the communalty of the imposturous *Dneffa*, must be a very *Ignaro*.

In like manner, the sense of the placing these *flaming Cherubims* before Paradise and the gate to the Tree of Life, is only that they may be for an Hieroglyphical Representation, to shew what a one a man must be, or what state or condition he must partake of or pass into, before he can arrive

rive to a blessed Immortality ; namely, that he must recover his *fiery Vehicle*, be made *Angelical*, *אֱלֹהִים*, and enter as it were into the order and condition of the *Celestial Angels*. Which I think is so easie and unexceptionable a sense, that nothing can be more.

Unless peradventure it may seem still easier, if we superadde also, That the being assimilated to these *Cherubick Orders* is not without considerable Colluctation and Conflict, the Soul not being able to approach the *Angelical nature* in her *inward advances* but with pain and agonie. (*Who shall dwell with devouring fire ? who shall dwell with everlasting burnings ? He that walketh righteously, he shall dwell on high, &c.*) Which Colluctation, or, if you will, Digladiation, may be represented by the *flaming sword turning every way* : As if the meaning were, That he that would recover the capacity of eating of the *fruit of the Tree of Life*, must first undergoe the combat with the *fiery Angelical nature*, through which state he is to pass before he can come to be made partaker of life and immortality. For that *external Things and Persons* are the *Symbols and Hieroglyphicks of internal Dispensations* in Holy Scripture, is so trite and obvious, that I need not take notice thereof.

Isa. 33. 14, 15.

6. I have by this time, I hope, made all smooth and plain in my *Philosophical Cabbala*, and taken away every imaginable scruple concerning the fitness and concinnity of things and clearness of those grounds I goe on, and have so expressly and articulately in every punctilio fitted a Philosophical sense to the Letter of the Text, that I must confess I do not hold it probable that either *Pythagoras* or any one else had so particular and minute an account of the *Cabbala* thereof from any Jewish Priest or Prophet, supposing they had any at all, as my self have given. Not that I am so vain as to imagine with my self, that I have a certainer knowledge of the meaning of the *Mosaical Text* in this *Philosophical way* then they had ; but because it was not needful for them to insist upon so curiously fitting a sense to every clause thereof as I have done : they being able to perswade their inquisitive *Mysta* upon the faith of a continued Tradition, that this or that was the *Philosophical meaning of Moses* ; whenas this Tradition being interrupted so many Ages, I was necessitated to find a rational account or meaning of *every thing*, lest the probability of truth should be doubted in all.

Which if any one think too great a curiosity, as it may be it is, ( and yet why should a man conceit he has found any thing fit that was not intended by that Wisdome that prevents all thoughts ? ) he may content himself with those more plain and general strokes of the *Cabbala*, not expecting to find every passage of the Text concerned in such a *Philosophical sense* : For thus the whole Contexture will be as an *Apple of Gold with pictures of Silver*, as I have already noted out of *Maimonides*. But if I have fitted a *Philosophical sense* to every clause with that unexceptionableness that he can hardly refrain his assent, I hope he has no cause to complain that the *Cabbalist* has put into his hand a *Ball of pure and continued Gold*.



## CHAP. XII.

1. *The Cabbalist's Apologie whereby he would clear himself of the imputation of either trifling Curiosity, 2. Rashness in divulging such hidden Mysteries, 3. Or of Inconstancy in judgment. 4. The main Aime of his Philosophick Cabbala. 5. The reason of placing it before the Moral.*

1. **T**HUS much in Defence of my *Philosophick Cabbala*. It will not be unseasonable to subjoyn something by way of Apology for the *Cabbalist*: For I find my self liable to no lesse then three several imputations, *viz.* of *trifling Curiositie*, of *Rashnesse*, and of *Inconstancy of Judgement*.

And as for the first, I know that men that are more severely Philosophical and rational will condemn me of too much curious pains in applying *Natural* and *Metaphysical* Truths to an uncertain and lubricous Text or Letter; whenas they are better known and more fitly conveyed by their proper proof and arguments, then by fancying they are aimed at in such obscure and Ænigmatical Writings.

But I answer, There is that fit and full congruity of the *Cabbala* with the Text, besides the backing of it with advantages from the History of the first rise of the *Pythagorical* or *Platonical* Philosophy, that it ought not to be deemed a fancie, but a very high probability, That there is such a *Cabbala* as this belonging to the *Mosaical Letter*: especially if you call but to minde how luckily the nature of *Numbers* sets off the work of every day, according to the sense of the *Cabbala*.

And then again, for mine own part, I account no pains either curious or tedious that tend to a common good; and I conceive no smaller a part of mankind concerned in my labours then the whole Nation of the *Jewes* and *Christendome*; to say nothing of the ingenious *Persian*, nor to despair of the *Turk*, though he be for the present no friend to Allegories.

Wherefore we have not placed our pains inconsiderately, having recommended so weighty and useful Truths in so religious a manner to so great a part of the world.

2. But for the imputation of *Rashness*, in making it my businesse to divulge those secrets or mysteries that *Moses* had so sedulously covered in his obscure Text; I say, it is the privilege of Christianity, the times now more then ever requiring it, to pull off the veil from *Moses* his face: And that though they be grand Truths that I have discovered, yet they are as useful as sublime, and cannot but highly gratifie every good and holy man that can competently judge of them.

3. Lastly, for *Inconstancy of Judgement*, which men may suspect me of, having heretofore declared the Scripture does not teach men Philosophy; I say, the change of a mans judgement for the better is no part of Inconstancy, but a Vertue, nay part of that Vertue which is Constancy, it being the constant purpose of a good man to embrace that which is best and truest; whenas to persist in what we find false is nothing but perversnesse

versnesse and pride. And it will prove no small argument for the truth of this present *Cabbala*, in that the evidence thereof has fetch'd me out of my former opinion wherein I seemed engaged.

But to say the truth, I am not at all inconsistent with my self; for I am still of opinion, That the Letter of the Scripture teaches not any precept of Philosophy concerning which there can be any controversie amongst men. And when you venture beyond the *Literal sense*, you are not taught by the Scripture; but what you have learned some other way, you apply thereto. And they ought to be no trash, nor trivial *Notions*, nor confutable by Reason or more solid Principles of Philosophy, that a man should dare to cast upon so sacred a Text; but such as one is well assured will bear the strictest examination, and that lead to the more full knowledge of God, and do more clearly fit the *Phænomena* of Nature and external *Providence* to his most precious *Attributes*; and tend to the furthering of the *holy Life*, which I do again professe is the sole end of the Scripture. And he that ventures beyond the *Letter* without that guide will soon be bewilder'd, and lose himself in his own fancies.

4. Wherefore if this *Philosophick Cabbala* of mine, amongst those many other advantages I have recited, had not this also added unto it, the aim of advancing the *divine Life* in the world, I should look upon it as both false and unprofitable, and should have rested satisfied with the *Moral Cabbala*. For the *divine Life* is above all *Natural* and *Metaphysical* knowledge whatsoever. And that man is a perfect man that is truly righteous and prudent, whom I know I cannot but gratifie with my *Moral Cabbala* that follows. But if any more zealous pretender to prudence and righteousness, wanting either leisure or ability to examine my *Philosophick Cabbala* to the bottome, shall notwithstanding either condemn it or admire it; he has unbecomingly and indiscreetly ventured out of his own sphere, and I cannot acquit him of *Injustice* or *Folly*.

5. Nor did I place my *Cabbala's* in this order out of more affection and esteem of *Philosophy* then of *true holinesse*, but have ranked them thus according to the order of Nature: the holy and divine Life being not at all, or else being easily lost in man, if it be not produc'd and conserv'd by a radicated acknowledgement of those grand Truths in the *Philosophick Cabbala*, viz. *The existence of the Eternal God*, and *a certain expectation of more consummate happinesse upon the dissolution of this mortal Body*. For to pretend to Vertue and Holinesse without reference to God and a life to come, is but to fall into a more dull and flat kind of *Stoicism*, or to be content to feed our Cattel on this side of *Jordan*, in a more discreet and religious way of *Epicurism*, or at least of degenerate *Familism*.



# THE D E F E N C E O F The Moral Cabbala.

## C H A P. I.

*What is meant by Moral, explained out of Philo. 3. That the Light in the First day improv'd to the height, is Adam; in the Sixth, Christ, according to the Spirit. 4. In what sense we our selves may be said to doe what God does in us. 5. Why ערר and בוקר are rendred Ignorance and Inquiry. 18. Plato's τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐν βραχεὶ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ. The Pythagoreans ἀπλῶς σαυτὸν applied to the Fourth day's progress. 22. That Vertue is not an extirpation, but regulation, of the Passions, according to the mind of the Pythagoreans. 24. Plotinus his τὸ ἀμετάθετον καὶ ἀσύνθετον applied to the Sixth day's progress. 26. What the Image of God is, plainly set down out of S. Paul and Plato. The divine Principle in us, ὁ ἀληθινὸς ἀνθρώπος, out of Plotinus. 28. The distinction of the Heavenly and Earthly Man, out of Philo. 31. The Imposture of still and fixed Melancholy, and that it is not the true divine Rest and precious Sabbath of the Soul. A compendious rehearsal of the whole Allegory of the Six days Creation.*



**W**E are now come to the *Moral Cabbala*, which I do not call *Moral* in that low sense the generality of men understand *Morality*: For the process and growth, as likewise the failing and decay, of the *divine Life*, is very intelligibly set forth in this present *Cabbala*. But I call it *Moral*, in counter-distinction to *Philosophical* or *Physical*; as *Philo* also uses this terme *Moral* in divine matters. As when he speaks of

*Leg. Allegor.*  
*lib. 1.*

God's breathing into *Adam* the breath of Life, εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον, saith he, ἐμπνέει φυσικῶς καὶ ἡθικῶς, *God breathes into Adam's face Physically and Morally*: *Physically*, by placing there the *Senses*, viz. in the *Head*; *Morally*, by inspiring his *Intellect* with *divine knowledge*, which is the highest Faculty of the *Soul*, as the *Head* is the chief part of the *Body*. Wherefore by *Morality*, I understand here *divine Morality*, such as is ingendred in the *Soul*

by

by the operations of the holy Spirit, that inward living Principle of all godliness and honesty. I shall be the more brief in the Defence of this *Cabbala*, it being of it self so plain and sensible to any that has the experience of the life I describe; but to them that have it not, nothing will make it plain or any thing at all probable.

*Vers. 1. A Microcosm or little World.* Nothing is more ordinary or trivial, then to compare Man to the Universe, and make him a little compendious World of himself. Wherefore it was not hard to premise that which may be so easily understood. And the Apostle supposes it, when he applies the Creation of *Light* here in this Chapter to the illumination of the Soul, as you shall hear hereafter.

*Vers. 2. But that which is Animal or Natural operates first.* According to that of the Apostle, *That which is Spiritual is not first, but that which is Animal or Natural; afterward that which is Spiritual.* <sup>1 Cor. 15. 46, 47.</sup> The first Man is of the Earth, earthy; the second Man is the Lord from Heaven. But what this earthy condition is, is very lively set out by *Moses* in this first day's work. For here we have *Earth, Water, and Wind*, or one tumultuous dark *Chaos* and confusion of dirt and water, blown on heaps and waves; an unquiet night-storm, an unruly black tempest.

And it is observable, that it is not here said of this deformed Globe, *Let there be Earth; Let there be Water; Let there be Wind*: but all this is the ὁ ὑποκείμενος, *The subject matter*, a thing made already, viz. *The rude Soul of Man in this disorder that is described; sad Melancholy* like the drown'd Earth lies at the bottome, whence Care, and Grief, and Discontent, torturous Suspicion, and horrid Fear, are washed up by the unquiet watry Desire, or irregular suggestions of the *Concupiscible*, wherein most eminently is seated base Lust and Sensuality; and above these is boisterous Wrath, and storming Revengefulness, fool-hardy Confidence, and indefatigable Contention about vain objects. In short, whatever Passion and Distemper is in fallen Man, it may be referred to these Elements. But God leaves not his creature in this evil condition; but that all this disorder may be discovered, and so quelled in us, and avoided by us, he saith, *Let there be Light*, as you read in the following verse.

*Vers. 3. The day-light appears.* To this alludes *S. Paul*, when he says, <sup>2 Cor. 4. 6.</sup> *God who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, shine in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ.* Where the Apostle seems to me to have struck through the whole *Six days* of this Spiritual Creation at once. The highest manifestation of that Light created in the First day being the face of *Jesus Christ*, the Heavenly Adam, fully compleated in the *Sixth day*. Wherefore when it is said, *Let there be Light*, that Light is understood that enlightens every man that comes into the world, which is the divine Intellect as it is communicable to humane Souls. And the First day is the first appearance thereof, as yet weaker and too much disjoyn'd from our affections; but at last it amounts to the true and plain Image and Character of the Lord from Heaven, Christ according to the Spirit.

*Vers. 4. And God hath framed the Nature of Man so, that he cannot but say, &c.* God working in second causes, there is nothing more ordinary then



then to ascribe that to him that is done by men, even then when the actions seem less competible to the Nature of God. Wherefore it cannot seem harsh, if in this *Moral Cabbala* we admit that man does that by the power of God working in the Soul, that the Text says God does; as *the approving of the Light as good, and the distinguishing betwixt Light and Darknes*, and the like; which things in the *Mystical* sense are competible both to God and Man. And we speaking, in a *Moral* or *Mystical* sense, of God acting in us, the nature of the thing requires that what he is said to doe there, we should be understood also to doe the same through his assistance.

For the Soul of man is not merely passive as a piece of wood or stone, but is forthwith made active by being acted upon: and therefore if God in us rules, we rule with him; if he contend against sin in us, we also contend together with him against the same; if he see in us what is good or evil, we, *ipso facto*, see by him; *In his light we see light*: and so in the rest. Wherefore the supposition is very easie in this *Moral Cabbala*, to take the liberty, where either the sense or more compendious expression requires it, to attribute that to man, though not to man alone, which God alone does, when we recur to the *Literal* meaning of the Text. And this is but consonant to the Apostle, *I live, and yet not I*. For if the life of God or Christ was in him, surely he did live, or else what did that life there? Only he did not proudly attribute that life to himself, as his own, but acknowledged it to be from God.

Rom. 13. 12.

1 Theff. 5. 8.

*Vers. 5. As betwixt the Natural Day and Night.* It is very frequent with the Apostles to set out by *Day* and *Night* the *Spiritual* and *Natural* condition of man. As in such phrases as these; *The night is far spent, the day is at hand: Walk as children of the Light*. And elsewhere, *Let us who are of the day*; and in the same place, *You are all the sons of light, and sons of the day. We are not of the night, nor of darknes*. But this is too obvious to insist upon.

Psal. 24. 6.

Gen. 32. 30.

Prov. 9. 17.

John 4. 15.

*And thus Ignorance and Inquiry.* The Soul of man is never quiet, but in perpetual search till she has found out her own Happinesse, which is the *Heavenly Adam, Christ, the Image of God*; into which Image and likeness when we are thoroughly awakened, we are fully satisfied therewith; till then we are in *Ignorance & Confusion*, as the Hebrew word ערר does fitly signifie. This *Ignorance, Confusion and Dis-satisfaction* puts us upon seeking, according to that measure of the *Morning light* that hath already visited us. And בוקר is from בקר to seek, to consider, and inquire. *This is the Generation of those that seek thy face, O Jacob*, that is, the face of *Jesus Christ*, the result of the *Sixth day's* work, as I have intimated before.

*Vers. 6. Of savoury and affectionate discernment.* Wherefore he will not assent to *Solomon's* whore, who says, *Stoln water is sweet*; but will rather use the words of the *Samaritane* woman to *Christ*, when he had told her of those waters of the Spirit, though she did not so perfectly reach his meaning, *Sir, give me this water, that I thirst not, neither come hither to draw*. For who would seek to satisfy himself with the toilsome pleasures of the world, when he may quench his desires with the delicious draughts of that true, and yet easie-flowing, *Nectar* of the Spirit of God?

Vers.

*Vers. 10. To compare to the Earth.* Origen compares this condition to the Earth for fruitfulness; but I thought it not impertinent to take notice of the steadiness of the Earth also. But the condition of the ungodly is like the raging waves of the Sea; or, as the Prophet speaks, *The wicked are as the troubled Sea that cannot rest, whose waters cast up mire and dirt.*

*Vers. 11. He is a fruitful field.* This Interpretation is Origen's; as I intimated before.

*Vers. 14. According to the difference of these lights.* What this difference is, you will understand out of the sixteenth and eighteenth verses.

*Vers. 18. To this one single, but vigorous and effectual, Light.* For indeed, a true and sincere sense of this one comprehends all. *For all the Law is fulfilled in one word; to wit, in this, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and all thy soul, and thy neighbour as thy self; and, to doe so to others as we our selves would be done to.* Wherefore for men to make nothing of this Royal Law of Christ, and yet to pretend to be more accurate Indagators into matters of Religion, and more affectionate Lovers of Piety than ordinary, is either to be abominably hypocritical, or grossly ignorant in the most precious and necessary parts of Christianity; and they walk by *Star-light* and *Moon-light*, not under the clear and warm enlivening raies of the *Sun of Righteousness*.

It is an excellent saying of *Plato's* in an Epistle of his to *Dionysius*, *Τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐν ἑραρχεῖ κείνῳ*, *That Truth lies in a little room*: and assuredly that which is best and most precious does; whenas the folly of every man notwithstanding so mis-guides him, that his toil and study is but to adorn himself after the mode of the most ridiculous fellow in all the *Gracian Army*, *Thersites*, of whom the Poet gives this testimony, that he was

—ἀγομά τι πολλά τι εἰδώς,

*That he had a rabble of disordered Notions and fruitless Observations*; but that neither he nor any body else could make either head or foot of them, nor himself became either more wise or more honest by having them.

That Precept of the *Pythagoreans*, *ἁπλῶσαι σεαυτὸν*, *Simplify your self, Reduce your self to One*, how wise, how holy, how true is it? What a sure foundation is it of life, liberty, and easie sagacity in things belonging to Vertue, Religion, and Justice? I think no man is born naturally so stupid, but that if he will keep close to this *single Light of divine Love*, in due time, nay, in a short time, he will be no more to seek what is to be done in the carriage of his life to God or man, then an unblemished Eye will be at a loss to distinguish colours. But if he forsake this *One Light*, he will necessarily be benighted, and his minde distracted with a multitude of needless and uncomfortable scrupulosities, and faint and ineffectual Notions; and every body will be ready to take him up for a *night-wanderer*, and to chastise him for being out of his way; and after, it may be, as friendly offer himself a guide to another path that will prove as little to the purpose, unless he bring him into this *Via Regia* or *Νόμος βασιλικός*, as Saint James call it, this *Royal Law of the sincere Love of God and a mans neighbour.*

James 2. 8.

*Vers. 20. That is, that the Concupiscible in man. That the Waters are*



an Emblem of this *Concupiscible*, *Venus* her being born of the Sea does intimate ; which were not so much to the purpose, did not Natural Philosophy and Experience certifie that *Concupiscence* is lodg'd in *moisture*. Whence is that of *Heraclitus*, *Ἐνὰ ψυχῇ σφωτάμ* (in *Porphyrus* his *De antro Nympharum*) i. e. *Anima sicca sapientissima*. And without all question the inordinate use of the *Concupiscible* does mightily besot the Soul, and makes her very incapable of divine Sense and Knowledge. And yet to endeavour after an utter insensibility of the pleasures of the body, is as groundless and unwarrantable. But concerning this I shall speak more fully on the 22. and 31. verses of this Chapter.

*Vers. 21. Winged Ejaculations.* Whether *Mental* or *Vocal*, they are not unfitly resembled to *Fowls*, according to that of *Homer*,

—ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα.

And if *Vocal* words have *wings*, the *inward Desires* of the Soul may well be said to have *wings* also, they being the *words of the Mind*, as the other are of the *Mouth*, and fly further for the most part, and get sooner to Heaven than the other.

Note also, that *Origen* likewise makes a difference here betwixt the *Fish* and the *Fowl*, and makes the *Fowl* to be good cogitations, the *Fish* evil. But I account them rather both indifferent, and to be regulated, not extirpated, by the *Mystical Adam*, *Christ*, the *Image of God* in Man. And these strong Heats and Ejaculations are the effects of *Melancholy*, wherein the divine Principle in man, when it actuates it, works very fiercely and sharply, and is a great waster of the delightful moisture of the *Concupiscible*, and weakens much the pleasures of the Body, to the great advantage of the Mind, if it be done with discretion and due moderation ; otherways if this passion be over-much indulged to, it may lead to *Hecticks*, *Phrensies* and *Distractions*.

The contrivance of the Text mentioning only such *Fowls* as frequent the *waters*, naturally points to this sense we have given it ; but if our imagination strike out further to other winged creatures, as the *Fowls of the Mountains*, and sundry sorts of Birds, they may also have their proper meanings, and are a part of those *Animal Figurations* that are to be subdued and regulated by the *Mystical Adam*, the Spirit of *Christ* in us.

*Vers. 22. Might have something to order.* But if you take away all the *Passions* from the Soul, the Minde of man will be as a General without an Army, or an Army without an Enemy. The *Pythagoreans* define *Righteousness*, εἰρήνη τᾶς ὅλης ψυχᾶς μετ' ὁρμῆς, *The peace of the whole Soul, the parts thereof being in good tune or harmony* ; according to that other Definition of theirs, describing *Righteousness* to be ἀρμονία τῆς ἀλόγου μερὸς τᾶς ψυχᾶς πρὸς τὸ λόγον ἔχον, *That it is the Harmony or Agreement of the Irrational parts of the Soul with the Rational*. But quite to take away all the *Passions* of the Minde, in stead of composing them to the right rule of Reason and the divine Light, is as if a man should cut away all the strings of an Instrument, in stead of tuning it.

*Vers. 24. And makes the Irascible fruitful.* Religious devotions help'd on by *Melancholy* dry the Body very much, and heat it, and make it very

very subject to *wrath*: which, if it be placed upon holy matters, men call *Zeal*; but if it be inordinate and hypocritical, the Apostle will teach us to call it *bitter zeal*. This more fierce and fiery affection in man is *Plotinus* his τὸ *δυναμὸδες καὶ λεοντῶδες*, the *Lion-like nature in us*, which if *Adam* keep in subjection, there is no hurt in it, but good. And it is evident in the Gospel, that our Saviour Christ was one while deeply impassioned with *Sorrow*, another while very strongly carried away with *Zeal* and *Anger*, as you may observe in the stories of his raising up *Lazarus*, and whipping the Money-changers out of the Temple. And this is no Imperfection, but rather a Perfection; the *divine Life*, when it has reached the Passions and Body of a man, becoming thereby more palpable, full and sensible. But all the danger is of being impotently passionate, and whenas the Body is carried away by its own distemper, or by the hypocrisy of the Mind, notwithstanding to imagine or pretend that it is the Impulse of the *divine Spirit*. This is too frequent a mistake God knows, but such as was impossible to happen in our Saviour; and therefore the Passions of his Mind were rather Perfections than Imperfections, as they are to all them that are close and sincere followers of him, especially when they have reach'd the *Sixth* day's progress.

*Vers. 26. By the name of his own Image.* What this *Image of God* is, \* *Plato*, who was acquainted with these *Mosaical Writings*, as the holy Fathers of the Church so generally have told us, plainly expresses in these words, Ὁμοίωσις ᾧ, ὅσον ἐ δίκαιον γενέσθαι καὶ φρονήσεσθαι, *To be like unto God, is to be Just, Holy, and Wise*. Like that of the Apostle to the *Colossians*, *And have put on the new Man, which is renewed in Knowledge, after the Image of him that created him*: and that more full passage in the fourth of the *Ephesians*, *And that you put on the new Man, which after God is created in Righteousness and true Holiness*. There are all the three members of that divine Image, *Knowledge, Righteousness* and *Holiness*, which are mentioned in that foregoing description of *Plato's*, as if *Plato* had been pre-instructed by men of the same Spirit with the Apostle.

*The true and perfect Man.* *Plotinus* calls that *divine Principle* in us τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἀνθρώπου, the *true Man*. The rest is the *brutish nature*, the τὸ λεοντῶδες καὶ δυναμὸδες, as I said before.

*But has full power.* Wherefore if this Definition of the *Image* or *Likeness of God* which *Plato* has made does not involve this *Power* in it in the word δίκαιον, according to the Description of *Justice* by the *Pythagoreans* above recited, (which implies that the rational and divine part of the soul has the Passions at its command) I should adde to καὶ φρονήσεως this one word more, καὶ δυνάμεως, that the Description may run thus, *To be like unto God, is to be Holy and Just, together with Wisdom and Power*. But I rather think that this *Power* is comprehended in *Holiness* and *Justice*: For unless we have arrived to that Power as to be able constantly to act according to these Vertues, we are rather well-willers to Holiness and Righteousness, then properly and formally righteous and holy.

*Vers. 27. In his little World.* They are the words of \* *Philo*, βεβα-  
χὺν μὲν κόσμον τὸν ἀνθρώπου, μέγαν ᾧ ἀνθρώπου τὸν κόσμον ἔτι, *That Man is*  
S f f 2 a little

\* In his Theaetetus.

Chap. 3. 16.

Ennead. 1. 6. 12

\* In his de Plantat. Noe, lib. 2. and elsewhere.



a little World, and that the World is one great Man; which Analogy is supposed, as I said at first, in the *Moral Cabbala* of this present Chapter, and Origen upon this Chapter calls Man *Minorem Mundum*, a *Microcosm*.

Leg. Allegor.  
lib. 1.

Vers. 28. *The Heavenly Adam, Christ.* Philo makes mention of the Heavenly and Earthly man, in these words; *Διτὰ ἀνθρώπων γένος ὁ μὲν ἔστιν ἀθάνατος, ὁ δὲ θνήσκει.* Man is of two sorts, the one Heavenly, the other Earthly. And S. Paul calls Christ the Heavenly Adam, and Philo's Heavenly Adam is *κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγενῆς*, Created after the Image of God, as Saint Paul in the forecited places to the *Colossians* and *Ephesians* also speaks concerning Christ.

Leg. Allegor.  
lib. 1.

John 4. 34.

Vers. 29. *The Heavenly Adam to feed upon, fulfilling the Will of God.* As Christ professes of himself, *It is my meat and drink to doe the will of him that sent me.*

Vers. 30. *Nor is the Animal Life quite to be starved.* For a good man is mercifull to his beast. See Origen upon the place.

Vers. 31. *Approves all things which God hath created in us to be very good.* Not only the divine Principle, but also the Fishes, Beasts, and Birds. *Vult enim Deus ut insignis ista Dei factura, Homo, non solum immaculatus sit ab his, sed & dominetur eis: For it is the Will of God, saith Origen, not only that we should be free from any soil of these, (which would be more certainly effected if we were utterly rid of them, and they quite extirpated out of our nature) but that we should rule over them, without being anything at all blemished or discomposed by them.* And for mine own part, I do not understand how that the Kingdome of Heaven which is to be within us can be any Kingdome at all, if there be no Subjects at all there to be ruled over and to obey. Wherefore the *Passions* of the Body are not to be quite extinguished, but regulated, that there may be the greater plenitude of life in the whole man.

And those that endeavour after so still, so silent & demure a condition of Mind, that they would have the sense of nothing there but peace and rest, striving to make their whole nature desolate of all *Animal Figurations* whatsoever, what do they effect but a clear Day shining upon a barren Heath, that feeds neither Cow nor Horse: neither Sheep nor Shepherd is to be seen there, but only a vast silent Solitude, and one uniform parchedness and vacuity. And yet while a man fancies himself thus wholly *divine*, he is not aware how he is even then held down by his *Animal Nature*; and that it is nothing but the stilnesse and fixedness of *Melancholy* that thus abuses him, and in stead of the true Divine Principle, would take the Government to it self, and in this usurped tyranny cruelly destroy all the rest of the *Animal Figurations*: But the true Divine Life would destroy nothing that is in Nature, but only regulate things, and order them for the more full and sincere enjoyments of man; reproaching nothing but sinfulness and enormity, entituling *Sanguine* and *Choler* to as much Vertue and Religion as either *Phlegme* or *Melancholy*. For the Divine Life as it is to take into it self the humane nature in general, so it is not abhorrent from any of the complexions thereof. But the squabbles in the world are ordinarily not about true Piety and Vertue, but which of the Complexions or what Humour shall ascend

ascend the Throne, and sit there in stead of Christ himself. But I will not expatiate too much upon one Theme; I shall rather take a short view of the whole Allegory of the Chapter.

In the *First* day there is *Earth, Water and Wind*, over which, and through which, there is nothing but disconsolate *darkness* and tumultuous agitation; the Winds ruffling up the Waters into mighty waves, the waves washing up the mire and dirt into the Water; all becoming but a rude heap of confusion and desolation. This is the state of the *υἱοῦ* *χοιρῆς*, or *Earthly Adam*, as *Philo* calls him, till God command the Light to shine out of *Darkness*, offering him a guide to a better condition.

In the *Second* day is the *Firmament* created, dividing the *upper* and the *lower* Waters, that it may feel the strong impulses or taste the different relishes of either. Thus is the Will of man touch'd from above and beneath, and this is the day wherein is set before him *Life and Death, Good and Evil*, and he may put out his hand and take his choice.

In the *Third* day is the Earth uncovered of the Waters, for the planting of fruit-bearing trees. *By their fruits you shall know them*, saith our Saviour, that is, by their works.

Matth. 7. 20.

In the *Fourth* day there appears a more full accession of Divine Light, and the Sun of Righteousness warms the Soul with a sincere love both of God and man.

In the *Fifth* day, that this light of Righteousness and bright Eye of divine Reason may not brandish its rayes in the empty field, where there is nothing either to subdue or guide and order; God sends out whole shoals of *Fishes* in the Waters, and numerous flights of *Fowls* in the Air; besides part of the *Sixth* day's work, wherein all kind of *Beasts* are created.

In these are decyphered the sundry Suggestions and Cogitations of the Mind, sprung from these lower Elements of the Humane nature, *viz. Earth and Water, Flesh and Blood*; all these man beholds in the Light of the *Sun of Righteousness*, discovers what they are, knows what to call them, can rule over them, and is not wrought to be over-ruled by them. This is *Adam*, the *Master-piece of God's Creation*, and Lord of all the creatures, framed after the Image of God, *Christ according to the Spirit*, under whose feet is subdued the whole *Animal Life*, with its sundry Motions, Forms and Shapes. He will call every thing by its proper name, and set every creature in its proper place; *The vile person shall be no longer called liberal, nor the churl bountiful. Wo be unto them that call evil good, and good evil, that call the light darkness, and the darkness light.* He will not call bitter Passion, holy Zeal; nor plausible meretricious Courtesie, Friendship; nor a false soft abhorrency from punishing the ill-deserving, Pity; nor Cruelty, Justice; nor Revenge, Magnanimity; nor Unfaithfulness, Policy; nor Verbosity, either Wisdom or Piety. But I have run my self into the second Chapter before I am aware.

Esay 32. 5.

Esay 5. 20.

In this first, *Adam* is said only to have dominion over all the living creatures, and to feed upon the fruit of the Plants. And what is *Pride* but a mighty Mountainous *Whale*; *Lust*, a *Goat*; the *Lion, Eagle and Bear*, wilful dominion; *Craft*, a *Fox*; and worldly toil, an *Oxe*? Over these and a thousand more is the rule of *Man*, I mean of *Adam*, the *Image of God*.



But his meat and drink is to doe the will of his Maker ; this is the fruit he feeds upon.

Behold therefore, O Man, what thou art, and whereunto thou art called, even to be a mighty Prince amongst the creatures of God, and to bear rule in that Province he has assigned thee, to discern the Motions of thine own heart, and to be Lord over the suggestions of thine own natural spirit : Not to listen to the counsel of the flesh, nor conspire with the Serpent against thy Creator ; but to keep thy heart free and faithful to thy God : so maist thou with innocency and unblameableness see all the Motions of Life, and bear rule with God over the whole Creation committed to thee. This shall be thy Paradise and harmlesse sport on Earth, till God shall transplant thee to an higher condition of Happinesse in Heaven.

## CHAP. II.

*The full sense of that Ἀπειθα that keeps men from entring into the true Sabbath. 4. The great necessity of distinguishing the innocent motions of Nature from the suggestions of Sin. 5. That the growth of a true Christian indeed doth not adequately depend upon the lips of the Priest. 7. The meaning of This is he that comes by Water and Blood. 8. The meaning of Repent, for the Kingdome of Heaven is at hand. The Seventh thousand years, the great Sabbatism of the Church of God. That there will be then frequent converse betwixt Men and Angels. 9. The Tree of Life, how fitly in the Mystical sense said to be in the midst of the Garden. 17. A twofold death contracted by Adam's disobedience. The Masculine and Feminine Faculties in Man what they are. Actuating a Body an Essential operation of the Soul ; and the reason of that so joyfull appearance of Eve to the Humane Nature.*

**T**O the Fifth verse there is nothing but a recapitulation of what went before in the first Chapter ; and therefore wants no further proof then what has already been alledged out of S. Paul and Origen and other Writers. Only there is mention of a Sabbath in the Second verse of this Chapter, of which there were no words before. And this is that Sabbatisme or Rest, that the Author to the Hebrews exhorts them to strive to enter into through faith and obedience. For those that were faint-hearted, and unbelieving, and pretended that the children of Anak, the off-spring of the Giants, would be too hard for them ; they could not enter into the promised Land wherein they were to set up their rest, under the conduct of Joshua, a Type of Jesus. And the same Author in the same place makes mention of this very Sabbath that ensued the accomplishment of the Creation, concluding thus ; *There remaineth therefore a Sabbatism or Rest to the people of God : For he that has entred into his Rest, he also has ceased from his own works, as God did from his. Let us labour therefore to enter into that Rest, lest any man fall after that example*

Hebr. 4.

Hebr. 4. 9 ;  
10, 11.

example of disobedience and unbelief. For the Greek word *Ἀπειθεῖα* may well include both Senses, *viz.* *Disobedience*, or the not doing the Will of God according to that measure of Power and Knowledge he has already given us; and *Unbelief*, that the divine Life and Spirit in us is not able to subdue the whole Creation of the little World under us, that is, all the *Animal Motions* and *Figurations*, be they *Lions, Bears, Goats, Whales*, be they what they will be, as well as to cast out the children of *Anak* before the *Israelites*, as it is in that other Type of Christ, and of his Kingdome in the Souls of Men.

*Vers. 4. The Generations of the Animal Life when God created them.* For these are as truly the works of God as the Divine Life it self, though they are nothing comparable unto it. Nay, indeed, they are but an heap of confusion without it. Wherefore the great accomplishment is to have these in due order and subjection unto the Spirit or Heavenly Life in us, which is *Christ*: and that you may have a more particular apprehension of these generations of the *Animal Life*, I shall give you a Catalogue of some of them, though confusedly, so as they come first to my memory.

Such therefore are *Anger, Zeal, Indignation, Sorrow, Derision, Mirth, Gravity, Open-heartednesse, Reservednesse, Stoutnesse, Flexibility, Boldness, Fearfulness, Mildness, Tartness, Candour, Suspicion, Peremptoriness, Despondency, Triumph or Gloriation*: All the *Propensions* to the exercise of Strength, or activity of Body; as *Running, Leaping, Swimming, Wrestling, Fusting, Coursing*, or the like: Besides all the Courtly Preambles, necessary Concomitants, and delightful Consequences of *Marriage*, which spring up from the Love of Women and the Pleasure of Children. To say nothing of those Enjoyments that arise from correspondent affections and mere natural friendship betwixt man and man, or fuller companies of acquaintance; their *Friendly Feastings, Sportings, Musick and Dancings*. All these, and many more that I am not at leisure to reckon up, be but the genuine pullulations of the *Animal Life*, and in themselves they have neither good nor hurt in them. Nay, indeed, to speak more truly and impartially, they are good, according to the Approbation of him that made them; but they become bad only to them that are bad, and act either without measure, or for unwarrantable ends, or with undue circumstances; otherwise they are very good in their kind, they being regulated and modetated by the divine Principle in us.

And I think it is of great moment for men to take notice of this Truth for these three reasons: First, because the bounds of Sin, and of the innocent Motions of Nature, being not plainly and apertly set out and defined, men counting the several *Animal Figurations* and natural Motions for *Sins*, they heap to themselves such a task, to wit, the quite extirpating that which it were neither good, nor it may be possible, utterly to extirpate, that they seem in truth hereby to insinuate that it is impossible to enter into that *Rest* or *Sabbath* of the people of God. Wherefore promiscuously sheltring themselves under this confused cloud of sins and infirmities, where they aggravate all, so as if every thing were in the same measure sinful; if they be but zealous and punctual in some,



they account it passing well, and an high testimony of their sanctimony. And their hypocrisie will be sure to pitch upon that which is least of all to the purpose; that is, a man will spend his zeal in the behalf of some natural Temper he himself is of, and against the opposite Complexion. But for the indispensable dictates of the divine Light, he will be sure to neglect them, as being more hard to perform, though of more concernment both for himself and the common good. But if it were more plainly defined what is Sin, and what is not Sin, a man might with more heart and courage fight against his enemy, he appearing not so numerous and formidable; and he would have the lesse opportunity for perverse excuses and hypocritical tergiversations.

The second reason is, That men may not think better of themselves then they are, for their abhorrency from those things that have no hurt in them; nor think worser of others then they deserve, when they doe but such things as are approvable by God and the divine Light. And this is of very great moment for the maintaining of Christian Love and Union amongst men.

The third and last is, That they may observe the madness and hypocrisie of the world, whose religious contestations or secret censures are commonly but the conflict and antipathy of the opposite *Figurations of the Animal Life*, who, like the wilde beasts, without a Master to keep good quarter amongst them, are very eagerly set to devour one another. But by this shall every man know whether it be Complexion or Religion that reigns in him, if he love God with all his heart and all his soul, and his neighbour as himself; and can give a sufficient reason for all his actions and opinions from that *Eternal Light*, the *Love of God* shed abroad in his heart: If not, it is but a faction of the *Animal Life*, fed up and fostered by either natural Temper or Custome; and he is far from being arrived to the Kingdome of Christ, and entring into that true Rest of the people of God.

*Vers. 5. Where there is no external doctrine.* Pulpits, and Preachings, and external Ordinances, there is no such noise of them amongst the holy Patriarchs whose lives *Moses* describes; and therefore I conceive this sense I have here given the Text more genuine and warrantable. But besides, *Moses* unveiled being Christianity it self, the manner of the growth of the true Christian is here prefigured. That he is \* rather taught of God then of Men, he having the Spirit of Life in him, and needs no man to teach him: For he has the *Unction* in himself, which will teach him all things necessary to Life and Godliness. \* Which *Unction* notwithstanding does never slight external helps and the holy Ordinances of Christ, as I have abundantly proved in its due place.

*Vers. 6. Which is Repentance from dead works.* In this verse 78 in the *Philosophick Cabbala* signified a *Vapour*, but here I translate it a *Fountain of Water*, which I am warranted to doe by the *Seventy*, who render it *מַיִם* but that *Water* is an Embleme of *Repentance*, it is so obvious that I need say nothing of it: *John's* baptizing with Water to Repentance is frequently repeated in the Gospels.

*Vers. 7. And breaths into him the Spirit of Life.* In allusion to this passage

\* 1 Cor. 3. 6.

1 John 2. 27.

\* See *Mystery of Godliness*,  
Book 8. ch. 12.  
Book 10. ch. 12.  
sect. 8, 9.

passage of *Moses* in all likelihood is that of the *Psalmist*, *Thy hands have made me, and fashioned me: O give me understanding, and I shall live*; as if, like *Adam*, he were but a Statue of Earth till God breathed into him the Spirit of Life and Holiness. Psal. 119.

*Of the Water and of the Spirit.* The *Water* and the *Spirit* are the two extremes; the first and the last that makes up the Creation of the *Spiritual Adam*, or *Christ*, compleated in us, and includes the middle, which is *Blood*. First therefore is *Repentance* from what we delighted in before: then the killing of that evil and corrupt life in us, which is resisting to blood, as the Apostle speaks. And the 1 Epistle of *John*, *Whatever is born of God, overcomes the world: Who is he that overcomes the world, but he that believes that Jesus Christ (the divine Light and Life in us) is the Son of God*; and therefore indued with power from on high to overcome all sin and wickedness in us? *This is he that comes by Water and Blood*, by Repentance and perseverance till the death of the body of sin; not by Repentance only and dislike of our former life, but by the mortification also of it. Then the *Spirit of Truth* is awakened in us, and will bear witness of whatever is right and true. And according to this manner of testimony is it to be understood especially, *That no man can say that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, but by the Spirit of God*, as the Apostle elsewhere affirms. Hebr. 12. 4.  
1 John 5. 4.  
1 John 4. 13,  
14, 15.  
1 Cor. 12. 3.

This is the *Heavenly Adam*, which is true Light and Glory to all them that have attain'd to the mystical resurrection of the dead, and into whom God hath breathed the breath of Life, without which we have no right knowledge nor sense of God at all. Πῶς γὰρ ἀνενόησον ἡ ψυχὴ θεόν, εἰ μὴ ἐνέμνησεν αὐτῆς ἡ ψαλὸς αὐτῆς καὶ δύναμις; They are the words of *Philo* upon the place. *For how should the Soul of man, says he, know God, if he did not inspire her, and take hold of her by his power?* In his Leg. Allegor. lib. 2.

*Vers. 8. To the Kingdome of Heaven.* And the end of the doctrine of *John*, which was *Repentance*, was for this purpose, that men might arrive to that comfortable condition here described; and therefore it was a motive for them to repent. *For though sorrow endure for a night, yet joy will come in the morning.* For the new *Jerusalem* is to be built, and God is to pitch his Tabernacle amongst men, and to rule by his Spirit here upon Earth; which, if I would venture upon an *Historical Cabbala* of *Moses*, I should preface would happen in the *Seventh thousand years*, according to the Chronology of Scripture; when the world shall be so spiritualized, that the work of Salvation shall be finished, and the great *Sabbath* and Festival shall be then celebrated in the height: *A thousand years are but as one day*, saith the Apostle *Peter*; and therefore the *Seventh thousand years* may well be the *Seventh day*. Wherefore in the end of the *Sixth thousand years* the Kingdomes of the Earth will be the second *Adam's*, the Lord *Christ*, as *Adam* in the *Sixth day* was created the Lord of the world and all the creatures therein; and this conquest of his will bring in the *Seventh day* of rest and peace and joy upon the face of the whole Earth. Which preface will seem more credible, when I shall have unfolded unto you out of *Philo Judæus* the mysterie of the number *Seven*: but before I fall upon that, let me a little prepare your belief, by shewing the truth of the same thing in another Figure.

*Adam,*



Revel. 21. 2.

*Adam, Seth, Enos, Cainan, Mahalaleel, Jared*, they died, not enjoying the richness of God's goodness in their bodies. But *Enoch*, who was the *Seventh* from *Adam*, he was taken up alive into Heaven, and seems to enjoy that great blisse in the body. The world then in the *Seventh Chiliad* will be assumed up into God, snatch'd up by his Spirit, inacted by his Power. The *Jerusalem* that comes down from Heaven will then in a most glorious and eminent manner flourish upon Earth. God will, as I said, pitch his Tabernacle amongst men. And for God to be in us, and with us, is as much as for us to be lifted up into God.

But to come now to the mysterie of the *Septenary*, or number *Seven*; it is of two kinds: the one is ἡ ἐντὸς δεκάδου ἑβδομάς, the other ἡ ἐκτὸς. The *Septenary* within the *Decad* is merely *seven unites*; the other is a *Seventh Number*, beginning at an *Unite*, and holding on in a continued Geometrical Proportion, till you have gone through *Seven Proportional Terms*. For the *Seventh Term* there is this *Septenary* of the second kind, whose nature \* *Philo* fully expresses in these words; Αἰεὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀπὸ μονάδος συντελεσθεὶς ἐν διπλασίοις ἢ τριπλασίοις ἢ συνόλῳ ἀναλογεῖται, ἑβδομος ἀριθμὸς ὡς π. π. καὶ τετραγώνος ἔστιν, ἀμφότερα εἶδη περιέχων τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν ἐς συμμετρίαν ὅσας τῆς μὲν ἀσωμάτου καὶ τῆς ὁμήπεδον ἢν ἀπτελῆσαι τετράγωνοι, τὴν δὲ συμμετρίαν καὶ τῆς ἐπείρου, ἢν ἀπτελῆσαι κύβοι. To this sense: For always beginning from an *Unite*, and holding on in double, or triple, or what proportion you will, the seventh number of this rank is both *Square* and *Cube*, comprehending both kinds, as well the *Corporeal* as *Incorporeal Substance*: the *Incorporeal*, according to the *Superficies* which the *Squares* exhibite; but the *Corporeal*, according to the *solid dimensions* which are set out by the *Cubes*.

As for example, 64. or 729. these are Numbers that arise after this manner; each of them are a *Seventh* from an *Unite*, the one arising from double Proportion, the other from triple; and if the Proportion were Quadruple, Quintuple, or any else, there is the same reason, some other *Seventh* Number would arise which would prove of the same nature with these, they would prove both *Cubes* and *Squares*, that is, *Corporeal* and *Incorporeal*: For such is sixty four, either made by multiplying eight into eight, and so it is a *Square*, or else by multiplying four *Cubically*; for four times four times four is again sixty four, but then it is a *Cube*. And so seven hundred twenty nine is made either by *Squaring* of twenty seven, or *Cubically* multiplying of Nine for either way will seven hundred twenty nine be made; and so is both *Cube* and *Square*, *Corporeal* and *Incorporeal*. Whereby is intimated, that the World shall not be reduced in the *Seventh day* to a mere *Spiritual* consistency, to an *Incorporeal* condition, but that there shall be a co-habitation of the Spirit with *Flesh* in a *Mytical* or *Moral* sense, and that God will pitch his Tent amongst us. Then shall be settled everlasting Righteousness, and rooted in the Earth, so long as mankind shall inhabit upon the face thereof.

And this Truth of the *Reign of Righteousness* in this *Seventh thousand years* is still more clearly set out to us in the *Septenary* within Ten, τῇ ἐντὸς δεκάδου ἑβδομάδι, as *Philo* calls it, the naked number *Seven*. For the parts it consists of and into which it is the most equally divisible, or rather only divisible as into different numbers, are 3 and 4. which put together

together make 7. And these parts be the sides of the first *Orthogonion* in Numbers, the very sides that include the right *angle* thereof. And the *Orthogonion* what a foundation it is of *Trigonometry*, and of measuring the *altitudes*, *latitudes* and *longitudes* of things, every body knows that knows any thing at all in *Mathematicks*. And this prefigures the *Uprightnesse* of that holy Generation who will stand and walk κατ' ὀρθούς, inclining neither this way nor that way, but they will approve themselves of an upright and sincere heart. And by this Spirit of Righteousness will these Saints be enabled to find out the *depth* and *breadth* and *height* of the Wisdom and Goodness of God, as somewhere the Apostle himself phraseth it.

But then again in the second place, this *Three* and *Four* comprehend also the conjunction of the *Corporeal* and *Incorporeal* nature; *Three* being the first *Superficies*, and *Four* the first *Body*: and in the *Seventh thousand years* I do verily conceive that there will be so great Union betwixt God and Man, that they shall not only partake of his Spirit, but that the Inhabitants of the *Aethereal Region* will openly converse with these of the *Terrestrial*; and such frequent conversation and ordinary visits of our cordial friends of that other world will take away all the toil of life and the fear of death amongst men, they being very chearful and pleasant here in the body, and being well assured they shall be better when they are out of it: For Heaven and Earth shall then shake hands together, or become as one house; and to die, shall be accounted but to ascend into an higher room. And though this dispensation for the present be but very sparingly set a-foot, yet I suppose there may some few have a glimpse of it, concerning whom accomplish'd Posterity may haply utter something answerable to that of our Saviour's concerning *Abraham*, who tasted of Christianity before Christ himself was come in the Flesh; *Abraham saw my day, and rejoiced at it.* And without all question, that plenitude of Happiness that has been reserved for future times, the presage and presentation of it, has in all ages been a very great Joy and triumph to all holy men and Prophets.

*The Morning Light of the Sun of Righteousnesse.* This is very suitable to the Text, *Paradise* being said to be placed *Eastward* in *Eden*, and our Saviour *Christ* to be the *bright Morning-Starre*, and the *Light that lightens every one that comes into the world*; though too many are disobedient to the dictates of this Light, that so early visits them in their mindes and consciences; but they that follow it, it is their peace and happiness in the conclusion.

Revel. 22. 16.

*Vers. 9. Which is a sincere Obedience to the Will of God.* The *Tree of Life* is very rightly said to be in the *midst of the Garden*, that is, in the midst of the Soul of man; and this is the *Will* or *Desire of man*, which is the most inward of all the Faculties of his Soul, and is as it were the λογικόν κέντρον, or *vital Center* of the rest, from whence they stream or grow. That therefore is the *Tree of Life*, if it be touch'd truly with the divine Life, and a man be heartily obedient to the Will of God. For the whole Image of divine Perfection will grow from hence, and receives nourishment, strength and continuance from it. But if this *Will* and *Desire* be broke



broke off from God, and become actuated by the creature, or be a *Self-will* and a *spirit of disobedience*, it breeds most deadly fruit, which kills the divine Life in us, and puts man into a necessity of dying to that disorder and corruption he has thus contracted.

*Whatever others would insinuate to the contrary.* For there is nothing so safe, if a man be heartily sincere, as not to be led by the nose by others: For we see the sad event of it in *Eve's* listening to the outward suggestions of the *Serpent*.

In his Leg.  
Allegor. lib. 1.

*Vers. 10. The four Cardinal Vertues.* It is the Exposition of *Philo*. Till verse 17. there is no need of adding any thing more then what has already been said in the Defence of the *Philosophick Cabbala*.

*Vers. 17. Dead to all Righteousness and Truth.* The mortality that *Adam* contracted by his *disobedience* in the Moral or Mystical sense is twofold; *The one* a death to righteousness, and it is the sense of *Philo* upon the place, Ὁ ὅς ψυχῆς διατάττει, ἀρετῆς μὲν φθορὰ ἐστὶ, κακίας δὲ ἀνάληψις, *The death of the Soul is the extinction of Vertue in her, and the resuscitation of Vice*: and he adds, that this must be the death here meant, it being a real punishment indeed to forfeit the life of Vertue. *The other mortality* is a necessity of dying to unrighteousness, if he ever would be happy. Both those notions of *Death* are more frequent in *S. Paul's* Epistles then that I need to give any instance.

\* In his Cos-  
mopæia Mosaic.

*His more noble and Masculine Faculties.* What the Masculine part in man is \* *Philo* plainly declares in these words, Ἐν ἡμῶν γὰρ ἀνδρὸς μὲν λόγον ἔχει ὁ νῦς, γυναικὸς δὲ ἡ αἰσθησις, *In us, saith he, the Man is the Intellect, the Woman the Sense of the Body.* Whence you will easily understand, that the Masculine Faculties are those that are more *Spiritual* and *Intellectual*.

\* Theff. 5. 23.

*Vers. 18. That the whole Humane Nature may be accomplished with the Divine.* Which is agreeable to that pious ejaculation of the Apostle, 1 *Theff. 5.* And the God of Peace sanctifie you wholly, or thoroughly; and I pray God your whole Spirit, Soul and Body, may be kept blamelesse; ἐν τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ, by the presence or abode of *Jesus Christ*, the divine Life or heavenly *Adam* in you. This is the most easie and natural sense of that place of Scripture mystically understood, as it will appear to any man whose minde is as much set on Holiness as hard Theories. And it is very agreeable to the *Mystical* sense of the second *Psalms*, where the Kingdome of *Christ* reaches to the utmost ends of the Earth, that is, as far as Soul and Life can animate, so that our very flesh and body is brought under the Scepter of *Christ's* Kingdome.

*Vers. 19. The Figurations of the Animal Life.* That the Motions of the Minde, as they are suggested from the *Animal Life* of the Body, are set forth by *Fishes, Beasts* and *Birds*, I have already made good from the authority of *Origen*.

*Vers. 20. In a capacity of taking delight in them.* For *Melancholy* had so depraved the complexion of his body, that there was no grateful sense of any thing that belong'd to nature and the life of the *Vehicle*.

*Vers. 22. The greatest part of that Paradise a man is capable of upon Earth.* This is a Truth of Sense and Experience, and is no more to be proved by Reason, then that White is White or Black is Black.

*Vers. 23.*

*Vers. 23. Essential operation of the Soul.* The very nature of the Soul, as it is a Soul, is an aptitude of informing or actuating a Body; but that it should be always an organized Body, it is but *Aristotle's* saying of it, he does not prove it. But for mine own part, I am very prone to think that the Soul is never destitute of some *Vehicle* or other, though *Plotinus* be of another minde, and conceives that the Soul at the height is joyned with God and nothing else, nakedly lodged in his arms. And I am the more bold to dissent from him in this exaltation of the Soul, I being so secure in my own conceit of that other suspected extravagancy of his, in the debasement of them, that at last they become so drowsie and senseless, that they grow up out of the ground in that dull function of life, the efformation of Trees and Plants. And I am not alone in this liberty of dissenting from *Plotinus*: For besides my own conceit this way, (for I must confess I have no demonstrative reasons against his opinion) I am emboldened by the example of \* *Ficinus*, who is no small admirer of the forenamed Author.

See *Immortals*  
of the Soul,  
Book 3. chap. 1.  
sect. 2.

That which I was about to say is this; The informing or actuating of a Body being so *Indispensable* and *Essential* an act of the Soul, the temper and condition of the Body that it thus actuates cannot but be of mighty consequence unto the Soul that is conscious of the plight thereof, and reaps the joy of it or sorrow, by an universal touch and inward sense springing up into her cognoscence and animadversion. And we may easily imagine of what moment the *health* and good plight of the Body is to the Mind that lodges there, if we do but consider the condition of *Plants*, whose bodies we cannot but conceive in a more grateful temper while they flourish and are sweet and pleasing to the eye, then when they are withered by age or drought, or born down to the Earth by immoderate storms of rain. And so it is with the body of man, (where there is a Soul to take notice of its condition) far better when it is in health by discretion and moderation in diet and exercise, then when it is either parched up by superstitious melancholy, or flocked and drowned in sensuality and intemperance; for they are both abaters of the joyes of life, and lessen that plenitude of happiness that man is capable of by his Mystical *Eve*, the woman that God has given every one to delight himself with.

\* Comment. in  
*Plotin. Ennead.*  
2. lib. 8. cap. 8.  
and elsewhere.

*Vers. 24. So far forth as they are incompatible with the health of the body.* This is an undeniable truth, else how could that hold good that the Apostle speaks, *That Godliness is profitable for all things, having the promise of this world, and that which is to come*; whenas without the health of the Body there is nothing at all to be enjoyed in this present world? And certainly God doth not tie us to the Law of Angels or superiour Creatures, but to precepts suitable to the nature of man.

1 Tim. 4. 8.

*Obedience to the Precepts of that Superiour Light.* For if the Life of the Body grow upon us so as to extinguish or hinder the sense of divine things, of our dependence on God, and of the joyful hope of the life to come; it is then become disorderly, and is to be castigated and kept down; that it pull not us down into an averfation from all Piety, and sink us into an utter oblivion of God and the divine Life.

*Vers. 25. Without any shame or blushing:* See what has been said upon the *Philosophick Cabbala*.

T t t

CHAP.



## CHAP. III.

*A story of a dispute betwixt a Prelate and a Black-Smith, concerning Adam's eating of the Apple. 1. What is meant by the subtilty or deceit of the Serpent. That Religion wrought to its due height is a very chearful state; and it is only the halting and hypocrisie of men that generally have put so soure and sad a vizard upon it. 5, 6. That worldly Wisdom, not Philosophy, is perstringed in the Myserie of the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil. 10. The meaning of Adam's flying, after he had found himself naked. 20. Adam, the Earthly-minded Man, according to Philo. 21. What is meant by God's clothing Adam and Eve with hairy Coats in the Mystical sense. 23. Παράδεισος τρυφῆς, or the Paradise of Luxury. That History in Scripture is wrote very concisely, and therefore admits of modest and judicious Supplements for clearing the sense. 24. What is meant by the Cherubim and flaming Sword. Plato's definition of Philosophy, Μελέτη Σαφείας. A more large description of dying to Sin, and of the life of Righteousness. That Christian Religion, even as it referres to the external Person of Christ, is upon no pretence to be annull'd till the Conflagration of the world.*

**I**N this Third Chapter is the sad *Catastrophe* of the Story, the Fall of Adam, and the Original of all that misery and calamity that hath befallen mankind since the beginning of the World. Of so horrid consequence was it, that our Mother Eve could no better suppress her longing, but upon the easie perswasion of the Serpent ate the forbidden Fruit; as a famous Prelate in France once very tragically insisted upon the point to his attentive Auditory.

See Jo. Bodin.  
Mag. Dæmono-  
man. lib. 2. c. 2.  
pag. 123, 124,  
125.

But it should seem, a certain *Smith* in the Church, as *Bodinus* relates, when he had heard from this venerable Preacher, that Universal Mankind, saving a small handful of *Christians*, were irrevocably laps'd into eternal damnation by Adam's eating of an Apple, and he having the boldness to argue the matter with the Prelate, and receiving no satisfaction from him in his managing the *Literal* sense of the Text, ( and his skill it would seem went no further, ) the *Smith* at last broke out into these words, *Tam multas rixas pro re tantilla ineptè excitari*; as if he should have said in plain English, *What a deal of doe has there here been about the eating of an Apple?* Which blasphemous saying, as *Bodinus* writes, had no sooner come to the ears of the Court of France, but it became a Proverb amongst the Courtiers. So dangerous a thing is an ignorant and indiscreet Preacher, and a bold, immodest Auditour. *Bodinus* in the same place does profess it is his Judgement, that the unskillfull insisting of our Divines upon the *Literal* sense of Moses has bred many hundred thousands of *Atheists*. For which reason, I hope that men that are not very ignorant and humorous, but sincere lovers of God and the divine Truth, will receive these my *Cabbala's* with more favour and acceptance; especially this *Moral* one, it being not of too big a sense to stop the mouth of any

any honest, free, inquisitive *Christian*. But whatever it is, we shall further endeavour to make it good in the several passages thereof.

*Vers. 1. Inordinate desire of pleasure.* It is \* *Philo's*, τὸ φιν ἡδονῆς ἐστὶ σὺμβολον, *That the Serpent is a Symbole or representation of Pleasure*; which he compares to that Creature for three reasons.

First, because a Serpent is an *Animal* without feet, and crawls along on the Earth upon his belly.

Secondly, because it is said to feed upon the dust of the Earth.

Thirdly, because it has poisonous teeth that kill those that it bites. And so he assimilates *Pleasure* to it, being a base affection, and bearing it self upon the belly, the seat of lust and intemperance, feeding on earthly things, μή σιτεμένη ὃ ἢ ἐξάνιον τροφήν ἢν ὀρέγῃ τοῖς φιλοθεάμοσι διὰ λόγου καὶ δογματικῶν σοφία, *but never nourishing her self with that heavenly food which Wisdom offers to the Contemplative by her precepts and discourses.*

It is much that *Philo* should take \* no notice of that which is so particularly set down in the Text, *the subtilty of the Serpent*, which methinks is notorious in *Pleasure*, it looking so smoothly and innocently on't, and insinuating it self very easily into the minds of men upon that consideration; and so deceiving them; whereas other Passions cannot so slyly surprise us, they bidding more open warre to the quiet and happiness of mans life, as that judicious Poet *Spencer* has well observed in his *Legend* of Sir Guyon or *Temperance*,

*A harder lesson to learn continence*

*In joyous pleasure then in grievous pain:*

*For sweetness doth allure the weaker sense*

*So strongly, that uneathes it can refrain*

*From that which feeble Nature covets fain;*

*But grief and wrath that be our enemies,*

*And foes of life, she better can restrain:*

*Yet Vertue vaunts in both her Victories,*

*And Guyon in them all shews goodly Masteries.*

*What a rigid and severe thing, &c.* This is the conceit of such as are either utter strangers to Religion, or have not yet arrived to that comfortable result of it that may be expected. For God takes no delight in the perpetual rack of those Souls he came to redeem, but came to redeem us from that pain and torture which the love of our selves, and our untamed lusts, and pride of spirit makes us obnoxious to; which men being loth to part with, and not having the heart to let them be struck to the very quick, and pulled up by the roots, the work not accomplished according to the full mind and purpose of God, there are still the seeds of perpetual anxiety, sadness, and inevitable pain. For to be dead, is easement; but to be still dying, is pain: and it is most ordinarily but the due punishment of halting and hypocrisie. And mens spirits being long sowed thus and made sad, their profession and behaviour is such, that they fright all inexperienced young men from any tolerable compliance in matters of Religion, thinking that when they are once engaged there, they are condemned *ad Fodinas* for ever, and that they can never emerge out of this work and drudgery in those dark Caverns, till they die there like the

\* In his *Cosmopœia* Mosaisc.

*Philon. Cosmopœia* Mosaisc.

\* Which yet he does els where. *Φερονιμωσις ὁ οὖτος πάντων ἀνθρώπων, τῶν ὁ πάντων πανουργίας ἡδονῆς.* Leg. Allegor. lib. 3.

In his *Fairy Queen*, Book 2. cant. 6.



poor *Americans*, enslaved and over-wrought by the merciless *Spaniard*.

John 8.36.

But verily if we have but the patience to be laid low enough, the same hand that depressed us will exalt us above all hope and expectation. For if we be sufficiently baptized into the Death of Christ, we shall assuredly be made partakers of his Resurrection to Life, and that glorious liberty of the Sons of God, according as it is written, *If the Son make you free, then are you free indeed*; free from Sin, and secure from the power of any Temptation. But if *Mortification* has not had its perfect work, too mature a return of the sweetness of the *Animal Life* may prove like the Countrey-man's cherishing the Snake by the fire-side, which he had as he thought taken up dead in the Snow; it will move, and hiss, and bite, and sting. The strong presages of the manifold corporeal delights and satisfactions of the flesh may grow so big and boisterous in the mind, that the Soul may deem her self too streightly girt up, and begin to listen to such whispers of the *Serpent* as this, *What a rigid and severe thing is this business of Religion?* &c. and account her self, if she be not free to every thing, that she is as good as free to nothing.

*Vers. 2, 3. But the Womanish part in Adam.* 'Tis but one and the same Soul in man entertaining a dialogue with her self that is set out by these Three parts, The *Serpent*, *Adam*, and the *Woman*. And here the Soul recollecting her self, cannot but confess that Religion denies her no honest nor fitting pleasure that is not hazardous to her greater happiness, and bethinks her self in what peril she is of losing the divine Life and due sense of God, if she venture thus promiscuously to follow her own will, and not measure all her actions and purposes by the divine Light that for the present is at hand to direct her.

2 Cor. 6.14.

Ephes. 5.27.

*Vers. 4. But the Serpent, &c.* The sense of this verse is, that the eager desire of *Pleasure* had wrought it self so far into the sweetness of the *Animal Life*, that it clouded the mans judgement, and made him fondly hope that the being so freely alive to his own Will was no prejudice to the Will of the Spirit and the life of God which was in him, whenas yet notwithstanding the Apostle expressly writes, *What fellowship is there betwixt righteousness and unrighteousness? what communion betwixt light and darkness? what agreement betwixt Christ and Belial?* And he elsewhere tells us, *That Christ gave himself for his Church, that he might so thoroughly purge it and sanctify it, that it should have neither spot nor wrinkle; but that it should be holy and unblameable*, a true Virgin-Bride clothed with his divine Life and Glory. And those men that are so willing to halt betwixt two, the *Flesh* and the *Spirit*, and have house-room enough to entertain them both, (as if there could be any friendship and communion betwixt them) let them seriously consider whether this opinion be not the same that *deceived Adam* was of, and let them suspect the same sad event, and acknowledge it to arise from the self-same Principle, the inordinate desire of pleasing their own wills, without the allowance of the divine Light and consulting with the Will of God.

*Vers. 5. Skill and Experience in things.* And some men make it no sin, but warrantable knowledge, to know the world, and account others fools

fools that are ignorant of that wicked myſterie. For man would be no Slave or Idiot, but know his own liberty, and gain experience; as he pretends, by the making uſe of it.

But that the accurate exerciſe of *Reason* in the knowledge of God's marvellous works in *Nature*, or thoſe innocent delightful Concluſions in *Geometry* and *Arithmetick*, and the like, that theſe parts of Knowledge ſhould be perſtringed by *Moses* in this Hiſtory, it ſeems to me not to have the leaſt probability in it; for there are ſo very few in the world whoſe minds are carried any thing ſeriouſly to ſuch Objects, that it had not been worth the taking notice of. And then again, it is plain that the miſcarriage is from the affectation of ſuch kind of Knowledge as the *Woman*, the *flowring life of the Body*, occaſioned *Adam* to tranſgreſs in. Wherefore it is the fulfilling of the various deſires of the fleſh, not an high aſpire after Intellectual Contemplations; for they reſpect the *Maſculine Faculties*, not the *Feminine*, that made way to the tranſgreſſion.

Wherefore, I ſay, the *Wiſdome* that the *Serpent* here promiſed was not *Natural Philoſophy*, or *Mathematicks*, or any of thoſe innocuous and noble accompliſhments of the Underſtanding of man, but it was the *Knowledge of the world* and the *Wiſdome of the fleſh*. For the *Life of the Body* is full of deſires, and preſages of ſatisfaction in the obtaining of this or the other external thing, whether it be in *Honour*, *Riches*, or *Pleasure*; and if they ſhake off the divine Guide within them, they will have it by hook or by crook. And this *worldly Wiſdome* is ſo plauſible in the world, and ſo ſweetly relished by the mere natural man, that it were temptation enough for a Novice, if it were but to be eſteemed *Wiſe*, to adventure upon ſuch things as would initiate him therein.

*Verſ. 6. But the Wiſdome of the fleſh.* The Apoſtle calls it *φρόνημα σαρκός*. Which *wiſdome of the fleſh*, he ſaith, *is enmity with God*. But the free and cautious uſe of *Reason*, the Knowledge of the fabrick of the world and the courſe of Natural cauſes, to underſtand the Rudiments of *Geometry* and the Principles of *Mechanicks*, and the like, what man, that is not a *Fool* or a *Fanatick*, will ever aſſert that God bears any enmity to theſe things? For again, theſe kind of Contemplations are not ſo properly the Knowledge of *Good* and *Evil*, as of *Truth* and *Falſhood*, the Knowledge of *Good* and *Evil* referring to that experience we gather up in *Moral* or *Political* encounters.

But thoſe men that from this Text of Scripture would perſtringe *Philosophy*, and an honeſt and generous Enquiry into the true knowledge of God in *Nature*, I ſuſpect them partly of *ignorance*, and partly of a *ſly* and *partial kind of countenancing of thoſe pleaſures that Beaſts have as well as Men*, and I think in as high a degree, eſpecially Baboons and Satyres, and ſuch like lecherous *Animals*. And I feare there are no men ſo ſubject to ſuch miſ-interpretations of Scripture as the boldeſt *Religioniſts* and *Mock-Prophets*, who are very full of heat and ſpirits, and have their Imagination too often infected with the fumes of thoſe lower parts, the full ſenſe and pleaſure whereof they prefer before all the ſubtile delights of *Reason* and generous *Contemplation*.

But leaving theſe *Sanguine-inſpired Seers* to the ſweet deception and gullery



1 Pet. 2. 11.

gullery of their own corrupted Fancy, let us listen and keep close to him that can neither deceive nor be deceived, I mean *Christ* and his holy Apostles; and now in particular, let us consider that grave and pious Monition of *S. Peter, Beloved, I beseech you, as Strangers and Pilgrims, abstain from fleshly lusts that warre against the Soul.* Wherein this holy man, instructed of God, plainly intimates that the Soul in this world is as a traveller in a strange Countrey, and that she is journeying on to a condition more sutable to her then this in the Body. Whence it follows, that the tender patronizing of those Pleasures that are mortal and die with the Body, is a badge of a poor, base, degenerate Minde, and unacquainted with her own nature and dignity.

Wild. 1. 5.

*Vers. 7. How naked now he was, and bare of all strength and power to divine and holy things.* This was *Adam's* mistake, that he thought he could serve two Masters, *The will of God,* and *The dictates of the flesh.* But thus he became estranged to the divine Life and Power, *which will not dwell in a body that is subject unto sin; For the holy Spirit of discipline will fly deceit, and remove from thoughts that are without understanding, (viz. such as are suggested and pursued at randome) and will not abide when unrighteousnesse cometh in.*

*Vers. 8. Could not endure the presence of it.* For the *divine Light* now was only a convincer of his miscarriages, but administred nothing of the *divine Love and Power,* as it does to them that are obedient and sincere followers of its Precepts, and therefore *Adam* could no more endure the presence of it then sore eyes the Sun or Candle-light.

*Vers. 9. Persisted and came up closer to him.* This *divine Light* is God, as he is manifested in the Conscience of man, but his *Love and Power* are not fit to be communicated to *Adam* in this dissolute and disobedient condition he is in, but merely Conviction, to bring him to repentance. And after the hurry of his inordinate pleasures and passions, when he was for a time left in the fuds, as they call it, this *light of Conscience* did more strictly and particularly sift and examine him, and he might well wonder with himself that he found himself so much afraid to commune with his own Heart.

*Vers. 10. Ingenuously confessed.* For he presently found out the reason why he was thus estranged from the divine Light, because he found himself naked of that power and good affection he had in divine things before; having lost those by promiscuously following the wild suggestions of his own inordinate will, as you see in the following verse. Wherefore he had no minde to be convinced of any obligation to such things as he felt in himself no power left to perform nor any inclination unto.

*Vers. 11. The sad event upon his disobedience.* *Adam's* Conscience resolved all this confusion of minde into his disobedience and following his own will, without any rule or guidance from the will of God.

*Vers. 12. His Rational Faculties, and said.* Like that in the Comedian,

*Homo sum, humani nihil à me alienum puto.*

And

And so commonly men reason themselves into an allowance of sin, by pretending humane infirmities or natural frailties.

*Vers. 13. That he kept his Feminine faculties in no better order.* That is, the foolish and mischievous Sophistry amongst men, whereby they impose upon themselves, that because such and such things may be done, and that they are but the suggestions of nature, which is the work of God in the world, that therefore they may doe them, how and in what measure they please. But here the *divine Light* does not chastise *Adam* for the exercise of his *Feminine* faculties, but that in the exercise of them they were not regulated by an higher and more holy Rule, and that he kept them in no more subjection unto the *Masculine*.


*To which he had nothing to say, but, &c.* The meaning is, that *Adam's* temptations were very strong, and so accommodate to the vigorous life of the body, that, as he thought, he could not resist. But the will of man assisted by God, as *Adam's* was, if it be sincere, what can it not doe?

*Vers. 14. Then the divine Light began to chastise the Serpent.* From this 14<sup>th</sup> verse to the 20<sup>th</sup> there seems to be a description of the Conscience of a man plainly convincing him of all the ugliness and inconveniencies of those sinful courses he is engaged in, with some hints also of the advantages of the *Better life*, if he converted to it, which is like a present flame kindled in his mind for a time: but the true love of the divine Life and the power of Grace being not also communicated unto his Soul, and his Body being unpurg'd of the filth it has contracted by former evil courses, this flame is presently extinct, and all those monitions and representations of what so nearly concerned him are drowned in oblivion, and he presently settles to his old ill ways again.

*That it crept basely upon the belly.* See what has been said out of *Philo* upon verse 1.

*Vers. 15. But might I once descend so far.* This the *divine Light* might be very well said to speak in *Adam*. For his Conscience might well remind him how grateful a sense of the *harmless joyes of the Body* he had in his state of obedience and sincerity: and if the *divine Light* had wrought it self into a more full and universal possession of all his Faculties, the regulated *joyes of the Body*, which had been the off-spring of the woman, had so far exceeded the tumultuous pleasures of inordinate desires, that they would, like the Sun-beams playing upon a fire, extinguish the heat thereof, as is already said in this 15<sup>th</sup> verse.

*Vers. 16. So that the kindly Joy of the health of the Body shall be much depraved.* The *divine Light* in the Conscience of *Adam* might very well say all this, he having had already a good taste of it in all likelihood, having found himself after inordinate satiating his furious desires of pleasure, in a dull, languid, nauseating condition, though new recruits spurred him up to new follies. For the *Moral Cabbala* does not suppose it was one single mistaken act that brought *Adam* to this confusion of mind, but disobedience at large, and leading a life unguided by the Light and Law of God.

*Earthly-minded Adam.* *Philo* calls him  *מִיָּדוֹן רָע*, the earthly mind, pag. 332.



*Vers. 17, 18, 19.* *Adam's* Conscience was so awakened by the *divine Light* and *Reason*, and *Experience* so instructed him for the present, that he could easily read his own doom, if he persisted in these courses of disobedience, that he should be prick'd and vex'd in his wild rangings after inordinate pleasure all the while the *Earthly mind* was his light and guide. But after all this conviction, what way *Adam* would settle in, did not God visit him with an higher pitch of superadvenient Grace that would conveigh *Faith*, *Power*, and *Affection* unto him, you see in the verse immediately following.

*Vers. 20.* *Adam* was not sufficiently. For mere conviction of *Light* disjoyn'd from *Faith*, *Power*, and *Affection*, may indeed disturb the *Mind* and confound it, but is not able of it self to compose it and settle it to good, in men that have contracted a custome of evil.

*Called her, My life.* So soon as this reproof and castigation of the *divine Light* manifested in *Adam's* Conscience was over, he forthwith falls into the same sense of things, and pursues the same resolutions that he had in design before, and very feelingly concludes with himself, that be that as true as it will that his Conscience dictated unto him, yet nothing can be more true then this, *That the Joy of his Body was a necessary solace of life, and therefore he would set up his happiness in the improvement thereof.* And so adhering in his affection to it, counted it *his very life*, and that there was no living at all without it. They are almost the words of \* *Philo*, speaking of the sense of the Body, in which was this corporeal Joy; *Ἦν γὰρ ὁ γὰρ ὁ σώματος, ὁ νόμος Ἀδάμ, ἰδὼν ἀγαπᾶσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸ δίναν, ζῶν ἐν αὐτῷ νόμῳ, ἰ. e. which corporeal sense the earthly mind in man, properly therefore called Adam, when he saw efformed, though it was really the death of the man, yet he called it his Life.* This is *Philo's* Exposition of this present verse.

\* In his *Quis rerum divinarum hares.*

*Isal. 35. 26.*  
& *109. 29.*

*Vers. 21.* *Put hairy Coats.* The *Philosophick Cabbala* and the Text have a marvellous fit and easie congruency in this place. And this *Moral* sense will not seem hard, if you consider such phrases as these in Scripture; *But as for his enemies, let them be clothed with shame*; and elsewhere, *Let them be clothed with rebuke and dishonour*; besides other places to that purpose. And to clothe men according to their conditions and quality, what is more ordinary, or more fit and natural? As those that are *Fools*, they ordinarily clothe them in a *Fools coat*. And so *Adam's* will and affection being carried so resolutely to the *brutish* life, it is not incongruous to conceive that the *divine Light* judging them *very Brutes*, the reproach she gives them is set out in this passage of *clothing them with the skins of beasts.*

The meaning therefore of this Verse is, that the *divine Light* in the Conscience of *Adam* had another bout with him, and that *Adam* was convinced that he should grow a kinde of a *Brute* by the courses he meant to follow. And indeed he was content so to be, as a man may well conceive, the pleasure of sin having so weakned all the Powers of that higher life in him, that there was little or nothing, especially for the present, able to carry him at all upwards towards Heaven and Holiness.

And of a truth, vile *Epicurism* and *Sensuality* will make the Soul of man  
so

so degenerate and blinde, that he will not only be content to slide into *Brutish* immorality, but please himself in this very opinion that he is a real *Brute* already, an *Ape*, *Satyre*, or *Baboon*; and that the best of men are no better, saving that civilizing of them and industrious education has made them appear in a more refined shape, and long inculcate Precepts have been mistaken for *connate Principles of Honesty and Natural Knowledge*; otherwise there be no indispensable grounds of *Religion and Vertue*, but what has hapned to be taken up by *over-ruling Custome*. Which things, I dare say, are as easily confutable, as any Conclusion in *Mathematicks* is demonstrable. But as many as are thus sottish, let them enjoy their own wildeness and ignorance; it is sufficient for a good man that he is conscious unto himself that he is more nobly descended, better bred and born, and more skilfully taught by the purged Faculties of his own Minde.

*Vers. 22. Design'd the contrary.* The mercy of the Almighty is such to poor man, that his weak and dark spirit cannot be always so resolutely wicked as he is contented to be; wherefore it is a fond surmise of desperate men, that doe all the violence they can to the remainders of that Light and Principle of Religion and Honesty left in them, hoping thereby to come to rest and tranquillity of minde, by laying dead or quite obliterating all the Rules of Godliness and Morality out of their Souls. For it is not in their power so to doe, nor have they any reason to promise themselves they are hereby secure from the pangs of Conscience. For some passages of Providence or other may so awaken them, that they shall be forced to acknowledge their error and rebellion with unexpressible bitterness and confusion of spirit: And the longer they have run wrong, the more tedious journey they have to return back.

Wherefore it is more safe to close with that life betimes, that when it is attained to, neither deserves nor is obnoxious to any *change or death*; I mean when we have arrived to the due measure of it. For this is the natural accomplishment of the Soul, all else but rust and dirt that lies upon it.

*Vers. 23. Out of this Paradise of Luxury.* The *English Translation* takes no notice of any more Paradises then one, calling it alwaies the *Garden of Eden*. But the *Seventy*, more favourable to our *Moral Cabbala*, that which they call a *Garden in Eden* at first, they after name *παράδεισον ἡδονῆς*, which may signifie the *Garden of Luxury*. But whether there be any force at all in this or no, that Supplement I have made in the foregoing verse will make good the sense of our *Cabbala*. And in the very Letter and History of the Scripture, if a man take notice, he must of necessity make a supply of something or other to pass to what follows with due cohesion and clearness of sense.

So in the very next Chapter, where God dooms *Cain* to be a Vagabond, and he cries out that *every man that meets him will kill him*, according to the concise story of the Text, there was none but *Adam* and *Eve* in the world to meet him, and yet there is a mark set upon him by God, as if there had been then several people in the world into whose hands he might fall, and lose his life by them. And then again at *vers. 17. Cain*  
had



had no sooner got into the *Land of Nod*, but he has a wife and a child by her, and he is forthwith said to build a City, whenas there is no mention of any but himself, his wife, and his child, to be the Artificers; but any ingenious Reader will easily make to himself fitting supplements, ever supposing due distances of time and right preparations to all that is said to be acted. And so in the Story of *Samson*, where he is said to take three hundred Foxes, it may be rationally supposed that Countrey was full of such creatures, that he had a competency of time, a sufficient number to help him, and the like. That the History of Scripture is very concise, no body can deny; and therefore where easie, natural, and agreeable supplements will clear the sense, I conceive it is very warrantable to suppose some such supplies, and for a Paraphrast judiciously to interweave them.

But now that *Paradise* at first should signifie a state of *divine pleasure*, and afterward of *sensual voluptuousness*, it is no more harsh then that *Adam* one while is the *Spiritual* or *Intellectual Man*, another while the *Earthly* and *Carnal*. For one and the same Natural thing may be a Symbol of contrary Spiritual Mysteries. So a *Lion* and a *Serpent* are figures of Christ as well as of the Devil: and therefore it is not so hard to admit that this *Garden of Eden* may emblemize, while *Adam* is discours'd of as innocent and obedient to God, the *delights of the Spirit*; but after his forsaking God, the *pleasures of the Flesh*; and consequently, that the fruit of the *Tree of Life* in the one, may be *perseverance and establishment in the divine Life*, in the other, a *settlement and fixedness in the brutish and sensual*.

*Vers. 24. The manly faculties of Reason and Conscience.* These I conceive may be understood by the *Cherubim* and *flaming Sword*. For the *Cherubim* bear the Image of a *Man*, and *Reason* is a cutting, dividing thing like a *Sword*, the Stoicks call it *διαιρῶντα λόγον*, *dividing and distinguishing Reason*. For *Reason* is nothing but a distinct discernment of the *Idea's* of things, whereby the Mind is able to sever what will not sute, and lay together what will. But if any body will like better of *Philo's* interpretation here of the *Cherubim* and *flaming Sword*, who makes the *Cherubim* to signifie the *Goodness and Power of God*; the *flaming Sword*, *θεῖον λόγον*, the *effectual and operative Wisdome or Word of God*; it does not at all clash with what we have already set down. For my self also suppose, that God by his *Son* the *Eternal Word* works upon the *Reason* and *Conscience* of man: For that *Word* is *living and powerful*, *sharper then any two-edged Sword*, *piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joynts and marrow*, and is the *discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart*; *neither is there any creature that is not manifest in his sight, but all things are naked and open unto the eyes of him with whom we have to doe*.

That he could not set up his rest for ever. Assuredly a mans heart is not so in his own hand, that he can doe himself all the mischief he is contented to doe. For we are more God's then our own, and his Goodness and Power has dominion over us. And therefore let not a man vainly fancy, that by violently running into all enormity of life, and extinguishing all  
the

the Principles of Piety and Vertue in him, that he shall be able thus to hide himself from God, and never be re-minded of him again for ever. For though a man may happen thus to forget God for a time, yet he can never forget us, sith all things lie open to his sight. And the power of his *ever-living Word* will easily cut through all that thicknes and darkness which we shrowd our selves in, and wound us so as to make us look back with shame and sorrow at a time that we least thought of.

But that our pain may be the lesse, and our happiness commence the sooner, it will be our wisdom to comply with the *divine Light* betimes; for the sooner we begin, the work is the easier, and will be the more timely dispatch'd through the power of God working in us. But this I must confess (and I think my self bound to bear witness to so true and useful a mysterie wrapt up in this *Mosaical* covering,) *That there is no other passage nor return into happiness then by death.* Whence *Plato* also, that had been acquainted with these Holy writings, has defined *Philosophy* *Μελέτη θανάτου*, *The meditation of death*, viz. the dying to the lust of the flesh and inordinate desires of the Body; which Purgatory if we had once passed through, there would soon spring up that *Morning Joy*, the Resurrection from the dead, and our arrival to everlasting life and glory. And there is no other way then this that is manifestable either by *Scripture*, *Reason*, or *Experience*.

But those that through the grace of God and a vehement thirst after the divine Righteousness have born the Crosse till the perfect death of the body of sin, and make it their business to have no more sense nor relish of themselves or their own particular persons then if they were not at all, they being thus demolished as to themselves, and turned into a *Chaos* or dark *Nothingness*, as I may so speak, they become thereby fitted for the *new Creation*.

And this *personal life* being thus destroyed, God calls unto them in the dead of the Night, when all things are silent about them, awakes them, and raises them up, and breathes into them the breath of everlasting life, and ever after actuates them by his own Spirit, and takes all the humane Faculties unto himself, guiding or allowing all their operations, alwaies holding up the spirit of man so that he will never sink into sin; and from henceforth death and sorrow is swallowed up for ever, for the sting of Death is Sin.

But whatever liberty and joy men take to themselves that is not founded in this new life, is false and frivolous, and will end but in sadness, bitterness, and intolerable thralldome. For the *Corporeal life* and *sense* will so deeply have sunk into the Soul, that it will be beyond all measure hard and painful to disintangle her.

But as many as have passed the *Death* have arrived to that *Life* that abides for ever and ever.

And this Life is *pure and immaculate Love*, and this *Love* is God, as he is communicable unto man, and is the sole Life and Essence of Vertue truly so called; or rather, as all colours are but the reflexion of the Rayes of the Sun, so all Vertue is but this One variously coloured and figured from the diversity of *Objects* and *Circumstances*. But when she playes



playes with ease within her own pure and undisturbed Light, she is most lovely and amiable; and if she step out into zeal, Satyrical rebuke, and contestation, it is a condescent and debasement for the present; but the design is, a more enlarged exaltation of her own nature, and the getting more universal foot-hold in other persons, by dislodging her deformed enemy.

For the *divine Love* is the love of the *divine Beauty*, and that *Beauty* is the *divine Life* which would gladly insinuate it self, and become one with that particular Principle of Natural life, the Soul of man. And whatever man she has taken hold upon, and won him to her self, she does so actuate and guide, as that whatever he has, she gets the use of, and improves it to her own *interest*, that is, the advancement of her self.

But she observing that her progress and speed is not so fast as she could wish, (that is, that mankind is not made so fully and so generally happy by her as she could desire, and as they are capable of) she raises in a man his Anger and Indignation against those things that are obstacles and impediments in her way, beating down by solid Reason such things as pretend to Reason, and such things as are neither the genuine off-spring of the humane faculties, nor the effects of her own union with them, discountenancing them, and deriding them as Monsters and Mongrel things, they being no accomplishment of the humane nature, nor any gift of the divine. She observing also that mankind is very giddily busie to improve their Natural faculties without her, and promise themselves very rare effects of their art & industry, which if they could bring to pass, would be in the end but a scourge and plague to them, and make them more desperately bold, sensual, Atheistical, and wicked; (for no fire but that of God's Spirit in a man can clear up the true knowledge of himself unto us,) she therefore taketh courage (though she see her self slighted, or unknown) and deservedly magnifies her self above all the effects of Art and humane industry, and boldly tells the world what petty and poor things they are if compared unto her.

Nor doth she at all stick to pour out her Scorn and Derision unto the full upon those garish effects of fanatical Fancy, where *Melancholy* dictates strange and uncouth dreams, out of a dark hole, like the whispers of the Heathen Oracles. For it is not only an injury to her self, that such *Antick Phantasms* are preferred before the pure simplicity of her own beauty; but a great mischief to her darling, the Soul of man, that he should forsake those Faculties she has a mind to sanctifie and take into her self, and should give himself up to mere inconsiderate Imaginations and casual impresses, chusing them for his guide, because they are strongest, not truest, and he will not so much as examine them.

Such like as these and several other occasions there are that oftentimes figure the *divine life* in good men, and sharpen it into an high degree of Zeal and Anger. But whom in wrath she then wounds, she pities, as being an affectionate Lover of universal mankind, though an unreconcilable disliker of their vices.

I have

I Have now gone through my *Threefold Cabbala*, which I hope all sincere and judicious Christians will entertain with unprejudic'd candour and kinde acceptance. For as I have lively set out the mysteries of the holy and precious life of a Christian, even in the *Mosaical Letter*, so I have carefully and on purpose cleared and asserted the grand essential Principles of *Christianity* it self; as it is a *particular Religion*; avoiding that rock of scandal that some who are taken for no small Lights in the *Christian* world have cast before men, who attenuate all so into *Allegories*, that they leave the very Fundamentals of Religion suspected, especially themselves not vouchsafing to take notice that there is any such thing as the *Person of Christ now existent*, much lesse that he is a *Mediatour with God for us*, or that he was a *sacrifice for sin* when he hung at *Jerusalem* upon the *Crosse*, or that there shall be again any *appearance of him in the Heavens*, as it was promised by the two Angels to his Apostles that saw him ascend; or that there is any *life to come*, after the dissolution of the natural body, though our Saviour Christ sayes expressly, *That after the Resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are like the Angels of God*. But to be so *spiritual* as to interpret this of a *mysterious resurrection* of a man in this life, is in effect to be so truly *carnal*, as to insinuate there is no such thing at all as the *Life to come*, and to adde to *Saducism*, *Epicurism* also, or worse, that is, a religious liberty of filling one anothers houses with brats of the adulterous bed, under pretence that they are now risen to that state that they may without blame commit that which in other mortals is down-right *Adultery*. Such unlawful sporting with the *Letter* as this, is to me no sign of a *spiritual man*, but of one at least *indiscreet and light-minded*, more grosse in my conceit thn *Hymeneus* and *Philetus*, who yet affirmed that the resurrection was past, and so *allegoriz'd* away the faith of the people.

See *Mystery of  
Godlines*,  
Book 6. chap.  
16, and 17.

Matth. 22. 30.

See *Mystery of  
Godlines*,  
Book 6. chap.  
17. sect. 3.

For mine own part I cannot admire any mans *Fancies*, but only his *Reason*, *Modesty*, *Discretion* and *Miracles*, the main thing being presupposed ( which yet is the birth-right of the meanest Christian ) *to be truly and sincerely Pious*. But if his *Imagination* grow rampant, and he aspire to appear some strange thing in the world, such as was never yet heard of; that man seems to me thereby plainly to bewray his own *Carnality* and *Ignorance*. For there are no better Truths then what are plainly set down in the Scripture already, and the best, the plainest of all. So that if any one will step out to be so venerable an *Instructor of the World*, that no man may appear to have said any thing like unto him, either in his own age or foregoing generations; verily I am so blunt a Fool as to make bold to pronounce, that I suspect the party not a little season'd with *spiritual Pride* and *Melancholy*: For, God be thanked, the *Gospel* is so plain a Rule of *Life* and *Belief* to the sincere and obedient Soul, that no man can adde any thing to it.

But then for comparison of persons, what dotage is it for any man, because he can read the *common Alphabet of Honesty* and a *Pious life* in the History of the Old and New Testament, finely *allegorizing*, as is conceiv'd, those *external Transactions* to a *mysterious* application of what



See *Mystery of  
Godliness*,  
Book 6. ch. 12.

concerns the *inward man*; to either place himself, or for others to place him in the same level with *Jesus Christ the Son of God*, the *Saviour of men*, and *Prince of the highest Angelical Orders*, who rose out of the grave by the Omnipotent hand of his Father, and was seen to ascend into Heaven by his Apostles that gazed upon him as he passed through the Clouds, and whom all true *Christians* expect visibly to appear there again and revisit the world according to the promise: I say, it seems to me a very unreasonable and rash thing, if not impious and blasphemous, to acknowledge any man whatsoever comparable to so *sacred a Person* as he every way approved himself, and was approved by a voice from Heaven, saying, *This is my beloved Son, hear him*.

If any man therefore having none of these Testimonies from above, nor being able to doe any thing more then other men, shall be so unmannerly as to place himself in the same order and rank with *Christ the Son of God*, because he has got some fine fancies and phrases, and special and peculiar interpretations of Scripture, which he will have immediately suggested from the Spirit; I cannot forbear again to pronounce, that this man is overtaken with an high degree of either *Pride* or *Madness*, and if he can perswade any others to look upon him as so *sacred a Prophet*, that it must be in them at least *Inadvertency* or *Ignorance*; nay, I think I shall not say amisse if I attribute their mistake to a kinde of *Pride* also. For *Pride* affects nothing more then *Singularity*; and therefore undervaluing the plain Simplicity of ordinary *Christianity*, such as at first sight is held forth in the Gospel of Christ, they think it no small priviledge to have a Prophet of their own; especially they getting this advantage thereby, that they can very presently, as they fancy, censure and discern the Truth or Falshood of all that venture to speak out of the Rode of their own Sect; as if every body were bound to conne their lessons according to *their Book*. And it is a fine thing to become so accurately wise at so cheap a rate, and discover who is *Spiritual*, or who is the *Carnal*, or mere *Moral* man. This is indeed the folly of all Sects, and there is no way better that I know to be freed from such inveiglements, then by earnestly endeavouring after that which they all pretend to, and to become truly more holy and sincere then other men; for the *thoroughly-purified man* is certainly delivered from all these follies.

See *Mystery of  
Godliness*,  
Book 6. ch. 13.  
sect. 7.

These things I could not forbear to speak in zeal to the honour of my *Saviour*, and the good and safety of his *Church*. For if men once get a trick to call the world *Christian*, where the *death of Christ on the Crosse at Jerusalem* is not acknowledged a sacrifice for sin, nor himself now in his humane Person a Mediatour with God the Father, and the Head of his Church Militant and Triumphant; nor that there is any *Eternal Life* nor *Resurrection*, but that in the *Moral or Mystical sense*: assuredly this will prove the most dangerous way imaginable quite to take away that in time, which is most properly called Christian Religion, out of the world, and to leave merely the name thereof behinde.

But a Religion so manifestly established by God in a most miraculous manner, and being so perfect, that the wit of man cannot imagine any thing more compleat, and better fitted for winning souls to God: It can  
be

be nothing but giddiness or light-mindedness, to think that this Religion can be ever superannuated in the world, but that it shall last till *Christ's Corporeal appearance in the Clouds*. For there is no reason at all that the Holy Ghost should be thought to come in the flesh of some particular man, no more then God the Father did under the Law. For what can he tell us more or better then Christ already has told us, or what himself may tell us without any personal shape? And there is no Prophecie of any such thing, but onely of that which is better; that Christ will procure for all those that are his faithful and obedient followers, the Spirit of Truth and Righteousnesse, and indue them with the divine Life; and that it shall so at length come to pass, that Justice, Peace and Equity shall more universally and fully flourish in the world then ever yet they have done; and that Faith in God and of the Life to come shall be more vigorously sealed upon the hearts of men; and that there shall be a nearer union and conjunction betwixt the humane and divine nature in us then ever, and more frequent and sensible commerce betwixt the Inhabitants of the *Athereal* and *Terrestrial* Region, according as I have already declared concerning the *Seventh day* in this *Defence of the Moral Cabbala*.

But in the meantime though that full *Sabbatism* be so far off, yet I doubt not but there have been and are very sweet and joyful *pralibations* of it in sundry persons, which quickens their hopes and desires of the compleatment thereof: and that of the holy Apostle, *Πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις συζητάει καὶ σπουδάζει ἀρετῇ κυῖω*, is not lesse true now then in his own times. But those that would abuse that Text to a Political sense and tumultuous mispractice, are the Birth of Vipers, not the revealed Sons of God. For *the wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God. Nor are the weapons of our warfare carnal, but Spiritual*. Which may be a safe key to the unlocking of the Mystery of all those Prophecies concerning the Reign of the Saints and their Victories, which fanaticall persons and of a grosse temper so easily erre in, to the great disturbance of the World. And I must confesse that even learned men and of a more polite judgment and peaceable Spirit have been very prone to mistake in this point, the phrase of Scripture seeming literally to sound that way: which if I could believe to be the right sense thereof, I should not be able to read the Predictions without horrore and affrightment; there being greater reason to be impatient for miseries to come then those that are long since passed, and for such as are some time to fall upon the Church of Christ then for those that concern mere Pagans. *Pour out thy wrath upon the Heathen that have not known thee, and upon the Kingdoms that have not called upon thy name*; would be the more natural wish of every well-willer to Christendome in this case; amongst the number of whom I cannot but profess my self.

And therefore perceiving the order of things so demonstrable, that of necessity *the judgment of the Little Horn, the destruction of the Man of sin, the burning of the Whore of Babylon*, and the like, are yet to come, and also concern the Christian World; and that upon this destruction all the Kingdomes of the Earth are to be the Kingdomes of Christ and of his Saints: I am infinitely relieved and refreshed in my own spirit, in that I am sufficiently satisfied in my self that

See *Mystery of Godliness*,  
Book 6. ch. 15.

Rom. 8. 12.

Jam. 1. 10.  
2 Cor. 10. 4.

Psal. 79. 6.



Chap. 17.  
and 18.  
2 Cor. 10. 4.

this Destruction is not to be understood necessarily of any carnal warfare and effusion of blood, but of that warfare which is *not carnal*, as *S<sup>t</sup> Paul* speaks; and that the Reign of the Saints will not be by the invasion of the rights of Princes upon the pretense of their want of Saintship, but by the conversion of Prince and people every where into the condition of Saints; and that the burning of *Rome* by fire is no more meant by that Tragical Prediction in the Apocalyps, then the sacking of *Corinth* by *S<sup>t</sup> Paul's* weapons of warfare, which he boasts to be so mighty through God for pulling down of strong holds. Nay I will adde further, that it is not onely not necessary that these Predictions should be understood in so grosse a sense, but that there is far greater reason to conclude that they are not so to be understood, whether we consider the things themselves that are predicted, or the phrases and prefigurations of them in the Prophecies. And it would make much for the peace and happiness of Christendome, if any able Pen were employ'd in a more particularly making out so concerning a Truth: Besides the gratifying of the more ingenuous Spirits, whose understandings cannot be well at rest in any supposition that clashes with that demonstrable order of Visions, *Synchrional* and successive, which *Mr Mede* has so happily light upon, and out of the rode of which all Expositions are found so groundless and inept, so rack'd and confused; nor their hearts at ease, if those menaces and encouragements to revenge, warrs and bloodshed, should be the real scope and meaning of these Apocalyptick visions, and should not be figuratively and spiritually to be understood: which undoubtedly is the chief and primary, if not the only, sense of them. An Hypothesis which once received would prevent all the ill use that might be made of these clear and wonderful Predictions, and would remove all occasion of prejudice and disgust of the most rational and coherent interpretations of them.

But out of my love of the Peace and Tranquillity of the Church, not to lull her asleep into a false security; It does not at all follow, That, because this storm of destruction is not literally meant against her, therefore she shall never fall into any such. For assuredly there may be such a constitution of things, as if the Church should fall thereinto, would certainly bring down divine vengeance, though God had never threatened it. As for example, If the Generality of the Guides of Christendome should be grosse Idolaters, bold Nullers or Abrogatours of the indispenfable Laws of Christ by their corrupt Institutes, and bloody and barbarous Persecutours and Murderers of those that out of conscience towards God will not commit Idolatry with them, nor forsake the commands of Christ; and to arme and occrustate themselves in this devilish Apostasy, should secretly foment in their own breasts, and endeavour to convey unto others, that hideous monster of Atheism and Infidelity; taking it for their deepest foundation, That all things are alike true in Religion, only they must have the wit to dictate what is most for the *power* and *profit* of the Priest, and make his Interest the measure of all, not the honour of God nor Salvation of the people: I say, if they should lapse into such a dreadful Apostasy as this, it is unimaginable how Vengeance could be kept off from overtaking them at the long run, or what hope they could have to speed better then

then the Jews, those Murderers of the Prophets of old, of whom Christ declares, that for persecuting and killing his innocent servants, all the righteous blood shed upon Earth should come upon them, from the blood of *Match. 23. 35* righteous *Abel* to the blood of *Zacharias* the Son of *Barachias*, whom they slew betwixt the Temple and the Altar. And what a sad vengeance it was that did at last overtake them, though they were the peculiar people of God, is over-well known, unless it were better considered.

If any such thing should ever come to pass, which God avert, the very external *Cortex* then of the Prophetick Visions would *ex accidenti* seem Prophetical, and the contexture of Phrases and Prefigurations such, as if they were intended to be in some sort *δελφινὴ μάχαιρα*, a *two-edged Sword*, striking both waies, and so destroying them in the gross sense that had hardned themselves against the spiritual edge thereof, and would not suffer their foul abominations to be cut off, and that bloody and Idolatrous Beastliness, that had ruled so long, to be slain thereby. To as many as so modest a sense as this can seem intolerable; they cannot but seem to me either Atheistically sottish, and utterly unbelieving of any truth of either Prophecies or Providence, and to think that humane wit and force will carry all before it: or else they are in a sleepy self-condemned condition, and hate the light because their deeds are evil; such as say unto God, *Depart from us, we desire not the Knowledge of thy waies*; or such as give the *Nazarites* wine to drink, and command the *Prophets*, saying, *Prophecy not*; that say to the *Seers*, *See not*, and to the *Prophets*, *Prophecy not unto us right things*; speak unto us smooth things, *prophecy deceits*. *Job 21.* *Amos 2.* *Esay 30.*

But unless I would my self be a false and deceitfull Interpreter of the Prophets, I cannot but profess, that I think that that more *Eximious and Illustrious Kingdome of Christ upon Earth* is yet to come, and that it will in due time be accomplished one way or other, according as *Daniel* has predicted, That the *Kingdome, and Dominion, and the greatnesse of the Kingdome under the whole Heaven, shall be given to the people of the Saints of the most High*: Which is not yet come to passe, forasmuch as that little *Horn that speaks such great things* is not yet put to silence. *Dan. 7. 27.*

Which little *Horn* cannot be *Antiochus Epiphanes*, he plainly belonging to the *Leopard with Four heads*, or to the *Goat with four horns*; which *Beasts* denote the *Greek Kingdome*, of which the great *Horn*, or *Alexander*, is accounted the first King, and the other four as his *successours*, (else how could he be first?) and *Antiochus* reckoned in the latter time of the Kingdome of the *Four Horns*: which further shews that the *successours* of *Alexander's* *successours* belong all to that one kingdome that is styled *Greek*, and represented by the entire bodies of those *Beasts*, the *Leopard* and *He-Goat*, the one with *four heads and four wings*, and the other with *four horns* after the breaking of that first great one. From whence it is necessary that the *Fourth beast* be the *Roman Empire*, according to what has been also the constant opinion of the Church and of the Fathers. *Dan. 7. 6.*

At the same Times and Events does *St. John* point with these of *Daniel*, in the blast of the seventh Trumpet. And the seventh Angel sounded, and there were great voices in Heaven, saying, *The Kingdomes of the World are become* *Rev. 11. 15.*



*become the Kingdomes of our Lord, and of his Christ, and he shall reign for ever and ever.*

1 Cor. 15. 24.

25, 26.

\* Dan. 7. 14, 27.

And lastly, the Apostle Paul also witnesseth, that *before Christ deliver up the Kingdom to his Father, he is to put down \* all Rule, and all Authority and Power; For he must reign till he have put all his enemies under his feet: The last enemy that shall be destroyed is Death*, which (as I have already signified unto you) though he be now the *King of Terrours*, will in that great *Festival and Sabbatism*, by reason of so sensible and palpable union betwixt the Heavenly and Earthly nature, be but a pleasant passage into an higher room, or, to use that more mysterious expression of the *Rabbins* concerning *Moses*, in whose Writings this *Sabbatism* is adumbrated, God will draw up a mans Soul to himself by an *Amorous kisse*; For such was the death of that holy man *Moses*, who is said to have died in *Moab* על פי ידוה, *in the kisses and embracements of God*.

R. Maimonid.

More Nevoch.

part. 3. cap. 51.

2 Pet. 3. 10.

This shall be the condition of the Church of Christ for many hundred years; till the Wheel of Providence driving on further, and the Stage of things drawing on to their last Period, men shall not only be freed from the fear and pain of death, but there shall be no capacity of dying at all. *For then shall the day of the Lord come, wherein the Heavens shall passe away with a noise, and the Elements melt with fervent heat, and the Earth with all the things in it shall be burnt up.* Thus Christ having done vengeance upon the obstinately wicked and disobedient, and fully triumphed over all his enemies, he will give up his Kingdom to his Father, whose *Vicegerent* hitherto he hath been in the affairs of both Men and Angels. But till then, whosoever by pretending to be more Spiritual and Mystical than other men, would smother those Essential Principles of the Christian Religion that have reference to the *external Person of Christ*, let him phrase it as well as he will, or speak as magnificently of himself as he can, we are never to let go the plain and warrantable Faith of the Word for ungrounded fancies and fine sayings.

Wherefore let every man seek God apart, and search out the Truth in the holy Scripture, preparing himself for a right understanding thereof, by stedfastly and sincerely practising such things as are plainly and uncontrovertedly contained therein, and expect illumination according to the best communication thereof, that is, answerably to our own Faculties; otherwise if we bid all *Reason*, and *History*, and *Humane helps* and *Acquisitions* quite adieu, the world will never be rid of *Religious Lunacies* and *Fancies*.

# THE C O N T E N T S O F

## The Literal Cabbala.

### The P R E F A C E.

1. **W**Hat is meant by the term Cabbala, and how Warrantably the Literal Exposition of the Text may be so called. 2. That dispensable speculations are best propounded in a Sceptical manner. 3. A clear description of the nature and dignity of Reason, and what the Divine Logos is. 4. The general probabilities of the truth of this present Cabbala. 5. The design of the Author in publishing of it. page 1.

### C H A P. I.

2. **T**HE Earth at first a deep miry Abyſſe, covered over with Waters, over which was a fierce Wind, and through all Darkneſſe. 3. Day made at first without a Sun. 6. The Earth a floor, the Heavens a transparent Canopy, or strong Tent over it, to keep off the Upper Waters or blew conspicuous Sea from drowning the World. 8. Why this Tent or Canopy was not said to be good. 9. The Lower Waters commanded into one place. 11. Herbs, Flowers, and Fruits of Trees, before either Sun or Seasons of the year to ripen them. 14. The Sun created and added to the Day, as a peculiar Ornament thereof, as the Moon and Stars to the Night. 20. The Creation of Fish and Fowl. 24. The Creation of Beasts and creeping things. 27. Man created in the very shape and figure of God, but yet so, that there were made females as well as males. 28. How

Man came to be Lord over the rest of living creatures. 30. How it came to pass that Man feeds on the better sort of the fruits of the Earth, and the Beasts on the worse. 6

### C H A P. II.

3. The Original of the Jewish Sabbaths, from God's resting himself from his Six dayes labours. 5. Herbs and Plants before either Rain, Gardning or Husbandry; and the reason why it was so. 7. Adam made of the dust of the ground, and his Soul breathed in at his nostrils. 8. The Planting of Paradise. 9. A wonderful Tree there, that would continue youth, and make a man immortal upon earth: Another strange Tree, viz. the Tree of knowledge of Good and Evil. 11. The Rivers of Paradise, Phas, Gihon, Tigris, Euphrates. 18. The high Commendation of Matrimony. 19. Adam gives names to all kind of creatures except Fishes. 21. Woman is made of a rib of Adam, a deep sleep falling upon him, his Mind then also being in a trance. 24. The first Institution of Marriage. 10

### C H A P. III.

1. A subtil Serpent in Paradise, indued with both Reason and the power of Speech, deceives the Woman. 2. The Dialogue betwixt the Woman and the Serpent. 7. How the shame of nakedness came into the world. 8. God walks in the Garden, and calls to Adam. 10. The Dialogue betwixt Adam and God. 14. The reason why Serpents want feet, and creep upon the ground. VVV4



# The CONTENTS.

ground. 15. *The reason of the Antipathy betwixt Men and Serpents.* 16. *As also of Womens pangs in child-bearing, and of their being bound in subjection to their Husbands.* 18. *Also of the barrenness of the Earth, and of mans toil and drudgery.* 21. *God tea-*

*cheth Adam and Eve the use of leathern clothing.* 24. *Paradise haunted with Apparitions: Adam frighted from daring to taste of the Tree of Life, whence his posterity became mortal to this very day.* 12

## The Philosophick Cabbala.

### CHAP. I.

I. **T**HE World of Life or Forms, and the Potentiality of the visible Universe created by the Tri-une God, and referr'd to a Monad or Unite. 6. *The Universal immense Matter of the visible World created out of nothing, and referr'd to the number Two.* 7. *Why it was not said of this matter that it was good.* 9. *The ordering of an Earth or Planet for making it conveniently habitable, referr'd to the number Three.* 14. *The immense Æthereal matter, or Heaven, contriv'd into Suns or Planets, as well Primary as Secondary, viz. as well Earths as Moons, and referr'd to the number Four.* 20. *The replenishing of an Earth with Fish and Fowl, referr'd to the number Five.* 24. *The Creation of Beasts and Cattel, but more chiefly of Man himself, referr'd to the number Six.* 16

### CHAP. II.

2. *God's full and absolute Rest from creating any thing of anew, adumbrated by the number Seven.* 4. *Suns and Planets not only the furniture but effects of the Æthereal Matter or Heaven.* 6. *The manner of Man and other Animals rising out of the Earth by the power of God in Nature.* 8. *How it was with Adam before he descended into flesh, and became a Terrestrial Animal.* 10. *That the four Cardinal Vertues were in Adam in his Æthereal or Paradisiacal condition.* 17. *Adam in Paradise forbidden to taste or relish his own Will under pain of descending*

*into the Region of Death.* 18. *The Masculine and Feminine faculties in Adam.* 20. *The great Pleasure and Solace of the Feminine faculties.* 21. *The Masculine faculties laid asleep, the Feminine appear and act, viz. the grateful sense of the Life of the Vehicle.* 25. *That this sense and joy of the Life of the Vehicle is in it self without either blame or shame.* 21

### CHAP. III.

I. *Satan tempts Adam, taking advantage upon the Invigoration of the Life of his Vehicle.* 2. *The Dialogue betwixt Adam and Satan.* 6. *The Masculine faculties in Adam, swayed by the Feminine, assent to sin against God.* 7. *Adam excuses the use of that wilde Liberty he gave himself, discerning the Plastick Power somewhat awakened in him.* 8. *A dispute betwixt Adam and the Divine Light, arraigning him at the Tribunal of his own Conscience.* 14. *Satan stricken down into the lower Regions of the Aire.* 15. *A Prophecy of the Incarnation of the Soul of the Messias, and of his Triumph over the head and highest Powers of the rebellious Angels.* 16. *A decree of God to sowre and disturb all the pleasures and contentments of the Terrestrial Life.* 20. *Adam again excuses his Fall, from the usefulness of his Presence and Government upon Earth.* 21. *Adam is fully incorporated into Flesh, and appears in the true shape of a Terrestrial Animal.* 24. *That Immortality is incompetent to the Earthly Adam, nor can his Soul reach it, till she return into her Æthereal Vehicle.* 25

The

# The Moral Cabbala.

## CHAP. I.

1. **M**AN a Microcosm or Little World, in whom there are two Principles, Spirit and Flesh. 2. The Earthly or Fleshly Nature appears first. 4. The Light of Conscience unlistned to. 6. The Spirit of Savoury and Affectionate discernment betwixt good and evil. 10. The inordinate desires of the flesh driven aside and limited. 11. Hereupon the plants of Righteousness bear fruit and flourish. 16. The hearty and sincere Love of God and a mans neighbour is as the Sun in the Soul of man : Notionality and Opinions the weak and faint Light of the dispersed Stars. 18. Those that walk in sincere Love, walk in the Day : They that are guided by Notionality, travel in the Night. 22. The Natural Concupiscible brings forth by the command of God, and is corrected by Devotion. 24. The Irascible also brings forth. 26. Christ the Image of God is created, being a perfect Ruler over all the motions of the Irascible and Concupiscible. 29. The food of the Divine Life. 30. The food of the Animal Life. 31. The Divine Wisdom approves of what soever is simply natural, as good.

p. 29

## CHAP. II.

3. The true Sabbatism of the Sons of God. 5. A Description of men taught by God. 7. The mysterie of that Adam that comes by Water and the Spirit. 9. Obedience the Tree of Life : Disobedience the Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil. 10. The Rivers of Paradise, the four Cardinal Vertues in the Soul of man. 17. The Life of Righteousness lost by Disobedi-

ence. 19. The mere Contemplative and Spiritual Man sees the motions of the Animal Life, and rigidly enough censures them. 21. That it is incompatible to Man perpetually to dwell in Spiritual Contemplations. 22. That upon the slaking of those, the kindly Joy of the Life of the Body springs out, which is our Eve. 23. That this kindly Joy of the Body is more grateful to Man in Innocency then any thing. 25. Nor is man mistaken in his judgment thereof.

34

## CHAP. III.

1. Adam is tempted by inordinate pleasure from the springing up of the Joy of the invigorated Life of his Body. 2. A dialogue or dispute in the Minde of Adam betwixt The inordinate Desire of Pleasure and The natural Joy of the Body. 6. The Will of Adam is drawn away to assent to Inordinate Pleasure. 8. Adam having transgressed, is impatient of the Presence of the divine Light. 10. A long conflict of Conscience, or dispute betwixt Adam's earthly minde and the divine Light, examining him, and setting before him both his present and future condition, if he persisted in rebellion. 20. He adheres to the Joy of his Body without reason or measure, notwithstanding all the castigations and monitions of the divine Light. 21. The divine Light takes leave of Adam therefore for the present, with deserved scorn and reproach. 22. The doom of the Eternal God concerning laps'd Man, that will not suffer them to settle in Wickednesse, according to their own depraved wills and desires.

36



# The Defence of the Threefold Cabbala.

## The INTRODUCTION.

I. **D**iodorus his mistake concerning Moses, and other Law-givers that have professed themselves to have received their Laws from either God or some good Angel. 2. Reasons why Moses began his History with the Creation of the World. 3. The Sun and Moon the same with the Egyptians Osiris and Isis, and how they came to be worshipped for Gods. 4. The Apotheosis of mortal men, such as Bacchus

and Ceres, how it first came into the world. 5. That the Letter of the Scripture speaks ordinarily in Philosophical things according to the sense and imagination of the Vulgar. 6. That there is a Philosophical sense that lies hid in the Letter of the Three first Chapters of Genesis. 7. That there is a Moral or Mystical-sense not only in these three Chapters, but in several other places of the Scripture. 47

# The Defence of the Literal Cabbala.

## CHAP. I.

I. **T**HE genuine sense of In the Beginning. The difference of עשה, ברא, קנה, neglected by the Seventy, who translate ברא only ἐποίησαν. 2. The ground of their mistake discovered, who conceive Moses to intimate that the Matter is uncreated. That רוח אלהים is no more then ventus magnus. 4, 5. That the first darkness was not properly Night. 6. Why the Seventy translate רקיע Firmamentum, and that it is in allusion to a firmly-pitched Tent. 11. That the sensible Effects of the Sun invited the Heathen to Idolatry, and that their Oracles taught them to call him by the name of Jao. 14. That the Prophet Jeremy divides the day from the Sun, speaking according to the vulgar capacity. 15. The reason why the Stars appear on this side the upper ceruleous Sea. 27. The Opinion of the Anthropomorphites, and of what great consequence it is for the Vulgar to imagine God in the shape of a Man. Aristophanes his story in Plato of Men and Womens growing together at first, as if they made both but one Animal. 57

## CHAP. II.

7. The notation of ψυχὴ answerable to the breathing of Adam's Soul into

his nostrils. 8. The exact situation of Paradise. That Gihon is part of Euphrates; Pison, Phasis, or Phasitigris. That the Madianites are called Ethiopians. That Paradise was seated about Mesopotamia, argued by six Reasons. That it was more particularly seated where now Apamia stands in Ptolemie's Maps. 18. The Prudence of Moses in the commendation of Matrimony. 19. Why Adam is not recorded to have given names to the Fishes. 24. Abraham Ben Ezra's conceit of the names of Adam and Eve as they are called אדם and חווה. 25. Moses his wife Anthypophora concerning the natural shame of nakedness. 64

## CHAP. III.

I. How much it saves the credit of our first Parents, that the Serpent was found the prime Author of the Transgression. That according to S. Basil all the living creatures of Paradise could speak: undeniable reasons that the Serpent could, according to the Literal Cabbala. 9. The opinion of the Anthropomorphites true, according to the Literal Cabbala. 14. That the Serpent went upright before the Fall, was the opinion of S. Basil. 16. A story of the easie delivery of a certain poor Woman of Liguria. 19. That the general

ral calamities that lie upon mankind came by the transgression of a Positive Law, how well accommodate it is to the scope of Moses. 23. That

Paradise was not the whole Earth. 24. The Apparitions in Paradise called by Theodoret Θεοδωροῦ. 68

## The Defence of the Philosophick Cabbala.

### CHAP. I.

1. **W**HY Heaven and Light are both made Symbols of the same thing, viz. The World of Life. That ברא אלהים intimate a Trinity. That ראשית is a Title of the Eternal Wisdom, the Son of God, who is called also קדם, Ἀρχὴ and ἀνατολή, and λόγος as well in Philo as the New Testament. That רוח אלהים is the Holy Ghost.
2. The fit agreement of Plato's Triad with the Trinity of the present Cabbala.
5. The Pythagorick names or nature of a Monad or Unite applied to the First day's work.
6. What are the Upper waters: and that Souls that descend εἰς ἕρπον are the Naiades or water-Nymphs in Porphyrius.
8. That Matter of it self is unmoveable. R. Bechai his notation of שמים very happily explained out of Des-Cartes his Philosophy. That Universal Matter is the Second day's Creation, fully made good by the names and property of the number Two.
13. The nature of the Third day's work set off by the number Three.
16. That the most learned do agree that the Creation was perfected at once. The notation of כוכב strangely agreeing with the most notorious Conclusions of the Cartesian Philosophy.
19. That the Corporeal world was universally erected into Form and Motion on the Fourth day, is most notably confirmed by the Titles and Property of the number Four. The true meaning of the Pythagorick Oath, wherein they swore by him that taught them the mysterie of the Tetractys. That the Tetractys was a Symbole of the whole Philosophick Cabbala, that lay couched

under the Text of Moses. 20. why Fish and Fowl created in the same day. 23. Why living creatures were said to be made in the Fifth and Sixth days. 31. And why the whole Creation was comprehended within the number Six.

71

### CHAP. II.

3. The number Seven a fit Symbole of the Sabbath or Rest of God. 7. Of Adam's rising out of the ground, as other creatures did. 11. That Pison is from פשה or פוש, and denotes Prudence. The mystical meaning of Havilah.
13. That Gihon is the same that Nilus, Sihor, or Siris, and that Pison is Ganges. The Justice of the Æthiopians. That Gihon is from גון; and denotes that Vertue.
14. As Hiddekel denotes Fortitude.
17. That those expressions of the Soul's sleep, and death in the Body, so frequent amongst the Platonists, were borrowed from the Mosaical Cabbala.
19. Fallen Angels assimilated to the Beasts of the field. The meaning of those Platonical phrases πρεσβυτεῖν, πρεσβεῖν, ἢ πρὸς πρεσβῶν ἀποβολή, τὸ τ' ὑπὸ πρεσβείας, and the like. That Θεοὶ in Platonism is the same that אלהים in Moses, that signifies Angels as well as God.
22. That there are Three Principles in Man, according to Plato's School, Νῆς, Ψυχὴ, ἑσώλογος Ψυχῆς, and that this last is Eve.

85

### CHAP. III.

1. The Serpent Ὀφίων in Pherecydes Syrus. אהים, שערים, ציים, אים, and לילית, names of Spirits haunting Fields and desolate places. The right Notation of שרים. 13. That Satan upon his tempting Adam was cast down lower towards the Earth; with



## The CONTENTS.

with all his Accomplices. 15. Plato's Prophecie of Christ. The reasonableness of Divine Providence in exalting Christ above the highest Angels. 20. That Adam's descension into his Terrestrial Body was a kind of Death. 22. How incongruous it is to the Di-

vine Goodness, Sarcastically to insult over frail Man fallen into Tragical misery. 24. That it is a great mercy of God that we are not immortal upon Earth. That Δαίμων, Ψυχὴ, and Ἄγγελος, are all one. 92

## The Appendix to the Defence of the Philosophick Cabbala.

### CHAP. I.

I. **T**HE strength of the Philosophick Cabbala argued from the nature of the Truths therein contain'd. 2. The dignity of Pythagoras. 3. That he was acquainted with the Mosaick Philosophy. 4. Pythagoras his Miracles. 5. Of Plato, that he was acquainted with the Jewish Learning; and what miraculous of him. 6. Of Plotinus, his retorting of Olympius his Magical practice against him upon himself; his great esteem of Origen. 7. The folly of men in their adhering to some private judgment more then to Fathers, Churches, Workers of Miracles, and to Reason it self. 8. The Cartesian Philosophy a restauration of the Physical part of the Mosaick, and of Descartes his being inspired. 99

### CHAP. II.

1. An Enumeration of Objections against the Philosophick Cabbala. 2. The Objection from the Inadequateness of the Pythagorick Numbers to the Six dayes Creation, answered. 3. That Tetractys in the Pythagorick Oath is neither the four Elements, nor Mens, Anima, Opinio, Corpus, nor yet the Tetragrammaton. 4. That the exquisite finess of the Pythagorick Numbers to the Days of Creation argue his Philosophy the same with the Mosaical. 5. That the Mystical use of Numbers through the whole Denary is Judaical as well as Pythagorical. 6. And that neither the Jews nor Pythagoreans confine themselves to Ten:

whence this Objection from Inadequatenesse is found very invalid. 104

### CHAP. III.

I. The Invalidity of the Objection from the Inadequateness of the Pythagorick Names of Numbers, the reason of the accumulation of them being so easily discoverable. 2. That the genuine Pythagorick Names are discernible from the spurious, as the sincere Doctrines of Christianity are from after-Corruptions. 3. Ten more Names added that are significative of the nature of Mundus vitæ in the First Day's Creation. 4. Ten others significative of the Metaphysical Hyle created on that day. 5. Ἀυξία and Σημεῖα παραδείου how accurately significant of What is in this First Day's Creation. 6. A plain account of those Pythagorick Names of an Unite that make nothing to the First Day's work. 7. Six more names of the Binary significative of the Second Day's work, with an account of such as are impertinent thereto. 8. An account of the impertinent Names of the Ternary. 9. Of Θέος, Ἀγνόησις and Κεραυτός. The fit significancy of Δοξίας in reference to the Third Day's work. 10. The Notations of ארץ, שמש and כוכב, how Philosophical they are, and how significant of the grand Physical Truths of the Pythagorick or Judaick Cabbala. 108

### CHAP. IV.

I. Four Names more of the Tetrad that are Pertinent. 2. An account of those that are Impertinent. 3. That such Trifles

*Trifles either Numeral or Nominal could not win that reverence from Pythagoras, as to induce him to swear by the first Imparter of the Tetractys.*

4. *Γάμψ a Name proper to the Quinary and Senary, and how the Binary and Ternary came by that Title.*
5. *Two more Pertinent names of the Quinary, with an account of the Impertinent ones.*
6. *That if the nature of Numbers, and not of Things, had been intended by the Tetractys, the Pentad had rather merited the Religion of an Oath.*
7. *The Impertinent Names of the Senary.*
8. *Names thereof referable to Γάμος and Κόρυς.*
9. *Six other Names of the Senary most fitly interpretable from the Text of Moses.*
10. *Eight Names of the Septenary referring to the same Text.*
11. *Of the Impertinent Names of the Septenary, and why that number is called Pallas, and why Apollo ἐξομαρύνει.*

114

#### C H A P. V.

1. *The trivial Names of the Denary.*
2. *Nine significant Names of the Denary relating to the Universe or the Fourth Day's work.*
3. *Aaron's Vestments an emblem of the Universe;*
4. *And an Indication of the Divinity of Christ.*
5. *Three more names, "Ηλιος, Φώνος, and Σπαίρα, and in what regard given to the Denary.*
6. *The Decad, or rather the Tetractys, called Κλειδῶς, because the mystery of the Creation is chiefly locked up in the Fourth day.*
7. *As also because of its punctual and express significancy of the nature of that Day's creation.*
8. *Why it was called Κλειδῶς τῆς φύσεως.*
9. *Why the Decad or Denary called Κλειδῶς.*
10. *And why Πίσις with a fuller inference of the true ground why the Tetractys was mentioned in the Pythagorick Oath, rather than the Pentad or any other Number.*

118

#### C H A P. VI.

1. *The Second Objection, from the Unstableness of the Pythagorick Philosophy to the Judaick Cabbala, which makes no mention of the Motion of the Earth; with the first Answer thereto.*

2. *A second Answer, wherein is shown how easy, if not necessary, it was, that the Motion of the Earth should be lost out of the Judaick Cabbala.* 3. *But that there is notwithstanding that in the Jewish Cabbala which will necessarily inferre the Motion of the Earth.* 4. *That the Ancient Wise men of the Jewes did hold the Motion of the Earth, as appears from Pythagoras his having drawn his doctrine from that Fountain.* 5. *That Numa Pompilius was descended from the Jewes.* 6. *And that the Temple he built to Vesta is a Demonstration he held the Earth's Motion.*

126

#### C H A P. VII.

1. *The Third Objection, taken from the Heterogeneousness of the Exposition of the First Day's Creation to all the rest, it alone being Symbolical.*
2. *The Answer to the Objection*
3. *That the Description of the Earth in the First Day intimates a Symbolical sense thereof; And how there is the same Idea in vulgar phantasies of Light or Day and of Heaven.*
4. *That Heaven in the First Day signifies the Immaterial Orders of Beings, expressly proved out of Origen.*
5. *The same further confirmed out of Parmenides the disciple of Diocætus the Pythagorean, whom it is probable to have been acquainted with the Text of Moses.*
6. *That the Jewish Rabbins also give their suffrage thereto.*
7. *Testimony of Scripture that the Creation of Angels and of the Souls of men is signified by the Light created in the First day.*
8. *That Heaven and Light understood of the Mundus Vitæ do not signify merely Symbolically.*
9. *A further consideration evincing the same Conclusion.*
10. *That whether Heaven and Light signify Symbolically or no, the First Day's work will not be so heterogeneous to the rest, an Evening and Morning being fetched from thence to every Day's Creation.*
11. *That the Metaphysical Hyle in the First day's creation is not called Earth merely Symbolically, a thing not hard to prove, but needless.*

129



# The CONTENTS.

## CHAP. VIII.

1. *That Hyle or first Matter, is mere Possibility of being, according to Aristotle. 2. That the same is but Empty Space or Capacity of Body, according to Plato and Plotinus; and how fitly the Description of Hyle in them agrees with Moses his Terra inanis & vacua. 3. What in Plotinus his description answers to Abyfs, Darknefs, and Waters in Moses. 4. That Plotinus seems to make Hyle a mere Non-Entity. 5. But that his more express Opinion is, that it is the Potentiality of Corporeal Beings, and Entity in reversion. 6. How this Hyle may be said to be created. 7. Why Moses would take notice of so lank and evanid a business as this Hyle seems to be, in his Six Days Creation. 8. That Impossibility is involved in the notion of the Mosaic Hyle, with a special reason why the Pythagoreans might call the Decad 'Ανάσxn.* 135

## CHAP. IX.

1. *A new Supposition concerning Hyle, as if it were an actual material Substance, and how applicable Moses his description is therunto. 2. How it can be referred to the First Day's Creation, of which an Unite is the Character. 3. How it will be found to be the Inferiour Waters, in the Philosophical sense. 4. What coagulated the Monadical consistence of this Physical Hyle into a capacity of becoming Æther or the Second Day's work. 5. That the supposition of this Physical Hyle is very passable, if of Monadical consistence; otherwise intolerable.* 140

## CHAP. X.

1. *The Fourth Objection, taken from the preposterous placing the Suns in the Fourth Day and the Earths in the Third. 2. The Answers; First, That the inflexible Order of those Six mystical numbers of the Creation was in-*

*tended only as a Repository for memory and concealment, not for a book of accurately-digested Method. 3. Secondly, that the Method is not so reprehensible as is pretended, the Earth rightly following the Æther (which is the Second day's work). as the immediate effect thereof; 4. As does the garnishing of the Earth also (as the first assured effect of the conjunction of the Active Principle with the Æther in the Second Day) but rightly precedes the Fourth day's work, as the End or Object thereof. 5. That it was not needful, nor it may be possible, that one and the same series of Text should bear a threefold sense with the same exactness of order in things belonging to each of them.* 143

## CHAP. XI.

1. *The Fifth Objection answered, concerning the pretended Trivialness of the Fifth Day's Work: 2. As also of the work of the Sixth day. 3. An Answer to the Sixth Objection, against that 'Υπεργloria implied in our Interpretation of Paradise; First, in reference to Grammar and Criticism: 4. Secondly, in reference to the nature of things themselves. 5. An Answer to the Last Objection, made against the interpreting the Cherubim and Flaming Sword to be a state that Adam must pass through or into, before he can become immortal. 6. That there was a necessity of so punctually and continuedly fitting a Philosophical sense to Moses his Text, because of the Interruption of the Tradition of the Mosaic Philosophy.* 145

## CHAP. XII.

1. *The Cabbalist's Apologie whereby he would clear himself of the imputation of either trifling Curiosity, 2. Rashness in divulging such hidden Mysteries, 3. Or of Inconstancy in judgment. 4. The main Aime of his Philosophick Cabbala. 5. The reason of placing it before the Moral.* 150

# The Defence of the Moral Cabbala.

## CHAP. I.

**W**Hat is meant by Moral, explained out of Philo. 3. That the Light in the First day improv'd to the height, is Adam; in the Sixth, Christ, according to the Spirit. 4. In what sense we our selves may be said to doe what God does in us. 5. Why **ערב** and **בוקר** are rendred Ignorance and Inquiry. 18. Plato's τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐν βραχί καὶ δὲ. The Pythagoreans ἀπλωσεν σεαυτὸν applied to the Fourth day's progress. 22. That Vertue is not an extirpation, but regulation, of the Passions, according to the mind of the Pythagoreans. 24. Plotinus his τὸ θειῶδες καὶ λεοντώδες applied to the Sixth day's progress. 26. What the Image of God is, plainly set down out of S. Paul and Plato. The divine Principle in us, ὁ ἀληθινὸς ἀνθρωπῶς, out of Plotinus. 28. The distinction of the Heavenly and Earthly Man, out of Philo. 31. The Impestore of still and fixed Melancholy, and that it is not the true divine Rest and precious Sabbath of the Soul. A compendious rehearsal of the whole Allegory of the Six days Creation. 152

## CHAP. II.

The full sense of that Ἀπίδα that keeps men from entering into the true Sabbath. 4. The great necessity of distinguishing the innocent motions of Nature from the suggestions of Sin. 5. That the growth of a true Christian indeed doth not adequately depend upon the lips of the Priest. 7. The meaning of This is he that comes by Water and Blood. 8. The meaning of Repent, for the Kingdome of Heaven is at hand. The Seventh thousand years, the great Sabbathism of the Church of God. That

there will be then frequent converse betwixt Men and Angels. 9. The Tree of Life, how fitly in the Mystical sense said to be in the midst of the Garden. 17. A twofold death contracted by Adam's disobedience. The Masculine and Feminine Faculties in Man what they are. Actuating a Body an Essential operation of the Soul; and the reason of that so joyful appearance of Eve to the Humane Nature. 160

## CHAP. III.

A story of a dispute betwixt a Prelate and a Black-Smith, concerning Adam's eating of the Apple. 1. What is meant by the subtilty or deceit of the Serpent. That Religion wrought to its due height is a very chearful state; and it is only the halting and hypocrisie of men that generally have put so sour and sad a vizard upon it. 5, 6. That worldly Wisdom, not Philosophy, is perstringed in the Myserie of the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil. 10. The meaning of Adam's flying, after he had found himself naked. 20. Adam, the Earthly-minded Man, according to Philo. 21. What is meant by God's clothing Adam and Eve with hairy Coats in the Mystical sense. 23. Παράδεισος τρυφῆς, or the Paradise of Luxury. That History in Scripture is wrote very concisely, and therefore admits of modest and judicious Supplements for clearing the sense. 24. What is meant by the Cherubim and flaming Sword. Plato's definition of Philosophy, Μελέτη δαμάτου. A more large description of dying to Sin, and of the life of Righteousness. That Christian Religion, even as it referres to the external Person of Christ, is upon no pretence to be annull'd till the Conflagration of the world. 168

FINIS.

X x x 2



# Alphabetical INDEX of the whole Work.

- A. denotes the Antidote against Atheism, and Appendix.  
 B. Enthusiasmus triumphatus, and Epistles.  
 C. the Immortality of the Soul.  
 D. the Cabbala.  
 E. the Preface general.

## A.

**A** *Aron* the Eternal Logos. D. 121. E. 5. his garments the world. D. 120.  
 Absolute perfection. vid. Perfection.  
 Abstracted Essence unknowable. A. 15. C. 19.  
 Abyss what. D. 29. 59. 74. 153. a name of Hyle. D. 137.  
*Aconitum hyemale*. A. 56.  
 Actual knowledge in the mind. A. 17.  
*Adam* what. D. 12. 32. 34. 86. 151. no Hermaphrodite. D. 64.  
 Adders tongue. vid. *Ophioglossum*.  
 Æther devoid of knowledge. A. 44. 188.  
 Æthereal Animals. C. 123. 147.  
 Æthereal State immortal. C. 224.  
 Æthereal Vehicles. C. 123. 147. vid. Vehicles.  
 Air devoid of knowledge. A. 44. 188.  
 Air-pump its experiments. A. 44. why its sucker riseth. 45.  
 Air whether it have an Elastick power. A. 45.  
 Air the place of Souls departed. C. 155. its inhabitants ignorant of nature. C. 147. and mortal. C. 218. 219.  
 Airy vehicles. C. 123. 147. vid. Vehicles.  
 Allegorical sense of Scripture. D. 54.  
 Allegories of Enthusiasts. B. 17.  
*Alleluja* its leaves are cardial. A. 57.  
*Amantius* carried by a tempest. A. 91.  
 Anabaptists of Germany. B. 17.  
*Ἀναξάν* *Democriti* & *Pythag.* D. 103. 119. 139.  
*Anaxarchus* his courage. B. 41.  
 Angels. vid. *Genii*.  
 Angle of contact. A. 152.  
 Animadversion incompatible to the Brain. A. 33. 169. vid. Perception.  
 Animals. vid. Brutes.  
 Animal Spirits. C. 99. have not sense. A. 33. C. 85. are the immediate instrument of the Soul. C. 95.  
*Anne Bodenham* her story. A. 103.  
*Anne Styles*. ibid.  
*Ἀντίχ* *Say Pythag.* D. 106.  
 Antipathy of the Ape and Snail. A. 82. vid. Sympathy.  
*Anisthenes* his opinion of pleasure. B. 41.  
*Anthura* roots cardial. A. 57.

Apathy of the Stoicks. B. 41.  
*Apodes* why so shaped. A. 78.  
 Apoplexies caused by melancholy. B. 19. no argument of the Souls Mortality. C. 207.  
*Ἀπαίεστα* what. C. 125. possible in ecstasies and how. 126. 127.  
 Apparitions of Spirits. A. 100. C. 50. 140. when and where most frequent. C. 130. how they come to passe. C. 131.  
 Apparitions in the Air. A. 125. 140. not the effects of Phancy. A. 138. C. 41. nor *exuvia*. C. 139. nor reflexions. ibid.  
*Arcadian* murdered, calling for help of his friend in another Inne. C. 129.  
*Archei*. vid. *Rationes seminales*.  
 Architecture what provision there is for it in Nature. A. 49.  
*Arimanius* of the Persians. C. 234.  
*Aristeus Proconesius* his rambling Soul. C. 125.  
*Ἀεθμός* *πύρα* *ἐντονα*, the title of that *Pythagorick* Aphorisme. D. 130.  
 Armature of beasts. A. 70.  
*Aron*. vid. *Saiyrion*.  
 Assent may be firmly given to what is possible to be otherwise. A. 10. 26.  
 Astral spirit the harbour of Enthusiasm. B. 48.  
 Astral Vehicle. C. 122. vid. Vehicle.  
 Astrologie a relique of Pagan Idolatry. B. 30.  
 Atheism of Affinity with Enthusiasm. B. 1. its Danger. A. 9. whence it riseth. A. 141. who most obnoxious thereto. A. 9.  
*Athenian* house haunted, and freed by *Athenodorus*. C. 130.  
 Atomes. B. 63. 68.  
 Atomical Philosophy derived from *Moses*. D. 101.  
 Attributes of God. A. 14.  
*Ἀυγὰ* *πρωτότης*. C. 177.  
*Aventisical Genii*. C. 219. 221.  
*Avenzoar* *Albumaron's* dreams. C. 129.  
*Augustines* judgement of preexistence. E. 14.

## B

**B** Alm leaves cardiacall. A. 57.  
*Bara*, what it signifies. D. 58.  
*Bara Elohim*. D. 73.  
 Barnacles. vid. Tree-geese.

*Baruch's* prophecy of Christ, D. 122.  
 Beasts what they signifie according to the Cab-  
 bala, D. 32, 90, 92.  
 Beasts skins, D. 28.  
 Beauty a real perfection, A. 53, not discerned by  
 brutes, A. 63, 175.  
 Beauty of Animals and Plants not by chance, A.  
 53, 62.  
 Beauty of *Genii*, C. 178.  
*Behmen*, his odde opinions, B. 30.  
*Bereſith*, what it signifies, D. 58, 73.  
 Binary, its names & signification, D. 78, 111.  
 Birds why oviparous, A. 67. the artifice of their  
 nests, A. 67. C. 201. their shape and fabrick,  
 A. 70, 72.  
 Bird of Paradise described, A. 74. whether it have  
 any feet, A. 75.  
 Birds of prey how shaped, A. 74.  
 Birth of Animals an argument of providence,  
 A. 65.  
 Blood of Cats, Swine, &c. begets an imagination  
 of being Cats, Swine, &c. B. 6.  
*Bodenham* her story, A. 103.  
*Bodin's* opinion of Witches, A. 121. his story of  
 a Guardian *Genius*, A. 127. of a Blacksmiths  
 dispute with a Pielate, D. 168.  
 Body, vid. Matter.  
 Bodies of Spirits, vid. Vehicles.  
 Brains have no perception, A. 33, 35, 169. C.  
 78, 79, 91. its ventricles, C. 95, 99.  
 Branches of the Soul, vid. Rays.  
 Brutes their usefulness, A. 62. made to enjoy  
 themselves, A. 66, 178. act onely from phan-  
 tasms, A. 148.  
 Brutes whether they be Machins, B. 64, 70, 77,  
 83, 110. or have immortal Souls, C. 82, 110.  
 and sense after death, C. 135.  
 Bullet shot up so high as not to return, C. 199.

C.

**C**abbala what, D. 1. its evidence, D. 3, 45,  
 54, 99, 132. E. 10. and use, B. 123. D. 4,  
 150. Historical Cabb. D. 163. the literal and  
 Philosophical Cabbala hinted by *Parmenides*,  
 D. 132. coherence of parts requisite only in  
 one and the same Cabbala, not of the several  
 Cabbala's one with another, D. 131.  
 Camel how remarkably framed, A. 72.  
*Capillus Veneris*, vid. *Polytrichon*.  
*Cardan* could cast himself into an Ecstasie, B. 20.  
 C. 128. his Astrological Impiety, B. 35. his  
 Fathers vision, C. 218.  
*Cartes* his praise, B. 59, 61, 120. the use of his  
 Philosophy, B. 59. C. 13. free from Atheism,  
 B. 124. E. 11. his Method, B. 128. who pre-  
 pared his way, B. 127. his philosophy the Phy-  
 sical part of the Cabbala of *Moses*, D. 102, 103,  
 104. E. 17. in what sense inspired, D. 104. his  
 failings, B. 110, 131. his opinion of Motion,  
 vid. Motion.  
*Catechans* of *Crete*, C. 131.  
 Catalepsies no argument of the Souls Mortality,  
 C. 207.  
 Centaures, the occasion of the fable, A. 65.  
 Center of the Soul, C. 28. its seat, C. 109.  
 Ceremonies of Witches, A. 91, 103.  
 Charmes, vid. Divination.

Cherubims at the entrance of Paradise what, D.  
 97, 147, 176.  
 Children of Monstrous shapes, C. 171, 173.  
*Xwēg*, one of the names of *Hyle*, D. 136.  
 Christ, vid. *Legos*. His Divinity indicated by *Aa-*  
*rons* robes, D. 122.  
 Chymists often Enthusiasts, B. 29. several of their  
 wild opinions, *ibid.* why so bad Philosophers,  
 B. 35.  
 Coactivity what, E. 14.  
 Coats of beasts skins, vid. Skins.  
*Cocab* whence, D. 80, 113.  
 Cock, how advantageously framed, A. 73.  
 Cold what, B. 115.  
 Colours their nature, B. 95, 102, 117.  
 Common notions not from sense, A. 19.  
 Common *Sensorium*, vid. *Sensorium*.  
 Complexion how distinguish'd from Religion;  
 B. 12, 44. disposeth to one kind of knowledge  
 more then another, B. 46.  
*Conarion* hath no perception, A. 35, 168. C. 80, 94.  
 Conflagration of the Earth, C. 226.  
 Connex propositions, vid. Disjunct.  
 Continuity of Air not from mere matter, A. 44.  
 Contraction, vid. Self-penetration.  
 Conscience argues the existence of a Deity, A.  
 29, 167.  
 Conventicles of witches, A. 119. why dissolved  
 by certain words or names, A. 181.  
 Converse of *Genii*, C. 165.  
 Cordage its great usefulness, A. 60.  
 Corn its growth and use, A. 60.  
 Coskinomancy, A. 89.  
 Covenants why sealed with the Devil, A. 101.  
 Counsell and contrivance very conspicuous in the  
 frame of Nature, A. 38.  
*Crucia*, vid. *Magdalena*.  
*Cuinus* his depolition against *Marg. Warren*, A. 92.  
*Cuntius* his Apparition, A. 114. C. 131.  
 Cure of Enthusiasm, B. 36.  
 Cures wrought by Enthusiasts, B. 40.

D.

**Δ**αιμων, *ψυχή, ἀγγελος*, D. 98.  
 Dæmons, vid. *Genii*.  
*Dark of Westminster* killed by an invisable blow,  
 A. 90.  
*David George* his person and doctrine, B. 16, 23.  
 reflexions thereon, B. 24.  
*David* the second, vid. *German*.  
 Day and night in *Moses* what, C. 17, 30.  
 Death of *Adam* what, D. 90, 166.  
 Decad why called *Θεός*, D. 119, 120, 121.  
 Decrees how farre consistent with Free-will, C. 76.  
 Definition, vid. *Idea*.  
*Democritus* succeeded *Pythagoras* in the physical  
 Cabbala, D. 103.  
 Demonstration what, A. 10, 12.  
 Denary, vid. Ten.  
*Des-Cartes*, vid. *Cartes*.  
 Desire may cause an *ἀπαίρεσις*, C. 128.  
 Descent of Souls into bodies, C. 118.  
 Devil, vid. Spirits.  
 Devil of *Mascon's* pranks, A. 94.  
 Devotional Enthusiasm, B. 45.  
 Difficulties of Life no argument against providence  
 A. 175.



Difficulty of Conception no argument against the being of a thing, A. 14. nor greater in the notion of a Spirit than a body, *ibid.*  
 Dilatation, *vid.* Self-penetration.  
*Diocrates* acquainted with *Moses* his Text, D. 131.  
*Dyonisius's* sacrilegious Scofts, A. 87.  
 Discernibility of matter, C. 20.  
 Diseases sometimes infect the Fancy, B. 7.  
     cause oblivion, C. 116. or ἀπαρτοσία, C. 127.  
 Disjunct proposition when true, C. 74.  
 Dissent, *vid.* Assent.  
 Distance what, A. 164.  
 Distinction of sea and land, A. 50.  
 Distinction of sexes not by chance, A. 65. 78.  
 Divine sagacity, E. 7.  
 Divination its kinds, A. 89.  
 Dizziness, *vid.* Vertigo.  
 Dogges their serviceableness, A. 62.  
 Dreams their cause, B. 3. 129.  
 Drink and Diet their effects on the Fancy, B. 5.  
 Δεσμός Ἀχιλλέως, C. 138.  
 Ducks why so shaped, A. 73.  
 Dying men how they visit their Friends, C. 128.

E.

**E**agle that flew without its head, C. 205. 208.  
 Earth in the Cabbala what, D. 29. 73. 130. 135. 141. 153. 155.  
 Earths motion, B. 79. 84. 93. 118. *vid.* Planets.  
 Earths motion part of the Judaick Cabb. D. 126. 127. 128.  
 East what it signifies, D. 73. 87.  
*Eckerken* apparition, A. 100.  
*Echium*, *vid.* *Scorpioides*.  
 Ecstaticall separations, C. 126. 128. *vid.* Epilepsie.  
 Ed, what, D. 65.  
 Eels why they have no sex, A. 66.  
 Ἐιδωλον ψυχῆς, D. 91.  
 Elastick power of the Air what, A. 45. its effects, *ibid.*  
*Elohim* what, D. 58. 91.  
 Eloquence an effect of Melancholy, B. 11. 39. 44.  
 Elysiums (*vid.* Future state) C. 167. 179.  
 Emanative cause what, C. 27.  
 Emanative effect coexistent with its cause, C. 28.  
*Engasfrimuthi*, A. 100.  
 Entertainments of Spirits, C. 162. 179. 190.  
 Enthusiasme what, B. 2. its affinity with Atheisme, B. 1. its kinds, B. 22. not alwaies culpable, B. 45.  
 Enthusiasts frequently lustful, B. 15. extravagant sometimes in one point, and sober in all things else, B. 10. 27.  
 Enthusiastick Revelations and visions whence, B. 19. prophecies, B. 21. 40.  
 Epilepsies caused by Enthusiasm, B. 19. whether in our power, B. 20. 47.  
*Ereus* whence, D. 113.  
 Essence, *vid.* Abstracted.  
 Essence & Existence not distinct in God, A. 22.  
 Essential spissitude, C. 20.  
 Estrich, *vid.* Ostrich.  
 Ἔσθω whence, 113.  
 Eternity must needs belong to something, A. 16.  
*Ethiopians* famous for Justice, D. 89.  
*Euchises* how they fitted themselves for the recep-

tion of the evil Spirits, A. 131.  
*Eve* what, D. 28. 36. 39. 91. 96.  
 Evening what, D. 134. 154.  
 Evils from whence, D. 138. 139. 140.  
 Evil God, *vid.* God.  
 Existence a perfection, A. 155. *vid.* Necessary.  
 Extension essential and integral how they differ, C. 3.  
 Extension how it belongs to Spirits, A. 151. 172. B. 62. 111. C. 67. 75. 83. 86. E. 12.  
 Extinction of the Sun, C. 230.  
 Eye exquisitely contrived, A. 79. and placed, A. 69.  
 Eye of the Soul, *vid.* Centre.

F.

**F**abrick of Animals argues a providence, A. 69. of the body of man, A. 79.  
 Faculties, *vid.* Powers.  
*Facinus*, *vid.* *Cardan*.  
 Fairy Circles, A. 121.  
 False religion, *vid.* Religion.  
 Fancy has no verdict in judging of Truth, C. 128. *vid.* Imagination.  
 Fear of Death whence, C. 210.  
 Feet only in such Animals as have use of them, A. 76.  
*Ficinus's* Ghost appearing to *Marcus*, C. 137.  
 Final causes, B. 110.  
 Fire what, B. 115.  
 Firmament what, D. 30. *vid.* *Rakia*.  
 Fishes their peculiar shape, A. 67. 70. 73. 78. why oviparous, 67.  
 Fish and fowl in the Cabbala what, 32. 90. 156. why made the same day, D. 83.  
 Figure not in bodies infinitely great or little, C. 30.  
 Flaming sword, *vid.* Cherubims.  
 Flax, *vid.* Cordage.  
 Fluid Heavens the opinion of the ancient Jews, D. 127.  
 Food of Animals, A. 49.  
 Forbidden fruit, D. 26. *vid.* Tree of knowledge.  
 Forgetfulness, *vid.* Oblivion.  
 Forms substantial, B. 117.  
 Frantickness no argument of the Souls mortality, C. 207.  
 Free-will defended, C. 71. how it consists with præscience, C. 76. argues a principle distinct from matter, C. 69.  
 Frogs exenterated have sense and motion, C. 91. generated on a suddain, C. 125.  
 Fruit of trees not by chance, A. 60.  
 Future state why so particularly described, C. 7. not like *Mahomess* paradise, C. 8. nor too easy for the wicked, C. 8.  
 Functions, *vid.* Powers.

G.

**Γ'α'μ'θ'** misapplied by Pseudo-Pythagorists, D. 111.  
*Genii*, C. 134. whether extended, *vid.* Extension. alwaies vitally united with some matter, B. 86. 103. 105. C. 146. why so seldome appear, A. 126. 130. C. 156. why they doe so little hurt, C. 157. their entertainments, C. 163. 179. 190. their converse, C. 165. their motion, C. 166. whether mortal, C. 225. Guardian *Genii*, D. 48. 117.

117. Guardian *Genius* mentioned by *Bodin*, A. 127, 183. reflexions thereon, A. 129. whether every one have one, A. 130. who are fit for them, A. 132. whether lawful to pray for one, A. 132.  
*German* that styled himself *David* the 2d, B. 22. another, fifth monarch, *ibid*.  
*George*, *vid. David*.  
*Ghosts*, *vid. Spirits*.  
*Gikon*, D. 88.  
*Glandule*, *vid. Conarion*.  
*Gladiator* that laugh while his wounds were dressing, B. 42.  
*Globe* how moved upon a plain unimaginable, A. 151.  
*Globuli* convertible into the first element, B. 80, 85.  
*God* what, *vid. Idea*. could not more effectually make known his existence then he hath done, A. 28. his shape, D. 63, 69.  
*God of the Manichee's* includes not necessary existence in his *Idea*, A. 160. but impossibility, *ibid*.  
*Gods of the Heathen* what, D. 49.  
*Goodness of God* argues the Soul immortal, C. 143.  
*Gravity* argues a principle distinct from matter, A. 43. B. 93. is from the spirit of nature, C. 196.  
*Great things* supposed Divine, B. 11.  
*Greenesse of Grass* argues providence, A. 59.  
*Greyhounds* exquisitely framed, A. 62, 65, 71.  
*Großpetter* carried in the Air, A. 72, 120.

H.

**H** *A*, emphatical, D. 80.  
*Hacket* fancied himself the holy Ghost, B. 12.  
*Hardness* what, B. 90, 114.  
*Hares* advantageously framed, A. 71.  
*Havilah*, where, D. 67. what, D. 88.  
*Head* cut off bit a dog by the ear, C. 205, 208.  
*Heart* not the common *Sensorium*, C. 78, 90.  
*Heat* what, B. 115.  
*Heaven* what, D. 29, 51, 72, 130, 131, 133.  
*Heaven and light* the same, D. 130.  
*Hedge* a name of *Hyle*, D. 136.  
*Hebrew words* for the chief *Phænomena* in Nature pledges of the truth of the Philof. Cabbala, D. 113.  
*Heel of the Messias* what, D. 95.  
*Helmont's* wild opinions, B. 30. his opinion of the seat of the Soul confuted, C. 89.  
*Hembach's* piping to a conventicle of Witches, A. 120, 182.  
*Hemp*. *vid. Cordage*.  
*Hermotimus Clazomenius* his wandering Soul, C. 115.  
*Herns* why so shaped, A. 73.  
*Hesiod's* opinion of the mortality of Dæmons, C. 119.  
*Heterogeneity of the Soul*, C. 151.  
*Hiddekel*, D. 89.  
*High-priest*, *vid. Aaron*.  
*Hills* their usefulness, A. 48.  
*Hippocrates* his definition of animal Spirits, C. 95.  
*Hobbs's* arguments against spirits, C. 37. answered, C. 39. against free-will, C. 71. answered, C. 72. for the heart being the common *Sensorium*, C.

90. his explication of gravity confuted, C. 197.  
*Homogeneity in the seed of Animals*, A. 68, 179.  
*Horses* their usefulness, A. 63. their beauty, 65.  
*Hounds*, *vid. Dogs*.  
*Hubener's Ghost*, C. 131.  
*Humility* a cure of Enthusiasm, B. 37.  
*Husbandry* and its instruments, A. 60.  
*Hyle* (*vid. Earth*) D. 130, 135, 140. how created, D. 138. its impossibility, D. 138. simple and incorporeal according to *Plotinus*, D. 136.  
*Hylopathy* what, A. 153.  
*Hypericon* a good wound-herb, A. 57.  
*Hypochondriacal*, *vid. Melancholy*.  
*Υποβαθρα* one of the names of *Hyle*, D. 136.

I.

**I** *Acob*, *vid. Behmen*.  
*Idea* of God, A. 13, 15, 20. C. 23. argues his existence, A. 26. includes unity, A. 24. is a natural *Idea*, A. 13, 21, 156, 165. no signment of politicians, A. 166.  
*Idea* of a being absolutely evil doth not imply necessary existence, A. 156. but impossibility, A. 157. is arbitrary and compounded of heterogeneous notions, A. 157.  
*Idea* of a spirit, A. 15, 25. C. 21, 24. as easy as the *Idea* of body, A. 15, 149. C. 21.  
*Idea's* innate, A. 17, 147.  
*Image of God*, D. 32, 84, 157.  
*Imagination* not competent to the brain, A. 33, 169. C. 82. cannot form an Animal, A. 69.  
*Imagination* baffled, A. 151. C. 18. not wholly in our power, B. 3. the cause of Enthusiasm, B. 4. most apt to work in a way of Religion, B. 10. extravagant in one point and sober in all other, B. 9.  
*Imagination* cannot produce *spectra*, A. 101. C. 130. its strange effects, C. 106, 169. especially on the *fatus*, C. 170.  
*Immortality of the Soul* how useful a speculation, C. 15. universally believed, C. 138. proved from the attributes of God, C. 139. from the nature of the soul, C. 133. from History, C. 125. objections answered, C. 204.  
*Immediate property* indemonstrable, C. 19.  
*Imps of witches*, A. 101.  
*Inclination of the Earths Axis* of how great use, A. 40.  
*Incubi*, A. 125.  
*Impossibility of matter*, D. 121, 138.  
*Indefinite and Infinite* how they differ, B. 63, 69, 74. *vid. World*.  
*Indiscernibility of perfect similitudes*, C. 3, 27, 29. of Spirits, C. 7, 20, 27.  
*Indivisibility of Spirits*, A. 151, 173.  
*Indolency*, *vid. Apathy*.  
*Infinity* must needs belong to something, A. 16.  
*Infinite progress*, A. 134, 186. Infinite space and time subindicate the necessary existence of God, A. 163.  
*Infancy* no argument of the Souls mortality, C. 206.  
*Influences*, *vid. Sun*.  
*Inspiration* what, B. 2.  
*Instinct* whence, C. 200.  
*Intoxication* from various causes, B. 5.  
*Invention*, *vid. Reason*.



# The I N D E X.

Joy of Enthusiasts, B. 17.  
 Joynts of the body excellently disposed, A. 81.  
*Isis* appearing to the *Egyptians*, C. 129. D. 49.  
*Island* spirits, C. 130.  
 Justice of God argues the Soul immortal, C. 141.

## K.

**K**illing of Beasts like fraying a bird from her nest, A. 63, 178. their killing one another no argument against providence, A. 63, 177.  
*Κλειδὸς Χρῆστος*, D. 123, 124, 125.  
 Knives conveyed into the bodies of men, A. 98.  
 Knowledge not all derived from sense, A. 17, 18. vid. *Actual*.  
 Knowing Principle the authour of the world, A. 37.

## L.

**L***acedemonian*, vid. *Spartan*.  
 Land, vid. Sea.  
*Laplenders* sellers of winds, A. 90.  
 Lassitude whence, C. 96.  
 Law of *Moses* from God, D. 48.  
 Laws of motion countermanded by some immaterial principle, A. 46.  
 Lawgivers of Nations whence said to have their laws, D. 47, 48.  
 Legs of Animals their number, A. 70.  
 Liberty of will, vid. *Free-will*.  
 Liberty not in matter, C. 70.  
 Light what, B. 116. Light a symbol of a Spirit, A. 150, 173. C. 25. D. 30, 73, 130, 147, 153.  
*Lilith*, D. 92.  
 Literal sense of Scripture teacheth no Philosophy, D. 51. unskilfully handled the cause of Atheism, D. 168.  
*Logos* why the eternal high Priest of the world, D. 121, 122.  
*Λόγος* what, D. 121. E. 5, 8.  
 Logical notions not derived from sense, A. 18, 147.  
*Λοξίας* a name of the Ternary, and why, D. 113.  
 Love an effect of melancholy, B. 13.  
 Lust a frequent attendant of Enthusiasm, B. 15.  
*Lycanthropi*, A. 122, 184.

## M.

**M**adness no Argument of the Souls Mortality, C. 207.  
*Magus* a lustful Enthusiast, B. 15.  
 Magick of nature, C. 127. vid. *Sympathy*.  
 Magical cure of an horse, A. 86.  
*Magdalena Crucia* a sorceress married to the Devil, A. 97.  
 Magnitude how seen, B. 98.  
*Mahomet* whether really an Enthusiast or not, B. 15.  
*Majim*, whence, D. 113.  
 Man (vid. *Adam*) a necessary part of the universe, A. 84.  
 Mankind the *peculium* of Spirits, C. 157, 185.  
*Manes* a lustful Enthusiast, B. 15.  
*Manichæes* God, vid. *God*.  
*Manucodiotia*, vid. Bird of Paradise.  
*Margaret Warine* carried by a tempest, A. 92.  
 Marrow, vid. *Spinall*.  
*Marsilius*, vid. *Ficinus*.  
 Martyrdome, vid. *Sufferings*.

*Mascon*, vid. *Devil*.  
 Mathematical notions not derived from sense, A. 18, 147.  
 Matrimony commended by *Moses*, D. 67.  
 Matter what, B. 62, 66, 72. C. 21. of it self uniform; A. 38. though difform could not produce the world, A. 39, 47, 52. doth not necessarily exist, A. 163.  
 Matter whether self-moved, A. 38. B. 80, 85, 88, 107. C. 31, 44. consists of parts indiscerpible, vid. *Indiscerpible*.  
 Matter whether indued with life, B. 88, 90. and sense, C. 5, 65. Divine matter, C. 47, 60.  
 Matter and Motion can produce many *Phænomena*, B. 117. but not all, B. 120.  
 Meats their power upon the Fancy, B. 6.  
 Mechanical Motion of the Matter permitted to go as far as it can, A. 39, 52. B. 117. but must be improved by a superiour principle, A. 47, 53. B. 120.  
 Medicall use of Plants not unknown to Brutes, A. 59.  
 Melancholy its various effects, B. 8. inequalities, B. 13. its absurd conceits, B. 8. is of an inebriating nature, B. 14. disposeth to apoplexies, &c. B. 19. makes men ridiculous in one point, whilst sober in all other, B. 10, 27.  
 Melancholy a Religious complexion, B. 10, 46. its advantages thereto, B. 46. how distinguishable from true Religion, B. 13, 44. its various guises, B. 11.  
*Meliiorina* fancied her self a Queen, B. 29.  
 Memory incompetible to Matter, A. 169. C. 68, 82, 87. argues distinct Souls, C. 9.  
 Memory explained, C. 106. Memory after death, 187.  
 Membranes not the common *Sensorium*, C. 79, 92.  
*Menander* a lustful enthusiast, B. 15.  
 Metalls their use, A. 47.  
 Metaphysical notions not from sense, A. 18, 147.  
*Millennium*, D. 163.  
 Mind, vid. *Soul*.  
 Miracles compared with sanctity and goodness, D. 44, 45. Miracles required of them that disclaim reason, D. 45.  
 Mole its admirable fabrick, A. 71.  
 Monadical consistence of Physical matter, D. 141, 142.  
 Monsters with two heads, C. 208.  
 Monstrous births, C. 170, 173, 208.  
*Montanus* a lustful enthusiast, B. 15.  
 Moon what, D. 31. her motion in the zodiack, A. 42.  
 Morality what, D. 152.  
 Morall notions not derived from the senses, A. 18, 147.  
 Morning, vid. *Evening*.  
 Mortality an happiness, D. 97.  
 Mortality of *Genii*, C. 215.  
*Mosaical* Philosophy the same with the *Cartesian*, D. 102, 103, 104.  
*Moses* speaks according to appearance, D. 50. but hath an hidden philosophick sense, D. 53.  
 Motion what, B. 79, 84, 87, 104, 106, 110. E. 11. how propagated, C. 88, 105, 107. whether always at much motion in the world, B. 90, 114. Motion variegated the cause of all sensible qualities, B. 114.

Motion

Motion of the body not from the brain, A. 33, 170.  
 C. 78, 90. argues existence of spirits, C. 44.  
 Motion of animals whose heads are off, C. 108.  
 Motion of the Earth, vid. Physical Cabbala.  
 Mouth, vid. Stomach.  
 Mountains, vid. Hills.  
 Mrs *Muschamp's* children bewitched, A. 96.  
 Muscles their excellent contrivance, A. 86.  
 Musick of the spheres, D. 121.  
 Mystical interpretations effects of melancholy, B. 18, 44.  
 Mystical sense of Scripture, D. 54.

N.

**N**aiades, vid. Water-Nymphs.  
 Nakedness, D. 91.  
 Naked essence, vid. Abstracted.  
 Natural Conscience and Religion argues a Deity, A. 30, 167.  
 Navigation, and the means thereof, not by chance, A. 50.  
 Nayles of the body why so placed, A. 81.  
 Nayles conveyed into the bodies of men, A. 98.  
 Necessity what, A. 23. more perfect then contingency, A. 16, 155.  
 Necessary existence belongs to something, A. 23. proves the existence of God, A. 22, 155. is the only proof of his unity, A. 24.  
*Neufesser*, vid. *Ulricus*.  
*Nicols* the successour of *David George*, B. 16. their likeness, B. 27.  
 Nine what, D. 107.  
*Noë Ambuli*, C. 127.  
 Notion, vid. *Idea* and Common.  
 Notions Logically applicable to non-entities, B. 76. are not in the matter, C. 69.  
 Nourishment of Demons, C. 162, 182.  
*Nama Pempilius* of Jewish extraction, D. 128. held the motion of the earth, *ibid*.  
 Numbers the symbols of ancient Philosophy, D. 43, 105, 130, 145. names of numbers, D. 108.  
 Nuns bewitched, A. 97.  
 Nut-tree of *India* described, A. 61.  
 Nymphs what, C. 227.

O.

**O**bjective reality of the *Idea* of God, A. 4.  
 Oblivion whence, C. 116. no argument against *præexistence*, C. 117.  
 Octonary of what the symbol, D. 107.  
 Odours whence they arise, B. 115.  
 Old Age no argument of the Souls Mortality, C. 206.  
*Ophioneus*, D. 92.  
*Ophioglossum* } good against Kings, A. 57.  
*Ophioscoridon* }  
 Orb of light, vid. Light.  
 Orchiſſes provocative of lust, A. 57.  
 Order of things in the world, nor by chance, A. 37. C. 48.  
*Origen* his life and Opinions, E. 21.  
 Orifice of the stomach, vid. Stomach.  
*Ormasdes* of the *Persians* what, C. 234.  
 Ostrich why she sits not on her eggs, A. 68.  
*Oſiris* who, D. 49.  
 Oviparous Animals, A. 67.

Oxen their use, A. 62.  
 Oynments of Witches, C. 128.

P.

**P**ain whence, C. 104.  
*Paracelsus* a Philosphick Enthusiast, B. 33.  
 his Philosophy the sanctuary of Atheism and Paganism, B. 34. though himself were neither, B. 33, 35. his wild opinions, B. 31.  
 Paradise where, D. 65, 175. what, D. 22, 35.  
 Parallelisme of the earths axis of how great use, A. 40.  
*Parmenides* his Principles, D. 132. E. 17, 18.  
 Parts indiscerpible, vid. Indiscerp.  
 Parts of Animals live, C. 205, 208.  
 Passions their use, A. 82. argue the Souls diffusion through the whole body, C. 103. cause of *ἀπαρτησία*, C. 127. of Death, *ibid*.  
 Patience of Enthusiasts, B. 4.  
 Penetrability, vid. Self-penetration.  
 Penetration of matter, C. 32. takes not away the power of moving it, A. 151. C. 32.  
 Perception not competible to Matter, A. 33. C. 65. though organized, C. 77. not to the brain or Conarion, A. 33. C. 78, 80.  
 Perception the same with re-action if there be nothing but matter in the world, C. 9, 48, 59.  
 Perception how consistent with extension, E. 13.  
 Perfection what it contains, A. 14.  
 Perfect parvitutes, vid. Indiscerpible.  
*Peruvian* Dr. that thought himself Pope, B. 28.  
*Phænomena* of Nature argue a Deity, A. 37.  
 Phantasy, vid. Imagination.  
 Philosophical Enthusiasm, B. 28.  
*Pherecydes* acquainted with *Moses* Text, D. 132. E. 17.  
 Physical Monads. See Monadical Consistence.  
 Physical Cabbala how lost, D. 126.  
 Pieces of wood, &c. conveyed into the stomach, A. 90.  
 Pied Piper of *Hammel*, A. 100.  
*Pison* what, D. 87.  
*Πίστις* a name of the Decad, as *Ὀρκῶ* of the Tetractys, D. 125.  
 Place of Souls departed, C. 155.  
 Planets how generated, B. 129. their Epicycles, B. 119. repedations, B. 118.  
 Plants (vid. Vegetables) have but one Soul, C. 199.  
 Plants in the Cabbala what, D. 30, 33.  
 Plastick power of the Soul, C. 101. is heterogeneous, C. 152.  
*Plato* had his Philosophy out of *Moses*, D. 3, 84, 87, 92, 95, 100, 102.  
*Plato's* worth, D. 101. his prophecy of Christ, D. 95.  
*Plotinus* his praises, D. 102.  
*Plutarchs* story of the Death of *Pan*, C. 219.  
 Poetry its affinity with Enthusiasm, B. 14.  
*Pomponatius* ascribes miracles and apparitions to the stars, B. 35. C. 215.  
 Political order reaches through all ranks of Beings, C. 157, 185.  
 Political enthusiasm, B. 22.  
*Potus's* intoxicating Potion, B. 7.  
 Possibility of being otherwise should not hinder assent, A. 10, 12, 26. C. 17.  
 Powers of a Spirit, A. 15. C. 25. of the Soul, B. 3.



B. 3, 38, C. 17, 83, 102. of the animal life, A. 171.  
 Poysons no argument against providence, A. 55.  
 Præexistence not irrational, C. 111. held by the wise men of all ages, C. 113. by *Aristotle*, C. 114. *Moses*, D. 86. the Jewish Church, D. 147. the ancient Fathers, E. 20. doth not overthrow original sinne, E. 25.  
 Presages whence they arise, B. 21.  
 Prescience how it consists with free-will, C. 76.  
 Primary substance, vid. Substance.  
 Priest, vid. *Aaron*.  
 Prophecies of Enthusiasts, B. 21, 40.  
 Propositions connex and disjunct when true, C. 75.  
 Propositions de futuro when true, ibid.  
 Prudence useful in all states, D. 23.  
 Περὶ φύσεως *Platon*. D. 90, 96.  
 Punishments of the wicked, C. 186, 188. not too easy, C. 7.  
 Purity of the vehicles perfects the faculties, C. 147.  
*Pythagoras* his worth, D. 100. his oath, D. 44, 82, 106, 119. his miracles, D. 44, 101. his philosophy derived from *Moses*, D. 3, 84, 87, 92, 95, 100, 102, 117, 118. E. 17. *Pseudo-pythagoreans*, D. 109, 111.  
*Pythagorick* system of the world, B. 119. D. 106.  
*Pythagoras* his natural Philosophy Atomicall, D. 102, 103. E. 18. his musick of the spheres mistaken, D. 121. his φᾶς καὶ σκότος answerable to *Parmenides* his πῦρ καὶ γῆ.

Q.

Quakers the most melancholy sect, B. 19.  
 Quaking the effect of Melancholy, not of the Spirit of God, B. 18.  
 Quantity of motion whether alwaies the same in the world, B. 114. C. 47.  
 Qualities nothing but motion variously modified, B. 114.  
 Quantity, vid. Extension.  
 Quarries of stone their use, A. 49.  
 Quaternary, D. 81, 114. vid. *Tetractys*.  
 Quiescency whether a positive affection, B. 80, 85, 88, 90, 104, 106.  
 Quinary its names and nature, D. 83, 115.  
 Quinces good to make hair grow, A. 57.

R.

*Rakia* what, D. 60, 77.  
*Rationes seminales*, A. 53, 180. C. 34. whether parts of the Soul of the world, A. 180. whether but one, C. 199.  
*Rationale*, vid. Λόγιον.  
 Rays of the Soul, C. 109.  
 Re-action, vid. Perception.  
 Reason its nature, excellency and use in Religion, D. 2. E. 4. incompatible to the brain, A. 169. or animal spirits, C. 86. a cure of enthusiasm, B. 38.  
 Reduplication what, C. 20.  
 Refraction whence, B. 96.  
*Regius* his explication of motion, C. 82. of the common sensorium, C. 79, 92.  
 Religion argues a Deity, A. 29, 82. the falseness of some Religions no argument to the contrary,

ibid. no political engine, A. 166.  
*Remigius's* relations of Witches, A. 91, 120.  
*Restitutus* cast into an Ecstasy by a mournfull tone, B. 20.  
 Revelations of Enthusiasts, B. 19.  
 Rivers rise on the tops of mountains not by chance, A. 48.  
 Rivers of Paradise, D. 23, 35.  
 Root of the Soul, vid. Centre.  
 Roundness of the Sun and starres above the power of matter, A. 39. B. 92, 94.  
*Rotarius* carried by a tempest, A. 92.  
*Ruach* what, D. 29, 59, 74.  
 Rules to examine the truth of miracles, apparitions, &c. A. 88.  
 Rules how to judge of free and rational discourses, E. 5.

S.

*Sabbath* what, D. 34, 160, 163.  
 Sagacity, vid. Divine.  
 Sallads eaten within few houres after they were fown, C. 125.  
 Same thing that perceives must move the body, C. 65, 77.  
 Sanguine mixt with Melancholy disposeth to Enthusiasm, B. 15, 25. to amorosusness, B. 25. and disbelief of a future life, B. 26.  
*Satyrior* provocative of lust, A. 57.  
 Saturation what, C. 20.  
 Scrue-particles, vid. Striate.  
 Savours whence they arise, B. 115.  
 Scripture, vid. Literal.  
*Scolopendra* its parts live when cut in pieces, C. 205, 208.  
*Scorpioides* good against biting of Serpents, A. 57.  
 Sea-water its fitness for navigation, A. 50.  
 Sealing of Covenants why used by the Devil, A. 102.  
 Seat of the Soul where, C. 89.  
 Seeds of plants not by chance, A. 55. of Animals, A. 68.  
 Self-existence, vid. Necessary Existence.  
 Self-motion of Spirits, C. 31.  
 Self-penetration, A. 150. B. 80, 85, 104. C. 19, 32. why the Soul doth not use it to avoid pain, A. 151.  
 Seminal forms, vid. *Rationes seminales*.  
 Sensation incompatible to the brain, A. 33. C. 78. (vid. Perception) is raised by corporeal motion, B. 114. explained, C. 106.  
 Sensible, vid. Tangible.  
*Sensorium commune* what and where, C. 65, 77, 89, 91.  
 Senary its names and nature, D. 84, 116.  
 Separation of the Soul from the body, C. 123.  
 Sepenary its names and nature, D. 86, 117, 163.  
*Septum lucidum* not the common *Sensorium*, C. 79, 92.  
 Serpents charmed, A. 89, 181.  
 Serpent of paradise what, D. 26, 37, 69, 92, 169.  
*Shamajim* whence, D. 78, 113. vid. Heavens.  
*Shemesh* whence, D. 113.  
 Sheep their usefulness, A. 62.  
 Shoemaker of *Silesia's* apparition, A. 111. C. 131.  
 Signatures of plants, A. 56. of the fetus, C. 171.  
 Silk-worm described, C. 201. A. 62.  
*Simonides's* life saved by a dream, C. 129.

Sight

# The INDEX.

Sight explained, C. 96, 105. B. 115.  
*Sibyl's* description of *Aaron's* Garments, D. 120.  
 Situation how discerned, B. 98. situation of Images in a glass, B. 100.  
 Skins of beasts their use, A. 62. what they signifie in the Cabbala, D. 96, 174.  
 Sleep no argument of the Souls Mortality, C. 205.  
 Softness what, B. 114.  
*Solanum lethiferum*, A. 56.  
 Souls whether extended, vid. Extension. whether in the brain or whole body, B. 79, 84. C. 101. its dimensions, C. 151. how united to the body, B. 79, 84. C. 33, 203 alwaies united to some body, B. 86, 103, 105. C. 146. can exist out of a terrestrial body, C. 122, 137. doth not impart new motion but determination, C. 97, 148. unless in an ethereal body, C. 149. cannot quit the body when it pleaseth, C. 155.  
 Soul of man not *abrasa tabula*, A. 17. not a body nor bodily mode, A. 33. no vital ray of the Soul of the world, C. 115, 227. whether the architect of its own body, C. 101. capable of sense in any vehicle, C. 148. can change the figure of its vehicle, C. 150, 166, 188. how it doth in tempests, C. 159. immortal (vid. Immortal) what becomes of it at the conflagration of the earth, C. 227, 229. at the extinction of the Sun, C. 230.  
 Souls of Brutes whether immaterial and immortal, A. 171. C. 110, 135. vid. Brutes.  
 Souls of Witches, whether they goe out of their bodies, A. 121, 184. C. 125, 128.  
 Soul of the world, C. 9, 212, vid. Spirit of nature.  
 Souls of Angels, C. 35.  
 Sounds what, B. 115.  
 Space what, A. 164. B. 61, 67, 73, 82.  
*Spartanism*, B. 41.  
*Spartan* boy's hardiness, *ibid.*  
*Species* of things none of them inept, A. 135.  
 Specifick difference, B. 116.  
 Spectres, vid. Spirits.  
 Spinnall marrow not the common *Sensorium*, C. 85, 94.  
 Spirit what, A. 5. C. 24. its powers, A. 15. C. 25. whether extended, C. 42, vid. Extension. is in a place, C. 42. is indiscerpible, C. 7, 20, 27.  
 Spirits, *homines aërei*, A. 94, 130, 186. C. 34, 134. are not aire or fire, 125, 188. whether they have any determinate shape, A. 131. C. 150, 177. why they feel cold, A. 125. and sometimes hot, 185. how they beget dreams and inable to prophecy, A. 132.  
 Spirits, vid. Animal.  
 Spirit of Nature, B. 121. C. 11, 103, 171, 174, 193, 203. E. 15.  
 Spirit its advantage for perception above matter, E. 14.  
 Spirit in Enthusiasts nothing but heated melancholy, B. 12, 38.  
 Spirit of God no enemy to Reason, B. 39. how distinguishable from complexion, B. 44.  
 Spontaneous motion, vid. Motion.  
 Statick power of the Soul, C. 159.  
 Stare, vid. Future.  
 Starres, vid. Sun.  
 Stomack its orifice not the common *Sensorium*, C. 79, 89.

Striate particles how generated, B. 79, 84, 92. 111. how they find their way, B. 113.  
*Stryx* what, D. 141. why the Gods swore by it, *ibid.*  
 Substance what, C. 21. of it self indifferent to penetrability or impenetrability, C. 20. to discernibility or indiscerpibility, C. 20. whether any other species of substance besides body and spirit, C. 22. primary and secundary substance of the Soul, C. 28.  
 Subtily consistent with truth, A. 174.  
 Sufferings of Enthusiasts, B. 41.  
 Suffering for false Religion no argument against Religion, B. 42. but against Atheisme, B. 43.  
 Suddain passion cause of *ἀπαρτησία*, C. 127. or death, *ibid.*  
 Sun how generated, B. 129. its extinction, C. 230. why he moves in the Ecliptick, A. 41. the great Deiry of the heathen, D. 49, 61. no spectatour of our affairs, C. 4, 53. nor cause of apparitions, C. 51. nor indued with a Soul, C. 4.  
 Sun what according to the Mystical Cabbala, D. 31, 155.  
 Supernatural effects argue a Deity, A. 86.  
 Superstition (vid. Religion) E. 10.  
 Swans why so shaped, A. 73.  
 Sympathies whence, C. 103. vid. Vital.  
 Sympathetick Cures, C. 103, 193.

## T.

**T**angibility of matter, 62, 66, 73. vid. Impenetrability.  
*Tarantula* its various effects, B. 6.  
 Tasts, vid. Savours.  
 Teeth why so placed, A. 81.  
 Temper, vid. Complexion.  
 Temperance cures Enthusiasm, B. 31.  
 Tempests raised by Ceremonies, A. 91.  
 Ten its names and nature, D. 82, 119, 139.  
 Tendons, vid. Muscles.  
 Ternary its names and nature, D. 79, 112.  
*Tetractys*, (vid. Quaternary) D. 82, 106, 107, 114, 116, 119, 123.  
*Θεοὶ* Angels, D. 90.  
*Theano* bit out her tongue, &c. B. 42.  
 Theosophists their wild conceits, B. 29.  
 Things are nothing to us but as they are cognoscible, C. 17.  
 Thousand years, D. 163.  
*Thracians* intoxicated with fumes, B. 5.  
 Tillage, vid. Husbandry.  
 Timber-trees their use, A. 49, 51, 58.  
*Tobu va bohu*, D. 74.  
 Transformations of men into Brutes, A. 122, 184. C. 126.  
 Tree-geese, A. 136, 186.  
 Tree of life what, D. 23, 34, 165.  
 Tree of knowledge, *ibid.* 171.  
 Trinity in *Moses*, D. 73, 127.  
*Triton* upon the river *Rubicon*, A. 101.  
 Turkey-cock why so shaped, A. 73.  
 Tutelary Angels, vid. Guardian *Genii*.

## V.

**V**acuum whether it be or not, B. 63, 68, 73.  
 Vallies, vid. Hills.

Valves



# The I N D E X.

Valves their great usefulness, A. 81. not found in the nerves, C. 82.  
*Van-Helmont*, vid. *Helmont*.  
*Vaninus* a zealous Atheist, A. 138. B. 35.  
 Vegetables not merely from matter, A. 52.  
 Vehicles, A. 94, 130, 180, 185. C. 6, 98. the several sorts of them, C. 118.  
 Vehicles have as much substance as grosser matter, C. 153. why so cold, A. 124, 185. and sometimes very hot, A. 185.  
 Ventricles of the brain their use, C. 100. fourth ventricle, C. 95, 99.  
 Veracity of God argues the Soul Immortal, C. 140.  
*Vesta*, D. 113, 128.  
 Vicissitudes of seasons not casual, A. 47.  
 Vines of no use but to men, A. 60.  
 Vital congruity what, C. 120, 123.  
 Vital sympathy, E. 14.  
 S. *Vitus's* dance, B. 6.  
 Visions of Enthusiasts whence, B. 19.  
*Ulricus Neuseffer* had knives, nails, &c. conveyed into his body, A. 98.  
*Umbilicus Veneris*, A. 57.  
 Universal consent argues a Deity, A. 30, 167.  
 Union of a Spirit with Matter as intelligible as of the parts of Matter, A. 152. C. 32. ariseth from vital congruity, A. 153. C. 120.  
 Vomiting of nails, pins, &c. A. 98, 182.  
 Vortices how generated, B. 128. held by *Demoniacus*, D. 103.  
 Union strings why they sympathise, C. 193.  
 Unite its names and nature, D. 75, 109, 141.  
 Unity of Souls confuted, C. 212.

## W.

**W** *Arine*, vid. *Margaret*.  
 Waters of what the symbole, D. 29, 34, 60, 76, 142, 153, 155.

Water-nymphs, D. 76.  
 Water-fowl their shape, A. 73.  
 Wall-nuts good for the brain which they resemble, A. 57.  
 Weapon-salve, vid. Sympathy.  
 Weariness, vid. Lassitude.  
 Weeds no arguments against providence, A. 55.  
*Wharton's* argument against the *Conarion* answered, C. 93.  
*Wierus's* opinion of witches, A. 91.  
 Wild beasts their use, A. 63.  
 Winds raised by Witches, A. 90, 92, 99.  
*Winnick* his contract with the Devil, A. 101.  
 Winter-wolfsbane, vid. *Aconitum*.  
 Witches, vid. Souls of Witches.  
 Witch of *Constance*, A. 93. of *Warbois*, A. 96. witch that burnt a town, C. 221.  
 Witches executed at *Cambridge*, A. 90.  
 Wood-Sorrell, vid. *Alleluja*.  
 Wool, vid. Sheep.  
 World whether infinite, B. 64, 69, 76, 78, 83. in what sense an Animal, C. 126. the vest of the eternal *Logos*, D. 120. E. 5. why called *Θεός*, D. 120.

## Z.

**Z** Eale of Enthusiasts an effect of heated Melancholy, B. 11.  
 Zeale mistaken of how ill consequence to our future state, C. 192.

# E R R A T A.

A. Pag. 158. lin. 21. lege seems. 168. l. 38. not the  
 B. 60. l. 21. leg. Suecos. 66. l. 3. singularis. 73. l. 33. dubitavi. 84. l. 12. à terra removeat. 93. l. 15. ad F. leg. ad T. 99. l. 17. E. leg. C. 129. l. 29. tractamus. 132. l. 36. expeditum.  
 C. 60. in marg. leg. book 1. p. 123. l. 4. power, the.  
 D. 82. l. 15. *πίσμα τ'* 103. l. 36. *διπυμένας*. 116. l. 18. l. rationall. 119. l. uk. *πείδη τα*.

# F I N I S.



























R-13

B1299.M6  
fol.  
1662







Casey, Sean P.

---

From: Colford, Michael  
Sent: Monday, September 08, 2008 9:09 AM  
To: Casey, Sean P.  
Subject: FW: [Scod-bpl] Request for scan of collection of several philosophical writing

-----Original Message-----

From: scod-bpl-bounces@archive.org [mailto:scod-bpl-bounces@archive.org] On  
Library  
Sent: Wednesday, August 20, 2008 4:13 PM  
To: scod-bpl@archive.org  
Subject: [Scod-bpl] Request for scan of collection of several philosophicalw

\*\*\* S C A N O N D E M A N D \*\*\*

2008-08-20 15:57:08.815609

TITLE: collection of several philosophical writings of  
AUTHOR: More, Henry,  
BIB ID: MBMBN:982346  
CALL#: B1299 .M6 1662,  
BARCODES: 37777006360309,  
LOCATIONS: BPL Central - Rare Books,  
PUB DATE: 1662





